Twice to vote

By Conrado R. Banal
Philippine Daily Inquirer
11:35 pm | Wednesday, March 28th, 2012

Disturbing issues hound Chief Justice Renato Corona regarding his actions in the Supreme Court even while he is standing trial at the Senate that may cost him his powerful position. According to reports, in a landmark case involving a 30-year dispute over some 34 hectares of prime property in Quezon City, the Chief Justice in effect voted not just once but twice. The SC early this month issued a ruling en banc that the so-called Piedad Estate, which is close to the Ayala Heights project of premier developer Ayala Land, should belong to the government. The en banc voting was close at 8 versus 7, meaning it could have gone either way. It seems the Chief Justice himself broke the deadlock, but not with his own vote. Together with his own vote, he supposedly also used the vote of a justice on leave for more than a month Justice Mariano del Castillo. The ailing Del Castillo reportedly was not even able to take part in the deliberation. In fact, all other SC documents would show that Del Castillo was on leave. In this particular case, the Chief Justice simply used the vote of the absent justice. It was the tie-breaking vote, at that. Disturbing questions thus arise. For one, can an absent justice, who could not be present in the discussion of the issues in a case, vote on en banc decision? May the Chief Justice really take the place of an absent justice? Is it legal, and if it is, is it the proper thing to do, particularly for a man who is supposed to be the paragon of fairness and morality in this country? * * * We have been following this interesting case since the 1990s and have written a number of pieces on it. It started way back when, in 1988, a mysterious fire broke out at the office of the Registry of Deeds at the Quezon City hall. The result was a flood of apparently spurious titles over pieces of property in the city. The longtime owner of the Piedad Estate was the Manotok family, whose ancestor bought the land from the government in the 1930s. For the past 80 years or so, the family has been paying for the real estate tax on the property. All of a sudden after the fire at city hall, two other titles appeared, purportedly as evidence of the real ownership of the property. Two other names surfaced in the land title mess, Manahan and Barque, both claiming ownership of the property. Thus the Manotok family went to court to challenge the alleged reconstituted titles. The case dragged on for over two decades, going back and forth between the Court of Appeals and the SC. This is important: The ownership of the Manotok family, who had control over the property for the longest time by sheer of possession, was never in question in the original case. In an earlier decision, the SC negated the claims of the two groupsthe Manahans and Barques. Thus, you would think that the Manotok family has won in the long-running land dispute. For whatever mysterious reason, the SC also decided that the CA should answer a question that came from nowhere. And that was, Did the Manotok family own the land or not? The CA eventually ruled that the property should go back to the government because of one reason: Some bureaucrats signature was missing in the documents presented by the Manotok family. Look at that: it was the government that failed to do its job. The court in effect said that, because of such a government failure, the poor individual must be punished. The SC in 2010 upheld the CA decision. The SC early this month ruled with finality on the case. That was the ruling in which the Chief Justice voted twice, if only to beat the dissenting opinion, penned by Senior Justice Antonio Carpio. * * * Horror stories are flying on the possible reason for the daring role that the impeached Renato Corona played in this landmark decision. One story points at the group of lawyers specializing in land disputes in Quezon City. It is said that the Chief Justice could possibly owe the group favors in connection with the ongoing trial at the Senate. Those stories are rather difficult to substantiate. The fact is they are going around business and legal circles. They are not doing the impeachment process any good.

But more than the reputation of the embattled Chief Justice, the land title system in this country can be in danger of collapse. Thousandsif not millionsof individuals already have titles on their properties in former friar lands, seized by the Americans during their occupation of the Philippines, and then sold to various individuals. More than half of Metro Manila used to be friar lands. The question is this: What will happen to the titles covering all those properties? The recent SC ruling takes the force of law, and it could therefore encourage other crooks to lay claim on thousands upon thousands of hectares of property all over the country. The decision may even open up an entire new racket in the property sector: Some syndicates would be selling land titles over certain property owned by millions of Filipinos for the past several years. Officials of the Land Registration Authority have long admitted such a problem. It seems that, for some time now, the LRA has been trying to settle land disputesall in Quezon City. The cases were all handled by a certain group of lawyers associated with an organization.

SC ruling on prime Quezon City land blow to land titles

By Marlon Ramos
Philippine Daily Inquirer
4:03 am | Saturday, March 31st, 2012 Tweet

Registered owners of more than half of the land in Metro Manila may lose their properties as a result of a recent Supreme Court ruling that the sale certificates of form er friar lands that lacked the signatures of prewar government officials should be deemed void, a senior justice of the court said. In a 23-page dissenting opinion, Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio said the Supreme Courts March 6 decision in the ownership dispute involving the Manotoks and Barques over the P4-billion Piedad Estate in Quezon City would render millions of residents homeless. This is a disaster waiting to happena blow to the integrity of our Torrens system [of titles] and the stability of land titles in this country, Carpio said. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of landowners would surely be dispossessed of their lands in these areas, he said. With a split vote of 8-7, the tribunal upheld its Aug. 24, 2010, decision that awarded the ownership of the 1,282hectare of lands to the national government. Chief Justice Renato Corona, who is facing impeachment in the Senate, agreed with the majority ruling written by Associate Justice Martin Villarama Jr. Corona votes twice Curiously, Corona virtually participated twice in the decision as he also voted with the winning bloc on behalf of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo, who was supposed to be on sick leave when the court voted on the matter. On the signature page of the 32-page decision, Corona wrote on top of Del Castillos name, I certify that J. del Castillo sent his vote concurring with Justice Villarama. Like the Chief Justice, Del Castillo is also facing impeachment in the House of Representatives for allegedly plagiarizing the works of two international legal scholars in a ruling he wrote in 2010 junking the claims suit of World War II comfort women. Sought for comment on Friday, Corona said there was nothing irregular in his signing for Del Castillo, who reported back to work only this week after he went under the knife for a heart ailment last month. Corona dismissed speculations that he could have influenced his fellow justice in voting for the majority, saying he never [discussed] cases with justices outside our sessions. He said he did not really sign the ruling for Del Castillo. Thats not true, the Chief Justice told reporters after attending the daily noon Mass at the Supreme Court. I did not sign for him. I only certified what his vote was. Corona added: He sent [in] his vote. Thats a long-standing practice [on] the court.

