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I.-THE THOUGHT: BY
A LOGICAL INQUIRY
in the Beitr&ge zur Note: This essay was first [Translators' published Philosophie desDeutschen Ideacismus for1918-19, and was the first of two connectedessays, the other being 'Die Verneinung', which has been translated into Englishby Mr. P. T. Geach,and appearsin his and Mr. M. Black's Translations thePhilosophical from of Gottlob Writings Frege. A. M. and MarcelleQuinton, Oxford.] THE word" true" indicates the aim oflogicas does " beautiful" that of aesthetics or " good " that of ethics. All scienceshave truth as theirgoal; but logicis also concerned withit in a quite different to truth way from this. It has muchthe same relation as physics is the task has to weight or heat. To discover truths ofall sciences; it fallsto logicto discern the laws oftruth. The word " law " is used in two senses. When we speak of laws of morals or the state we mean regulationswhich ought to be obeyed but with which actual happeningsare not always in of natural conformity.Laws of nature are the generalization withwhichtheoccurrences are alwaysin accordance. occurrences It is ratherin this sensethat I speak of laws of truth. This is, to be sure,not a matterof what happensso muchas of what is. thinking, followfrom Rules forasserting, judging,inferring, the laws of truth. And thus one can very well speak of laws of thoughttoo. But thereis an imminent dangerhereof mixing " "law of thought different thingsup. Perhaps the expression is interpreted by analogywith" law ofnature" and the generalization of thinking as a mental occurrence is meant by it. A law of thought in this sonsewouldbe a psychological law. And so one mightcome to believe that logic deals with the mental laws in accordance and the psychological process of thinking
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with whichit takes place. This would be a misunderstanding of the task oflogic,fortruthhas not been giventhe place which have causes just as much is its due here. Errorand superstition both of what is false and as genuineknowledge. The assertion laws. withpsychological of whatis truetakesplace in accordance of a mentalprocess from theseand an explanation A derivation in an assertioncan never take the place of a that terminates proof of what is asserted. Could not logical laws also have played a part in this mental process? I do not want to is not possibility disputethis,but whenit is a questionof truth enough. For it is also possible that somethingnot logical it fromthe truth. played a part in the process and deflected We can only decide this afterwe have discernedthe laws of truth; but then we will probablybe able to do withoutthe ifit is important ofthementalprocess and explanation derivation the assertionin whichthe processterto us to decide whether minatesis justified. In orderto avoid this misunderstanding between ofthe boundary psychology the blurring and to prevent the laws of and logic,I assign to logic the task of discovering truth,not of assertionor thought. The meaningof the word "true " is explainedby the laws oftruth. what I wantto call to outline I shallattempt roughly But first truein thisconnexion. In thisway otheruses of our wordmay " be excluded. It is notto be used herein the senseof" genuine of occursin the treatment or " veracious ", nor,as it sometimes questionsof art, when,for example,truthin art is discussed, whentruthis set up as the goal of art,whenthe truthof a work is spokenof. The word " true" is put in of art or truefeeling of anotherword in orderto show that this word is to be front understoodin its proper,unadulteratedsense. This use too lies offthe path followedhere; that kind of truthis meant is the goal of science. whose recognition the word "true" appears as an adjective. Grammatically Hence the desire arises to delimitmore closely the spherein in which truth comes into the which truth can be affirmed, of pictures,ideas, question at all. One findstruth affirmed thatvisibleand audible and thoughts. It is striking statements, thingsoccur here alongsidethingswhich cannot be perceived of meaninghave taken withthe senses. This hintsthat shifts place. Indeed! Is a picture, then, as a mere visible and reallytrue,and a stone,a leaf,not true? Obvithing, tangible ously one would not call a picturetrue unless there were an intention behind it. A picture must representsomething. an idea is not called true in itselfbut only with Furthermore,
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THE THOUGHT: A LOGICAL INQUIRY 291 respectto an intention that it shouldcorrespond to something.It would only be possibleto comparean idea with a thingif the did correspond thingwere an idea too. it is probablethat the contentof the word " true" is unique and indefinable. So what is improperly called the This content downloaded from 200. if the corresponding things coincide and are. And then. not distinct thingsat all. So nothing be no completecorrespondence. "My idea corresponds corresponds to " is a sentence and the questionnow arisesof CologneCathedral the truthof this sentence. If I do not knowthat a picture is meantto represent CologneCathedral thenI do not knowwithwhat to comparethe pictureto decide can only be perfect on its truth. It mightbe supposedfrom thisthat truthconsists in the correofa picture spondence withwhatit depicts. But thentherecan that the realitybe distinct no complete truth.theywould coincide. But yet? Can it not be laid in a certain downthat truthexistswhenthereis correspondence respect? But in which? For what would we thenhave to do were true? We should have to to decide whethersomething it weretruethat an idea and a reality. Consequently. Truth cannot toleratea more or less. in the laid-down corresponded respect. For it is absolutelyessential fromthe idea. however. inquirewhether perhaps. moreover.199 on Tue. Correspondence is a relation. For in a definition certaincharacteristics would have to to anyparticular case thequestion be stated. to a pictureone does not reallywant Whenone ascribestruth which belongsto this picturealtogether to ascribe a property of other things. Andin application it weretruethat the characteristics would always arise whether were present. forwhatis onlyhalftrueis untrue. But this is not perfectly is defined as the correspondence at all whatis wantedwhentruth of an idea with something real. therefore.52. And thenwe shouldbe confronted by a questionof the same kind and the game could to explaintruthas correspondence beginagain. It is said to be possibleto establishthe of a banknote authenticity by comparing it stereoscopically with an authentic one. A correspondence. This is contradicted. But it wouldbe ridiculous to tryto compare a gold piece with a twenty-mark note stereoscopically. So one goes roundin a circle. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . So the attempt collapses. by the use of the word " true". And every other attemptto definetruthcollapses too.if the first withthe second. whichis not a relation-word and containsno reference else to whichsomething to anything must correspond.but one always has something independently in mind and one wants to say that that picture quite different in someway "tothisthing.255. at all wouldbe true.
