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Constitutional Law II Reviewer

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves


D 2015 | Prof. Gwen Grecia-De Vera

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 1

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Introduction to the Course Due Process of Law Due Process of Law (vis--vis the other powers of the State) Due Process of Law (Definition)

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Equal Protection of the Law Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Privacy of Communication and Correspondence Writ of Habeas Corpus Liberty of Abode and Travel Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment Freedom of Speech and of Expression Freedom of the Press Freedom to Assembly, Association and to Petition Access to Information Freedom of Religion and Non-establishment of Religion Eminent Domain Contracts Clause Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder Non-Imprisonment for Debt and Involuntary Servitude Free Access to Courts and Quasi-Judicial Bodies

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II REVIEWER 1 I. INTRODUCTION TO THE COURSE A. SOURCE OF RIGHTS: Is the Bill of Rights the only source of rights? extraordinary circumstances before, during and after the EDSA Revolution, the Filipinos simply found themselves without a constitution, but certainly not without fundamental rights. B. HEIRARCHY OF RIGHTS UNDER BILL OF RIGHTS: Primacy of Human Rights

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan: EO 1 created the PCGG which has the power to (1)
conduct investigations regarding ill-gotten wealth; (2) promulgate such rules as may be necessary to investigate. In this case, PCGG investigated charges of ill-gotten wealth against Major General Josephus Ramos, and subsequently confiscated items and communication facilities from his alleged mistress, Elizabeth Dimaano on March 3, 1986.

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills. Co:

Issue: WoN the Bill of Rights was operative during the interregnum from February 26,

1986 (the day Corazon C. Aquino took her oath as President) to March 24, 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution)? NO, the Bill of Rights was not operative, thus private respondent Dimaano cannot invoke the right against unreasonable search and seizure and the exclusionary right. HOWEVER, the constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. Did the raiding team exceed its authority, and therefore the seizure of Dimaanos items is null and void and must be returned? YES.

Ratio: The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. (Interregnum: after the actual take-over of power by the revolutionary government). BUT the protection afforded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Universal Declaration of Human Rights remained in effect during this time. During the interregnum, directives of the revolutionary government were supreme law because there was no constitutionally limited extent/scope of such directives. During the interregnum, a person cannot invoke any right under the BoR because there was neither a Constiution nor a BoR during the interregnum. If the BoR of 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum, that would render void all sequestration orders issued by PCGG before adoption of 1987 Constitution.

5 BASIC CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES: 1. Preservation and enhancement of dignity of the human being is most important in a democracy. 2. BoR is designed to protect and preserve ideals of liberty, equality and security against assault of opportunism J. Jackson: Purpose of the BoR is to withdraw certain subjects from viccisitudes of political controversy and establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. 3. Freedom of expression and of assembly is included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people. J. Douglas: Liberties of one are liberties of all; liberties of one are not safe unless all liberties are protected. 4. Rights of free expression, assembly and petition are not only civil but also political rights. 5. BoR primarily protects human rights, which are imprescriptible.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled. Despite PBMs pleas, the petitioners and their 400 members proceeded with the demonstration. PBM filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.

J. Punos DISSENT: The Bill of Rights is NOT the only source of rights. In its

Issue: PBM reasoned that it would suffer loss and damage by reason of emplo yees
absence, arguing preservation of property rights. Is this a valid ground for the dismissal of employees? NO.

absence, the people can still invoke their inherent rights under natural law . As the right to revolt is a right recognized in natural law, it is under this same natural law that Dimaano has a right against unreasonable search and seizure. Filipinos during that one month from February 25 to March 24, 1986 were NOT stripped naked of all their rights, including their natural rights as human beings. With the
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Ratio: Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of

Guide: BOLD FONT for Constitutional Articles and Sections Underlined the important words, phrases and provisions Yellow highlight for case titles, and following that will be the MAIN DOCTRINE. Issues, Ratio decidendis, Dissents, Arguments will be indicated by Green highlight.

the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration as a violation of the CBA stretches unduly the compass of the CBA; a potent means of inhibiting speech, inflicts moral and mortal wounds on Constitutional guarantees. Property and property rights can be lost through prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 2 II. DUE PROCESS OF LAW (vis--vis the other powers of the State) Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assn v. City of Manila: Police power has

Ichong vs. Hernandez The State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property,
provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. KEY CONCEPTS: A. As limitation on the fundamental powers of the State Due process and equal protection are two of the most important limitations in the fundamental powers of the State. The three fundamental powers of the State are inherent; it inheres in a State by virtue of its being. It is not a power granted by the Constitution. Instead, the Constitution provides certain limitations on the exercise of these powers, foremost of which is due process and equal protection. To appreciate how due process works, it is first necessary to define the fundamental powers of the State. Due process and equal protection serve as a limit to these powers. B. Fundamental powers of the State

been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent, and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Ordinance number 4760 is beyond the powers of municipal board to enact insofar as it regulates motels; unconstitutional and violative of due process. SC: Ordinance is not unconstitutional. Police power measures designed to safeguard morals should not be nullified purely on conjecture. Alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila is traceable to the existence of motels. The ordinance only proposes to check on the clandestine harboring of guests and discourage establishments from operating illegally.

People vs. Pomar: By reason of the constant growth of public opinion in a developing

1. POLICE POWER

Definition:

Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro: The police power of the state is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the law of overruling necessity. It is that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.

Ichong vs. Hernandez: As [police power] derives its existence from the very existence

civilization, the term police power has never been, and we do not believe can be, clearly and definitely defined and circumscribed. x x x [Hence] a definition of the police power of the State must depend upon the particular law and the particular facts to which it is to be applied. x x x Mr. Justice Cooley says: The police power is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subject of the same. Although it is a growing and expanding power, police power] cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the peoples law the constitution. PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Pomar is in violation of Section 13 in connection with Section 15 of Act #1371 because while he granted his pregnant employee her leave, he refused to pay her corresponding regular wages. SC: Law is unconstitutional and void because it takes account of the necessities of only one party to the contract and ignores the necessities of the employer. He is precluded under penalty from adjusting compensation to the differing merits of employees. The employer and employee must have equality of rights, and only legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract. Liberty in this case includes: 1. Right to labor 2. Right to refuse labor

of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. x x x So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause .

White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila: Police power, while incapable of an exact

definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Challenges validity of Manila Ordinance 7774 (ordinance prohibiting short-time admission rates and wash-up rate schemes) because it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement, invalid exercise of police power, unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business. SC: Ordinance is unconstitutional because it denies the legitimate activities curtailing liberty of citizens legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting adults

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 3

legitimate uses for wash rates or renting out room for twice a day The ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Behavior ordinance seeks to curtail is already prohibited.

Definition: power by which the State raises revenue to defray the necessary expenses of the Government. It is the enforced proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by the State by virtue of its sovereignty, for the support of the government and for all its public needs. Limitations Public purpose Should not be confiscatory Uniformity of taxation Exemption of government from taxation C. Life, Liberty, Property

Test for valid exercise: LAWFUL SUBJECT: Interest of the general public (as distinguished from a particular class) LAWFUL MEANS: Means employed is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and is not unduly oppressive. The exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to the judicial inquiry. And the principal yardsticks against which such exercise must be measured are the due process clause and the equal protection clause. IN GENERAL: Restrictions found in the BoR are directed against the state. They do not govern the relations between private persons. EXCEPTION: Almost all the protections against the state found in the BoR have been made applicable as civil law to relations between private persons through Article 32 of the Civil Code.

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills, Co., Inc Hierarchy of rights - Primacy of human rights over property rights is

recognized because these freedom are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society and the threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions. They need breathing space to survive, permitting government regulation only with narrow specificity. Human rights are imprescriptible.

2. EMINENT DOMAIN

Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro Definition of liberty - Liberty, as understood in democracies, is not license; it

Definition: power of the State to forcibly take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation. Requisites: Necessity the necessity must be of public character. Political question when power is exercised by Congress, generally justiciable when exercised by a delegate (except when grant is grant of authority for special purpose). Private property all private property capable of ownership may be expropriated, except money and choses in action. It may include services. Private property devoted for public use is also a proper subject of expropriation. Taking see case of Republic v. Castelvi for requisites of taking. See also: Association of Small Landowners case. Public use includes not only use directly available to the public but also those which redound to their indirect benefit. See Heirs of Ardona v. Reyes. Just compensation the full and fair equivalent of the property taken; the fair market value of the property. Due process of law the property owner must be given an opportunity to be heard in the determination of the fair market value of the property.

is liberty regulated by law. Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater food of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizens would, if exercised without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. xxx None of these right can be taken except by due process of law . DUE PROCESS D. Definition of Due Process The earliest articulations of the due process clause seem to combine both substantive and procedural aspects of due process. See the following examples:

Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro Due process of law means simply, first that there
shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class

3. TAXATION

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 4 PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Rubi, et al are illegally deprived of their liberty due to Sec 2145 of Administrative Code of 1917 (section 2145 in a nutshell: provincial governors can direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up habitation on unoccupied public lands; refusal amounts to imprisonment) SC: Law is valid. Regarding religious discrimination: Term non-Christian = natives of Philippine islands of low grade of civilization Does not discriminate based on religious differences but on geographical area

Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assn v. City of Manila : [Due process]

furnishes a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.x x x It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively pit, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. x x x Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. Requirements progressed as understanding of due process became more refined: Broad articulation above is often repeated in cases where rational basis test is applied Rational basis is most often applied by the SC in analysis of cases (for the most part, the court has been deferential due to the presumption of constitutionality). E. Procedural Due Process vs. Substantive Due Process The distinction between procedural due process and substantive due process was discussed in:

Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad: To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf
of the public, it must appear, first that the interests of the public generally , as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires such interference, and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. x x x [The determination of the legislature] as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts. PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Act #2972 (in a nutshell, it is unlawful for account books to be in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect) is in violation of the constitutional rights of Chinese merchants, domiciled in the Philippines. SC: Law is valid and constitutional because the permissible construction is that the law does not specify what books shall be kept; law only intended to require keeping of books as were necessary in order to facilitate governmental inspection for tax purposes. Under this construction, the Chinese are not singled out as special subjects for discriminating and hostile legistlation. Due process at its core simply means reasonable application, or the absence of arbitrariness. See People v. Cayat, Rubi v. Provincial Board: a. Law is prescribed in harmony with the powers of the legislature b. Law is reasonable in its application c. Enforced according to regular methods of procedure d. Applicable alike to all citizens of a state or all of a class

White Light Corporation v. City of Manila: The due process guaranty has traditionally

been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, procedural due process and substantive due process. Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty or property. Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. [But the due process clause is not limited to procedural aspects.] Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires on whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. It is to this question of WoN substantive due process was afforded that the different levels of scrutiny may be applied (rational basis, immediate/intermediate review, and strict scrutiny) F. Different Levels of Review (White Light v. Manila case) Three levels of review when an exercise of police power is being challenged as violative of a constitutional right (esp. due process): Rational basis: laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a

Ichong v. Hernandez : The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of
legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. x x x [T]he guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Retail is common, ordinary occupation, gainful and honest and beyond power of legislature to prohibit. SC: This argument rests on the assumption that they practiced in a creditable manner, without injury to citizens, which they didnt. Thus, the exclusion of aliens is not unreasonable. This is necessary to free the national economy from alien dominance.

legitimate government interest

Economic/commercial/property legislation Anything that would satisfy the court that the law is not unreasonable/arbitrary, etc. Is there public interest/welfare involved?

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 5 Is the means reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose? Presumption of validity of laws

a. b. c. d. e. f. g.

Strict scrutiny: Compelling state interest. The focus is on compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest. Fundamental liberties those dealing with freedom of the mind or person, or restricting the political process Compelling state interest: Does the state have a compelling reason/interest to reach into such legislation infringing into the private domain? Is there no other alternative? Presumption is not forcefully enforced in this analysis/test Immediate scrutiny: important government interest. Governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered Issues of gender and legitimacy Important state interest - does not rise to the level of compelling state interest so as to remove the presumption of constitutionality No local jurisprudence applying this test yet

Right to hearing, which includes the right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented. The decision must have something to support itself. The evidence used to support a finding or conclusion should be substantial. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The tribunal must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The tribunal must render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.

