Critical Review Imperialism and Empiricism in IR Theory

Elisabeth Nicole Barnes

rca707772

Advanced International Relations Theory

October 15,2009

lnternational relations theory is a chimera of 'one-size fits all' explanations of how and why things happen in the field of intsrnational relatiors [Ot"+, and Friedrichs' 'neomedievalism' is no exception- However, Friedrichs is unique in several of his realizations,
and these realizations

will no doubt helpto detemdne the future of internationat relations theory.

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In this paper, I will argue that Friedrichs makes several important inroads in solving the
problems of the discipline, but that he in fact continues others. In the space provided, I

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will

attempt to illustrate how an empiriciqflapproach is a pivotal first step, and with revision could
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expanded to understand and explain (and even possibly predict) the choices and actions

of

interstate actors.

Friedrichs' "The Meaning of New Medievalism", is based upon the term first coined by
Wolfers, and the work of Hedley Bull in the 1970's. It is Friedrich's basic contention that
changes in international relations have been described in a largely contradictory way, and that

new medievalism, namoly '*a systefi of werlapping authority and multiple loyal4t, held together
by a duality of competing universalistic claims" (Friedrichs, 2001: 482), provides a conceptual

altemative of the nature of the international political system. I will argue that fu his
conceptualization, Friedrichs puts his finger on a number of significant issues, but falls short

of

providing a truly unbiased alternative. In coming to his argument, Friedrichs describes three competing perspectives in intemational relations theory: state-centricism, globalizatianand ftagmentation. It is his
argurnent that each perspectir#

#srs

a piece of reality, but

all fall short of the whole (Friedrichs,

2001: 479). Ha argues that

tb

nafion-state is not failing, and that fragmentation and

globalization are part of the same story. It is here that we see the first really important claim this paper: that international relations needs to move away from the idea that there is ane

of

organizational logic to describe the entire system, but the author continues by stating that it is in

fact overlapping authority, multiple loyalty, and dual competing universal claims that are the
realrty (Friedrichs, 2001 : 47 9).

Friedrichs begins an important thought here but fails to carry it through. The solution to
an attitude

of 'one-size fits all' is not to argue for a theory that includes 'dual universalistic

claims'; multiple loyalty and overlapping authori$, yos, but if one organizational logic for
everyooe is an imprialistic attitude (say globalbalron or the self-interested actions espoused by realists), why is two competing organizational logics, predetermined as the same for everyone, any different? By arbitrarily deciding whatthe logics of political action are, Friedrichs is

imparting his Western bias.

I argue that

a proper

ernpirical determination of the logics of political action is

incomplete without meirtion of agency, personolity or influences. Friedrichs identifies the ontological prejudice of others, but refuses to see his own. By deciding that the international
systsm is in fact a replica of the WesternEuropean system of the Middle Ages, Friedrichs is discounting millennia of political history from all over the world. I

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would pose this question:

why must we create historically contextualized theories? To account for reconfiguration, transformation, cultural relativism, the introduction of catalysts etc. is it not logical to count historical context as an influence rather than working within it to find the timeless 'reality' of

the ff4* ' "^^.R*r system? As Smith notes in 2004, "the disciplines of Political Science and Intemational Relatiottt

recreate and reinforce a socially, culturally and historically specific view of the world, present

and

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it

as timeless, as natural, as

empirical" (Smith" 2004:505)

The danger posed by doirg so is that as soon as the historical context changes, the theory runs the risk of becoming obsolete. A rather unfair example would be if a deadly plague swept

the world, and it became common practice to consider the health effects of all international decisions. The transnational markot economy and the natior-state system would remain as

important considerations, but the continuation of the species, self-preservation, may become a
new influence that cotnpetes with or eveo surpasses the others, thus making new-medievalism

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obsolete; the pattern that 'stabilizes' the world would be disproved. Also, this theory is disproved
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already by an attempt to apply it to other historical epochs and cultures (.e. the native American
system of intemational relations and intemational trade).

