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Title:

Arctic 1 HSE SAFETY CASE

Revision Status:

Level: Classification: Manual Number: Issue Number: Revision Number: Revision Date:

L3 Procedure AC1-HSE-PR-01 01 01 2009

Transocean

NONCONTROLLED

ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 1 Introduction and Executive Summary

PART 1 Introduction and Executive Summary

Blade Offshore Services Ltd 2009

ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 1 Introduction and Executive Summary

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 1. PAGE

HSE CASE; INTRODUCTION & EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................... 3 1.1

1.2 1.3

1.1.1 1.1.2 1.1.3 1.2.1 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.3.3 1.3.4 1.4.1 1.4.2 1.4.3 1.4.4 1.4.5 1.4.6 1.5.1 1.5.2 1.5.3 1.5.4 1.5.5 1.6.1 1.6.2 1.6.3 1.6.4 1.6.5 1.6.6 1.6.7 1.6.8 1.6.9 1.7.1

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 3

THE TRANSOCEAN HSE CASE FOR ARCTIC I ............................................................................ 5

Purpose of the HSE Case...................................................................................... 3 Document Update ................................................................................................ 3 Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... 4 HSE Case Overview .............................................................................................. 5 Senior Management Commitment....................................................................... 5 HSE Case Responsibilities .................................................................................... 6 HSE Case Reviews & Updates .............................................................................. 6 Continuous Improvement .................................................................................... 6

MANAGEMENT DEMONSTRATION............................................................................................. 5

1.4

HSE CASE STRUCTURE ........................................................................................................ 7

1.5

ARCTIC I CONSTRUCTION DETAILS ....................................................................................... 8

IADC Template ..................................................................................................... 7 Part 2 Drilling Contractors Management System ............................................ 7 Part 3 MODU/Rig Description & Supporting Information ............................... 7 Part 4 Risk Management .................................................................................. 8 Part 5 Emergency Response ............................................................................. 8 Part 6 Performance Monitoring ........................................................................ 8

1.6

JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION ............................................................................. 9

Design .................................................................................................................. 8 Operational intent ................................................................................................ 8 Class and Compliance .......................................................................................... 9 Accommodation ................................................................................................... 9 Major Modifications since new ............................................................................ 9 Continued Operation............................................................................................ 9 Management Systems ........................................................................................ 10 Process for Hazard Identification...................................................................... 10 Management of Risk and ALARP ....................................................................... 10 HSE Compliance ................................................................................................. 11 Commitment to close CARs .............................................................................. 12 Statement of continued Operation .................................................................... 12 Management Commitment for continued compliance...................................... 13 Areas for Continued Enhancement .................................................................... 14 Documentation................................................................................................... 15

1.7

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 15

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 1 Introduction and Executive Summary

1. 1.1 1.1.1

HSE CASE; INTRODUCTION & EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Introduction Purpose of the HSE Case

1.1.1.1 The ARCTIC I HSE Case provides the means for formally demonstrating how Transocean applies a systematic risk management approach to maintain and improve Health, Safety and Environmental operational performance. 1.1.1.2 The HSE Case will fulfil two primary functions; Provide clear evidence of the systematic process of assurance within the Transocean organisation, that the systematic management system processes for reducing risk, are in place and effective, and meet the companys expectations. Provide clear evidence to relevant third parties; Clients, necessary Regulatory bodies, Coastal States organisations, of the formal management system processes for reducing risk as applicable to the ARCTIC I operation

1.1.1.3 The HSE Case is documented as demonstrating the ARCTIC I and Transocean Compamy Management System status at a moment in time. However the Case demonstrates a dynamic process of continuous assurance that the HSE risks are effectively managed and provides assurance that risks associated with changes to equipment, activities or locations, as well as system weaknesses identified by incident analyses and audits will be effectively managed. 1.1.2 Document Update

1.1.2.1 The text within this section of the case has been updated in the light of the change of ownership of the ARCTIC I and the integration of the unit into the Transocean Management system. In some areas it is necessary to describe the original systems in place and where appropriate reference regarding sections of the Corporate Management system is reference in terms of the current system as applied.

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 1 Introduction and Executive Summary

1.1.3 1.1.3.1

Abbreviations As identified within the text. Definition American Bureau of Shipping (Class Society) Automatic Identification System As Low as Reasonably Practical American Petroleum Institute Blow Out Preventer Corrective Action Request Closed Circuit Television Company Designated Person Company Management System Det Norsk Veritas (Class Society) Global Maritime Distress Safety System Global Management System Health and Safety Executive (UK Government body) International Association of Drilling Contractors International Maritime Organisation Improvement Requirement Report International Safety Management System International Standards Organisation Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Offshore Installation Manager Programmable Logic Controllers Shell International Exploration and Production Summary of Operation Boundaries Ship Security Alert System United States Coast Guard

Abbreviation ABS AIS ALARP API BOP CA CCTV CDP CMS DNV GMDSS GMS HS&E IADC IMO IRR ISM ISO MODU OIM PLC SIEP SOOB SSAS USCG

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 1 Introduction and Executive Summary

1.2 1.2.1

The Transocean HSE Case for ARCTIC I HSE Case Overview

1.2.1.1 The ARCTIC I HSE Case as now amended identifies that since the ownership of the unit was transferred to Transocean in 2007 the level of risk management as identified within Rev 1 of the Case issued under the previous GlobaSantaFe ownership, continues to sustain a high level of risk management and control and this amended Case continues to demonstrate that the level of risk associated with the safe operation of the mobile offshore drilling unit is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). As a consequence the Case will also demonstrate compliance with the Transocean HSE management system which integrates the IMO International Safety Management System and the Shell Operating criteria for the operation in the Brazil locations. 1.2.1.2 The documentation will reflect the inclusion of the ARCTIC I workforce and external specialist throughout the Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment processes which were then developed onwards for 4 detailed SOOB/Bow Tie review for the conditions that were identified as being of a sufficient potential as requiring further analysis and investigation. 1.2.1.3 The Transocean health, safety and environmental management system recognizes the importance of loss control and risk management in achieving commercial success. To remain competitive there is a need to achieve continuous improvements in our ability to manage the risks associated with our business. It is the cornerstone of this management system that continuous improvements in risk management are derived from a motivated workforce, committed, from senior management level downward, to accepting responsibility for their own safety, that of their colleagues working alongside them and protection of the environment. 1.2.1.4 The Case and its contents are approved by the Managing Director and is considered an integral part of the ARCTIC I. 1.2.1.5 This Case remains valid for the ARCTIC I in a stand alone operating condition, in the event that the operation is extend to cover any Combined operations with other units, the case will be revisited and the necessary management systems reviews and risks assessments made to ensure that the hazards presented by this new operation are suitable covered with full communication to both Management and Work force. 1.2.1.6 The Case outlines the safe operating envelope of the MODU and as such forms part of our management system documentation and may be revised in accordance with good industry practices and applicable legislation. 1.3 1.3.1 Management Demonstration Senior Management Commitment

1.3.1.1 Management commitment is demonstrated at the highest level through the formulation, review and updating of Health and Safety, and Environmental Policy Statements and the involvement of the Transocean Corporate Management Team. The objectives of these policies are achieved through the development of related management strategies by the Brazil Management Team

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 1 Introduction and Executive Summary

participating through the provision of personal leadership, based on the drive for continuous improvement. 1.3.1.2 By virtue of the integration of the International Management system (for Safe Operation of Ships and Pollution Prevention) within their own CMS the Company demonstrate a commitment to compliance to this system through external audit by IMO approved bodies, in this case ABS. Hence the Transocean CMS stem is subject to the highest level of external audit and command a level of visibility that assures the highest level of commitment. 1.3.2 HSE Case Responsibilities

1.3.2.1 This Case and its contents are approved by Transocean Managing Director. 1.3.2.2 The ARCTIC I Rig Manager/Performance is the owner of the case and is responsible for reviewing and accepting that ownership. As the Custodian, the Onshore QHSE Manager and, in conjunction with the Rig Manager/Performance, is responsible for ensuring that the Case is implemented and complied with. 1.3.3 HSE Case Reviews & Updates

1.3.3.1 The ARCTIC I HSE case is a live document that reflects the ongoing operation of the unit the associated risk and the management of the risk mitigation process to provide a safe place of work at all times. 1.3.3.2 The case is deemed relevant at time of issue, however it is only normal that system and operational changes will occur that will effect the day to day risks and the management of those risks to one degree or another, hence review on the case will at the first instance depend on an assessment of the relevance of the existing documentation being made by the relevant personnel onboard ARCTIC I. 1.3.3.3 Development, maintenance and review of the Case in accordance with regulatory requirements, changes in corporate policies, or corporate standards is carried out by the Transocean QHSE Director who will determine whether a revision to the Case is required. The decision process to update the Case is primarily based on whether the proposed change affects, materially, the risk to individuals working offshore. 1.3.3.4 In accordance with the Company Management system the HSE Case for the ARCTIC I will be subject to periodic review in accordance with the Management of change process utilizing the START and THINK processes. 1.3.4 Continuous Improvement

1.3.4.1 Continuous review is an objective of the Transocean management system. The HS Manual reflects the broad band of these objectives which are devised to ensure that Transocean strives to continuously improve the safety performance of all aspects of operations through the observation identification and reduction of at risk behaviours and the elimination of incidents. 1.3.4.2 Within the Transocean units this policy is supplemented at the work place by the FOCUS process [HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 6.2] which provides the facility of formal recording either as a result of non conformity situation or as a result of a pro-active observation through the Focus system.

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 1 Introduction and Executive Summary

1.3.4.3 Hence a broad spectrum for Continuous improvement of the Case exists through both management review and workforce involvement. 1.4 1.4.1 HSE Case Structure IADC Template

1.4.1.1 The construction of the Case will reflect the template established in the IADC document Health, Safety and Environment Case Guidelines for Mobile Offshore Drilling units, Global Version 3.2, October 2006. 1.4.1.2 The Case is comprised of 6 sections, section 1 being this introductory section complete with executive summary. The 5 remaining sections are closely linked and form the core Case due to their relationship around the overall Risk Management section. 1.4.1.3 The schematic below identifies the 5 sections of the case.

Part 2 Drilling Contractor's Management System

Part 3 Rig Description & Supporting Information

Risk Management

Part 4 Emergency Response

HSE Management Assurance

Part 6 Performance Monitoring

1.4.2

Part 2 Drilling Contractors Management System

1.4.2.1 This section will describe the Transocean HSE management system and will identify the management objectives that will be met to demonstrate assurance that the HSE risks are reduced to a tolerable level. The methods of achieving the HSE management objectives are considered in Part 4. 1.4.3 Part 3 MODU/Rig Description & Supporting Information

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 1 Introduction and Executive Summary

1.4.3.1 Section 3 will provide the equipment and systems necessary to meet the HSE management objectives described in Part 2 and to fulfil the requirements of the Transocean scope of operations. The equipment and systems mill be considered in Part 4 1.4.4 Part 4 Risk Management

1.4.4.1 This part of the Case will describe the Risk Management process for assuring that the risks associated with the scope of operations are reduced to a level that is tolerable to the owner and all other parties with an interest in the operation, e.g. the owners client. The Risk Management process will consider the HSE management objectives described in Part 2 and the systems and equipment described in Part 3. 1.4.5 Part 5 Emergency Response

1.4.5.1 Part 5 will describe the management objectives for emergency response to incidents which will mitigate the potential consequences/severity identified through the analysis work undertaken in Part 4. The HSE management objectives included in Part 5 are considered in Part 4 as a part of the iterative assessment analysis process. 1.4.6 Part 6 Performance Monitoring

1.4.6.1 Part 6 identifies the vessel specific arrangements for system monitoring to ensure that risk management measures identified in Part 4 are implemented, maintained and effective at the work place. Regular monitoring at the workplace is also a risk reducing measure considered in Part 4. 1.5 1.5.1 ARCTIC I Construction Details Design

1.5.1.1 The ARCTIC I mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) was built in by Rauma Repola Oy at Mantyluota Shipyard in Finland in 1983. The MODU is a Friede and Goldman model L907 series enhanced pacesetter design 1.5.2 Operational intent

1.5.2.1 The layout and mobility of the MODU make it well suited for drilling operations in connection with the following: Exploratory drilling Appraisal drilling Development drilling Work-overs Well tests Early production Subsea completions High pressure/high temperature

1.5.2.2 The MODU can also be used for certain offshore construction operations and can be modified

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 1 Introduction and Executive Summary

to allow it to be used as an accommodation vessel. 1.5.3 Class and Compliance

1.5.3.1 The ARCTIC I is classed and surveyed by the Det Norsk Veritas (DNV) society for compliance to the standard notation:

+1A1 Column-stabilised Drilling Unit CRANE HELDK Non-self propelled


1.5.3.2 This notation indicates compliance to the following class standards; 1.5.3.3 1.5.4

+
1A1

Vessel built under the supervision of DNV Indicates that the hull, machinery, and equipment comply with the relevant sections of the DNV class rules. Indicates vessel design concept

Column-stabilised CRANE HELDK

Indicates the cranes are compliant to DNV Class construction rules Indicates the Helideck is compliant to DNV Class construction rules

Non-self propelled The rig is not considered as a self propelled unit

The ARCTIC I is registered with the Flag State administration of the Port of Vila in Vanuatu Accommodation

1.5.4.1 The crew accommodation is provided within the main superstructure block extending the full breadth of the vessel at the forward end. This places the location as far as reasonably practical away from the drill floor. Accommodation is provided for 116 persons. 1.5.5 Major Modifications since new

1.5.5.1 A number of major modifications have been made to the MODU since building, carried out in conjunction with the Certifying and Classification Authorities. These include 1.6 1.6.1 Upgrading the drilling facilities for high pressure high temperature drilling Installation of a Varco TDS-4H Topdrive and derrick extension KEMS system A Refined solids control system Installation of four column blisters to increase Rig stability Installation of starboard midship deck infill extensions to improve deck storage Installation of a 3rd Mud pump to provide back up and higher pumping rates/volume

1.5.5.2 In 1996 / 1997 further upgrades were carried out including:

Justification for Continued Operation Continued Operation

1.6.1.1 The case demonstrates the active Management System originally pursued by the former owner have been seamlessly transferred to Transocean for the safe operation of its global facilities and in particular the ARCTIC I. The application of this management system and in particular the pro

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 1 Introduction and Executive Summary

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active Hazard Identification and Risk reduction measures it employs are demonstrated within this Case as supporting the continued safe operation of the unit. 1.6.1.2 These systems in place are fully supported by Transocean management through their objectives for the continual enhancement of safe systems of work and the strategy of continual improvement through the management of change process. 1.6.2 Management Systems

1.6.2.1 The Company Management System provides managers and supervisors at all levels (corporate and installation) with expectations represented by principles, policies and procedures, which are intended to motivate people to execute work safely and effectively to achieve results. Managers and supervisors are responsible to ensure their people understand their responsibilities as described in the Company Management System. 1.6.2.2 The Company Management System establishes consistent standards across the companys worldwide operations and is the mechanism for promoting and sharing lessons learned and continuous improvement within the organization. The purpose of the Companys Management System is to provide the platform for people to create value and prevent loss, achieved by meeting expectations through applying appropriate controls (principles, policies and procedures) embodied within the management system. 1.6.2.3 The Company Management System communicates to employees the values and Company leadership expectations required to conduct business that lead to extraordinary service and performance excellence 1.6.2.4 These processes are fully documented and accredited through audit by internationally accredited bodies. These Management systems provide the elements that drive the daily management regime of the organisation. The ARCTIC I is full included within this Management system and through the inclusive verification process by the external bodies, its active compliance to the established standards will be confirmed. 1.6.3 Process for Hazard Identification

1.6.3.1 This HSE Case indicates the formal philosophy adopted for the process of Hazard identification. To ensure the process was location and vessel specific the formal process was undertaken through a set of formal objective discussions involving both ARCTIC I personnel, supporting Management and representatives from the client. This ensured full coverage of the work scopes to be undertaken and the Hazards attributable, in terms of the specific requirements of the ARCTIC I, and personnel involved. 1.6.4 Management of Risk and ALARP

1.6.4.1 The formal process of Hazard identification provided the initial stage in the Management of risk. The Hazard Registry was developed using the SIEP established format but extended where thought relevant to cover the specifics of the operations under evaluation. 1.6.4.2 The process of risk evaluation for each hazard within the context of each scenario was considered and evaluated using a standard Risk Matrix format. The Matrix based upon the IADC template but modified in line with SIEP and the owners criteria. Throughout this evaluation process the Matrix was used to define the severity of the consequence in relation to;

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 1 Introduction and Executive Summary

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People Asset Environment Reputation

1.6.4.3 The frequency of the event was considered under the realistic pragmatic approach of the recorded historical frequency of similar events. The basis of Consequence and severity was considered for all hazards and the rating indicated on the hazard registry sheet. 1.6.4.4 The process of determining risk in terms of status with regard to ALARP (A risk deemed to be as low as reasonably practical) required the identification of all necessary controls or Boundaries and the allocation and evaluation of the effectiveness of those controls. 1.6.4.5 The analysis identified four specific cases in need of further analysis and this was undertaken again through the convening of a formal working party. The format for the analysis being the Bow Tie principle. 1.6.4.6 These final extensive studies evaluated the integrity and consistency of the identified barriers evaluating the effectiveness against a declared standard for; In place and being used Reliability Human factors

1.6.4.7 The final decision on meeting the ALARP standard being a declared rating of above a zero position indication. 1.6.4.8 The four hazardous criteria analysed were found to meet a standard indicating that; Hardware and Supervision are in place and effective for greater than 75% of the time AND Reliability was adjudged as in operation and effective for greater than 95% of the time AND Clearly defined task, defined operating procedures, operator is trained and experienced, or errors conceivable but very unlikely.

1.6.4.9 On the basis of the formal studies that were undertaken using identifiable and established industry guidelines and procedures it was established that for the period of the operation in the Brazil Offshore sector operational risk had been adjudged as meeting the ALARP principle in all states for the vessel in its current operating configuration for the given location and client requirements 1.6.5 HSE Compliance

1.6.5.1 Transocean integrate the ISM management system to their core HSE Management system. The ISM system requires periodic verification of compliance by external bodies, hence compliance to the overall objectives of the management system will be assured through the mandatory internal and external audit processes. 1.6.5.2 Within this compliance evaluation process any areas of non compliance will be subjected to the FOCUS system and documented for processing and attention within that system.

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1.6.6

Commitment to close CARs

1.6.6.1 Any item identified and recorded within FOCUS as requiring a formal action is required to be assigned a suitable close out date. 1.6.6.2 The FOCUS Improvement Process incorporates a planning and tracking tool (FOCUS tool) located within the Global Management System (GMS) as a means to efficiently manage the steps of formulating the plan, organizing the resources, communicating the plan, undertaking the improvement/corrective opportunities and summarizing the results.[HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 6.2 4.1] 1.6.6.3 The FOCUS procedure enables the Company to identify, establish and document the cause(s) of any known nonconformity or potential nonconformity within the Management System (MS) and to apply the appropriate corrective/preventive action which best addresses the nonconformity and prevents occurrence or reoccurrence. 1.6.6.4 As the FOCUS system application is based in the Transocean Intranet Global Reporting System data posted on the system regarding ARCTIC I activities will be visible to the onshore and offshore management teams and to the layers of senior management with authority involving the unit. The ARCTIC I Rig Manager, OIM and Supervisors all have a responsibility to review this data and raise any issues at the relevant HSE meetings to ensure a suitable close out of any action items is required. 1.6.7 Statement of continued Operation

1.6.7.1 The Case demonstrates that through the application of the Transocean Management system, the expected day to day hazards associated with operations for SIEP at the location offshore Brazil, as analysed and assessed through a formal documented process, are found to be within a suitable level of acceptance, to enable operations to continue. 1.6.7.2 The Case demonstrates that ARCTIC I is compliant to all mandatory Class, Flag state and Coastal State legislation, and that the application of the Transocean Management system will continue the rig within that level of compliance to maintain its maritime occupation. 1.6.7.3 The application of the Company Management system ensures the vessel operational regime adopts the highest level of Industry practices, as supported by the clear mission statement of Transocean. 1.6.7.4 Transocean have established objectives which are endorsed at the highest level. The Management system is established in a framework that clearly supports the pursuit of these objectives which in turn will provide the fundamental basis for continuing the enhancement of safety at work through the reduction of risk. In the adherence to the company Management System ARCTIC I subscribes and pursues these objectives.

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1.6.8

Management Commitment for continued compliance

1.6.8.1 Within the declared management objectives set out in the Transocean Health and Safety Policies and Procedures Manual, the commitment for continued compliance is assured within the following declared intent; HSE Policy; Management at Transocean is fully committed to conduction operations in an incident free workplace all the time, everywhere. Proactive individual involvement, personal responsibility, accountability, and continuous improvement are expected of all employees, clients and subcontractors. The Health and Safety Management System is designed to align all stakeholders efforts to enable attainment of these objectives. HSE Management is a line management responsibility. Visible management commitments and involvement is essential at all levels.

Quality Policy Transocean is committed to providing high quality well construction services which meet or exceed the needs of our customers and comply with the requirements of the Company The Company will manage systems and processes which are designed to deliver value and prevent deficiencies in quality. Quality means; 1. Compliance with applicable laws and regulations 2. Compliance with Company policies, procedures and standards 3. Conformance to agreed customer requirements The quality system will promote and maintain service quality and facilities continuous improvement within each business section. All employees are responsible for quality of services to internal and external customers. All Employees shall be familiar with and apply the policies and procedures of the Company.

Environmental Policy Transocean is committed to conducting business and operational activities in a responsible manner which limits adverse impact to the Environment and promotes the effective use of resources and contributes to continual improvement

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1.6.9

Areas for Continued Enhancement

1.6.9.1 In line with the declared intent for the minimisation of risk onboard the ARCTIC I and the integration of new equipment and systems to promote the units continued operation, the following area of improvement were undertaken during a planned shipyard period in the third quarter of 2007.
Work Schedule Commissioning of New Ballast Control system Removal of Halon system Brief Details Replacement of old PIU system with PLC Based redundant control Ethernet based system In compliance with IMO requirements current system was replaced with Novec 1230 fire extinguishing system Aft crane was removed and replaced with new 100 Tonne SWL unit New PLC based CCTV system was installed with enhanced monitoring capabilities Installation of additional temporary living quarters module for clients personnel. Additional foam monitor to be installed enhancing ability for application of foam in event of Helideck incident Installation of two larger capacity Air Compressors for Tensioner system Installation of larger capacity Bulk air compressor Installation of new GMDSS, AIS and SSAS systems New GMDSS installation with updated equipment Installation of Automatic Identification system (AIS) sys Installation of automatic Ship security Alert System (SSAS) Surface BOP modifications/installation Modifications to Moonpool and Drill floor associated with installation of Surface BOP and associated control system

Aft Deck Crane change out Installation of CCTV system Installation of additional Quarters Installation of additional Helideck Foam Monitor

Upgrade of existing HP and Bulk Air compressors

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1.7 1.7.1

REFERENCES Documentation Iss 04 Jan 31st 2009 Iss 03 August 2009 Transocean Company Management System Health and Safety Policy and Procedures Manual Performance Procedures Monitoring Audit and Assessment

HQS-CMS-GOV HQSHSEPP-01

HQS-CMSPR02 Iss 03 Dec 31st 2008 HQS-HSE-PR-01 HQS-HSE-PR-02 HQS-HSE-PP-02 HQS-HRM-PP-01 HQS-OPS-PR-01 HQS-OPS-PP-01 HQS-OPS-HB-03 HQS-OPS-HB 05 Iss 01 Oct 31st 2007 Iss 02 Oct 12th 2007 Iss 01 Sept 30th 2007 Iss 02 Mar 1st 2009 Iss 02 Nov 1st 2007 Iss 01 Nov 1st 2004 Iss 02 Nov 11th 2004 Iss 01 Nov 11th 2005

Emergency Management Procedures Manual Medical Protocols Manual Environmental Management System Human Resources Policies and Procedures Manual Maintenance Manual Operations Policies and Procedures Manual Certificate and Survey Manual Field Operations Manual

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 2 Health, Safety and Environmental Management System.

PART 2 Health, Safety and Environmental Management System.

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 2 Health, Safety and Environmental Management System.