In denying with finality the opposing appeals of the Manotok and Barque families, the court argued that its previous ruling in the case of Alonso vs Cebu Country Club Inc. would best settle the issue. Absence of signatures Reiterating its decision in the Alonso case, which covered the sprawling Banilad Estates in Cebu, the tribunal argued that documents showing purchase and ownership of former friar lands must have the approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. It said that no valid titles can be issued due to the absence of the signatures of the [the n] Director of Lands and the Secretary of the Interior. The court said that these signatures were indispensable proof of the authenticity of the land titles and that the absence of such approval made the sale void from the start. The prospect of litigants losing friar lands they have possessed for years or decades had never deterred courts from upholding the stringent requirements of the law for a valid acquisition of these lands, the court said, adding: The courts duty is to apply the law. Petitioners concern for other landowners [who] may be similarly affected by our ruling is, without doubt, a legitimate one. The court said the solution for the concern of the Manotoks lies in the legislature as in the Alonso case, which, it noted, resulted in the enactment of Republic Act No. 9443. Equal protection clause That law upheld the validity of the land titles of former friar lands covered by the Banilad Estates that did not bear the signature of the prewar secretary of the interior. But Carpio said it was wrong for the court to apply RA 9443 only to the Banilad Estates since it would result in class legislation. RA 9443 should be extended to lands similarly situated. [O]therwise, there will be violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution, Carpio said. Save for their location, Carpio insisted that there is no substantial distinction between the lands in the Banilad Estates and the other friar lands all over the country. Since the lack of signatures and absence of approval were cured with the passage of RA 9443, the benefits of the law should also apply to other lands similarly situated, he said. Carpio also noted that former Environment Secretary Michael Defensor signed an affidavit on Nov. 11, 2010, stating that he had issued Memorandum Order 1605 on Oct. 27, 2005, to deal with the question of the authenticity of land titles of former friar lands. To preserve Torrens integrity In his order, Defensor said all deeds of conveyance of friar estates that did not have the signatures of concerned prewar government officials are deemed signed or otherwise ratified. Defensor said the order was intended to preserve the integrity of the Torrens system and affirm the governments obligation as seller of the vast tracts of land. The former environment secretary also attested that all documents pertaining to the sale of friar estates in the records of the Land Management Bureau (LMB), the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office and the National Archives did not have the signature of the secretary of the interior. To repeat, [Defensor] states that upon examination, all deeds of conveyance involv ing friar lands did not have the signature of the secretary [of the interior], Carpio said. If the majority ruling would be implemented, Carpio said, more than half of Metro Manilas 63,600 -hectare area may be affected since these used to be friar estates. If the Torrens titles to these lands are declared void then hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of landowners would be rendered homeless or propertyless by the majority decision, he said. Govts responsibility He said the court should not fault the Manotoks for their failure to present the original copy of the assignment of sale certificate since the safekeeping of those documents is the responsibility of the government. It is only the option for the landowners to keep them. How many landown ers can present copies of their original sale certificates? he said. As long as landowners can show other evidence to prove their ownership, they should not be dispossessed of their titles, he said. Carpio said that while the Manotoks failed to present the original sale certificate of the property, the petitioners were able to provide three incontrovertible documents pertaining to their ancestors purchase of the lands.

These included the original copy of the March 11, 1919, Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 1054 from the records of the LMB, a subsequent sale certificate dated June 7, 1920, culled from the National Archives and another similar document dated June 23, 1923. The third document, which Carpio noted was verified to be authentic by LMB records divisions chief Fe Tuanda in 2009, showed that the Manotoks had acquired the former friar lands. He said the petitioners were able to prove that their family settled the full payment of P2,362 to the government on Dec. 7, 1932, as shown in the acknowledged receipt to Severino Manotok. Thus, the Manotoks had already acquired ownership [of the lot]. The only resolutory condition can no longer happen because the full purchase price had already been paid, Carpio said. There is nothing more that is required to be done as the title already passes to the purchaser.

The law and the facts on Manotok stand up

August 27, 2010 pagbabago The law and the facts on Manotok stand up AMADO P. MACASAET http://www.malaya.com.ph/08172010/columnbusi1.html How the Land Management Bureau made the conclusion that the title of the Manotoks is spurious and fake and how the Court, including the Supreme Court, accepted this baseless conclusions cannot escape the public suspicion that there could be unseen hands manipulating the case. WITHOUT saying that the adverse claimants to the property of the heirs of Severino Manotok woke up rather late to assert their rights, it is worth noting and repeating that the facts presented to the courts by the Manotoks have not been discredited as products of a fertile imagination. It is also worth noting that the earlier findings of the Land Registration Administration, the Court of Appeals and lastly the Supreme Court itself that the title of the Manotok is sham and spurious do not have any basis in fact. According to the lawyers of the Manotoks, the NBI examined the sale and assignment by the Manotoks on the questioned Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate. The NBI chemist opined that the documents could not be as sold as it (sic) purports to be. At the request of the Manotoks, the Land Management Bureau (formerly bureau of lands) issued at least six certified copies of sales certificate covering the disputed land. The request was made on Feb. 29, 2000. Little or no attention at all is paid to the fact that LMB issued these certificates, effectively rendering useless the findings of the NBI chemist that the same documents were received in July 1999, a good seven months earlier. Surprisingly, the dates appear to have been the basis for the LMB to make the conclusion that the documents of the Manotoks are spurious and fake. It is clear that the NBI chemists opinion that the Manotok documents could not be as sold as it (sic) purports to be was completely disregarded by the LMB. What is in dispute is the basis of making the conclusion that the title of the Manotoks is spurious or fake.

The most telling was the report of the chemist saying she found handwritten entries and signatures on the documents that were written in ballpoint pen and sign pen. She consequently opined that these writing implements came into use only in the fifties and sixties, the LMB documents did not exist in the years from 1919 to 1923 when the Bureau of Lands issued a deed of conveyance to Severino Manotok. The Manahans which intervened in the case as another adverse claimant must have theorized that, in the words of the lawyers of Manotok, if those documents were only created in the 50s and 60s, then the Manotoks did not acquire Lot 823 in 1919-1923 as represented. Critical to what appears to be a design to have a circuitous and dizzying chain of events and documents is the tellall deed of assignment issued to Severino Manotok in 1923. This document has never been assailed. This document is the origin of a Torrens title which has not been subjected to any question either. Plain sense would tell anyone that the resolution of the dispute should start from the date the Manotok allegedly acquired the property. Next question should be whether or not the acquisition was contrary to law. The deed of conveyance has never been assailed by either Manahans or the heirs of Homer Barque. How the Land Management Bureau made the conclusion that the title of the Manotoks is spurious and fake and how the Court, including the Supreme Court, accepted this baseless conclusions cannot escape the public suspicion that there could be unseen hands manipulating the case. It is important to note that the genuine versions of a sale certificate and three assignment documents existed on their respective dates of execution in 1919 to 1923. These documents were obtained from official sources other than the Land Management Bureau. Their validity has not been questioned. Yet the LMB came up with the baseless conclusion that the title of the Manotok is spurious and fake. And the courts believed it. The case becomes even more curious because the Supreme Court refuses to furnish a copy of the report of the Court of Appeals to which the dispute was remanded for review and recommendation. The Supreme Court also denied a motion of the Manotoks for an open oral argument over the report. In a word, it is possible that the Supreme Court will make a ruling on the report of the CA without informing the litigants of the contents of the report. This denial borders on denial of due process.

A very interesting case.