It

seems here as

if I am at odds with the

author, yet it is Friedrichs that begins this dialogue by stating that we need to "widen out

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historical horizon beyond the emergence of the Western states system" and interpret organizatioflal logics as "ftansepochal historical forces" (Friedrichs,2001; 481-2). His bias does not lead him past Europe however, and he disregards the possibility of transepochal historical
forces being cultgrally or societally specific (i.e. specifically westem) and inapplicable in certain

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times and places. Unfortqnately his theory does not allow for differences within a given epoch.
So, while I would agree that the "moderfl stiate system is one of many possible transitory

configurations" (Friedrichs,2001: 482),Iwill emphasize that it is onty legitimate asaperceived configuration, legitimized by popular authority, and subject to change through the agency

of

recognized interstate actors and cannot be counted as alogic. By accounting for agency and influences, this would explain regional integration, globalization and fragmentatiou and is more tasteful than assuming that "these actors are...forced, via socialization, into accepting a common

rationality" (Smrth" 2004: 506).

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society, politics or economy

Friedrichs makes a clear point that we should not

ever one another (Friedrichs,2007:481). This I disagree with whollY, and he supports my views

with his own arguments. It is his assertion that international recognition and legitimacy, namely

the ability to act and influence, depnds wholly upon worldwide political models "constructed
aad propagated through the global cultural process" (Friedrichs, 2001: 48?). He argues that

formal attributes and standardizations convey legitimacy to the self-understanding of individuals

as intsr-state actors (Friedrichs, 2001:

*the nation-state is the only 457).It fact, he states that

authonty which is entitled to convey popular legitimacy to collective decisions at the international level" (Friedrichs,2001'.491). This suggests to me that politics is supreme- If ar
action is only considered legitimate if undertaken by a recognized interstate actor, the privilege

of politics is being the only source of legitimately recognized international action. This leads to
the logical conclusion that if it is the political relations between states that are the subject

of

international relations theory, sconomy and society should be Ltegate dto rnfluencex and not
organizational determinants. In my view, the transnatiot u,

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economy should be seen as an

ideological pressure group, and not one of only two organizational logics.

I'd

also like to note that the originat definition makes no reference to the importance

of

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society, though Friedrichs recognizes that

"ro actor can easily dismiss...claims if backed by

sufficiently strong societal forces" (Friedrichs, 2001: 491). He continually mentions the "two
competing organizational logics of state and market" (Friedrichs,2001: +15) but,Llegates society to an afterthought with no place in the definition. It is my assertion that society and economy are the competitors, competing to influence actors (of the state, empire, tribe etc).

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To sum up, Friedrichs is particularly iosightful in many respects, including his

acknowledgement and exploration of the trarrowness of IR theory, his recognition of the modern
state system as the sole sourcs of legitirnacy of political action right now,the idea that all can be

explained with a widening of the historical context, the recognition of the ontological prejudice

of theoriss of globalization and fragmentation, the introduction of the idea of transepochal

In continualtce and/or change, and the possibility of a multitude of logics behind political action.
many other ways, he disappoints us by failing to truly explore and apply these ideas.

I argue that while new medievalism is not the truth of the system, while there is no
standard reality, Friedrichs has made some important observations that

will allow

us to move to

an empirical analysis of international relations. Attached is an example of how I think

international action canbe measured, explained predicted understood. It is a method of study

whereby it is presupposed that the influences on, agsncy of, and capabilitres of actors determine{

their actions in the international system. It is a theory that does not rely on specific historical conditions to work (i.e. demarcated borders), or specific cultural attachments (market liberalism)" or coucrete assumpions (they will always actto garr, keep orbalance powe{. In conclusion,I aglee with the author that there are multiple authorities and loyalties in
any given place at any given time, but would argue that it is the perceived legitimacy of political
actors and their actions that provides stability in international relations, not dual universalistic

claims specific only to a historical epoch and insersitive of cultural values. I find his insights into bias and history particularly important in an understanding of the interactions and actions

of

'legitimate' astors. The claim that economy is on par with politics in a theory of international
relations, however, is a result of westem perception and should be reassessed. Finally I hope the

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community will continue to search for

theory that can explain and predict the interactions and

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.--<Ractions of international actors by accounting for their personal choice and identity (loyalties), //? that is too true academics (societal It and economic). their capabilities, and their influences
attempt to paint all with the same brush, and ar "intemational theory that remains true

to

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diplomatic experience" (Wight, 1960: 43) is necessary to dispel the imperialistic academia resulting from "the belief in progress" (Wight. 1960: 43).
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