You are on page 1of 17

Urban's Crusade--Success or Failure Author(s): A. C. Krey Source: The American Historical Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Jan.

, 1948), pp. 235-250 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the American Historical Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1842819 . Accessed: 23/06/2011 17:50
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The University of Chicago Press and American Historical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Historical Review.

http://www.jstor.org

Urban'sCrusade-Successor Failure
A. C. Kiuy* THE success of the First Crusade in its capture of Jerusalem and in the foundation of the Latin states in Syria was so unprecedented and so stirring that historians generally have overlooked the possibility that from the point of view of Urban II, who inspired the Crusade, it may have fallen far short of the goal which he hoped to attain when he set it in motion. It is this possibility which the present paper seeks to explore. In recent years, it is true, there has been an ever widening awareness of the fact that Pope Urban may have sought by way of that Crusade to bring about a union between the Greek and Latin churches. La Monte, for example, in commenting Upon an early copy of the present article, which was then unpublished, found support for its thesis in the writings of Norden, Munro, Leib, Duncalf, and Baldwin.' Some thirty years earlier, Munro also referred, in considering the possibility, to K6hler and Fuller as exponents of the same idea;2 and a number of others, especially Brehier, might be added to the list.3 But the references just cited will serve, perhaps, to indicate the growing conviction among historians that the union of the Latin and Greek churches was one of the impelling motives in the call for the First Crusade. A number of the scholars named above have reached this conclusion through a variety of shrewd conjectures that, since the material considerations in the agreement with Alexius were so heavily in favor of the latter, there must have been certain less tangible considerations, such as the union of the two churches, perhaps, to establish the balance. Others, including Leib, Brehier, and Norden, have arrived at a similar inference through a systematic examination of the previous relations of the churches; and both of these approaches have served to throw new light on the whole discussion. But in striving to weigh and canvass the full extent of the problem more
The author is professor of history and chairman of the department in the University of Minnesota. 1 John L. La Monte, "La Papaute et les croisades,"Renaissance,II and III (New York, 1945), 156-58. 2 Dana C. Munro, "The Popes and the Crusades," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, LV, no. 5 (I9I6), I-2. 3 Louis Brehier, L'eglise et l'Orient au moyen age: Les Croisades (5th ed.; Paris, I928), pp. 57-62. See also his two chapters in the Cambridge Medieval History, IV (London, 1927),

chaps.IX,

XIX.

235

236

a. C. Krey

thoroughly, one must also take into accounta numberof otherfactorswhich are to be found in the intricateinterplayduring the Crusadeof all the separate elementswhich theseresearches imply. Some inkling, for instance,of Pope Urban'sdesire to bring about the union of Greek and Latin Christendom is furnishedby the reportsof his speech at Clermont.'Yet, since none of these was written at the time and since all, furthermore,were naturallyinfluencedby later events, Urban's ambitionto achievethis result is much more clearlyindicatedin the letters which he addressedto the assemblingcrusaders. In these he assignedgreat prominence to the plight of "ecclesias Dei in Orientispartibus"; and sincehe chose, in addition,to single out the liberationof "orientalium ecclesiarum" as the major objectiveof the expedition,5 one may reasonably assumethat his identification of the "orientalchurches" as "Churches of God" was no mere casualstatement. Rather,it may quite well havebeen deliberate and, as such, intended to stress the fact that he proposedto make no distinction between Greek and Latin Christiansbut to regard them all, instead, as common membersof one fold, of which the pope at Rome was the proper shepherd. Other items of evidenceto this effect may likewise be drawn from the fact that Urban had alreadyestablished a recordof friendly relationswith EmperorAlexius long beforeClermont. Furthermore, partof the correspondence of the emperorwith the abbotof Monte Cassinohas survived,and its tone is also one of friendlyco-operation.6 More significantperhaps, was the action of Urban in sending militaryaid, however small, in responseto the emperor'srequest, in Io92.7 This action, as well as the presenceof the envoys of Alexius at the Council of Piacenza,about which we know too little, must be countedas important evidencein establishing the probability of some friendly understandingbetween Urban and Alexius before the First Crusade.8 More convincing,though still inferential, are the deductionsto be drawn
4 Dana C. Munro, "The Speech of Pope Urban II," American Histor-ical Review, XI (1905I906), 231-42.

Epistulac et Chartae (Innsbruck, I9OI), pp. 136-37. (Hereafter abbreviated,H. Ep.) 6fTwo letters to Oderisius, abbot of Monte Cassino, H. Ep., pp. 140-41, 152-53. See also Bernard Leib, Rome, Kiev et Byzance (Paris, 1924), pp. 103-105. 7Anna Comnena, Alexiad, VIII, 5. (Unless otherwise specified the edition of chronicles of the Crusades cited in this article is that of the Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, published by the Academy of Inscriptionsand Belles-Lettres,Paris ['4 vols., Paris, i869-I906]. References to Latin chronicles are abbreviatedH. Oc. Referencesto the works of Anna Comnena [abbreviated Alexiad], of William of Tyre [abbreviated W. T.], and of the anonymous Gesta Francorum [abbreviatedGesta], are made in terms of book and chapter to permit use of convenient editions.) See also Brehier, pp. 6I-62, and Leib, pp. 20-26. 8 Dana C. Munro, "Did the Emperor Alexius Ask for Aid at the Council of Piacenza?"
Am. Hist. Rev., XXVII (I922),
731.