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 2. PAGE

ARCTIC 1 HEALTH SAFETY & ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ...................... 4 2.1

2.2

2.1.1 2.1.2 2.1.3 2.1.4 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3 2.2.4 2.2.5 2.2.6 2.2.7 2.2.8 2.2.9 2.3.1 2.3.2 2.3.3 2.3.4 2.3.5 2.3.6 2.3.7 2.4.1 2.4.2 2.4.3 2.4.4 2.5.1 2.5.2 2.5.3 2.5.4 2.5.5 2.5.6 2.5.7 2.6.1 2.6.2 2.6.3 2.6.4 2.6.5 2.7.1 2.7.2

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 4

POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................... 8

Purpose ................................................................................................................ 4 Document Update ................................................................................................ 4 Third Parties ......................................................................................................... 4 Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... 6 Policies and Principles ......................................................................................... 8 Quality Policy Statement ..................................................................................... 9 Health & Safety Policy Statement ..................................................................... 10 Environmental Policy Statement ....................................................................... 11 Objectives .......................................................................................................... 12 Corporate Goals and Objectives ........................................................................ 12 Corporate Department Goals and Objectives ................................................... 12 Unit Goals and Objectives.................................................................................. 12 Division & Installation Plans ............................................................................. 12

2.3

ORGANISATION RESPONSIBILITIES AND RESOURCES .................................................................. 14

2.4

RESPONSIBILITIES ............................................................................................................ 26

The Organisation ................................................................................................ 14 HSE Responsibilities .......................................................................................... 16 Bridging Documents .......................................................................................... 16 Review ................................................................................................................ 17 Document Management..................................................................................... 18 Workforce Participation ..................................................................................... 22 ARCTIC I Organization....................................................................................... 23 Senior Management ........................................................................................... 26 Line Management Responsibility ...................................................................... 28 Individual Responsibility ................................................................................... 28 Regulatory Requirements .................................................................................. 29

2.5

RESOURCES .................................................................................................................... 29

2.6

COMPETENCE .................................................................................................................. 40

HSE Resources ................................................................................................... 29 HSE Committee Representation ........................................................................ 31 Support ............................................................................................................... 33 Clients................................................................................................................. 35 Clients Third Parties........................................................................................... 36 Catering & Accommodation ............................................................................... 37 Medical Support ................................................................................................. 38 Selection of Personnel ....................................................................................... 40 Selection and Control of Contractor Personnel................................................. 41 Competence Assessment & Records ................................................................. 41 Training .............................................................................................................. 43 Induction Program ............................................................................................. 48 Planning and Risk Management ........................................................................ 49 Management of Change ..................................................................................... 52

2.7

STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES ............................................................................................ 49

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 2 Health, Safety and Environmental Management System.

2.8

2.7.3 2.7.4 2.7.5 2.8.1 2.8.2 2.8.3 2.8.4 2.9.1 2.9.2 2.9.3 2.9.4

ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES....................................................................... 60

Emergency Response ......................................................................................... 55 Permit to Work System ...................................................................................... 56 Safe Working Practices ...................................................................................... 59 Environmental Management ............................................................................. 60 Environmental Protection .................................................................................. 64 Management of Wastes ..................................................................................... 65 Occupational Health .......................................................................................... 66 HSE Procedures .................................................................................................. 67 HSE Communication .......................................................................................... 67 HSE Alerts........................................................................................................... 69 Rig Security ........................................................................................................ 69

2.9

HSE STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES ...................................................................................... 67

2.10

2.11

2.10.1 Drilling and Well Control Operations ................................................................ 70 2.10.2 HSE, Client Management Interfaces ................................................................. 71 2.10.3 Simultaneous & Combined Operation Risk Assessments ................................. 71 2.10.4 Marine Operations & Site Assessment .............................................................. 72 2.10.5 Support Vessels.................................................................................................. 73 2.10.6 Engineering Management .................................................................................. 74 2.10.7 Lifting Operations & Material Handling ............................................................ 75 2.10.8 Personnel Tracking ............................................................................................ 76 2.10.9 Helicopter Operations ........................................................................................ 76 2.10.10 Hazardous and Radio-Active Substances ...................................................... 77 2.10.11 Procurement Management ............................................................................. 78 2.10.12 Maintenance Management ............................................................................. 79 2.10.13 Contractor Management................................................................................. 81 2.11.1 2.11.2 2.11.3 2.11.4 2.11.5 2.11.6 2.11.7 2.11.8 2.12.1 2.12.2 2.12.3 2.12.4 2.12.5 2.12.6 2.12.7

OPERATIONAL STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES .......................................................................... 70

ADVERSE WEATHER .......................................................................................................... 82

2.12

PERFORMANCE MONITORING ............................................................................................... 88

Adverse Weather................................................................................................ 82 Responsibility ..................................................................................................... 83 Weather Forecasts ............................................................................................. 83 ARCTIC I Operational Limits ............................................................................. 83 Helicopter Operations ........................................................................................ 84 Over-the-side Work ........................................................................................... 85 Crane Operations ............................................................................................... 86 Launching of TEMPSC ........................................................................................ 86

2.13 2.14

2.13.1 Review ................................................................................................................ 94 2.14.1 Documentation................................................................................................... 96


REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 96

MANAGEMENT REVIEW AND IMPROVEMENT .............................................................................. 94

Periodic Monitoring............................................................................................ 88 Incident Reporting & Analysis ........................................................................... 89 Behaviour Based Observation Systems ............................................................. 90 Environmental Monitoring and Measurement .................................................. 91 Audit and Audit Compliance .............................................................................. 92 Verification of HSE Critical Tasks/Activities/Equipment/Systems .................. 93 Certification ....................................................................................................... 94

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2. 2.1 2.1.1

ARCTIC 1 HEALTH SAFETY & ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Introduction Purpose

2.1.1.1 Part 2 of the ARCTIC I HSE case will describe the Transocean Company Management system and present the management objectives that have been established to reduce the level of HSE risk to a suitable acceptable level. 2.1.1.2 The Company Management System provides managers and supervisors at all levels (corporate and installation) with expectations represented by principles, policies and procedures, which are intended to motivate people to execute work safely and effectively to achieve results. Managers and supervisors are responsible to ensure their people understand their responsibilities as described in the Company Management System. 2.1.1.3 The Company Management System establishes consistent standards across the companys worldwide operations and is the mechanism for promoting and sharing lessons learned and continuous improvement within the organization. The purpose of the Companys Management System is to provide the platform for people to create value and prevent loss, achieved by meeting expectations through applying appropriate controls (principles, policies and procedures) embodied within the management system. 2.1.1.4 The Company Management System communicates to employees the values and Company leadership expectations required to conduct business that lead to extraordinary service and performance excellence. 2.1.1.5 The implementation of the Companys principles, policies and procedures is essential to the Companys ability to manage operations safely, efficiently and effectively. It enables our people to: Understand and meet Company expectations. Achieve operational, safety and environmental goals. Achieve performance excellence. Provide value-added services and benefits to all stakeholders. Meet or exceed customer requirements. Meet regulatory requirements

2.1.1.6 Through the application of the company principles, policies and procedures onboard the ARCTIC I, risks will be reduced to an acceptable level, and effective HSE management will be proven. 2.1.2 Document Update

2.1.2.1 The text within this section of the case has been updated in the light of the change of ownership of the ARTCTIC I and the integration of the unit into the Transocean Management system. In some areas it is necessary to describe the original systems in place and where appropriate reference regarding sections of the Company Management system is reference in terms of the current system as applied. 2.1.3 Third Parties

2.1.3.1 The Company periodically engages third parties on its behalf to perform services in support of
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its global activities. Throughout the corporate management system such personnel as these agents or subcontractors are considered totally within the definition of the term All Personnel . 2.1.3.2 It is incumbent upon all personnel to comply with the written requirement of the Company management system and participate in the wide scope of activities to ensure to achieve corporate HSE success. The Management system identifies the required contribution required of all third parties to align with Managements aspirations for the safe operation of the ARCTIC 1. In a clear and concise manner.

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2.1.4 Abbreviations 2.1.4.1 As identified with the text. Abbreviation ABS ALARP API ASA AVL CDP CEO CMS DNV EAM FAC FAT GMS HLO HP/HT HSE IADC IATA IMDG IMO IMP ISM ISO ISPS LQ MODU MS MSDS MTC OIM OJT PC PIC POB PPE PTW QA RMR RSA RSTC RWC SIC SIEP SOOB Definition American Bureau of Shipping As Low as Reasonably Practical American Petroleum Institute Advanced Safety Auditing Approved Vendors List Company Designated Person (ISM Corporate Manager) Chief Executive Officer Company Management System Det Norsk Veritas (Area) Environmental Affairs Manager First Aid Case Fatality Global Management System Helicopter Landing Officer High Pressure/High temperature Health Safety and Environmental International Association of Drilling Contractors International Air Transport Association Code International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code International Maritime Organisation Installed Medical Person International Safety Management (System) International Standards Organisation International Ship and Port Facility Security Code Living Quarters Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Management System Material Safety Data Sheets Medical Treatment Case Offshore Installation Manager On the Job Training Personal Computer Person in Charge Personnel On Board Personal Protective Equipment Permit To Work Quality Assessment Rig Modification Request Rig Security Assessment Rig Safety Training Coordinator Restricted Work Case Serious Injury Case Shell International Exploration and Production (The Client) Summary of Operation Boundaries
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SRMR SSEs RSTC STEA TEAM USA VP

Subsequent Remedial Measures Report Short Service Employees Rig Safety Training Coordinator Safety Training and Environmental Affairs (department) Total Environmental Awareness Management United States of America Vice President

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2.2 2.2.1

Policies and Objectives Policies and Principles

2.2.1.1 The Company Management System manual uses principles, policies and procedures to describe the responsibilities and requirements on how Company leadership expectations are to be achieved. These expectations are documented and organized within the Company Management System manual so that: Management expectations are communicated effectively through a standard and consistent approach Individuals can understand their responsibilities and align their efforts to achieve desired results 2.2.1.2 Principles embody the core values and leadership expectations that lead and guide behaviour within the Company organization. Performance excellence requires individual and collective commitment to these principles. 2.2.1.3 Principles provide direction to people in their decision-making, behaviour and conduct. This ensures that people meet leadership expectations by acting within a given or defined process for which they are responsible and accountable 2.2.1.4 The corporate policies and procedures section includes high-level policies and procedures to support the Company Management System. These policies and procedures cover: - System Management and Review Team (SMART) Process - Management System Document Structure - Document Control - FOCUS Improvement Process - Management of Change - Performance Monitoring Audit & Assessment (PMAA) - Service Quality Appraisals (SQA) - Code of Business Conduct and Ethics - Insider Trading and Confidential Information - Contracts - Records Management Program 2.2.1.5 The Corporate Quality, Health & Safety and Environmental Policy Statements represent the Companys commitment to provide clients, employees and suppliers with a safe environment and clear expectations and values that enable people to achieve desired business results. 2.2.1.6 The Companys Corporate Policy Statements, as outlined in the Company Management System, identifies fundamental expectations of how leadership requirements are to be met.

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2.2.2

Quality Policy Statement

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2.2.3

Health & Safety Policy Statement

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2.2.4

Environmental Policy Statement

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2.2.5

Objectives

2.2.5.1 Annual goals and objectives support the Companys strategic plans and enable the Company to execute its mission and achieve its vision. Corporate departmental goals and objectives are developed to support, and are aligned with, corporate goals and objectives. Unit goals and objectives are developed to support, and are aligned with, corporate departmental goals and objectives. 2.2.5.2 Goals are expectations against which results are measured. Goals should be developed to be measurable (quantitative) if possible. Objectives are performance measures that are used to determine the degree to which a goal has been achieved. Not all performance measures can be clearly quantified, due to the nature of a changing business environment. In exceptional cases they may be qualitative (subjective). 2.2.5.3 Goals and objectives are developed within 4 main areas of responsibility; 2.2.6 Corporate Goals and Objectives Corporate Department Goals and Objectives Unit Goals and Objectives Division & Installation Plans

Corporate Goals and Objectives

2.2.6.1 Executive Management sets corporate goals and objectives annually based on short and longterm strategies designed to achieve the mission and vision. These goals are related to key result areas established by Executive Management after reviewing the global environment and Unit-specific strategies. The goals and objectives are aligned with the annual budget and approved by the Board of Directors. 2.2.7 Corporate Department Goals and Objectives

2.2.7.1 Corporate departmental goals and objectives support Corporate goals and must be specific and measurable. These goals and objectives are interdependent with the Unit goals and objectives and represent aligned performance standards and measures. 2.2.7.2 Each Corporate department develops its own goals and objectives to enable it to contribute to achieving the corporate goals. In some cases, it may be necessary for a corporate department to translate or extrapolate a corporate goal in order to achieve some clear and measurable objective. 2.2.8 Unit Goals and Objectives

2.2.8.1 Unit goals and objectives support and will be aligned with corporate goals. In some cases, Units may develop Unit-specific goals to meet regional business conditions. Because of the diversity of the business environment, measurement and evaluation of the Key Step Measures (KSMs) is critical. (See Figure 2.3.1.) 2.2.9 Division & Installation Plans

2.2.9.1 Divisions and installations develop plans to achieve unit goals and objectives. In some cases, divisions may develop Division-specific goals to meet local business conditions. Division and Installations are instrumental in planning and achieving Unit goals and objectives.

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2.2.9.2 Development of Annual Corporate/Unit Goals and Objectives

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2.3 2.3.1

Organisation Responsibilities and Resources The Organisation

2.3.1.1 Transocean Inc is the world's largest offshore drilling company, specializing in technically demanding segments of the offshore drilling business, including industry-leading positions in deepwater and harsh environment drilling services. 2.3.1.2 In order to manage a large fleet effectively and to achieve the Companys mission, Executive Management developed a management organization based on principles of leadership, essential management processes and personal accountability. 2.3.1.3 The Companys worldwide operations consist of international and deepwater drilling services. 2.3.1.4 The Company organization is depicted on the following organization chart, which shows the relationship between corporate and business unit offices.

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2.3.1.5 The organisation chart showing the

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2.3.2

HSE Responsibilities

2.3.2.1 HSE management is a line management responsibility. Visible management commitment and involvement at all levels is essential for successful HSE performance. As identified within section 2 of the corporate Health and Safety Policies and Procedures Manual [HQS-HSE-PP-01] All Company personnel at all levels of the organization have the responsibility to comply with policy and procedures and participate in the achievement of annual HSE goals. Participation fosters positive, proactive attitudes and behaviour to help meet HSE goals . 2.3.2.2 The Chief Executive Officer is ultimately responsible for the safe and efficient operation of the Company. The President and Chief Operating Officer is responsible for the day to day operations of the Company. The Vice President QHSE is responsible for the activities of QHSE Department to achieve global QHSE management objectives. The Director of QHSE is responsible for the overall planning, maintenance and implementation of the HSE Management System in order to achieve QHSE objectives 2.3.2.3 The Corporate Director QHSE, also nominated as the Designated Person in charge with regard to ISM issues, provides the link between personnel on the installation and the highest level of Corporate management. He is supported through the Division QHSE Manager who will maintain a direct link with the OIM of the ARCTIC I [Ref section 2 1.6 HQS-HSE-PP-01] 2.3.2.4 The responsibility for ensuring implementation of Health, Safety and Environmental policies within Brazil will lie with the Managing Director [Ref section 2 1.5 HQS-HSE-PP-01] 2.3.2.5 The OIM of the ARCTIC I is designated as the person responsible for the development of the HSE Plans to achieve the Company Safety Vision, and he is required to; Monitor execution of installation HSE plans and provide a consistent approach to achieving the Company Safety Vision. Lead by positive example. Implement HSE policies and procedures on their assigned installation Develop installation-specific procedures. Ensure installation class and statutory documentation is current. Assist with incident analysis as required. Authorize specific personnel for various circumstances (for example, responsible person for work permits, authorization for specific equipment operation, and so on).

2.3.3

Bridging Documents

2.3.3.1 The Company recognise the need for co development with their global clients for documentation to cover the integration of the asset within the HSE system of their clients in such a manner as to maximise the benefit to both parties and minimise both the operational risk and administrative demands. The benefit of the consultative approach being the integration of both parties regimes of the HSE management together with the experienced personnel involved at the work site. 2.3.3.2 The Interface or Bridging document will ensure all aspects of contracts are planned, understood and communicated effectively, the client and the company. These plans are developed to address the following areas:

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Rig modification or upgrade projects (usually referred to as Project Management Plans.) Mobile Unit/Drilling Services contracts (usually referred to as Operations Management Plans).

2.3.3.3 As an aid to such a Bridging document the ARCTIC I HSE Case provides a key component as the summary for the assessment and management of the operational risk associated with the completion of the operations within Brazil. 2.3.4 Review

2.3.4.1 The Company have extensive Performance Monitoring and Assessment Procedures document within Manual HQS-CMS-PR-02. 2.3.4.2 The Policy [Section 1 Para 1] documents the requirement that Management conducts audits and assessments to verify compliance and evaluate performance of people in achieving the expectations and requirements described in the Company Management System. The Frequency of audit is identified as a 30 month minimum period but may be conducted more frequently at the discretion of; Executive Vice Presidents Asset and Performance for Corporate Level 1 and Business Unit Level 2 PMAAs Business Unit Senior Vice President or Division/Sector Manager for Division/Sector Level 2 or Installation Level 3 PMAAs. Level 1 Corporate Level 2 Division/Sector Level 3 Installation (Installation-specific procedures) Ensure managers and supervisors monitor, evaluate and take appropriate action to maintain or improve Company performance through an effective Performance Monitoring Audit and Assessment (PMAA). Facilitate in the development of a performance culture. Ensure people have the understanding and ability to execute and deliver required results. Ensure key Company risk-reducing controls that contribute to safe and reliable performance have been implemented and are effective. Verify compliance with the Company Management System.

2.3.4.3 The definition of the hierarchical levels being;

2.3.4.4 The purpose of this policy is to:

2.3.4.5 Level 1 Policy and Procedure PMAA criteria are determined by Corporate departments and are contained in the applicable section of the PMAA Criteria Standard, HQS-CMS-STD-01. Any additional Division-specific policies and procedures require the Business Unit and Division departments to develop the necessary audit key elements and criteria for Level 2. The development of Division policy and procedure key elements and the process for how they are audited must follow the PMAA Criteria Standard. 2.3.4.6 The Core PMAA Scope consists of assessing the eight management and three personal principles as well as auditing selected policies contained in Corporate Level 1 policy and procedure manuals

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2.3.4.7 Follow-up and Close-out is the final step in the PMAA process. Follow-up ensures the Locations performance is optimized by carrying out the Improvement and Corrective Actions to completion. Close-out is a management responsibility which is carried out after verifying follow up has been satisfactorily completed. 2.3.4.8 Within the PMAA process all levels of management are allocated responsibilities within the PMAA process from decisions with regard to audits frequency to recording the audit follow up and ensuring items are closed out. [HQS-CMS-PR-02. Sec 1 9] 2.3.5 Document Management

2.3.5.1 The Corporate Management System is shown in the figure below. This document management hierarchy describes the relationship between the Company Management System (GOV) manual and the corporate department management system and support documents.[HQS CMS GOV Sec 5 2]

2.3.5.2 Management system documents are organized in a hierarchy from Corporate to Installation. The organization provides a method for locating and retrieving documents in ways specific to how information is required to carry out work, either by function (discipline) or by category (type).
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2.3.5.3

The management system document structure is divided into three levels as follows: Level 1 Corporate Governance. Level 1 documents define executive management expectations and requirements. Level 1 is subdivided into 2 levels: Level 1A Corporate Department Policies and Procedures. Corporate department policies and procedures define explicitly the expectations and requirements for each core management function (discipline) within the organization. Level 1B Corporate Department support documentation. These documents provide additional direction and/or guidance in achieving the requirements specified in the Level 1A manuals.

(Together, these Level 1 documents represent governance, i.e. expectations and requirements that apply worldwide) Level 2 Unit Manuals are Unit-specific documents deemed by the Unit Senior Vice President necessary to address local specific business process requirements, local regulatory authorities and/or local client requirements not already covered in Corporate Levels 1A and 1B. They follow the Management System Document Classification System and must not conflict nor contradict Level 1A and 1B corporate requirements. Level 3 Rig procedures are Rig-specific documents which describe the steps, activities, tasks, and work processes required to safely, responsibly, consistently and reliably execute work to meet Corporate, Unit, client, operational and regulatory requirements. CORPORATE DEPARTMENT VICE PRESIDENT Determines the need to develop any new documents to support the corporate department management system. Reviews and approves changes to department management system documents. UNIT SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT Determines the need to develop any new documents to support the Unit management system. Reviews and approves changes to Unit management system documents. CORPORATE DEPARTMENT HEAD Ensures documents to support corporate department management system manuals as specified by the Corporate Vice President are developed. Notifies the corporate Quality department of any proposed and/or final changes to the corporate department management system documents. Ensures department management system manuals are developed and controlled as prescribed in this policy CORPORATE DIRECTOR, QHSE Ensures that Corporate and Unit management system documents meet the defined document control requirements.

2.3.5.4 The responsibility for the issuing and control of documents is as follows;

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DIVISION QHSE MANAGER Ensures that Unit documents meet the defined document control requirements. RIG MANAGER Approves Level 3 documents under their jurisdiction. Ensures their Level 3 documents meet the defined document control requirements. OFFSHORE INSTALLATION MANAGER (OIM) Submits Level 3 documents to Rig Manager for approval. Develops Level 3 documents according to defined document control requirements

2.3.5.5 Change to the Company Management System is formally captured, reviewed, communicated and executed through the System Management and Review Team (SMART) process. 2.3.5.6 The SMART process [HQS CMS GOV Sec 5.1] enables people at different levels in the Company (corporate, unit, division and installation) to propose and implement change to the Company Management System categorized by the core management functions; shown below; Health, Safety & Environment Engineering & Technical Services (Operations) Operations Performance (Operations) Supply Chain Management (Operations) Human Resources Finance Information Technology Legal Services Investor Relations & Communications Marketing & Planning

2.3.5.7 Corporate and Unit management use the SMART process to make changes to the Company Management System through their existing organizations and resources. SMART is also the means to communicate and implement change to the management system (represented in manuals and other documents) to corporate, unit and field personnel. 2.3.5.8 The SMART process is initiated by a SMART request. SMART requests require an action from the receiving organization. The action may involve review, feedback communication and/or execution of change to the management system. SMART requests are initiated at the Corporate or Unit level. 2.3.5.9 Unit SMART requests originate from the Unit and requires action (change or clarification request regarding the corporate/unit management system) from either unit or corporate. 2.3.5.10 Feedback is the means by which improvement to the Company Management System is captured. Feedback related to the Company Management System is SMART feedback. The most common source of SMART feedback is through corporate or Unit SMART Reviews. An alternate source of feedback may also be submitted through the FOCUS protocol. 2.3.5.11 The SMART Monitor is a log that formally captures SMART feedback requiring action. To ensure feedback is properly reviewed, approved and captured in the respective SMART Monitor, all feedback must be forwarded to the Division QHSE Manager. For feedback related to corporate Level 1 documents, the Division QHSE Manager forwards the approved feedback to the corporate Quality Manager.
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2.3.5.12 For feedback related to Level 2 (Unit) documents, the Division QHSE Manager facilitates review and actions taken by Unit Process Owners. 2.3.5.13 Corporate and Division SMART members are individuals who have the experience and responsibility to develop and maintain the Company management system manuals and support documentation. They also have the authority to make and/or approve changes to processes within their area of responsibility. 2.3.5.14 Their primary responsibility as SMART members is to ensure that management expectations as described in their management system documentation are clearly defined, understood and communicated. Their secondary responsibility is to respond and act on Corporate and Unit feedback. 2.3.5.15 Corporate SMART Members are chosen by their respective corporate department Vice Presidents (who also determines the number of members required). Corporate SMART members are usually the corporate department head. As often as possible, SMART members should be the defined Process Owner of a given departments management system. 2.3.5.16 Unit SMART members are chosen by the Unit Senior Vice President (who also determines how many members are needed). Unit SMART Members are usually Unit department heads. At his discretion, the Unit Senior Vice President may select additional members who directly report to the Division department heads and have a functional reporting relationship to corporate departments, e.g., Division Technical Field Support Manager and Division Materials Manager. 2.3.5.17 The Corporate QHSE Director and Corporate Vice President establish the Corporate SMART Contact List. The Corporate Quality Manager maintains the Corporate SMART Contact List. The Division QHSE Manager and the Division Senior Vice President establish the Unit SMART Contact List. The Division QHSE Manager maintains the Division SMART Contact List. 2.3.5.18 The Corporate Quality Manager uses the SMART contact list to select SMART Members to review changes to the management system based on the possible impact the change may have on the others management system. Corporate department process owners can use the SMART contact list in the same way 2.3.5.19 The corporate SMART process is initiated when change to the Company Management System, originating from corporate departments, requires Unit review, feedback, commissioning (where applicable) and implementation. (Minor revisions may be made without a Division SMART review). 2.3.5.20 The Division SMART feedback request is initiated when change/clarification to the Company Management System originating from the organization (which includes Division, Sector, Branch and/or Installation) requires corporate action. 2.3.5.21 In both Corporate and Division case the initiation of a SMART request will then follow the established protocol as shown below;
Step 1 Corporate SMART
Corporate SMART Review Corporate ensure ramifications understood Division SMART review Changes communicated to Unit and within unit ensure changes understood at site Commissioning - Executive management delegates responsibility to Division management for the commissioning of corporate documents. This is

Division SMART
Division submits feedback to the appropriate Unit SMART Team member(s) for approval. (Refer to Unit SMART Contact List). Division SMART feedback are logged and tracked in the Unit SMART Monitor by the Division QHSE Manager. Division SMART member(s) either reject or approve the submitted feedback for submission to corporate SMART.