Class legislation in Manotok case

This is a disaster waiting to happen a blow to the integrity of our Torrens system and the stability of land titles in this country. SENIOR Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio does not dispute the validity of R.A. 944 confirming and declaring, subject to ce rtain exceptions, the validity of existing TCTs (transfer certificates of title) and reconstituted certificates of title covering the Banilad Friar Lands Estate situated in Cebu. He dissented in the Manotok land case promulgated on March 6, 2012 saying that the law should apply to all friar land cases all over the Philippines. If the intent of the law is limited to Banilad, a case of class legislation prohibited by the Constitution becomes real and apparent. Carpio declared in his 23-page dissent (Justice Villaramas ponencia had 30 pages) to limit its (RA 944) application to the Banilad Estate will result in class legislation. Carpio explained RA 944 should be extended to lands similarly situated, otherwise, there will be violation of the equal prot ection clause of the Constitution. In defense of a memorandum issued by then DENR Secretary Michael T. Defensor saying that all deeds of conveyances are deemed signed by the secretary of agriculture, |Carpio said If we do not apply the DENR memorandum to these areas, the Court will be disquieting titles held by generations of landowners since the passage in 1904 of Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act) The ruling endangers the ownership of 63,600 hectares of Friar lands in Metro Manila; 35,000 hectares in Muntinlupa, Piedad, San Francisco de Malabon, Santa Cruz de Malabon, and Tala where the old leprosarium used to sit. According to Carpios dissent, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of landowners would surely be dispossessed of their land s in these areas. This is a disaster waiting to happen a blow to the integrity of our Torrens system and the stability of land titles in this country. What Carpio sees as a dire possibility, the ponente sees as things in the realm of speculation. As reported on this space e arlier, the Manotok case is a reality that will bring about similar realities. It should be recalled that a division in the Court earlier ruled that the title of the Manotoks is sham and spurious. The property was awarded with finality to the heirs of Homer Barque. In that 16-page ruling, Carpio expressed his dissent in 38 pages. After the en banc took over, the Court of Appeals discovered that the documents of the heirs of Homer Barque were not genuine and therefore unverifiable. The heirs of Severino Manotok had all the documents which were verified. The Supreme Court makes them suffer for the failure of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to sign the deed of conveyance. In other words, the Manotoks are being punished for the omission of the state. If only in that respect, the ruling is inhuman, cruel, and oppressive. There are two major factors why the dissent of Carpio clearly holds water and is defensible. First, the court itself admits that the signature of the secretary of agriculture and natural resources is ministerial. It is not a mandatory requirement. But the Supreme Court says it is. Even so, the secretary of the department of environment and natural resources cured that defect with his memorandum clearly stating that all applications for the purchases of friar lands that comply with the rest of the requirements are deemed signed.

But the Supreme Court stuck literally to the interpretation that all deeds must be signed by the secretary. It should be noted that there never was any party that questioned the lack of signature on the deeds of conveyance. It was the Supreme Court that raised the issue without anybody remotely mentioning it. For why should the subject even come up when the memorandum of the secretary of environment and natural resources cured that defect not for the benefit of the state but to quiet all the titles of friar lands whose deeds of conveyance did not have the signature of the secretary. In law and morals, the state exists for the people. The people cannot be denied their rights by the state particularly in cases where payments, taxes and all other requirements for the purchase of Friar Lands have been met. For its failure to comply with the requirement of having the signature of the secretary, the state should be penalized or at least should be forced to quiet the titles of the friar lands. The Supreme Court disquieted the titles instead and opened all friar lands to arbitrary seizure by the state. The ponencia of Justice Martin Villarama mindlessly makes the guess that the clear and present danger is in the realm of speculation. The truth is the danger is staring all buyers of friar lands in the face. Are we going to hang a medal on the magistrates who deprived these buyers of their right to own the land for the omission of the state. There is something here that does not wash. We just do not know what it is. How is the state going to dispose of the invalidated purchases of the friar lands? Does the state have the obligation to pay the friar land owners the expenses they incurred including taxes and payments for the said lands? How about the improvements on the land? Will the state reimburse the owners for these improvements? Maybe these questions are not relevant to the title issue. That is why the Court did not have a word about it. And that is precisely what makes us shake in our boots. There could be a hidden agenda behind the ruling. We do not know who will benefit most from the decision. We only know how the victims will suffer. Related Articles

Manotok v. BarqueFACTS: Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed apetition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177issued in the name of Homer L. Barque, which was destroyed in the fire that gutted theQuezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, sometime in1988. In support of the petition, petitioners submitted the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, real estate tax receipts, tax decla-rations and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering theproperty.Upon being notified of the petition for administrative recon-stitution, private respondents(petitioners herein) filed their opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the titleunder reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their reconsti-tuted title TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of petitioners predeces-sors-in-interest is spurious. ISSUE:

Whether or not irregularly issued titles can be cancelled by the LRA. Held: Respondents levied on a portion of the MAGRA to satisfy the tax delinquency of PNOCEDC.However, the land being levied is classified as inalienable. It is owned by the governmentand thus, cannot be sold at public auction. Likewise, the machineries, equipment and otherinfrastructures in the MAGRA cannot be levied and sold at public auction because it is notthe property that is subject to the tax. The personal liability for the tax delinquency, is generally on whoever is the owner of thereal property at the time the tax accrues; where, however, the tax liability is imposed on thebeneficial use of the real property such as those owned but leased to private persons orentities by the government, or when the assessment is made on the basis of the actual usethereof, the personal liability is on any person who has such beneficial or actual use at thetime of the accrual of the tax.In the case at bar, PNOC-EDC is the beneficial user, however, since respondents cannot availof the administrative remedy through levy, they can only enforce the collection of realproperty tax through civil action.PNOC-EDC also claims that the real property tax assessment is not yet final and executory. Itavers that prior resort to administrative remedies before seeking judicial remedies is notnecessary considering that the issue raised is purely a question of law. Consequently, itneed not appeal the assessment to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals or to the CentralBoard of Assessment Appeals as provided under Sections 22627 and 22928 of the LGC.We disagree. It is well-settled in Systems Plus Computer College of Caloocan City v. LocalGovernment of Caloocan City29 that all adminis-trative remedies must be exhausted beforeavailing of the judicial remedies. Thus: The petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative agencies anddirectly seek redress from the courts even on the pretext of raising a supposedly purequestion of law without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.Hence, when the law provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board,body, or officer, as in the case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only after exhaustingall remedies provided therein. Otherwise stated, before seeking the intervention of thecourts, it is a precondition that petitioner should first avail of all the means afforded by theadministrative processes.If PNOC-EDC was not satisfied with the assessment of its property, it should have appealedto the Local Board of Assessment Appeals within 60 days from receipt of the written notice

Manotok v. Barque, the Lot No. 823, Piedad Estate Ownership Controversy Part I : The December 12, 2005 Decision
Last March 6, 2012, the Supreme Court en banc promulgated its resolution in Manotok vs. Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, the case involving Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate (a former friar land) located in Quezon City.

Voting 9-6, the High Tribunal DENIED WITH FINALITY the motions for reconsideration filed by all parties in this case. It REITERATED its August 24, 2012 decision declaring that the subject lot legally belongs to the national government of the Republic of the Philippines, and denying the respective claims of the opposing parties (the Manotoks as petitioners, the Barques as respondents, and the Manahans as intervenors) over Lot No. 823. In this four-part series, I will endeavour to sequentially summarize the series of opinions rendered by the Supreme Court in this case, to wit: Part I (this entry) The December 12, 2005 decision of the 1stDivision (4-1 vote, Ynares-Santiago, J., ponente), which denied the Manotoks consolidated petitions and sustained the order for the cancellation of the Manotoks title and for the reconstitution of the Barques title; Part II The December 18, 2008 en banc resolution (8-6-1 vote,Tinga, J., ponente), which reversed the decision of the 1stDivision and remanded the petitions to the CA for further proceedings; Part III The August 24, 2010 en banc decision (9-5-1 vote,Villarama, J., ponente), which denied the Manotoks consolidated petitions and declared their title null and void, but also denied the petition for reconstitution of the Barques and declared that the subject lot legally belongs to the national government of the Republic of the Philippines; Part IV The March 6, 2012 en banc resolution (9-6 vote,Villarama, J., ponente) denying with finality the motions for reconsideration of the parties. What went before : The facts The Barques filed a petition for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 issued in the name of their predecessor, Homer L. Barque, which was allegedly destroyed in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, sometime in 1988. The Manotoks filed their opposition to the Barques petition, claiming that the lot covered by the title sought to be reconstituted by the latter forms part of the land covered by the formers own reconstituted title, TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque is spurious. On June 30, 1997, the reconstituting officer denied the reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 on grounds that the two lots covered by the Barques title appear to duplicate the lot covered by the Manotoks own reconstituted title; and that the Barques plan, Fls-3168-D, is a spurious document. On appeal by the Barques, the LRA reversed the reconstituting officer and ordered that reconstitution of the Barques title be given due course, but only after the Manotoks own title has been cancelled upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction. The parties separately appealed to the CA. The two divisions of the CA where the cases landed similarly modified the LRA decision, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the Manotoks title without a direct proceeding with the RTC, and directing the LRA to reconstitute the Barques' title. Thus, the Manotoks filed these petitions to the SC. The December 12, 2005 decision of the SC 1st Division The consolidated petitions were DENIED by the Supreme Court 1stDivision, which AFFIRMED the appealed CA resolutions. Justice Ynares-Santiago, wrote the opinion for the 1st Division, reasoning that [t]he LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined himself to the owner's duplicate certificate of title prior to the reconstitution. She went on to state:

(1)

(2) (3)

(4)

The factual finding of the LRA that [the Barques] title is authentic, genuine, valid, and existing, while [the Manotoks] title is sham and spurious, as affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals, is conclusive before this Court. It should remain undisturbed since only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. xxx xxx xxx

There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of their property without due process of law when the Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even without a direct proceeding in the RTC . . .[T]here is no need to remand the case to the RTC for a re-determination on the validity of the titles of [the Barques] and [the Manotoks] as the same has been squarely passed upon by the LRA and affirmed by the appellate court. By opposing the petition for reconstitution and submitting their administratively reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to the authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority to pass judgment on their title. All the evidence presented was duly considered by these tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners' claim that they were deprived of their right to be heard and present evidence, which is the essence of due process. xxx xxx xxx

The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on petitioners' title which was irregularly and illegally issued in the first place. xxx.
Only Chief Justice Davide fully concurred with Justice Ynares-Santiago. Justices Quisumbing and Azcuna wrote separate opinions concurring in the result. The fifth member of the 1st Division, Justice Carpio, dissented and voted to REVERSE the appealed CA resolutions. He summarized his opinion thus:

[T]he Heirs of Barque filed before the Register of Deeds an administrative petition to reconstitute their allegedly destroyed TCT. The Register of Deeds, as reconstituting officer, denied the petition of the Heirs of Barque because, based on official records, the property involved is already registered under the Torrens system in the name of Manotok, et al. The LRA affirmed the Register of Deeds, stating that only the proper trial court could cancel the TCT of Manotok, et al. although the LRA believed that the TCT of Manotok, et al. was a sham. The LRA recognized that in an administrative reconstitution, the decision of the reconstituting body is either to deny or approve the reconstitution of the applicant's title, never to cancel the Torrens title of a third party. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals declared the TCT of Manotok, et al. void and the TCT of the Heirs of Barque valid. Clearly, the Court of Appeals deprived Manotok, et al. of their property without due process of law. The Court of Appeals blatantly disregarded Section 48 of PD 1529 and Section 19 of BP Blg. 129 which confer on the proper trial court exclusive original jurisdiction to cancel a Torrens title in an action directly attacking the validity of the Torrens title. The Court should not countenance this gross injustice and patent violation of the law.
[You may also refer to Part II, Part III, and Part IV of this series of posts for the succeeding opinions of the Supreme Court en banc.]

Manotok v. Barque, Part II : The December 18, 2008 En Banc Resolution

Part I of this four-part series is a summary of the December 12, 2005decision of the Supreme Court 1st Division denying the Manotoks consolidated petitions and sustaining the order for the cancellation of the their title without a direct proceeding before the RTC and for the reconstitution of the Barques title. In this entry, we look into the December 18, 2008 en banc resolutionthat reversed the decision of the 1st Division and remanded the petitions to the CA for further proceedings. The intervening facts After the promulgation of the December 12, 2005 decision, the Manotoks filed several motions for reconsideration with the 1st Division but these were all DENIED by the Court. On May 2, 2006, the decision of the 1st Division was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment. But when the Barques moved for the execution of the decision, the Manotoks sought the referral of the motion to the Court en banc, which the Court en banc accepted on July 26, 2006.

On September 7, 2006, the Manahans sought to intervene in the case, alleging that their predecessorin-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued Sales Certificate No. 511 covering the subject lot. On December 18, 2008, the Court promulgated an en banc that SET ASIDE the decision and resolutions of the 1st Division and RECALLED the entry of judgment. Voting 8-6 with 1 abstention, the Court REVERSED the decisions and resolutions of the CA and the LRA, and REMANDED the cases to the CA for further proceedings. How the court en banc voted The Court en banc decided to accept the cases from the 1 st Division on a pro hac vice basis to lend much needed jurisprudential clarity as only the Court en banc can constitutionally provide. J. Tinga wrote the opinion for the Court. He was joined by CJ Puno, and JJ. Austria-Martinez, Velasco and Brion. Concurring with their respective separate opinions were J. Carpio, with whom J. CarpioMorales joined, and J. Corona. J. Ynares-Santiago, the ponente of the 1st Division decision and resolutions, wrote a dissenting opinion. She was joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, Reyes, and Leonardo-De Castro. J. Nachura did not take part. Issue: Can the Court en banc validly re-evaluate the decision of the 1stDivision? The Court first grappled with what it called procedural unorthodoxies involved in the re -evaluation of the Manotoks petitions even after an entry of judgment had already been made by the 1st Division in favor of the Barques. The Court justified its pro hac vice re-evaluation of the petitions based on the constitutional principle that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the [C]ourt in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. This, according to the Court, is necessitated by the argument that the 2005 Decision of the First Division is inconsistent with precedents of the Court, and leaving that decision alone without the imprimatur of the Court en banc would lead to undue confusion . . . over whether the earlier ruling of the Division constitutes the current standard with respect to administrative reconstitution of titles. Issue: Did the LRA and the CA have jurisdiction to annul the Manotoks title? The Court held that the LRA and the CA had no jurisdiction to direct the annulment of the Manotoks title. It reasoned:

Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 . . . provides that [a] certificate of ti tle shall not be subject to collateral attack [...and] cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA's administrative proceeding. There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional trial court. Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the Barques and the Manotoks petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place. xxx xxx xxx

Nowhere in [Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 where the general functions of the Land Registration Commissioner are enumerated] is it stated that the LRA has the power to cancel titles. Indeed, the Barques are unable to point to any basis in law that confirms the power of the LRA to effect such cancellation, even under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which authorizes the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited cases. In fact . . . such laws take great care to ensure that a petition for administrative reconstitution of title will not disturb existing Torrens titles. It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title.
Issue: Did the LRA and the CA have jurisdiction to annul the Manotoks title? The Court held that the LRA and the CA had no jurisdiction to direct the annulment of the Manotoks title. It reasoned:

Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 . . . provides that [a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack [...and] cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA's administrative proceeding. There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional trial court. Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the Barques and the Manotoks petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place. xxx xxx xxx