That the sun has risenis seen to be trueon the basis of sense-impressions. the sensewhich'judgment' has in the writings proximately whyI choose'thought'.we need sense-impressions a body as magnetic.292 GOTTLOB FREGE: truthof picturesand ideas is reducedto theAtruth of sentences. We say a sentenceexpressesa thought.it is not a visiblethinglike the sun itself.perceptible property. in orderto recognize is something way it has perhapsbeen said 'a judgment 'In a similar ' in aptrueor false'. As is given thata. So it is sharply spondswitha particular fromthe qualitieswhichwe denoteby the words distinguished " red ". forotherwise reiterateitselfto infinity. as I have said. The thought. On the otherhand. and everything A thoughtis something immaterial material is excludedfromthis sphereof that forwhich and perceptible the questionof trutharises.distinction is a logicaldeficiency it shouldnot by any means be judged is concerned. However. clothesitselfin the materialgarment of a sentenceand thereby becomescomprehensible to us. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Truthis not a qualitythat correkindofsense-impression. Now is the sense of a sentence an idea ? In any case being true does not consistin the correspondence of this sense with something the questionof truthwould else. in itselfimmaterial.52. the word 'true ' indicatesthe aim of as trifling logic.by whichis not meantthat everyseriesof soundsthathas senseis a sentence.255. For being magneticis also recognizedon the basis of senseas of something. Andwhenwe call a sentence true we reallymean its sense is. impressions thoughthis property corresponds kind of sense-impressions. What does one call a sentence ? A seriesof sounds. From whichit follows that it is forthe sense of a sentence that the questionof truth arisesin general.199 on Tue. This content downloaded from 200. So little as truthwith a particular -far theseproperties agree. far as significance if. Such I hopeit willbecomeclearin whatfollows thatin it a distinction has beenobjectedto on theground an explanation ofall possible distinctions which trueand falsejudgments between is drawn the least significance. So I ascribewhatis false to a thought just as muchas what is true. But being true is not a material. I call a thought to givea definition.I cannotsee thatit has perhaps amongjudgments withthe explanation. Without wishing something forwhichthe questionoftruth arises. But do we not see that ". but only whenit has a sense. clilac-smelling the sun has risenand do we not thenalso see that thisis true? That the sun has risenis not an object whichemitsrays that reachmy eyes. " bitter ". In factI use the word ' thought whichis either of logicians.' So I can say: the to say as thoughtis the sense of the sentencewithoutwishing wellthatthe senseofeverysentence is a thought.
Sentencesexpressing in thesameway.in the ordinary dealingherewithsomething sense. The answer" yes " means the same as an indicativesentence. that they are to communicate agreement something. This content downloaded from 200. forin it the thoughtthat was already completely containedin the sentenceis laid down as true.52. I do not do so on the basis of sense-impressions. Word-questions the completion are accordare a here.255.199 on Tue.whereasthe complexsentence sense. to be called a qualityat all ? In spiteof thisdoubtI wantfirst in accordancewith ordinary expressmyself usage. werea quality. But how ? In a word-question sentences about interrogative we utter whichonlyobtainsa true sensethrough an incomplete sentence forwhichwe ask.untilsomething In order to work out more preciselywhat I want to call various kinds of sentences.THE THOUGHT: A LOGICAL INQUIRY 293 whenI findthat it is truethat I do not smellanything at this moment. But I do not count or state something among these exclamationsin which one vents one's feelings. So it is added to the thought seems.then. sense is not such that the questionof truthcould arise forit. An isolatedsubordinate clause does not always have a sense about whichthe questionof truth to whichit belongshas such a can arise. as if truth moreto the pointis found. Sentence-questions inglyleft out of consideration different matter. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . sighing. May we not be whichcannot. Onlythosesentences in which we communicate come into the question.' One thought. And yet is it not a greatresult ing to it the property after muchhesitation and careful can whenthe scientist inquiry. It may nevertheless be thoughtthat we cannot recognizea property ofa thing without at thesametimerealizing thethought that this thinghas this property to be true.I shall distinguish but this does not want to denysenseto an imperative sentence. unlessit has been decidedby some groaning. We expect to hear " yes " or " no ".that nothing by my ascribof truth. It is also worthy of noticethat the senteince smell the scent of violets" has just the same contentas the sentence" it is true that I smell the scent of violets". An on this exclamationcannot be regardedas a communication 1I am not usingthe word 'sentence' here in a purelygrammatical it also includes subordinate sensewhere clauses. laughing. "I that of truth. property namely. So a sentenceinterrogative question can be formedfromevery indicativesentence. I shall not call the sense of an imperative Therefore sentencea desiresor requestsare ruledout thought. finally say " what I supposedis true"? The meaningof the word " true" seems to be altogether unique. So with every of a thingis joined a property of a thought.
not in it. two things more too. question. must be distinguished sentence-question. (3) the manifestation a sentence-question. this thoughtis investigations. For we have adequatelydistinguished. (1) the apprehension of the truthof a thought-judgment.and. It is only acting.294 GOTTLOB FREGE: can be formed. even if he says somethe actor assertsnothing.An thefirst act whenwe form Weperform a thought advancein scienceusuallytakesplace in thisway.Perhapslanguage to the sentence whichcorresponds clause in the indicative no particular in the form of the lies rather is beingasserted that something assertion. As stage thunderis only apparent thunderand a so stage assertionis only stage fightonly an apparentfight. but the indicativecontainssomething contains sentence the assertion. We declare the recognition sentence. afterappropriate of finallyrecognizedto be true.' (2) the recognition of this judgment-assertion. The interrogative well. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Both are so closelyjoined in an indicatheirseparability. namely a request. and theassertion. So it is possibleto expressthe thought layingit downas true.199 on Tue. The former without the thought. We havetheadvantage it is noticeclausesare distinguished bytheword-order. forward to the hearerto make an assenting it maybe suggested although it must still always be asked.Therefore in the formof an indicativesentence.but in theform real assertive force the word" true" thislosesits assertive and where sentence cannotput it back again. We do not have to of an indicative truthin the form use the word" true" forthis. This happenswhenwe do not speak seriously. And even whenwe do use it the oftheindicative force lies.52. thingof whose falsehoodhe is convinced.. In poetrywe have without beingactuallyput beingexpressed the case of thoughts as true in spite of the formof the indicativesentence. Conthat it is easy to overlook tive sentence we may distinguish: sequently of a thought-thinking. thatmainand subordinate in German indicative.namely. In his part nor does he lie.first in a sentencesuch as can perhapsbe expressed is apprehended. sentence selvesbut onlythe complex This content downloaded from 200.sinceno corresponding sentenceand an indicativeone contain the An interrogative else as same thought. about what is presented I It seemsto me that thought have not hitherto been and judgment is misleading. sentence-question account.onlyfancy. withthecorresponding it has in common which or at least contains is thethought. apparentassertion.255. Therefore something in an indicativesentence: the content.In thisconnexion and thatoften an assertion clausecan also contain able thata subordinate a complete clauseexpress by themthought mainnorsubordinate neither does. judgmenthimself.