Lumiqued vs. Estrada: In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is to

explain ones side. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process as long as the party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course. A public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law for it is a public trust or agency. I. Due Process in Academic Disciplinary Proceedings As enumerated in Non vs. Dames, there are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process [in academic disciplinary proceedings], and these are, that: a. The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; b. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; c. They shall be informed of the evidence against them; d. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; e. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. J. Due Process in Labor Cases The Labor Code requires twin requirements of NOTICE and HEARING for a VALID DISMISSAL. However, the Court in Serrano v. NLRC clarified that this pro cedural due process requirement is not constitutional but merely statutory, hence a violation of such requirement does not render the dismissal void. Hence:

Strict scrutiny was applied in determining whether the requirements of substantive due process were met in an ordinance challenged as unconstitutional in White Light. The requirements of due process that must concur (as held in that case) are: Interest of the public generally, as opposed to a class; Means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights; No other alternative less intrusive of private rights can work; Reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. G. Substantive Due Process in Publication of Laws

Tanada v. Tuvera: [The publication of laws] "of a public nature" or "of general

applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. H. Cardinal Requirements of Due Process in Administrative Proceedings As enumerated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations : The cardinal primary rights which must be respected in administrative proceedings are as follows:

Serrano vs. NLRC: There are three reasons why, on the other hand, violation by the
employer of the notice requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process resulting in the nullity of the employee's dismissal or layoff. x x x

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 6 Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private power, such as the termination of employment under the Labor Code. x x x b. Notice and hearing are required under the Due Process Clause before the power of organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. This is obviously not the case of termination of employment under Art. 283. x x x c. The third reason why the notice requirement under Art. 283 cannot be considered a requirement of the Due Process Clause is that the employer cannot really be expected to be entirely an impartial judge of his own cause. PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Isetann Dept. Store phased out the entire security and got an independent security agency, thus Serrano was dismissed. He argues that his dismissal was illegal given that he was given his notice of termination on the same day his services were terminated, when the notice should have been given 1 month prior according to Art. 238 of the LC. SC: Petition granted and Isetann is ordered to pay petitioner separation pay. Failure to comply with the notice requirement is not a denial of due process, but a mere failure to observe a procedure for termination of employment makes termination merely ineffectual.

a.

necessity; (2) change modified rates by reducing to 15%. PHILCOMSAT now argues that this order violates due process because there was no notice and hearing. SC: Order is null and void. It was premised on a superficial finding of fact without affording the petitioner the benefit of explanation as to what aspects of the financial statements warranted a rate reduction. The rate-fixing order of NTC does not exempt it from notice and hearing. K. Other Concepts Third party standing The right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: 1. The litigant must have suffered an injury-in-fact 2. The litigant must have a close relation to the third party; 3. There must exist some hindrance to the third partys ability to protect his or her own interest. (White Light Corporation v. City of Manila) Overbreadth Doctrine Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. (White Light Corporation v. City of

Agabon vs. NLRC Where dismissal is for a just cause, lack of statutory due process
should not nullify the dismissal, but the employer should indemnify employee for violation of statutory rights. PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: They were dismissed because private respondents refused to give them assignments unless they agreed to work on a pakyaw basis; the private respondents did not comply with twin requirements of notice and hearing. SC: In this case, the dismissal is for a just or authorized cause but due process was not observed. Serrano did not consider the full meaning of Labor Code Art. 279, maning the termination is illegal only if it is not for any justified or authorized cause. Payment of backwages is justified only if employee was unjustly terminated. The due process under the labor code has two aspects: Substantive: valid and authorized causes of termination under LC Procedural: manner of dismissal Statutory due process should be differentiated from failure to comply with constitutional due process. Statutory: protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing Constitutional: protects individuals from government and assures him his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings.

Manila)

A governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

(Estrada v. Sandiganbayan)

Void for Vagueness Doctrine A statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. [This doctrine] can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan)

Philcomsat vs. Alcuaz: The power of the state to regulate conduct and business of
public utilities is limited insofar as its not the owner of the property or has general power of management. Hence, any regulation which operates as effective confiscation of private property is void because its against the due process and equal protection clauses. PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Under EO 546, NTC issued an order requiring PHILCOMSAT to: (1) apply for a requisite certificate of public convenience and

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 7 Statutory vs. Constitutional Due Process Due process under the Labor Code, like constitutional due process, has two aspects: substantive (i.e. the valid and authorized causes of employment termination), and procedural (i.e. the manner of dismissal). . . Breaches of these due process requirements violate the Labor Code, not the Constitution. Therefore, statutory due process should be differentiated from failure to comply with constitutional due process. III. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS KEY CONCEPTS: A. Definition

Ichong v. Hernandez: The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor

Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and

assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing. (Agabon v. NLRC)

and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. Regarding objections to alien participation in retail trade: Mere fact of alienage is root cause of distingction between alien and national as trader Alien owes allegiance to his own country so he lacks in spirit of sympathy/consideration for Filipino customers The manipulative practices of aliens justify the legislative classification adopted in retail trade measure. Regarding difference in alien aims as sufficient basis for distinction: Objectionable characteristics of alien retailers which are actual and real are sufficient grounds for legislative classification. Can citizenship be basis for classification? YES Difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes basis for reasonable classification in exercise of police power.

Dumlao v. COMELEC: The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real

differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class.xxx It does not forbid legal classification. What it forbids is classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. PETITIONER DUMLAOS ARGUMENT: Assails constitutionality of BP 52, Sec. 4 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process. The law in question provides special disqualification to those who are retired provincial, municipal or city officials who have received their retirement benefits, who shall have been 65 yo at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected. SC: BP 52, Sec. 4 is constitutional.There is reason to disqualify a retired 65 yo elective official because the need for new blood assumes relevance. Purpose of the law is to allow young blood in local governments; classification is therefore based on substantial distinction. PETITIONER IGOTS ARGUMENT: Questioning accreditation of some political parties by respondent as contrary to the Constitution that provides that a bonafide candidate shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 8 SC: BP 52, Sec. 4, Par. 2 is null and void. It contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on grounds that charges have been filed against him. It condemns before hearing. c. d. Not be limited to existing conditions only; and Must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission: Arbitrariness is challenged by the due process


clause but if an act partakes of an unwarranted prejudice, the equal protection clause applies. Substantial similarity suffices as long as all the requirements for valid classification are achieved and all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. PETITIONERS ARGUMENT : EO 1 (or the creation of the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010) violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution, officials and personnel of the previous administration, even as it excludes those of other administrations. SC: EO 1 should be struck down because it violative of the equal protection rights. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Not to include past administration similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness. OSCs enumerated differences of the Arroyo administrtation is not substantial enough to merit restriction of investigation to previous administration only.

The test for valid classification articulated in Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City is substantially the same: a. Classification is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; b. These are germane to the purpose of the law; c. The classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of present; d. The classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. Examples of Valid Classification Valid People v. Cayat Ichong v. Hernandez Dumlao v. COMELEC C. Standard of Review

Invalid Philippine Judges Assn v. Prado Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City

Brown vs. Board of Education: The denial of admission to minor children of Negro
race to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting racial segregation was ruled in this case to be violative of the equal protection clause. Separation of Negro children from others solely because of race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community. This case overturned the Plessy vs. Ferguson doctrine which upheld the separate but equal doctrine, meaning, that equality of treatment is accorded when races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate.

Serrano v. Gallant Maritime introduced a modification in equal protection


jurisprudence by using the three-level review/scrutiny heretofore used in due process cases (rational basis, immediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny). So that, in effect, the level of review when it comes to equal protection challenges may follow the following format: Whether the State was justified in making a classification at all. Three level scrutiny Deferential or Rational Basis Scrutiny - the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest Most liberal test + the most used test Applied to most subjects Middle-tier or Intermediate Scrutiny - the government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest Usually applied to: suspects classifications (gender or illegitimacy) Strict Judicial Scrutiny - a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. Usually applied to: cases involving classifications based on race, national origin, religion, alienage, denial of the right to vote, migration, access to courts, other rights recognized as fundamental

Tecson vs. COMELEC: The distinction on legitimate and illegitimate children rests on

real differences, but real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose, but not for another purpose. To disqualify an in illegitimate child from holding public office is to punish him for indiscretion of parents no justice and rationality in this distinction, hence violation of the equal protection clause. PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Since FPJ was an illegitimate child, he followed the citizenship of his American mom, Bessie Kelly. Thus, he cannot run for the presidency. SC: Such pronouncement violates the equal protection clause twice. a. it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate and illegitimate child b. it would an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and illegitimate child of a Filipino mother. B. Requisites of Valid Classification It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. It is enumerated in People v. Cayat and Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, that the classification must: a. Rest on substantial distinctions; b. Be germane to the purposes of the law;

Whether the classification was valid. --> usual test in EPC cases: test of valid classification

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 9 III. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES - ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES OF 4TH AMENDMENT AND SECTION 2, ARTICLE III Katz vs. US (1967) Scope of 4th amendment: The 4th amendment protects people not simply areas against unreasonable search and seizure The 4th amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but also extends as well to the recording of oral statements, over-heard without any trespass under local property law. Overturning the Olmstead doctrine: Olmstead doctrine: absent penetration of a constitutionally protected area is legal under the 4th amendment Terry vs. Ohio (1967) The heart of the 4th amendment: The right against unreasonable searches and seizure belong to citizens. No right is more sacred or is more guarded than right of an individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from restraint and interference. People vs. Marti (1991) In the absence of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the state. The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against private individuals, this article serves as a protection against the State The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the State. It does not concern itself with relations between individuals What the Bill of Rights does is to declare the forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder (Fr. Bernas, as quoted by the case in deliberations by the Constitutional Commission) Warrant is needed if the government requests for the search and seizure: but, if at the behest of a private person or establishment for its own private purposes, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be invoked. Alvarez vs. CFI (1937) Power of State to Search and Seize: necessary for public welfare Must be exercised and enforced without violating constitutionally granted rights of the citizens It is the highest duty and privilege of the court to protect the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutionally granted rights General rule: Laws authorizing searches and seizures must be strictly construed (favouring the citizen) SEARCH WARRANT Alvarez vs. CFI (1937) Search warrant (definition) An order in writing Issued in the name of the People of the Philippines Signed by a judge or justice of peace Directed to a peace officer: commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court JUDICIAL ORDER COURT ISSUANCE Katz vs. US (1967) There is a need of a judicial order The judicial order of a search and seizure warrant serves as a safeguard which limits government agents in their actions. Self-restrain of police force is not sufficient. The omission of judicial authorization bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause. It substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event-justification for the search Alvarez vs. CFI (1937) Reasonableness of search warrant is a judicial question Determination of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a search warrant is a judicial question which is based on the following circumstances: Existence of probable cause The manner of the search The place or thing searched The character of articles produced Roan vs. Gonzales (1986) Illegal items can be seized if search is valid In this case the search is not valid There was no valid search warrant Absent such warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived

The court determined it was not a valid warrant

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 10 REQUIREMENTS OF A SEARCH WARRANT Nala vs. Barroso, Jr. (2003) a. Probably cause is present b. Such presence is determined personally by the judge c. The complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judgment In writing or under oath or affirmation d. The applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them e. The warrant specifically describes the person and place to be searched and the person and things to be seized (based on Rule 126, Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, Sections 4 and 5) PROBABLE CAUSE AND PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF APPLICANTS Such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection to the offense are in the place ought ot be searched. Must be based on the personal knowledge of complainant or applicant As stated in: Nala vs. Barroso, Jr. (2003) Burgos vs. AFP (1984) Roan vs. Gonzales (1986) People vs. Malmstead (1991) Nala vs. Barroso, Jr. (2003) Determining probable cause: The magistrate must make an exhaustive and probing examination of witnesses and applicant and not merely routine or pro forma examination Alvarez vs. CFI (1937) An affidavit must be sufficient in order to establish probable cause Burgos, Sr. vs. AFP (1984) Affidavit insufficient when: a. The requirement of personal knowledge by complainant and witnesses is not met (upheld Alvarez vs. CFI) b. The purpose of having personal knowledge by the complainant and witnesses and the sufficiency of the warrant is to convince the magistrate seeking the issuance of the warrant that there is probable cause OATH Alvarez vs. CFI (1937) Oath (definition) Any form of attestation that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; or An outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God Requisites of an oath It must refer to facts Such facts are of personal knowledge of the petitioner or applicant or witnesses NOT HEARSAY Test of sufficiency of an oath Whether or not it was drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged against the affiant and he be held liable for damages. RESPONSIBILITIES OF A JUDGE Bache vs. Ruiz (1971) Personally examination (why needed) It is necessary to enable the judge to determine whether or not there exists a probable cause

In this case there was no personal examination of the judge

The determination of probable cause calls for an exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of the facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary

How to personally examine (to determine probable cause) There must be opportunity to observe the demeanor of those to be examined There must be follow-up questions People vs. Marti (1991) Modifications were introduced in the 1987 Constitution regarding the issuance of a warrant and the corresponding responsibility of a judge in the issuance Nala vs. Barroso, Jr. (2003) What the judge must do: Not simply rehash contents of affidavit Must make his own extensive inquiry on the existence of personal knowledge on the part of the applicant/witnesses

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 11

Lim vs. Felix (1991) Issuance of a warrant of arrest Placer vs. Villanueva: the judge may rely upon a fiscals certification of the existence of a probable cause on the basis thereof, may issue a warrant of arrest Personal determination of probable cause (Requisite Procedure) Judge will personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the Fiscal regarding the existence of a probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest If on the basis thereof, finds no probable cause, he may disregard the report of the fiscal and require the submission of supporting affidavits of the witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause But, in the case of Lim vs. Felix, the judge didnt evaluate the probable cause personally it was the provincial prosecutor who determined the probable cause. There was no basis for the judge to determine probable cause because records of the case were still in Masbate, he did not know of the events which transpired, he only had the certification of the prosecutor and denied the transmittal of the evidence on the ground that the mere certification for him was enough basis. Preliminary investigations It must be determined whether the investigation shall be for: 1. Sufficient ground to file information 2. Examination or determination of a probable cause Roan vs. Gonzales 1986 Purpose of personal examination of judge To strengthen the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure Questions regarding contents of affidavit is not sufficient There must be own searching questions There must be taking of depositions in writing attached to the record with the affidavit

PARTICULARITY OF A WARRANT Stonehill vs. Diokno (1967) GENERAL WARRANTS evil sought to be remedied by Constitution Constitution wants to outlaw general warrants General warrants would place the sanctity of the domicile and privacy of communication at the mercy of the whims and caprice of peace officers Issuance of general warrants may be for fishing expeditions 1. It is when the applicant has no evidence and uses the warrant to procure evidence 2. This is not allowed because lack of particularity of affidavit would be impossible for the determination of probable cause Alvarez vs. CFI (1937) General rule: the warrant must contract the particular place to be searched and person or thing to be seized The affidavit must be sufficient in order to establish probable cause The affidavit must contain the particular items, person and place Exception: If the nature of the goods to be seized cannot be particularly determined. The nature of the thing is general in description The thing is not required of a very technical description Stonehill vs. Diokno (1967) There must a specific offense alleged in the application of a warrant Must not be abstract averments 1. Consequence of this: impossible for judge to have issued warrants upon probable cause 2. Probable cause: presupposes that particular acts or specific omissions violating provisions of criminal law Bache vs. Ruiz (1971) There must be only one offense in each warrant Previous rule: As discussed in Stonehill vs. Diokno, the Rules of Court which was not yet amended regarding particularity of a warrant which allowed to include violations in relation to one specific offense Now, as amended by the ROC, no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense General warrants not allowed GENERAL WARRANT IF: If the language used in a search warrant is all embracing as to include all conceivable records of the accused, which if seized, could possible render his (Bache Co., Incs) business inoperative

1.

