Q's for the ROLLOUT

1. Acting DCI John McLaughlin has shot down the idea of

an "intelligence czar who would stand apart from CIA
and oversee all aspects of American intelligence."
Noting that the idea was "first floated in 1955," he
said central control could be asserted "without the
additional layers of command or bureaucracy such a
change would inevitably bring." His solution would
be to recognize that CIA is already "central,"
describing it as the only U.S. intelligence agency
that "integrates all intelligence sources" and is not
part of a larger department, such as Defense or State
or Justice, and therefore "does not create or advocate
policy."

• Aren't you just creating another bureaucratic layer

with an NID and his three deputies?

• Won't an intelligence czar appointed by the

President, serving at his pleasure and acting as his
intelligence advisor be more likely to politicize
intelligence than an independent Director of Central
Intelligence?

2 . At the April hearing before the Commission George

Tenet warned you about separating the DCI job from CIA
saying: "the DCI has to have an operational and
analytical span of control that allows him or her to
inform the President authoritatively about covert
action and other very sensitive activities."

• How does your proposal avoid doing exactly what

George Tenet warned the Commission it shouldn't do?

• Who is going to oversee the conduct of covert action

and ensure it is carried out in a legal, policy
supportive manner?

3. A major feature of these proposals is taking authority

away from the Secretary of Defense to make decisions
about NSA, NGA and NRO. The DCI cautioned you about
changing authorities. He said "in the foreign
intelligence arena, aside from the President, the
DCI's most important relationship is with the
Secretary of Defense. Rather than focus on a zero sum
game of authorities, the focus should be on ensuring
that the DCI and the Secretary of Defense work
together to guide investments tied to mission.
Together, these investments have enormous power when
they are synchronized. This is precisely what Don
Rumsfeld and I have been trying to do." He went on to
say:

"We need to understand the relationship between

the DCI and the secretary of Defense in a very,
very fundamental way. Why? You have an
organizational structure today that basically has
three or four of the major organizations or
combat support organizations. They provide
tactical support to the military as well as
support the national intelligence needs. And
somehow in the structure that you create he must
be a partner in designing this framework to
ensure that we don't miss or don't crack a seam
that we're trying to build together because he
executes tactical and other programs that, in
effect, add to the power of what the DCI can do.
But we have to wrestle with that in some way."

"All I want to focus on is don't throw the baby

out with the bathwater. Don't miss the
capabilities that have to be grown. Don't
separate those capabilities from a chain of
command that can only execute them and then
figure out how that mesh works."

• Did you consider Director Tenet's admonitions to

ensure that your proposal doesn't "throw the baby
out with the bathwater?"

• What are the risks with your proposals? On the

one hand you state in your report (page 427)
"Creating a new domestic intelligence agency
would divert attention of the officials most
responsible for current counterterrorism efforts
while the threat remains high. Putting a new
player into the mix of federal agencies with
counterterrorism responsibilities would
exacerbate existing information sharing problems"
while you advocate creation of a National
 Counterterrorism Center that shifts terrorism
intelligence, operations and warning functions to
a new entity. Aren't you going to create
confusion and disruption in the war against
terrorism by creating a new organization with new
command and control responsibilities?

4. Director Tenet and Acting DCI John McLaughlin have

said that great change has occurred since the
September 11, 2001 attacks and that those changes need
to be understood before undertaking any structural
changes.

• Did the Commission investigate the changes that

have occurred in the Intelligence Community since
September 11, 2001? How do you judge the
performance and role of the TTIC, the Terrorism
Tracking Center, the new watch-listing procedures,
the expanded intelligence collection priorities of
the FBI, the coordinating and dissemination role of
the Department of Homeland Security?

• Didn't your mandate limit your investigation to

events and activities up to September 20, 2001?

DCI Tenet in his testimony before the Commission said:

"But before we rush to a judgment, don't we want to know
what the world's going to look like? Don't we want to
understand with some precision where you want to end up?
And I think you have to focus on that fusion of
capabilities around mission, first and foremost, and then
decide the rest. It will flow from there. The power of
forcing that collaboration in and of itself breaks down the
walls."

• To what extent did the Commission examine the

current threat or consider how terrorism might have
changed since 9-11? Did you look out 5-10 years to
consider the international context in which
intelligence will have to perform?
You recommend shifting paramilitary covert action from CIA
to DOD.

• What events/incidents relative to the 9-11 attacks led

the commission to make this recommendation?

• Doesn't the conduct of paramilitary operations

secretly overseas (without the consent of a foreign
country) place the military participants at great risk
since such activity is contrary to the Geneva
Convention and thus could result in our military being
treated as spies? Doesn't such a course of action
increase the risk for all US military personnel
overseas?