5 The letter of Pope Urban II to the crusaders in Flanders in Heinrich Hagenmeyer, ed.,

UJrban'sCrusade-Success

or Failure

237

from the conductof the pope'spersonalrepresentative or representatives on the expeditionitself. These were, in the first instance,Bishop Adhemarof Puy and, secondly,Count Raymondof Toulouse,who was presentat Clermont; and it may be safely assumed that Urban discussedhis hopes and plans with Adhemar,9 and possiblyalso with Count Raymond.Inasmuch as Adhemaraccompanied the count'sforceson the long journeyto the Holy Land, that militaryleadermust likewise have becomeacquaintedwith the pope'splansfromthe bishop,if not fromthe popehimself. The first importantoccasionfor the revelationof any previousunderstanding between pope and emperor was in connection with the treaty which the several leadersof the expedition were requiredto make with Alexius.This includedthe agreementbetweenthem that all cities and territorieswhich had been previouslyheld by the empirewere to be returnedto Alexius; and, though no definitedate for the earlierboundaries of the empire was specified,Antioch and its environs were apparentlyincluded.10 This fact in itself is enough to make one wonder whether so substantial a concessiondid not depend on other considerations which may, in turn, have rested upon some previousunderstanding with the real leaderof the Crusade, Pope Urban.For over a yearand a half, at any rate,this agreement was faithfullyrespected by the crusaders. In further supportof this general thesis let us return,for the moment, to Urbanin Italy,wherecontinuedefforton his partwas required to persuade the Italiansto respondto his call for a crusade.Finally, however,he was successful,enlisting not only southernNormans but the maritime cities, Genoa,Pisa, and Venice, and, last of all, the Lombardregion,whose largest contingents started after his death. More significant for our immediate argument,however,is the fact that he carefullyplanned a church council at Bari to considerthe union of Greek and Latin churches.This council, in which the momentarily exiled Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury, played such an importantpart, met in October,I098; and though it is not certain that any of the prelatesfrom Constantinople were present,it adjournedto meet again in Rome the following spring for furtherconsideration of the union of the two churches." Turning again at this point to the crusadingarmy, and especiallyto its protracted siege of Antioch,it is clearthat, since much of the territory which had been recoveredfrom the Muslim was garrisonedby crusaders,the
9 The letter to the crusadersin Flanders, H. Ep., p. 136. 10 A. C. Krey, "A Neglected Passage in the Gesta," The Crusadesand Other Historical Essays Presented to D. C. Munro (New York, I928), pp. 57-78. 11 J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio (Florence and Venice, 175998), XX, cols. 947-52.

238

S. C. Krey

policy which was adoptedin filling churchofficesin these regions required carefulconsideration, and the decisionsbearon our problem.This becomes evident as soon as one recalls that whenevera former Greek prelate was availablehe was reinstated.In no instance up to the death of Adhemar were the two churchesprovidedwith separate leadershipin the same area. So harmonious,indeed, was the relationshipat that time between the Greek and Latin churchesthat Simieon, the Greek patriarch of Jerusalem, who was then a refugeein Cyprus,joined Adhemarin a letterto the West asking for reinforcements.'" Again, when Antioch was finally securedby the crusaders, Adhemar,who seemsto have assumedthat the two churches were to be united, arrangedfor the ceremonialrestorationof the Greek patriarch there;13and in following this policy there is little reasonto doubt that he was faithfullycarryingout the instructions of Pope Urban. In fact, the entire consistencyof his actionswith both the words and the deeds of the pope would seem to indicate that their common understanding must have been based upon somethingmore definitethan a vague hope that the unionof the two churches might resultfromthe Crusade. Assuming for the moment,then, that some suchagreement betweenpope and emperordid exist, or at least that the union of the Greek and Latin churcheswas a definitepart of Urban'splan for the Crusade,why do we not hear more about it later? The answerto this questionmust be sought first of all, the evidencesuggests,in the events aroundand about Antioch, and particularly in those which occurredafter the death of Adhemar;and to go very far on this line of inquiry, it is importantto rememberthat Bohemond'sdesire to keep Antioch for himself was alreadyplain, even beforethe bishop'sdeath. Moreover,it is Bohemond's own chroniclerwho assuresus most clearlyof all that the other leaders,presumably Adhemar among them, did not agreewith Bohemond's ambitionbut, on the contrary, consideredAntioch as part of the territoryto be returnedto Alexius. This dispositionon their part is clearlyconfirmedby the anonymousauthorof the Gesta who reportsthat, after the final captureof Antioch, the council of leaderssent an embassy, of which Hugh the Great'4was chief,to Alexius inviting him "ad recipiendam. civitatem" and to the fulfillment of his treatyobligations. So specifica statementcan hardlybe disregarded; and it is clearfrom it
12 Letter of Simeon and Adhemar to the faithful of the northern regions, H. Ep., pp. I41-42. It is noteworthy that Adhemar gives precedenceto Simeon as befitted the latter's superior dignity, a further reflection of his assumption that there was to be but one church. 13 W. T., VI, 23. 14 Hugh of Vermandois, brother of the king of France.

