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Sarmiento III vs.


Facts: Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and respondent Carague as Secretary of the Dept of Budget from disbursing payments for Misons salaries and emoluments on the ground that Misons appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (CA). On the other hand, respondents maintain the constitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the (CA). It is apparent in Sec 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution that there are four groups of officers whom the president shall appoint. (1) the heads of the exec departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution, (2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, (3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint and (4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

The 1st group is clearly appointed with the consent of the CA. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups are the present bone of contention. Issue: Whether or not the 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups should be appointed by the president with or without the consent/confirmation of the CA Held: The fundamental principle of Constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and the people adopting it. The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide. The 1935 Constitution requires confirmation by the CA of all presidential appointments. This has resulted in horse-trading and similar malpractices. Under the 1973 Constitution, the president has the absolute power of appointment with hardly any check on the legislature. Given these two extremes, the 1987 Constitution struck a middle-ground by requiring the consent of the CA for the 1st group of appointments and leaving to the President without such confirmation the appointments of the other officers. The clear and expressed intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation on the CA except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII. Therefore, the confirmation on the appointment of Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs by the CA is not required.

The appointment of Mison without submitting his nomination the CA is within the constitutional authority of the President.
FELIMON LUEGO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G. R. No. L-69137, August 6, 1986 FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointment was described as permanent but the Civil Service Commission approved it as temporary. On 22 March 1984, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and accordingly directed herein private respondent in place of petitioners position. The private respondent was so appointed on 28 June 1984, by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking his earlier permanent appointment as well as to question the Civil Service Commissions order and the private respondents title. ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service Commissions resolution is set aside.

Monsanto v. Factoran
Facts: Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. She was found guilty and was sentenced to jail. She was howevergranted pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for her to be reinstated to her former position since it was still vacant. She was also requesting for back pays. The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President and Factoran denied Monsantos request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto avers that by reason of the pardon, she should no longer be compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought about by her acts. ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post. HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any

obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be requi red. This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil liability arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It subsists notwithstandingservice of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioners civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.

Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary

Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positionsin addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows: Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor. Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position. Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary. The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality b ecause it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.

No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void. Ratio: In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. The phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.

LABO vs. COMELEC 176 SCRA 1 Facts: Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship. He was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous. According to Australian records, Labo is still an Australian citizen. Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines.

Held: The petitioners contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all other allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship.

Antonia Yee is a civil service eligible serving as as a regular public school teacher having passed the required teachersexamination. Antonia Yee has since been serving as a public school teacher in Buhang Elementary School, Buhang Hamtic, Antique. In 1957, she married a Chinese citizen, Ng Foo. In the same year, Yee received notice that she is being terminated from her job by reason of her marriage, and subsequent loss of citizenship. Yee then filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the Director of Public Schools to reinstate her. ISSUE: Whether or not Yee should be reinstated. HELD: No. She was validly removed from her position as a public school teacher because she lost her Filipino citizenship when she married Ng Foo. The law provides that persons qualified to serve in classified public service must be Filipino citizens. A public school is qualified under public service. Further, it is so provided that an applicant for the civil service examination must be a Filipino citizen; that requirement subsists even after such applicant had passed the exam.

Laurel vs. Desierto [G.R. No. 145368 April 12, 2002]

Post under case digests, Political Law at Monday, April 09, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 "constituting a Committee which was mandated "to take chargeof the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and

the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, "reconstituting the said Committee and renamed it as the "National Centennial Commission." Appointed to chair was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary Chairpersons. Vice President Laurel by virtue of his chairmanship also became the chairman of EXPOCORP, a corporation organized to undertake the Freedom Ring Project in relation to the centennial celebration. Later in 1999, investigation was conducted by an independent committed due to allegations of graft and corruption against Laurel as NCC and EXPOCORP chair. The committee recommended the filing of charges by the Ombudsman upon which the Office of theOmbudsman took cognizance of the case. Laurel then questioned the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman by filing this petition, saying that (1) EXPOCORP was a private corporation, (2) that NCC is not a public office and (3) that he is not a public officer as defined in the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Issue: Whether or not the contentions of Vice President Laurel are correct. Held: No. The Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including

government-owned or controlled corporations. However, is NCC a public office? Yes, it is because it exercises executive functions by implementing the policies set forth in the Constitution regarding history and cultural heritage, thus satisfying an important element of public office: the delegation of sovereign functions. It also follows that Laurel is a public officer. That he did not receive compensation is of no consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached. It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a public official whether or not one receives compensation, thus: Public Officials include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or noncareer service including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount.