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    SECOND DIVISION     ARMANDO BARCELLANO,                                 Petitioner,         -versus        DOLORES BAÑAS, represented by her son and Attorney-in-fact CRISPINO

BERMILLO,                             G.R. No. 165287                              Respondent.                                                                          Present:               CARPIO,J.,                  Chairperson,             BRION,             ABAD,*             PEREZ, and             SERENO,JJ.             Promulgated:              September x  - - - - - - - - 14, - 2011 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x   D E C I S I O N   PEREZ, J.:   Before the Court is an appeal by certiorari[1] from the Decision[2] of the Fiftee nth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67702 dated 26 February 2 004, granting the petition of Dolores Bañas, herein respondent, to reverse and set a side the Decision[3] of the lower court. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:   WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED.  The dec ision of the court a quo is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and in its stead anoth er one is rendered GRANTING to petitioner-appellants the right to redeem the sub ject property for the amount of Php 60,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the f inality of this decision.     The facts as gathered by the court follow:   Respondent Bañas is an heir of Bartolome Bañas who owns in fee simple Lot 4485, PLS-722-D situated in Hindi, Bacacay, Albay.  Adjoining the said lot is the propert y of Vicente Medina (Medina), covered by Original Certificate of Title No. VH-90 94, with an area of 1,877 square meters. On 17 March 1997, Medina offered his lo t for sale to the adjoining owners of the property, the heirs of Bartolome Bañas, including herein respondent Dolores Bañas, Crispino Bermillo (Bermillo) and Isabel a Bermillo-Beruela (Beruela)[4] Crispino Bermillo, as the representative of his fa mily, agreed to the offer of Medina, the sale to take place after the harvest se

the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action. the petition was withdrawn on the ground tha t:               xxx considering the present worse economic situation in the country.    Trial ensued.               On 11 March 1998. the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the lo wer court and granted the heirs the right to redeem the subject property. Dolores Bañas.  The appel late court ruled that the filing of a complaint before the Katarungang Pambarangay s hould be considered as a notice to Barcellano and Medina that the heirs were exe rcising their right of redemption over the subject property. went to th e Office of the Barangay Council to settle the dispute.                The Court s Ruling .ason. the Bañas he irs and Barcellano.000. Barcellano told them that he would be willing to sell the property but for a higher price of P90. On 15 March 2000. filed another action Redemption.  On 9 April 1997.[10]  Because the parties could not agree on the price and for failure to settle the dispute.[15]   Hence.  According to one of the Bañas hei rs. Barcellano questions the ruling of the appellate court fo r being contrary to the admitted facts on record and applicable jurisprudence.[6]  Medina confirmed that the lot was sold to Barcellano.   On appeal.  However. the complaint is hereby ordered DISMISSED.  It was opposed by Barcellano insisting that he complied with the provis ions of Art.00. the appellate court ruled that a formal offer to redeem. and as having set i n motion the judicial process of legal redemption. The tender of payment and consignation become inconsequential when the redemptioner files a case to redee m the property within the 30-day period.000.[7]  Also.   In this petition.  The following day.[5]       On 3 April 1997. the heirs of Bañas learned about the sale and went to the house of Medina to inquire about it.00.00 redemption amount to Medina. Medina sold the property to herein petitioner Armando Barc ellano for P60. this Petition for Review on Certiorari. Dolores Bañas filed an action for Legal Redemption before the R al Court.000.[9]  Medina sent only his tenant to attend the proceeding. 1623 of the New Civil Code but Bañas failed to exercise her right withi n the period provided by law. and consignation are proper only if the redemptioner wishes to a vail himself of his right of redemption in the future.  The heirs conveyed their intention to redeem the property b ut Medina replied that there was already a deed of sale executed between the parties . with neither Medina nor his tenant in attendance.[13]  The dispositive portion reads:   WHEREFORE. petitioner o he amount they are supposed to pay for the redemption be readily available for t heir immediate and emergency needs. coupled with a tender of payment of the re demption price. on 5 February 1998. the trial court dismissed the complaint of the Bañas heirs for their failure to comply with the condition precedent of making a formal offer to redeem and for failure to file an action in court together wi th the consignation of the redemption price within the reglementary period of 30 days. as represented by Bermillo. the heirs went to the Office of the Barangay Council on 5 April 1997 . [11]              On 24 October 1997. the Bañas heirs failed to tender the P60. [8]    Aggrieved. premises considered.[14]  Further.