are morecloselyconnected What are called the humanities with less scientific than the exact sciences poetryand are therefore which are drierthe more exact they are. The assertiveforcedoes not extendover that in whichthese words illumination in a poem. Words like " alas " and " thank God " belong here.fragrance. for exact science is directedtoward truthand only the truth. over whichthe aMertion does not extend. Wherethe main thingis to approach what cannot be these components grasped in thoughtby means of guesswork an exposihave theirjustification. Andthisquestionmust in thenegativeiftherequisite be answered seriousness is lacling. This seemsto be added to a thought explainswhyit is that nothing to it the property of truth. Much of language servesthe purpose of aiding the hearer's the stressing forinstance ofpart ofa sentence understanding. They occur more rarelyin thanin historical orchemical mathematical. the thought. by attributing An indicativesentenceoftencontains. physical. Therefore all conto whichthe assertive of sentences forcedoes not reach stituents do not belong to scientific expositionbut they are sometimes hard to avoid.as well as a thought a thirdcomponent and the assertion. at stillnot come" one reaLly says " Alfred the same time. This content downloaded from 200.52. the mood of the heareror to arouse his imagination. Such constituents of in poetry. the of language.THE THOUGHT: A LOGICAL INQUIRY 295 whether it reallycontainsan assertion. since Alfred'sarrival is not is therefore the senseof the sentence false.199 on Tue. of poetryverydifficult. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . even forone who sees the dangerconnected with them. forit is in precisely plete translation that in whichpoeticvalue largelyconsiststhat languagesdiffer most. With the sentence" Alfredhas has not come" and. by accentuationor word-order. does not belongto what is portrayed 'by cadence and rhythm. even make a commakethe translation almostalways impossible.but it is only hinted.One should remember words like " still" and " already" too. It cannot be said that.but are sentencesare more noticeablyprominent seldom whollyabsent fromprose. to the thought I use the word It makesno difference whether horse" or C steed or " cart-horse or " mare". What is called mood. It is irrelevant whether the word " true" is used here.to whichI want to call attention constituents here. The word expected.255. On the otherhand. differ.hintsthat his arrivalis expected. The moreexactlyscientific of its authorbe discernible tion is the less will the nationality and the easier will it be to translate. This is oftensaid to act on the feelings. expositions.
Such suggestions enceto thethought. of which some may be true. present second. The same utterance in the the word " I " will expressdifferent containing thoughts mouths of different men. he must replace this word with " yesterday". but they do not touch the thought. whichcan be graspedby writing of the thought.296 GOTTLOB FREGE: " but " differs from" and " in that with itsone intimates that what follows is in contrastwith what would be expectedfrom in speech make no differwhat precededit. Naturallysuch transformations are not indifferent in everyrespect. is partoftheexpression fore ofthethought. but the writing. Think.52. in order to eliminateany temporalrestriction where timelessness or eternityis part of the thought. Althoughthe thoughtis the same its verbal so that the sense. The pointingof fingers. To a mind conin languagewhat is indifferent cernedwithwhat is beautiful to the logiciancan appear as just what is important. A sentence can be transformed by changing the verb fromactive to passive and making the object the subject at the same time. thetimeofutterance If someone wantsto say thesametodayas he expressed yesterday using the word " today". The phone does not suffice forthe expression in orderto give a date. are needed whichare used as means of expressing for its correctapprehension. hand movements. In all such cases the merewording. knowledgeof certain accompanyingconditionsof utterance. tenseis used in two ways: first. otherwise be affected by the differing adjusted. the thought. for instance. which would expressionmust be different is retimesof utterance. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . they do not touch what is true or false. The case is the same with words like " here" and " there". that the or the gramomere wording. If a timeindicaoccursis not expressed tion is needed by the presenttense one must know when the was uttered the thought sentence to apprehend Therecorrectly. Thus the contents often of a sentence go beyondthe thoughts expressedby it. But what is essentialdepends on one's purpose.199 on Tue.255. In the same way the dative may be changed into the nomin4tivewhile "give" is replhced by " receive". glancesmay belonghere too. others false. This content downloaded from 200. But the oppositeoftenhappenstoo. as it is givenin -is not the completeexpression of the thought.of the laws of mathematics. If the inadmissibility of such admittedthen all deeperlogical transformations were generally investigation would be hindered. Which of the two cases but mustbe guessed. It is just as importantto neglectdistinctions that do not touch the heart of the matter as to make distinctions whichconcernwhat is essential.
Lauben spoke and now hears what is relatedby Leo is utteredby Dr. To a"void the drawbackof HerbertGarner's the same language. Lauben has been wounded".then theyboth understand the sentence" Dr. But it is also possiblethat Rudolph Lingens does not know Dr. Leo Peter hearsthis and remarks some days later. Lauben and Leo Peter. Gustav Lauben has been wounded" in the same way. " I have been wounded". Dr.199 on Tue. Then as faras the propername " Dr.althoughtheydo in fact refer to the same man withthis name. In this case Rudolph Lingens cannot know that the same thing is in question. Lauben who recently said " I have been wounded". they do not know that they do so. " Dr. againstthis. that HerbertGarnerknowsthat Dr. in this whichLeo Peter expresses is not the same as case: the thought that whichDr. since. they associate the same thought withit. Lauben personallyand does not knowthat he is the veryDr. Lauben " the doctorwho livesas the onlydoctorin a houseknownto both of them.supposeLeo Peterdoes not knowthat Dr. 1875 in N. On the otherhand. in N. Lauben uttered.I am assuming and Leo Peter'snot speaking name " Dr. If the same thought Peter thenRudolphLingens. master of thelanguage whois fully what Dr. Does this sentenceexpressthe same thoughtas the one Dr. HerbertGarnerand Leo Peter do not speak the same language. Now if both Leo Peter and Rudolph Lingensunderstand by " Dr. Lauben now lives nor indeed anything about him.supposethat he does not know whereDr. Lauben ". Gustav Lauben says. Lauben " and Herbert thatLeo Peteruses theproper This content downloaded from 200. Considerthe following case. and this is not true of anyoneelse.52. I say.255. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Gustav Lauben has been wounded". Gustav Lauben " is concerned. therefore. Gustav Suppose further Lauben was born on 13th September. Lauben has said in his presence. Therefore Herbert Garnerdoes not associate the same thoughtwith the sentence " Dr. In this case one needs forcomplete understanding a knowledgeof the expression" Dr.N. Gustav Lauben has been wounded" as Leo Peter wants to expresswithit.THE THOUGHT: A LOGICAL INQUIRY 297 of the word " I " in a sentencegives rise to The occurrence some questions. and remembers must now know at once from Leo Peter's report that the same thing is under discussion. Lauben utteredhimself 2 Suppose that Rudolph Lingenswere present whenDr. Lauben was born on 13th September 1875.N. It may well be the case that only a fewpeople associatea particular thought with the sentence " Dr. But knowledgeof the language is a separatethingwhenit is a matterof propernames.