2 3

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intended to ensure that responsible individuals (i.e., managers, supervisors and department heads) are aware of and understand key changes to the Company Management System. Implementation - If commissioning is necessary, it is followed by implementation. This involves applying the specified changes in the workplace to achieve compliance. Compliance is achieved either by immediately applying change or by applying an interim action until a permanent change can be applied The Division QHSE Manager forwards the feedback to the corporate SMART member(s) who reviews the feedback and responds accordingly. The corporate SMART member decides if action is necessary and captures his decision and comments in the corporate SMART monitor. Any decisions that require action will follow the corporate SMART process.

Feedback is maintained throughout the process using the Corporate SMART Monitor. 2.3.6 Workforce Participation

2.3.6.1 The Company have an established philosophy for ensuring the involvement of the workforce at all levels of the Safety Management System. This includes the SMART system and FOCUS. 2.3.6.2 Installation communications involving the full range of the ARCTIC I personnel encompass formal shift handovers, correspondence, emails, daily meetings and reports that relate to the installations safety and performance. Rig management (Rig Manager and OIM) are responsible to participate in the process of information exchange and communication to ensure the safety and integrity of the operation and installation is achieved. 2.3.6.3 Supervisors are required to ensure effective communications are achieved in the following areas: Conversations with people Conversations with people about safety Formal Shift Handovers Reports/ Logbook for all Supervisors Client Daily Communications Crew change Handovers Daily Standing Instructions to Drillers Daily Standing Instructions to Crane Operators QHSE Feedback Daily review of well performance Service Quality Appraisals PMAA close-out meetings HSE Alerts Equipment Alerts FOCUS Action Plans Incident reporting

2.3.6.4 Onboard the rig a wide range of HSE based meeting will for the core of communicating HSE matters. Company personnel, client personnel and all subcontractor personnel will attend and participate in relevant HSE meetings as determined by the OIM. These meetings will be in the format of; Weekly Departmental HSE Meeting General HSE Meeting Pre Tour Meeting Pre Task
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Daily Operations QHSE Steering Committee

2.3.6.5 The scope of this policy is applicable to all personnel onboard the ARCTIC I. 2.3.6.6 In addition all employees will participate in the FOCUS observational safety system as a proactive means of demonstrating their own commitment to occupational safety onboard the ARCTIC 1. 2.3.6.7 The FOCUS Improvement Process is the Companys approved method for developing and tracking corrective and improvement action plans, and capturing lessons learned to improve Company performance. The FOCUS Improvement Process provides a consistent means to improve Company performance through effective planning. FOCUS is used with Management of Change to develop plans, obtain approvals, and monitor and track the progress of plans to completion. It is incumbent upon all personnel to improve Company performance through the effective use of the FOCUS Improvement Process. 2.3.6.8 All personnel onboard the ARCTIC 1 also have a responsibility to participate in the START process. The START process must be actively led by all supervisors and supported by all Company personnel. All Company personnel are responsible for their own safety and behaviour. All Company personnel are obligated to interrupt any unsafe operation and correct any at-risk/unsafe behaviour or unsafe condition. [HQS-HSE-PP-01 Section 4 5.1]. 2.3.6.9 The START process contains 5 specific elements to be undertaken by all personnel as a part of their proactive duties whilst undertaking any work onboard the ARCTIC I. These elements being; SEE THINK ACT REINFORCE TRACK

2.3.6.10 A Proper implementation of the START process by all personnel provides an effective method of preventing injuries, safeguarding equipment and avoiding operational exposures by all personnel. 2.3.6.11 The completion of the Start record cards will be overseen by departmental supervisors. The OIM is required to ensure that an effective system is in place and that the system is fully operational from review through to communicating, and trending of the observations and tracking of the results and finally acting upon if deemed an action is required. 2.3.7 ARCTIC I Organization

2.3.7.1 An organisational chart of the ARCTIC 1 is shown below;

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ARCTIC I MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION

2.3.7.2 As shown above the ARCTIC I management system organisation is led by the OIM, who supports the position of Barge Engineer onboard the unit. The OIM is supported by his management team consisting of; Performance Toolpusher Maintenance Supervisor Toolpusher

2.3.7.3 The OIM is identified as having the following general role within his Rig Management remit. (Operations Job Description Manual) The OIM has the overall charge and responsibility for the health, safety and welfare of all persons, and activities onboard the ARCTIC I and on any unit within the associated 500 meter zone. As such, the OIM is fully authorized and obliged to take whatever actions are considered necessary to prevent injury, loss of life, damage to equipment/structure and/or loss of drilling integrity. The O.I.M. manages the rig by establishing goals and objectives (consistent with the Company's stated mission) in pursuit of satisfying the requirements of both the client and shore based management. Management of key areas either directly or indirectly through designated
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department head supervisors appointed. Safety Environment Rig Management Operations Personnel and training Information Regulatory compliance Budget management

2.3.7.4 Within the HSE remit the OIM is identified to have the following responsibilities; (ISM302.00) Develop installation HSE plans to achieve the Company Safety Vision. Monitor execution of installation HSE plans and provide a consistent approach to achieving the Company Safety Vision. Lead by positive example. Implement HSE policies and procedures on their assigned installation. Develop installation-specific procedures. Ensure installation class and statutory documentation is current. Assist with incident analysis as required. Authorize specific personnel for various circumstances (for example, responsible person for work permits, authorization for specific equipment operation, and so on).

2.3.7.5 In addition, the OIM has the authority to; (ISM 302.00) The OIM/PIC has the authority to request assistance from shore-based management as necessary. The OIM/PIC has the authority to issue instructions and orders to crewmembers. The OIM/PIC has the authority to assign special duties to the crewmembers.

2.3.7.6 The Performance Toolpusher supervises the work activity of the entire drilling department personnel to include carrying out objectives established by onshore rig management and/or the Offshore Installation Manager (O.I.M). Essential functions include planning, scheduling, problem solving, conducting inspections and operational meetings, interacting with other rig department heads, and communicating directions to the Toolpusher. The ultimate objective of this position is to complete successful offshore oil and/or gas wells to the satisfaction of the Client, Company management and within compliance of applicable regulation

2.3.7.7 The Maintenance Supervisor is responsible for the management, the maintenance, repair and operation of all mechanical and electrical equipment on board the unit. He has to maintain documentation in compliance with regulatory and Company requirements. The Maintenance Supervisor is responsible for the preventative maintenance system on board. He advises the O.I.M. on all engineering, maintenance and repair matters.
2.3.7.8 The Night Toolpusher supervises the work activity of the on tour drilling department personnel to include carrying out objectives established by the Toolpusher and/or the Offshore Installation Manager. Essential functions include planning, scheduling, problem solving, conducting inspections and operational meetings, interacting with other rig department heads, and communicating directions to the Driller. The ultimate objective of this position is to complete
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successful offshore oil and/or gas wells to the satisfaction of the Client, Company management and within compliance of applicable regulations. 2.4 2.4.1 Responsibilities Senior Management

2.4.1.1 At Corporate level, the Vice President QHSE has the following HSE responsibilities Ensuring adequate resources are available to support Business Unit Senior Vice Presidents on HSE issues that are applicable worldwide. Participate in the annual review of HSE performance to identify gaps and any needed modification of HSE plans to achieve the Company Safety Vision. Review and give approval of Company QHSE policies applicable to worldwide operations. Review and give approval of the Company Quality, Health and Safety, and Environmental Policy Statements applicable to worldwide operations. Be responsible for the activities of QHSE Department to achieve global QHSE objectives

2.4.1.2 The Corporate Director QHSE (Designated Person ISM) has the following HSE responsibilities; Provide a link between personnel on the installation and the highest level of Corporate management. Review results for Corporate and Business Unit internal and external ISM audits of all applicable offices and installations. Ensure all applicable ISM audit results, including the OIM/Masters review for ISM Code, are reported to the highest level of corporate management through the QHSE Steering Committees. Serve as Designated Person (ISM Code). Serve as Company Security Officer (ISPS Code). Be responsible for safe and efficient operation in their assigned area of operations. Participate in the annual review of HSE performance to identify gaps and any needed modification of HSE plans to achieve the Company Safety Vision. Ensure that adequate resources are dedicated to effectively support line management with regard to HSE issues within their Business Unit. Assist with the analysis of incidents as required. Provide authorization to Business Unit, Division, Sector and Branch department heads for development of respective manuals. [Ref HQS-CMSGOV Section 5, Subsection 2.] Establish approval authority limits for policies, procedures and standards applicable only within their Business Unit. [Ref HQS-CMS-GOV Section 6.) Assure implementation of Company HSE policies and procedures in their area of operations. Support and monitor installation HSE plans to achieve the Company Safety Vision. Recognize effective performance and execution of installation HSE plans.
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2.4.1.3 In the Brazil, the Managing Director has the following HSE responsibilities;

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2.4.1.4 The Division QHSE Manager (Designated Person ISM) based in the Area office has the following responsibilities; Providing a link between personnel on the installation and the highest level of Corporate management. Serving as Designated Person (ISM Code) in their assigned area of operations. Serving as Company Security Officer (ISPS Code) in their assigned area of operations. Ensuring an alternate Designated Person (ISM Code) is named and communicated in their assigned area of operations. Developing installation HSE plans to achieve the Company Safety Vision. Monitoring execution of installation HSE plans and provide a consistent approach to achieving the Company Safety Vision. Leading by positive example. Implementing HSE policies and procedures on their assigned installation

2.4.1.5 The OIM has the following main responsibilities for HSE activities;

2.4.1.6 A schematic of the QHSE organisation is shown below;

2.4.1.7 Operational support for the ARCTIC I is provided locally in Brazil by the Rig Managers (Asset/Performance) and the Operations Managers Performance and Asset. The Rig Managers liaise directly with the OIM and monitors the rig compliance with management system requirements on an
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ongoing basis in order to achieve safe and effective MODU operations. 2.4.2 Line Management Responsibility

2.4.2.1 Within the Company Management system, it is established that a proactive approach to health, safety and environmental protection to be an integral part of line managements responsibility and accountability. The management system identifies a commitment that Risk mitigation is recognised at every level as the fundamental to creating a safe place of work. 2.4.2.2 HSE management is a line management responsibility. Visible management commitment and involvement at all levels is essential for successful HSE performance. 2.4.2.3 All Company personnel at all levels of the organization have the responsibility to comply with policy and procedures and participate in the achievement of annual HSE goals. Participation fosters positive, proactive attitudes and behaviour to help meet HSE goals 2.4.2.4 All individuals onboard the ARCTIC I are required to incorporate the THINK Planning Process into all tasks performed, whether working individually or in teams. The THINK Planning Process is utilized for Risk Management of all activities and tasks carried out throughout the Company [HQS HSE PP01 Section 4 2.1.4] 2.4.2.5 It s a requirement that all managers, supervisors and individuals demonstrate risks are ALARP prior to performing activities or tasks. Verifying controls (preventive and mitigating) are in place and effective helps ensure identified risks are maintained as low as reasonably practicable. [HQS HSE PP01 Section 4 2.1.4] 2.4.2.6 All supervisors and individuals onboard the ARCTIC I demonstrate their responsibility to supporting a safe system of work by following the policies of the HSE Management system and maintaining a proactive approach to ensure all activities are undertaken in a safe manner. 2.4.2.7 By virtue of their position as being in charge of or providing guidance to a team of personnel to undertake a particular work scope the Supervisor has the responsibility of identifying and assessing risks associated with performing such tasks and ensuring that steps are taken to manage those risks. 2.4.2.8 Supervisors have the particular responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the THINK process in particular they are required to ensure the following; 2.4.3 Ensure their crews are trained in the use of the THINK Planning Process. Be responsible for the quality and use of the THINK plans created by their crews. Lead the THINK Planning Process daily. Participate in the development and continuous review of Task Specific THINK Procedures. Participate in development and review of Task Risk Assessments (TRAs). Ensure appropriate Company Management System Procedures are correctly implemented and applied (preventive and mitigating controls) in THINK plans.

Individual Responsibility

2.4.3.1 As soon as an individual commences employment with the Company they are reminded of, and encouraged to, adopt a proactive approach to perform work in a manner that fosters the health and safety of everyone at the work site and know their responsibilities for HSE issues.
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2.4.3.2 The individual HSE responsibilities of Transocean employees are clearly identified in the relevant job descriptions and emphasised during induction periods. HSE responsibilities of contractors and third party personnel are highlighted during the offshore induction process that covers, applicable Transocean policy, procedures and relevant management system requirements. 2.4.3.3 The individual, employee or contractor has a commitment to adhering to their responsibility for HSE issues within the HSE safety culture. This is highlighted from the time of initial induction and is maintained through the use of extensive peer behaviour processes like; 2.4.4 START regime. which forms a core part of the offshore daily safety management

Regulatory Requirements

2.4.4.1 As part of the company objectives and in line with the mission statement the Company adhere to the goal of maintaining the highest level of integrity to safeguard the environment and the safety of the personnel within the workforce. 2.4.4.2 The use of an independent Classification Society using internationally recognised standards to undertake external verification of compliance provides the assurance that both the Management system and the ARCTIC I complies to the highest level of recognised standards. 2.4.4.3 As part of the requirements for adopting the IMO (International Maritime Organisation) ISM system the Company are required to demonstrate compliance, which is monitored through external auditing by DNV (Det Norsk Veritas) of the management system and associated activities and requirements within that system. 2.4.4.4 In order to be accepted to operate in any Coastal state and to provide the vessel underwriters with a level of assurance that the vessel meets the necessary equipment configuration and design standards, ARCTIC I is Classed by DNV (Det Norsk Veritas) as meeting their requisite criteria. 2.4.4.5 Continued compliance to Class Standards is maintained through the application of annual surveys and review and established requirements to be met in the event of any failures within the realms of the Hull, Generating and integrated systems, Cranes, and Helideck that are covered by the DNV Class certification. 2.5 2.5.1 Resources HSE Resources

2.5.1.1 The HSE Department is independent of line management and provides support and advice on all matters related to HSE. The role of the HSE Department includes three main areas: development and communication of appropriate HSE Policies and Procedures, global HSE strategy and support to operations, and development and deployment of personnel participating in the Operations Safety Development Program. 2.5.1.2 The Corporate organisation is shown in 2.4.1.6 and is based in Houston providing the necessary resources to guide the application of the HSE Management system throughout the Global Operation. The SAM Division HSE group is based in the Rio de Janeiro Office to provide the local interface direct to the ARCTIC I. The local organisation is shown on the following page.

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2.5.1.3

The chart below identifies the personnel and positions within the HSE Group of the Brazil Area

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2.5.2

HSE Committee Representation

2.5.2.1 A wide range of HSE Meetings are undertaken onboard the Company units to ensure the broadest depth of communication with the workforce to ensure a mutually proactive HSE philosophy is maintained at all times. All Company personnel, client personnel and subcontractor personnel must attend and participate in relevant HSE meetings as determined by the OIM. [HQS HSE PP01 Sec 4 4.2] 2.5.2.2 The purpose of holding effective HSE meetings is to: Recognize proactive HSE performance. Provide an opportunity for crews to discuss, understand and apply Company HSE processes and procedures for conducting tasks and identifying hazards and potential risks. Increase awareness and motivate crewmembers by reviewing and learnin from incidents and HSE information.

2.5.2.3 All HSE meetings will be documented and attendance sheets signed by all personnel attending. The OIM and Rig Manager will review and sign each meeting report and ensure appropriate action identified in the meeting is addressed using the FOCUS Improvement Process. Depending on the resources required to implement the improvement/corrective opportunity, utilization of the FOCUS tracking software may also be required. 2.5.2.4 The OIM has the responsibility to encourage Client and all client subcontractor personnel to participate in relevant HSE meetings, and in addition the OIM will; Review and validate (within GMS) each meeting report and ensure appropriate action identified in the meeting is addressed using the FOCUS improvement process. Give full consideration to conducting a general HSE meeting on a periodic basis. Conduct the Daily Operation meeting. Conduct QHSE Steering Committee Meetings at specified intervals.

2.5.2.5 The scope of regular meetings that will be held is shown on the following page.

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Meeting Type
Weekly Departmental

Purpose
To discuss the various planning, monitoring, corrective and improvement processes (THINK, START and FOCUS) used throughout the Company, how they apply, and are used. Additional topics include reviewing and discussing how other HSE information, internal or external, could apply to the department. To be used for issues that apply to all personnel, such as HSE performance recognition, incident status (Division, Sector, Branch, installation or facility), and significant change to normal routines To be part of the hand-over process to ensure that all personnel starting work are aware of the current operation and their particular responsibilities. Specific meetings must be held prior to certain tasks being conducted. The formality and content of the meetings depends on the exact nature of the task to be conducted. The person who has direct operational responsibility for the proposed operation must ensure that an effective pretask meeting is conducted All department heads or their designees, together with the OIM, must attend a joint, daily operation meeting, to discuss each departments plans for the next 24 hours. Division, Sector, facility, and Corporate QHSE Steering Committee Meetings must be conducted at least twice a year. Installation QHSE Steering Committee

General HSE Meetings Pre Tour Meetings

Pre Task Meetings Daily Meeting Operations

QHSE Steering Committee Meetings

Meetings must be conducted at specific times so that each crew has the opportunity to attend a meeting per year. Annual HSE goals must be reviewed during Corporate, Division, Sector, Branch installation and facility QHSE Steering Committee Meetings to determine HSE performance gaps and identify improvement/corrective opportunities (if any) to be addressed.

2.5.2.6 Within the scope of the HSE meetings the following personnel play key roles and are designated with specific responsibilities; (HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 4.2]
Position
All Personnel Supervisors Department Heads Sub contractors

Responsibility
Attend and participate in relevant HSE meetings. Ensure effective HSE meetings are conducted. Ensure all personnel within their department attend at least one HSE meeting per week. Attend a joint daily operation meeting with the OIM Attend and participate in relevant HSE meetings. Encourage Client and all client subcontractor personnel to participate in relevant HSE meetings. Review and validate (within GMS) each meeting report and ensure appropriate action identified in the meeting is addressed using the FOCUS improvement process. Give full consideration to conducting a general HSE meeting on a periodic basis. Conduct the Daily Operation meeting. Conduct QHSE Steering Committee Meetings at specified intervals.

OIM

Rig Manager Division Manager Corporate Department QHSE

Review and validate (within GMS) each meeting report and ensure appropriate action identified in the meeting is addressed using the FOCUS improvement process Conduct QHSE Steering Committee Meetings at specified intervals. Conduct QHSE Steering Committee Meetings at specified intervals.

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2.5.3

Support

2.5.3.1 The support elements for the ARCTIC I operation are focussed through the OIM Rig manager. Operational Technical Management System Security Safety HR

2.5.3.2 In addition within the remit of Company Designated Person the OIM has the authority to communicate directly on significant items falling direction within the remit of ISM and ISPS systems. 2.5.3.3 Through the availability of the Company Intranet system the OIM and supervisory personnel onboard are provided with access to the full scope of information held within the companys internal web site. 2.5.3.4 The day to day Management of the ARCTIC I is supported through the Operations Group. The HQS Operations Group is divided into three key components, Engineering and Technical Services, Performance and Technology and Marketing. The combined group, which forms part of the Companys management organization, is responsible for providing all related services to Operations. 2.5.3.5 The roles of Engineering and Technical Services Group key areas are: Provide engineering services for the analysis, evaluation and design of installation upgrades, new construction projects or major repairs and refurbishments. Ensure that Company assets are maintained in good condition and that they perform to required standards. Monitor equipment related downtime performance and ensure that adequate corrective or improvement measures are taken and that these measures are shared across the fleet when appropriate. Provide engineering and technical support for the operations and marketing of assets and services. Maintain a technical leadership position in deepwater and technically demanding drilling services. Provide project management services for new construction, major upgrade, major repair and engineering projects. Foster a close technical relationship with clients, classification societies and regulatory bodies. Ensure that materials and services required for daily operations or construction projects are procured and delivered to the installations when needed.

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2.5.3.6 The roles of Performance and Technology Group key areas are: Promote operational efficiency by making assessments of operations and verification of compliance with Corporate Operations policies and procedures. Foster the identification and implementation of best practices and operational standardization throughout the Company. Identify and assess new technology for application on Company installations Provide operational planning and well construction support to improve the service delivery to the Companys clients.

2.5.3.7 Within the Brazil organization the headquarters organisation is reflected s shown in the two organisational charts shown on the next page.

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2.5.3.8 Performance Group

2.5.3.9 Asset Group

2.5.4

Clients

2.5.4.1 The Company recognizes the need to ensure that safe and effective working relationships are established with both Clients and third party specialists contracted to undertake work activities onboard the ARCTIC I. 2.5.4.2 All Well construction activities have to be pre-planned in advances of any operations being commenced. [HQS OPS PP 01 Sec 3 1.7]. Pre-planning will ensure adequate communication between the Client and the Company and eliminate assumptions that may have a negative impact towards safety of personnel, environment, equipment or operational performance. Pre-planning is an act of communication and will identify the Transocean methods of operation, understand the Clients expectations, identify risks / opportunities for operational improvement, required resources and wellBlade Offshore Services 2009

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site information required for safe and efficient operations. 2.5.4.3 The Rig Manager- Performance, is the primary interface link between the Company and the Client. Prior to commencing drilling operations, it is the Rig Managers responsibility to ensure that the Well Planning Checklist has been completed in accordance with the Division Policy. [HQS OPS HB 05 Sec 3 1.7]. The completion of the Well Planning check list promotes a high degree of communication relevant to the forthcoming campaign between the Rig Manager and his supporting team, on and offshore and the client. 2.5.4.4 As identified throughout the Transocean CMS the Rig Manager/Performance, is responsible for the compliance of all the Company employees onboard the ARCTIC I and all other third parties with the established HSE management system. It is an established policy that the Clients and their subcontractor personnel are encouraged to participate in the Companys HSE system.[HQS HSE PP01 Sec 4 2.3] 2.5.4.5 Through the media of various HSE meetings the Clients representative onboard the ARCTIC I will be briefed on the day to day HSE activities and any recent occurrences, areas of concern or needs for additional attention. 2.5.4.6 Within the open HSE culture that prevails within Transocean in addition to the daily planning meeting the Clients Representative will have his own individual access to all the routine weekly safety and HSE meetings held onboard the unit. As such meetings from part of the HSE communication structure within the ARCTIC 1 the Client will be kept aware of all ongoing developments within the HSE organisation. 2.5.4.7 At an early stage in the contractual process the HSE management process is clearly outlined to the clients. 2.5.4.8 Through the Asset and Performance Teams the Rig Manager/Performance can call upon the wide range of Technical and HSE support to assess the impact of the any specific Client requirements upon the current or future business campaign, to ensure that the ARCTIC I is not compromised by the proposed work programme. 2.5.5 Clients Third Parties

2.5.5.1 As has been identified within the previous section, the structure of the Transocean Management system provides a fully open and communicable means for active participation by the third party when onboard the ARCTIC I. In compliance with this system all parties whether Transocean direct employees, their contractors, the Client or the clients contractors have a duty for compliance with this system in pursuit of the maintenance of a safe working environment. 2.5.5.2 Upon joining the ARCTIC I all third parties are provided with an orientation briefing that identifies the Company Safety culture and ensures all personnel receive critical safety information and understand site specific hazards prior to having access to the worksite. 2.5.5.3 Onboard the ARCTIC I all third parties will be represented within the Safety Management organisation through the provision of active representation on the HSE Committee. Through the organisation associated with this committee all third parties are integrated to the Management system.