Ur-ban's Crusade-Success

or Failure

239

that, to acquirelegal title to Antioch, Bohemondwould have to bolsterhis claimby some morepersuasive argumentthan merepossession."5 To do so, of course,his most obviousstrategywas to discreditthe emperor's fulfillment of his treatyobligations;and, if we are to believeAnna, the wily Bohemond was alreadyengagedupon this policy even beforeAntioch was firstentered. No doubthe was, as is furthersuggestednot only by his treatmentof Taticius, the militaryrepresentative of Alexius but also by his insinuationsas to the motivesfor the latter'sdeparture Neverfrom the siege of Antioch."6 theless,it would be difficultto maintainthe thesis that Alexius had failed to live up to his obligationsat this time, for he was personallyleading an army to aid in the captureof Antioch in I098 and was well acrossAsia Minor when he was dissuaded from his purpose by the panic-stricken Stephen of Blois, who assuredhim that the crusadingarmy had already been destroyed.Upon hearing that report, the energies of the emperor's expeditionwere accordinglyspent in applying the "parchedearth"treatment to cover its retreat;and when Hugh finally arrivedat the imperial court it was too late for Alexius to launch a new expeditionimmediately. But he did prepareanotherfor the next year, and his envoys announcing the coming of this expeditionreachedAntioch as early as Februaryand the main army of the crusaders at Arka by April.'7 In addition,Alexius must also be given creditfor the supplieswhich came by ship from Cyprus andeven fromConstantinople throughout thisperiod. How soon Alexius became convinced that the agreement concerning Antioch was to be repudiatedis uncertain,for, though Bohemond'sintentions in the matter must have become increasinglyclear before the year I098 had run its course,the letterin which they are statedspecifically, along with a reportof Adhemar'sdeath, was not sent beforeSeptemberii. This letter from the crusadingchieftainsto Urban was edited or supplemented by Bohemondwhen most of the other leaderswere absent from Antioch; and in it the pope was urged "now that his vicar was dead, to come in personand establishhis see at Antioch 'the original see of Peter himself''urbemprincipalemet capitalemChristianinominis."''Writing in the first person,Bohemondassuresthe pope that he feels quite competentto cope with the Infidel but that the heretics (Greeks, Armenians,Syrians,and
15 Anonymi Gesta Francorum et aliortumHierosolymitanorum, ca. XXX. See also Ralph B. Yewdale, Bohemond 1, Prince of Antioch (Princeton, I924), pp. 72-73. Hagenmeyer dates Hugh's arrival at Constantinople July 2T, I098. Heinrich Hagenmeyer, Chronologie de la Premi?re Croisade (Paris, I902), No. 304. (Hereafter abbreviatedH. Chron.) 16 Alexiad, XI, 6. 17 Yewdale, pp. 77-78. See also W. T., VII, 2o.

240

i'. C. Kr-ey

Jacobites are specified) are beyond him. To deal with them, he needs the pope's help "omnes haereses, cuiuscumque generis sint, tua auctoritate et nostra virtute eradicas et destruas";8 and there in those few words he announces not only his determination to hold Antioch, even though it may mean war with the Greeks to do so, but his not too subtle purpose, furthermore, to gain sanction for his usurpation, at least in the eyes of the Latins, by having the pope establish his see in that city. By I098, therefore, Bohemond was embarked upon a course that was certain to lead to a war with Alexius for the possession of Antioch, a struggle which was to engage his energies for the rest of his life. Bohemond's intentions and policy now being clear, it becomes necessary to discover their effect on (i) the pope, (2) Alexius, and (3) the crusading leaders. To begin, then, with Urban: How startled he must have been, if our conjecture about his hopes and his plans is correct, to receive the letter of September ii, which, though written ostensibly by all the crusading leaders, ended so clearly as a personal appeal from Bohemond alone. And indeed he had reason to be surprised by its whole general tenor, for he was not accustomed to thinking of Greek Christians as "heretics"nor had his representative, Adhemar, ever treated the Greek clergy as such; and as he pondered over the letter in question, it must have been very soon clear to him that he had hardly to read between its lines to gather that Bohemond was at least contemplating, if not already set upon, a course which could only lead, if carried out, to a complete reversal of the policies which had hitherto been followed. Just when Urban received this portentous communication we do not know; for ships and fleets traveled with so little speed in these years that there are instances during the early twelfth century when certain important messages from Syria to Italy were as long in transit as all of six months. So it is doubtful whether this special letter could have reached any Italian port much before the end of the year; and even after it arrived there, it had still to be carried to its final destination.1" As uncertain, therefore, as we must remain about the date of its arrival, we are no more sure as to what its immediate effect upon Urban may have
The letter of Bohemond and the other leaders to Pope Urban II, H. Ep., pp. I6I-65. 19 The best basis for calculation on this point is afforded by two voyages which are fairly definitely dated, first that of the Bruno of Lucca who left Antioch July 20, I098, and reached Lucca the first week in October, I098, an interval of nearly three months (H. Chron. Nos. 303, and second, that of the Genoese who left Laodicea some time in September, I099, and 3I9), reached Genoa December 24, I099 (H. Chron. Nos. 430, 437). It is safe to assume that the letter of Bohemond and the other leaders of the Crusade, dated September ii, I098, did not reach Italy much before late December of I098.
18