it dependson how whatever it refers to is presented. expression metaphorical takes with language placeandI amcompelled to occupy myself language in it is notmyproper concern here. And only Dr. perhapsin the sense of " he who is speaking to you at thismoment ". in which he is presentedto no-one else. It is oftenunimportant shouldbe fulfilled but not always.in short. I havetocontent with myself presenting initself insensible dressed form.255. he mustuse the " I " in a sensewhichcan be graspedby others. So. I hopeI havesucceeded although to calla thought. The different thoughts whichthus in theirtruth-value. that is to say.he will probablytake as a basis this primitive way in whichhe is presented to himself. linguistic breaks in The sensible aspectof language presents difficulties. perceive 1I amnotinthehappy whoshows his here ofa mineralogist position ofmy inthehands a mountain I cannot hearers crystal.misledby false information. puta thought it from all therequest examine with readers thatthey should minutely a thought. witha proper name. takingthe sense of the sentence " Gustav Lauben has been wounded" to be false.52.and if one is false then all are false.199 on Tue. been wounded".on the other hand. So it mustreallybe demanded in whichwhatever is referred to is presented be associatedwith that this demand everypropername. resultfrom the same sentence correspond of course. when Dr. always So a battle with and makes and so improper. with thereader sides. Therefore.. Is it at all the same thought that man expresses and now thisone ? of knowsfirst A personwho is stilluntouched by philosophy withthe all things whichhe can see and touch. uses the proper name " Gustav Lauben ". 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . He cannot communicate if he now says " I have whichhe alone can grasp. Under the assumptions given these thoughtsare therefore different.if one is truethenall are true. Lauben has been wounded" to be true while.1 whichfirst Yet thereis a doubt.Themetaphorical immaterial. Lauben himselfcan grasp in this way. Nevertheless theirdistinctness must that a singleway be recognized. Now it is possible that HerbertGarnertakes the sense of the sentence" Dr. But now he may want to thoughtsdetermined a thought communicate with others. making clear to myreaders what I want This content downloaded from 200. Accordingly. Now everyoneis presentedto himselfin a particularand primitive way. This can happenin different ways and everysuchway corresponds witha particular senseof a sentence containing a propername.298 GOTTLOB FREGE: Garner. Lauben thinksthat he has been wounded. by doingwhichhe makesthe associated conditionsof his utterance serve for the expressionof his thought.
and I are convinced that we both see the same My companion field. The colourwhichhe receives from the strawberry. independently. I have it but I do not see it. wishes.a worldof inclinations. Thingsof the outerworldare however independent. feelings. For it is This content downloaded from 200.a wishshould rove about the world without a bearer. One has sensations. to the content of his consciousness.of feelings and moods.or does he see both as of one colourwithwhich berry I am not acquainted at all? These are unanswerable. questions. indeed reallynonsensical. Now do thoughts belongto thisinnerworld? Are theyideas? They are obviously not decisions. Thirdly: ideas need a bearer.and he is convinced that anotherpersonequally can see and touchthe same treeand the same stone whichhe himself sees and touches.inclinations. Obviouslyno thoughtbelongs to these things. in it. the sun whichshineson themare The fieldand the frogs thereno matterwhether I look at them or not.THE THOUGHT: A LOGICAL INQUIRY 299 senses.52.a world of sense-impressions. For when the word " red " does not state a property of thingsbut is supposedto characterize sense-impressions belongingto my consciousness. norheard. is not noticefrom the one he receives from the leaf. stand in the same relation to a personas to a tree? Even an unphilosophical person soon findsit necessaryto an innerworlddistinct recognize from the outerworld. I have a visual impression of the greenas well.suchas trees. I am its impression bearer.a mood. but the senseI have of greenexists only because of me. I go fora walk witha companion. he is colour-blind.it is only applicable withinthe sphere of my consciousness. The inner worldpresupposes the personwhoseinnerworldit is. of creationsof his imagination. Now can he. nevertheless. I see a greenfield. Secondly: ideas are had. My companiondoes not notice it. Now does ably different my companionsee the greenleaf as red.stonesand houses. but each of us has a particular of green. It seemsabsurdto us thata pain. For brevityI want to collect all these. underthe word " idea ". How are ideas distinct from the thingsofthe outerworld? First: Ideas cannotbe seenortouched. impression. cannotbe smelled.255. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . or does he see the red as green. with the exceptionof decisions. nortasted. of sensations. sense-impression I notice a strawberry among the greenstrawberry leaves. An idea whichsomeone has belongs moods. wishesand decisions.An experience is impossible without an experient.199 on Tue.