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2.5.5.4 It is a requirement that Third Party Equipment received on board an installation must be inspected and documented within the CMS to ensure compliance in all categories for code, safety and performance. Third Party Equipment must also be included in the CMS to verify that maintenance procedures are carried out by the relevant owners or persons in charge of the equipment[HQS OPS PR Sec 2 2.11.2] 2.5.5.5 In addition to the installation documentation process a 6 monthly review of the equipment will be completed to verify continued conformance with the original documentation leading to continued operation. 2.5.5.6 The process is reversed when the equipment is disconnected for removal back to onshore. 2.5.5.7 Through their own contract QA and acceptance organisation SIEP ensure the credibility of their Third parties own HSE system, and the compliance of that system to the SIEP minimum standard. The integration of the SIEP Third Party Management system is therefore co-ordinated through the same interface as that of SIEP itself and hence will be bound by the structure that provides the framework for the ARCTIC 1 HSE management. The respective management systems are interfaced through the SIEP Document HSE Management System Bridging Document. 2.5.6 Catering & Accommodation

2.5.6.1 The Company identify the relevance of occupational health and the implementation of standards of hygiene as a critical factor to the wellbeing of employees and the minimising of environmental harm. 2.5.6.2 It is a company policy that Accommodation, food preparation and services areas must be maintained to high standards of sanitation and hygiene [HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 3 3.1] 2.5.6.3 Within the living quarters, The Chief Steward is the immediate supervisor responsible for standards of work including hygiene within the galley and is responsible for standards of work of the catering crew, which includes galley staff and stewards, throughout the LQ. 2.5.6.4 The Galley and associated food handling areas are potential sources of food contamination requiring particularly high standards of personal hygiene from the catering personnel and Transocean recognise the need for the maintenance of these standards. 2.5.6.5 The importance of occupational health through the maintenance of established standards of hygiene is reflected in the implementation of Transocean procedures for occupational health, control of hazardous substances and identification of appropriate monitoring and control measures. 2.5.6.6 The HSE Management system contains extensive guidelines for the implementation of practices and procedures to be used within the Living Quarters in the pursuit of high levels of occupational health and hygiene consistent with the risks involved in such close contact areas. 2.5.6.7 Prior to arrival on an installation, all food handlers must have documentation to confirm they have received instruction in the prevention of food-borne illness. It is the responsibility of the catering contractor to provide the training required for catering personnel prior to arrival on the installation. 2.5.6.8 In exceptional circumstances training requirements for catering personnel may be met on the installation, provided the IMP is qualified to carry out this training and has the approval of the Rig Manager/Performance.

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2.5.6.9 It is a requirement that the accommodation, offices, galley, mess hall, food storage and recreation areas will be inspected weekly by a team composed of; OIM or designee Installation Medical Person Camp Boss

2.5.6.10 Within section 3.1 of the Health Safety and Policies Procedures Manual a wide range of company policies are identified to ensure the highest level of Occupational Health and Hygiene is maintained within the Catering Group and the accommodation areas. The Company policies and the reference section with section 3 of the manual are show below.

Policy
Inspection Training Food Selection Food Transportation Food Storage Food Preparation Food Protection Leftovers Cleaning and Sanitizing Utensils Accommodation Personal Hygiene Smoking Limitation

Reference Section of 3 3.1


4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12

2.5.6.11 The Medic functions as an independent inspector of standards of work within the LQ and with particular regard to standards of hygiene within the galley and reports on a weekly basis to the OIM. The Medic, in conjunction with the Company Doctor, also has an important role to play in understanding occupational health risks and the implementation of health surveillance measures. 2.5.7 Medical Support

2.5.7.1 It is Company Policy that all installations must maintain a dedicated clinic, adequately equipped and staffed by a qualified Medical Person to effectively attend to all trauma and medical cases. In addition systems must be in place whereby both personal medical information and information surrounding all treatment provided is accurately recorded, maintained and confidential. 2.5.7.2 The ARCTIC 1 Medic provides the immediate first line medical and first aid support assisted by a suitable trained group of First Aiders.

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2.5.7.3 The prime role of the Medic is to provide; Medical assessment and screening services Occupational health monitoring Medical and occupational health advice to management and offshore Medics Emergency medical services Independent occupational health and hygiene reviews/audits.

2.5.7.4 The Rig Medic is backed up ashore with a Local Medical Provider who has been nominated by the Division Team but reviewed and assessed by the Corporate Medical Advisor [HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 2.1 4.5.2] 2.5.7.5 The Medic and the first-aiders carry out exercises and conduct on-site training together as part of the ARCTIC Is emergency drills and exercises programme. The Medic is provided with a dedicated sick bay that conforms to recognised standards in the provision of appropriate medical equipment and medical supplies, including medications and drugs.

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2.6 2.6.1

Competence Selection of Personnel

2.6.1.1 The Transocean Human Resources Department provides the service for the selection and recruitment of personnel. The Companys Global Human Resources Department is formed by the Human Resources Offshore, Human Resources Onshore, and Human Resources Services groups to provide a service to operations and support functions on matters relating to the Companys documented Management System in general, and Human Resources matters specifically [HQS HRM PP 01 Sec 1 2] 2.6.1.2 Initially consideration is given to existing employees for all vacancies, offering promotional opportunities. Recruitment is generally carried out at the lowest level possible within the organization. This policy ensures the continuity and development of the Transocean management philosophy and reduces the impact of any potential for risk management deterioration through any lack of familiarisation with the system. 2.6.1.3 The established recruitment policy enables the Company to introduce new personnel at the lower levels. Through the Orientation and Induction process new recruits are familiarised into the HSE management system and educated with the necessary personal risk reduction tools to ensure they are fully equipped to manage the day to day risk at the work site and provide a proactive and dynamic commitment to the reduction of risk onboard Transocean units.[HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 1] 2.6.1.4 Within the Company, promotions may occur at any time during the year based upon the requirement to fill a vacant existing position. The Company promotes from within whenever possible. All promotions within the Company are based on performance, competency, professional qualifications, abilities and potential of the individual and will be approved in writing by the Unit, Human Resources or Human Resources Houston Corporate Office. [HQS HRM PP 01 Sec 2 4.3] 2.6.1.5 The Company has established regular training programs for some positions to enable employees to acquire competencies necessary both to perform their jobs and to advance throughout their careers. Courses that are part of job training are compulsory and failure to complete them successfully may result in dismissal or demotion. Non-compliance with Company training course requirements will hinder promotion possibilities and merit bonus awards A number of key personnel are identified who have specific HSE responsibilities within the organization. These personnel include;
Position HSE Critical Activity
OIM / PIC Performance Toolpusher Tool Pusher Driller Maintenance Supervisor Crane Operator HLO Medic Chief Mechanic Chief Electrician Yes Yes Yes Yes as as as as Supervisor Supervisor Supervisor Supervisor

Areas of Responsibility Hazardous Activity Environmental Oversight


Responsibility for all areas Yes Drilling Operations Yes Spillage Yes Drilling Operations Yes Spillage Yes Drilling Operations Yes Spillage Yes Spillage & Air Pollution through Machinery & Stored exhaust discharges Energy Yes Suspended Loads Yes Spillage Yes Heli-deck Operations Yes Refuelling activities Potentially in Response Yes Working on live Yes Spillage equipment Yes Working of live No. equipment
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Senior Supervisor

Subsea

Yes Well Control Equipment

Yes - Spillage

2.6.1.6 The Company identify the above personnel as critical for the setting, achievement and maintenance of the standards relating to safe systems of work and environmental protection offshore. These positions are within the active management group of the ARCTIC I and hence have an active role within the daily operational management of the unit and specific roles within any emergency response situation. 2.6.1.7 The competence of such key personnel is assessed in accordance with the requirements of knowledge, training and experience. 2.6.1.8 In addition to their job function, all personnel have HSE responsibilities and arrangements are in place to ensure that personnel are aware of their responsibilities and are accountable for carrying them out. In addition to the provision of, and access to, job descriptions, awareness of responsibilities is a feature of HSE training. 2.6.2 Selection and Control of Contractor Personnel

2.6.2.1 All personnel arriving on the ARCTIC 1 for the first time or any person who has not been on the installation within 6 months will attend an HSE Orientation and sign a form to verify their understanding. [HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 1.1]. Short Term Visitors, persons departing the same day, will be provided with a condensed orientation. 2.6.2.2 In all cases personnel will be introduced to their supervisor and are responsible to familiarize themselves with their work area, emergency equipment layout and emergency exits. Key personnel with specific HSE duties (for example, Installation Medical Person, emergency response teams, and so on) will receive additional specific instruction on their duties 2.6.2.3 All new Company personnel, Company personnel transferred between installations and newly promoted Company personnel participate in the buddy system for a sufficient period of time to become familiar with specific aspects of the installation Company personnel in the buddy system must spend sufficient time together before, during or after tour to familiarize the newcomer with the installation, policy and procedure manuals; and instruction manuals specific to the position. The OIM or designee will determine the content and the duration of the buddy system for personnel transferred between installations and newly promoted personnel, taking into account the individuals knowledge and experience 2.6.2.4 In the case of Subcontractor personnel wherever possible, a proactive approach to assess suitability of client and subcontractor personnel and equipment is preferred to ensure an acceptable standard of personnel or equipment arrives at the installation. [HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 2.3 4] 2.6.2.5 It is a requirement that the Company approved system is in place to easily identify individuals who are visiting or new to the installation (HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 2.4 4.3). The OIM or designee will determine how long an individual is identified as new or visiting and any further training requirements that are required to ensure effective understanding of HSE procedures. 2.6.3 Competence Assessment & Records

2.6.3.1 Competency is a combination of knowledge, practice, skills, abilities and behaviour that are necessary to perform a task or function instinctively in a work setting in order to achieve a defined performance standard. The organization and the work environment determine the competencies that must be applied and achieved. [HQS CMS Gov Sec 3 7 2.2]
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2.6.3.2 Managers and supervisors are required to be competent in their jobs. These competencies are determined through formal standards or expectations established through practice within the organization. Managers and supervisors are responsible and required to satisfy themselves that the people reporting to them are competent and able to achieve the required level of performance. This can be accomplished by evaluating and assessing people through formal and established work standards or, if not available, by their personal experience and knowledge. In either case, it is the responsibility of managers and supervisors to ensure that the people reporting to them possess the necessary knowledge, experience and skills to satisfy the requirements of the tasks they are performing. [HQS CMS Gov Sec 3 7 2.2] 2.6.3.3 It is Company policy that the ability of an employee to perform tasks safely and efficiently can only be effectively judged at the workplace. Having carefully examined an employees ability, training, performance and potential, the supervisor is in a position to decide on promotion. If an employee requires further training prior to promotion, it is the duty of the supervisor to inform the employee and advise the relevant onshore manager or department head in order that a training schedule can be developed. 2.6.3.4 The OJT (On The Job) module system is an integral part of the company training system. The system is a task based, self-paced, on-the-job training program to train and measure a participants competence that is required in each job category or function. The training increases efficiency, safety awareness, morale 2.6.3.5 In all cases the modules require the individual to demonstrate a suitable level of competency through the completion of a set of questions to determine the depth of knowledge attained. The administration of the individuals onboard is undertaken by their Supervisor who will also instigate a determination as to the level of competency shown by that individual. 2.6.3.6 Competence for the key Marine and Drilling personnel is maintained through compliance to the internationally recognised accreditation processes in line with the Worldwide Training requirements located on the Company Intranet site 2.6.3.7 It is the responsibility of the RSTC to administer the required training for installation personnel through enrolment, record keeping, monitoring, reporting, maintenance and procurement of training materials, and conducting instructor-led training as required. 2.6.3.8 It is the responsibility of the Rig Manager and OIM to monitor the progress of the required training for all Transocean employees assigned to the installation. The Rig Manager and OIM will ensure that the training is completed within a reasonable time frame, and that the annual compliance level is attained. 2.6.3.9 The training records for training completed while employed by Transocean for all personnel holding positions listed on the Worldwide and Division Training Matrices, are recorded in the company approved training administration database. Personnel training records will remain in the database for a period of 4 years from the date of separation from the company. 2.6.3.10 Personnel successfully completing external training courses are required to provide a copy of the training certificate to their designated training coordinator or RSTC for entry into the approved training administration database. Personnel are encouraged to keep hardcopies of all training certificates for their personal records. [HQS HRM PP 01 Sec 6 2 4.1] 2.6.3.11 It is the responsibility of all personnel holding positions listed on the Worldwide Training Matrix to periodically review their personal training record with their designated training coordinator and ensure that the training record is up to date and correct. Personnel are responsible to provide a copy of the training certificate for all external training to their designated training coordinator or
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RSTC. 2.6.4 Training

2.6.4.1 The role of training is to enable individuals to develop their knowledge, skills and abilities so they can perform their job and meet their responsibilities. Individuals are expected to actively participate in their career development. 2.6.4.2 The Company have designated that all managers and supervisors are trainers. They have a responsibility to train and develop their people by planning their peoples development, being personally involved in their training, assessing their competency and evaluating their individual performance. Through their normal day-to-day interaction, managers and supervisors should continuously assess the competence of their people and provide feedback and guidance where necessary to motivate and build confidence to ensure consistent performance that meets expectations.[HQS CMS Gov Sec 3 7 2.1.3] 2.6.4.3 Managers and supervisors are required to: evaluate their people in order to assess peoples understanding of what they have learned and practiced satisfy themselves that their people have learned, practiced and developed the necessary experience and skills to carry out their job in a competent and responsible manner complete the OJT competence task list appraisal on their people reinforce on-the-job learning experience and practice by including personal and specific assessment criteria in the OJT competence task appraisal

2.6.4.4 Managers and supervisors are responsible to observe and monitor peoples performance and differentiate between an individuals confidence level and their competency to perform a task. Although a level of confidence is required to be competent, confidence alone should not be mistaken for competency 2.6.4.5 It is Transocean policy that Company personnel who perform work on installations or at facilities must be provided with HSE training in accordance with the worldwide training matrix.[HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 1.3 1]. The purpose of this policy is to ensure all Company personnel are adequately trained to perform their duties in the safest manner possible and to prevent incidents or injuries 2.6.4.6 The HSE training requirements are detailed in the company's Worldwide and Division Unit Training Matrices. Training, beyond the minimum required to assist personnel in complying with the specific HSE Policies and Procedures, is also detailed in the Company Training Matrix. 2.6.4.7 The table on the following pages identify the expected Transocean training subjects, their application and Training resources.

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HSE Manual Section Reference


Section 3 Subsection 1.2 Section 3 Subsection 2.1

Subject

Application
Persons whose duties may bring them into contact with blood or bodily fluids Installation Medical Person All Food Handlers All Catering Personnel All Catering Personnel All Catering Personnel All Catering Personnel

Training Resource

Pathogens Awareness Periodic theoretical and practical refresher training. Principles of food-borne illness. Transmission of communicable diseases Personal hygiene First aid for choking

RSTC Toolbox Advanced Medical Care Course Worldwide Training Matrix

Catering Contractor

Section 3 Subsection 3.1

Refresher training for above (At the discretion of Rig Manager) Emergency drills/duties Fire prevention Fire fighting equipment associated with the galley, mess hall, accommodation and laundry areas

Kitchen Hygiene and Safety RSTC Toolbox

All Catering Personnel

Installation Specific

Section 4 Subsection 2.1

THINK planning Process Firewatcher Training Permit to Work

All Company Personnel Anyone prior to being assigned as a Firewatcher Anyone person performing work that requires a PTW All personnel entering confined Spaces Confined space stand-by person Responsible persons and all the members of the Emergency Response Teams All Company Personnel All Company Personnel

Safety Leadership Training DVD Module 6** Firewatcher CDROM RSTC Toolbox Permit to Work Confined space awareness RSTC Toolbox/Practical skills installation specific equipment Installation Specific Manufacturer recommendations /instructions and Safety OJT Module Safety OJT Module Safety Leadership

Section 4 Subsection 2.2

Confined Space Awareness Proper use of the installation or facility specific confined space rescue and retrieval equipment

Section 4 Subsection 2.4 Section 4 Subsection 3.1 Section 4 Subsection 5.1

Use of PPE H2S Awareness Training

START

All Company Personnel All Company personnel who travel to or from Company offshore installations by helicopter All personnel driving Company vehicles and/or personal vehicles used for Company business All Company Personnel All Company Personnel

Training DVD Module 7**

Helicopter Safety Section 4 Subsection 5.2 Defensive Driver Training Safe working practices associated with hand tool Ladder Safety

Helicopter Safety DVD-ROM

Division/Sector specific training Hands on training Section 4 provided on the rig RSTC Toolbox
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Section 4 Subsection 5.4

Energy Isolation Fall Protection Awareness Fall Protection Competent Person

All Company personnel who perform maintenance or repairs All Company Personnel Anyone so that one trained person is onboard at all times Anyone so that one trained person is onboard at all times Anyone so that one trained person is onboard at all times All Company personnel that erect scaffolding All Company personnel that operate winches Any person using lifting equipment All company personnel involved in manriding activities All Company personnel that operate forklifts All Company Personnel Anyone so there is at least one trained Materialsman on board at all times All Company Personnel Personnel authorized by the electrical responsible person who perform any work on electrical equipment All relevant personnel Personnel with responsibilities for incident analysis Installation Medical Person All personnel required to wear a respirator All Company personnel All Company personnel that use vibration tools All Company personnel where ACM exists Responsible Persons All Company personnel

Electrical OJT Worldwide Training Matrix Awareness Training RSTC Toolbox/Practical skills with installation specific equipment Division approved training Division approved training Division approved training Division approved training Installation specific equipment Division approved Training RSTC Toolbox Awareness RSTC toolbox/Practical skills-based training with installation specific equipment RSTC Toolbox Division approved training Division approved training Worldwide Training Matrix Manufacturer Instructions for installation specific equipment Division approved training that supports Unit Incident Analysis Procedure Company Approved RSTC Toolbox Hazardous Material Training Safety OJT Company approved Division approved training Company approved RSTC Toolbox

Section 4 Subsection 5.5

Confined Space Rescue Competent Person Rescue From Heights Competent Person Scaffold Training Operation of winches Rigger Training

Section 4 Subsection 5.6

Manriding Awareness

Forklift Training Hazardous Materials Awareness Section 4 Subsection 5.7 Handling/Shipping of Hazardous Materials Asbestos Awareness Electrical Safety Training Use of insulated tool for removing persons from live conductors Section 4 Subsection 6.3 Section 5 Approved Subsection 1.1 Section 5 Subsection 1.2 Section 5 Subsection 1.3 Section 5 training Subsection 2.1 Section 5 Subsection 3. Training for Incident Analysis Respirator Fit Test Respirator Training Manual Handling Awareness Vibration Awareness Asbestos Awareness Asbestos Operation and Maintenance Noise Awareness

Section 4 Subsection 5.9

2.6.4.8 The training needs of personnel are monitored and reviewed regularly to ensure compliance with internal and external training requirements for Transoceans area of operation. These needs are documented on a training matrix.

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2.6.4.9 Onshore managers and department heads have a responsibility to ensure that all personnel are provided with the appropriate training to carry out their job functions safely and effectively. Assistance is provided by a dedicated training function. 2.6.4.10 Training needs of personnel are driven by all of the following: Legislation, Approved Codes of Practice and Guidance Notes Contractual and industry standards Transocean specific requirements Training matrix.

2.6.4.11 Training records are maintained electronically and the maintenance of these records ensures that refresher training is flagged in sufficient time for arrangements to be made. 2.6.4.12 The ARCTIC 1 Training Matrix is established to provide the requisite training for HSE and Safety specific roles as shown on the following page;

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Position Confined Space Entry Awareness

ARCTIC 1 Safety Training Requirements Environmental Advanced Fire Fighting Survival Craft Safety Management Leadership First Aid & CPR

Toolpusher Day Toolpusher Night Driller Assistant Driller Derrickman Floorman Subsea Engineer Maintenance Supervisor Assistant Engineer Mechanic Electrician Electronic Technician Engine Assistant Welder OIM Floater Ballast Operator AB Seamen Crane Operator Roustabout Storekeeper Radio Operator Medic Safety & Training Coordinator STC/Translator Control Room

Stability Technician

Brazilian Crew

Required Training

2.6.4.13 In addition to the mandatory HSE Training undertaken prior to appointment to the ARCTIC I regular HSE onboard training is undertaken in the form of weekly emergency response drills in support of the ARCTIC I contingency planning preparations. All weekly drill training is formally recorded onboard.

Offshore Survival

HUET

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2.6.5

Induction Program

2.6.5.1 The Transocean New Hire Orientation Programme introduces newly recruited offshore personnel, experienced or inexperienced, to the Companys beliefs, policies, procedures and work ethics, and provides training to the inexperienced personnel in good industry practice and current legislation. 2.6.5.2 The ARCTIC I has a system in place to ensure all first-time arrivals are met by the OIM or designee. All personnel arriving on the ARCTIC I for the first time or any person who has not been on the installation within 6 months will attend an HSE Orientation and sign a form to verify their understanding. [HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4] 2.6.5.3 Unless receiving a Short-Term Visitor Orientation, all personnel must receive a clearly structured program to ensure new employees are suitably introduced to the encompassing management system to ensure their effective role within the organisation. 2.6.5.4 On arrival offshore, it is the responsibility of the OIM to ensure that all personnel arriving offshore, including third party personnel and visitors, are given MODU specific induction and that such training is recorded on-board. The induction covers the following minimum requirements: Transocean Core Values Introduction to the Company HSE Philosophy and various behaviour programmes MODU emergency procedures Details of HSE Communication Systems Details of the ARCTIC I safe areas and onboard work regime The physical location of emergency/safety equipment.

2.6.5.5 It is the OIM/PIC or his nominated deputy, typically the RSTC or Medic on duty to conduct a tour of the rig with all new employees under his/her supervision explaining emergency procedures and evacuation routes. 2.6.5.6 All personnel must be introduced to their supervisor and are responsible to familiarize themselves with their work area, emergency equipment layout and emergency exits. Key personnel with specific HSE duties (for example, Installation Medical Person, emergency response teams, and so on) must receive additional specific instruction on their duties 2.6.5.7 All new Company personnel, Company personnel transferred between installations and newly promoted Company personnel must participate in the buddy system for a sufficient period of time to become familiar with specific aspects of the installation Company personnel in the buddy system must spend sufficient time together before, during or after tour to familiarize the newcomer with the installation, policy and procedure manuals; and instruction manuals specific to the position. 2.6.5.8 The OIM or designee must determine the content and the duration of the buddy system for personnel transferred between installations and newly promoted personnel, taking into account the individuals knowledge and experience. 2.6.5.9 All personnel attending the ARCTIC 1 are subject to a full induction refresher after an absence of six months or more. 2.6.5.10 When operating in an offshore location where English is not the first language, the RSTC, appointed locally, with an ability to speak English fluently will undertake the necessary briefings with non English speaking personnel.
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2.7 2.7.1

Standards and Procedures Planning and Risk Management

2.7.1.1 It is a fundamental requirement of the Transocean Management system that a safe system of work is adopted throughout all level of the operations. To this end the company take a proactive role to familiarise all personnel with the process of Job Risk Assessment at all level of operations. 2.7.1.2 A suitable plan with a risk assessment and appropriate controls must be confirmed in place, prior to all tasks.[HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 2.1]. The THINK Planning Process is utilized for Risk Management of all activities and tasks carried out throughout the Company to ensure that hazards are identified and risks are effectively managed and controlled at all times. 2.7.1.3 The THINK Planning Process is utilized for Risk Management of all activities and tasks carried out throughout the Company. The THINK Planning Process for Risk Management consists of the following steps: Correctly identifying the hazards (What If?) and associated risks (consequences and likelihood) involved in an activity or task through risk assessment. Utilizing knowledge and experience to demonstrate risks are as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) by applying the appropriate level of risk assessment (THINK planning level). Determining the controls (policies, procedures, standards and work practices) required to ensure the risk to people, the environment and property is as low as reasonably practicable throughout the task or activity: 1. Preventive controls prevent an incident by reducing the likelihood an incident will occur. 2. Mitigating controls reduce the consequences of an incident if preventive controls fail or are not effective. Communicating the risks and controls to personnel who may be affected. Anticipating possible deviations from the THINK plan by identifying changes, conditions and in actions (What If?).

2.7.1.4 It is essential for managers, supervisors and individuals to demonstrate risks are ALARP prior to performing activities or tasks. Verifying controls (preventive and mitigating) are in place and effective helps ensure identified risks are maintained as low as reasonably practicable. 2.7.1.5 Personnel will have the necessary knowledge, skills, and experience to perform the activities or tasks assigned to them, including any activities to control risks. This cannot be determined without a correctly developed THINK plan. 2.7.1.6 All Company personnel will be trained in the THINK Planning Process, supervisors taking an active role in the training to ensure effective understanding. Tools are available to assist supervisors with training and implementation of the THINK process on the Transocean Safety Leadership Training DVD Module. Effective understanding of the process cannot be accomplished from employeecomputer interface, therefore Supervisors must utilize the information from the DVD to coach, mentor and monitor the effectiveness of their employees THINK plans. 2.7.1.7 Personnel reduce risks to as low as reasonably practicable by completing a qualitative risk assessment at the appropriate THINK planning level and applying appropriate controls available in the Company management system (policies procedures and standards), site specific work practices, and regulatory requirements.

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2.7.1.8 All THINK plans include the requirement to reduce risks to as low as reasonably practicable. Reducing risks to as low as reasonably practicable requires personnel to consider the various additional risk reduction measures (additional controls) and determine if the effort and cost of those measures justify the additional amount of risk reduction obtained. 2.7.1.9 The THINK Planning Process includes hazard identification and provides various levels of risk assessment to demonstrate risks are as low as reasonably practicable. The level of risk assessment applied is dependent upon the: Number of people involved in the assessment Knowledge, experience, and skill of the people participating in the assessment and developing the plan Criticality and complexity of the task or activity Potential negative consequences that may occur during the task or activity.