The judge in this case just questioned whether the complaint and witnesses understood what was written in the affidavit

Sufficiency of depositions Examination must be probing and exhaustive to establish probable cause 1. Own inquiry regarding intent and justification of the application The judge must make his own inquiry and not simply rehash contents of an affidavit

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 12 Tests of particularity of a search warrant: When the description is as specific as circumstances will ordinarily allow; or When the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which warrant officer may be guided in making search and seizure; or When the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is issued Burgos Sr. vs. AFP (1984) Supporting affidavits must contain a specification station with particularity the alleged subversive material which Burgos has published or is intending to publish. Mere conclusions of law will not suffice Being bereft of particularity will not justify issuance of a warrant Wording in the affidavit: is in possession or has in his control printing

office. Olongapo RTC convicted her in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act (life imprisonment).
WON it was reasonable search? NO. No probable cause for search incidental to lawful arrest. Comparison of Aruta to other cases Other cases which held that the search was valid due to presence of probable cause

Arutas Case probable cause

without

People vs. Tangliban

equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion under PD885

Conducted surveillance of victory bus liner Person was acting suspiciously Bag was asked to open On the spot tip allowed Acted suspiciously No reasonable time to get warrant He was aboard moving vehicle

Aruta was not acting suspiciously Narcom had knowledge prior

People vs. Malmstead

Roan vs. Gonzales (1986) Purpose of the particularity of a search warrant To prevent the arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant by persons in authority SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT PEOPLE VS. ARUTA (1998) [BIBLE] a. Search incidental to lawful arrest (ROC Rule 113, Sec. 5) b. Seizure in plain view Valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties The evidence was inadvertently discovered by police who had the right to be there Evidence must be immediately apparent Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search c. Search of moving vehicles d. Consented warrantless search (waiver of right against unreasonable searches and seizures) e. Customs search f. Stop and frisk g. Exigent or emergency circumstances

Not suspicious There was reasonable time to get warrant She was just crossing street Crossing street, moving vehicle not

People vs. Bagista

Described exact appearance and when searched, it fitted the description Moving vehicle and check point Surveillance of Kalookan Cemetery because druggies roam about Chanced upon a person who appeared, based on officers experience, were high on drugs

Manlili vs. CA

No suspicious or illegal actions by Aruta

ARUTA CASE SIMILAR TO AMINUDIN (both are not valid search and seizures)
Why Aruta case doesnt fall under the other categories of valid warrantless search Not Plain view The confiscated item was inside the bag Not moving vehicle Because she was in the middle of the street descending a parked bus Not stop and frisk There was no way her actions could arouse suspicion that she was going something illegal Not exigent or emergency Unlike People vs. De Gracia there is no general, circumstance prevailing chaos that would render the Courts inactive No waiver of right or Silence does not constitute a waiver consented search Waiver of an unreasonable search and seizure is not presumed

Short facts: P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by an informant that a certain Aling Rosa (ARUTA) will arrive from Baguio with large volume of marijuana with her via bus which the informant identified. Aruta descended from the bus, informant points finger at her and police asked if they could open her bag and check contents. They found it contained dried marijuana leaves and a bus ticket such were brought to NARCOM

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 13

SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST

for the arrest. Aminundin was not doing anything illegal at the point of the arrest.
People vs. Burgos (1986) Explanation of Sec. 5 (a) of ROC Rule 113 This provision requires that the officer arresting has personal knowledge of the act. The offense must also be committed in his present

LAWFUL WARRANTLESS ARREST NEEDED TO UNDERSTAND CASES UNDER THIS SECTION


ROC Rule 113, Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. People vs. Malmstead (1991)

In this case there is no personal knowledge. It came from informant Cesar Masamlok At the time of the arrest Burgos was plowing his field, without weapon hes not committing a crime The information regarding the gun came from the wife and the subversive documents from Burgos

Explanation of Sec. 5 (b) of ROC Rule 113 Reasonable ground of an informant is not enough for officers to arrest an accused. There must be in fact a crime committed it must be an undisputed fact Essential precondition: that a crime has been committed

The question in this case was WON the search was valid proceeding from valid arrest? The search of Malmsteads personal items were i ncidental to his arrest when he was found in possession of illegal drugs (Under ROC Rule 113, Section 5, par. a) not a valid arrest, hence, not a valid search The arrest was made on probable cause that he was committing a crime: Narcom officers received report that a Caucasian will be travelling by bus out of Sagada area There was a routine check (this case also falls under search of moving vehicle) There was a bulge on his waist prompting Narcom officers for passport presentation which he vehemently denied presenting

In this case the crime has not yet been ascertained They were still fishing for evidence against Burgos

People vs. Aminudin (1988)

Aminudin disembarked from a vessel. An informant pointed his finger at him saying he was the one who shall bring in drugs. Without an arrest warrant, the police proceeded to handcuff him and take a look at his belongings and found what looked like marijuana leaves. An info was filed against him in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. WON SEARCH VALID? IT IS NOT
VALID SEARCH BECAUSE ARREST NOT VALID.

Chimel vs. California (1969) Police may search without a warrant only the immediate area around the suspect from which he could obtain a weapon or destroy evidence. But a person's entire dwelling cannot be searched merely because he is arrested there. Immediate area: reasonable only to the defendants person Nearby weapons he could grab to attack the officer What he has in his pockets Reason for allowable search of the person without warrant: Reasonable for officer to confiscate whatever may be used to threaten his life or limb There is no justification for routinely searching rooms other than that which is where the lawful arrest is The 4th amendment did not allow a search to beyond that of the area of the person arrested SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE Papa vs. Mago (1968)

OSG invoked Rule 113 Section5, par. b and the court found that the search was not incidental to a lawful arrest. They had all the info needed for a warrant but cavalier Narcom officials were complacent and confident. Bill of rights were ignored. The finger pointed by informant was the only trigger

Upheld United States Carroll doctrine


The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 14 practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which a warrant must be sought. Reasons for allowing warrantless search of moving vehicles Swift and powerful Numbers of automobiles increased Can be used for the successful commission of a crime Provides for silent approach and swift escape of criminals CHECKPOINT SEARCH Valmonte vs. De Villa (1990) Checkpoints Security measures of the state State has the right to defend itself from enemies and pursue program of development under its Police Power The State has the authority and the right to select reasonable measures and means for best achieving its goals Checkpoint search: It is only a brief detention or brief hassle Only required to answer 1-2 questions In US courts: checkpoints are less intrusive because they are conducted in one area Reasonable Checkpoint search: The vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to body search The inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search. The routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of right against unreasonable searches and seizures Warrantless checkpoint searches These searches are not objected because it is founded on public interest, safety and necessity No warrant is needed because of mobility of vehicles CUSTOMS SEARCH Papa vs. Mago (1968) The police are allowed to conduct warrantless searches in behalf of the Department of Customs. They are authorized to: examine, open any box, trunk, other containers when he has reasonable cause to believe that such items were hidden from customs search Sec. 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code states that no warrant is required for police or authorized persons to pass, enter, search any land, enclosure, building, warehouse, store, vessels, aircrafts, vehicles but not dwelling. Purpose of customs search: The purpose of the seizure of the Customs bureau was to verify whether or no Custom duties and taxes were paid for their importation PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE Nala vs. Barroso, Jr. (2003) Police authorities may seize without warrant illegally possessed items found in plain view. Requisites of Plain View Search: The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes is a contraband or otherwise subject to seizure Roan vs. Gonzales (1986) An earlier case trying to list down cases of allowable search without warrant (ARUTA IS STILL BIBLE) Search incidental to lawful arrest When a person is being frisked for weapons he may use against an officer Search of moving vehicles Inspection of a vessel and aircraft Because of their mobility Relative ease in fleeing states jurisdiction When the person knowingly waives objections to an illegal search or agrees to be searched Officers may take prohibited items without warrant if they are open to the eye and hand and the peace officers comes upon them inadvertently

In Roan vs. Gonzales, they were trying to be exempt under #6 but failed because they deliberately sought the illegal firearms

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 15 STOP AND FRISK Terry vs. Ohio (1967) Stop and frisk rule: The right of an agent, to protect himself and others, to conduct a carefully limited search of outer clothing of such persons (as listed below) in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such search is reasonable under the 4 th amendment: a. Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the person with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous; b. Where in the course of the investigation of this behaviour he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries; and c. Where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety. No probable cause Of all the valid warrantless searches, stop and frisk does not require a probable cause but a reasonable conclusion by the police officer through observing unusual conduct of the person to be searched Test of agents reasonable conclusion: WoN a reasonably prudent man would be warranted to believe his safety is jeopardized Seizure (in stop and frisk) When a police officer accosts an individual and restrains him of his freedom Search (in stop and frisk) A careful exploration of outer surfaces of a persons clothing in an attempt to find weapons Manalili vs. CA (1997) Guidelines of Stop and Frisk a. When police officer observes unusual conduct b. This conduct leads him to believe, also in light of his experience, that criminal activity may be afoot c. The persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous d. Also, in the course of investigating his behaviour of the man, after identifying himself as a police officer the man is entitled to a limited search of outer clothing because: a. Fear of his own safety b. Fear of publics safety that a crime might ensue Definition of stop and frisk: (upheld Terry vs. Ohio)

The right of the police to stop a citizen on the street to interrogate him and pat him for weapons Evidence obtained in valid stop and frisk is admissible as evidence

Stop and frisk effective It is an effective crime prevention in the US for inspecting possible criminal behaviour RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE EXERCISED BY Stonehill vs. Diokno (1967) RULE: the legality of the seizure could only be contested by the party whose rights have been impaired. The objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal Cannot be invoked by a third party Bache vs. Ruiz (1971) A Corporation has a right to exercise right against unreasonable searches and seizure The individuals, in forming a corporation, do not waive their right against unreasonable searches and seizures The property of a corporation cannot be taken without compensation Protected by the 14th amendment against unlawful discrimination Valmonte vs. De Villa (1989) This right is a personal right d. Invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed or threatened to be infringed WAIVER OF RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE People vs. Burgos (1986) Requisites of a waiver: A right must exist Person had knowledge of such right Person has intention to relinquish that right

In this case, mere failure to object to the search and seizure does not constitute a waiver

There is a presumption against waiver by the courts

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 16 VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST 2 People vs. Mengote (1992) Explanation of Rule 113, Section 5 (a): The person must be arrested after the offense has been committed Must be committed in the presence of a police officer Purpose of Exclusionary Rule: To deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effective way by removing the incentive to disregard i Right to object use of evidence: The exclusive right (of the accused) Like the right against unreasonable searches and seizure this is a personal right which could not be invoked by third parties

Both are not evident in the case of Mengote. Mengote was only looking from side to side holding his abdomen he was not committing any criminal act His act was not suspicious enough to suggest he is about to commit a crime

Explanation of Rule 113, Section 5 (b): The arresting officers need personal knowledge of the crime Condition precedent: that a crime has in fact been committed

In this case, Stonehill is a member of the corporation and invoked the right to exclude evidence procured against the Corporation. It should be the corporation and not Stonehill who should have invoked the right, insofar as the items seized in the premises of the corporation.

The arresting officers had no personal knowledge of the facts indicating that Mengote already committed a crime suspicion is not enough A crime has yet to be committed

Rule: If government action invaded rights of a corporation, not affecting the personal rights of individuals, then the corporation and not the other individuals can invoke this right. Such search and seizure will be unlawful if the rights of persons (personal property had been seized) and their privacy disturbed. People vs. Mengote (1992) Illegally obtained evidence could not be admitted because it is a fruit of a poisonous tree General Rule: there is an absolute prohibition of presentation of evidence obtained in violation of Art. 3 Section 2 Exception: when the search is preceded by a valid warrantless arrest under ROC 113, Section 5 RULES OF COURT: RULE 126 - SEARCH AND SEIZURE Section 1 . Search warrant defined. A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court. Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following: (a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed. (b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. Section 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:

People vs. Manlulu (1994)

A crime was committed 1am, but there was still no search and seizure warrant when the arresting officer detained the accused at 7pm .
Explanation of Rule 113, Section 5 (b): There was no personal knowledge of the arresting officer in this case

Patrolman only personally gathered information Sufficient knowledge does not constitute as personal knowledge

A crime was not in fact has just been committed: The persona must be immediately arrested after the commission of the offense

In this case it was already 17 hours (but Manlulu is still guilty because of strong testimony of credible witness)

EXCLUSIONARY RULE Stonehill vs. Diokno (1967) Exclusionary rule (definition) Exclusion of evidence illegally obtained Reason for Exclusionary Rule: The exclusionary rule is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against the right to unreasonable searches and seizures This is also essential to the right to privacy

Please see Rule 113, Section 5 which was inserted under Valid Warrantless Search

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 17 (a) Subject of the offense; (b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or (c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules. Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant to liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. Section 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses. No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. Section 9. Time of making search. The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. Section 10. Validity of search warrant. A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter, it shall be void. Section 11. Receipt for the property seized. The officer seizing the property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property. Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. (a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath. (b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complied with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with. (c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge. A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court. Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court.

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 18 PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Privacy in General

Morfe v. Mutuc first recognized that there is a constitutional right to privacy. It


is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty. It is inherent in the concept of limited government.