No otherpersonhas my pain. it too. I pickthe strawcompareanother I hold it betweenmy fingers. belonging a sense-impression. No otherpersonhas my idea but many people can see the same thing.199 on Tue. part of the divine conconsciousness? Only if I were myself sciousness.300 GOTTLOB PREGE: withthat ofsomeone to compare my sense-impression impossible in one else.then I have gone astray into the sphere of or wantingto.distinct mightbe at the ideas.255. He does not have my pain and I do and his sympathy not have his sympathy. It is so much of the essence of each of my ideas to be the contentof that everyidea of anotherpersonis. same time the contentof a more embracing.if on that account the designation" that limetree" is empty. the entirecontentof my consciousness perhaps divine. just as my consciousness. In that case neither withoutknowing. In any case it is impossible person'sideas withour own. of thispersonand For otherwise it would exist independently of that one. There are now two possibilities. consciousness belongingto another consciousness.forwiththis expression reallyalreadyanticipated to what I see and to what otherpeople can also want to refer look at and touch.52.it fiction of the sentence" that lime-tree is myidea nor the the content ofthe sentence" that lime-tree content is not my idea is true. Fourthly: everyidea has onlyone bearer. But if my intention is not realized. But then would they reallybe my ideas. So forin both cases I have a statement This content downloaded from 200. If my is realizedwhenI refer to something withtheexpression intention " then the thoughtexpressedin the sentence " that lime-tree " that lime-tree is my idea " must obviouslybe negated. Now my companionsees berry. whichlacks an object. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . at the same time. But might such. with a sense-impression one Now even ifit werepossibleto make an idea disappearfrom and.if I only thinkI see without really seeing. would I be their bearer? This overstepsthe limits of human understandingto such an extentthat one must leave its possibility forus as men to out of account. Someonecan have sympathy forme but still my pain always belongsto me to him. it not be possiblethat my from mine.but each of us has his own idea. Is that lime-treemy idea? By independently " in this questionI have using the expression" that lime-tree I the answer. idea in both would still remain unanswerable.to make an idea appear in consciousness the questionwhetherit were the same anotherconsciousness. this verysame strawberry. For that it would be necessaryto bringtogether to one consciousness. no two men have the same idea.
a whole of thoughtwhose bearer I am and another withthe contents personhas his. forthe sense belongsnecessarily Then my thoughtcan be the contentof my consciousness and the contentof his. but weresomehow appointedto characterize wouldbe restricted the content ofmyconsciousness. have my science. However. Each of us occupieshimself betweenthe two of his own consciousness. He would thenbe the bearerof that to whichhe wantsto refer withtjhose words.then it would be a thoughtof this to many. as I understand them. Could the sense of my Pythahis thought be truewhilethat of his was false? I said that goreantheorem the word " red " was applicable only in the sphereof my conif it did not state a property of thingsbut was supsciousness one of my sense-impressions.52.indeedalmostludicrous. perhaps. disputeabout truth. Now someonemay reallywant to refer to one of his ideas with the words" that lime-tree ". a hundred-mark note were be fortwo people to disputewhether had in his pocket whereeach meantthe one he himself genuine. I now returnto the question: is a thoughtan idea? If the thought I expressin the Pythagorean theorem can be recognized by othersjust as muchas by me thenit does not belongto the contentof my consciousness. " his Pythagorean to the sentence. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .if it is not the nevertheless.but I am not referring to this with the words " that lime-tree ". naturally. I am not its bearer. Thentruth and it wouldremaindoubtful ofmyconsciousness to the content in the consciousness occurred whether at all comparable anything of others. namely. recognize same thoughtat all which is taken to be the contentof the theorem Pythagorean by me and by anotherperson.were was not the bearer. be different.199 on Tue. I have.THE THOUGHT: A LOGICAL INQUIRY 301 then one can only refuse to answerthe questionforthe reason that the content of the sentence" that lime-tree is my idea " is a piece of fiction.one should not really say "the Pythagoreantheorem" but " my Pytha" and thesewould theorem goreantheorem ". Therefore posed to characterize the words " true" and " false".255.to the contentsof whose consciousness it belongs.but thenhe would not see that lime-tree and no-one else would see it or be its bearer. This content downloaded from 200. got an idea then.could ifthey also be applicableonlyin the sphereofmyconsciousness. yet I can. it to be true. of not be concerned with which I to supposed something . If everythoughtrequiresa bearer. But I.on beareronlyand therewouldbe no sciencecommon which many could work. No contradiction scienceswould then be possible and it would reallybe idle to as it would as idle.
For a certainly man cannot be my idea.199 on Tue. Perhaps the realm of thingsis emptyand I see no thingsand no men. cannot be a man. cannot see the strawberry I am that I should really have only holding.255.indeed. What belongs to this with ideas. if everything were only a dream? If I only dreamedI was walkingin the companyof anotherperson.the contentof his consciousness and does notproperly concern otherpeopleat all. performed it wouldbe doubtful whether therewere thingsof the outerworldat all. what he thenrecognizes to be true is. in whichI am supposedto move and to act. if it were all only a play on the stageofmyconsciousness. I have assumed severaltimesthatthe same thing that I see can also be observed by otherpeople. to whatalreadyexistedbeforehand. And so theground would be removedfromunderany processof thought in which 1One sees a thing. he also cannotbe an objectofmyawareness. And yet it is an inevitable consequenceof the thesisthat onlywhat is my idea can be the object of my awareness.52. one has an idea. in thatit needsno bearerto the contents senses. Thus the thought. consequently.it wouldnot now concern him. This content downloaded from 200. on his own view. It is quite incredible my innerworldinstead of the whole environment.' But I thinkI hear an unusual objection.302 GOTTLOB FREGE: and understood theword" genuine " in his ownparticular sense.if I only dreamedthat my companion saw the greenfieldas I did. one apprehends or thinks a thought. So the resultseemsto be: thoughts are neither of the thingzs outerworldnorideas. of whose consciousnessto belong. An idea.true independently anyone takes it to be true. for example. but have onlyideas of whichI myself am the bearer. What would follow from thisthesisif it were true? Would there then be other men? It would be possiblebut I should know nothingof it. It needsno bearer. whichcan as littleexist independently being something of me as my feeling of fatigue. It is not trueforthe first time whenit is discovered. has been in interaction withotherplanets. If someonetakes thoughts to be ideas. But how could this be the case. If he wereto me the opinionthat a thought hear from is not an idea he could not disputeit. but is like a planet which.alreadybefore anyonehas seen it. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . if our thesiswere true. cannot look at the same fieldtogether with me. or thinks Whenone apprehends a thought one does not createit but only comesto standin a certain which is different from relation. for. in that it cannot be perceivedby the corresponds but withthings. seeinga thing or havingan idea. A third realm must be recognized. which we expressedin the Pythagoreantheoremis of whether timelessly true.