2.7.1.10 The schematic below identifies the levels of the Risk Management Planning processes 2.7.1.11 Levels of Risk Management

2.7.1.12 As shown in the above diagram, higher levels of THINK planning used within the Company include Task Risk Assessments (TRAs), HAZOPs/HAZIDs, Major Accident Hazard Risk Assessments (MAHRAs), Safety Cases, and Operations Integrity Cases (OICs). These levels of THINK planning provide a higher level of detail to ensure risks are demonstrated to be as low as reasonably practicable. Demonstrating risks are as low as reasonably practicable for tasks, activities and hazardous operations is accomplished through risk assessment and effective application of controls represented by the Company Management system and site specific work practices
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2.7.1.13 The table below identifies the levels of Risk Management and associated processes.
Level of Risk Management Process
Most widely applied at the individual THINK plan level to assist individuals in planning what they are about to do. Individuals must use the THINK Planning Process to Plan, Inspect, Identify, Communicate and Control all tasks and associated hazards and risks. Individuals must apply START monitoring during execution of the planned task in order to recognize any deviation from the THINK plan, which may create new hazards and risks. Used when more than one person is involved in a task. Joint participation in developing the THINK plan is required. Adequate communication between the personnel involved must ensure all aspects of the activities, tasks, risks and controls in the THINK plan are reviewed and understood. When each person involved fully understands and agrees on the THINK plan and the necessary controls are implemented, the task may proceed. The written THINK plan is provided for supervisors to manage risk associated with tasks carried out by their crew using the Rules of Task Planning and by: THINK PLANNING WRITTEN PROCESS Creating experiences that provide learning opportunities. Ensuring their people practice effective individual and verbal THINK planning skills on the job. Reinforcing the practice of hazard identification (What If?) and assessment on the job. Satisfying themselves people have learned and developed necessary skills to carry out their job in a safe and responsible manner. Understanding and implementing available preventive and mitigating controls. Identifying the hazards and assessing the risks (What If?). Understanding what is needed to anticipate, recognize, and manage change,

THINK PLANNING INDIVIDUAL

PROCESS

THINK PLANNING PROCESS VERBAL

The supervisor is responsible for the quality and completion of the written THINK plan. The THINK Process Checklist must be utilized and completed to ensure effective written THINK plans are created. TASK SPECIFIC THINK PROCEDURE Utilized to execute tasks that have been identified to have a higher level of criticality, complexity, or risk, based on the hazards identified for the tasks within the activity. Task Specific THINK Procedures document the safest and most effective way to perform a task, incorporating the experience of personnel involved. The Task Risk Assessment provides a more detailed risk assessment to demonstrate that risks related to specific task steps are as low as reasonably practicable. The potential consequences for all critical task steps must be clearly identified in the assessment so existing control measures can be verified and/or new control measures implemented to reduce the identified risks to as low as reasonably practicable A HAZID study is the structured, systematic risk assessment of an activity in order to identify the hazards associated with it. For example, the activity of drilling a high pressure/high temperature well would normally be split into a number of smaller tasks. Each task should be reviewed in turn, asking, "What could go wrong?" or "What if this happened?" A HAZOP study is used to identify HSE hazards and operability issues for equipment or systems to reduce risks to ALARP. HAZOPs are primarily used during the design stage. A HAZOP team should consist of personnel familiar with the equipment and systems and be lead by a facilitator trained and competent in the HAZOP process MAJOR AND OTHER WORKPLACE HAZARDS A Major Accident Hazard Risk Assessment (MHRA) shows that major hazards have been identified, the risk associated with those hazards has been qualitatively assessed and that the preventive and mitigating controls necessary to reduce the risk to ALARP have been identified. The MHRA identifies risks from three perspectives: by compartment, by system, and the installation as a whole. The MHRA relies upon the knowledge and experience of the installations personnel

TASK RISK ASSESSMENT

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION (HAZID)

HAZARD (HAZOP)

AND

OPERABILITY

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2.7.1.14 All personnel onboard the ARCTIC 1 have a responsibility to participate and incorporate the THINK Planning Process into all tasks performed, whether working individually or in teams. In addition all personnel will participate in the development and review of Task Specific THINK Procedures, and ensure appropriate preventive and mitigating controls are in place to address the risks which are present in all tasks.[HQD HSE PP01 Sec 4 2.1 5.1] 2.7.2 Management of Change 2.7.2.1 Management of Change is used to effectively recognize and manage risks when changes, conditions and inactions in a given situation or unexpected events are experienced [HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 1 4 4.1]. 2.7.2.2 Management of Change is: Planning, monitoring, recognizing change, Interrupting to evaluate the effect of change, and Modifying the plan as necessary.

2.7.2.3 The requirements and/or complexity of a task determine the level of management and supervision necessary to ensure appropriate expertise and resources are used to assess the risk, apply controls and develop the plan. 2.7.2.4 THINK is used by the Company to formulate and communicate the plan. START is used by the Company to monitor the plan and recognize when the plan is no longer suitable. Managing change while performing your task is simply the effective use of THINK and START. 2.7.2.5 Schematic showing simplified Management of change process.

2.7.2.6 FOCUS enhances the execution of THINK and START within the Management of Change process by providing a consistent means to request, track and receive additional expertise (knowledge, experience, skills) and approval from within the organization. If, while monitoring a plan, a change is recognized, the task must be interrupted to assess the change and any new risks.

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2.7.2.7 The following steps represent the Management of Change process: 1. 2. 3. 4. Develop a plan for a task (THINK). Monitor the plan: (START). Recognize changes. (START). Interrupt the task to evaluate the change (assess the risk). (START and THINK). 5. Revise the current plan or develop a new plan (THINK) and initiate the (FOCUS) improvement process if required. 6. Continue with the task using the revised plan.

2.7.2.8 The process of Management of Changed is undertaken using one of three approaches, Simple Enhanced - Exemption; 2.7.2.9 To determine which approach applies to a given situation, the rules of task planning must be followed by the person(s) involved in creating the new or revised plan.
Does the new or revised plan comply with Company Management System procedures? Do I/we have the knowledge to assess AND implement the new or revised plan? Do I/we have the experience to assess AND implement the new or revised plan? Do I/we posses the skills to assess AND implement the new or revised plan? Do I/we have the approval authority to assess AND implement the new or revised plan?

2.7.2.10 If the answer to ALL of these questions is yes, the Simple Approach may be used 2.7.2.11 If the new or revised plan complies with the Company Management System procedures but the knowledge, experience, skills, or approval authority is NOT available, the Enhanced Approach must be used. 2.7.2.12 The Enhanced Approach may be used even if the Simple Approach has been determined to be acceptable, at the discretion of the personnel performing the risk assessment. 2.7.2.13 If the new or revised plan does not comply with the Company Management System procedures, an Exemption must be requested. 2.7.2.14 Responsibilities for the execution of the Management of change process are clearly allocated to all personnel involved from the Workforce on site to the Corporate Director of QHSE. As shown below. At Rig level the responsibilities are allocated as follows; All Personnel Use START to monitor the plan and recognize when the plan is no longer suitable. Use THINK to formulate and communicate the plan. Use FOCUS to develop corrective and improvement opportunity plans. Use THINK and START together as the simplest form of Management of Change for an individual. Recognize changes to the plan and interrupt the task (stop the job) to assess the change and any new risks. Understand the Simple Approach available to execute the Management of Change process.

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OIM/Department Supervisors Review specific procedures (including Task Specific THINK Procedure), give approval and submit to Rig Manager for final approval. Review and approve Task Risk Assessments and submit to Rig Manager for final approval. Complete and approve Request for Exemption form. Ensure the Simple Approach is understood and implemented by all employees. Understand the three approaches (Simple, Enhanced, Exemption) available to develop plans and manage planned or unexpected change and execute the Management of Change process. Review action plan and determine if additional expertise is required and/or other parties are affected prior to approving. Communicate requirements to the appropriate expertise (Engineering, Technical Field Support, Operations, QHSE, and so forth). Ensure completion of supporting documentation. Inform the OIM/Supervisor of any changes to the plan. Review Request for Exemption form and approve; submit to Division/Sector Manager for further approval

Rig Manager

2.7.2.15 Within the Division, responsibilities are allocated as follows; Division Manager Review Request for Exemption and approve; submit to Business Unit Senior Vice President for final approval. Ensure that there is a system in place so all approved Request for Exemption forms that relate to the Corporate Management System procedures are available to the Corporate Director of QHSE. Ensure all approved Request for Exemption forms related to the Division Management system procedures are reviewed by the Division SMART member(s). Ensure the Request for Exemption forms related to the Corporate Management System procedures are reviewed by the Corporate SMART member(s) to determine if changes are required.

Division QHSE Manager

Corporate Director QHSE

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2.7.3 Emergency Response 2.7.3.1 The company have an established Emergency Response Organisation, as identified within HQS HSE PR 01 Sec 2 3.1]. 2.7.3.2 The objectives of the Onshore Emergency Response procedures are to ensure that in the event of an offshore incident, an onshore management team is established as soon as possible in order to provide the necessary support required by the emergency site. Additionally a single source of information is established to allow the incident to be managed as effectively as possible, in particular with regard to informing personnel, relatives, press, client and relevant authorities. 2.7.3.3 The mission of the Corporate Emergency Response Team is to provide managerial and technical support to the Division, Sector, Branch, facility or installation operational staff in the event of an emergency at a Transocean installation, office or facility. 2.7.3.4 The mission of the Division Emergency Response Team is to provide managerial and technical support to the Division, Sector, Branch, facility or installation operational staff in the event of an emergency at a Transocean installation, office or facility. 2.7.3.5 The mission of the Division Emergency Response Team is to provide managerial and technical support to the Sector, Branch, facility or installation operational staff in the event of an emergency at a Transocean installation, office or facility. 2.7.3.6 The mission of the Sector Emergency Response Team is to provide managerial and technical support to the installation operational staff in the event of an emergency at a Transocean installation. 2.7.3.7 The mission of the Branch Emergency Response Team is to provide managerial and technical support to the installation operational staff in the event of an emergency at a Transocean installation. 2.7.3.8 In all cases the team will liaise with agencies involved and with any necessary resources internal or external to Transocean 2.7.3.9 The following personnel have the following responsibilities with regard to Emergency Response plans;[HQS HSE PR 01 Sec 2 3. 8] Vice President of QHSE - Approve the Corporate Emergency Response Manual. Division Managing Director - Approve the Business Unit and Division Emergency Response Manuals. 2.7.3.10 It is a requirement that the ARCTIC I has an Emergency Response manual in compliance with the Company standard [HQS HSE PR 01 Sec 2]. The OIM is responsible for the Development and maintenance of emergency contingency plans and procedures for relevant site-specific and area or location emergencies based on risk assessments including the MAHRA/Safety Case/OIC. The OIM is also responsible for ensuring that the external emergency contact information is up to date on a weekly basis 2.7.3.11 The Rig Manager has the responsibility for the approval of the ARCTIC 1 Emergency Response manual prior to final approval by the Division Manager.

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2.7.3.12 The ARCTIC I has a formal, DNV accredited Emergency Response Manual identifying a the necessary response to a range of established Emergencies, as follows; Fire Explosion Person Overboard Collision Flooding and Damage Control Helicopter Crash on ARCTIC I and Near to ARCTIC 1 Search and Rescue Evacuation/Abandon Ship Hydrogen Sulphide Emergency Move Off Location Ballast Emergency Structural Failure Machinery Damage/Breakdown Propulsion Failure/Grounding Minor/Major Injuries/Death Medical Evacuation Contagious Disease Bomb Threat Criminal Activity Heavy weather Operational Spills Tank Overflow Hull leakage Spill Response

2.7.3.13 In all case a simple activity flow chart and check list is provided as an aid to expediting the response. 2.7.3.14 Emergency response drills are conducted at specified intervals to test all elements of the installation's Emergency Response plans and procedures. The scenarios of these drills and exercises will be varied to encompass different aspects of the responses required for that particular emergency. [HQS-HSE-PP-01 Sec 4 3.2] 2.7.3.15 As part of the established onboard Training routine Emergency Drills are completed on a weekly basis and teams de-briefed after each drill. All drills are logged within the IADC report format and through the Marine Log. 2.7.3.16 Whilst the onboard training supports the necessary contingency response onboard the ARCTIC 1 for all personnel, those personnel identified to have specific duties within the Response organisation have received the necessary additional specialist training on shore. 2.7.4 Permit to Work System 2.7.4.1 Transocean operate a comprehensive Permit To Work system onboard the ARCTIC I. The purpose of the Permit to Work Policy is to ensure that authorized personnel, who are knowledgeable of the hazardous operation to be performed, have planned the work, inspected the work site, identified the hazards and communicated the suitable control measures to be taken to prevent the occurrence of an incident using the Permit to Work System.[HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 2.2 2] 2.7.4.2 The PTW System provides rig management with a formal method to administer, coordinate and control work that may adversely impact other concurrent work, impair safety systems or otherwise endanger personnel and/or the facility. The Objectives and Function of the PTW system
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are; Ensure that proper authorization is given to carry out specific work at a certain time and place Ensure that personnel carrying out the work clearly understand the nature of the job, the hazards involved and the limitations on the work and time. Specify the control measures to be taken before starting the work, during the work and after completing the work. Ensure the OIM or designee is fully aware of and approves the work to be done. Provide a record showing the type of work and indicate that a responsible person is assigned. Provide a procedure for determining times when work must be suspended. Provide procedures for other activities that may interact. Provide a formal hand-over procedure if work overlaps a shift change. Provide a formal hand-back procedure to ensure that any part of the installation affected by the work is returned to a safe condition and ready for reinstatement. Provide a central display of open or suspended permits

2.7.4.3 As identified in the Policy, Permit to Work is required for the following hazardous Operations;[HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 2.2 4.4] Hot work Entry into confined spaces Work above Open Water Personnel Transfers from/to Supply Boats/Crew Boats Work on Supply Boats Work with Explosives Work with Radioactive Materials Diving Energy Sources Maintenance of Critical Safety Systems Asbestos Special Straps Dangerous Liquids Manriding Pressure Testing Overboard Dump Valves Any Other work deemed by the OIM where the OIM or Supervisor or any risk assessment identifies the requirement of a Permit to Work to control risks. In addition Any work where equipment that is not intrinsically safe is used in a hazardous area.

2.7.4.4 Onboard the ARCTIC I Responsible persons have designated areas of the installation/facility and relevant equipment in their spheres of responsibility. A list of the responsible people (by position), their designated areas of responsibility and equipment is posted at the administration site. They are responsible for ensuring all control measures and procedures are in place, prior to signing the Permit to Work.
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2.7.4.5 The OIM is designated as the Responsible Person, for the approval of the PTW System, including supplemental certificates, the OIM responsibility extends to ensuring that participating personnel are aware of requirements and are competent to perform the work. The Responsible Person will also oversee all ongoing operations and planned activities to ensure conflicts and increased risks are not caused by simultaneous activities. 2.7.4.6 When the OIM is off tour he may appoint a designee to approve, on his behalf, work to be carried out under the Permit to Work system. The designee must be the on tour Toolpusher 2.7.4.7 The maximum validity of any Permit to Work is 24 hours. If the work is not complete within 24 hours, close the existing Permit to Work and initiate a new one following all steps listed in this procedure 2.7.4.8 When a permit is to be carried over to another shift, both the responsible person and the person in charge of the work must ensure that the work is understood and the control measures are in place. The OIM and OIM Designee must ensure they are aware of all open permits at commencement of their daily tour 2.7.4.9 A permit must be suspended for any of the following reasons: Activation of the general alarm or instructions on the PA system. The permit administrator must be notified immediately of the cessation of work. As soon as it is safe and practicable, return all copies of suspended permits to the Permit System Administrator to keep until reactivation is allowed. At any time when any person feels that the circumstances have or may change, such as when the control measures in place are not adequate or other activities going on could cause additional hazards. If the control measures in place are not adequate.

2.7.4.10 In order to be able to control and administer the Permits, an administration site is established for the purpose of maintaining all open Permits to Work. Onboard the ARCTIC I this site is located in the BCR, an area that is manned 24 hours a day 2.7.4.11 The Permit to Work administration site is equipped with a board suitable for a quick glance display of all open permits. The information presented on the board includes as a minimum: Permit type Location of work performed

2.7.4.12 Two different signatures must always be on the Permit to Work. The same person must not sign as both the Responsible Person and the Person in Charge of the Work. This does not exclude the OIM or designee from acting as the Responsible Person. 2.7.4.13 The signatures on the Permit will be; Person In Charge of the work - The work detailed on the Permit Responsible Person for area as indicated on the publicly displayed notice boards The OIM

2.7.4.14 Control of the PTW system requires the sequential transfer of authority starting and finishing with the Responsible Person. All permits must be presented to the Responsible Person for approval prior to the commencement of any associated task. At the completion of the permitted task the Responsible Person must be advised and will then close out the permit after ensuring the work site has been made safe.
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2.7.4.15 Onboard ARCTIC I a log is maintained in the BCR of each permit issued and its status and the OIM is responsible for monitoring, on a random basis, a certain percentage of current permits. 2.7.4.16 Copies of closed/suspended permit are placed in a closed permit file and the Permit to Work Log updated. It is the responsibility of the Issuing Authority to ensure that all permits are closed out in a timely manner on completion or postponement of the work. 2.7.4.17 It is a requirement of the Management System that training of all personnel, including 3rd parties is undertaken for any individuals performing tasks governed under the companys PTW System. All personnel are required to undertake PTW training that includes viewing an instruction video during the Orientation process. A record of such training shall be maintained under the administration of the OIM/PIC. All individuals acting as Performing Authorities, Issuing Authorities or Responsible Persons are required to complete the Permit to Work Role Specific Training. 2.7.5 Safe Working Practices

2.7.5.1 It is a prime consideration of the Transocean Management system that the concept of a safe system of work is cascaded down to all levels of responsibility within the line management structure. This encourages the development and implementation of procedures that enable the company to identify hazards, assess risks and establish controls to ensure risks are, and remain, ALARP. 2.7.5.2 The Company Management System is intended to enable individuals to control risk to a level that is within Company expectations while allowing them to create value, prevent loss and achieve desired results. It is only through full implementation of the Company Management System that these desired results can be achieved. Managers and supervisors must consider and assess the risk associated with a task or process and make the appropriate plans to apply risk-reducing controls. These controls are the means to reduce the likelihood of an undesired event occurring and/or reduce the consequences of an undesired event if it does occur. 2.7.5.3 It is a requirement of the Company that all their personnel and Company subcontractors must behave safely to prevent injury, environmental and property damage and must interrupt the work to avoid a risk of injury, or damage to the environment or property.[HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 5.3 1] 2.7.5.4 Controls have not been developed for every conceivable or identified risk. However, the Company Management System provides tools (i.e., THINK Planning and START processes) to develop risk management plans and manage changes to these plans. Before implementing any plan, the risks and the controls must be effectively communicated to and understood by every individual involved. Plans must be continuously monitored and evaluated by managers, supervisors and individuals throughout execution 2.7.5.5 The THINK Planning Process is utilized for Risk Management of all activities and tasks carried out throughout the Company. 2.7.5.6 Understanding risk and acknowledging that not everyone perceives risk at the same level creates the need for effective communication at all times. All Company personnel are responsible for their own safety and behaviour. They are also obligated to interrupt any unsafe operation and take necessary steps to correct any unsafe behaviour or conditions. 2.7.5.7 Typically, many injuries occur when basic safe practices are not followed, causing slips, trips, falls and crush points. Proactively using the THINK planning and START monitoring processes and incorporating basic safe practices will prevent such injuries from occurring. 2.7.5.8 The list of safe working practice procedures below does not capture all basic safe work practices but provides examples to encourage personnel to THINK about basic safe work practices
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when planning or carrying out a task. The reference refers to the relevant paragraph of the Health and Safety Policies Procedures Manual Section 4, sub section 5.3.
Procedure
Housekeeping Lighting Deck Management Safe Behaviour Safe Working Limits Safe Tripping of Tubulars Manual Tong Snub Lines Wire Line Operations Dropped Objects Knives Hand Tools Portable Ladders and Steps Powered Local or Remote Watertight Doors and Hatches Remote Controlled Machinery Radio Communication Non Metallic Pipes

Section Reference
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16

2.7.5.9 The application of the THINK and START process is required of all personnel onboard the ARCTIC 1 and ensures a personal proactive approach to the maintenance of a suitable level of safe working practices. 2.7.5.10 In addition to the proactive philosophy encouraged through the START and THINK processes and the generic guidance provided for the generic list of working practices already identified additional guidance and standard operating guidelines for Drill Related and Marine and Environmental Related operations is provided in the Operations Policies and Procedures Manual [HQS OPS PP 01] Section 3 and 4 and section 3 of the Field Operations Manual [HQS HB 05]

2.8 2.8.1

Environmental Standards and Procedures Environmental Management

2.8.1.1 The elements of the companys Environmental Management System are: Environmental Policy Planning and Risk Management THINK Implementation of Controls THINK Monitoring Operations START OBSERVATION AND MONITORING Management Review PMAA/START Corrective and Improvement Opportunities FOCUS/SMART

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2.8.1.2 The EMS is a simple cycle that allows any potential impact on the environment to be identified, controlled, recorded and improved. The tools in the cycle provide a system and framework that promotes continuous improvement. 2.8.1.3 The schematic below demonstrates the Transocean EMS Cycle.[HQS HSE PP02 EMS]

2.8.1.4 Within the cycle the following stages are identified; Baseline Survey Carry out an initial site survey at the location. Identify all potential aspects and their associated impacts and relevant legislation. Aspects & Impacts Register A table of all potential environmental hazards and consequences and the associated risk for a particular installation/facility/office. Operational Control Procedures The system and operation tools that provide the correct mitigation and list of responsibilities in order to remove or minimize risk to the environment while meeting all legislative requirements. Environmental Awareness Determining the characteristics of the environment in which you are working through a site survey and awareness material or external resources. Environmental Audit A set of defined procedures from the individual level to the corporate level designed to assess compliance and performance against the EMS and the Environmental Performance Plan. Improvements and Feedback The mechanism of Continuous Improvement. The process by which recommendations and results from different audit levels are incorporated into the EMS.

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2.8.1.5 The Companys Director QHSE Services is the overall Environmental Management Representative responsible for ensuring the Environmental Management System (EMS) is established, implemented and maintained in accordance with the Companys Environmental Policy Statement. The Director QHSE Services is also responsible for reporting and reviewing with Executive Management the effectiveness of the Environmental Management System, including recommendations for improvement through the Corporate QHSE Steering Committee. 2.8.1.6 Compliance with company policies and procedures, environmental legislation and agreed client requirements are key elements addressed in the Environmental Management System. 2.8.1.7 Each location (office, facility and installation) establishes an environmental Green Team that is responsible for assisting in the implementation and maintenance of the EMS for that location along with senior management. 2.8.1.8 The Green Team meets at least quarterly to discuss location-related environmental issues, review the status of the Environmental Performance Plan and report this status to the Business Unit/Division QHSE Steering Committee. Additional Green 2.8.1.9 Onboard the ARCTIC I all Green Team meeting minutes sre reviewed and approved by the OIM. Green Team meeting minutes should be posted at the installation or facility and a copy sent to the Rig or facility Manager and Unit/Division QHSE Steering Committee. 2.8.1.10 A QHSE Steering Committee at Corporate establishes the overall company goals and each Unit/Division establishes a plan to meet those goals through the setting of objectives and meets regularly to discuss the status of the Environmental Performance Plans for each rig or facility.

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2.8.1.11 Environmental Management Function [HQS HSE PP 02 Sec 1 3]

2.8.1.12 Onboard the Company units, the Environmental Green Team are a group of location individuals who meet regularly to discuss the status of the Environmental Performance Plan, and report the status to the QHSE Steering Committee. The team facilitate the implementation and maintenance of the EMS and provide a focal point for Environmental improvement initiatives. On the ARCTIC I the Green Team group includes the following individuals: Offshore Installation Manager Barge Supervisor RSTC and/or RSTT Materials Supervisor Toolpusher Maintenance Supervisor Others as appropriate (Cementer, Mud Engineer, ROV Supervisor

2.8.1.13 All personnel have a responsibility to be familiar with and conform to the requirements of the Transocean EMS. Onboard the ARCTIC 1 the Green Team interact with the personnel onboard and address their own local EMS issues, assist in the development and implementation of the EMS onboard the unit and report the progress of implementation and maintenance of the EMS to the QHSE Steering Committee and Rig Manager (Installations) through the distribution of meeting minutes.