Ople v. Torres

In the United States, the right of privacy is not recognized explicitly in the Constitution. Its protection is guaranteed because it is seen as a peripheral right, within the penumbra of constitutional amendments. These constitutional guarantees create zones of privacy. In Griswold v. Connecticut, prior to the issue regarding the right to privacy, an issue on standing was raised against the appellants who were physicians who prescribed a contraceptive thereby violating a statute. The US SC granted 3rd party standing and held that: 'certainly the accessory should have standing to assert that the offense which he is charged with assisting is not, or cannot constitutionally be, a crime. x x x The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.' The Court first recognized the right of association stated in the First Amendment because the Court saw marriage as an association: 'Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.'

has enumerated several provisions of the constitution where the right of privacy is enshrined ( penumbras): a. Sec. 3 Privacy of communication b. Sec. 1 Life, liberty and property c. Sec. 2 Unreasonable searches and seizures d. Sec. 6 Liberty of abode e. Sec. 8 Right to form associations f. Sec. 17 Right against self-incrimination

protected in our laws: Civil code RPC Anti-Wiretapping Law Security Deposits Act Intellectual Property Code Limitations By lawful order of the Court;

Ople v. Torres has also indicated that zones of privacy are recognized and

Public safety or public order requires otherwise, as may be provided by law (Sec 3, Art III)

Zulueta v. CA: The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is


if there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouse by making it privileged. They may not testify for or against the other without consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists (Rule 130, Sec 22). And they may not be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions (Rule 130, Sec 24).

According to the US SC, the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion. Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Without those peripheral rights, the specific rights would be less secure. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The case concerned a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by fundamental constitutional guarantees and the prohibition on the use of contraceptives has maximum destructive impact on that relationship. Thus, by a vote of 7-2, the prohibition was held to be unconstitutional, violating marital privacy. In the country, the essence of privacy is the right to be let alone .

Ayer Productions PTY. LTD. V. Capulong (hint: Enrile Case) : The right to
be let alone is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a persons privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 19 Right of Privacy v. Freedom of Speech and Communication already an existing ID system within each government agency. EO 420 will only have to streamline and harmonize it. EO 420 was within the power of the President to promulgate. The President has the constitutional power of control over the executive department. AO 308 (National ID System), however, was not a mere administrative order but a law. It involved policy setting, creating rights and duties, which is beyond the power of the President. It involved a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. EO 420 has shown no constitutional infirmity on the right of privacy because it even narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded and shown as compared to AO 308 which was not narrowly drawn.

Because of the preferred character of the constitutional rights of the freedom of speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint upon the exercise of such freedoms. (Ayer v. Capulong) Right of privacy of a public figure us necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. (Ayer v. Capulong) Public figure: A person who by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doing, his affairs and his character, has become public personage. Why? o They had sought publicity and consented to it, so they could not complain. o Their personalities and their affairs had already become public and could no longer be regarded as their own private business o The press had a privilege , under the Constitution, to inform the public about those that have become legitimate matters of public interest. BUT: As held in Lagunzad v. Soto, being a public figure does not automatically destroy in toto a persons right to privacy. In the case at bar, while it is true that the producer exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, he admits that he included a little romance in the film. The right of freedom of expression indeed occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties. It is not, however, without limitations: Clear and present danger rule Balancing-of-interest test requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation. (The Court used this in Lagunzad)

Two-part test to determine the reasonableness of persons expectati on of privacy

Whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy Whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable

Note: The factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness

of the expectation. However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation. ( Ople v. Torres) Exclusionary Rule (par 2, Sec. 3, Art. III)

Zulueta v. CA: The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a
lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation renders the evidence obtained inadmissible .

Right of Privacy v. Freedom of Access to Information

The exclusion of evidence applies not only to testimonial evidence but also to documentary and object evidence. (Evidence in Zulueta were documents, i.e. correspondence with paramours)

Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Director-General: Section 7, Article III of the 1987


Constitution grants the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Personal matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the peoples right to information on matters of public concern. The data treated as strictly confidential under EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public concern, these data cannot be released to the public or the press. Difference with Ople v. Torres: o System involved in KMU was not a national system but a system only for government agencies and GOCSS. Moreover, there is

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 20 WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Art. III, Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it. Art. VII, Section 18. x x x In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. xxx The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not x x x automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. I. Writ of Habeas Corpus The constitutional guarantee that protects personal liberty would be worthless if its violation were not immediately remediable in law. Definition It is defined as a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf. Function Function of the writ: to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary and to relieve a person if such restraint is illegal. When Available In cases of illegal detention or restraint; or In custody cases (even for a corpse)

Primary requisite for its availability is actual deprivation of personal liberty, or deprivation of right of custody

Barcelon v. Baker SC denied the petition and declared that the conclusion set forth

there existed in the Province of Cavite and Batangas open insurrection against the constituted authorities, was a conclusion entirely within the discretion of the legislative and executive branches of the Government, after an investigation of the facts and that one branch of the US Government in the Philippines had no right to interfere or inquire into, for the purpose of nullifying the same, the discretionary acts of another independent depart of the Government. *Note however that the authority of the Governor-General jointly with the Philippine Commission, to suspend the writ was not in issue at all. What was in issue was the reviewability of the joint executivelegislative decision regarding the existence of the factual situation which would warrant suspension. The SC, following the doctrine of separation of powers, refused to review the act of the two branches. II. The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus It is the right to have an immediate determination of the legality of the deprivation of physical liberty. III. Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus The writ is never suspended. It always issues as a matter of course. What is suspended is the privilege of the writ, i.e. once the officer making the return shows to the court that the person detained is being detained for an offense covered by the suspension, the court may not enquire further.

Lansang v. Garcia overruled Barcelon v. Baker; Prof. Gwen described


this case as the Marcoss test balloon f or the declaration of martial law SC said that for the validity of the suspension of the privilege, two conditions must concur: That there is invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger Public safety requires the suspension In answering the question regarding review, the SC first gave the general answer that its power was merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. The Courts power rests on whether or not the President did not act arbitrarily in issuing the writ and not whether or not the Presidents decision is correct. SC held that judicial review is available only for the determination of factual basis for the suspension of the writ. From Prof. Gwens discussion, she also mentioned that the requisites of judicial review were relaxed in this case.

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 21

Locus standi party can file only when he was suffered direct and substantial injury. Exceptions: Transcendental importance When the basis of the right is a public one. (example: right to information)

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL Sec. 6 The Liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired, except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. From Fr. Bernas Commentaries Freedom of movement includes 2 rights; 1. Liberty of abode a. It may be impaired only upon lawful order of the court b. The court itself is to be guided by the limits prescribed by law Example: A condition imposed by the court in connection with the grant of bail. Liberty of travel a. May be impaired even without a lawful order of the court b. But the appropriate executive officer (who may impair this right) is not granted arbitrary discretion to impose limitations c. He can only do so on the basis of national security, public safety, or public health and as may be provided by law d. Impairment of this liberty is subject to judicial review

The 1987 Constitution has removed insurrection and imminent danger of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion as gro unds for the suspension. The effect of the suspension of the writ is to prevent courts, temporarily, from enquiring into the legality of the detention. It is not enough that the crimes covered by the suspension be those coming under the constitutional enumeration. For a person to lose the privilege of the writ, he must be judicially charged. a. Judicially charged - It is not enough that a complaint is under investigation by a fiscal or that a charge has been filed before the public office. It is necessary that the criminal charge has been filed in court. The suspension of the privilege of the writ does not suspend the right to bail.

2.

IV. Limitations Habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement. The fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the detainees desire to live comfortably does not convent those restrictions into punishment. Habeas corpus is no longer available once charges have been filed in court.

Cases Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro Rubi, a Mangyan, contests the forcible relocation of his tribe and people to a reservation through a writ of habeas corpus. The Court through Justice Malcolm denies his request on the grounds that the forcible relocation is a valid exercise of police power. This police power is made legitimate because there exists reasonable classification with which it can operate namely the difference of culture and civilization of the non-Christian tribes (which includes the Mangyans) and Christian peoples of the Philippines. This law was made with the intent and purpose to uplift the development of (their) culture and civilization. Furthermore, the law does not specifically single out the Mangyans, rather using the term non -Christian, thus making it amenable to the equal protection clause. Villavicencio v. Lukban This the case of the Mayor of Manila and his act of forcibly rounding up the citys prostitutes and exiling them to Davao. The women and their relatives file writs of habeas corpus for the exiles. The Court grants the same, holding the Mayor and the police under contempt, saying that there is no law or provision with which the Mayor is granted the power to round up the women and forcibly exile them from the citys boundaries. The women have their constitutional rights which guarantees liberty of both abode and travel, rights which the Mayor may not validly impede.

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 22 Lorenzo v. Director of Health A leper contests his forced confinement through a writ of habeas corpus. He presents to the court that the controlling law re. the confinement (Administrative Code, Sec. 1058) is unconstitutional, and is based on erroneous facts. The Court responds by saying that this law was enacted by the Legislature as a valid exercise of police power, with the purpose of preserving public health. It is not violative of the due process clause because the law outlines specific methods for the control of leprosy. Further, the most the Court can do is to take judicial notice of the new scientific findings re. the transmissibility of the disease. These are questions of fact which are best left to the Legislature to decide on. Salonga v. Hermoso Jovito Salonga applied for a certificate of eligibility to travel. However, the Travel Processing Center withheld the same. Hence, he files for a writ of mandamus to compel the said government agency to issue it. The Court notes that this is not the first time that this has happened, as the same exact thing was filed by Salonga, for the same relief, only in a different set of facts. Even if it was rendered moot and academic (because the Travel Processing Center subsequently released the certificate of eligibility), the Court deemed it necessary to lay down various points. O ne of the highlights of the keynote address of President Marcos in the Manila World Law Conference in celebration of the World Peace Through Law Day on August 21, 1977 was the lifting of the ban on international travel. There should be fidelity to such a pronouncement. This was cited by the Court to give emphasis to the point that the President himself has pointed to the high accord of the right of travel, and thus the agencies under him (ie. the Travel Processing Center) must follow suit. The Court stresses that the Travel Processing Center must exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. The Court notes that President and Prime Minister Marcos re-emphasized the respect accorded to the constitutional rights of freedom to travel, saying that it is one of the most cherished. Manotoc v. Court of Appeals Manotoc is out on bail, after a series of estafa cases were filed against him and his corporation. He petitions the court to allow him to leave the country because of urgent business matters. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the lower courts to deny this request to leave the country. They stress that bail is a valid impairment of the right to liberty of abode and travel. Furthermore, the rationale of the bail bond is for the Court to have security measures that the accused will be present at the trial whenever he is needed. As such, the bail bond does not equal unrestrained liberty re. these rights. Marcos v. Manglapus This the celebrated case which dealt with the band of president Aquino on former President Marcos return to the Philippines. The band was challenged as violative of the right to travel and right to return to ones abode. The Court treated this case merely as involving the right to travel (because of the reason that the right to return to ones home is a different right altogether, most notably recognized in international law, and thus this is not specifically stated in the Constitution). Further explaining this point, the Court deemed that the right to travel guaranteed by the Constitution involves the right to travel within the country, but not the right to return to the country. Since authority to impair the right to travel must be based on law the President had to be able to point to a law giving her such authority. This is where the Court, through Justice Cortes, found that in the totality of executive powers, there are both stated and unstated in the Constitution there are explicit and residual powers.

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 23 Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment Sec. 19 - (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. From Fr. Bernas Commentaries Cruel and Unusual To be prohibited by this provision, the punishment must not only be unusual, but it must also be cruel. Cruel and unusual embodied an inseparable pair. There is no reason why unusual punishments which are not cruel should be banned. Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of the Constitution. (Cruel) implies there (is) something inhuman and barbarous, something more that the mere extinguishment of life. An early case of cruel and unusual punishment was the case of Weems v. US. Weems was sentenced to cadena temporal under the old Penal Code. It literally involved having a chain from ones wrist to ones ankle. The Court deemed it cruel and unusual, (remembering) that this has come to us from a government of a different form and genius from ours. Re. The Abolition of the Death Penalty Furman v. Georgia is an early case on the American jurisprudence ruling that the death penalty (imposed in Georgia) is unconstitutional, not because it is cruel and unconstitutional, but because it vested to the trial court judges the power to impost death without any bounds or parameters (People v. Echegaray). Here, Justices Brennan and Marshall filed a dissent in which they considered the death penalty unconstitutional per se, by measuring capital punishment against what they considered to be basic principles for judging severe punishment, to wit; Justice Brennan: 1. A punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings 2. It must not be applied arbitrarily 3. It must not be unacceptable to contemporary society 4. It must not be excessive it must serve a penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment would Justice Marshall: 1. 2. 3. 4. There are certain punishments which inherently involve so much and and suffering that civilized people cannot tolerate them There are unusual punishments in the sence of being previously unknown for a given offense A penalty may be cruel and unusual because it is excessive and serves no legislative purpose A punishment that is not excessive and possessing a legislative purpose may nevertheless be unvalid if popular sentiment abhors it

Father Bernas notes that these tests by Justices Brennan and Marshall were taken into deep consideration by the 1986 Constitutional Commission. The Commission subsequently voted for the abolishment of the death penalty in the 1987 Constitution. But it is important to note that this does not prevent the legislature from re-imposing it at some future time. An amendment adds that the legislature may re-impose it if for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. People v. Echegaray Echegaray ruled that the import of the grant of power to Congress to restore the death penalty requires 1. That Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes 2. That Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition xxx and designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which the latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous 3. That Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by compelling reasons involving heinous crimes In upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty, the Court declares, xxx the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so. Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice The Court cites various rpecedents as to why death penalty is not unconstitutional re. the change from electrocution to lethal injection, to wit; 1. Harden v Director of Prisons: "Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishments of life."

