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Understanding the Liberal Peace1 Oliver P. Richmond2 Reader in International Relations University of St Andrews “To remember Hiroshima is to commit oneself to peace.”3 ‘Pax Invictis’4 “Virtue runs amok.”5 Introduction What is peace? This essay examines the genealogy of the ‘problem of peace’- the consequence of conceptualising peace as a negative epistemology- taking as its starting point its assumed conceptualisation in most academic and policy documentation and literatures.6 This may be described as the ‘liberal peace’.7 The liberal peace is assumed to be unproblematic in its internal structure, and in its acceptance in post-conflict zones, thought its methodological application may be far from smooth.8 The liberal peace’s main components- democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalised markets, and neo-liberal development- are increasingly being critiqued from several different perspectives. These critiques have focused upon the incompatibility of certain stages of democratisation and economic reform, the ownership of development projects and thick and thin versions of the neoliberal agenda, the possible incompatibility of post-conflict justice with the stabilisation of society, and the problem of crime and corruption in economic and political reform and the establishment of the rule of law. These terrains are relatively well explored.9 What has received rather less attention is the scope and conceptualisation of the liberal peace itself. There appear to be four main strands of thinking within the liberal peace framework. These include the victor’s peace, the institutional peace, the constitutional peace, and the civil peace.10 The victor’s peace has evolved from the age-old argument that a peace that rests on a military victory, and upon the hegemony or domination of that victor is more likely to survive. The institutional peace rests upon attempts to anchor states within a normative and legal context in which states multilateral agree how to behave and how to enforce or determine their behaviour. The constitutional peace rests upon the Kantian argument that peace rests upon democracy, trade, and a set of cosmopolitan values that stem from the notion that individuals are ends in themselves, rather than means to an end. The civil peace is derived from the phenomena of direct action, of citizen advocacy and mobilisation, in the attainment or defence of basic human rights and values. These aspects of the liberal peace are both contradictory and complimentary, and each brings with it a certain intellectual and empirical baggage. The victor’s peace framework has been subject to the hamartia of territorial and strategic over-extension, greed, and an inability to control unruly subjects despite its impositionary qualities. The civil peace discourse often struggles to be heard, even

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though it may be propagated by non-state actors motivated by human security and social justice, who blame the state for war, or liberal states for self-interest. The institutional peace discourse struggles to cope with many discordant voices and the enormity of its systemic project, which requires the consent of a broad range of actors. Its development and implementation and has drawn the UN system, IFIs, and agencies into the quagmire of multilateral governance. It struggles to create consensus or to communicate with those involved at the civil level, or to receive and respond to feedback on its overall project. The constitutional peace struggles with those who do not want to share power in domestic constitutional situations, and who do not want the certainty of domestic legal structures that might outlaw their activities. It struggles to overcome the simple binaries it depends upon- the territorial inside/ outside, and the identity of friend or enemy. How does one emancipate without dominating, without ignoring difference, without knowing the mind of the other? How do these different discourses interweave, play themselves out, and communicate with each other, without competing, dominating or negating each other. How can those who ‘know’ peace talk to those who do not? So arises the question of the nature of peace, and how it is to be achieved. The fact that peace is so rarely openly conceptualised and explicitly defined in much international discourse other than in negative terms is, in the light of the above, the ‘problem of peace’.11 The liberal peace is a discourse, framework and structure, with a specific ontology and methodology. Its projected reform of governance entails a communicative strategy on which depends its viability and legitimacy with its recipients. This operates both at a social and a state level. It cannot be achieved without significant resources. The allocation of those resources, the power to do so, and their control, is often the new site of power and domination in post conflict societies. It must be asked how this can be so while at the same time remaining true to the emancipatory claims of the liberal peace. It must also be said that the NGO and agency personnel, those in the UN, and World Bank, diplomats and officials, generally show great commitment to the countries they are working in (often in difficult, uncomfortable, and dangerous conditions), and are to a large degree implicitly, if not explicitly, aware of the problems of the liberal peace model.12 Many are committed to avoiding the creation of dependency, sensitive to the needs of local ownership, careful not to tread on the toes of local, district or central officials and governments, even where they may also feel that interests and politics are blocking their progress. They may be sensitive to such problems, while also recognising that their professional roles or the projects they are part of are in many ways inadequate. What little is done is normally better than nothing. They can adhere to the injunction “do no harm”,13 recently written into the mandates of UNDP, and the World Bank, for example, because they have an implicit if somewhat vague understanding that the liberal peace is what requires protecting from harm at the most basic level. Understanding the different conceptualisations of peace, and the different graduations of the liberal peace, therefore offers an important contribution towards unravelling the dilemmas and issues outlined above. These understandings offer a better awareness of what the objectives of multiple interventions engendered in the contemporary ‘peacebuilding consensus’ construct, and what different decisions, actions, and thinking, imply about the achievement of these objectives. To know peace provides a clearer understanding of what must be done, and what must be avoided, if it is to be achieved. First, we must know peace. The following essay argues that the liberal peace is subject to four graduations, which carry important implications for intervention, peace operations, and peacebuilding, for the

. the victor’s peace. and normative aspects of the liberal peace. Similar normative frameworks are also integral to the civil peace model. international. mainly western literatures and policy discourses (the dominant forms of ‘print capitalism’ 14 in the context of peace) are dominated by the liberal peace. institutional. Understanding Contemporary Thinking About Peace The implicit concepts of peace and their usages in the relevant.18 This is telling of the liberal peace project: it merely constructs a defence against the worst excesses of the state of nature. the constitutional. All of this is measured against the liberal peace. The emergence of the liberal peace reflects Augustinian thinking on ‘tranquillity of order’15. The subjectivity of the debate on the liberal peace is generally disguised by the objectification and universalisation of peace in theoretical and policy usage. epistemological. and for the exit strategies of internationals and other interveners. though there are divisions about whether this ideal form is practical or unobtainable. the contradictions of Hobbesian thinking on containing the state of nature. conceptualisation has underlined the ontological. and civil society level. but in particular during the Twentieth Century. that peace is represented by a community in which law and order prevail. both internally and externally. Of course. domestic. from the victor’s to the civil peace. This opens up the conceptualisations and imaginings of peace as a serious research agenda. It is presented as an ideal form. the Enlightenment and often Christian based work on constitutional peace. The liberal peace is a Platonic ideal form20 and a Kantian moral imperative: it is also a discourse or a master signifier that may sometimes silence any thought or discussion of other alternatives.16 and the project outlined by Quincy Wright. underpinned by various forms of liberalism and progressivism found therein.17 War is made in the ‘minds of men’ and therefore ‘…in the minds of men the defences of peace must be constructed’. and the Twentieth century secular attempts (but also tinged with non-secular. effectively nominate omniscient third parties which are then placed in a position to transfer external notions of peace into conflict societies and environments. have been strongly influenced by pacificism21 in that they construct the use of force as either defensive or in the name of the liberal peace (hence its imperial and neo-colonial overtones). All four strands of thinking about peace. and the notions of rationality and sovereignty. The liberal peace depends upon intervention. and civil notions of peace.19 The liberal peace is a hybrid of the age-old victor’s peace.3 sustainability of the peace to be constructed. though this is more strongly focused upon social justice. What is clear from this debate is the privileging of the western experience of peacemaking. This hegemonic. The basic characteristics of both thought and practice on peace are rooted in the Enlightenment. which of course has been on an enormous scale since the Treaty of Westphalia. or anarchy and hegemony implicit in its victor’s peace component. moving away from the constant assumption that peace is an ideal form. and a balance of consent and coercion. mainly western claims) to create an institutional peace at the structural.