Urban's Crusade-Success

or Failure

24I

been. From the natureof its contents,however,one might supposethat no hastyreplywas likely to be sent. For, as the pope thoughtover the information which was thus conveyedto him, he could hardlyhave failedto understand that its import was such as to representconsiderably more than a passingthreat to the forthcomingcouncil at Rome, where the questionof unity with the Greek church,which had alreadybeen debatedat Bari in the previous fall, was again to receive major attention. As to -how soon that was clear to him, we can only speculate,of course;but the very fact that the reportsof this council contain almost no mention of the chief question which it was supposedto considermight lead one to infer that Bohemond'sletter had been so disturbingto both pope and Greeks alike as to renderfurtherdiscussion of unitymomentarily impossible.20 Some new courseof action was obviouslyrequired;but on what Urban decidedor, indeed, whetherhe ever reacheda conclusionon this matteris not at all clear,for he lived little more than three monthsafter the Council of Rome, and he may have been ill most of this time. It has usually been assumed, however, that Daimbert or Dagobert, archbishopof Pisa, was sent by him to succeedAdhemaras the papalrepresentative on the Crusade. But this is pure assumption.All the chronological indexes that we possess indicatethat Daimbertand his Pisan fleet were alreadyat sea long before Urban receivedor could have receivedthe officialnotification of Adhemar's death.21 At most, Daimbertwent as ecclesiastical leader of the Pisan contributionto the Crusade,which he had done so much to enlist. True, he was the rankingLatin prelatein the East when he arrived,and therefore assumed a position of ecclesiastical leadership,but that is another story. For our immediatepurposes,it is importantonly to rememberthat he was not Urban'sappointeeto succeedAdhemar.It is doubtful,in fact, whether Urban ever nominateda successor; and there is reasonto believe that Cardinal Maurice,who was appointedby Paschal II in April, IIOO, was the first papal vicar after Adhemar.22 If so, every crucialevent of the Crusade from August i, ioQ8, until the arrivalof CardinalMaurice,must have ocMansi, XX, cols. 96I-70. See also Leib, pp. 296-97. The arrival of Daimbert, archbishop of Pisa, at Laodicea approximately a year after the death of Adhemar, the first important prelate from the West since Adhemar, has led most historians, even Leib (p. 269), to assume that he was the papal legate to succeed Adhemar. It is probable that the Pisan fleet left some time in the late summer of I098 for it is known to have wintered on the islands in the eastern Mediterraneanwhich it had captured (H. Chron., No. 428). He had therefore left Italy before the news of Adhemar's death had been received. There is no letter of Urban's or Paschal's which describes him as papal legate in the Holy Land as there is of Adhemar or Maurice. Nor does he so style himself in his letter of September, I099 (H. Ep., p. i6i), nor does a close study of his conduct after his arrival in the East justify such assumption; indeed, there is much to the contrary. 22The letter of Pope Paschal II congratulating the triumphant crusaders in Asia (H. Ep.,
T78-79). 20 21

242

A. C. Krey

curred without the presence or the guidance of any official representative of the pope. And, if we accept this view, we may therefore conclude not only that Bohemond's letter quite probably served to paralyze the efforts of Urban II to push forward his plans for unifying the Greek and Latin churches but also that the pope himself died before he was able to go any further with that hope or expectation. As to what may have been the effect of Bohemond's actionison Alexius, whatever disquieting rumors may have reached the emperor by the time Hugh the Great arrived at Constantinople toward the end of July, 1098, they must have been more than offset by the reportsof that official messenger, for Alexius immediately began preparations for another expedition, and he furthermore sent envoys to the crusaders to announce its coming. These envoys reached Antioch in February, IO99; and then and there only did they learn for certain that Bohemond meant to keep that city. Nor did they know until they moved on to Arka in April23 that the crusading army meant to go on to Jerusalem without waiting for the forces of the emperor. As a consequence, the expedition which Alexius had prepared to aid the Crusade was diverted into an attack upon Antioch and the region thereabout. Thus unexpectedly, at least on the part of Alexius, was the war between him and Bohemond begun;24 and until that should be settled, the emperor was hardly in a mood to co-operate in any plan looking toward unity between the two churches. Having considered the effect of Bohemond's policy upon Pope Urban and Emperor Alexius, we must also try to estimate its impact on the rest of the crusading leaders. To proceed with that inquiry, then, it is highly important to recall not only the fact that the council of crusading leaders had sent Hugh the Great to urge Alexius to come to receive Antioch and fulfill his obligations to the crusaders but also, in addition, that this action was taken after the capture of that city in i098 and likewise after Bohemond had won, it is thought, the promise of the majority of the leaders to give him possession of it. Furthermore, Hugh had been sent on his mission before the death of Adhemar; and, to judge from all this whole series of events, one can only conclude tha.t, on sober second thoucrht and after the crisis at Antioch was past, the crusaders' leaders must have repented of their earlier action in promising Bohemond the city which was so manifestly due Alexius under terms of their agreement with him. Doubtless it was Adhemar's influence which thus prevailed; but whatever may have moved
23 24

H. Chron., No. 36I. See also Yewdale, p. 73, and W. T., VII, 20. Yewclale. p. 87. Ferdinand Chalandon, Essai stir la r?gne d'Alexis etr Comnacne(Paris,

I 900).

Urban's Crusade-Success

or Failure

243

them to this decision,their attitudeat the end of June or earlyin July, Io98, was based apparently, as officiallyvoiced, on the understanding that even if any considerable number of them had made concessionsto Bohemond about Antioch before its capture,their previous agreementwith Alexius was boundto supersede any or all suchcommitments to Bohemond. Whether this general decisionof the council also implied that, if Alexius failed to live up to his full contractwith the crusadingleaders,they would then approve Bohemond's claimto Antioch,is not certain. After the death of Adhemar,Count Raymondof Toulouse becamethe leaderof the oppositionto Bohemond'splans,25 and much of the bickering that went on among the crusadingleadersduring the fall and winter of in general,with the disposition of Antioch.Though I098-IO99 was concerned, there were many other questionsthat came up during that time, this was the most persistentand far-reaching, so much so, indeed, that when the decision to march on Jerusalemwas finally made, Bohemond seems to At any rate, he have given a somewhatequivocal promiseto participate. apparentlyaccompanied the rest for only a short distancesouthward,and then returned to Antiochin a withdrawalwhich Raymond,who felt himself too far committed to abandonthe march,vigorously resented.2" The next test of the opinion of the crusadingleaderscame in April, IO99, at Arka, near Tripoli,where the envoysof Alexius,aftertheir fruitless stay in Antioch,reachedthe main crusadingarmy and urged the crusaders to await the coming of Alexius and his expedition,which was promisedon and the St. John'sDay. Count Raymondstronglyurged that coursealso,27 decision of the leadersto reject this advice was compoundedof so many diverseinterests be regarded as a clearindicationof their that it can scarcely attitudetoward either Bohemondor Alexius. For the rank and file were impatientand anxious to complete their vows; and since Raymond had indicateda deep interest,which arousedno enthusiasmamong the other leaders,in capturingTripoli for himself, his motives in counseling delay were questionedeven by his own followers.Thus losing the position of leadershipwhich he had held since Bohemond abandonedthe march toward Jerusalem,Raymond never regained it, either during or after the capture of Jerusalem.His wishes, and possibly his hopes, regarding the dispositionof the Holy City were thwartedby the other leadersof whom Robertof Normandywas his leadingopponentat Jerusalem, as he had been at Arka earlier.28
25 26 27 28

H. Ch/ont.,No. 352; Yewdale, pp. 73-78. Yewdale, p. 87; H. Chron., No. 349. Raymond d'Aguilers, H. Oc., III, 268; Alexiad, XI, 9; W. T., VII, 2o. H. Chron., No. 4I1 s; Raymond d'Aguilers, H. Oc., 111,301-303. It was Robert'schaplain,

244

J. C. Krey

In the light of these developments, the incidentsat Laodicea,where the homeboundcrusaders encounteredBohemond,may seem strange,for there both Robertof Normandy and Rroert of Flanders29 sided with Raymond when he took an active stand against Bohemond,who was energetically engagedin the siege of that Greektown. In this effort Bohemondhad won the aid of ArchbishopDaimbertand his recentlyarrivedPisan fleet. With this help the captureof the city was assured;and, underthe circumstances, it is hardly surprisingthat his old rival, Raymondof Toulouse, expressed strong oppositionto Bohemond's plans.Yet even if Raymond's positioncan be thus accountedfor, that of the two Robertsis far from clear, for there is every reason to believe that they personallypreferredBohemond.That they neverthelessjoined Raymond in the threat to take up arms against Bohemond,unlesshe desistedfrom the siege,can only be explainedon much higher grounds than personalantagonism;and the fact that they added their voices to Raymond'scan best be accountedfor on the assumption that his opposition reflected not only his own interestsbut also the original plan of Urban as executedby Adhemarup to the latter'sdeath. In such a situation,of course,the two Robertscould do no less than acknowledge, as they had done in the council of leaders in Antioch after Karbuqa's defeat, the justice of Raymond's contention; for Bohemond'saction at which was includedin the environsof Antioch,had againbrought Laodicea, into sharp focus the whole question of the returnof that city to Alexius. As a resultof so manycombined Daimbertcalledoff his protests, Archbishop Pisan fleet,and devotedhis energiesto reconciling the Latin leaders,"0 while Bohemondwas forcedto give up the siege. In spite of that, however,and even though the two Roberts returned to the West with their troops, Raymond and a considerable portion of his troops remained in or near
Arnulf of Choques, who broke Count Raymond's leadership by questioning the validity of the Holy Lance which Peter Bartholomew, a humble cleric and visionary in Raymond's army had found in Antioch. Count Raymond, wealthiest of the leaders, had granted subsidies to the four principalleaders after Bohemond's defection. This leadershipby purchasehe reinforcedby keeping Peter Bartholomew close to himself. The latter continued to report visions and supernatural revelations so obviously in the interest of Count Raymond at Arka that Arnulf became skeptical and questioned the validity of the lance upon which Peter Bartholomew's reputation and influence rested. This led to the trial of the visionary by the ordeal of fire which he did not survive a sufficient number of days to prove a miracle. The other leaders had been restive to move on for some time. Now the rank and file, many of Count Raymond's troops among them, refused to stay at Arka any longer. Count Raymond was thus compelled to follow on to Jerusalem.See Charles Wendell David, Robert Curthose (Cambridge, 1920), pp. iII-i5. The legend that Raymond was offered the rule of Jerusalem, which David unfortunately repeats, was started by Raymond's chaplain and can mean only that some of Raymond's immediate friends may have suggested the possibility but there is no evidence that any of the other leaders made, or would have acquiescedin such an offer. 29 Yewdale, pp. 88-89; H. Chron., No. 430. 30 The letter of Daimbert, Godfrey, and Raymond to the pope, H. Ep., pp. i67-74.