according of my thinking. Some and bring about a change. on the contrary.but I could know nothingof it. On the contrary. For if to our thesis.He on nerve-fibres as dependent sciousness in the eye. let us suppose.255.THE THOUGHT: A LOGICAL INQUIRY 303 person was an object'for another I might assumethat something for even if this were to happen I should know as for myself.accordingto this a hundredkilogrammes shell weighing view? Perhaps. it would have no weight. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . refracted establishes a stimulus. to arise and these perhaps join themselves colour-impressions what we call the idea of a tree. So little does he considernerveand ganglion-cells to be the contentof his consciousness fibres ratherinclinedto regardhis conthat he is. ideas are not visible. there. exist. of the into each other. Physical. he is.199 on Tue. that forme to distinguish nothing of it.are onlyoccurrences This content downloaded from 200. of it is transmitted throughnerve-fibres Furtherprocessesin the nervoussystemare perhapsinvolved. independent need of his consciousness.upon such reflections. If a shell is it cannotbe an object to our thesis. In this case I should have only an innerworld and I should know nothingof otherpeople. In not to be myidea I wouldmake it the object judgingsomething myidea. As is properfora scholarly he sees and touches thethings he is convinced supposing farfrom he believes that in senseto be his ideas. So it follows: is a property Germany Eitherthe thesisthat onlywhat is my idea can be the object is and perception of my awarenessis false. But this of the whole idea any more than part-ideais not a property of Europe. and ganglion-cells. therefore. On thisview. Does a field. nerve-endings and ganglion-cells. imagining. senses.is therea and.according for object of my awareness.to thestageofmyconsciousness.strike the visual that light-rays. so it seems. These are immediately and in mynervoussystem but. of his feeling.be an a fieldis not my idea. But if it is my idea it is invisible. I can indeed have the idea of a green but this is not greenforthereare no greenideas. But if a shellweremy idea. I can have an idea of a heavy shell.but it wouldnot be visibleto me. ofmythinking greenfield? Perhaps. it cannot. not myidea then. the oppositescollapse It is strange how.chemicaland physioinsertthemselves betweenthe tree and my logical occurrences connected withmy consciousness idea. It wouldbe impossible of whichI was the bearerfromthat of whichI was not. first scientist. of my awareness.52. Thereis. he has the surestproofof thingswhichare wholly impressions whichhave no thinking.a physiologist of all.or all my knowledge limited to therangeofmyideas. This then containsthe idea of weightas a part-idea.
thissensation. considered as thebearerofmyideas. We believe that a thing. Now the light-rays.have othercauses also.the front part of a a waistcoat.maybe reflected on a place behindthe mirror. a nerve and by this means producesa sense-impression. If lightning visual nervesneed not even happenthrough even thoughwe cannot strikes near us we believewe see flames.Is everything whichit could have no stability? I have without need a bearer.the hair of a beard. I am not actually much dif- This content downloaded from 200.255.two hands.304 GOTTLOB FREGE: in his occurrences everyspectatorof the treehas his particular before they particularnervous system. and ganglion-cells nerve-fibres from into ideas. not exist at all.everything hypothesis. Could not this senseto a nerve-stimulawhichwe attribute impression. can tion.52.we experienceonly the end of this process which projects into our consciousness. It is an idea. ticularsleeves. It of the visual nerve. to whichnothing the bendingof light. see the lightning itself. Am I myself this total idea? It also seems to me as if I see a impressions. ofthe visual still.but am I not an idea myself as if myself? It seemsto me as if I werelyingin a deck-chair. I could see the toes of a pair of waxed boots. If the visual nerve is by lightstimulated by thismeans.buttons.the blurredoutthis entireassociationof visual line of a nose. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . An idea. but is only a hyponerve is not actually immediately of us. as the same nerve-stimulation arise in different ways? If we call what happens in our consciousnessidea. in parpair of trousers. then we really experienceonly ideas but not their causes.withthe mediation can also arise through of the of the eye and the nervoussystem.just as it wouldbe stimulated rays comingfromflames.part of a jacket. In this case the visual nerveis perhaps in our body in whichoriginate stimulated by electriccurrents consequenceof the flash of lightning.199 on Tue. the light-rays. But the stimulation light. The effects as if theycame from willnow take place just as the visual nervesand all that follows had come froma tree behindthe they would if the light-rays to the eye. So undisturbed mirror and had been transniitted occureven thoughsuch a treedoes an idea of a treewill finally at all corresponds. the foundations of undermines whichhe started. And if the scientistwants to avoid all mere resolves then onlyideas are leftforhim.independent but. This stimulation One can go a stepfurther given. chair over there. So he finally an idea? Does everything his own construction. and be spreadfurther by a mirror entermyeye.then we believe we see flames. it is inon the stimulation just dependsdifferent how that itselfcomes about. strictly speaking. stimulates thesis.
199 on Tue. once again. The dependence. subjects. whileanotherpart is. Every reason is wanting for grantingan exceptionalpositionto that object whichI call " I ". without But is that possible? Can there be an experience someone to experienceit? What would this whole play be withoutan onlooker? Can there be a pain withoutsomeone copnectedwith is necessarily who has it? Being experienced is necessarily connectedwith pain. If everything then there is no bearer of ideas. pendent.an contentof my consciousness idea of the moon? Does this perhapstake place when I judge that I am looking at the moon? Thenthisfirst part wouldhave a consciousness and part of the contentof this consciousness once more. perhaps.afterall. that I do not feelany pain at thismoment. Or can I be part of the thinking. that is me myself. And so on. And so now. I am not my own idea and if I assertsomething thenmy myself.255. idea amongotherideas and I am its beareras I am thebearerof 20 This content downloaded from 200. forthen therewould not be only one I but infinitely about many.does not the word 'I' nevertheless correspond and is that not in the contentof my consciousness something idea in myconsciousness an idea? That maybe. foram I not myself just an association of sense-impressions. if thereis no morebearer. 'A certain may But thenit is an be associatedwiththe idea of the word'I. I a changeinto the opposite.g. something indeis idea. an idea? But wherethen is the bearerof these ideas? How do I come to singleout one of these ideas and set it up as the bearerofthe rest? Whymustit be the idea whichI chooseto call " I "? Could I not just as well choosethe one that I am temptedto call a chair? Why.of my I am myself of this nature. which is not a contentof my judgmentconcernssomething is not my idea. have a bearer for ideas at all? But this would always be something essentially different frommerelyborne ideas. Yet it is surelyinwould be I myself in this way to conceivablethat I should be boxed into myself iaflnity.forideas need a bearerwithout thereare also no whichtheycannotexist. But there is something idea and yet whichcan be the object of my awareness. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . If thereis no bearerof experience ideas then-there are also no ideas.needingno extraneous bearer.if I thinkI have no pain at the with moment.52.THE THOUGHT: A LOGICAL INQUIRY 305 ferent from this myself. If thereis no ruler. someoneperhapsobjects. But.which I found myselfinduced to is abolished confer on theexperience as opposedto theexperient. e. What I called ideas are then independent objects. and someone experiencing which is not my being experienced. Therefore consciousness. is not necessarily that about whichI state something my idea.