This later discourse. by coalitions of organisations. free markets. development. assistance Institutional Peace Project Peace as regime based. liberal. a vibrant civil society. The liberal peace is created through the methodologies associated with a ‘peacebuilding consensus’. states. But. which were mainly European in origin and euro-centric in nature. mechanisms and tools deployed by epistemic communities which have the necessary expertise. the victor’s peace increasingly become diluted and disguised by the long-line of peace projects in the post Enlightenment period. and then in the Twentieth century the formalisation of an institutional discourse on peace. institutions. a methodology. in which multiple actors at multiple levels of analysis in rigid conditional relationships with each began its universal construction according to a mixture of conservative. Tools.22 This construction requires a specific ontology of peace. again underpinned by the victor’s peace. and a conditional relationship between them and actors upon whom the Liberal Peace is being visited. and multilateralism. involved in a conditional relationship between them and locations where the liberal peace is being constructed.4 Figure 1 A Genealogy of the Liberal Peace Victor’s Peace Project Constitutional Peace Project (peace as democracy. coalitions of organisations. Liberal Peace These notions have lengthy antecedents and the victor’s peace has remained a key aspect of the liberal peace. human rights. which still seem to depend on others being able to know. 23 This . the emergence of a private discourse on peace with the growth of NGOs and civil society actors. Epistemic Communities which have expertise. states. and distributive tendencies. aid. and NGOs. institutions. underpinned by international organisation Construction of the Liberal Peace Requires Methodology. regulative. law and trade) Civil society Peace Project Peace as disarmament. and install peace for those caught up in conflict. even possibly including the emancipatory discourses. where like-minded liberal states coexist in a westernoriented international society and states are characterised by democracy. formed the basis for the hybrid form that was to become the liberal peace.

This important capacity is of course of great benefit to the predominantly state-centric liberal peace project. these dynamics are also subject to change. Indeed. enshrined in domestic constitutional documentation. consent. Despite the assured nature of the liberal peace from this perspective the peacebuilding consensus is heavily contested both in discourse and in practice. and marginalisation through either a universal critical order. and also which aspect of the liberal peace should be prioritised. It also contains a post-positivist strand. It underpins the constitutional and institutional peace. or even the outright use of force. though it is heavily disguised. It contains a positivist strand that seeks to create a basic level order through scientific investigation of the interactions of units vis-à-vis a re-ordering of resources and structures. Their control of this process rests upon a combination of inducement. law. it has been argued that institutional and local capacity is actually being destroyed by intervention in conflict environments. What is rarely discussed in this context. civil society. and NGOs as to the objectives entailed in the different components of the liberal peace. which in the context of the liberal peace. The reform of governance is directed by an alliance of actors. focusing on emancipation from hegemony. At the same time. the outcome normally reflects the work of the earliest political theorists in the western tradition. is without question the key states. Knowing peace empowers an epistemic community. international organisations and international financial institutions. which become custodians of the liberal peace. means that many non-state actors have developed the capacity for the most intimate forms of intervention in states and in civil society in order to develop a civil peace and to contribute the broader liberal peace project. and effectively to conform to critical notions of peace. donors. so it is likely that different aspects of the liberal peace may receive more attention at different periods in the postconflict peacebuilding process. there is also disagreement on the methodologies to be applied for its creation. in which such actors are deployed as norm entrepreneurs promoting the validity of its components. Yet. being part of this framework of liberal peace provides certain rights. This means that victor’s peace continues to hold legitimacy. donors. domination. occasionally verging upon the coercive. This represents a continuum from war to absence of war or to peace. and in international treaties at the heart of the new peace.5 represents a superficial consensus of states. Yet. is which of these strands of the peace are the most evident in any particular post conflict environment. or through a reflection on an underlying ontological and epistemological understanding of being at. IOs. Their conditional relationship with recipients. and their focus upon the form of government required to create a durable peace. a multiple or hybrid peace. and executers of its components through the many agents of the peace building consensus. ROs. and trade. funders. This is often resisted by those working on bottom-up versions of peacebuilding. 25 The liberal peace conceptualisation also represents a hybrid of the main associated ontological and epistemological issues: it contains a philosophical strand that seeks to provide a normative understanding of how peace would be probably in terms of a universal moral order. and co-operation. These versions of peace combine governance. along with the emergence of a civil society and NGO discourse of peace (the ‘civil peace’). This mainly depends on where the observer is located. democracy. legitimately able to transfer the liberal peace into conflict zones. The liberal peace is often claimed to be emancipatory in the context of liberal and normative approaches.24 This is partly because those working from the top-down to construct the liberal peace tend to focus more on the state and its institutions. There is . but it is undeniable that the form of peace perceived is dominated by its main sponsors. Of course. and knowing.

30 Cosmopolitan versions of peace provides a universal basis (as with constructivist accounts) for the extension of internationalist and institutionalist arguments about cooperation. and economic reform. assuming that the liberal peace unquestionably forms the basis for theorising the ending of conflict. rules and rights. in the context of the states-system. prestige.27 It incorporates official and private actors from the local to the global. derived from debates in political theory and philosophy. and multilayered.31 Structuralist versions of peace require the replacement of structural violence. . There is little questioning of the validity of the liberal peace. institutionalism and constitutionalism. This is also reflected in the implicit development of concepts of peace in IR theory. as a logical extension of the debates on conflict management. efficiently. As a result. and civil conceptualisations of peace. or the way in which its various components fit together. who. hegemony. which is super-territorial. Peaceas-governance in state building terms focuses on the institutions of state as the basis for the construction of the liberal peace. and civil society converge in this version of peace in an era of governmentality.6 essentially a conditional relationship between different states and other actors involved in projecting the liberal peace. whether official or non-official actors. along with human rights reform. They give rise to ‘normalising’ activities involving the methodological transfer of knowledge from peaceable communities into conflict zones. institutional. and legal processes. control. This is the most common form of peace applied through a methodological peacebuilding consensus in conflict zones where international actors become involved. conflict resolution. A realist peace lies in the state centric balance of power. organisations. in which a reordering occurs in the distribution of power. These generations of thinking about approaches to ending conflict each reflect aspects of the victor’s peace. institutionalised in the alphabet soup of agencies. polities. Approaches to peace and conflict theory reflect this evolution clearly. and peacebuilding. responsibility.29 Liberal debates in IR theory. dominated by a hegemon. other than amongst its recipients. This is rarely made explicit. the constitutional peace plans of the medieval peace. it is assumed that democratisation. the agents they use to construct the peace. tend to be suspicious of outsiders’ objectives. peace studies. the different strands of thinking about peace. in its top down guise it is also a form of the victor’s peace. the constitutional. Most of the critical focus therefore tends to be on the methods used to construct the liberal peace most effectively. are complimentary.28 Debates on peacebuilding have moved into the terrain of the reform or construction of liberal modes of governance of economies. In terms of bottom-up peacebuilding different actors contribute to the liberal peace model by installing forms of peace-as-governance associated with the regulation. which operates to moderate the worst excesses of the state of nature. and protection of individuals and civil society. There is also little questioning of the motivation of the projectors and agents of the liberal peace. the empowerment of civil society. and the recipients of the liberal peace. and in particular those associated with internationalism and. The balance of power. however. and the institutional peace plans of the imperial and postimperial periods have converged on a contemporary notion of what I term peace-asgovernance.26 Thus. and development. But. and as quickly as possible. and institutions. and rights. it focuses on the governance of society. institutionalism see peace as existing in liberal institutions and international regimes governing international cooperation. For NGOs and agencies. relying on dominant states. The emergence of peacebuilding approaches since the 1990s have been effectively a hybrid reflecting the liberal peace extremely closely. conflict transformation. development.