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 24 2. State of Nevada v Gee Jon: "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." 3. Ex Parte Granviel: The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely. What is cruel and unusual is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice and must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. 4. Stanford v Kentucky: The primary indicator of society's standard of decency with regard to Capital Punishment is the response of the country's legislature to the sanction. Freedom of Speech, Expression, the Press and the Right to Peaceable Assembly Art. III, Sec. 4 No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceable to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Gitlow v. New York (1925) J. Sanford


Benjamin Gitlow was indicted for statutory crime of criminal anarchy in this case, the act of advocating through printing, publishing, editing or circulating documents advocating doctrines of the overthrow of givernment. He was a member of the Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party and arranged for the publishing or a Manifesto published in The Revolutionary Age, the official organ of the Left Wing. Copies were also sold from his office and was responsible for its circulation. The Manifesto espoused, in plain and unequivocal language, the need for a Communist Revolution by a militant and revolutionary Socialism based on class struggle and mobilization of proletariat action. He was convicted of the charges against him and of the main rationale that he advocated, through the Manifesto, the overthrow and destruction of the State. The jury rejected the defense that it was a mere academic and harmless discussion of the advantages of communism and advanced socialism. Gitlow questions the constitutionality of the statute on criminal anarchy as a violation of the fourteenth amendment or the due process clause and specifically on the reach of the first amendment to include freedom of speech. SUPREME COURT HELD: It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. ON THE STATES EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER: That a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open to question. State may punish utterances endangering the foundations of organized government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means. These imperil its own existence as a constitutional State. Freedom of speech and press does not protect disturbances to the public peace or the attempt to subvert the government. It does not protect publications or teachings which tend to subvert or imperil the government or to impede or hinder it in the performance of its governmental duties.

Hence, for as long as the Death P enalty remains in our statute books and meets the most stringent requirements provided by the Constitution, we must confine our inquiry to the legality of RA No. 8177. The legislature's substitution of the mode of carrying out the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection infringes no constitutional rights of Echegaray.

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 25 THE TESTS EMPLOYED IN THE ANALYSIS OF FREE SPEECH ON UTTERANCES OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL: A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER That utterances inciting to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means, present a sufficient danger of substantive evil to bring their punishment within the range of legislative discretion, is clear. In this case, Schenk v. US was cited, and the clear and present danger test was used to affirm Gitlows conviction. The dangerous tendency test was also first established in this case.

Clear and Present Danger Test Defined in Schenk v. US as the following:

The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.

Rust v. Sullivan (1991) J. Rehnquist


In this case, what was being questioned was the constitutionality of Section 1008 of the Public Health Service Act specifies that none of the federal funds appropriated under the Act's Title X for family-planning services "shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning", instituted by Respondent Sullivan, the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The regulations promulgated by respondent also prohibited projects receiving these funds from not only providing abortions, but also counseling, advising, or promoting the idea that a woman seek an abortion. Petitioners are Title X grantees and doctors who supervise Title X funds suing on behalf of themselves and their patients. Petitioners questioned the regulation on the ground of violation of the First Amendment on free speech, by discriminating "all discussion about abortion as a lawful option -- including counseling, referral, and the provision of neutral and accurate information about ending a pregnancy -- while compelling the clinic or counselor to provide information that promotes continuing a pregnancy to term." SUPREME COURT HELD: The government may choose to fund one program at the exclusion of another. The decision of the legislature not to fund or subsidize abortion, does not necessarily infringe upon the exercise of this right. By requiring that the Title X grantee engage in abortion-related activity separately from activity receiving federal funding, Congress has not denied it the right to engage in abortion-related activities. Congress has merely refused to fund such activities out of the public fisc, and the Secretary has simply required a certain degree of separation from the Title X project in order to ensure the integrity of the federally funded program The decision is NOT a content-based restriction on speech. The focus of the main decision is on the scope of the regulation. Family planning counseling does not, by definition, include abortion. By this same reasoning, prenatal care discussions are also prohibited in these programs. As such, the regulations were found to be within the permissible scope of legislative and police power.

Schenk v. US (1919)

Schenk was Secretary of the Socialist Party and responsible for printing, distributing, and mailing leaflets to prospective military draftees advocating the opposition to being drafted into military services during the first world war. He was indicted for violation of the Espionage Act. He questioned the constitutionality of the statute and claims that it violated his First Amendment rights.

COURT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE STATUTE When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right. It seems to be admitted that if an actual obstruction of the recruiting service were proved, liability for words that produced that effect might be enforced. If the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) its tendency and the intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime.

Abrams v. US (1919)

The defendants, all born in Russia but had been living in the US for at least 5 years, were convicted of printing and throwing from windows in a New York City building 2 types of leaflet one in English, and the other in Yiddish that claimed them as revolutionists and denounced the war efforts of the US against Soviet Russia. They were charged and convicted under the Espionage Act of 1917, particularly in conspiring to unlawfully utter language that would incite disloyalty, contempt, and disrepute on the government, as well as incite resistance to US war efforts. They questioned the validity of the statute for being in violation of their First Amendment Rights.

COURT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE STATUTE [W]hile the immediate occasion for this particular outbreak of lawlessness, on the part of the defendant alien anarchists, may have been resentment caused by our government sending troops into Russia as a strategic operation against the Germans on the eastern battle front, yet the plain purpose of their

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 26 propaganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis of the war, disaffection, sedition, riots, and, as they hoped, revolution, in this country for the purpose of embarrassing and if possible defeating the military plans of the government in Europe. But it is not necessary to a decision of this case to consider whether such distinction is vital or merely formal, for the language of these circulars was obviously intended to provoke and to encourage resistance to the United States in the war, as the third count runs, and, the defendants, in terms , plainly urged and advocated a resort to a general strike of workers in ammunition factories for the purpose of curtailing the production of ordnance and munitions necessary and essential to the prosecution of the war as is charged in the fourth count.

The essential distinction is that those to whom the advocacy is addressed must be urged to do something, now or in the future, rather than merely to believe in something.

Imminent Action or Direct Incitement Test Defined in Brandenburg v. Ohio as the following:

[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.

Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)

Dissenting Opinion of J. Holmes

The United States constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent This power is greater in time of war. HOWEVER: against dangers peculiar to war, as against others, the principle of the right to free speech is always the same. It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned. Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the mind of the country. Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present any immediate danger that its opinions would hinder the success of the government arms or have any appreciable tendency to do so. Publishing those opinions for the very purpose of obstructing, however, might indicate a greater danger and at any rate would have the quality of an attempt. NO INTENT WAS PROVEN.

Appellant, a Ku Klux Klan leader, was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for "advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform" and for "voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." He was filmed in a KKK rally with several men in robes and hoods, carrying firearms, burning crosses, making speeches with regards to exacting revenge against niggers and Jews and the Congress supposedly suppressing the white Caucasian race.

COURT REVERSED HIS CONVICTION AND STATUTE IS HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL [T]he mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action." A statute which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It sweeps within its condemnation speech which our Constitution has immunized from governmental control. IN THIS CASE: Freedoms of speech and press do not permit a State to forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.

Advocacy of Abstract Doctrine Test Defined in Yates v. US as the following:

Concurring Opinion of J. Douglas

[I]t was nevertheless incumbent on the court to make clear in some fashion that the advocacy must be of action and not merely abstract doctrine.

There must be a distinction between restraint on action and restraint on speech. When one reads the opinions closely and sees when and how the "clear and present danger" test has been applied, great misgivings are aroused. First, the threats were often loud but always puny and made serious only by judges so wedded to the

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 27 status quo that critical analysis made them nervous. Second, the test was so twisted and perverted in Dennis as to make the trial of those teachers of Marxism an all-out political trial which was part and parcel of the cold war that has eroded substantial parts of the First Amendment. The line between what is permissible and not subject to control and what may be made impermissible and subject to regulation is the line between ideas and overt acts. Example: falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater J. Douglas says on this: This is, however, a classic case where speech is brigaded with action. They are indeed inseparable and a prosecution can be launched for the overt acts actually caused. Apart from rare instances of that kind, speech is, I think, immune from prosecution. Certainly there is no constitutional line between advocacy of abstract ideas as in Yates and advocacy of political action as in Scales. The quality of advocacy turns on the depth of the conviction; and government has no power to invade that sanctuary of belief and conscience. Mentioned in this case were precedents that merely employed the dangerous tendency rule as a basis for judgment. J. Sanford had this to say about them: In other words, when the legislative body has determined generally, in the constitutional exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be punished, the question whether any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not open to consideration. It is sufficient that the statute itself be constitutional and that the use of the language comes within its prohibition.

Balancing of Interests Test

Salonga v. Pano (1985)


Government tried to implicate Sen. Salonga on the bombings in Manila based on Salongas remark in an interview that there will be violent events if Pres. Marcos does not implement reforms in his administration. He was charged with subversion.

COURT SAYS THERE WAS NO POLITICAL SUBVERSIVE ACTION TAKEN Court determines that there must be a difference between: Abstract teaching for a resort to force or violence Speech that would prepare a group for violent action and steel it to such action In this case: There was merely political discussion There was also NO LINK of Salonga to any subversive organization or actions made in furtherance of the destabilization of the government.

Dangerous Tendency Rule/Test

Defined by BERNAS as the following: Speech may be curtailed or punished when dangerous tendency which the State has a right to requires, for speech to be punishable, is there connection between speech and the evil being apprehended.

it creates a preventAll it be a rational sought to be

Gitlow v. New York (supra)

Defined in the dissenting opinion of J. Castro in Gonzales v. Comelec: In enunciating a standard premised on a judicial balancing of the conflicting social values and individual interests competing for ascendancy in legislation which restricts expression the "balancing" test requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation. In the actual application of the "balancing-of-interests" test, the crucial question is: how much deference should be given to the legislative judgment? Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by Congressional power restricting the individual's freedom, and the social importance and value of the freedom so restricted, "are to be judged in the concrete, not on the basis of abstractions," a wide range of factors are necessarily relevant in ascertaining the point or line of equilibrium. Among these are: (a) the social values and importance of the specific aspect of the particular freedom restricted by the legislation; (b) the specific thrust of the restriction, i.e., whether the restriction is direct or indirect, whether or not the persons affected are few; (c) the value and importance of the public interest sought to be secured by the legislation the reference here is to the nature and gravity of the evil which Congress seeks to prevent; (d) whether the specific restriction decreed by Congress is reasonably appropriate and necessary for the protection of such public interest; and (e) whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom. Also found in the citation made by J. Castro in Gonzales v. Comelec:

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 28

"The theory of balance of interests represents a wholly pragmatic approach to the problem of First Amendment freedom, indeed, to the whole problem of constitutional interpretation. It rests on the theory that it is the Court's function in the case before it when it finds public interests served by legislation on the one hand, and First Amendment freedoms affected by it on the other, to balance the one against the other and to arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be placed. If on balance it appears that the public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such a character that it outweighs the abridgment of freedom, then the Court will find the legislation valid. In short, the balance-of-interests theory rests on the basis that constitutional freedoms are not absolute , not even those stated in the First Amendment, and that t hey may be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and important public interests."

Gonzales v. Comelec (1969)


Petitioners Cabigao, incumbent councilor of Manila and Vice-Mayoral candidate, and Gonzales, a political leader, question the validity of 2 sections of RA 4880 prohibiting the early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign and partisan political activity. They argue that the nomination of candidates and fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail among themselves; that limitations of these through police power absent a clear and present danger to State would violate constitutional rights.

COURT UPHELD THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTE Although the challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn as to not fall under the problems of the overbreadth doctrine, it is still constitutional. It is a necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to an actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty, corruption, violence that has marred election campaigns and partisan political activity. Simple expression of opinions and thoughts concerning election SHALL NOT BE considered as part of election campaign and nothing in the Act shall be understood to prevent any person from expressing views on a current political problem on issues or from mentioning names of candidates he supports.

Dissenting opinion of J. Castro:

In my view, the "balancing-of-interests" approach is more appropriately used in determining the constitutionality of Sections 50-A and 50-B. Both the "dangerous tendency" and "clear and present danger" criteria have minimum relevancy to our task of appraising these provisions. Under these two tests, the statute is to be assayed by considering the degree of

probability and imminence with which "prolonged election campaigns" would increase the incidence of "violence and deaths," "dominion of the rich in the political arena" and "corruption of the electorate." Although 50-A remains constitutional, 50-B must be struck down as unconstitutional. I reach a different conclusion with respect to Section 50 -B. Here, the restraint on the freedoms of expression, assembly and association is direct. Except within the "open seen" of 120 and 90 days preceding the election, the statute prevents and punishes by heavy criminal sanction speeches, writings, assemblies and associations intended to promote or oppose the candidacy of any person aspiring for an elective public office, or which may be deemed a direct or an indirect "campaign" or as "propaganda" for or against a political party. The prohibition reaches not only "a relative handful of persons;" 25 applies to any person "whether or not a voter or candidate," and to any group of persons "whether or not a political party or political committee." The effect of the law, therefore, is to impose a comprehensive and prolonged prohibition of speech of a particular content, except during the 120 or 80 days, respectively, immediately preceding an election TAKE NOTE: Under the first proviso, it "simple expressions of opinion and thoughts concerning the election shall not be considered as part of an election campaign." From the precise use of the word "simple" may be rationally drawn an inference that "non-simple" expressions fall within the proscription of election campaigns. But the law conspicuously fails to lay dawn a standard by which permissible electioneering. How simple is "simple"? In the absence of such a standard, every speaker or writer wishing to make publicly known his views concerning the election and his preferences among the candidates, must speak at his own peril. He could carefully choose his word's with the intention of remaining within the area of speech left permissible by Section 50-B. But, in the nature of things, what and who can provide him assurance that his words, "simple expressions of opinion and thoughts concerning the election" as they may be, will not be understood by his audience or at least by some of them, or by the prosecuting officers of the Government, or by the courts even, as a "speech" or "commentary" "for or against the election of ... a candidate for public office," or at least an indirect solicitation of votes?