Nowhere in [Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 where the general functions of the Land Registration Commissioner are enumerated] is it stated that the LRA has the power to cancel titles. Indeed, the Barques are unable to point to any basis in law that confirms the power of the LRA to effect such cancellation, even under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which authorizes the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited cases. In fact . . . such laws take great care to ensure that a petition for administrative reconstitution of title will not disturb existing Torrens titles. It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title.
Issue: Should the Supreme Court, after dismissing the Barques petition for administrative reconstitution, act further on the apparent problems of the Manotoks title? After noting the apparent flaws in the Manotoks claim, which it described as considerable and disturbing enough, the Court decided to remand the case to the CA for reception of evidence on the validity of the Manotoks title. It explained this extraordinary step in the following wise:

It must be borne in mind that the disputed property is part of the Friar Lands over which the Government holds title and are not public lands but private or patrimonial property of the Government and can be alienated only upon proper compliance with the requirements of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The Alonso [v. Country Club] approach [of declaring that a former friar land still legally belongs to the national government for failure of the private claimant to establish a clear title thereto] especially appeals to us because, as in this case, the subject property therein was a Friar Land which under the Friar Lands Law (Act No. 1120) may be disposed of by the Government only under that law. Thus, there is greater concern on the part of this Court to secure its proper transmission to private hands, if at all. At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not yet any sufficient evidence for us to warrant the annulment of the Manotok title. All that the record indicates thus far is evidence not yet refuted by clear and convincing proof that the Manotoks claim to title is flawed. To arrive at an ultimate determination, the formal reception of evidence is in order. This Court is not a trier of fact or otherwise structurally capacitated to receive and evaluate evidence de novo. However, the Court of Appeals is sufficiently able to undertake such function.
The Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Carpio Like the majority, J. Carpio holds that the the re-evaluation of the consolidated petitions is proper even after entry of the 1st Divisions decision. He does not however join the majority in remanding the case to the CA. He merely voted to GRANT of the Manotoks motion for reconsideration,REVERSE the 1st Divisions decision and resolution and RECALL its Entry of Judgment, and DENY the petition for administrative reconstitution respondents Heirs of Homer L. Barque, Sr. J. Carpio argued that the doctrine of immutability is not applicable in this case since the 12 December 2005 Decision never became final and executory, thus:

There are two compelling jurisdictional reasons why the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division never became final and executory. First, the First Division has no jurisdiction to overturn a doctrine laid down by the Court en banc or in division [such as the decision in Sps. Antonio and Genoveva Balanon-Anicete, et al. v. Pedro Balanon]. xxx. xxx xxx xxx

Second, the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions applies only if the trial court or hearing officer has jurisdiction over the subject matter. A decision rendered by a trial court or hearing officer without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void and cannot become final and executory. Such decision cannot even become res judicata because there can be no conclusiveness of judgment if the trial court or hearing officer has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. In these cases, the LRA has no jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the title of the Barques because such reconstitution constitutes an indirect or collateral attack on the pre-existing Torrens title of the Manotoks over the same property. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree states that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack. The LRA, or even any court for that matter, has no jurisdiction to entertain a collateral attack on a Torrens title. The Manotoks prior title must be deemed valid and subsisting as it cannot be assailed through collateral attack in the reconstitution proceedings.
J. Carpio noted a surfeit of forgeries and badges of fraud regarding the Barque title. He also distinguished the Manotoks and the Barques situations, thus: [A]t the time of the reconstitution of the Manotoks title, the Barques had no duly issued existing Torrens title" from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. When the Barques filed the reconstitution of their title, the Manotoks already had a prior title, which was the only duly issued existing Torrens title over the property issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. On the question of whether the LRA has jurisdiction, in administrative reconstitution proceedings, to rule which between two titles over the same property is valid, or who between two claimants over the same property is the lawful owner, J. Carpio held in the negative, thus:

...[R]econstitution, even judicial reconstitution, does not confirm or adjudicate ownership over a property. Reconstitution merely restores a missing certificate of title in the same condition that it was when lost or destroyed, nothing more. If the original title had a legal defect at the time of the loss or destruction, as when the land covered is part of the public forest, the reconstituted title does not cure such defect. xxx.
On the question of whether equity can be used to justify the collateral attack on the Manotoks title at the LRA level, he reasoned: no court can extend equity jurisdiction to the LRA where the law ha s expressly reserved exclusive original jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court. No court, invoking equity jurisdiction, can also allow a collateral attack on a Torrens title, either before the LRA or before itself, in gross violation of Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree expressly prohibiting collateral attacks on Torrens titles. The Separate Opinion of Justice Corona J. Coronas joined the majority in reversing the 1st Division and in remanding the case to the CA for further proceedings. According to him, the First Division . . . enlarged the scope of the authority of the [LRA] in administrative reconstitution proceedings when it recognized the authority of the LRA to rule that petitioners certificate of title was a sham, spurious and not duly issued since under PD 1529, the LRA has no authority to rule on the authenticity and validity of a certificate of title. The referral of the case to the CA for the complete determination of contentious factual issues is necessitated because the investigation and appreciation of facts is beyond the province of [the Supreme Court] as it is neither a trier of fact nor capacitated to appreciate evidence at the first instance. On the other hand, the [CA] has the competence to perform that task. The dissenting opinion of Justice Ynares-Santiago J. Ynares-Santiago found no compelling reason to further require the referral of these cases to the RTC or the CA for a re-litigation of the issues already raised and resolved by the two divisions of the CA and affirmed by the Court's 1st Division in its final and executory decision dated December 12, 2005. She reasoned that the doctrine of immutability of final and executory decisions precludes the Court from taking this unprecedented action. Particularly, the lady justice found no justifiable basis to disturb the LRA finding that [the Barques] Plan FLS-3168-D indeed exists in the official files of LMB, DENR; thus, she held that [the Barques] title, TCT No. 210177, which describes Lot 823 as subdivided into Lots 823-A and 823-B in accordance with Fls-3168-D, [is] in order. She would also sustain the LRA finding that the Manotoks reconstituted title is spurious, considering petitioners' failure to prove facts contrary to the LRA findings. She concluded that since the property covered by [the Manotoks] reconstituted title is not the property in Matandang Balara that they are occupying as clearly shown by their own documentary evidence, it necessarily follows that they are not the owners of such property. On the issue of the jurisdiction of the CA to order the cancellation of the Manotoks title and the reconstitution of the Barques title, she held:

The Court of Appeals . . . has the corresponding authority and jurisdiction to decide the appealed case on the basis of the uncontroverted facts and admissions contained in the petition, comment, reply, rejoinder, and memoranda, filed by the parties, and to apply the law applicable in administrative reconstitution proceeding which is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6732. Section 10, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court specifically mandates that the findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals. Since petitioners were not able to show that the LRA findings of fact were unsupported by evidence, the Court of Appeals committed no error of jurisdiction when it confirmed such findings.