In turn. The general deficit or oversight in its explicit study and conceptualisation has in essence arisen because the effort required to gain a concurrence about a ‘peace’ acceptable to all has in the past seemed impossible or unlikely. to establish the basis for an order which the hegemonic agents of the liberal peace recognise as an opportunity for its installation. Critical versions of peace extend the cosmopolitan argument in order to develop its treatment of social justice and communication to provide a much broader emancipatory discourse of peace. tending towards the coercive and often seen as an alien expression of hegemony and domination. not least the use of violence or humanitarian catastrophe. state-led peace.32 Like many of the afflictions of the developing world. sometimes through the use of force. Orthodox. Of course. tend to propagate development strategies in the first instance (though many US agencies and actors prefer the historical US focus on democratisation). in liberal or other guise. This .7 hegemony and domination. is to be achieved. This has given rise to a certain intellectual laziness. This equates to a hegemonic and often unilateral. with social justice. In these terms. There is first the conservative model of the liberal peace. peace is found in a cosmopolitan transcendence of parochial understandings of global responsibility and assistance. The next section examines the different graduations of the liberal peace these debates. Indeed. but more often at recent US unilateral state-building efforts. and Emancipatory Graduations within the Liberal Peace Framework The liberal peace project can be broken down into several different graduations.34 the same could be said of the problem of war and peace. and a sleight of hand. such as poverty and its associated implications (which have been unpacked by Thomas Pogge). rather than prevent. mainly in the developed. This is also indicative of the fact that peace is a slippery concept.33 the equation of development with the liberal peace may disguise the lack of capacity of the self-defined liberal and ‘peaceful’ states and actors of the ‘international community’ in their project to construct the liberal peace. both top-down or bottom up.35 Such charges are often levelled at the World Bank or the UN. There are many qualifying moves which any actor or individual must make before attracting the gaze of the liberal peacemakers. have the legitimate capacity to speak of peace and then only fleetingly and in a superficial mode. this lack of engagement actually acts as an arbitrary discrimination process in which only certain actors. Conservative. If we agree with the argument that developed states actually participate. post-structuralist approaches see peace as lying in the identification of structures of dominance and their complete replacement as a consequence of that identification. most international actors tend to equate challenges to the liberal peace with development and poverty and in practise most peacebuilding strategies. despite general aspirations towards it. as well as in civil society. a discourse of peace is a closely guarded privilege in the international community. which diplomats are fond of describing as the ‘art of the possible’. or through conditionality and dependency creation. This discrimination and silence must be addressed if an emancipatory peace. again to paraphrase Pogge. Thus. the problem of starvation because of the nature of global interdependence and responsibility. rich parts of the world. that has obscured the fact that this does not mean that there cannot and should not be any debate on these issues. mainly associated with top down approaches to peacebuilding and development.

the Balkans. and institutions. as well as through international NGOs. and Iraq represents a hyper-conservative model. especially as has been seen in Somalia. Local actor’s responses may also have some impact. It focuses upon and contests needs-based and rights-based activities. donor interests. donors. officials. and emancipatory versions of the liberal peace may actually contradict and undermine each other. A third discourse is provided by a more critical form of the liberal peace. This model is exemplified by the UN family’s practices of peacebuilding and governance reform. and tends to be very critical of the coerciveness. leading to disruption in the broader peacebuilding process. top-down peacebuilding activity tends to dominate particularly through the conditional models and practices of donors.36 However. These different actors. IOs. The militarisation of peace in this context. which is concerned with a much closer relationship of custodianship and consent with local ownership. but shaped by private actors and social movements. and norms into the new governance framework. through which peacebuilding is led by states. orthodox. mainly local and international NGOs in association with major agencies and some state donors. It represents a bottom up approach. During an emergency period the hyper-conservative or conservative version of the liberal peace may finds their raison d’etre at the top-down level and operate partly as a way of fulfilling the norms of the liberal international community. This is generally found again within the international organisations and institutions. but accentuates its discursive and negotiated requirements. organisations. and where it becomes an expression of external interest rather than external concern and responsibility. but still also determined to transfer their methodologies.38 The nominal unity of the peacebuilding consensus often breaks down exactly because of the internal competition. heavily informed by the victor’s peace in preliminary stages of intervention. The next discourse is provided within an orthodox model of the liberal peace in which actors are wary and sensitive about local ownership and culture. which become involved. Clearly. but also to preserve and reinforce the sanctity of the liberal peace model within the states- . tend to become more or less prominent in different phases of the conflict and the peacebuilding process. conservative. as well as the normative universality of the liberal peace. and generally is not state-led. Afghanistan. This framework is dominated by consensual negotiation. which started at the end of the Cold War and culminated in UN sovereignty for a time over East Timor. This critical approach to the liberal peace still envisages its universalism. and capacity of its different components. as does the interests of major states and donors. peacebuilding peace via grassroots and civil society oriented activities. and associated types of the liberal peace. as well as a top down approach. the emancipatory model. and IFIs. objectives. conditionality and dependency that the conservative and orthodox models operate on the basis of. and the capacity of peacebuilding actors. as has been seen in the case of the ‘Timorisation’ campaign in East Timor.8 represents a fear of moving peacebuilding into a terrain where coercion and even force may used to apply it. This peace equates to the civil peace. These main aspects of the liberal peace model often tend to be combined in the peacebuilding consensus and are expressed to different degrees in any one peacebuilding intervention. and still state-centric peace. This equates to a balanced and multilateral. This is mainly found within the bottom-up approach.37 or in Kosovo. Both the conservative and orthodox models assume technical superiority over recipient subjects. depending upon priorities associated with dominant state interests. interests. and tends to veer towards needs-based activity and a stronger concern for social justice.

This raises some important policy implications in terms of the different versions of the liberal peace outlined above. occurred in the broader context of a belief in the superiority. Depending on the strength this position.9 system. and lack of parsimony. or immediate post-conflict phase. institutions and constitutions that preserve or redefine the state but also provide for the interests and requirements of the general population. In a post-conflict reconstruction phase official actors may begin to shift to the orthodox version of the liberal peace. despite its breadth. Clearly. Agencies and NGOs often operate in both phases upon the basis of the more critical emancipatory version of the liberal peace. One could draw a broad teleological evolutionary line in which the victor’s peace gave way to a constitutional peace. to which was then added an institutional and civil peace in European and Western thinking and policymaking. All of these strands of the liberal peace are often presented as emancipatory in policy discourse. mainly agencies and NGOs. even top-down actors begin to move towards more critical emancipatory models of the liberal peace. however. This latter discourse appears to be the most legitimate of all of these models. while those working in the latter tend to be disdainful of consensual requirements and local ownership while ‘results’ are more pressing than sustainability in an emergency. This has. or contests a specific combination of all of the above. working within the critical model tend to be wary of the conservative approaches and their associated actors. infallibility. to the more consensual orthodox model. of course. . once sustainability becomes key in a post emergency phase. depending upon the conditions and thinking prevalent within the international community and within conflict zones. and internationals begin to think about their exit strategies. and universality of the liberal peace. the project of the liberal peace moves from the conservative coercive models. which focuses on the development of institutional relationships. Those actors. It is clear that there seems to be shifts between these different approaches. mainly because they are much more dependent upon local and donor consent. or even to the emancipatory model.