The invalidwho has a pain is the bearerof thispain. consciousness. shouldbe sharply the thesis that only what belongs to my thought. Therefore can be the object of my awareof my consciousness the content is false. And if I state somebut I do not confuse I do not state it about the idea that I thingabout my brother have of my brother. And here I come up against a further distinctionbetween my inner and outer worlds. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .306 GOTTLOB FREGE: but I am notidentical the otherideas. What is a contentof my consciousness. contrary certain whiledoubt neveraltogether in the inner world we findcertainty into the outerworld.52. but the on the cause ofthispain is not who reflects doctorin attendance the bearerof the paini.the second doctor'sidea of this pain. If man of whichhe was could not thinkand could not take something not the bearer as the object of his thoughthe would have an innerworldbut no outerworld. that I see a lime-leaf.againstour will. He does not imaginehe can relievethe himself. whichthey do not bear. what is an object of from distinguished idea. as a drawingcan be such an aid perhaps. Thenonemustdistinguish: consult doctor might thefirst doctor's second. it seems to me. I cannot of greenbut it is not so doubt that I have a visual impression to widespread views. probabilityfrom This content downloaded from 200. as theircommonobject of thought. nevertheless. first. But may I not be makinga mistakeabout this? Such mistakesdo happen. It can be seen fromthis object that not onlya thingbut also an idea can be the common ofpeople who do not have the idea. thepain whosebeareris theinvalid. So. an aid to reflection. Both doctorshave the invalid's pain. We then.of my thought.255. oftheseconddoctor's This idea does indeedbelongto thecontent it is rather but it is notthe objectofhis reflection.199 on Tue. I have an idea ofhim bearer wellas to be an independent it withhim himself. the matterbecomesintelligible. of thought So. I have an idea of myself my with this idea. third. The not the pain and not what the doctoris trying another doctor. Indeed! By the step I expose myself formyself withwhichI securean environment to the risk of error. idea of this pain.lapse intofiction. It is difficult leaves us in our excursions to distinguish in many cases. anotherpersonas Now the way is clear forme to recognize ofideas. An idea in the doctor'smind pain by anaesthetizing to the pain of the invalidbut that is may verywell correspond to remove. But may thisnot be based on a mistake? I am convincedthat the idea I associate withthe that is not my to something words 'my brother' corresponds idea and about whichI can say something. ness.
of its truthand of my thinking of my recognition That someonethinksit has nothingto do with the truthof a if he wantsto thought. assumingthat there are other reflections who can take the same thingas the object people besidesmyself unremainessentially of theirthinking. impaired is an idea.199 on Tue.everylaw otherwise would be leftof religion? The naturalsciencestoo could only be assessed as fables like astrologyand alchemy. What emphasise is a fact? A fact is a thoughtthat is true. Thus the I have carried on. We do not have a of thoughts but we also do not as we have.so we can presumeto judge about thingsin the certainty outer world.facts' criesthe scientist the necessity of a firm foundation forscience. once given is verygreat. Would from in my opinionno longerdistinguishable there be a science of historyotherwise? Would not every come to nothing? What preceptof duty. '. as a bearerof ideas. capacity.255. thepurpose. as of me. Thus I can also recognizethe Not everything thought. in force. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . thought as we see.THE THOUGHT: A LOGICAL INQUIRY 307 here. facts. In thinking to the apprehension mustcorrespond them. The nature of language does not permitanything sciousness of mv be regarded as the content What I hold in myhand can certainly ofmyhand in quite a different way hand but is all the same the content ofwhichit is made and theirtensions. a sense-impression. if we do not want to succumbto fargreater error I lay down the In consequenceof these last considerations that can be the object of my underfollowing: not everything an standingis an idea. And we must presumethis even at the risk of dangers. a star. 'Facts. But the scientist which depends on men's will surely not recognisesomething of science. I can recognizea science in which being independent many people can be engagedin research. And. varyingstates of mind to be the firmfoundation 1 The expression as 'content of con'apprehend' is as metaphorical else. say. Nothing now stands in the way of recognizing people to be bearersof ideas as I am myself. For what but we apprehend we do not producethoughts I have called thoughtstands in the closest relationto truth. A particular I of thought. We are not bearers as we are bearersof our ideas.which otherpeople can grasp just as much as I.52. So it is advisableto choose see a thought ' offers itselffor and the word ' apprehend a special expression mental thepowerofthought. I. certainty. am not myself other idea. and is the bonesand muscles from to it thantheyare.so greatthat it is the probability the possibility. say. muchmoreextraneous This content downloaded from 200. as trueI judge to be truequite independently What I recognize about it. of theirconsideration.
52. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . To have visual impressions does it happen that I see the tree just therewhereI do see it? I have and on Obviouslyit dependson the visual impressions the particulartype which occur because I see with two eyes. This consequence. Perhapsthereis a beingthat has onlysense-impressions without seeingor touching is not to see things. Perhaps theirtask could be representedrather as the investigation ofthe mind. The astronomer can apply a mathematicaltruth in the investigation of longpast eventswhichtook place when on earth at least no one had yet recognized that truth. But this shouldnot be confused withthe thought itself. It will. Not everything is an idea. Otherwisepsychologywould contain all the scienceswithinit or at least it would be the highest judge overall the sciences. perceptible things. Similarly Algol itselfis different from the idea someonehas of Algol. In any case two men do not have the same.physically speaking. thoughtheymay have similar. But with what right? For sense-impressions are necessaryconstituents of sense-perceptions and are a part of the innerworld. alone do not disclosethe outerworldto us. He can do this because the truthof a thoughtis timeless. A particularimage arises. Sense-perception indeed is oftenthought to be the most certain.on each of the This content downloaded from 200.199 on Tue.even to be the sole.ofthemindnot of minds. Therefore thattruthcannothave comeintoexistence with its discovery. These sense-impressions. The apprehension of a thoughtpresupposessomeone who apprehendsit. who thinks.seem impossibleto some people to obtain information about something not belongingto the inner world except by sense-perception. How things. Otherwise psychology would rule over logic and mathematics.308 GOTTLOB FREGE: The work of science does not consist of creationbut of the discovery oftruethoughts. not perhaps be accepted without opposition. The thought belongsneither to my innerworldas an idea nor yet to the outerworldof material. howevercogently it may followfromthe will nevertheless exposition.255. He is the bearer of the thinking but not of the thought. sourceof knowledge about everything that does not belong to the innerworld. Although the thought does not belong to the contents of the thinker's consciousness yet something in his consciousness must be aimed at the thought. But nothingwould be a greater of mathematics misunderstanding than its subordination to psychology. Neitherlogic nor mathematics has the task of investigating minds and the contentsof consciousness whose bearer is a singleperson. I think.