Moreover, Section 11 of R.A. No. 6732 provides that: SEC. 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or other machination is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and all persons having knowledge thereof. Thus, the Court of Appeals had the authority to order the cancellation of petitioners reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 after it affirmed the findings of the LRA that petitioners TCT No. RT -22481 is spurious and void ab initio. Having also affirmed the LRA finding that respondents title, TCT No. 210177, is genuine, valid and existing, the Court of Appeals likewise had the authority to order its reconstitution since this was the final step in the administrative reconstitution process.
On the issue of whether the LRA has jurisdiction to administratively reconstitute the Barques title despite the Manotoks previously reconstituted title, J. Ynares-Santiago held in the affirmative. She cited the fact that it appears from the records that the location and technical description of the properties described in the parties respective titles are not the same. Thus, [i]t is . . . misleading and baseless for [the Manotoks] to assert that their previously reconstituted title . . . covers the same property as that identified and described in [the Barques title] so as to deprive the LRA of jurisdiction over [the Barques] petition for reconstitution. However, even assuming that both parties respective titles cover the same property, the LRA would still have jurisdiction over respondents' petition for reconstitution, thus:

As [the Manotoks] themselves admit, they caused the administrative reconstitution of their TCT No. RT 22481 in 1991 under R.A. No. 6732. On the other hand, [the Barques] TCT No. 210177 shows that it was issued on September 24, 1975 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Its existence was likewise confirmed by the LRA in its Resolution of June 24, 1998 based on the logbook of the Register of Deeds, which contains the list of titles lost during the fire that destroyed its records in 1988. [The Barques] TCT No. 210177 was, therefore, in existence at the time [the Manotoks] filed their petition for reconstitution. In Alipoon v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that: [I]nasmuch as TCT No. T-17224 has been in existence as early as March 16, 1933, the issuance in 1989 of a reconstituted original certificate of title bearing the number OCT No. RO 12890 (N.A.) over Lot No. 663 in the name of petitioners' parents Fausto Alipoon and Silveria Duria is rendered legally doubtful, and the reconstituted title is void. It, therefore, follows that [the Manotoks] reconstituted title, even assuming the same to have been duly reconstituted, was deemed nullified by the mere existence of [the Barques] title at the time of the administrative reconstitution of [the Manotoks] title. xxx.
On whether the LRA has jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of the Manotoks title in the administrative reconstitution proceedings filed by the Barques, J. Ynares-Santiago held in the affirmative, reasoning that [s]ince the LRA had the duty to resolve the petition for reconstitution as well as [the Manotoks] opposition thereto, it necessarily had to examine the title of the parties, using its technical expertise, to determine if the petition for reconstitution should be given due course, or denied as prayed for by the [Manotoks]. On whether the LRA or the CA has jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the disputed property in the administrative reconstitution of title filed by the Manotoks, J. Ynares-Santiago also held in the affirmative: [S]ince [the Manotoks] themselves laid before the LRA and the Court of Appeals all their evidence to prove the genuineness of their reconstituted title and their ownership of the property in dispute, the Court of Appeals had the corresponding authority and jurisdiction to pass upon these issues.

Manotok v. Barque, Part III : The August 24, 2010 En Banc Decision
Part I of this four-part series is a summary of the December 12, 2005decision of the Supreme Court 1st Division denying the Manotoks consolidated petitions and sustaining the order for the cancellation of the their title without a direct proceeding before the RTC and for the reconstitution of the Barques title.

Part II, on the other hand, is a summary of the December 18, 2008 en banc resolution that reversed the decision of the 1st Division and remanded the petitions to the CA for further proceedings. In this entry, we will look at the summary of the Courts August 24, 2010 en banc decision that (1) DENIED that the Manotoks petitions, the Manahans petition-in-intervention, and the Barques petition for reconstitution; (2) declared NULL AND VOID TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Severino Manotok IV, et al., TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, and Deed of Conveyance No. V-200022 issued to Felicitas B. Manahan; (3) ordered The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and/or Quezon City to CANCEL the said titles; and (4) DECLARED that the subject Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, legally belongs to the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, without prejudice to the institution of REVERSION proceedings by the State through the Office of the Solicitor General. We will also look at the dissenting opinions of the minority.

The intervening facts After the promulgation of the December 12, 2005 decision, the Manotoks filed several motions for reconsideration with the 1st Division but these were all DENIED by the Court. The decision of the 1st Division was later entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment. But when the Barques moved for the execution of the decision, the Manotoks sought the referral of the motion to the Court en banc, which the Court en banc accepted on July 26, 2006.

Meanwhile, the Manahans sought to intervene in the case, alleging that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued Sales Certificate No. 511 covering the subject lot. On December 18, 2008, the Court promulgated an en bancresolution that SET ASIDE the decision and resolutions of the 1st Division and RECALLED the entry of judgment. Voting 8-6 with 1 abstention, the CourtREVERSED the decisions and resolutions of the CA and the LRA, andREMANDED the cases to the CA for further proceedings to determine the validity of the Manotoks title. In due time, the CA received evidence with primary focus on whether the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar Land. The Barques and Manahans were likewise allowed to present evidence on their respective claims that may have an impact on the correct determination of the status of the Manotok title. The CA then submitted to the SC a Commissioners Report that served as basis for Courts August 24, 2010 en banc decision. How the court en banc voted The Court voted 9-5 with 1 abstention. Justice Villarama, Jr. wrote theopinion for the Court. Concurring with him were Chief Justice Corona, andJustices Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Perez, and Mendoza. Justice Carpio, with whom Justices Velasco, Jr., and Brion concurred, wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Carpio Morales wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion. Justice Sereno likewise dissented and reserved the right to issue a separate opinion. Justice Nachura did not take part. The issue The core issue identified and resolved by the Court was: Does the absence of approval of the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No. 1054 and Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 in favor of the Manotoks warrant the annulment of their title? The Courts ruling

The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE and held that the absence of approval of the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in Sale Certificate No. 1054 and Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 in favor of the Manotoks predecessor-in-interest warrants the annulment of the Manotok title. The ponencia of Justice Villarama Justice Villarama cited as the central legal basis of the Courts rulingSection 18 of Act No. 1120, which provides: SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior. He then explained:

It is clear from the foregoing provision that the sale of friar lands shall be valid only if approved by the Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce). . . [T]he approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale of friar lands. xxx. xxx xxx xxx

[T]he absence of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in the sale certificate and assignment of sale certificate made the sale null and void ab initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such sale or assignment. The Manotoks reliance on the presumption of regularity in the statutorily prescribed transmittal by the Bureau of Lands to the Register of Deeds of their deed of conveyance is untenable. In our Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., we underscored the mandatory requirement in Section 18, as follows: Section 18 of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act unequivocally provides: No lease or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now the Director of Lands) under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the In terior (now, the Secretary of Natural Resources). Thus, petitioners claim of ownership must fail in the absence of positive evidence showing the approval of the Secretary of Interior. Approval of the Secretary of the Interior cannot simply be presumed or inferred from certain acts since the law is explicit in its mandate. This is the settled rule as enunciated in Solid State Multi-Products Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and reiterated in Liao vs. Court of Appeals. Petitioners have not offered any cogent reason that would justify a deviation from this rule. xxx xxx xxx

In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the Manotoks could not have acquired ownership of the subject lot as they had no valid certificate of sale issued to them by the Government in the first place. Sale Certificate No. 1054 dated March 10, 1919 (Exh. 10) purportedly on file with the DENR-LMB, conspicuously lacks the signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. In fact, Exh. 10 was not included among those official documents submitted by the OSG to the CA. We underscore anew that friar lands can be alienated only upon proper compliance with the requirements of Sections 11, 12 and 18 of Act No. 1120. It was thus primordial for the Manotoks to prove their acquisition of its title by clear and convincing evidence. This they failed to do. Accordingly, this Court has no alternative but to declare the Manotok title null and void ab initio, and Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate as still part of the Government's patrimonial property, as recommended by the CA. The decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823, their payment of real property taxes and construction of buildings, are of no moment. It must be noted that the Manotoks miserably failed to prove the existence of the title allegedly issued in the name of Severino Manotok after the latter had paid in full the purchase price. The Manotoks did not offer any explanation as to why the only copy of TCT No. 22813 was torn in half and no record of documents leading to its issuance can be found in the registry of deeds. As to the certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, it simply described the copy presented (Exh. 5-A) as DILAPIDATED without stating if the original copy of TCT No. 22813 actually existed in their records, nor any information on the year of issuance and name of registered owner. While TCT No. 22813 was mentioned in certain documents such as the deed of donation executed in 1946 by Severino Manotok in favor of his children and the first tax declaration (Exh. 26), these do not stand as secondary evidence of an alleged transfer from OCT No. 614. This hiatus in the evidence of the Manotoks further cast doubts on the veracity of their claim.