obstacles to trade. barriers to norms and regimes. universal form of peace should be aspired to but is unreachable Orthodox Method Top-down peacebuilding. and NGO personnel but led by local actors. Emancipatory Method Top-down and Peacebuilding Actors Combinations of state officials and regular/ irregular military forces. settlement more important than justice. or is territorially bounded. social actors. Ontology of Peace Peace is a product of force and elite diplomacy. obstacles to trade. Nature of Peace Civil Peace. Emancipatory Aims at universal coverage War. very limited. structural violence. Wary of external forms of domination being imported through external intervention. RO. and the axis along which the nature of the liberal peace can be located. As with conservative model. Actors State officials and regular/ irregular military forces Nature of Peace Victor’s peace. under-development. war and capacity for war. RO. peace is utopian Conservative Method Force and Diplomacy. focus on social movements. but long term measures for sustainability also included: institutional. Sustainability of Peace: Negligible Exit of Internationals: Unlikely limited possible in long term? high Likely in medium to long term Hyper-Conservative Method Use of Force Actors State officials and regular/ irregular military forces Nature of Peace Victor’s peace defined solely by military superiority. bottom-up . IO. IFI. terrorism. obstacles to necessary resources. identity conflict. it is universal and can be achieved through epistemic transference of technical knowledge and frameworks. constitutional. terrorism. identity conflict. under-development. military intervention leading leading to ceasefire. obstacles to trade and resources. Hyper-Conservative Geography: limited area of strategic allies Conservative Limited area of norm sharing allies. as well as state/ official actors. social justice as a pathway to peace. economic. and civil governance measures for political. free communication and representation. Ontology of Peace Peace rests on social justice and open and free communication between social actors. IFI. some bottom-up peacebuilding Actors State officials and regular/ irregular military forces. developments. mediation or negotiation. structural violence. and issues. Quasi military measures such as peacekeeping deployed for long periods. IO. War. Ontology of Peace Peace is not possible. Orthodox Still geographically bounded but aims at universal coverage. Nature of Peace Constitutional and institutional Peace. Ontology of Peace Peace rests on mainly on constitutional and institutional measures. elements of victor’s peace through hegemony rather than use of force. and social issues imported through conditional relationship between agents of peacebuilding and recipients. Agency. terrorism. constitutional peace settlement/ international peace treaty (but not an institutional peace).10 Figure 2 Graduations of the Liberal Peace Model This figure illustrates the working conceptualisations of peace developed. social justice. recognition of difference and otherness. terrorism. which control Agencies and NGOs. complete? likely in medium to long term Threat: Regular and irregular Regular and irregular war and capacity for war.

A significant number of examples can be provided for this movement. as many of the cases in Figure 2 indicate. ROs.11 Figure 3 Current Examples of the Liberal Peace Hyper-Conservative Conservative Orthodox Emancipatory Iraq/ Afghanistan (Bosnia 1995.40 Where entry is based upon a peace agreement with broad consensus. What the above seems to illustrate is that entry into a conflict zone is often predicted on a conservative version of the liberal peace. Kosovo 1999. and the four graduations of the liberal peace outlined above. No cases can be located within the emancipatory graduation. can be drawn in a number of cases. and likely areas of resistance. the above diagrams illustrate the tendency for internationals to enter a conflict environment somewhere within the conservative graduation.39 Clearly. IFIs. However. and (iii) the sustainability of this peace. its costs. It indicates the general tendency of peacebuilding interventions. and socioeconomic well-being and development seems to mar all international involvements in the post-Cold War era. Agencies. NGOs Objective of Intervention Current Status It is vital to identify the graduations of the liberal peace that are being constructed through different types of intellectual and policy analysis. though it should be acknowledged that interventions often show some cross-over between these graduations. the lack of social justice. and then aspire (both the internationals and local recipients included) to move along the axis to the orthodox peace. and indeed. in order to evaluate the effectiveness and sustainability of peacebuilding approaches. and by different actors. moving along the axis towards the orthodox category tends not to occur. and from which the implications for sustainability of the peace. and socially and economically unsustainable despite the length of time the internationals have been involved. The figures above illustrate the axis along which the nature of the liberal peace can be located. where the political entity (state or not) is weak. but a significant number also remain mired within the conservative graduation of the liberal peace. experience seems to show that where force is used in a hyper-conservative initial approach. as Figure 2 illustrates. . Somalia 1993) Somalia/ Bosnia/ Kosovo/ Rwanda/Sierra Leone/ Congo/ Haiti East Timor/ Cambodia El Salvador/ Angola/ Mozambique/ Namibia/ Nicaragua/ Guatemala Objective of UN. which is both sustainable and allows the internationals to withdraw. This should lead to a better understanding of (i) the type of peace being created. with the aspiration of moving towards the orthodox position. This analysis and comparison carry important policy and intellectual implications and open the way for a greater intellectual and policy understanding of the agendas inherent in the different aspects of the liberal peace project. The best illustration of this appears to be Bosnia and Kosovo. it often occurs within the conservative graduation but moves rapidly towards the orthodox. This is represented by a configuration of the main four discourses of peaces. (ii) impediments to peace.

Japan. but moving along the axis towards the emancipatory version. Canada.the victor’s peace. despite the fact that they may not be complimentary. Clearly. as well as suspicion of the intentions of internationals. lack of development. and institutions. but they all share an assumption of universality. as well as a lack of confidence in constitutions. and of the superiority of the epistemic peacebuilding community over its recipients. or through NGOs. The OSCE and EU have probably the most explicit view of their end goals. there is suspicion of the intentions of internationals. In the more critical approaches. conditionality is imposed from the top down by the external actors involved. The US tends to focus on the victor’s peace as well as the constitutional peace.depends on which actors take the lead in intervention or coordination. terrorism and political violence. which also emphasise the institutional peace and associated forms of multilateralism. and civil society is marred by joblessness. through the UN. and other forms of structural violence. In practice. This is despite the lengthy presence of the many internationals.41 If a sustainable peace is to be constructed there can be no exit until both locals and internationals have agreed that such a version of peace has actually been achieved. underdevelopment. the viability of the states being formed. though it must be noted that on all terms apart from per capita. What is more. The conservative approaches tend to be more conditional. Internationals are now learning that where they set conditionalities so local actors also expect conditionalities to be observed. a lack of confidence in the new polity. however. local actors are being adept at manipulating conditionalities in their favour. throughout the Balkans. agencies. For instance. human rights. development. conditionality is subject to negotiation. which may then shift from the conservative to the orthodox. as well as a civil peace. though this can also be seen in the more critical liberal peace approaches in relations between grass roots actors and donors. and Norway. Furthermore. and of local actors. which are constituted in terms of the orthodox category above. of local politicians. and international relations with institutions. and in the economy are often key problems. human rights abuses. the emphasis of different aspects of the liberal peace. often argue that their understanding of peace is often .42 Those engaged in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. the US is the biggest contributor to all of the different aspects of the construction of the liberal peace. and acute problems relating both to unemployment and ethnic chauvinism. forms of nationalism. as do major donors such as Britain.12 This raises the question of what the requirements are for the construction of a specific graduation of the liberal peace. the liberal peace discourse focuses on constitutional democracy. and the often tortuous slowness of the shift from the pre. institutional. In the conservative discourse. The liberal peace ranges from the virtual and highly interventionary to the more consensual versions which are also concerned with social justice. these providing the general framework through which the liberal peace can be achieved. the processes have created very weak states. The UN family tends to focus simultaneously on all aspects. All of these versions of the liberal peace identify geographical zones that are to be safe from war. This conditionality is also two-way. which legitimates intervention. constitutional. NGOs and agencies tend to focus on the civil peace. thus acquiring a bottom-up aspect and being coloured more by social justice concerns. however. All of these strands of the liberal peace have graduated approaches to consent and conditionality. but the institutional peace provides its raison d’etre (though this is constrained by the imperative to foster and preserve state sovereignty as part of its charter).intervention situation to even the most limited and conservative form of the liberal peace. In these conditions. and civil.