Urban's Crusade-Success

or Failure

245

Laodicea to assure protectionof the Greek city; and when he himself finally sailed to Constantinople to confer with Alexius, he left his family and his troops behind.81 Looking closely, therefore,at this whole episode, one is led to concludethat Raymondand the two Robertsmust have regarded Bohemond'sconduct at Laodicea as a violation not only of their common agreementwith Alexius but also of the plans of Pope Urban. In addition,the circumstances would seem also to imply that Daimbertcould hardlyhavebeenUrban'sappointee to succeedAdhemar. And now to go a step furtherin the thesiswhich is here being advanced, let us turn our attention more directly on the war between Bohemond and Alexius.The troopsof Alexius had been operatingaboutthe periphery of Antioch in the summer and early fall of IO99, but militaryoperations had ceased at the approachof winter. The respite which the unfavorable seasonoffered made it possiblefor Bohemondto fulfill his crusader's vow by going to Jerusalemfor Christmas;and on this pious excursionhe was joined by ArchbishopDaimbert,who had spent the better part of the fall in flitting between the troopsof Raymondat Laodiceaand those of Bohemond at Antioch. These two ambitious men, Bohemond and Daimbert, were thus able to perfecttheir plans; and when they arrivedat Jerusalem it was Bohemondwho engineeredthe projectfor the depositionof Arnulf as patriarchof Jerusalem and the elevationof Daimbertto that office.32 It was also Bohemondwho, when this had been accomplished, arrangedfor the joint submissionof Godfreyand himself as vassalsfor their respective principalities to PatriarchDaimbert.33 This was no boon to Godfrey,but it was to Bohemond,who hoped therebyto committhe Latin churchto the full supportof his claim to Antioch,which neitherthe crusading leadersnor Alexius had recognized;and the fact that this ambition on his part was involved in his dealings with Daimbert is amply confirmedby the much disputed letter of Daimbert to Bohemond,which the troops of Raymond interceptedand William of Tyre published."4 Neither of these schemers
H. Chron., No. 460. Godfrey, who had been left with no more than 200 knights and i,ooo foot soldiers, was too helpless to resist this carefully planned conspiracy. He did not have the force to oppose Bohemond, and he so pathetically needed the fleet which Daimbert commanded to obtain a seaport to serve as a gateway to the West. Count Raymond's clergy had bitterly opposed Arnulf's election to the patriarchate,and they had filled Daimbert's ear at Laodicea with charges against Arnulf, some real as well as imaginary. This afforded Bohemond and Daimbert the opening needed to achieve their ends. Most writers, confused by later events, accepted the convenient explanation that Daimbert had been sent to occupy the patriarchate.The true story, however, is provided, oddly enough, by two writers, neither of whom favored Arnulf but much preferred Daimbert: Bartolf de Nanges (H. Oc., III, 5I9) and William of Tyre (W. T., X, 4). See also
81 32

Yewdale, pp. 91-94.

3s W. T., IX, IS; Fulcher of Chartres,III, 34, i6. 84-W. T.X, 4.

246

A. C. Krey

profited too much, it is true, from this transaction,for Bohemond was capturedby the Turks in iioi,3' and the new papal legate, Robert,who arrivedat Jerusalemin II02, deposed Daimbert,who then sought refuge in Antioch,where he remaineduntil Bohemondwas releasedfrom captivity and decidedto returnto the West for reinforcements.36 It was doubtlessbefore or on that westwardjourney that the further plans of these two were perfected.Embracingnot only Bohemond'splans of for a new crusade and Daimbert'sdesire to recover the patriarchate Jerusalem,they may also have included the decision to spread abroad a much edited revision of the anonymousGesta Francorumas propaganda material for Bohemond'sprimary design.37Whatever these conspirators may have had in mind, their plans receiveda very favorablereceptionin Rome in IIO5 at the hands of Paschal II, who had succeededUrban as pope; and the end resultof their effortswas that Daimbertwas reinstated,38 and Bohemondwas given the help of a papallegate in his appealfor a new This change in papal attitude need not, crusade, especiallyin France.39 however,concernus at the moment,for the war betweenAlexius and Bohemond had alteredany prospectof a union between the Greek and Latin churches until the questionof Antiochwas settled. Turning once more to Alexius, then, we find that monarch intent, from the year io99, upon the recoveryof Antioch; and in this privatewar which of his own, Bohemond'senemies were his friends-a circumstance in dealing with the Crusade must have causedhim no little embarrassment of iioi. For Bohemond'senemies, then, including the Turks who lived near Antioch, were now Alexius' friends.Thus Alexius was asked to help the crusaders (many of whom would doubtlessturn againsthim when they discoveredthat he was at war with the Latins of Antioch) against the Turks who were his allies in that war. It was a difficult spot to be in, so difficult,in fact, that the disasterswhich befell the Crusadeof IIOI in its march acrossAsia Minor were in part blamed upon Alexius. When Bohemond was released from captivity and resumed active leadershipof the war against Alexius, he found the alliance of the latter with the Turks too strong for his limited forces. It was this fact which led him to seek additionalaid from the West. Alexius suspectedhis design and began re35 Ibid., X, 26; Bartolf, H. Oc., III, 538. The dismissal of Daimbert and subsequent events are reviewed in the letter of Pope Paschal II (Reinhold R6hricht, Regesta regni Hierosolymitani [Innsbruck, I893], No. 49). See also Yewdale, p. 92.