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 29 FREEDOM OF THE PRESS A) PRIOR RESTRAINT / CENSORSHIP / SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT - Prior restraint: official government restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. - Forms: a) system of licensing b) movie censorship c) judicial prior restraint/injunction against publication d) license taxes - There are exceptions to prohibition of prior restraint; it is not absolute. One example/scenario is when a nation is at war. - The free speech and press clause also prohibits systems of subsequent punishment which have the effect of unduly curtailing expression. NEAR v. MINNESOTA: The statute which perpetually enjoined the defendants "from producing, editing, publishing, circulating, having in their possession, selling or giving away any publication whatsoever which is a malicious, scandalous or defamatory newspaper, as defined by law" is unconstitutional. The statute must be tested by its operation and effect: the object of the statute is not punishment, in the ordinary sense, but suppression of the offending newspaper or periodical. The statute not only operates to suppress the offending newspaper or periodical but to put the publisher under an effective censorship. Prior restraint violates the 14 th Amendment and the freedom of the press. Liberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship. Public officers, whose character and conduct remain open to debate and free discussion in the press, find their remedies for false accusations in actions under libel laws providing for redress and punishment, and not in proceedings to restrain the publication of newspapers and periodicals. GROSJEAN v. AMERICAN PRESS CO.: The license tax on gross receipts derived from advertisements carried in the newspapers with a weekly circulation of more than 20,000 copies operates as a prior restraint in a double sense. First, its effect is to curtail the amount of revenue realized from advertising, and, second, its direct tendency is to restrict circulation. It is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties. Judge Cooleys test regarding censorship: "The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens." The protection of freedom of the press is not limited to any particular way of abridging it. NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. UNITED STATES: Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. The dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the BURGOS SR. v. CHIEF OF STAFF: The closure of the premises of We Forum and Metropolitan Mail and the seizure of their printing equipment is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. BRANDENBURG v. OHIO: Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute was declared unconstitutional because that statute broadly prohibited the mere advocacy of violence. The mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action. A statute which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It sweeps within its condemnation speech which our Constitution has immunized from governmental control. B) LIBEL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND PUBLIC FIGURES - In the US, the constitutional guarantee requires a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice. - Actual malice: It means with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. - We follow this rule in the Philippines. However, public figures are not unprotected. If the utterances are false, malicious, or unrelated to a public officers performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest, the utterance may give rise to criminal and civil liability. NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. SULLIVAN: Libelous statements in paid ads are usually not protected. However, in this case, it is protected because it served as an important outlet for promulgation of info and ideas by persons who wish to exercise their freedom of speech although not members of the press. NY Times Privilege: libelous utterances concerning public figures, even public officials, must be governed by the 1 st and 14th Amendment privilege. The 1st Amendment secures freedom of expression upon public discussions. Debate on public issues should be uninhabited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes sharp attacks on the government and public officials. Criticism of official conduct does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective criticism and hence diminishes the officials reputation. C) OBSCENITY IN THE PRESS ROTH v. UNITED STATES: Obscenity in the press is not protected under the 1 st Amendment. The reason why the guarantees of speech and press were granted in the first place was in order to better facilitate public discussion; it is hard to see how libel, profanity, and obscenity could be used in the light of the reason stated above. Also, widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing information. On public questions there should be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate.

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 30 the Roth Test was put forward as the proper test in obscenity c ases: the test in each case is the effect of the book, picture or publication considered as a whole, not upon any particular class, but upon all those whom it is likely to reach. In other words, you determine its impact upon the average person in the community. This is the proper test because it considers the object as a whole, as well as it interpolates it to the standards of society as a whole. MEMOIRS OF A WOMAN OF PLEASURE v. ATTY. GENERAL: This case expounded on the Roth Test. It laid down three elements: 1) The dominant theme is prurient in interest 2) It is patently offensive and it affronts community standards 3) It is utterly without social redeeming value. The 3 requirements/criteria must be applied independently. The book was held to be not obscene since it had some redeeming social value. D) LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN RE LOZANO: "Judicial proceedings, in a case which the law requires to be conducted in secret for the proper administration of justice, should never be, while the case is on trial, given publicity by the press." (sub judice rule) License or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important is the maintenance of the Judiciary. The administration of J ustice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. MTRCB v. ABS-CBN: All television programs, including public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorials, are subject to MTRCBs power of review under Sec. 3(b) of PD 1986. TV programs are more accessible to the public than newspapers, and thus the liberal regulation of the latter cannot apply to the former. MTRCBs power to review TV programs under Sec. 3( b) of PD 1986 is not prior restraint and does not violate ABS-CBNs constitutional freedom of expression and of the press. The only exceptions to MTRCBs power of review are TV programs imprinted or exhibited by the RP government and newsreels. FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND PETITION - Since the right of assembly and petition is equally as fundamental as freedom of expression, the standards for allowable impairment of speech and press are also used for assembly and petition. PRIMICIAS v. FUGOSO: A grant of unregulated and unlimited power to grant or refuse a permit for the use of streets and other public places for processions, parades, or meetings, would be null and void because it is violative of the peoples right to freedom of assembly. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. The applicant Primicias has the right to a permit (to hold a public meeting) which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The word "regulate," as used in section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code, means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but is not synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit. REYES v. BAGATSING: Freedom of assembly is not to be limited/denied except on a showing of clear and present danger of substantive evil which the state has a right to prevent. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public spaces has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as safeguards to good order. A licensing official (mayor) has the discretion to determine WoN licenses should be granted, but its not unfettered discretion: the assumption is that the permit if for a specific place. The exercise of such a right is not to be abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place (the choice of the place is in itself part of the peoples right to expression/assembly, e.g. significance of US embassy). NAVARRO v. VILLEGAS: Freedoms of assembly and petition are said to be the cognate rights to the freedom of speech, in that it complements and provides for the same objective (to facilitate political change, keep the government honest, keep the public united and vigilant, etc. etc.), but in different manners. Freedom to assembly and petition are not absolute rights, and are therefore subject to regulation. For freedom of assembly, the dangerous tendency test and the clear and present danger test may be applied, depending on the discretion of the Court. Freedom of assembly must be given much leeway and to be interpreted to have the widest scope possible. But once violence breaks out and happens, with which the executive branch has the right to police and regulate, it may validly do so, without any infringement on constitutional grounds. However, fear or apprehension of an impending outbreak of violence is NOT a valid ground for police power there must be violence first. The right to demonstrate (is) not accorded the same privilege as freedom of speech and of the press. PHIL. BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES v. PHIL. BLOOMING MILLS: Hierarchy of rights: the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 31 RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION Sec. 7 - The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. From Fr. Bernas Commentaries This right does not mean unbridled freedom to information. Rather, this right is given by the Constitution subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. In determining the allowable scope to access to official records, it is important to keep in mind that Sec. 7 guarantees only one general right -- the right to information on matter of public concern. Thus the right to information on matter of public concern is both the purpose, and the limit of the right to access public documents. Accoding to Chavez v. PCGG , the ff. are recognized limitations of the right to information; 1. National security matters 2. Trade secrets and banking transactions 3. Criminal matters or classified law enforcement matters 4. Other confidential matters Subido v. Ozaeta Subido, a newspaper journalist, wants access to the Registry of Deeds, with which the examine which lands are sold to resident aliens. The Court does not believe that liberty of the press is involved in this case. The Registrys refusal does not constitute censorship, and they are correct in saying that freedom of information is not guaranteed by the Constitution. In construing the law that provides for Subidos right to access the information he seeks, the Court cites: All records relatin g to registered lands in the office of the Register of Deeds shall be open to the public subject to such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed xxx Now, the Court does not construe this power to make regulations to be the same as the power to prohibit. Further, the Court adds that unless it is clear that the purpose is unlawful, or just sheer, idle curiosity, Subido must be able to be allowed access to such records. Baldoza v. Dimaano This concerns the filing of an administrative complaint before the Supreme Court, because allegedly, the Municipal Judge of Taal, Batangas refused to let some officers of the municipality look over the records of the court docket. The Court found that after a careful scrutiny of the communications between the municipal officials and the judge, it was found out that there was no showing of abuse of authority on the part of the judge. He actually allowed the complainants to view and see the docket reports, subject only to certain rules and regulations that he may impose. The communications would show that the complainants actually knew of these rules and regulations, and that they readily consented. Further, although the Court concedes that the right to information is applicable in this case, nevertheless it issues a warning that such records of sensitive material are to be properly kept by the judiciary in order to maintain that only the proper parties those with legitimate and legal interest have access to these records. This is to safeguard these records from the prying eyes of curiosity and to avoid the dirty hands of politics. Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission Legaspi seeks the records of two employees of the CSC to ascertain whether or not they are indeed qualified for their respective positions. This case holds that the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen, he satisfies the requirement to have standing to have access to information regarding public matters. In defining what public matters are, the Court holds that the concept defies a standard definition, but nevertheless encompasses the broad spectrum of subjects that the public may or would want to know because either; 1. These directly affect their lives 2. Or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen The Court further holds that it is the burden of the government to prove that there is a compelling interest with which to impair this right to information a burden it has failed to overthrow in this case. Neri v. Senate Committee This case is where then NEDA Sec. Neri invoked executive privilege to refrain from answering specific questions by the Senate Committees pertaining to the NBN-ZTE deal under then President Macapagal-Arroyo. This case most notably differentiated Presidential Communications Privilege from Deliberative Process Privilege, to wit; Presidential Communications Privilege - applies to decision-making of the President; rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the President's unique constitutional role; applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones; meant to encompass only those functions that form the core of presidential authority Requisites: 1. The communications relate to a " quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. 2. The communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President. Under the "operational proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo's cabinet. 3. There is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Deliberative Process Privilege applied to decision-making of executive officials; rooted in common law privilege; that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters."

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 32 J. Punos Dissent Function Impairment Test - the Court weighs how the disclosure of the withheld information would impair the President's ability to perform his constitutional duties more than nondisclosure would impair the other branch's ability to perform its constitutional function. Factors to be considered in determining the strength of the presumption of confidentiality of Presidential communications. They pertain to the nature of the disclosure sought, namely: Time of disclosure, whether contemporaneous disclosure or open deliberation, which has a greater chilling effect on rendering candid opinions, as opposed to subsequent disclosure; Level of detail, whether full texts or whole conversations or summaries; Audience, whether the general public or a select few; Certainty of disclosure, whether the information is made public as a matter of course or upon request Frequency of disclosure Form of disclosure, whether live testimony or recorded conversation or affidavit. The type of information should also be considered, whether involving military, diplomatic or national security secrets. Akbayan v. Aquino This case concerns the petition of a number of Congressmen and private individuals to access the full text of both the drafts of the negotiations and the final text of the JPEPA treaty. Usec. Aquino subsequently presents the final text, but still withholds the drafts of the negotiations. The Court notes that since the right to information is not absolute, there are readily some exceptions; one of which would be privileged communication. These are those which by their nature and their content are recognized by the other departments of the government as exempt from the need for disclosure to the public. The Court however notes that executive privilege is valid depending on the grounds which were used to invoke it. Here, the Court notes that since what the petitioners are asking for are the drafts of the negotiations, disclosing the same would pose some serious problems. It is in the nature of negotiations to be done in secrecy as to afford the two contracting parties the liberality with which they can perform their give-and-take offers and counteroffers. It would be quite dangerous and impractical wherein every move or every offer are given the spotlight and thus an outpouring of public scrutiny. The negotiations are rolling stones which change from day to day. The Court sees the need why Aquino wanted the petitioners to wait until the negotiations have been finished. In addition to this matter, it is also in the nature of negotiations with foreign countries and powers to be held in secret, and this secrecy has long been recognized to be not violative of the Constitution. This would be because diplomacy cannot be done in any other way, because if there is public scrutiny as to their every move, the negotiations, as well as the trust of the delegates to their co-delegates are paralyzed in their every move. The Court closely compares the nature of executive privilege in negotiations with those accorded to judicial deliberations which are also done in secrecy. Thus they would uphold the merits of negotiations done in secrecy, because it better facilitates the movement of ideas and counter-ideas, as well as the moves and counter-moves of the participants. Deliberative Process Privilege - Petitioners contend that the president should have kept the public informed of the negotiations, or at the very least Congress posted on the important matters attendant the issue. However, what she did was to keep out everyone, effectively closing out ever yones ability to participate in such an important matter. The Court shoots this down saying it is within the constitutional power as well as recognized in well-settled jurisprudence that the President alone has the power to negotiate with foreign powers. Attendant foreign policy, he dominates the field, and it is up to his decision and influence in which direction the foreign policy of the nation will set its sights to. The Constitution presents a limitation in which the Senate has to give its concurrence to any treaty to make it valid and binding, but this does not take away the Presidents power to negotiate. He alone does it, and no other department can invade this well settled power. This power falls under the Deliberative Process Privilege.

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 33 FREEDOM OF RELIGION Article III, Section 5: No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. In General Estrada v Escritor Case: Escritor worked as a clerk at court. Estrada filed an administrative complaint against her on the grounds of immoral conduct because she lives with a man who is not her lawful husband. Her main defense was her free exercise of religion as believer in Jehovahs Witness. Ruling: Case remanded for the application of the Compelling State Interest Test in 2003 but in 2006 the Court ruled that the State was not able to prove any compelling state interest necessary to override Escritors freedom to practice her religion and that the action taken against her by State wasnt proved to be the least intrusive means to achieve their purpose

Two Standards used in Deciding Religion Clause Cases

1. Separation - protects the principle of church-separation with a rigid reading of the principle a. Strict Separation -the wall of separation is mean to protect the state from the church -there is an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and state -there is hostility between the two b. Strict Neutrality or tamer separation -requires the state to be neutral in its relation with groups of religious believer; the relationship is not necessarily adversarial -allow for interaction between church and state, but is strict with regard to state action which would threaten the integrity of religious commitment -the basis of government action has a secular criteria and religion may bot be used as a basis for classification of purposes -public policy and the constitution require the government to avoid religionspecific policy 2. Benevolent Neutrality and the Doctrine of Accommodation - protects religious realities, tradition and established practice with a flexible reading of the principle of separation of church and state -the wall is meant to protect the church from the state -it allows interaction between the two and actually permits religious exercise without interference

Definition of religion

David v Beason - reference to ones views of his relations to his Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will. Torasco v Watkins - expanded religion to non-theistic beliefs such as Buddhism or Taoism US v Seager - used the four creed criteria to qualify as religion -there must be belief in God or some parallel belief that occupies a central place in the believers life -the religion must involve a moral code transcending individual belief (cant be purely subjective) -demonstrable sincerity in belief is necessary bit the court must not inquire into the truth or reasonableness of the belief -there must be associational ties

The Doctrine of Accommodation - this allows the government to take

religion into account when creating government policies to allow people to exercise their religion w/o hindrance. The effect they want to achieve is to remove a burden on ones exercise. The government may take religion into account to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.