and even the liberal peace. and what impact this has upon the recipients identity? Again these open questions underline the subjective ontology of peace. and local actors in the specific context of East Timor. states. All of these different approaches within the liberal peace framework often claim to be emancipatory. who use peace. that the preponderant framework relates to the reconstruction of the state. Afghanistan and Iraq. who carries it out as its agents. There is a general tendency to respond to the seriousness of conflict or war by moving the intervention along the liberal peace axis toward the hyperconservative framework. There is often an unspoken narrative that these actors and individuals have preserved the aspiration of an emancipatory peace in the face of the hegemonic qualities of the liberal peace. They all find their raison d’etre in the identification and response to specific threats identified against the liberal peace project. resisting the self-interested politics of ideology. Most contemporary peacebuilding cases can be placed somewhere between the conservative and orthodox liberal peace components in terms of their preponderant approaches. Cambodia. Angola. domination. The conservative notions of liberal peace and the critical notions act. and the limits of the liberal peace. They appear more comfortable claiming to locate their activity as a counter-discourse of an emancipatory peace which is in tension with conservative versions of the liberal peace. as brakes upon each other and upon the worst excesses of hegemony. for their own ends. and Kosovo. and those who operate or deploy them. to push the focus back along the axis toward the orthodox framework. The orthodox and emancipatory models would be more significant if one focused on agencies and NGOs and their peace projects. and more recently. this depends upon which phase of the peacekeeping/ peacebuilding intervention was under review). perhaps slowly moving toward the orthodox model. and in tension which each other. and relativism. and policy terms. This then raises serious questions about the sustainability of the peace that is being created. and then as peacebuilding consolidates. democratisation and development are also seen to be a right and in the recent report on the Responsibility to Protect the broader international community is called upon to protect communities and individuals where their host states are unable. It must be acknowledged. social.44 This is a far more interventionist agenda for peace than ever before: the liberal peace works only by creating a basis for liberal states and organisations to intervene to correct abnormalities in others’ political. Furthermore. would fit somewhere between the hyper-conservative and conservative frameworks (of course. This raises the question of what is emancipation.43 In the UN triptych of Agendas. Xanana Gusmao was evidently extremely aware of the questions relating to the nature of the peace that were apparent. These general positions can be broken down further by examining the different actors involved. but socioeconomic deprivation. Somalia.13 actually something much more than the liberal peace. they exist side by side. and economic practices. Bosnia. Given the significance of the experience of both internationals. it should not be surprising that the East Timorese President. however. conceptual. donors. and who receives. and why. and an engagement with the experience of recipient communities on the part of internationals. meaning that the conservative and orthodox discourse are the most commonly expressed through these peace operations. . both in theoretical. who understands and transfers it. and East Timor generally fit into the orthodox frameworks. a lack of development. In one of the most explicit documents in existence from the policy world on the nature of peace he argued that the experience of East Timor indicated that peace was a basic human right and this involved not just responses to international and civil violence.

constitutional and international levels. creating the liberal peace is about disciplining those deemed to be responsible for such abnormal practices through conditionality and effective transnational governance regimes controlled by liberal states. However. which recognises that its achievement is so difficult that this effectively justifies minimalist strategies for peace because of the presence of threats and the concurrent need for a militarised peace. and Epistemological Implications The ontological and epistemological undercurrents of these discourses about have not yet received much attention. yet it still forms the basis of much mainstream theorising in IR. It is amazing that this evolution of thinking about peace has occurred both in discourses and practices since Kissinger presented this view as an . If liberal peace is a right. the orthodox graduation would probably provide a minimum long-term aspiration. Notwithstanding these notions of peace as a right. NGOs. then clearly this raises the question of which form of liberal peace? It is clear that while the conservative versions may have some legitimacy in an illiberal transitional phase.14 Thus. Kissinger appears to be arguing that peace is merely the avoidance of conflict at best.has been the primary objective of a power or a groups of powers. This view echoes Kissinger’s argument that. Yet. the international system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community. “Whenever peace. structural violence. social welfare and justice are less well attended to. But Kissinger is correct to point out that ‘a generally accepted legitimacy’ is a key to the stability that he describes. this is clearly not how it has come to be conceptualised though those involved in the construction of the liberal peace are not averse to war as a tool of its construction. and constitutions may well be deferred (referring to the conservative versions of the liberal peace). as can be seen in the context of Afghanistan and Iraq.” 46 This view of peace seems positively antiquarian. Ontological. and the role of the international community and its agencies therein. The thin form exists where these levels of consensus are deferred into the future. The thick version occurs where there is a broad consensus represented at the civil. they legitimate its use by claiming that the elements of the liberal peace are universally legitimate. and has actually come to engender war itself.conceived as the avoidance of war.47 Implicitly it must also form the basis of the peace he appears to believe is unobtainable. Yet. led by a militarycivilian alliance in which the military may be preponderant. In both cases the liberal peace is often in the hands of an international epistemic community of peacebuilders. So peace is now conceptualised as far more sophisticated than the avoidance of war. organisations. and where physical violence. despite the fact that it has huge implications for the future of peacebuilding in collapsed or failing states around the world. as currently exists in a recognisable form in the West and amongst liberal states (referring to the orthodox version of the liberal peace). boundaries. Despite the graduations in discourses of peace outlined above. they are implicit in the various academic and policy literatures. the shift in the liberal peace model has generally been toward the conservative rather than emancipatory model. and donors and IFIs. the dominant view of peace has been one in which it exists as an ideal form. In general peace is commonly represented as a thick or thin form of social contract45 (coinciding with the conservative/ orthodox liberal peace graduations on the axis in Figure 1) and a social construction. Methodological. and international recognition and agreement over status. This remains unexplained.

isolation. and from the reddressal of micro and even international social. This peace is one that colonises. police. and normally elite level consensus in their area of engagement to actors who had not yet been ‘enlightened’ as to these approaches. This complex position on peace. but with little recognition of this shift from policy makers and theorists. peace is still policy. levels. and unobtainable. We have moved from a narrow and simplistic view of peace in which it was absolute.53 Similarly. This is what Rasmussen has called a ‘negative epistemology’ of peace.50 Thus. A state perspective of peace incorporate internal domestic stability amongst citizens. Regional organisations also see peace in this vein. International financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank see peace as a specific form of economic governance. of course. ideal. All of this is contested and racked by dissensus: yet the liberal peace construction project continues unabated. Much of the discourse of the liberal peace is derived from the development of a governance approach. economic. developmental. and specific models of development. and human rights issues. government and bureaucracy.51 According to Walker the construction of binaries has been one of the key approaches for mainstream theories of IR. International organisations and institutions see peace as a product of their mediating and norm-building role in which they act to build an international consensus. Amongst states. to a far more sophisticated epistemology and ontology of the concept.15 absolute truth. institutions. the liberal peace project has endeavoured to produce a peace that is stable and consensual. It is constructed through a process of intervention in which carrots are provided for specific types of reform in a system of conditionality which constructs a version of peace-as-governance. This has opened up the debates that Kissinger wanted to avoid. and institutions of governance by external actors. All of these different versions of peace emanating from actors within the international system seem to coincide in the context of the communitarian/ cosmopolitan debate about thick and thin versions of international order. and hegemony. these actors often operate as if peace was not at all problematic. This is essentially the peacebuilding consensus. Wilmer has argued in the context of former Yugoslavia that reconstruction and reconciliation and the construction of . that a universal peace could be created out of a consensus constructed in their area of cooperation and brought about by promoting the spread of a broader. control. rather than fact. and the global. The evolution of thinking about peace seems to show that it is an ontologically unstable concept (indicative of ontological insecurity). including balance of power approaches and discourses on security and sovereignty. and global governance. and army.52 This has meant that for a variety of conceptual approaches to IR. disarmament. problematic as it might be. a common pattern has emerged which depends upon the identification of threats and of an ‘other’. political. which since 1945 has focused on the reform and regulation of both domestic government. The liberal peace is a hegemonic discourse and practice. As Rasmussen has argued.48 Indeed. International agencies such as UNDP or UNHCR see peace as relating to their more specific activities within the UN system. needs to be clearly elucidated before we can begin to decide whether it has the potential to become ontologically stable and a positive epistemology. the state. peace is a balance brought about by cooperation.49 But the history of engagement with the construction of peace indicates that it has been generally thought of as an ontologically stable concept. openness. it is created through a peacebuilding consensus. which creates multiple processes. in a regulative and restrictive fashion. agencies. NGOs see peace as stemming from a global civil society. but within this cosmopolitan framework of governance which is both a representation of the individual.