Krey, in Crusades . . . Munro, pp. 57-78. 38 R6hricht,No. 49. 39 Yewdale, p. io8.

86 87

Yewdale, pp. 99-I02.

Urban's Crusade-Success

or Failure

247

cruiting a strong army with which to meet Bohemondin the West, and Arabicchroniclers inform us that he had no difficultyin recruitingMuslim troopsfor this purpose.40 As Alexius had correctlysurmised,Bohemondlanded his "Crusade" of II07 in the neighborhood of Durazzo, and it was there that Alexius had concentrated his greatestefforts in meeting the threat.To repel it and to defeat Bohemond,he used persuasion,bribery,and force, and Bohemond was forcedat last to an ignominiouspeace.4'What interestsus most about the terms which were then drawn up between him and Alexius is the fact that he, Bohemond, was not only required by it to recognize the previousagreementof I097 but also to reinstatein Antioch a single Greek patriarch,who was to be nominated by Alexius. This provision,which impliesthat Alexius, too, had acceptedthe idea of a unified church,recalls the actionof Urban'srepresentative Adhemar,in settingup a formerGreek in Antioch as the sole ecclesiastical patriarch head of that city. That nothing came of this treaty is beside the point, for the great efforts of Alexius against Bohemond in the West had made it impossiblefor him to exert anything like an equal amount of pressurein the East; and, as a natural consequence of that fact, Tancredwas able to hold out so successfully that Antioch remained an independent principalityof the Latins until the time of Manuel,grandsonof Alexius. But when it becameat last a fief of Manuel, the discussionsof the union of Greek and Latin churcheswere againresumedwith someprospect of success. That, however,is to anticipateevents; and we are concernedhere only with the fact that when the treaty was signed and Bohemond'shostile forceshad left the Balkanpeninsula,Alexius seems to have felt a sense of great relief, as well he might since Bohemond's careerwas virtuallyended. Though the latter returnedto Italy and startedto raise anotherarmy, he had made little progressin that endeavorwhen illness and death overtook him March7, iiii." No doubtthe news of his deathaffordedAlexius even greaterassurance, and we soon find him reopeningnegotiationswith the pope that involved specific referenceto the reunion of Greek and Latin churches.As evidence that the initiative came from the emperor,one has only to readthe letterof PaschalII to Alexius in i ii2;" and the longerone meditateson that letterthe more one is temptedto reflectthat the overtures
40 Hamilton A. R. Gibbs, The Damascus Chronicle of the Crutsades, extracted and translated from the Chronicle of Ibn al-Qalinisi (London, i932), pp. 8o, 9i-92. 41 Yewdale, pp. I25-31 Alexiad, XIII,8-i2, inclusive. 42 Yewdale, p. I33, n. 97. 43 Jaffe, Reg. i, No. 6334, pp. 747-48.

248

J. C. Krey

which Alexius put forwardat that time may have been but a repetitionof those which his envoys had conveyedto Urban II at Piacenzain I094 or even earlierand which may, therefore, have constituted the basisof Urban's greathopesand plansfor the FirstCrusade. If the pope's instructionshad been more fully carriedout, it is easy to see now, the prospectof that union betweenthe Greek and Latin churches would have come much nearerfulfillment;but that great opportunity was lost, or ratherdefeated,by the unbridledambitionof one man, Bohemond, who seemedto carrythat strainin his blood.For poets and novelistsmight find an abundanceof material in the remarkablesimilarityof the roles which he and his father,RobertGuiscard, both played in two papal efforts to unify the two greatbranches of the Christianchurch.Such unity, indeed, had beenone of the dearest wishesof Gregory VII; andthoughcircumstances preventedhis launchinga crusade,yet the prospectof the union apparently never left his mind-a fact which Guiscardwas canny enough to recognize and make use of in furtheringhis own attemptsto gain supportfor his attackon the Greek Empire.44 And so, as events turned out, Gregorywas thus forced into a positionwhere he seemedto be trying to attainby force what could only have been attainedthrough persuasionand co-operation. In the same way, also, Bohemondstrovein his turn to commit Urban to a programof force which he virtuallysucceededin winning from Urban's successor;45 and as an end resultof this doubleschemingof fatherand son, the two popes who might otherwisehave succeededin bringing about the much sought union betweenthe two churcheswere both thwartedin their purposes. Taking into consideration, then, all the factorswhich bearon the question we have been surveying,it would seem that, howevermuch Urban desired the otherobjectives of the Crusade, his chief aim was to bringaboutthe union of the Greekand Latin churchesunderthe headshipof the bishopof Rome; and this conclusion, which formsthe thesisof this paper,is not inconsistent apparently with the courseof churchhistory.For too much has been made of the so-called"definitive break"betweenthe Greekand Latin churchesin 1054, and too little of the efforts that were made during the great reform movement of the eleventh century to achieve uniformity of Christian doctrineand practice.As a matterof fact, there was nothing definiteabout the affair of I054, for negotiationsfor union and for the eliminationof
44Brehier in Cambridge Medieval History, IV, 598. Both Guiscard and Bohemond used fraudulent pretenders to the Greek throne, chiefly, no doubt, to entice papal support for their ventures. 45 The letter of Bohemond and the other leaders to Pope Urban II, H. Ep pD. i6i-65.