So since the answer lies in the non-sensible. if the expression This content downloaded from 200. All thisis a processin time. forit is not the same thoughtat all. What must stillbe added is non-sensible.e. He also has two retinalimagesbut theydiffer from mine. Onlya sentence supplemented by a time-indication in everyrespect and complete a thought. seeingthingsbut not suffcient. But are therenot thoughts whichare truetoday but false in six monthstime? The thought. perhaps something non-sensible could also lead us out of the innerworldand enableus to graspthoughts whereno sense-impressions were involved. the time of utteranceis involved as well. will surelybe false in six monthstime. And yet we move about in the same outerworld. for withoutthis nonsensiblesomething everyone would remainshut up in his inner world. changes it and again experiences reactionsitselfand is changedby them. Without the time-indication this gives we have no complete thought. i. We must assume that these retinalimages correspond to our impressions. But this. eternal. forexample.199 on Tue.255. Outside one's inner world one would have to distinguishthe properouter world of sensible. no thought at all. Now is the thought changeable or is it timeless? The thoughtwe expressby the Pythagorean theorem is surelytimeless.THE THOUGHT: A LOGICAL INQUIRY 309 two retinas. So that in whichthe distinction betweenthe way in which a thingand a thought is givenmainlyconsists is something which is attributable.that the tree thereis coveredwithgreenleaves. No. but to the inner world. The thought. not only not the same.but markedly different from each other. notto bothrealms. Consequently we have visual impressions. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . unchangeable. And yet this is just what opens up the outer worldfor us. admittedly. Having visual impressions is certainly necessary for. Thus the present tensein ' is true' does notrefer to the speaker'spresentbut is. The worldof the real is a worldin whichthis acts on that.perceptible things from the realm of the nonsensibly perceptible. We willhardly recognizewhat is timelessand unchangeableas real.52. Anotherperson sees the tree in the same place. is not something whichit is usual to call real. We should need something non-sensible forthe recognition of both realms but forthe sensibleperception of thingswe shouldneed senseimpressions as well and thesebelongentirely to the innerworld. Thus I cannotfindthis distinction to be so greatthat on its account it would be impossible for a thoughtto be given that did not belongto the innerworld.is truenot onlytoday expresses or tomorrow but timelessly.ifit is true. The words'this treeis coveredwithgreenleaves' are not sufficient by themselves forthe utterance.
One communicatesa thought. Even the timeless.whose recognition lies in the formof the indicative sentence. In this way the strict timelessness betweenessential annulled. or follows from the factthat.52. this change. and taken How does a thoughtact? By being apprehended to be true. And yet! What value could therebe forus in the eternally unchangeablewhich could neitherundergo effectsnor have effect on us? Something entirely and in everyrespectinactive would be unrealand non-existent forus. This is a processin the innerworld of a thinker which can have further consequencesin this innerworld and which. Thus our actions are usually precan have an pared by thinking and judgment. two things must be distinguished.it is apprehended by a thinker. makinga decisionwhichbringsabout the acceleration of masses.310 GOTTLOB FREGE: be permitted. if it is to be anything forus. concerns only the linguistic aspect ofthe matter. a tense of timelessness.on account of the variability of languagewithtime. that I apply it. If we use the mereform of the indicative sentence. It is possiblethat the same thoughtthat is thoughtby me today was not thoughtby me is of course yesterday. mustsomehow be implicated withthe temporal.255.I grasp the thoughtwhichwe expressby the theoremof Pythagoras. further. avoidingthe word'true'. And so thought of indirectinfluence on the motionof masses. The time-indication that may be containedin the sentencebelongsonly to the expression of the thought. Yet the same words. while the truth. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . But one is inclinedto distinguish and inessential as timeless properties and to regardsomething ifthe changesit undergoes involveonlyits inessential properties. The influence one personon anotheris broughtabout forthe most part by thoughts.express another thought.encroaching on the sphere of the will. How does this happen? One brings about changes in the common outside world which. are supposed to inducehimto apprehend a thought and take it to be true. the expressionof the thoughtand the assertion. is timeless. can also make itselfnoticeablein the outer world. for example. however. the consequencemay be that I recogniseit to be true and. If. Could the greateventsof worldhistory have come about withoutthe to regard communication of thoughts? And yet we are inclined influence as unrealbecause theyappear to be without thoughts This content downloaded from 200.take on another sense. perceivedby another person.199 on Tue. What would a thoughtbe for me that was never apprehended by me? But by apprehending a thoughtI come into a relationto it and it to me. A property whichconsists of a thought will be called inessential in.
255. overit. When a thought personhas no control only bringsabout changesin the innerworldof the it at first in its true essence. is changed in places. And yet the thinker beingappretake themas theyare.52. Andtheir at least as far as we withoutwhichthey would be ineffective. They can be truewithout and are not whollyunreal even then. one control passes from thought. There is ofall thiswitha thought.understanding on events. How muchmorereal a hammer the process appears comparedwith a thought. the changes it undergoesinvolve only inessentialproperties.stating. This content downloaded from 200. How different of a of handing over a hammeris fromthe communication it is to another. the like are factsofhumanlife. the we observe throughout There is lacking here something action.since yet it remainsuntouched apprehender. it undergoes pressure gripped.199 on Tue.THE THOUGHT: A LOGICAL INQUIRY 311 and judging.while thinking. the dispositionof its parts. of the communicator is apprehended. at hended by a thinker and by thismeansbe brought least iftheycouldbe apprehended intooperation. does not create them but must can see. 11 Jun 2013 17:42:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . It does not leave the control nothing for after all a by being communicated. Thoughtsare by no means orderof nature: reciprocal that of kindfrom unrealbut theirrealityis of quite a different is brought aboutby an act ofthethinker effect things. The hammer and on accountofthisits density.
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