This challenge to the mainstream can be constructed in terms of the creation of a positive epistemology of peace. however. the “international community” has been articulated by Western states/ people as a normative space. in part by defining the “international-community-as-self/ subject” as distinct from “backward. an emancipatory project in IR vis-à-vis peace has emerged which can be found in the work of an eclectic range of theorists from Cox to Walker.58 Cooper. realist.54 There is an important point here in that the peacebuilding consensus and peace-asgovernance have been constructed as ways around the incessant problem of seeing peace as a negative epistemology revolving around short term ‘threat assessments’. This is most often played out in a discourse of moral superiority versus inferiority: ‘Simultaneously. Drawing on the work of critical theorists and post-structuralists. and Der Derian.and technique.59 Yet this is a common misconceptualisation.representing the liberal peace as a distinct break with past versions of peace. Gramsci. Indeed. and the dominant threat discourses present in the international system. are troubled across the world. Habermas and others. The liberal peace has clear and unambiguous continuities with earlier versions and discourses. Part of the problem with this approach is its complexity. Peace.57 who themselves draw upon Foucault. and regimes. sees the world as divided into the pre-modern. while still aspiring to the plausibility. and is understood in opposition to threats. This is especially so in the light of strong evidence that the reductionist strategies of the internationals in the context of the peacebuilding consensus. and structuralist traditions. often to be achieved in or for the future. governance. Both the acts of defining and constructing peace are therefore hegemonic acts dependent upon international institutionalisation. if not possibility of universalism.56 Such approaches are indicative of a critical and post-modern construction of a counter debate to the general mainstream essentialisation of negative epistemological assumptions about peace that it is to be found in protective securitisation discourses within the traditional liberal. Linklater. This seems to be the main thrust of the act of defining or projecting peace. Whether they have achieved this. The recognition of the sheer complexity both of conflict. has long been a policy goal as Cooper points out. legitimates the use of force for its ends. incorporating progressively blurring distinctions between inside and outside. to name but a few. and post-modern. this looks very similar to the notion of imperial sovereignty. modern. which is very dubious. the increasing ‘non-place’ of empire. and of the peace projects of internationals is necessary. But this is also where its sophistication lies.and that the liberal peace is in practice often little more than a ‘virtual peace’. This reaffirms the claim that peace is ontologically unstable as a concept and should be recognised as such both by those inside the machinery of its construction and those seeking to understand and explain it. more specifically. The liberal peace is generally understood to be geographically limited. and one which attempts to avoid Orientalism and totalism. for example. It also presents the liberal peace as a critical or post-modern emancipatory project. indigenous peoples-as-other-object”. and supported by a notion of ‘omni-crisis’. in which a new imperialism is quite plausible and may effectively be equated with the construction of the liberal peace. The different and . or merely replaced it with a new imperial sovereignty (in the words of Hardt and Negri)55 is a matter of some debate.16 ‘otherness’ plays a key role.

the implication being that war may be necessary for peace.65 It is no surprise then that. War and peace are both social and political inventions:63 but war is generally seen as abnormal.17 dominant ontologies of peace illustrate that fact that peace is often based upon totalising. and so forth. Virtual Peace. antagonisms. underdevelopment. either through their acts or more basically through the peace discourses that are employed to describe conflict and war as located in opposition to agents of peace. In this sense.61 Thus peace. specifically in the context of western enlightenment and post. discords. there are also those who argue that peace must be attained rather than preserved. or simply against the multiple security issues that war creates for states and individuals.enlightenment thinking. all of them initiated by the US.62 It is of little surprise that the political and social institutions of both war and peace always coexist. universal claims which are both self-referential and under-developed. Peace is contested.”67 In other words. with technology and mobility. war.66 What this leaves open is what type of peace the ‘RMA’ helps construct. Either this is a situation of violence or war. Many assertions about peace are actually a forms of Orientalism in that they depend upon actors which know peace creating it for those that do not. becomes a visualisation of a social order in which war is controlled and ultimately abolished. Thus peace can be juxtaposed against systemic war. As the sociologist William Graham Sumner has argued.60 However. war. After the attacks on the US on 9/11/2001 the restrictions introduced in liberal states to combat the threat of symbolic forms of terrorism and to preserve the hegemony of the liberal state. What also becomes clear is that peace needs to be juxtaposed with a non-peace situation in order to have any meaning. by widening the peace group more and more. began to undermine the very freedoms of the liberal peace. it can at last embrace all mankind. Perhaps it might also be that the tendency to assume the virtuousness of the liberal peace is abnormal. or it can be juxtaposed against threats such as those seen in ethnic separatism or in the use of terrorism against the state. The task became one of how to preserve this peace while retaining security. As Howard has argued. War becomes peace. and even humanitarian catastrophe. a research agenda is needed which starts with the type of peace . Peace becomes war. and war begin inside of it on account of the divergence of interests. conflict. Most people conceptualise peace as a satisfaction with their lot in the context of what he argues are rather basic expectations. as it grows bigger. in Howard’s words. What happens is that. a universal understanding of peace may be a fallacy: “It is a fallacy to suppose that. peace merely becomes a discourse deployed to legitimate a response to perceived threats. or a threat. As Der Derian has pointed out much of US official rhetoric in recent times has linked the creation of peace with a revolution in military affairs. as peace spreads it collapses. since the end of WWII the US has been involved in what he called a ‘perpetual war for perpetual peace’ on hundreds of fronts. differences. Virtuous Peace Rather than starting with the problems caused by conflict.64 Power is still inextricably linked with peace as well as war. as Gore Vidal argued in an essay entitled “Black Tuesday”. thus indicating rather more sophisticated demands for the nature of peace. peace and war are derived from perceptions.

The peace being constructed in the various contemporary conflict zones around the world looks very different from the perspectives of local communities. more concrete. western political thought and policy has reproduced a science and methodology of peace based upon political. the reality. But. and legal frameworks. is explicitly advantageous for western liberal states and their interventionary policies in that this allows the superficial distinction based upon domestic and international public law to obscure the fact that in reality. polities. this is an expression of hegemony. is the democratic peace in post-conflict societies much more than a virtual construction by outsiders for the consumption of their own audiences? Of course. and of course. complete with a viable economy. and the internationals can withdraw. much has been achieved in conflict zones by the agents of the peacebuilding consensus. accepted. and to aspire to move towards the orthodox framework where the liberal peace becomes self-sustaining. Yet.is that intervention focuses upon the creation of the hard shell of the state and rather less so on establishing a working society. the possibility is that the ‘virtuous’ distinction between peace and war. but looks and feels like its more conservative version from the inside. It is also clear that the internationals’ representation of their achievements is often skewed in favour of what donors and the main actors in the international community want. This require extensive and ongoing consultation and research in order to develop these ideas so that they are ready to be negotiated. on the ground in many parts of the world. rejected.a tempered victor’s peace in which its agents and its . When internationals engage in conflict zones. by which conflict in the world is judged and dealt with. one of the first questions they might ask of disputants at the many different levels of the polity. cultural. social. the tendency appears to be for interventions to enter a conflict environment somewhere within the conservative category. upon the explicit understanding that this would be merely an interim (and possibly illiberal) measure.18 envisaged in a particular situation and at a particular level analysis. This appropriateness would be negotiated from the perspective of the internationals. war and terrorism that do not move beyond the strategic analyses of state interest runs the risk of remaining ‘virtual’. the use of strategies and theories for understanding conflict. local actors. and constructed when and where becomes necessary. but these achievements are mainly measured by their own frameworks and standards.69 Indeed. Indeed. meaning that peacebuilding occurs at two starting points. and is emphasised by the fact that these discourses are so rarely acknowledged. Clearly. This would have to occur in the explicit context of responses to the root causes of the conflict. which creates a situation of virtual peace. the other would compensate.underlines exactly this. and officials. Indeed. by particular actors whether they are intervening or are local actors. This is clear in the discourses about peace that are in evidence. peace and war are synonymous in actuality. and other interventionary actors. Where one set of actors could not agree.especially from the point of view of those who are experiencing it. In a rather Orientalist manner.as Orwell and Foucault have already pointed out. it would concurrently build peace from the perspective of the specific notion of peace deemed to be appropriate for the specific environment. economies. custodians.apparent from the Balkans to East Timor.68 This results in a virtual peaceone which looks like the virtuous orthodox liberal peace from the outside. economic.the victory of ‘democratic theory’. might be what type of peace could be envisaged? Working towards such an explicit end goal would be of great benefit both to internationals and recipients of intervention. As represented in Figure 2. Rather than merely beginning from the identification of the root causes of the conflict. war to create the liberal peace.