Urban's Crusade-Success

or Failure

249

variantpracticesin the two churcheswere resumedfrom time to time after that date, and the initiation of such negotiations were undertaken by Greeks as well as Latins. Furthermore,such negotiationshave recurred throughthe centuries rightdown to the present. The most remarkable featureof the affairof I054, it seems in retrospect, was the uncompromising insistenceof the Latin churchthat the union or reunion of Greek and Latin churchesmust be under the headshipof the pope at Rome; and this change of emphasis,it would also seem, must have developedas a logical consequenceof the great Western church reform program.This movement,which nearly all textbookson medievalhistory describeas devoted to the eliminationof simony, marriageof the clergy, and lay investiture, also supplied,in addition,as is seldom recognized,the over-alldrive to re-establish uniformityof church serviceand practice,and even of dogma, which had seriously disintegratedunder the effects of earlyfeudalism.That this drive for so much reformcame from northof the Alps, not from Italy, and that its core was consistentlymonastic,seemsagain on the long view-important; for the north,unlike Italy,was scarcely conscious of any Greek influence,nor did it share any tradition of occasional submission to Constantinople.On the contrary, the people of that regionwere conscious only of the fact that theirreligionhad come from Rome; and the monasticcore of the reformers'drive explainsits uncompromisingattitudeon the fundamentals of ecclesiastical uniformity. Furthermore, the congregationof Cluny, which in a sense epitomizesthe whole movement,supplieda sustainednucleus for its propagation;and whether we date the beginning of the movement in 9IO or at some later time in easternFrance or southernand western Germany,the reform drive had still gained such momentum that its force was effectivelyfelt in nearly every portion of Western Christendom before it capturedRome in I046.46 After that time, the identification of the popes with the leadershipof that great reformmovementinspiredthem with a consciousness of strength
46 It seems strange that Brehier (Cambridge Medieval History, IV, 272) should have repeated the expression "definitive rupture" when so much of his writing (ibid., IV, 594, in particular, and all of chapter XIX in general) proves the contrary. Deno Geankoplis, who assisted the writer in preparing this article for publication, assembled so much evidence from both Greek and Latin sources of continuing friendly relations and negotiations between Greeks and Latins after I054 as to render such characterizationabsurd. He was especially impressed by the fact that the edict of excommunication issued by the pope's representativeswas directed at certain Greek officials, e.g., PatriarchMichael Cellularius, and exempted Greek Christians; by the very friendly attitude of the popes toward the Basilian monasteriesin Italy, one of which, Grosso Ferrata,served almost as an unofficial embassy of the Greek church to Rome and bv the very cordial relations between the Greek church and Gregory VII until the latter lent his support to Robert Guiscard.Leib has traced the continuance of friendly relations during the days of Urban II until these were interrupted by the conduct of Guiscard'sson Bohemond. and virttually closes his book with the resumption of friendly relationsin III2 (pp. 310 ff.).

250

A. C. Krey

and a confidenceborn of a long succession of victoriesover many obstinate difficulties;for though they were now confronted with the practical problem of dealing with Greekchurchesin southernItaly,they had alreadymet and overcome a variety of other troublesomedifferences.So when Leo IX addressed himself to that specificproblem,he was able to do so in the very same spirit that had servedto iron out other such difficultiesin the North and West. When viewed in this light, therefore,the affair of 1054 meant merely that Constantinople was gaining at that time its first acquaintance with this new revivalin the Latin church,and that that experience proved momentarily to be nothingless thanbreath-taking. In general, this confident attitude continued in the papacy, and meni of Cluny were there to sustain it throughout the rest of the eleventh century.Abbot Hugh, for example, who became head of Cluny in 1048, was still abbotin 0IO9, having lived to see at least two of the monks whomn he had trained become popes. He was abbot when Leo IX took up the Greek problem,was with Gregoryat Canossa,and counseledUrban before the memorablemeeting at Clermont;and doubtlesshe too was fired on all these occasionsby the dream of Urban that all Christendom might be that the Crusade united. Doubtless,also, he sharedUrban'sdisappointment had failed to realizethat dream,for from Urban'spoint of view the Crusade that he plannedcould hardlyhave been counteda completesuccess.