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2.8.1.14 The Company require that all installations, facilities and offices develop and maintain an Environmental Aspects and Impacts Register specific to each location. The register includes a rigorous approach to identifying Environmental aspects and impacts arising from work activities, products or services related to company activities at the location. Environmental aspects and impacts at company locations arising from work activities, products or services over which the company has only indirect influence must also be considered.[HQS HSE PP02 EMS Sect 3 2 4.2] 2.8.1.15 The Aspects and Impacts Register will indicate any legal or other requirements which refer to individual aspects by referencing the aspect to the Registers of International and National legislation. This allows the legislative or other requirement to be considered against any operational control procedure which is related to the aspect, and ensures compliance with the relevant legislation or other requirement is considered and is included within the requirements of the related procedure. 2.8.1.16 The Environmental Aspects and Impacts Register must be reviewed and the results sent to the Rig Manager (Installation) and Unit/Region/Sector QHSE Advisor or by the location management (Onshore, Unit/Division QHSE Manager) 2.8.1.17 All Company personnel are made aware of and trained in accordance with the Company EMS requirements and policies. The Company provides appropriate access to training resources in order to fulfil this expectation. 2.8.1.18 Competency is a combination of knowledge, skills and experience. Environmental competency is derived from work experience and training. Environmental training involves testing and teaching personnel through drills with debriefs. In this respect it is critical that the ARCTIC I Emergency Response Team is made up of competent personnel. 2.8.1.19 On the ARCTIC I all personnel must have knowledge and understanding of environmental performance as defined by the Company Environmental Management System. In addition all personnel will complete the General Environmental Awareness Training Module and any departmental, position or task-specific environmental training. 2.8.1.20 The OIM on the ARCTIC 1 is required to ensure that all environmental roles and responsibilities have been communicated to all personnel, the EMS training requirements have been met including any departmental or task specific training. .[HQS HSE PP02 EMS Sect 6 1 6 7] 2.8.1.21 The Green Team Members have a responsibility to monitor the status of Environmental Awareness Training provided and report on the status and effectiveness within the Green Team meeting minutes. The Green Team are also required to participate in the environmental training of personnel during the Installation Environmental Site Assessment and complete environmental training as required by the Worldwide Training Matrix and Green Team-specific training. The Green Team must also monitor and report on the effectiveness of location environmental drills. .[HQS HSE PP02 EMS Sect 6 1 6 7] 2.8.2 Environmental Protection 2.8.2.1 Transoceans commitment to preservation of the environment is clearly defined in its policy, HSE plans and its corporate management system that identifies the organizations policies and objectives. 2.8.2.2 The development and implementation of its environmental management system [HQS HSE PP 02 EMS] ensures sound and cost effective environmental management is always considered before, during and after all the Company operations.
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2.8.2.3 The strategy for protecting the environment, which is reflected throughout Transoceans management system, involves: Demonstration of management commitment to protecting the environment Identification and control of environmental impacts Achievement of sound and improved environmental performance Demonstration of continual improvement and prevention of pollution Ongoing assurance of compliance with coastal state and international regulatory requirements, as well as good industry practice and relevant standards.

2.8.2.4 The arrangements in place to ensure environmental protection are subject to the Companys ongoing programme for continual improvement. This is accomplished by the setting of environmental goals but is restricted to those over which the Company has control or influence 2.8.2.5 The Corporate QHSE Department compiles the Register of International Environmental Legislation and Other Requirements, consisting of company, client and industry global requirements which may be in addition to or in some cases exceed regulatory requirements. The register is compiled, reviewed and updated using a variety of information sources which may include commercially available legislative update services, trade association bulletins, regulatory update bulletins and regulatory websites. This Register is reviewed on a regular basis and updated as legislation changes or appears. All entries in the Register will be subject to comprehensive review at least once in each 12 month period. The Register is available to all company installations, offices and facilities on the QHSE Intranet. 2.8.2.6 Operational Control procedures have been developed within the Environmental Management System Manual to provide guidance on a wide range of activities undertaken as a standard operation, but also as an operation that does have an impact upon the environment or which provides an ability to assist in the enhancement of the environment. These operational control procedures are identified within the Manual as follows; Loss of Containment Material and Product Selection Emissions Waste Minimization and Management Energy Conservation Environmental Emergency Preparedness and Response

2.8.3 Management of Wastes 2.8.3.1 It is the Transocean Policy that the planning of waste management and minimization must be a fundamental part of all operations. In this respect, the assessment stage must classify waste and identify the types and quantity of waste produced and it should be determined how the quantity of waste materials (hazardous and non-hazardous) can be minimized or eliminated. Correct segregation and storage procedures are required to be implemented for hazardous and non-hazardous materials as per Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) and for all materials capable of being recycled (paper, plastic, wood, metal, batteries, cardboard and glass). .[HQS HSE PP02 EMS Sect 4 4 4.1] 2.8.3.2 Several options exist for the minimization of waste. They can be organized in a hierarchy with Eliminate as the best option and Dispose as the least desirable option. Eliminate Reduce Re-use
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Recycle Dispose

2.8.3.3 The Waste Management Plan forms part of the Company management system and as such is subject to review and update in accordance with management system requirements 2.8.3.4 All personnel are required to understand their role in waste minimization and the location garbage plan. In addition all personnel are required to use and store products in a manner to minimize waste and properly segregate waste in the designated containers or areas. It also a subject of good management that at all levels measures are taken to control or reduce waste and ensure that at all times waste management is given a suitable level of consideration. 2.8.4 Occupational Health 2.8.4.1 The importance of occupational health through the maintenance of established standards of hygiene is reflected in the implementation of the Company procedures for occupational health, control of substances hazardous to health and identification of appropriate monitoring and control measures, as identified within the sections of the Health and Safety Quality Procedures Manual These include air and water quality, noise and standards of LQ and rest facilities, management, storage and handling of food and drink and associated arrangements for disposal of catering/LQ wastes. 2.8.4.2 The Medic and RSTC onboard the ARCTIC I undertake a wide range of activities in pursuit of marinating an active Occupational Health regime. In particular theses personnel are assigned specific responsibilities for; Respiratory Protection Manual Handling Industrial Ergonomics Hand Arm Vibration Asbestos Potable Water Noise Health status (fit for work) of all arriving personnel (daily or as required) Rig Hygiene (in conjunction with the Camp Boss) Medical Trauma Equipment Servicing / Inspection of stretchers in designated areas (weekly)

2.8.4.3 The IMP is also required to maintain the MSDS sheets in a suitable format that ensures they are current and available to all personnel [HQS HSE PP Sec 4 5.7 5.4]. The Materials Coordinator being responsible for ensuring that MSDS sheets received with Hazardous materials are passed to the IMP. 2.8.4.4 The Camp Boss is also required to undertake a Health Hygiene check with all new starts of personnel involved with food handling as part of their new start induction process. 2.8.4.5 In compliance with Brazil Coastal State requirements the Company have engaged the services of an external Health Service provider to undertake the requisite Occupational health monitoring of all personnel connected with the ARCTIC I operation.

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2.9 2.9.1

HSE Standards and Procedures HSE Procedures

2.9.1.1 The Company has developed and made available a number of operating policies and procedures that define how tasks and activities should be conducted in order to meet the requirements of its Corporate objectives. The corporate policies and procedures includes high-level policies and procedures to support the Company Management System. These policies and procedures cover: System Management and Review Team (SMART) Process Management System Document Structure Document Control FOCUS Improvement Process Management of Change Performance Monitoring Audit & Assessment (PMAA) Service Quality Appraisals (SQA) Code of Business Conduct and Ethics Insider Trading and Confidential Information Contracts Records Management Program

2.9.1.2 The purpose of the Company Management System (CMS) is to define and communicate Company leaderships values, beliefs and expectations. This provides direction so people can align their efforts and determine the best methods to achieve the desired results. The CMS establishes consistent performance standards across the Companys worldwide operations; describes processes for monitoring results, improving performance, capturing and sharing lessons learned; and provides people with the opportunity to align their understanding of expectations, make personal commitments and apply their efforts to meet performance standards. 2.9.1.3 The Company Management System includes performance standards established at all three levels: Level 1 Corporate, Level 2 Business Unit and Division and Level 3 Installation. 2.9.1.4 The HSE Policy and Procedures Manual [HQS HSE PP 01] is designated a Level 1A document within the CMS. Its purpose is to communicate the Corporate HSE group performance standards. The Director of QHSE Services is the designated owner of this document and is responsible for its content and implementation. 2.9.1.5 Recommended changes to the procedures in this manual are submitted to Quality Services through the SMART (System Management and Review Team) process. The SMART process enables people at all levels in the Company to propose and implement changes to the CMS through the individual Core Management Functions. 2.9.2 HSE Communication 2.9.2.1 The foundation of the Company HSE management system is the establishing of a clear system of multi directional communication, by which all HSE related issues are able to be highlighted and formalised for addressing in the pursuit of the provision of a suitable level of risk mitigation at the work site and ultimately an suitable level of ALARP in all activities conducted by the company in the pursuit of its operations.

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2.9.2.2 In this respect for Offshore; a series of formal meetings are undertaken which enable the discussion of all HSE related issues at a wide range of management and worksite levels. Weekly Departmental HSE meeting General HSE Pre Tour Pre Task Daily Operations meetings QHSE Steering Committee

2.9.2.3 The daily Operations meeting is conducted by the OIM and attended by offshore management and supervisors, Clients representative and third party supervisors when appropriate. Rig planned activities for that shift and associated hazards and preventive measures are discussed and minutes disseminated to individual work groups. 2.9.2.4 Departmental heads conducts the pre-tour safety/environmental meeting every shift handover using the daily planning minutes, relevant task mitigation procedures and TRAs for the work to be performed. These meetings are utilized to co-ordinate the activities of all personnel prior to a specific job beginning, to discuss a safe plan of action and to highlight individual work habits that may need correcting. 2.9.2.5 In accordance with the THINK process, pre task meetings are held by the supervisor with particular emphasis on hazards and associated protective/preventive measures. Both the pre-tour and pre-task meetings are extremely important, particularly for non-routine or infrequent tasks or where the original plan has had to be changed. 2.9.2.6 General weekly HSE meetings are mandatory and all Company personnel must attend. All other personnel (Operator and third party) are encouraged to attend and to contribute. Weekly safety/environmental meetings are conducted by the OIM, with minutes of meetings formally documented and distributed to ensure that appropriate information is disclosed and shared by all personnel. Pertinent topics for discussion include HSE management system requirements and START cards. 2.9.2.7 Department heads are responsible to ensure that all personnel within their department attend at least one departmental HSE meeting per week. These meetings can be conducted with another department. It is both department heads responsibility to ensure that the joint meeting is effective for all attending personnel. Company subcontractors must attend and participate in relevant HSE meetings. Client and all client subcontractor personnel must be strongly encouraged to participate in relevant HSE meetings 2.9.2.8 Onshore the Rig Manager is responsible for reviewing the meeting reports within the GMS and ensure appropriate action identified in the meeting is addressed using the FOCUS improvement process. 2.9.2.9 The Managing Director and Corporate QHSE Manager are all tasked to convene QHSE meetings at regular intervals [HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4.2] 2.9.2.10 In addition to the interactive meetings HSE information is also communicated in the form of; Monthly Incident Rate Chart Serious Incident Bulletin HSE Alert HSE Bulletins
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2.9.3 HSE Alerts

HSE Advisories HSE Signs Hazard Mapping QHSE Bulletin Board Organizational Charts

2.9.3.1 HSE Alerts provide immediate notification of critical information and actions to address an incident or situation which represents a clear and present hazard to people, environment or property. 2.9.3.2 Corporate HSE Alerts are developed and issued to advise all personnel of an immediate danger. An alert must be immediately distributed to all installations and facilities and urgently acted upon. 2.9.3.3 HSE Alerts are developed from facts gathered during the fact-finding of the incident. All HSE Alerts issued by Business Unit management are submitted to the Corporate HSE Department for consideration for global application. Only the Corporate HSE Department issues/distributes HSE Alerts globally. 2.9.3.4 Crewmembers review the alert and discuss corrective and preventive actions that might be taken to prevent a similar situation from occurring on their installation or facility. The OIM uses the FOCUS Improvement Process to confirm that appropriate action has been taken to cover the risk identified by the alert. The alert is posted on the QHSE bulletin board and files a copy in a permanent reading file/binder for future reference and review. [HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 4.1] 2.9.4 Rig Security 2.9.4.1 Transocean have adopted measures to comply with the requirements of the ISPS (International Ship and Port Security Code 2002) into their management system (Manual 1.1 ISM 802.00). 2.9.4.2 The ISPS code mandates the establishment of an international security management framework involving contracting governments (Flag states), government agencies, shipping and port industries. The security system is designed to detect security threats, provide a methodology for security assessments, and implement plans and procedures to respond to changing security levels as directed by the contracting governments. 2.9.4.3 Security system and response strategies are referenced in each rig specific manual for , Emergency Response, Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP), and, Onshore Emergency Response Guidelines. 2.9.4.4 The Business Unit QHSE Manager is designated as Company Designated Person, and is responsible for the implementation of the Security System and Response strategies for each vessel and specific area. The CDP will ensure that each rig which falls under the ISPS Code undergoes a Rig Security Assessment (RSA) and an ISPS Internal Audit at least once per calendar year. 2.9.4.5 The ARCTIC I security plan contains the applicable mandatory procedural requirements of Section 9 (Ship Security Plan) of Part A of the ISPS Code. Paragraph 9 (Ship Security Plan) recommendations of Part B of the ISPS Code have been taken into account. 2.9.4.6 Rig and shore-side training, drills and exercises are conducted at least once per year.
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2.9.4.7 The Offshore activity is fully supported by the Onshore Emergency response organisation as outlined in Manual 2.12. The ARCTIC 1 security response strategy will be complemented by the SIEP security policies enabled through the Brazil Region. 2.10 2.10.1 Operational Standards and Procedures Drilling and Well Control Operations

2.10.1.1 The Company determine that safety is integral to all operations and that suitable arrangements are in place to ensure all drilling and well control operations are carried out safely, efficiently and with minimum impact on health and the environment. 2.10.1.2 The Company has evolved the management system for delivering a service that satisfies the needs of the operations and the client, ARCTIC I and SIEP. In providing this service the company is conscious of the responsibilities of SIEP who determines the level of operational standards through the contractual requirements. 2.10.1.3 Through the contract with SIEP the location specific operating practices are established for each well. 2.10.1.4 The SIEP Well programme is the procedure for drilling the well and, serves to ensure that the service is completed to the required legal obligations. In following the well programme, the Company ensures that appropriate information is made available to the relevant personnel throughout the execution of the programme. This process is initiated through the formal interface between SIEP and the Company, represented by the ARCTIC I Rig Manager, reinforced at pre-spud meetings and maintained, both onshore and offshore, by the regular interaction between SIEP and Transocean representatives. 2.10.1.5 Well control procedures [Ref HQA OPS HB 01] are an integral part of the Transocean management system and reflect the application of standards set for well control equipment and the competence of the personnel who use that equipment. 2.10.1.6 The Well Control Manual identifies that at the start of all contracts and prior to the commencement of any well differing from the other wells under a contract, agreement shall be reached in writing with the operator which clearly sets out companies and supervisors responsibilities and the acceptance of the well control procedures. 2.10.1.7 The Well Control Manual contains the minimum standards for well control systems and equipment that the Company have set in order to reduce the risk of a well control incident to as low as reasonably practicable. These standards shall not be reduced in order to comply with any governmental agency or client requirements. They may be adjusted to comply with more stringent regulatory or client, through formal application of the Management of Change process incorporating the established risk mitigation START and THINK processes identifying risk based analysis of the impact of the variation of the procedure. 2.10.1.8 In order to reduce the risk of human error in well control operations, personnel whose job descriptions cover the operation of well control equipment are required to achieve a specific standard of competence in handling well control situations and the use of well control equipment. Well control certificates are issued to personnel who obtain the required pass mark in tests covering various well control situations. The tests are based on assessing an employees ability to recognise a potential problem and deal effectively with it. 2.10.1.9 While drilling certain critical wells, e.g. high pressure/high temperature (HP/HT), special training shall be provided to all relevant parties prior to entering the critical sections. The objective of
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such training is to ensure that all individuals concerned are aware of existing and well specific procedures and practices. 2.10.1.10 Well Control Training is mandatory for all those personnel who may be directly involved in such a situation and training is undertaken on a 2 year refresher basis. 2.10.2 HSE, Client Management Interfaces

2.10.2.1 The criticality and benefits of ensuring the seamless interface between the original company and SIEP HSE management interface were evaluated and integrated as part of the pre-operational discussions post contract award and pre-spud. In this respect it was established and accepted that at this time the GlobalSantaFe Management system provided the suitable foundation for the adoption of the enhanced Risk Assessment process necessary for the evaluation of the operational risk potential for the future operations offshore Brazil. Since that occasion the original company Management system has been integrated to the Transocean CMS and the Safety Case updated to reflect this seamless integration. 2.10.2.2 At the suitable stage post contract award the decision was taking to utilise the Formal Bow Tie and SOOB analysis process for the identification and evaluation of risk. In this respect the ARCTIC 1 Operational Team were integrated at an early stage into the SIEP additional requirements for HSE management which are an extension of the then GlobalSantaFe accredited system. 2.10.3 Simultaneous & Combined Operation Risk Assessments

2.10.3.1 As identified within Section 4 Risk Management, a joint approach was developed with the client, SIEP to undertake a full combined Operational Risk Assessment process. 2.10.3.2 In this combined process the skills and expertise of the senior ARCTIC 1 operational Team were utilised to review the operational Hazard sources and their effect upon the operations to be undertaken on behalf of the client, SIEP. 2.10.3.3 In this formally documented process SIEP provided the specific operational information for the envisaged drilling operations while the ARCTIC I operational personnel provided the ability to interpret the impact of the hazard sources with the context of the specific operations. 2.10.3.4 An initial Hazard Source identification process commenced and was then developed where necessary into formal SOOB and Bow Tie studies where it was agreed that some hazard sources had the potential to cause a succession of potential failures leading to a major emergency condition. 2.10.3.5 In all cases the use of formal Risk Assessment Matrices was utilised to determine the overall severity of the potential and determine the suitability of the mitigation in place. 2.10.3.6 This formal joint approach between both the Company operational specialists and the SIEP HSE and Well operations engineers provides the full integration between risk assessment and the application of the HSE Management systems and direct communication between the operational ARCTIC 1 Team and the SIEP specialist ensuring the full and intensive coverage of the operational requirements and risk to be associated with the future operations. 2.10.3.7 In support of the pre-operational Risk Assessment process when operational necessities require a deviation from the established operational plan it is part of the Transocean management strategy that, any new operation will require a formal assessment to be undertaken which will involve all teams involved in the operation, including the Client, SIEP as the operator of the drilling location.

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2.10.4

Marine Operations & Site Assessment

2.10.4.1 Prior to beginning work on a new location, an independent assessment of the ARCTIC Is suitability for working on the location is carried out, based on both the environmental and geotechnical conditions prevalent at the location. This work is undertaken by a recognized independent warranty surveyor and the site assessment process is carried out to API R 2SK standard. 2.10.4.2 All Installations must be operated in accordance with the approved Installation-specific Marine Operations Manual (MOM), pre-established practical operating limits and the contingency plans provided in the Installations Emergency Response Manual.[HQS OP HB 05 Sec 3 2.1 1] 2.10.4.3 Corporate guidance with regard to Marine Operations for the ARCTIC I is provided in the Operations Policies and Procedures Manual HQS OPS PP01 Sec 3 2.1 2.10.4.4 The key elements of marine operations, covered in the Field Operations Manual, HQS-OPSHB-05, Section 3, Subsection 2.1 include: Requirements of Installation specific Marine Operations Manual. Approval requirements for Variations from Installation Marine Operations Manual. Guidelines for operations during adverse weather conditions. Contingency plans for significant marine events. Ultimate responsibility for the safety of the Installation and personnel Maintenance and emergency exercise requirements

2.10.4.5 Operations policy HQS OPS PP 01 Sec 3 2.3 identifies the key areas required to be undertaken for any rig move by the ARCTIC I and are amplified in the Field Operations Manual HQSOPS-HB-05, Section 3, Subsection 2.3 include: Notification Site Assessment Mobilization and Site Approval Voyage Plans Transport Voyage Approval Installation Move Report Requirements Installations

for

self-elevating

and

moored

2.10.4.6 It is the responsibility of the Rig Manager for obtaining and reviewing the required information prior to deployment to the new drilling location. The Rig Manager will consult with the Manager Marine Operations with regard to the nature and acceptability of the information provided. 2.10.4.7 The established training program for the marine personnel provides for a formal familiarisation and learning process ultimately leading to a position as Barge Engineer or OIM with responsibility for overseeing Marine and mooring operations. This is supplemented by core personnel experience. 2.10.4.8 Within the Company accreditation process, personnel are required to be deemed to have gained sufficient knowledge and experience of the MODU, its systems and operations, and have demonstrated that they are competent, before they are considered for promotion

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2.10.5

Support Vessels

2.10.5.1 The effective management of offshore support vessels attending the ARCTIC I is a requirement of the Companys management system. The control and co-ordination of the support vessels is undertaken in accordance with good industry practice and covers hazards and environmental aspects associated with the vessels. The Field Operations Manual HQS OPS HB 05 Section 3 2.1 Appendix 4 provides extensive guidance for operations with a range of support vessels. 2.10.5.2 All support vessel movements within the ARCTIC Is 500 m zone are carried out under strict control, permission to enter being granted by the OIM. Prior to the vessel entering the 500 m zone, contact is established and a support vessel pre-entry checklist completed to the satisfaction of the OIM, confirming; Suitability of the weather conditions for the proposed operation Effectiveness of communications between all concerned parties Availability of all relevant operational and safety equipment Implementation of a PTW, where relevant.

2.10.5.3 The flow chart below identifies the risk management required in the event of a multi-vessel operation;

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2.10.6

Engineering Management

2.10.6.1 The HQS Operations Group is divided into three key components, Engineering and Technical Services, Performance and Technology and Marketing. The combined group, which forms part of the Companys management organization, is responsible for providing all related services to Operations. 2.10.6.2 The roles of Engineering and Technical Services Group key areas are: Provide engineering services for the analysis, evaluation and design of installation upgrades, new construction projects or major repairs and refurbishments. Ensure that Company assets are maintained in good condition and that they perform to required standards. Monitor equipment related downtime performance and ensure that adequate corrective or improvement measures are taken and that these measures are shared across the fleet when appropriate. Provide engineering and technical support for the operations and marketing of our assets and services. Maintain a technical leadership position in deepwater and technically demanding drilling services. Provide project management services for new construction, major upgrade, major repair and engineering projects. Foster a close technical relationship with clients, classification societies and regulatory bodies. Ensure that materials and services required for daily operations or construction projects are procured and delivered to the installations when needed. Promote operational efficiency by making assessments of operations and verification of compliance with Corporate Operations policies and procedures. Foster the identification and implementation of best practices and operational standardization throughout the Company. Identify and assess new technology for application on Company installations Provide operational planning and well construction support to improve the service delivery to the Companys clients.

2.10.6.3 The roles of Performance and Technology Group key areas are:

2.10.6.4 The key elements of Modifications, Upgrades and Certification of Equipment, covered in the Field Operations Manual, HQS-OPS-HB-05, Section 2, Subsection 5 include: Modification Request Process Certification of Equipment Issues Requiring Engineering Approval Documentation Requirements

2.10.6.5 The Management of Change Enhanced Approach must be used for all proposed modifications to an installation. The FOCUS Planning and Tracking Software is used to develop plans, obtain approvals, monitor the progress, and track the progress to completion. The Management of Change Enhanced Approach is described in the Company Management System Manual HQS-CMSGOV. Modification requests must be approved in accordance with Company Management System requirements and/or Business Unit FOCUS Approval Authority Limits. If engineering support is required, a request must be forwarded to HQS-Engineering in the form of an REA with drawings and
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any required documentation 2.10.6.6 Company Equipment Standards, Engineering Standards and Recommended Practices must be reviewed and followed where applicable. Consideration is required to be given to the impact any modifications have on the future operation of the Installation with regard to the Companys safety, environmental, operational and maintenance standards. If necessary, a project manager (and possibly a project team) will be appointed to develop and supervise the scope of work, gain the necessary approvals, and monitor the cost involved with the modification(s).[HQS OPS HB 05 Sec 2 5 4.1] 2.10.6.7 Factors that may necessitate the assignment of a project team include: Project total value of $10M and above and longer than 3 weeks duration. Project with high risk and/or with customer requiring special attention. Project requiring substantial engineering input. Project with tight constraints on timing and cost.

2.10.6.8 The OIM must ensure that no modifications are commenced until the necessary approvals are in place. Exceptions to this requirement are allowed for temporary emergency repairs authorized by the OIM/PIC when there is a potential or real threat to the safety of personnel, the environment, or the integrity of the rig. . 2.10.6.9 Four (4) main groups are involved in the Transocean Maintenance Organization: The Rig Operation and Maintenance Team operates the equipment, plans, performs and reports on the maintenance activities, evaluates the effectiveness of and provides feedback on the maintenance performed. The Rig Management Team takes a central role in the planning, execution and review of activities. They ensure that the MMS is implemented correctly and works effectively. The Division Management Team provides essential support and has a quality control role. It is also the communication link between the rigs and HQS. The Corporate Maintenance Group is part of the HQS Operations group and has several roles.