Purpose - to protect and promote religious liberty Free exercise - this is the end sought Establishment - mandates separation of church and state necessary to achieve free exercise Hierarchy of 3. Religious 4. Religious 5. Religious Protection Afforded belief and conviction speech and expressive religious conduct conduct (excludes expressive conduct)

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Three situations of accommodation:


1. Accommodation is required to preserve free exercise protections and not unconstitutionally infringe on religious liberty or create penalties for religious freedom Framework: THREE-STEP PROCESS: Has the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of religion? -look into the sincerity and centrality of t he claimants belief Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement of religious liberty? -government must show its legitimate purpose and that they are compelling -interest of the state vs religious liberty; the greater the interest of the states interest, the more the belief would have to overcome it Has the state in achieving legitimate purposes used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state? 2. Accommodation is permissible, the state may, but is not required to, accommodate religious interests 3. Accommodation is prohibited, establishment concerns prevail over potential accommodation interests

separation between the church and the state. This is what can be seen in the following provisions: Preamble Tax exemption on church property Salary of religious officers in government Optional religious instructions Saying that the Constitution mandates this approach doesnt mea n that the Court ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes against it. It only means that the Court will not be hostile or indifferent towards religious belief and practices, it will strive to accommodate when it can within constitutional limits. It also means that the Court will not quickly dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause because the conduct in question is said to offend a law or the orthodox view, for this is the protection afforded by the religion clauses (meaning, in the absence of legislation granting exemption from a law of general applicability, the Court can carve out an exemption when the religion clauses justify it).

Why choose to be an Accommodationist?

Most consistent with the language of the 1 st Amendment It best achieves its purpose Its interpretation is particularly necessary to protect minority religions Its the most practical way to deal with a pluralistic nation with various beliefs

The Religion Clauses In cases involving the two religion clauses, the courts must balance them against each other. They must review all the relevant facts and determine whether there is a sufficiently strong free exercise right that should prevail over the Establishment clause problem. The case stated that modern society is characterized by the expanding regulatory arm of government that reaches a variety of areas of human conduct and an expanding concept of religion. As such, the societal values the r eligion clauses intended to protect must be considered in their interpretation and resolution of the tension between free exercise and establishment. The Philippines adopts the Benevolent Neutrality Approach in interpreting its Religious Clauses in the Constitution Using the cardinal rule of in constitutional construction that the constitution must be interpreted as a whole and the seemingly conflicting provisions must be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that will to all of them full force and effect, the case stated that the framers intended to adopt this approach. Looking at the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitution, it will be revealed that the Filipinos did not intend to erect a high and impregnable wall of

Applying the Compelling State Interest Test in Limiting the Exercise of Religious Liberty "immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community" and "infringement of religious freedom only to the smallest extent necessary" to justify limitation of religious freedom religious exercise may be indirectly burdened by a general law which has for its purpose and effect the advancement of the state's secular goals, provided that there is no other means by which the state can accomplish this purpose without imposing such burden. "compelling state interest" test which grants exemptions when general laws conflict with religious exercise, unless a compelling state interest intervenes. The case of Estrada v Escritor stated that this test is proper where the conduct involved purely arises from religious belief. Its the one that is used because the conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the states interests; some effects may be immediate and short-term while other, delayed and far reaching. This was compared to the cases of American Bible and Iglesia where the clear and present danger and the grave and imminent danger tests were applied since speech has discernible or immediate effects.

Religious clauses and morality The morality referred in the law such the Civil Service Law or the Code of Professional Responsibility, is public and necessarily secular; not religious. With this, government action (including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law) must have a secular purpose. The government proscribes this conduct because it is detrimental to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society and not because such conduct is proscribed by any religion. Although the morality in law is secular, since the standard of benevolent neutrality is adopted, there is room for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it doesnt offend compelling state interests.

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 35 Free Exercise Clause Power of State to Regulate (Estrada v Escritor) The Free Exercise Clause affords absolute protection to individual religious convictions. However the government is able to regulate the times, places and manner of its exercise (Cantwell v Conneticut). Under the Free Exercise Clause, religious belief is absolutely protected, religious speech and proselytizing are highly protected but subject to restraints applicable to non-religious speech, and unconventional religious practice receives less protection; nevertheless conduct, even if its violates a law, could be accorded protection. Free Exercise Clause Tests Belief-action test- (Reynolds v US and Cantwell v Conneticut) Using this test, regulation of religiously dictated conduct would be upheld no matter how central it was to the exercise of religion and no matter how insignificant was the government's non-religious regulatory interest so long as the government is proscribing action and not belief. Reynolds case: Petitioner was a Mormon and claims that it was his duty to have several wives. Ruling: Convicted of biagamy. This allows absolute protection to belief but not action; put differently the government may interfere with practice but not belief. Cantwell case: Petitioner challenges a state law which prohibits door to door solicitation for any religious or charitable cause without prior approval of a state agency. Ruling: Law invalidated, saying that the approval was necessarily censorship of religion prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause. This furthers the Reynolds ruling and allows both protection of belief and also freedom to act for the propagation. Two concepts: freedom to believe and freedom to act; the 1 st is absolute while the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. In every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom. Deliberate-inadvertent Distinction test - (Minersville School District v Gobitis and West Virginia v Barnette) One must make a distinction between deliberate state interference of religious exercise for religious reasons which was plainly unconstitutional and governments inadvertent interference with religion in pursuing some secular objective Gobitis case: Jeho vahs Witnesses believers refused to salute to the flag in a public school program. Ruling: Law is valid as a means of attaining national unity and thus forced them to salute to the flag. Barnette case: same facts Ruling: Saluting was a form of utterance and the believers ought to be exempted saying that the freedom of worship (and speech) are susceptible only of restriction to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect.this wasnt explicitly stated to be a test

Two-part balancing test - (Braunfeld v Brown) a. Plaintiff should show that the regulation placed a real burden on his religious exercise b. Burden would be upheld only if the state showed that it was pursuing an overriding secular goal by the means which imposed the least burden on religious practices.
Case: WON Sunday closing laws should be applied to Jews who believe that they should observe another day as Sabbath and abstain from commercial activity on Saturday. Ruling: Burdens were an indirect effect of the law which had an overriding secular purpose and said that it would be violative of the Free Exercise Clause only if there were alternative ways of achieving the states interest.

belief.

Compelling State Interest text and Exemption Doctrine - (Sherbert v Verner and Wisonsin v Yoder) Sherbert case: Petitioner refused to work on Saturdays due to religious Ruling: Court allowed exemption; saying that In this highly sensitive constitutional area, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.'

This test is similar to the two-part balancing test but this one stresses that the interest must be paramount and compelling to override ones free exercise claim. When general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemption ought to be granted unless compelling state interest intervenes. Wisconsin case: Amish parents question the compulsory law on high school attendance; saying that they didnt allow their children secular education of their kids over 8th grade. Ruling: Convicted Here, the court stresses that belief and action cannot be confined in logic -tight compartments. Reading through this, I think what the case is trying to say is that there is difficulty in balancing which of the highest order interest of the state can overbalance legitimate claims of the free exercise of religion.

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Rational Basis Test - (Oregon Department of Human Resources v Smith) Case: The Native American Church members were drug rehabilitation counselors for a private social service agency and they ingested a hallucinogenic drug called peyote at their sacramental ceremony and were fired and not given unemployment compensation, saying it was a jobrelated misconduct. Ruling: we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law.

Ebralinag v Div. of Schools Case: Petitioners refuse to salute to the flag and sing the National Anthem because they believe that these acts constitute worship, which they claim they only offer to their god. Ruling: Forcing them to do so would be violative of their fundamental right to religious exercise and thus, are exempted from engaging in those external rights. Religious exercise is a fundamental right. The only justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and imminent danger, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the state has a right to prevent. Note: The court cites Gerona and says that the decision in that case which had similar facts to this one was uncalled for considering that believers of the Jehovah witness constitute only a small portion of the population and it wont shake up the nation which would then produce citizens with no sense of patriotism and love of country. But forcing them to salute the flag would actually do that.

The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development. To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs except where the State's interest is "compelling" - permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law unto himself," - contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense. This test states that the free exercise of religion can only be upheld if it is claimed in conjunction with other protections. J. Carpios agrees with this test in his 2006 dissent. Important Cases under the Free Exercise Clause American Bible v City of Manila Case: ABS sold bibles and the City required them to secure a permit to pay a license as well as tax. Ruling: The Ordinance is valid but was not applicable ABS; saying that the "government is not precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or sect" and to apply it to them would be a restraint of its religious profession and worship. . Religion has been spoken of as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to its Creator. It has reference to one's views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence to His being and character, and obedience to His Will The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraints of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. Note: Clear and Present Danger Test wasnt actually applied.

Pamil v Teleron Case: Petitioner seeks the removal of Respondent Mayor because he was a Father (priest) and is contrary to the Administrative Code, which disallows ecclesiastics to be part of the municipal office. Ruling: Technically, the Code is inconsistent with religious freedom but the required votes were not met to declare it unconstitutional. The Court cites Torcaso v Watkins which requires a belief in God to be part of an office of the State in saying that this is essentially a religious test which allowed for their exclusion in office.

Iglesia ni Cristo v CA Case: INC had a show in ABS but MTRCB reviewed this and X-rated it. Ruling: Court said yes to reviewing but annulled the X-rating, saying that it was a form of suppression on the free exercise of religion. Religious freedom had a preferred status. They discussed that freedom to believe is absolute but the freedom to act on ones belief, where it affects the public, is subject to the authority of the state; that religious freedom gave religious liberty and not civil immunity. Freedom to believe- a person is free to believe or not as he wants since religion is really a matter of faith Freedom to act on ones belief -in externalizing these beliefs in acts or omission that affect the public, his actions become subject to the authority of the State; in that it can exercise police power over him. Applied the Clear and Present Danger Test since it was said to be closest connected with the freedom of speech. As such, it is the governments burden to discharge the

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 37 presumption of invalidity of the prior restraint it imposed on Iglesia. However, they failed to do this. This test can be applied because the issue is about the content and not the manner the speech was delivered. Swaggart v Board The Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable tax. The burden caused on religious freedom caused by the tax was just similar to any other economic imposition that might make the right to disseminate religious doctrines costly. Gerona v Sec of Education In deciding these kinds of cases, the courts must determine whether a certain ritual is religious or not. Religious freedom will not be upheld if it clashes with established institutions of society and with the law such that when the law of general applicability incidentally burdens the exercise of ones religion, one s right to religious freedom cannot justify exemption from the compliance with the law. Ruling: yes, the school was merely furthering the states legitimate interest in getting children safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools (child benefit theory) It was stated there that the government cannot: set up a church, pass laws which aid religions or prefer one over the other, force anyone to go or remain in a church or profess a certain belief or disbelief, levy tax to support a religion, participate in the affairs of religious organizations and vice versa. The wall between the Church and the State must be kept high and impregnable. Lemon v Kurtzman - The Lemon Test requires a challenged policy to meet the following criteria to pass scrutiny under the Establishment Clause Three-pronged test Statute must have a secular legislative purpose Primary or principal effect must be one that neither advances or inhibits religion Must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion Case: WON a statutory program providing publicly funded reimbursement for the cost of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in secular subjects and salary supplements to teachers in parochial schools in unconstitutional Ruling: yes, as it fosters excessive entanglement between government and religion

Victoriano v Elizaide Rope Workers Union It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified and only to the smallest extent necessary.
Tests mentioned which may limit the extent of religious freedom -immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community -general law which advances states secular law may indirectly burden religious exercise, provided that there is no other means by which the state can accomplish the purpose w/o imposing such burden -compelling state interest

Engel v Vitale Case: WON the policy of voluntary recitation of a brief generic prayer by kids in the public is valid Ruling: no, a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion

German v Barangan Reiterated the doctrine that the freedom of belief of choice of religion cant be denied or restrained; only the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same action can be restrained. In this case, the court actually ruled that the petitioners could not invoke religious freedom because they lacked good faith.
Non-establishment Clause Important Cases under the Establishment Clause Everson v Board of Education - 1st case wherein the Court adopted Jeffersons metaphor of a wall of separation between church and state Case: WON the local school could reimburse parents for expenses in transporting their kids to and from Catholic Schools, regardless of religion

To withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause, the statute must have a legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advance nor inhibits religion.

Aglipay v Ruiz Case: Supreme Head of a Church seeks to prevent Director of Posts from issuing postage stamps. Ruling: Allow the Director to issue the stamps because there is no showing of religious purpose in the questioned law

Religious freedom is not just toleration. Religion is a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his creator. The Philippines has recognized the influence of religion in society through Constitutional Clauses such as -the Preamble when the people implored the aid of Divine Providence

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 38 - the exemption from taxation of the properties devoted to religious purposes exclusively -creation of the legal holidays such as the Holy Week, Christmas -optional religious instruction -those which relate to polygamy and bigamy The Court is not precluded from pursuing a valid objective secular in character even if incidental result would be favourable to a religion or sect. This test seems to discuss that there can only be a certain degree of entanglement between the state and the church; meaning that they should not intrude unto each others business. In order to determine whether the government entanglement with religion is excessive, the courts must examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority. Looking at the laws in this case, the court states that there is an inherent conflict in the situation wherein the State is paying for the salaries of teachers who are religious agents and thus, work under the control of religious officials. Essentially, the government was given inspection powers to see which part of the expenditures were devoted to secular education and religious activity which would ultimately create an intimate and continuous relationship between the church and state. -These programs would somehow benefit the religious organizations that are involved.