As we stressed in Alonso: Neither may the rewards of prescription be successfully invoked by respondent, as it is an ironclad dictum that prescription can never lie against the Government. Since respondent failed to present the paper trail of the property's conversion to private property, the lengthy possession and occupation of the disputed land by respondent cannot be counted in its favor, as the subject property being a friar land, remained part of the patrimonial property of the Government. Possession of patrimonial property of the Government, whether spanning decades or centuries, can not ipso facto ripen into ownership. Moreover, the rule that statutes of limitation do not run against the State, unless therein expressly provided, is founded on the the great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are confided. (Emphasis supplied.) xxx xxx xxx

Considering that none of the parties has established a valid acquisition under the provisions of Act No. 1120, as amended, we therefore adopt the recommendation of the CA declaring the Manotok title as null and void ab initio, and Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate as still part of the patrimonial property of the Government.
The dissent of Justice Carpio Justice Carpio dissented from the majority opinion insofar as it declared that the absence of approval by the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources of Sale Certificate No. 1054 and Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 warrants the annulment of the Manotoks title. On the majoritys reliance on 18 of Act No. 1120, which provides that [n]o lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior, Justice Carpio noted:

Under Section 18, any sale of friar land by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now Director of Lands) shall not be valid until approved by the Secretary. This means that the Secretary, under Section 18, approves the sale and thus signs the Deed of Conveyance upon full payment of the purchase price. However, under Section 12 of Act No. 1120, the Director of Lands signs the Sales Certificate upon payment of the first instalment. xxx. xxx xxx xxx

Under Section 12, it is only the Director of Land who signs the Sales Certificate. The Sales Certificate operates as a contract to sell which, under the law, the Director of Lands is authorized to sign and thus bind the Government as seller of the friar land. This transaction is a sale of private property because friar lands are patrimonial properties of the Government. In short, the law expressly authorizes the Director of Lands to sell private or patrimonial property of Government under a contract to sell. On the other hand, under Section 18, the Secretary signs the Deed of Conveyance because the Secretary must approve the sale made initially by the Director of Lands. The Deed of Conveyance operates as a deed of absolute sale which the Secretary signs upon full payment of the purchase price. The Deed of Conveyance, when presented, is authority for the Register of Deeds to issue a new title to the buyer as provided in Section 122 of the Land Registration Act.
On the citation by the majority of the ruling in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc. and other cases, which held that the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale of friar lands, Justice Carpio disagreed and held:

T]he ruling in Alonso was superseded with the issuance by then Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary Michael T. Defensor of DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05, which provides:

WHEREAS, it appears that there are uncertainties in the title of the land disposed by the Government under Act 1120 or the Friar Lands Act due to the lack of the signature of the Secretary on the Deeds of Conveyance; WHEREAS, said Deeds of Conveyance were only issued by the then Bureau of Lands (now the Land Management Bureau) after full payment had been made by the applicants thereon subject to the approval of the Secretary of the then Department of Interior, then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and presently, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, in accordance with Act 1120; WHEREAS, some of these Deeds of Conveyance on record in the field offices of the Department and the Land Management Bureau do not bear the signature of the Secretary despite full payment by the friar land applicant as can be gleaned in the Friar Lands Registry Book ; WHEREAS, it is only a ministerial duty on the part of the Secretary to sign the Deed of Conveyance once the applicant had already made full payment on the purchase price of the land ; WHEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above premises, and in order to remove all clouds of doubt regarding the validity of these instruments, it is hereby declared that all Deeds of Conveyance that do not bear the signature of the Secretary are deemed signed or otherwise ratified by this Memorandum Order provided, however, that full payment of the purchase price of the land and compliance with all the other requirements for the issuance of the Deed of Conveyance under Act 1120 have been accomplished by the applicant; This Memorandum Order, however, does not modify, alter or otherwise affect any subsequent assignments, transfers and/or transactions made by the applicant or his successors-in-interest or any rights arising therefrom after the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title by the concerned Registry of Deeds. (Italicization and boldfacing supplied) Despite the issuance of DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05, the majority still hold that the memorandum order does not apply to the Manotoks' title. The majority assert that the Manotoks could not benefit from DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 because the memorandum order refers only to deeds of conveyance on file with the records of DENR field offices. I find the majority's limited application of DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 erroneous. While the third WHEREAS clause of DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 refers to Deeds of Conveyance on record in the field offices of the DENR, the dispositive portion categorically states that all Deeds of Conveyance that do not bear the signature of the Secretary are deemed signed or otherwise ratified by the Memorandum Order. The word all means everything, without exception. DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 should apply to all Deeds of Conveyance, as declared in its dispositive portion, and should not be limited to those on file in DENR field offices. Clearly, as expressly stated in Section 20 of Executive Order No. 192, all DENR Regional Offices, including the Regional Office in NCR, are field offices of the DENR. Quezon City, where the land in question is situated, is under DENR's NCR field office. In 1919, when the Government sold the subject friar land to the Manotoks' predecessors-in-interest, the land was part of the province of Rizal, which also has a field office. Indisputably, DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 applies to all Deeds of Conveyance of friar lands anywhere in the Philippines without exception. Thus, conveyances of land within the NCR, including the conveyance to the Manotoks, are covered by DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05. The first WHEREAS clause clearly states that what DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 seeks to cure are the uncertainties in the title of the land disposed by the Government under Act 1120 or the Friar Lands Act due to the lack of signature of the Secretary on the Deeds of

Conveyance. If we apply DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 only to Deeds of Conveyance on record in the field offices outside of NCR, the purpose of the issuance of DENR Memorandum Order No. 1605 will not be fully accomplished. xxx xxx xxx

The total area of friar lands in NCR, specifically in Muntinlupa, Piedad, San Francisco de Malabon, Santa Cruz de Malabon, and Tala is 86,567.50 acres or 35,032.624 hectares. If DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 will not be applied to these areas, the Court will be disquieting the titles held by generations of landowners since the passage in 1904 of Act No. 1120. Thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of landowners could be dispossessed of their lands in these areas.
Justice Carpio held that Manotoks became owners of the subject land upon their full payment of the purchase price to the Government on 7 December 1932. Upon such full payment, the Manotoks had the right to demand conveyance of the land and issuance of the corresponding title to them. He continued:

Thus, the Court has held that in cases of sale of friar lands, the only recognized resolutory condition is non-payment of the full purchase price. Pursuant to Section 12 of Act No. 1120, upon payment of the last installment together with all accrued interest[,] the Government will convey to [the] settler and occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act. Once it is shown that the full purchase price had been paid, the issuance of the proper certificate of conveyance necessarily follows. There is nothing more that is required to be done as the title already passes to the purchaser. The Court has ruled that equitable and beneficial title to the friar land passes to the purchaser from the time the first installment is paid and a certificate of sale is issued. When the purchaser finally pays the final installment on the purchase price and is given a deed of conveyance and a certificate of title, the title, at least in equity, retroacts to the time he first occupied the land, paid the first installment and was issued the corresponding certificate of sale. The sequence then is that a certificate of sale is issued upon payment of the first installment. Upon payment of the final installment, the deed of conveyance is issued. It is the Deed of Conveyance that must bear the signature of the Secretary of Interior/Agriculture because it is only when the final installment is paid that the Secretary can approve the sale, the purchase price having been fully paid . This is why DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 refers only to the Deed of Conveyance, and not to the Sale Certificate, as the document that is deemed signed by the Secretary. In short,Section 18 of Act No. 1120 which states that (n)o xxx sale xxx shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of Interior refers to the approval by the Secretary of the Deed of Conveyance. DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 expressly acknowledges that it is only a ministerial duty on the part of the Secretary to sign the Deed of Conveyance once the applicant had already made full payment on the purchase price of the land . The majority expressly admit in their Reply to the Dissenting Opinion that Memorandum Order No. 16-05: x x x correctly stated that it is only a ministerial duty on the part of the Secretary to sign the Deed of Conveyance once the applicant had made full payment on the purchase price of the land. Jurisprudence teaches us that notwithstanding the failure of the government to issue the proper instrument of conveyance when the purchaser finally pays the final installment of the purchase price, the purchaser of friar land still acquired ownership over the subject land . (Italicization supplied) xxx xxx xxx

To repeat, Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 expressly and unequivocally acknowledged that Severino Manotok had fully paid the purchase price to the Government. Since the majority expressly

admit that upon full payment of the purchase price it becomes the ministerial duty of the Secretary to approve the sale, then the majority must also necessarily admit that the approval of the Secretary is a mere formality that has been complied with by the issuance of Memorandum Order No. 16-05. Since the majority further expressly admit that upon full payment of the purchase price ownership of the friar land passes to the purchaser, despite the failure of the Secretary to sign the Deed of Conveyance , then the majority must also necessarily admit that the Manotoks became the absolute owners of the land upon their full payment of the purchase price on 7 December 1932. xxx xxx xxx

Indisputably, upon full payment of the purchase price, full and absolute ownership passes to the purchaser of friar land. In the case of the Manotoks title, the Deed of Conveyance was issued except that it lacked the signature of the Secretary which the majority erroneously hold is still indispensable pursuant to Alonso. However, Alonso should not be applied to the Manotoks' title because DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 was not yet issued when the Court decided Alonso. The absence of the Secretarys signature in the Deed of Conveyance in Alonso was never cured and hence the Court in Alonso voided the Deed of Conveyance. Besides, in Alonso the corresponding Torrens title was never issued even after a lapse of 66 years from the date of the Deed of Conveyance. In sharp contrast, here the lack of the Secretarys signature in the Manotoks Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 was cured by the issuance of DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05, which expressly states that all Deeds of Conveyance that do not bear the signature of the Secretary are deemed signed or ratified x x x. Moreover, the Manotoks have been issued their torrens title way back in 1933. Section 122 of Act No. 496 states that [i]t shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such instrument, before its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the province where the land lies and to be there registered like other deeds and conveyances, whereupon a certificate shall be entered as in other cases of registered land, and an owner's duplicate certificate issued to the grantee. TCT No. 22813 would not have been issued in the name of Severino Manotok if Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 had not been delivered to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal to which the land covered by the Manotoks title then belonged. The Manotoks should not be punished if the documents leading to the issuance of TCT No. 22813 could no longer be found in the files of the government office, considering that these were pre-war documents and considering further the lack of proper preservation of documents in some government agencies. The fact remains that the Manotoks were able to present a certified true copy of Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 secured from the National Archives which is the official repository of government and public documents. This Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 was signed by the Director of Lands and lacked only the signature of the Secretary of Interior/Agriculture. Memorandum Order No. 16-05 speaks of all Deeds of Conveyance that do not bear the signature of the Secretary and thus includes Deed of Conveyance No. 29204. Under Memorandum Order No. 16-05, such Deeds of Conveyance are deemed signed by the Secretary. Clearly, Memorandum Order No. 16-05 applies squarely to the Manotoks title for two reasons. First, Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 was signed by the Director of Lands but lacked only the signature of the Secretary. Second, the purchase price for the land subject of Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 had been fully paid on 7 December 1932, more than 77 years ago.
The concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio Morales Justice Carpio Morales held that the absence of the signature of the Secretary of the Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in the Manotoks Sale Certificate No. 1054 and Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 issued in 1919 and 1932, respectively, does not warrant the annulment of their title. She advanced the thesis the [t]here is no absence of approval to speak of, since [the Manotoks] Deed of Conveyance is, pursuant to Order 16-05, deemed signed by the Department Secretary, and there is no legal basis for requiring another signature of the Department Secretary on the Sale Certificate. She continued: Contrary to the ponencia's position, Order 16-05 does not contravene Act No.

1120. Order 16-05 did not dispense with the requirement of the Department Secretarys approval. It recognizes that the approval of the Secretary is still required, the grant or ratification of which is made subject only to certain conditions, precisely to remove all clouds of doubt regarding the validity of these instruments which do not bear his signature. The fulfillment of the conditions must be proven to be extant in every case. Justice Carpio Morales likewise submitted the proposition that there is no statutory basis for the requirement of the Department Secretary's signature on the Certificate of Sale, apart from a strained deduction of Section 18. On the majoritys general proposition that a claim of ownership must fail in the absence of positive evidence showing the Department Secretarys approval, which cannot simply be presumed or inferred from certain acts, Justice Carpio Morales countered: Jurisprudential review is gainful only insofar as sett ling that the approval by the Department Secretary is indispensable to the validity of the sale. Case law does notcategorically state that the required approval must be in the form of a signature on the Certificate of Sale. On what constitutes the positive evidence of approval to lend validity to the sale of friar lands, Justice Carpio Morales held:

The ponencia concludes, as a matter of course on the strength of Sections 11, 12 and 15, that the certificate of sale must be signed by the Department Secretary for the sale to be valid. As discussed earlier, these three Sections neither support the theory that such signing is required in the sale certificate nor shed light to the specifics of approval. I submit that the Department Secretarys signature on the certificate of sale is not one of the requirements for the issuance of the Deed of Conveyance under Act No. 1120. To require another signature of the Department Secretary on the Certificate of Sale, on top of that deemed placed by Order 16-05 on the Deed of Conveyance, is to impose a redundant requirement and render irrelevant the spirit of said Order. IN FINE, petitioners having complied with the conditions for the applicability of Order 16-05, their Deed of Conveyance is deemed signed or otherwise ratified by said Order. It bears emphasis that Order 16-05 is a positive act on the part of the Department Secretary to remedy the situation where, all other conditions having been established by competent evidence, the signature of the Department Secretary is lacking. The Order aims to rectify a previous governmental inaction on an otherwise legally valid claim, or affirm an earlier approval shown to be apparent and consistent by a credible paper trail. Obviously, the incumbent Department Secretary can no longer probe into the deep recesses of his deceased predecessors, or unearth irretrievably tattered documents at a time when the country and its records had long been torn by war, just to satisfy himself with an explanation in the withholding of the signature. The meat of Order 16-05 contemplates such bone of contention as in the present case. The cloud of doubt regarding the validity of the conveyance to petitioners predecessors -ininterest having been removed by Order No. 16-05, petitioners title over Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is, I submit, valid.