in fora designed for multiple voices and free communication. the motivations of interveners and recipients in their relationship. The post-Gramscian notion of plural ‘hegemonies’70 encapsulates the liberal peace as a form of both multiple hegemonies and a single dominant discourse promoted by powerful states. involving political. and conflict. economic. The top down construction of the liberal peace dominates the epistemic community engaged in the construction of the institutions the liberal peace. The liberal peace legitimates the use of force and external long-term governance. For peace to be acceptably transformed. Peace can be problem-solving or emancipatory. war. most work dealing with peace both directly or indirectly fails to present a working definition of the peace that is being imagined. conditionality. and mediated. certainly in its more conservative forms. a virtual peace may be of a problem-solving character despite its ‘virtuous’ claims to be emancipatory. constitutional. It is in this context that it becomes clear that the liberal peace may well be a virtual peace. which treads a narrow path between dependency. the moral equivalence of interveners and the recipients of intervention. Examining a research agenda on the nature of peace rather than merely the nature of conflict and intermediate responses. social and economic interventions. and conditionality. negotiated. wars with no outcome except an end to . and even cultural intervention through external governance. it first needs to be understood. In this sense. Again.in this case of the liberal peace. This has increasingly taken the form of military occupation. not least the relationship and indeterminacy of forms of peace and war. despite (or because of) the fact that it is based upon deep-rooted intervention in governance. contemporary liberal peace as hegemonic. this represents a hybrid of the civil. and the militarist strategies associated with the realist project. neutrality. Ironically. a form of rehabilitation of imperial duty and a liberal imperative. but peace without external governance may not be achieved. Yet. nor engage with any of the epistemological. provides a much clearer vision of the specific project of peace implied and engaged with by specific intellectual and policy approaches to international order.and its key problems. essentially. but highly conditional understanding of. the liberal peace treads a fine line between a coercive peace based upon ‘…wars to determine once and for all what is good for all. impartiality. Top down approaches to the creation of peace have been based upon a mix of idealism associated with humanitarianism and through political. The graduations of the liberal peace are implicit in the construction of peace in the contemporary era but dangers in this project have become apparent.71 This peace project needs to respond to the suspicion that ‘[L]iberalism destroys democracy…’72 and that different forms and components of the liberal peace may effectively be incoherent…’. it engenders a whole range of debates about hegemony. methodological. Such claims have to be made on behalf of someone or something and the voices of the marginalized are often swamped by such hegemonic voices. or ontological issues it raises. and sustainability. This is. social.19 recipients clamour to be heard and to influence the outcome. Peace-as-governance is often presented as a transitional phase but a final outcome may remote. Because the liberal peace is virtual and highly interventionary. Peace has thus been transformed from a possibly unobtainable utopia coloured by the ideology and norms of the perceiver to an objectified graduation of the liberal peacean actually existing and obtainable peace propagated through an epistemic peacebuilding community. It underlines the possibilities of this project. This process is still little more than embryonic endorsing recent and critical claims about a regulative and distributive. and victor’s strands of thinking about peace. but in either case it is always laden with agendas related to actors’ interests and objectives. institutional.

20 politics and the liberation of difference…. rather than focussing more directly on peace. What this essay has underlined is that there is a need for a research agenda on the different components of the liberal peace (as well as any possible alternatives). has likewise mainly focused upon the roots of violence and their prevention. how human rights. There has been little research on the nature of the liberal peace project and few attempts to disaggregate its components. The IR project seems to have become wrapped up mainly in the discussion of war and the problems of international order construction. We need to know how one gains consent for it. and threats to this project. democratisation. how they overlap. how it is legitimated. and where they may impede each other. how actors learn in this context. and how they interact with each other. The conflict studies project has remained true to the discussion of the roots of violence and how to identify and placate them. and the peace studies project. free market reform and globalisation actually fit together. development. humanitarian assistance and aid. as there is much evidence to show that this interaction may often be negative. then this is inexcusable. apart from the notable democratic peace project. universal governance. .’ 73 and a peace based upon consensual. If we claim we now ‘know’ what peace is.

18 Ibid. Jack Snyder. I would like to thank the many people. K.or war. Anderson. 1.18-20. p. Mark Duffield. Op. 13.6. Inscribed on the Tomb of the Unknown Solider in St. p. Translated by Francis MacDonald Cornford. p. 14 Benedict Anderson. Jarat Chopra and Tanja Hohe. Chandra Sriram. 1 . Vivienne Jabri. NY: Verso. vol. and Peter Wallensteen. Michael Mandelbaum. 10.. Cambridge: CUP.ac. University of St.257. 1983. Challenges.uk. 25th February 1981. Review of International Studies. University of Chicago Press. 3 Pope John Paul II. Chapter 1 &2. p. Op. Part of an inscription at the Hiroshima Peace Park. p. XIX. Political Studies Association.292. Mary’s Cathedral. though they must also be read in the context of their need to work within their own constitution frameworks which have normally been constructed with a previous set of priorities and constraints in mind. Jason Franks. Report of the SecretaryGeneral’s High Level Panel on Threats. I am also grateful to the Leverhulme Trust. and Global Politics. Cambridge: CUP. 2002. 2002.11. 5 Credited to G. 4. Australia. and Liberalism”. 11 Ibid. AJR Groom. 6 For more on the use of this methodology and on the value of discursive analysis. 2001. Alison Watson. London: W. 9 See for example. United Nations. and the Russell Trust for providing funding for various parts of the fieldwork. University of Glasgow. 2000. A Bed for the Night. 2001. 2 Oliver Richmond is a Reader in the School of IR. such as. 19 See in particular.174. Global Governance. The Transformation of Peace (Palgrave. see Roland Bleiker. Hiroshima. City of God. Roland Paris. Andrews. p. The Republic of Plato. New York: Public Affairs. Kofi Annan. Op. Global Governance and the New Wars. introduction. 15 Saint Augustine. and NGOs on their aims and objectives. “International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice’”.I take responsibility for all errors in this essay as is the custom. Chesterton. 17 See Quincy Wright. 2000.. 4. forthcoming 2005). 2004.43. These assumptions as also prevalent in most policy documentation associated with peace and security issues. and Change. esp. See also Mark Duffield. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. The Study of War. This essay is based in part upon his new study. 1991. p. 2. private or official. 13 See for an influential study on this.. Mary B. New York. The Ideas that Conquered the World. 4 ‘Peace to the undefeated’ or the victor’s peace. who were willing to talk to me during the course of my fieldwork. 10 For more on these contributory strands. “The Responsibility to Protect”. local and international. Farid Mirabagheri. Chapters 1. Costas Constantinou.Cit. Sydney. 2001.11: Roland Paris. 2004. democracy and free markets. He can be contacted on opr@st-andrews.638. 7 This is essentially what Mandelbaum calls the combination of peace. Do No Harm: how aid can support peace . Norton. London: Zed Books. p. Vol. Japan. 1999. Ian Hall. London: Vintage. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1941.10. RJB Walker. Human Agency... Oxford: Oxford University Press. Agencies. 2002.W. Nick Rengger. see Oliver P. London: Zed Books. the Carnegie Trust. No. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. 12 This is clearly the case when one considers the scope of the official reports and documentation release by IOs. and 5. Boutros Ghali’s Agenda for Peace (UN: 1992) was perhaps the best example of this. From Voting to Violence.Cit. Global Governance and the New Wars. Popular Dissent. At War’s End. Thanks go Roland Bleikor. David Rieff. “Participatory Intervention”. p.Cit. 16 For an interesting discussion of such tensions see Gabriella Slomp.. 28. p. 8 Roland Paris. The irony of this is of course that a western and mainly Christian state was responsible for the use of the nuclear weapons against Japan. UK. 2004: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. p. 20 See “The Allegory of the Cave”. Feminism.. IFIs. London: Penguin Classics. “Hobbes. 1964.136. Richmond. Democracy as an International Issue. 1996. esp.

“Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Timor Leste”.E. pp. Ottawa. 34 Ibid.xi. From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention. 43 President Xanana Gusmao. 13 January. London: Palgrave. Cambridge: Polity. 2003.Cold War Order. Paper presented on the 10th Anniversary of Agenda for Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Michael G. David Chandler. Activists Beyond Borders. 2002. After Victory. Maintaining Order. Link et al (ed. 2002. . The Post. concl.53. 1998. 25 January 2005. Cambridge. 37 See for example. MA: MIT Press. 2001. in M. p. OUP. 23 For an explanation of this consensus see Oliver P. “Participatory Intervention”. p. Owen R. 41 ref 42 This point was made by Daniel Fearn. “UN Peace Operations and the Dilemmas of the Peacebuilding Consensus”. State Building: Governance and Order in the Twenty First Century.htm 39 For an indication of these problems.536-7.4-5. 27 Michel Foucault. Richmond. 2002. At War’s End. Smith. E. CO: Lynne Rienner. 26 Some notable exeptions are Jarat Chopra. 36 For more on this see David Chandler. No. Democracy and the Global Order. European Parliament. Kumar. International Peacekeeping. and Tanja Hohe. 26th November. Boulder. “Peace Operations and Global Order”. p..org/articles/sl/article_4265_sl. Jarat Chopra. 2004. Making Peace. 2004. Cornell University Press. The Adelphi Papers .). London: Profile. London: Pluto. Colin Gordon. in Arthur S. p. p.iix. Vol 10. Peacekeeping in East Timor.). Oxford: OUP. 2004. January 2003. For more on these aspects of the post Cold War order. World Poverty and Human Rights. Sean M Lynn-Jones & Steven E. & Peter Miller (eds. Keck & Kathryn Sikkind. Seminar on the role of the UN in Timor Leste.10. 2004. 35 This cliché has often been quoted to me during interviews with officials during fieldwork. Cousens and C. 25 Margeret E. 30 G. Lund. 1995. “What Kind of Peace is Being Built: Taking Stock of Post. Vol.4. 2005. 29 John Mearsheimer. 33 Thomas Pogge. From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention. London. Address to the Senate. Dili. Personal Interview. No. Richard Caplan. 40 This was the conclusion reached by many of my interviewees.Cit. Roland Paris. see among others Roland Paris. pp. 28 Oliver P. “Participatory Intervention”.4. 32 This found its seminal expression in Woodrow Wilson. Global Governance. http://europa-euun. Canada. Princeton: Princeton University Press. esp. The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. p. Millar. “The False Promise of International Institutions”. January 12th 1917. At War’s End. Thinking about Peace and War. in International Peacekeeping. 1991. p. 24 Francis Fukuyama. and Tanja Hohe.99. Cambridge: Polity. Richmond. 10. 2004.Conflict Peacebuilding and Charting Future Directions”. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Peacebuilding as Politics. London: Pluto. Foreign and Commonwealth Office..216-241.21 22 Martin Ceadal. 2001. official and non-official during fieldwork in the Balkans in January. Colorado: Lynne Rienner.63 38 See Statement by Jacques Rupnik (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales). “Governmentality”. 2002.214. Theories of War and Peace. 1998. Vol. 1983. Brown. in: Graham Burchell. Op. 2004. 10. pp.: Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams. 2004. Michael S.216-241. 2004. International Development Research Centre. see Ian Clark. Vol. Global Governance. John Ikenberry. A New Trusteeship? The International Administration of War-torn Territories. Coates. 40.103. 31 David Held. Vol. 2001. Pogge argues that severe poverty could be prevented by the rich without much of an effect upon their own wealth. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. p. Cambridge: CUP. 2002. Oxford: OUP. 1987.

62 Ibid.: Yale University Press. in The Last Empire. South Bend. 67 See William Graham Sumner. 52 See R. 1996. Vol. pp. 61 Ibid. The West. “The Responsibility to Protect: Imposing the ‘Liberal Peace’”. A World Restored. Conn. see Raymond C. Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. 59 Robert Cooper. pp. and that the economic and social conditions in which individuals live comes a very poor second. Richmond “Realising Hegemony? New Wars. 2003. War and Other Essays. 53 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen. p. The Just Peace.26. (1940) in Douglas Hunt (ed.6-7. 'Social Forces. London.1. pp. p. 2004.60. 1981.B.. Rummel. MUP. Human Agency.J. p.. 1992. Rob Walker. p. Conference Presentation at BISA. LSE. “The Social Reconstruction of Conflict and Reconciliation in the Former Yugoslavia”.11. No. p. p.. “Black Tuesday”. 183-204. p. pp.35-69. Vol. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 2001. 55 See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. The Invention of Peace and the Reinvention of War.xiv 65 For more on symbolic terrorism see Oliver P. 66 Gore Vidal. 2001. Cambridge: CUP. London: Continuum. 2000. p. David Cambell.25. Warless Societies and the Origins of War.56-59. Cambridge: CUP. p. Kelly. No. London: Abacus. Op. . International Peacekeeping. Mike Pugh.5. pp. 57 See for example. Vol.4. p.. 2. p. 2002. MA: Harvard University Press.11.248.Cit.. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Introduction to Paul Virilio. 56 Robert Cooper.). New Terrorism. 1992.44 See David Chandler. 2003. Millennium: Journal of International Studies.1. No. Terrorism and Conflict Studies.Cit. California: Sage.J Walker. 50 Ian Clark. Cambridge. London: Profile. Desert Screen. 48 See. “Peace Operations and Global Order”.174. Writing Security. Michael Walzer.. 1957. Vivienne Jabri. Discourses on Violence. 2003. 46 Henry Kissinger. (2nd edition). Empire.316-324. for example. 45 R. “Peacekeeping and Critical Theory”.. 1998.. Cox. 47 Ibid. 2002. Inside/ Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. 10.95. London: Palgrave. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1911.Cit. much of my fieldwork illustrates that the focus of internationals is on the state. Cambridge: Polity Press.4. 70 Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (Eds. and Global Politics. 71 Ian Clark. Lawrence & Wishart. States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory'. 1981. in Social Justice. 64 James Der Derian. Popular Dissent. The Breaking of Nations. Op. p. Virtuous War. London: Altantic Books. Op.. 1993. Boulder. Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory.216-241 51 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen..Cit. Cambridge University Press. Robert W. and the Roots of Conflict”. 415-421.1. Civil Society. p. 54 Franke Wilmer.108. 183-204.Cit. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci.6.. 16-18 December.: Notre Dame University Press. 63 Margaret Mead. and the Construction of Peace. Ind. Modernity and Self Identity in the Late Modern Age. 2000. no. Andrew Linklater. Roland Bleiker. The Transformation of Political Community.pp. 1991. 60 Michael Howard.. 2000. p.111. in Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams. The Dolphin Reader. 1996.).24. 49 Anthony Giddens. 58 See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Vol. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. James Der Derien. New Haven.113. 2002. 1990. CO: Westview Press. p. Op. Warfare is Only an Invention-Not a Biological Necessity. pp. Op. For anthropological evidence on this matter. 69 This clearly seemed to be the case in the fieldwork I undertook looking at these questions in the Balkans and East Timor in 2004 and 2005. 68 Indeed. University of South Carolina Press.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press. The Concept of the Political.69.72 Tracy Strong. Ibid. Foreword to Carl Schmitt. 73 Carl Schmitt. 1996. . p.. p.xxiii.

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