Bro. Velarde v SJS Case: Petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders who they allege were endorsing religious candidates. Ruling: The petitioners were not able to fulfil the requisites in discussing the constitutionality of a case.

The petitioners were not able to present a justiciable controversy; not being ripe for judicial determination. The petition was based on mere speculation that these acts might be done in the upcoming elections. Because of this, the petitioners also dont have a cause of action which has 3 elements -right in favour of the plaintiff -obligation on respondents part to respect that right -breach of obligation They also lack legal standing. It cant be a taxpayers suit because it has no relation to taxation and it cant be that theyd suffer a decrease of votes since theyre not even a registered party. Their petition did not have a statement of fact nor did it ask for any relief. The SC scolds the RTC because they didnt have the Fundamental Requirements of a Decision such as the facts and the dispositive. -Statement of the Case -Statement of Facts -Issues or Assignments of Errors -Court Ruling -Dispositive Portion

This term was briefly used in Estrada v Escritor which was then describing the Lemon Test. So, I browsed Lemon v Kurtzman
Case: WON public assistance to private schools (some of which were religious); this included paying for salaries of teachers of secular subjects and purchasing teaching supplies for secular purposes, were valid Ruling: This case held that the statutes in question were invalid considering that the relationship it fosters is one pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction of church schools, and hence of churches

Excessive Entanglement Test

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 39 Eminent Domain Article III, Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Diclipio Earth v Gozun Case: Petitioners question the RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act), DAO 96-40 and the FTAA for it allows unlawful taking without just compensation and that it allows the foreign company to take over the mining operations. Ruling: PD 512, Sec 1 granted the qualified mining operators the authority to exercise eminent domain and since this grant of authority is deemed incorporated in RA 7942, Sec 76, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter provision is a taking provision. There is no basis to say that the law does not provide for payment of just compensation. Citing the case of La Bugal, the Court says that the laws provide for sufficient safeguards which ultimately still let the State control the operations. Also, the Constitution used the word involving, thus, the intent was not to exclude other forms of assistance and that the service contracts were not deconstitutionalized just because it wasnt used in the Constitution. De Knecht v Bautista Case: Petitioners ask that the DPWH stick to the original plan in extending EDSA by using Cuneta Ave. Instead of the Del Pan St. where they lived. Ruling: Based on the report done by the Human Settlement Commission, Line 1 had against is the factors of cost and social impact while Line 2 had against it functionality. The citizens right of due process was violated; DPWH acted with grave abuse of discretion. Wanting to minimize social impact is not a justifiable reason to expropriate lands. The report stated that the DPWH shouldve gave more details of the plan and of payment of just compensation, as well as, to have a public hearing before taking action for expropriation. Heirs of Ardona v Reyes Case: Petitioners question the expropriation of the lands granted to the Philippine Tourism Authority to make a sports complex, clubhouse, picnic area etc.; saying that nowhere in the Constitution is this said to be allowed. They claim that it was not for public use and that it violates the non-impairment clause. Ruling: Though tourism is not specifically written in the Constitution, does not make it a limit in the exercise of the power of eminent domain; those mentioned such as for agriculture merely underscores the magnitude of the problem sought in this area. Furthermore, public use is not interpreted as used by the public as that is too restrictive but as whatever may be for the general welfare. Lastly, the non-impairment clause has never been a bar to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. EPZA v Dulay Case: Petitioners question Judge Dulays assignment of a committee to determine the amount of just compensation they needed to pay for on the land they expropriated. Ruling: All the PDs in this case (76. 464. 794. 1533.) are declared unconstitutional because it states that the basis for just compensation shall be the current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value as determined by the Assessor, whichever is lower when this is that task of the court. Sumulung v Guerrero Case: Petitioners assails the constitutionality of PD 1224 for being violative of due process, saying that they were deprived of their property w/o notice and hearing and that it failed to prove that the expropriation was for public use and no just compensation was provided. Ruling: It was proved to be for public use since it is a basic human need but there were no determination of just compensation and that there was no due process thus, the case was remanded. Eminent Domain Heirs of Ardona v Reyes Three provisions of the (1973) Constitution which directly provide for the exercise of the power of eminent domain; a) Section 2, Article IV: private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. b) Section 6, Article XIV: the State, in the interest of national welfare or defense and upon payment of just compensation to transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government. c) Section 13, Article XIV: the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens. Visayan Refining Co. v Camus from Heirs of Ardona v Reyes The power of eminent domain doesnt depend on a specific grant in the constitution because it is inherent in sovereignty and exists in a sovereign state w/o any recognition in the constitution. The provisions relating to taking of property for public use do not implicitly grant this power but limit it which would otherwise be without limit; the constitutional restraint being public use and just compensation. Heirs of Ardona v Reyes The non-impairment clause has never been a barrier to the exercise of police power and likewise eminent domain. Sumulong v Guerrero Allowing immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property w/o giving the owner his day in court is violative of due process. EPZA v Dulay Its violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong.

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 40 two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present

Private property De Knetch v Bautista It is recognized that the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private property should be taken JM Tuason v Land Tenure Administration from De Knetch v Bautista A landowner is covered by the mantle of protection due process affords. It is a mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness. There is recognition that the power of

whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

Congress designates the particular property to be taken and how much may be condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, however, it is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is
the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection clause will not allow. Guido v Rural progress Administration from Sumulong v Guerrero The test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of the land and not the number of people who stood to be benefited. There has evolved a clear pattern of adherence to the number of people benefited test. In PD 1224, the state acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes. Public use Dipido v Gozun

Lawmakers have determined the public policy that the power of eminent domain may be exercised in the promotion and development of Philippine tourism. The lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets built on expropriated land does not make the taking for a private purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlines and shipping companies are still for public use. Sumulong v Guerrero The public use requirement is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The socialized housing granted by PD 1224 for middle and lower class members of society was declared to fall within the confines of public use since shortage in housing is a matter of state concern.

The taking to be valid must be for public use .

Public use - synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare and public convenience. Mining industry plays a pivotal role in the economic development of the country and is a vital tool in the government s thrust of accelerated recovery. Mining is an industry which is of public benefit. De Knetch v Bautista In a choice between people on one hand and progress & development on the other, it must be remembered that in deciding favour of the latter, one must be mindful that

progress & development are carried out by the State precisely and ultimately for the benefit of its people.
Heirs of Ardona v Reyes

The strict construction of public use as literally used by the public is too restrictive.

The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We have never been a laissez faire State, and the necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources. Citing Chief Justice Fernando, As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 41 Taking Dipido v Gozun Republic v Castellvi from Dipido v Gozun Requisites of taking in eminent domain: The expropriator must enter a private property Entry must be for more than a momentary period Entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority Property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated on injuriously affected Utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Dipido v Gozun Eminent Domain -inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation - the power of eminent domain often results in the appropriation of title to or possession of property, it need not always be the case. -taking may include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, material impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property was intended such as the establishment of an easement. Just compensation

The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.

Looking at RA 7942 and DAO 96-40, it is clear that the courts are not excluded from taking cognizance of expropriation cases. The disagreement referred to in Section 107 does not involve the exercise of eminent domain, but a situation wherein the permit holders are allowed by the surface owners entry into the latters lands and disagreement ensues as regarding the proper compensation for the allowed entry and use of the private lands. Noticeably, the provision points to a voluntary sale or transaction, but not to an involuntary sale. EPZA v Dulay Municipality of Daet v CA: Just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. It means a fair and fun equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. Garcia v CA: In estimating the market value, all the capabilities of the property and all the uses to which it may be applied or for which it is adapted are to be considered and not merely the condition it is in the time and the use to which it is then applied by the owner. PD 76, 464, 794, 1533 which base just compensation on the market value determined by the owner or Assessor, whichever is lower was declared unconstitutional since it is an impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives because the court would be relegated to stating the lower value of the property as stated by the owner or assessor.

Police Power - power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property -property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious purpose; hence, no compensation shall be paid. -property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. -in the exercise of its police power regulation, the state restricts the use of private property, but none of the property interests in the bundle of rights which constitute ownership is appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public. -use of the property by the owner was limited, but no aspect of the property is used by or for the public. -deprivation of use can in fact be total and it will not constitute compensable taking if nobody else acquires use of the property or any interest therein.

The courts still have the power and authority to appoint commissioners for the purpose of determining just compensation. The valuation in the decree may only
serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it does not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. Sumulong v Guerero

Just compensation means the value of the property at the time o f the taking. All the
facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities should be considered. It means fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. Values given by assessors are usually uniform. The idea of expropriation never occurs until a demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so.

Where a property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare, or where property is destroyed because its continued existence would be injurious to public interest, there is no compensable taking. However, when a property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is compensable taking.

EPZA v Dulay The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial

determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee Rights that private property may not be taken for public use compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate determination shag prevail over the court's findings ; the courts cant
from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.

in the Bill of without just that its own


be precluded

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 42 CONTRACTS CLAUSE ART III, SEC 10 No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. Rutter v Esteban (1953) Moratorium law it is an extraordinary device to save the credit structure of a society. It provides for the suspension of rights and remedies of creditors incumbent upon some extraordinary circumstance. -Valid exercise of police power of the state and not violative of the constitution. Test of Constitutionality of a moratorium law: Determination of the reasonableness of the period of suspension of the rights and the remedies of the creditors. Law must refer to the remedy and not to a specific substantive right of any one individual. The state may postpone the remedy but cannot destroy it. The alteration or the impairment that the moratorium law changes in the contract must not be burdened with restrictions and conditions that would make the remedy hardly pursuing. RA 342 is unconstitutional because of the unreasonable period which it prescribes (8 years). Ilusorio v Court of Agrarian Reforms (1966) Sec 14, RA 1199 Change of system: the tenant shall have the right to change the tenancy contract from one of share tenancy to the leasehold tenancy and vice versa and from one crop sharing arrangement to another of the share tenancy xxx The prohibition in constitutional provisions against impairing the obligations of contracts is not absolute. Such provisions are restricted to contracts with respect to property or some object of value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice, and have no application to a statute relating to public objects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the state, and involving public right and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. They do not prevent proper exercise by the state of its police powers. RA 1199 was passed in compliance with the constitutional mandate that the promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the state (Art II, Sec 5) and that the state shall regulate the relations between landlord and tenant xxx in agriculture xxx. (Art XIV, Sec. 6) Caleon v Agus Development Corp(1992) Non impairment clause -Limited exercise of police power for the interest of public health, safety, morals of state. - In spite of constitutional prohibition, the state continues to possess authority to safeguard interests of the public - Every contract affecting public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. Exemption to non-impairment clause - This power can be activated anytime to change provisions of a contract or abrogate it entirely for promotion and protection of general welfare. such an act will not militate against the non-impairment clause of the constitution. EX POST FACTO LEGISLATION AND BILL OF ATTAINDER ART III, SEC 22 No ex-post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. Ex post facto law One which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or One which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or One which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; One which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant Assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. - Ex post facto clause prohibits only retrospective penal laws. Bill of Attainder Is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. Essential elements of a bill of attainder 1. There must be a law. 2. The law imposes a penal burden on a named individual or easily ascertainable members of a group. 3. The penal burden is imposed directly by the law without judicial trial.

Bareo, Garcia, Hernandez, Magno, Renes, Salanguit, Salayog, Teves | D 2015 Constitutional Law II | Prof. Gwen De Vera | 43 NON IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE Lozano v Martinez (1986) ART III, SEC 18 (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted Involuntary Servitude -It is every condition enforced or compulsory service of one to another no matter under what form such servitude may be disguised. Exceptions to the rule against involuntary servitude Involuntary servitude may be imposed as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted In the interest of national defense all citizens may be compelled by law to render personal military or civil service A return to work order Ganaway v Guillen (1922) Abolition of imprisonment for debt was brought about by the force of public opinion which looked with abhorrence on statutory provision whih permitted cruel imprisonment of debtors. The people sought to prevent use ofthe power of the state to coerce the payment of debts. Serafin v Lindayag (1975) Outright dismissal is warranted for the complaint against Serafin since its elementary that the non payment of debt is NOT A CRIMINAL ACT. US v Cara (1917) Consti provision prohibiting imprisonment or debt applies to actions on contracts, express or implied. Prohibition does not extend to actions for torts, fines, penalties arising from violating penal laws. Statute relieving from imprisonment for debt is not intended to take away the right to enforce criminal statutes and punish wrongful embezzlement or conversions of money. Does not prevent state from imposing a sentence for a crime which requires the restoration of the sum of money wrongfully converted in violation of a criminal statute. Ajeno v Inserto Constitutional provision is applicable only to money debts arising from contractual obligations Organic provisions relieving from imprisonment for debt were intended to prevent commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu. The inhibition was never meant to include damages arising in actions e delicto. It is within the prerogative of the law making body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. US v Pompeya (1915) Phil. Legislature has power to legislate upon all subjects affecting the people which has not been delegated to congress or expressly prohibited by said organic act. The conditions of Act no 1309 must exist in the complaint. -- not applicable to all persons and to every condition. The complaint must show that the person charged belongs to the class of persons to which the law is applicable. Absence of such, the courts would be unable to impose the penalty of the law because defendant might belong to an exempt class. Caunca v Salazar (1949) The fact that no physical force was exerted to keep her from leaving Salazars house does not make less the deprivation of Flores personal freedom which includes freedom to movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another and freedom to choose ones residence. An employment agency cannot curtail an employees freedom of movement, even though it advanced money to that employee. FREE ACCESS TO COURTS AND QUASI JUDICIAL BODIES ART III, SEC 11 Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. Access to justice Access to courts Adequate legal assistance Those protected include low paid employees, domestic servants and laborers. They need not be persons so poor that they must be supported at public expense. It suffices that plaintiff is indigent.