the period of thirty day s within which the right of legal pre-emption may be exercised. the Court of Appeals. we agree with petitioners that such not ice is indispensable.    These premises and conclusion lea ve no doubt about the thrust of Mariano: The right of the petitioner-heirs to exerci se their right of legal redemption exists. effecti vely affirming that the respondents had validly exercised their right of redempt ion. and to quiet any doubts that the alienation is not defini tive. 1623 to be given ing owner was no longer necessary because there was already actual notice. The written notice w as obviously exacted by the Code to remove all uncertainty as to the sale.                 Nothing in the records and pleadings submitted by the parties shows that there wa notice sent to the respondents. he questions as erroneous the application of Presidential Decree No. we ruled that  [P]etitioner-heirs have not lost their rig ht to redeem. Further . unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has giv en written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. does not start. 1 508. Reyes:   With regard to the written notice. does not satisfy the statute.   The indispensability of a written notice had long been discussed in the ear ly case of Conejero v. as well as its efficacy and status .  Without a written notice.  This Court has long established the rule t hat notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner. in Gosiengfiao Guillen v. its terms and conditions. (Emphasis supplied)      The petitioner argues that the only purpose behind Art.[16] penned by Justice J.  To advance their argument. he asserts that the appellate court erred in ruling that the tender of payment of the redemption price and consignation are not required in this case. they . and the running of the period for its exercise has not even been triggered because they have not been notified in wri ting of the fact of sale. the 30-day period has not even begun to run. mere knowledge of the sale.L.   This is the same ruling in Verdad v.[18] this Court again emph asized the mandatory character of a written notice in legal redemption:   From these premises.  thereby ruling that the filing by the heirs of the complaint before th e Barangay was an exercise of right of redemption. Court of Appeals:[17]   The written notice of sale is mandatory. for in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the ve ndors. 1623 of the New Civil hich provides that:   The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor. in view of the terms in which Article of the Phi lippine Civil Code is couched. Court of Appeals.             Barcellano maintains that the written notice required under Art.B.   Lately. the method of notific ation prescribed remains exclusive. the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertaint ies about the sale. or by th e vendor. 1623 of the New Civ il Code is to ensure that the owner of the adjoining land is actually notified o f the intention of the owner to sell his property. acquired in some othe r manner by the redemptioner. its t erms and its validity. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Regist ry of Property. The statute not having provided for any alternative.  Lastly.             We need only to discuss the requirement of notice under Art. and that. otherwise known as Establishing a System of Amicably Settling Disputes at the Barangay Level. as the case may be.

when Tecla Padua filed her complaint. in other words. given this unseemly situation. yet if the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry. and the means of ascertaining the truth were readily avail able upon inquiry. who were not among them.[20]   x x x x   The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although n o notice in writing was given them. we pronounced that the disregard of the mandatory written rule was an exception due to the peculiar circumstance of the case.cited Destrito v. This definitely was not the ac t of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. but the party neglects to make it. when the first complaint for redemption was filed.   The Court clarified that:   We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today. which were readily avail able. thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. we do say that sometime between those years and 1976. alth ough not in writing. we cannot accept the private respond ents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sis ter in 1963 and 1964.   Now.  There. This certainly looked like an ac t of ownership. Court of Appeals as cited in Alonzo v. We are satisfi ed that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and th e filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977.   The Alonzo case does not apply to this case. of the sales made in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such notice. This could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years. should enclose a portion of the inherited l ot and build thereon a house of strong materials. that to charge a party with laches in the asser tion of an alleged right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the fa cts upon which he bases his claim. By 1977. we would be clo sing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ign orance. none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire. Yet. [19] where this Court pronounced that written notice is no longer necessary in cas e of actual notice of the sale of property. the other co-heirs were actu ally informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired. without the co-heirs exercisin g their right of redemption. The said court acted properly as it had no . the same as if he had known the facts. to ascertain the facts. and that such notice wa s sufficient. Intermediate Appellate Court. the right o f redemption had already been extinguished because the period for its exercise h ad already expired. when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spou ses Alonzo.  Thus:   In the face of the established facts. we are deviating from the strict letter of the law. The purpose is cle ar enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?   While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of su ch sales in 1963 and 1964. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim the right of r edemption. but then it was already too late. he will be chargeable with laches. These are the justifications for this exception.   The following doctrine is also worth noting:   While the general rule is. which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence.

unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possibl e redemptioners. In fact.   SO ORDERED. a verbal notice or mere information was already deemed sufficient.000.   WHEREFORE. the law is applied according to its express terms. or by registration.[22]   Time and time again. CV No.00 within thirty (30) days from the finality of this decision is hereby AFFIRMED.                                                          JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ                                                               Associate Justice     WE CONCUR:           . it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that whe re the law speaks in clear and categorical language. and int erpretation should be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be e ither impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.  The r espondent Bañas has a perfect right of redemption and was never in danger of losin g such right even if there was no redemption complaint filed with the barangay.  There is only room for application. no tender of payment or no consignation.  The 26 February 2004 Decision of the Court of Appea ls in CA-G. no explanation of it is required.competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited c ases. there must first be a written notice to the family of Bañas.  That a departure from the strict letter should only be for ext raordinary reasons is clear from the second sentence of Art. we ourselves are not abandon ing the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines.[24]   We find no need to rule on the other issues presented by the petitioner. Alonzo cannot find applic bility in Alonzo of the parties not knowing about the sale of a portion of the proper ty they were actually occupying is not presented in this case. there is no room for interp retation. and this should be clearly stressed. 1623 that  The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property. the appeal is DENIED.[23]  Where the language of a statute is c lear and unambiguous. when the language of the law is clear. for under the old law.  The strict letter of the law must apply.  Both the letter and the spirit of the New Civil Code argue against any attempt to widen the scope of the written notice by including therein any other kind of notice such as an oral one.   Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget.  The law is clear in this case. Justice Edgardo Paras. referring to the origins of the requirement.R. granting to petitioner-appellants the right to redeem the subject property for the amount of Php60. in view of the peculiar circumstances of this c ase. there would have been no necessity or reason to specify in the a rticle that said notice be in writing. 67702.  If the intent of the law has been to include v erbal notice or any other means of information as sufficient to give the effect of this notice. the person having the right to redeem is STILL entitled to the written notice. What we are doing simply is adopting a n exception to the general rule.  No cost. would e xplain in his commentaries on the New Civil Code that despite actual knowledge.[21] (Emphasis supplied)             Without the peculiar circumstances in the present case.

Del Castillo (now a member of this Court). CORONA                                                                          Chief Justice     *              Per Special Order No. [2]               Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson             ARTURO D.  . and the Division Chairper estation. ABAD          Associate Justice                                     Associate Justice                      MARIA LOURDES P. pp. A.                                                                          ANTONIO T. 108-112.ANTONIO T. [1]               Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. CARPIO                                                                        Associate Justice                                                                            Chairperson                                     CERTIFICATION               Pursuant to Section 13.  Rollo. Article VIII of the Constitution. 1077-A dated 12 September 2011.                                                                                      RENATO C. concurring. it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opini on of the Court s Division. Cosico with Associate Justices Vicen ariano C. SERENO Associate Justice       A T T E S T A T I O N             I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultatio e the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court s Division. BRION                              ROBERTO A.

159755. p. 607 (1996). 14 July 1999. p. pp. Testimony of Isabela Beruela. [4]               Testimony of Isabela Beruela.  Rollo.. 62 (2003). 16 February 1999. p. at 7. Paras. 171 (2007). [21]             Id. [13]             Decision of RTC. at 9-10. 605. [16]             123 Phil. [17]             326 Phil. [18]             G. p. 695. p. . 699 (1968).  TSN. at 113. TSN. 601. at 275. 6. TSN. p. 8. No. R. 16 February 1999. 267 (1987). Municipality of Naga. Book V. 610 (1966).[3]               Dated 26 February 2004. [8]               Testimony of Vicente Medina. p. v. 56. Armando Barcellano and Vicente M edina because the Original Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Dolores Bañas married to Bartolome Bañas only. 6. [14]             CA Decision. 16 February 1999. 18 June 2009. [12]             The action was originally titled as Heirs of Bartolome Bañas v.  TSN. p. Armando Barc e Medina but it was later amended as Dolores Bañas v. [15]             Id. [24]             Rolando A. [20]             Id. TSN. [6]               Id. alo. 6. [10]             Id. [22]             Edgardo L. [7]               Id. 280-281(1998-20 [23]             Cebu Portland Cement Co. 14 July 1999. CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES. at 274-275. at 112. Suarez. 133 Phil. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. [19]             234 Phil. 589 SCRA 399. 6. [11]             Id.  Id. [9]               Testimony of Isabella Beruela. [5]               Testimony of Vicente Medina. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.