2.10.6.10 Within the ARCTIC I Maintenance regime, the Maintenance Supervisor is responsible for implementing and monitoring the effectiveness of established Company maintenance programs onboard the rig. The Maintenance Supervisor is also responsible for maintaining records of all repair and maintenance work carried out, advising of any defect or deficiency that should arise, and maintaining a safe and efficient operation of rig, engine and deck machinery. 2.10.7 Lifting Operations & Material Handling

2.10.7.1 In accordance with Transocean Policy, all lifting and material handling on the MODU is required to be carried out safely and with minimum risk to personnel and the environment. In this respect extensive guidelines have been developed for all Lifting and Mechanical Handling operations within the Company Health and Safety and Policy Procedures Manual Section 4 sub section 5.6. This section identifies requirements relevant to; Maintenance and Use of Lifting Equipment Padeyes Tugger Winches Manriding Lifting Equipment used for Persons Drill Line
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Portable Lifting gear and appliances Crane and Lifting Operations Forklifts Personnel responsibility

2.10.7.2 In all cases guidance for the operation is provided together with the roles and the responsibilities for the personnel involved and clear statements as to specific requirements that must be met for the various operations to proceed. Levels of the necessary training are indicated e.g. Crane Operators and deck crew are subject to formal training in Rigging and slinging techniques which includes pre-use inspection (visual examination) of lifting equipment, and the responsibility for ensuring that the training is undertaken is stated. 2.10.7.3 Six-monthly inspections of all lifting equipment and accessories are carried out by an independent and competent third party specialist. 2.10.7.4 A colour-coding system has been established for the control, selection and use of lifting equipment on-board the ARCTIC 1 and is managed by the designated competent person, ie Crane Operator. Subsequent to satisfactory inspection, the equipment is colour coded by the Companys appointed third party specialist indicating that the equipment is fit-for-purpose and available for use for a six-month period, subject to a further visual inspection on each occasion prior to the equipment being used. Only equipment coded with the recognized colour coding for that period is used. Signs are posted at strategic locations throughout the ARCTIC 1 clearly indicating the current lifting colour code. 2.10.7.5 The Transocean safety observation program (FOCUS) and offshore safety auditing process are the means used to spot-check the process. All lifting operations are subject to job risk assessment (JRA) which further highlights the requirement to use correctly colour coded equipment. 2.10.8 Personnel Tracking 2.10.8.1 The control and co-ordination of the movement of personnel to and from the ARCTIC 1 is administered using the company wide GMS The system is an instantly accessible personnel computer based tracking system online to all Transocean offices through the corporate Intranet system. 2.10.8.2 Onboard the ARCTIC 1 Personnel Tracking is the responsibility of the medic who updates all the necessary onboard records as the result of any crew changes. 2.10.8.3 Through such an integrated system any Company area office will be able to access the daily POB data of the rig, providing an immediate ability for expedient tracking of POB during the management of any Emergency Response scenario. 2.10.9 Helicopter Operations

2.10.9.1 It is a company requirement that all operations onboard the ARCTIC I are conducted in accordance with the Marine Operations Manual [Ref HQS OPP HB 05 Sec 3 2.1 1] 2.10.9.2 The ARCTIC I MOM recognises the high risk potential of Helicopter operations and the accompanying requirements for the allocation of precise roles and responsibilities and provides a rig specific Helicopter Operations Guidance document for use onboard.

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2.10.9.3 The ARCTIC 1 Helicopter procedures are required to cover the following; Employees having designated responsibilities. Control process of location where passengers are briefed and await departure. Process for obtaining accurate passenger, baggage and cargo weights. The verification of weights and passenger names listed on the manifest. Process and established time period for announcement of arrival. Communication to passengers regarding manifest and flight information. Control steps to ensure only passengers manifested are allowed to board.

2.10.9.4 In addition to the routine Helicopter Operating procedures Helicopter Emergency procedures are provided in the ARCTIC I Emergency Operations Manual. 2.10.9.5 All Heli-deck Emergency equipment is maintained under the control of the Rig Maintenance system. In support of this it is the HLOs responsibility to ensure that pre any helicopter operation the status of the emergency equipment is confirmed as operational and ready for use. As part of the routine emergency drills the Heli-deck emergency system is regularly tested for onboard familiarisation and training purposes. 2.10.10 Hazardous and Radio-Active Substances 2.10.10.1 The movement and handling of chemicals onshore and offshore is controlled in accordance with Transocean Company Management system requirements, the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG - shipment by sea) and the International Air Transport Association Code (IATA shipment by air), where relevant. All hazardous and dangerous goods are packaged and delivered to the MODU in containers marked with hazardous material labels. 2.10.10.2 All hazardous materials must be identified, labelled and effectively controlled at any installation or facility. Hazardous Material Identification System (HMIS) information concerning this material must be available at the installation or facility. [HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 5.7 1] 2.10.10.3 It is a Company requirement that all personnel are given Company approved hazardous materials awareness training. This training is to be given in an organized manner and fully documented. In addition it is required that at least one materials person that has attended a Business Unit approved course in the handling/shipping of hazardous materials must be onboard at all times. 2.10.10.4 The Handling and Storage of Hazardous Materials which includes; Chemicals Explosives Flammable Liquids Radio active materials Gas Bottles Containers Paint Asbestos

2.10.10.5 It is a requirement that an MSDS is available for every hazardous item for use with the THINK plan and that every hazardous unit must be labelled in English and in the predominant local language. Hazardous materials must be stored in dedicated areas that have adequate containment facilities. Products that may react with one another must be separated.

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2.10.10.6 The OIM is responsible for ensuring that a THINK plan is conducted before hazardous materials are unloaded from supply vessels and the relevant information from MSDS or HMIS specific to the chemicals is discussed and understood. The OIM is also required to ensure subcontractor personnel handling hazardous materials have applicable training and documentation to handle explosives, radioactive materials, dangerous liquids and gasses and approve those personnel to handle these materials at the installation or facility and must ensure that all Hazardous materials are suitably stowed and segregated. 2.10.10.7 The IMP maintains the register of all MSDS and ensures that the necessary information is available to any of the workforce when required. The MSDS being necessary for the undertaking of the THINK plan that will be undertaken before the use of any such item. 2.10.10.8 Prior to shipping offshore, MSDSs are received for all relevant substances. Dangerous substances are not permitted to go offshore until formal documentation has been received and reviewed. 2.10.11 Procurement Management 2.10.11.1 Goods and services purchased and used by Transocean are subject to procurement processes in accordance with management system requirements and must satisfy relevant HSE standards. Safety and environmental protective equipment is only purchased from reputable industry recognized companies. 2.10.11.2 The Supply Chain Management Manual, HQS-OPS-PR-02, Section 3 describes the procedures to be used to maximize the effectiveness of procurement activities while complying with applicable Company Policies and Procedures The main elements of the Supply Chain Management Manual related to Procurement Management are: Requisitions AFE requirements and approval Procurement Systems Sourcing and Quotations Purchase Orders Suppliers Management (Selection, Contracting) Logistics Procurement Incident Report Payment of invoices

2.10.11.3 It is a Company requirement that potential vendors must provide pertinent HSE information dependent on the criticality of the product/service to be supplied including evidence of a formal quality policy and management system and the ability to provide a standard acceptable to Transocean. Subject to satisfactory review by the relevant head of department, the vendor is placed on the approved vendors list. 2.10.11.4 Prior to shipment offshore and again upon arrival on-board the MODU, equipment is subject to visual inspection along with the equipments commissioning and testing certification. Damaged equipment is returned to the manufacturer in accordance with QA procedures. 2.10.11.5 Equipment found to have design or manufacturing defects (normally during testing or upon failure) are returned to the manufacturer for replacement. A product bulletin, issued throughout industry by the relevant manufacturer, is distributed throughout the fleet and each MODU requested
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to take action in accordance with the manufacturers recommendations documented on the bulletin and to further confirm to the onshore Rig Manager and Field Superintendent that the appropriate action has been taken. 2.10.11.6 Vendors may be subject to external audit in order to obtain assurance that adequate HSE management systems, including competence assurance, are in place and effective. 2.10.11.7 All non-conformances, e.g. defective equipment, are recorded and appropriate corrective action requested from the vendor who is then required to close any non-conformances out to the satisfaction of Transocean in order to remain on the Approved Vendors List. 2.10.11.8 The ability of the vendor to demonstrate a satisfactory standard of service is closely monitored. Vendors HSE/QA performance is monitored and reviewed on, at least, an annual basis by onshore management. 2.10.12 Maintenance Management 2.10.12.1 Transoceans fundamental corporate maintenance strategy is to: Preserve the installations, facilities, equipment, machinery, and structures Maximize the useful working life of our installations in a cost effective manner. Manage maintenance activities using standardized processes, focus on critical equipment, and plan the work to ensure it is carried out in a timely manner. Maintenance activities to be competently performed by, equipment owners, and maintenance personnel. Minimize down time through preventive maintenance, reporting, analysis, and follow up of all significant equipment problems. Continuously and actively monitor the results of the MMS and identify the ways to improve them.

2.10.12.2 The Maintenance Management System is centred on a concept of best practices built on a standard approach using common system tools. In this respect the ARCTIC I MMS will ensure that the same equipment is maintained to the same standard using the same system as other Company units. The main thrust is to focus efforts on critical equipment, while performing the most cost effective maintenance on non-critical equipment. [HQS OPS PR 01 Sec 1 2.1] 2.10.12.3 The strategy outlined above has been translated into eight (8) maintenance management related policies located in the Operations Policy and Procedure Manual (HQS-OPS-PP-01). The final 2 policies are located in the Coatings Handbook and GMS User manual. 2.10.12.4 The 8 Maintenance management policies are; Rig Condition Asset Management Plans Asset Management Philosophy Maintenance Standardization Maintenance Planning Maintenance Personnel Corrosion Prevention and Control Operational Event reporting

2.10.12.5 Maintenance management is a line management responsibility. Management make available the resources necessary to achieve the objectives and carry out the key elements.
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Management also provide strong visible commitment, leadership and personal involvement in the Maintenance, Procurement and Inventory processes. 2.10.12.6 The objectives of the Maintenance Management system are; Improved safety performance. Improved operational efficiency and performance. The implementation of improved maintenance practices. Providing a path for lateral learning (sharing of experience across the fleet) and continuous improvement

2.10.12.7 At Operational level it is a requirement that machinery, equipment and structures must be maintained based on its criticality to operations and safety. Critical equipment must be identified and maintained using Company's Standard Preventive Maintenance Tasks. Noncritical equipment must be maintained at the lowest effective cost.[HQS OPS PP 01 Sec 4 2.2] 2.10.12.8 Technical information from HQS Maintenance sent to the different Business Units for further distribution to installations are communicated in various forms. The company receives various advisory notices from both external (vendors, manufacturers, professional societies, etc.) and internal sources (experienced rig maintenance personnel, staff engineering teams, etc.) about equipment, safety and operations information. Upon review for relevancy or our equipment and operations, these notices may be transmitted to the field. HQS Maintenance also gathers information from lessons learned through various studies and reviews to be communicated as recommended practices. The format for circulating technical information within the Company is in the form of; Equipment Alerts Operational and Maintenance Advisories Product Information Bulletins Technical Information Bulletins

2.10.12.9 It is a Company standard that machinery, equipment and structures must be maintained based on criticality. Critical equipment must be identified and maintained using the Companys Standard Preventive Maintenance (PM) Tasks [HQS OPS PR 01 Sec 2 2.1]

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2.10.12.10 Four (4) main groups are involved in the Transocean Maintenance Organization: [HQS OPS PR 01 Sec 2 1.1] The Rig Operation and Maintenance Team operates the equipment, plans, performs and reports on the maintenance activities, evaluates the effectiveness of and provides feedback on the maintenance performed The Rig Management Team takes a central role in the planning, execution and review of activities. They ensure that the MMS is implemented correctly and works effectively. The Division Management Team provides essential support and has a quality control role. It is also the communication link between the rigs and HQS.

2.10.12.11 The Maintenance Supervisor and Department Heads, with the assistance of Rig Management and Offshore Installation Managers (OIM/PIC), have the primary responsibility for the effective execution of the Maintenance Management System. 2.10.12.12 The Company works to continuously improve its maintenance processes, contents and systems. All personnel are encouraged and expected to bring to the attention of their Supervisors any change that they believe would improve the efficiency or effectiveness of the processes, procedures or systems used in the performance of maintenance activities. Any suggested change will be reviewed at Division level, by a member of the Support Group, before being passed on to the Headquarters Maintenance group with a recommendation for action. The author of the proposal will be informed of the recommendation made by the Division. The HQS Maintenance group track and review the proposal and determine whether the proposed change can be incorporated on a worldwide basis, or be restricted to a local or district change or be rejected, the author of the proposal and the Division Support Team being advised accordingly. 2.10.12.13 The Company require Rig Management monitor regularly and review, at least on a monthly basis, and with the Rigs maintenance supervisor or Department Heads, the key indicators or elements of the maintenance, procurement and inventory processes/systems. The Division Management must also monitor these indicators, paying attention not only to the trends but also to the performance of each rig as compared to that of similar units in the fleet and to general benchmarks. 2.10.12.14 The maintenance documentation reflects written mechanical and electrical procedures, manufacturers maintenance manuals, statutory provisions and classification society requirements. All operational procedures include written procedures for testing and inspection in accordance with Transocean, regulatory and contractual requirements. 2.10.12.15 The maintenance of all third party equipment installed on the Companys units MODUs is the responsibility of the appropriate contractor and is covered by the contractors maintenance system. The performance of the contractors maintenance programme is monitored by competent rig personnel, appointed by the OIM. 2.10.12.16 Onboard the ARCTIC I, the OIM is responsible for ensuring that personnel carry out all maintenance actions, feedback, data entry and reports required by the maintenance systems in use for all critical equipment. 2.10.13 Contractor Management 2.10.13.1 Transocean require that all offshore operations are conducted in compliance with
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regulatory requirements and in accordance with the company policies and procedures. This includes the activities and operations carried out by third party specialists and sub-contractors on-board the ARCTIC I or within its 500 m zone. 2.10.13.2 Provision of services to Transocean will generally fulfil a specialist function. It is a requirement of the Company that all third party contractors, sub-contractors and services provider representatives work within the requirements the Transocean CMS management system. This includes ensuring that all third party representatives are adequately experienced and trained in accordance with applicable legislation and good industry practice for the work involved and have the appropriate certificates in force to prove same. [HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 2.3] 2.10.13.3 On the ARCTIC I Subcontractor personnel must perform a risk assessment appropriate to the task. Subcontractors performing specialized work must be able to demonstrate completion of an industry recognized training applicable to the type of work to be performed, and the OIM must approve these personnel to perform work. 2.10.13.4 Departmental supervisors monitor subcontractor personnel working in their area of responsibility to ensure they are working to an HSE system equivalent to that of the Company and ensure subcontractor personnel perform appropriate risk assessments and adequate control measures are in place for all tasks. 2.10.13.5 Any client, contractor or outside agency personnel that work on the ARCTIC I or any other Transocean facility are encouraged to take an active part in the Company THINK, START and FOCUS Processes. 2.10.13.6 The HSE (and operational) performance of third parties and contractors is monitored and reported in accordance with the Transocean CMS system requirements. 2.11 2.11.1 Adverse Weather Adverse Weather

2.11.1.1 The Company require that all Marine Operations are conducted in accordance with the protocols established within the Marine Operations Manual.[HQS OPS HB 05 Sec 3 2.1]. In this respect specific ARCTIC I operational guidance is available within; ARCTIC I Operations Manual Section F Part 4 ARCTIC I Emergency Procedures Manual Policy 4.6a

2.11.1.2 Within the Field Operations Manual Sec 3 subsection 2.1 provisions are identified for restricting personnel movements during adverse weather. In addition a requirements for considering the possible effects of Bad weather are identified for consideration during the Well Planning stage. HQS OPS HB 05 Sec 3 1.7 4.6] 2.11.1.3 If severe weather is forecasted the OIM ensures that the Installation is suitably prepared with particular reference to the watertight integrity and safety of personnel. Typically winds in excess of 60 Knots may threaten the safe movement of personnel on exposed decks. [HQS OPS HB 05 Sec 3 2.1 App 5] 2.11.1.4 Onboard the ARCTIC I the OIM monitors the approach of the weather system and uses the onboard equipment to assist in this matter. In addition the OIM should contact the forecasting bureau direct to obtain the latest information on the approaching weather. 2.11.1.5 In particular, decisions should be made regarding:
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Suspension of drilling Operations. Evacuation of non essential personnel. Verifying Installation stability. De-ballasting to survival draft. Adjusting any mooring systems. Securing deck loads. Ensuring all internal and external watertight closures are secure. Limiting personnel access to external decks. Rigging safety lines where necessary.

2.11.1.6 Upon the passing of severe weather the OIM of the ARCTIC I will ensure a suitable damage inspection is completed to verify the structural status. 2.11.2 Responsibility

2.11.2.1 The ARCTIC I (OIM) is responsible for reviewing the application of this guidance and providing more detailed instruction to offshore personnel as required, to ensure that safe practices are maintained throughout the units operational design envelope, and that the risks to personnel when carrying out all operational duties are maintained to an ALARP status. 2.11.2.2 Any decision regarding the continuation or cessation of work in weather conditions considered to be marginal must be made involving personnel with active participation in the relevant task, hence as an agenda item Operations in Adverse weather will be considered on receipt of a suitably adverse weather forecast. 2.11.3 Weather Forecasts

2.11.3.1 The process of determining the continuance, or not of the operation will be dependent upon the weather forecasts, which will be received twice daily as a minimum. If adverse weather is forecast the OIM may request a more frequent update. The comparison of actual against forecast conditions may assist in the decision process with regard to the timing of adverse weather preparations. 2.11.3.2 In considering actual against forecast weather conditions, the operational programme may be assessed to ensure that effective escape, evacuation and rescue procedures are not hindered. Consideration is also required to be given to vessel motions, i.e. heave, pitch and roll. 2.11.3.3 Consideration will also be given to the effect of the adverse weather on other routine activities such as; Over side work Supply vessel operations Helicopter Operations and potential for recovery of a ditched helicopter Heavy Lifts Consideration is also required to any other potential risk of a Man overboard incident and potential for recovery.

2.11.3.4 The ARCTIC I OIM will discuss with his senior supervisory personnel the clients representative and any relevant third party supervisors all implications associated with the current forecast conditions. 2.11.4 ARCTIC I Operational Limits
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2.11.4.1 In the event of the approach of an adverse weather system it will be necessary to ensure that ARCTIC I operational limits as applicable to that location and as defined in the Operations Manual are verified and confirmed as acceptable to the approaching situation, so that all necessary preparations can be made with regard to vessel loading and stability conditions. The limits must not be exceeded 2.11.4.2 Pre-operational analysis will have been used to verify that the rig is able to withstand the worst storm condition for the location and if any special requirements have been identified they must be enabled prior to the arrival of those conditions. 2.11.4.3 The ARCTIC I operational team will utilise their knowledge and experience combined with the guidelines contained in the various manuals to ensure all safety procedures are undertaken in a suitable time frame before the arrival of the approaching weather system. 2.11.5 Helicopter Operations 2.11.5.1 It is an established requirement that no routine flying operations will take place unless appropriate recovery and rescue means can be effectively deployed in the event of an accident at the location.

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2.11.5.2 An helicopters flying capabilities are well above those of the recovery and rescue capacity; hence, it is the OIMs responsibility to ensure that the information provided to the helicopter operator includes information regarding the capability of the recovery and rescue resource. In addition to daily forecasts, the helicopter operator should be informed if the recovery and rescue facility is available to effect a response, if required to do so. Information to be provided to the helicopter operator includes: Weather conditions Recovery and rescue availability Vessel motions (semi-submersibles)

2.11.6 Over-the-side Work 2.11.6.1 Over the side or work above water is deemed a hazardous activity and is required to be undertaken through the control of the Permit to Work system and the associated THINK and START risk mitigation processes. [HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 2.2 4.4.3] 2.11.6.2 As part of the active risk mitigation procedures onboard the ARCTIC I it will be required that in order to expedite recovery and rescue arrangements, it will be required that the MOB is made ready if required in an emergency situation. 2.11.6.3 It is a consideration that no over-the-side work or under-deck operations, which in the event of an accident could require personnel to be rescued by a fast rescue craft (FRC), should take place in conditions which clearly impose a high risk to the rescuers. Over-the-side work and under-deck operations will only take place when an immediate response for the rescue of persons from the sea is available. 2.11.6.4 All persons working over-side will be equipped with suitable life vests and safety lines. In specialist cases, consideration will be given to exempting specialist personnel carrying out specialist tasks, e.g. rope access who provide their own equipment, the components and compatibility of which are to be assessed at the time. 2.11.6.5 In order that a good prospect of recovery is achieved the following procedures are adopted: ARCTIC I rescue boat will be at close standby throughout all over-the-side operations Over-the-side operations will only be conducted when the ARCTIC I rescue vessel is capable of rescuing a person from the water Where visibility is reduced, over-the-side working will cease when the ARCTIC I OIM declares that the MOB crew or is seriously impaired in their ability to rescue a person from the sea.

2.11.6.6 Personnel may work over-the-side on occasions, e.g. moon pool operations, where it is not possible to provide close standby, or not possible to launch or use the MOB. In such circumstances, in addition to the normal controls (e.g. safety harness, inertia reels and life vests), suitable and sufficient secondary measures to prevent personnel from falling into the sea together with consideration given to suitable means of rescue, for example a Tugger, should be provided for immediate use. 2.11.6.7 Communications between over-the-side parties and the ARCTIC I Navigation Bridge or the boat must be established prior to, during and until such times as the work scope is completed and persons are back on-board

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2.11.7 Crane Operations 2.11.7.1 It is a requirement of the Company that the OIM authorizes the Crane Operators to operate cranes on the installation, and that a list of authorized crane operators must be available at the worksite. Only competent Crane Operators are authorized to operate cranes on Company installations or facilities. Exceptions, however, are made for the training of new Crane Operators or in connection with maintenance work. Only Crane Operators authorized by the OIM can train or instruct trainees. Trainee(s) must not operate the crane without an authorized operator present.[HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 5.6 4.8.1] 2.11.7.2 Crane operations shall always be conducted at the discretion of the Crane Operator in consultation with the OIM and in accordance with the operational limitations set by the crane manufacturer, as detailed in the crane handbook. Onboard ARCTIC I the current limitations set by manufacture for main boom over-side lifts indicate a limitation for a 1.5m significant sea height, or approximately 3 meter max sea height. This sea state is in line with a limiting wind speed of circa 40 knots and should be considered as a guiding factor for reviewing the suitability of crane operations. 2.11.7.3 This 1.5 meter sea height applies to the existing original cranes, Port and Starboard main deck. The new aft crane is able to operate in a wind speed of up to 50 Knots (25m/sec) as stated within the manufacturers documentation. However the crane instrumentation and safety system are to an advanced technology and may indicate to the Crane operator that operations should be suspended prior to this limit being reached. 2.11.7.4 It is a Company standard [HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 5.6 4.8.3] that Hand signals must be used as the primary means of communication for all crane signalling. Radios may be used in conjunction with hand signals, but they are considered secondary. Boom cameras may not be used as a means of communication. Hand signals used on all installations must be available and must be understood by every person involved in crane and lifting operations. 2.11.7.5 The prime assistant to the Crane Operator is the dedicated Banksman who has no other duties while assigned to this position. The Banksman does not participate in simultaneous operations (for example, supervising the lift while supervising boat operations alongside the installation). For boat operations it may be necessary to assign a banksman for the boat as well as a banksman on the installation. [HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 5.6 4.8.2] 2.11.7.6 In all lifting operations the Crane operators decisions based upon his or her operational experience to terminate operations prior to the design limits being reached that should be respected at all times. 2.11.7.7 The Chief Mechanic is identified as responsible for ensuring the maintenance of the cranes is completed. General guidance regarding guidelines for the maintenance of cranes in good working order is provide within the Company Maintenance Manual; HQS OPS PR 01 Maintenance Sec 5 subsection 1 Appendix C 8. 2.11.8 Launching of TEMPSC 2.11.8.1 Although evacuation by helicopter is the preferred means of departing from the rig, it is a consideration that this may not be an option due to the nature of the emergency or environmental conditions. Hence, the ARCTIC I OIM must be aware of the potential hazards associated with pending operations, the projected environmental conditions and their combined impact on the ability to carry out a successful launching of the TEMPSC in the event that launch limiting criteria is exceeded.

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2.11.8.2 The Company therefore consider that it is important to that the following guidelines should be used by the OIM in conjunction with his professional and reasoned judgment in the event an emergency TEMPSC launching has to be completed in adverse conditions.. 2.11.8.3 In conditions above the limiting criteria the OIM, in conjunction with Management team, if at all possible, assisted by the Clients representative, should review current operations so that any reasonable foreseeable emergency could be safely contained on the ARCTIC I. This may result in the prohibition of commencing drilling into a reservoir section or having to proceed with care if reservoir drilling has already commenced, or suspension of drilling altogether if required. It is important that discussions should take place between the OIM, Rig Superintendent Operators Supervisor, as well as with onshore support so that all are aware of any limitations to ensure the safety of POB and that the integrity of the rig is maintained. 2.11.8.4 As the weather deteriorates, restrictions are progressively introduced as required. e.g. crane operations, Helideck operations, redeployment of personnel to the interior of the ARCTIC I until weather conditions moderate. 2.11.8.5 To assist the OIM in the decision-making process, in addition to using professional and reasoned judgment on the day, consideration should be given to: Availability of information re the launch success rates of TEMPSC in various wind and sea states Restrictions on helicopter operations in conjunction with ability to provide rescue and recovery (Adverse Weather Policy) Manufacturers recommendations with regard to continued safe operation of equipment during certain environmental conditions and wind speeds etc (manufacturers recommendations) Heavy weather precautions (corporate Health, Safety and Environmentali) and Severe Weather and Storm Procedures (Operations Manual) Emergency response and responses to potential major emergencies (Emergency Response Manual).

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2.12 2.12.1

Performance Monitoring Periodic Monitoring

2.12.1.1 Within the Transocean CMS the proactive review of HSE compliance is performed at all levels of management. Onboard the ARCTIC I reviews may be undertaken as a routine process from Worksite, through the associated Pre-Tour meetings, FOCUS, daily departmental meetings, for feeding observations into a formal evaluation system requiring close out through formal management response. The SMART process is available to all personnel for the initiation of a formal consideration and approval process for potential changes to the Management system. The FOCUS system enables the recognition of areas for potential operational improvement to be captured from the formal and informal meetings and submitted to a formal process for evaluation and possible implementation. 2.12.1.2 Through the application of the PMAA Performance Monitoring Audit and Assessment Policy Procedures HQS CMS PR 02 it is established that Company Management will conducts audits and assessments to verify compliance and evaluate performance of people in achieving the expectations and requirements described in the Company Management System 2.12.1.3 The PMAA measures the effectiveness of the Company Management System by evaluating performance of people, processes and systems. By evaluating the effectiveness of the management system the Company identifies corrective and improvement opportunities. The PMAA audit and assessment criteria are based on leaderships expectations defined in the management system as policies, procedures and principles. 2.12.1.4 The PMAA process is a formal version of the daily monitoring of activities that managers and supervisors are required to perform to evaluate peoples efforts and the results of their efforts. Managers and supervisors perform daily monitoring to satisfy and assure themselves that their peoples efforts are aligned with the Companys expectations at all levels of the organization. 2.12.1.5 Clear responsibilities are allotted to all management personnel involved within the PMAA process, and are identified within the PMAA Manual HQS CMS PR 02 2.12.1.6 It the responsibility of the ARCTIC I management to ensure corrective and improvement opportunities and action plans are entered in to the FOCUS Planning and Tracking Tool, and that these opportunities are completed and closed out within the agreed target dates. 2.12.1.7 As Transocean have integrated ISM within their own management system there is a requirement that regular audits of the units and associated business centres are conducted to verify that the Company Management System and applicable installations are compliant with the requirements of the International Safety Management (ISM) and International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Codes. It is the OIMs responsibility on the ARCTIC I to undertake a review of the Company Management System (with respect to ISM) and report findings via the QHSE Steering Committee Meeting 2.12.1.8 The PMAA Manual HQS CMS PR 02 provides extensive guidance regarding the formal auditing processes , reporting structure, roles and responsibilities and audit team composition as well as clarification as to how audit results are marked.

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2.12.2 Incident Reporting & Analysis 2.12.2.1 The Company uses guidelines, consistent with industry standards, which classify and separate work related personal injuries and illnesses in accordance with IADC recognized categories, namely: Fatality (FAT) Lost Time Incident (LTI) Restricted Work Case (RWC) Medical Treatment Case (MTC) First Aid Case (FAC).

2.12.2.2 For both Non and Work Related incidents it is Transocean Policy that the initial factual points must be reported and documented on an Incident Report Form within the Global Management System and validated by the Rig Manager within 72 Hours of the event occurring. 2.12.2.3 In the event of a Fatality, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Operating Officer must be notified by the fastest means possible.[HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 6.3] 2.12.2.4 Other types of event reporting not relating to personal injury are identified as; Unsafe Observations - reported to a Supervisor as soon as observed or rectified by the Observer and recorded on a START Card Near Hits and Serious Near Hits - Initial facts to be recorded on Incident Report form in the GMS and reviewed by the Rig Manager within 72 Hours Loss of Containment Report - The initial factual points must be reported and documented within GMS and validated by the Rig Manager before the conclusion of the next business day. Any major Loss of Containment must be reported on the daily operations report and reported immediately to the Division/Unit QHSE Manager [HQS HSE PP 02 EMS Sec 4 1 4.8] Property Damage Report To be reported on an Operational Event Report

2.12.2.5 Upon review of the Incident report the Rig Manager will calculate the Actual and Potential Severity based upon the Companys criteria. .[HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 6.3 4.2] which is documented within the GMS. 2.12.2.6 Transocean utilise the Kelvin TOP_SET Incident investigation methodology which utilises three levels of investigation; Level I A Level I TOP-SET investigation must have an appointed Lead Investigator and the findings must be documented utilizing the report template specified in this procedure. When possible, the team members must not be directly responsible for the operation where the incident occurred. Level II A Level II TOP-SET investigation does not require an appointed Lead Investigator (as defined in this procedure). This level requires a team of installation or shore-based subject matter experts to ensure appropriate knowledge and experience level is applied. Level III A Level III TOP-SET investigation is simply a person, or group of persons, applying the methodology. This may take place in an informal setting aboard the installation.

2.12.2.7 Within the investigation Team it is required that the Lead Investigator has attended the three day TOP SET Investigator training. The Lead Investigator assumes the authority and responsibility for the investigation and ensures that the full scope of reporting is completed in
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accordance with the procedures as established within section 4 subsection 6.3 of the Company Health and Safety Policies and Procedures Manual 2.12.2.8 The Corporate Director of QHSE is responsible to ensure all Level I investigation reports are reviewed for consideration for global sharing of lessons learned. The Division QHSE Manager is responsible to ensure all Level II and III investigation reports are reviewed. When applicable, the investigation report must be forwarded to the Director of QHSE for consideration for global sharing of lessons learned. 2.12.3 Behaviour Based Observation Systems 2.12.3.1 The Transocean workforce, including senior management, line managers, department heads and supervisors, are encouraged to monitor HSE practices through structured observation systems including: START - used to observe and monitor work practices, plans and workplace conditions. THINK - utilized for Risk Management of all activities and tasks carried out throughout the Company.

2.12.3.2 FOCUS is a behavioural tool adopted and implemented for use by all personnel with the intention to continuously improve its safety performance through the identification, observation and reduction of at-risk behaviours and the elimination of incidents. The FOCUS Improvement Process provides a consistent means to improve Company performance by formulating an action plan, organizing resources to carry out the plan, communicating the action plan, undertaking the action, summarizing the results and capturing lessons learned

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2.12.3.3 The START process is a documented structured activity used to provide observations and feedback. The elements being See Think Act Reinforce Track

2.12.3.4 The START process is an active part of the monitoring of THINK plans to ensure the safe execution of the task and be able to communicate an enhancement to the safe performance of that task. All Supervisors are responsible for overseeing the use of START by their co-workers. 2.12.3.5 START cards are recorded by the OIM or designate, and trends monitored by the OIM and Rig Manager onshore. START cards are also an agenda item within the onboard Safety Steering Committee regimes. Any issues raised through the system that require further action are logged on the rig action register for tracking and close-out offshore and monitored by the Rig Manager onshore. 2.12.3.6 The THINK Planning Process includes hazard identification and provides various levels of risk assessment to demonstrate risks are as low as reasonably practicable. The THINK plan may be; Individual, Verbal or Written and will provide a task specific THINK procedure. 2.12.3.7 Training for the observation programmes is in accordance with management system requirements. All employees onboard the ARCTIC I are subject to START and THINK training which contribute within the integration of those processes within THINK. 2.12.3.8 Contractors and third party personnel attending the MODU are encouraged to participate in the full breadth of these proactive observation systems. 2.12.4 Environmental Monitoring and Measurement 2.12.4.1 As required by the Company EMS Policy[HQS JHSE PP 02 EMS] the ARCTIC I adopts a process to have a continual environmental monitoring and improvement process in place to ensure existing environmental performance is meeting Company expectations. Environmental performance is monitored to ensure full compliance with Company policies, government laws and regulations. 2.12.4.2 Transocean Management conducts audits and assessments to verify compliance to and evaluate performance of people in achieving the expectations and requirements described in the Company Management System Manual. These methods of monitoring include; Executive Management Review Corporate PMAA Unit/Division Management Review Unit/Division PMAA QHSE Steering Committee Monitoring by Rig Manager (Asset/Performance) Daily Monitoring by OIM Green Team Monitoring Environmental Site Survey

2.12.4.3 In addition to the above the ARCTIC I as a marine installation complies with the IMO requirements for;
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Prevention of Oil Pollution Emission control from Generator Exhausts Ballast Management control system

2.12.4.4 The Company verify the level of Environmental activity onboard the companys units through the environmental section of Unit/Division and Corporate PMAA which is designed to; Monitor, evaluate and take appropriate action to maintain or improve environmental performance through an effective Performance Monitoring Audit and Assessment (PMAA). Ensure the ability to meet environmental performance requirements and deliver environmental results is available. Evaluate and improve effectiveness of the location environmental management system.

2.12.4.5 Independent audits are held on installations to measure environmental performance compliance. Audits can be done by Corporate, Unit or Division personnel and are encompassed as a part of the PMAA audit. See HQS-CMS-PR-02-Section 6, 2.12.5 Audit and Audit Compliance 2.12.5.1 The Core PMAA Scope consists of assessing the eight management and three personal principles as defined in the PMAA manual as well as auditing selected policies contained in Corporate Level 1 policy and procedure manuals. 2.12.5.2 The 8 Management principles are; Leadership in management Policies and Procedures Organisation Resources and Responsibilities Planning and Risk Management Execution and Monitoring Evaluation and Improvement Training and Competence Communications Behavior Accountability Appraisals and Feedback

2.12.5.3 The 3 Personal principles are;

2.12.5.4 The Core PMAA scope is posted on the Corporate QHSE website. The Core PMAA Scope is determined by Corporate, Division management. The purpose of developing the Core PMAA scope is to establish a consistent approach to evaluate the effectiveness of key risk-reducing controls that contribute to safe and reliable performance. 2.12.5.5 At the discretion of Location Management, additional policies and procedures may be included in Division and Installation audits based on managements evaluation of the locations performance and results measured by Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and Key Step Measures (KSMs). Sources for these specific performance requirements may also be from Division Level 2 policies, requests by clients, or local regulatory requirements

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2.12.5.6 Compliance is a measurement of both how well people understand and how they apply their efforts to achieve the Companys expectations (policies, principles, objectives, etc). PMAAs are formal, independent evaluations necessary to provide a consistent, unbiased and objective performance measurement to assist Corporate, and Division management to maintain and improve performance. Performance monitoring is comprised of both audit and assessment 2.12.5.7 The PMAA Audit process measures compliance through the evaluation of objective evidence (indicators) against elements. Elements which are deemed by management to be essential in achieving the intent of the policy are termed key elements and are documented in individual department audit criteria 2.12.5.8 After completion of the audit and assessment stage of the PMAA the following steps are taken: 1. 2. 3. 4. Consolidate and evaluate the results. Analyze the results. Identify any improvement and corrective opportunities. Communicate the results and, improvement and corrective opportunities to Location management. Utilize the FOCUS Improvement Process to effectively plan and manage the improvement and/or corrective opportunity actions, and summarize the audit results.

5.

2.12.5.9 Follow-up and Close-out is the final step in the PMAA process, and ensures the Locations performance is optimized by carrying out the Improvement and Corrective Actions to completion. Close-out is a management responsibility which is carried out after verifying follow up has been satisfactorily completed 2.12.5.10 As an additional check on the functioning of the Management System, the Company has appointed 3rd party Certification bodies to verify conformance to the ISM Code (DNV) and the Management System is also subject to regular periodic audit visits by these bodies. 2.12.6 Verification of HSE Critical Tasks/Activities/Equipment/Systems 2.12.6.1 Safety critical systems and equipment located on-board the ARCTIC I are subject to independent verification in accordance with the units Class and Flag State Inspections. The arrangements form part of the management system and are, therefore, subject to continuous monitoring and review throughout the rigs life-cycle. 2.12.6.2 An annual review of the scheme is undertaken in conjunction with the ISM Audit at which time the findings of the verification processes are discussed and, where agreed and considered appropriate, revisions made to the scheme accordingly. 2.12.6.3 Independent physical condition inspections are conducted by the Rig Manager, Marine Representative and Field Support Group in accordance with management system inspection programmes. Such rig inspections are intended to verify rig physical condition standards with particular regard to legislative compliance and Transocean standards. 2.12.6.4 Physical condition inspections are also an established part of safe systems monitoring and a line management function. In addition to daily and weekly inspection reports, a detailed physical condition checklist is completed and submitted to the Rig Manager for review, in accordance with the programme. The Improvement Requirement Report Field Register provides a vehicle for the recording and closing out of defects from physical condition inspections and any other inspections. All defects raised are closed out to the satisfaction of the OIM.

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2.12.7 Certification 2.12.7.1 Transocean specialise in the provision of technically advanced drilling services for diverse range of challenging operations from both Client platforms and Transocean drilling units. The nature of the activities require a high degree of advice, expertise, experience and reliability with an overall emphasis on achieving and performing our services to high standards of safety, environmental compliance and quality. 2.12.7.2 The Company is certified to the ISM Code. The management system is mandatory and it is the responsibility of all personnel to comply with the requirements of the programme at all times. 2.12.7.3 The corporate management system defines how effective control of safety and the environment is established. QA issues where required are dealt with in the supplementary manual and the systems outlined therein describe how the QA programme is designed to ensure that all quality requirements are recognized and that a consistent and uniform control of these requirements is adequately maintained. 2.12.7.4 Corporate responsibility for the implementation and function of the management system in the Brazil Offshore area lies with the Divisions Manager. The responsibility for the implementation of the quality policy and monitoring of the quality system has been delegated to the QHSE Manager 2.12.7.5 The ARCTIC I MODU and Marine certification, is administered by the Asset Group nominated person, and is maintained in accordance with Classification, Flag- and coastal-state requirements. 2.13 2.13.1 Management Review and Improvement Review

2.13.1.1 The PMAA - Performance Monitoring Audit and Assessment Policy Procedures HQS CMS PR 02 defines the formal process of Management Review and Improvement through a formal scheduled audit process. This process integrates the policy under ISM and ISPS for the regular verification of these mandated systems 2.13.1.2 In addition to the scheduled audit process a dynamic Management Review and improvement process is available to all personnel through the application of the SMART process. 2.13.1.3 The SMART process enables people at different levels in the Company (corporate, unit, division and installation) to propose and implement change to the Company Management System categorized by the core management functions as listed below. Health, Safety & Environment Engineering & Technical Services (Operations) Operations Performance (Operations) Supply Chain Management (Operations) Human Resources Finance Information Technology Legal Services Investor Relations & Communications Marketing & Planning

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2.13.1.4 Corporate and Unit management use the SMART process to make changes to the Company Management System through their existing organizations and resources. SMART is also the means to communicate and implement change to the management system (represented in manuals and other documents) to corporate, unit and field personnel. 2.13.1.5 SMART is not a standing committee or working group but people performing their normal responsibilities in a more coordinated and effective way to foster understanding, participation, ownership and commitment, hence SMART is able to appeal to a wide range of experience in the review and documentation of any process that is enhance the effectiveness of the Company Management System.

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2.14 2.14.1

REFERENCES Documentation Iss 04 Jan 31st 2009 Iss 03 Jan 8th 2009 Transocean Company Management System Health and Safety Policy and Procedures Manual Performance Procedures Monitoring Audit and Assessment

HQS-CMS-GOV HQSHSEPP-01

HQS-CMSPR02 Iss 03 Dec 31st 2008 HQS-HSE-PR-01 HQS-HSE-PR-02 HQS-HSE-PP-02 HQS-HRM-PP-01 HQS-OPS-PR-01 HQS-OPS-PP-01 HQS-OPS-HB-03 HQS-OPS-HB 05 Iss 01 Oct 31st 2007 Iss 02 Oct 12th 2007 Iss 01 Sept 30th 2007 Iss 02 Mar 1st 2009 Iss 02 Nov 1st 2007 Iss 01 Nov 1st 2004 Iss 02 Nov 11th 2004 Iss 01 Nov 11th 2005

Emergency Management Procedures Manual Medical Protocols Manual Environmental Management System Human Resources Policies and Procedures Manual Maintenance Manual Operations Policies and Procedures Manual Certificate and Survey Manual Field Operations Manual

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 3 Description & Supporting Information

PART 3 Arctic I Description & Supporting Information

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 3 Description & Supporting Information

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 3. PAGE

ARCTIC I DESCRIPTION ................................................................................................. 6 3.1

3.2

3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.2.4

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 6

OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................................... 9

Purpose ................................................................................................................ 6 Document Update ................................................................................................ 6 Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... 7

3.3

3.4 3.5

3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3 3.3.4 3.3.5 3.3.6 3.3.7 3.3.8 3.3.9 3.3.10 3.3.11 3.3.12 3.3.13 3.4.1

PRIMARY STRUCTURE ........................................................................................................ 13

General Information ............................................................................................ 9 Classification and Registration ............................................................................ 9 Layout................................................................................................................. 10 Modifications and Upgrades .............................................................................. 12 Environmental Operating Limits/Design Criteria ............................................. 13 Structural Integrity ............................................................................................ 14 Marine Integrity - Stability ................................................................................ 15 Marine Integrity - Watertight Integrity ............................................................ 15 Ballast System.................................................................................................... 16 Ballast System Valves ........................................................................................ 17 Arctic 1 Ballast Control System ......................................................................... 18 Communication System Operational Overview ................................................ 18 Power Supplies for the Ballast System ............................................................. 19 Bilge System....................................................................................................... 19 De-Watering System .......................................................................................... 21 Mooring and Station-keeping Systems ............................................................. 21 Towing and Propulsion System ......................................................................... 23

DRILLING AND WELL CONTROL ............................................................................................ 25 HOISTING AND PIPE HANDLING ........................................................................................... 26

Overview ............................................................................................................ 25 Derrick ................................................................................................................ 26 Crown Block ....................................................................................................... 27 Drill Line ............................................................................................................. 27 Deadline Anchor ................................................................................................. 27 Crown Safety Device .......................................................................................... 27 Draw-works........................................................................................................ 28 Drill String Compensator ................................................................................... 29 Riser and Guideline/Podline Tensioner............................................................. 30 Top Drive ............................................................................................................ 30 Swivel Type ........................................................................................................ 31 Rotary Table ....................................................................................................... 31 Iron Roughneck ................................................................................................. 31 Casing Stabbing Board....................................................................................... 31 Hydraulic Power Units ....................................................................................... 32 Mud System ........................................................................................................ 32 Minimum Requirements .................................................................................... 32 Bulk Storage System .......................................................................................... 33 Sack Storage ...................................................................................................... 33

3.6

3.5.1 3.5.2 3.5.3 3.5.4 3.5.5 3.5.6 3.5.7 3.5.8 3.5.9 3.5.10 3.5.11 3.5.12 3.5.13 3.5.14 3.6.1 3.6.2 3.6.3 3.6.4

MUD AND CEMENT SYSTEM ................................................................................................. 32

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3.7

3.6.5 3.6.6 3.6.7 3.6.8 3.6.9 3.6.10 3.6.11 3.6.12 3.6.13 3.6.14 3.6.15 3.6.16 3.6.17 3.7.1 3.7.2 3.7.3 3.7.4 3.7.5 3.7.6 3.7.7 3.7.8 3.7.9 3.7.10 3.7.11 3.7.12 3.7.13 3.7.14 3.7.15 3.7.16 3.7.17 3.7.18 3.7.19 3.7.20 3.7.21 3.8.1 3.8.2 3.8.3 3.8.4 3.8.5 3.9.1 3.9.2 3.9.3 3.9.4 3.9.5 3.9.6 3.9.7 3.9.8

BOP SYSTEMS. ............................................................................................................... 42

Transfer of Bulk Material ................................................................................... 34 Protective (Safety) Gear .................................................................................... 34 High Pressure Mud System ................................................................................ 34 Mud Lines ........................................................................................................... 34 Shale Shakers..................................................................................................... 35 Degasser............................................................................................................. 35 Mud Pit Areas ..................................................................................................... 36 Low Pressure Mud System ................................................................................. 36 Mud Storage System .......................................................................................... 36 Bulk Cement System .......................................................................................... 37 Base Oil and Oil Based Mud Handling ............................................................... 37 Mud Monitoring .................................................................................................. 37 Mud Gas Separator ............................................................................................ 40

3.8

LIFTING EQUIPMENT & MATERIAL HANDLING ........................................................................... 58

Diverter .............................................................................................................. 42 Slip Joint............................................................................................................. 42 Marine Riser ....................................................................................................... 43 Riser Boost Line Valve ....................................................................................... 43 Ball Joint............................................................................................................. 44 LMRP Connector ................................................................................................. 44 Blow-out Preventer Stacks ................................................................................ 44 Riser Angle Indicator ......................................................................................... 46 BOP Control System ........................................................................................... 46 Choke and Kill System ....................................................................................... 49 Co-flexip Hose .................................................................................................... 49 Wellhead Connectors ......................................................................................... 50 Subsea Running Equipment............................................................................... 50 Well Control Practices........................................................................................ 50 Drilling Procedures ............................................................................................ 53 Float Valves ........................................................................................................ 53 Stab-in Valve ...................................................................................................... 53 Casing and Handling .......................................................................................... 54 Shallow Gas ........................................................................................................ 55 Communications ................................................................................................ 57 Pre-shift Checks ................................................................................................. 58

3.9

POWER PLANT AND SUPPORTING SYSTEMS .............................................................................. 62

General ............................................................................................................... 58 Cranes ................................................................................................................ 59 Pipe Handling ..................................................................................................... 60 BOP Transporter................................................................................................. 61 Man riding .......................................................................................................... 61 Power Distribution ............................................................................................. 62 Emergency Generator ........................................................................................ 62 Emergency Lighting ........................................................................................... 64 Motor Generators ............................................................................................... 64 System Instrumentation & Automation ............................................................ 65 Electrical System Monitoring ............................................................................. 66 Equipment Location and Manning ..................................................................... 66 Fuel Oil System .................................................................................................. 66

3.10

3.10.1 Overview ............................................................................................................ 67

RIG AIR SYSTEM.............................................................................................................. 67

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3.11

3.10.2 3.10.3 3.10.4 3.10.5 3.11.1 3.11.2 3.11.3 3.11.4 3.11.5 3.11.6 3.11.7 3.11.8 3.11.9

HEATING VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS........................................................... 69

Cold Start System .............................................................................................. 68 Dry Air system .................................................................................................... 68 Air System for Tensioners .................................................................................. 68 Bulk Air Compressor .......................................................................................... 69 General ............................................................................................................... 69 Living Quarters................................................................................................... 69 Mud Pit Room ..................................................................................................... 70 Shale-Shaker ...................................................................................................... 70 Paint Locker ....................................................................................................... 70 Loss of ventilation .............................................................................................. 71 Temporary Ventilation ....................................................................................... 71 Natural Ventilation............................................................................................. 71 Emergency Shut Down....................................................................................... 71

3.12

3.13

3.12.1 Drainage ............................................................................................................. 72 3.12.2 Sewage ............................................................................................................... 72 3.12.3 Environmental Impact ....................................................................................... 72 3.13.1 3.13.2 3.13.3 3.13.4 3.13.5 3.13.6 3.13.7 3.13.8 3.13.9
COMMUNICATIONS ........................................................................................................... 73

DRAIN EFFLUENT AND WASTE SYSTEMS ................................................................................. 72

3.14 3.15

3.14.1 Helideck .............................................................................................................. 77 3.15.1 3.15.2 3.15.3 3.15.4 3.15.5 3.15.6 3.15.7 3.16.1 3.16.2 3.16.3 3.16.4 3.16.5 3.16.6 3.16.7 3.17.1 3.17.2 3.17.3 3.17.4 3.17.5
STORING AND HANDLING OF EXPLOSIVES/FLAMMABLES AND OTHER HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES ............. 77

HELIDECK FACILITIES ........................................................................................................ 77

Alarms, PA Systems and Internal Communications ......................................... 73 General Alarm/Public Address System ............................................................. 73 Fire and Gas Alarms ........................................................................................... 73 Telephone Exchange/Public Address System ................................................... 74 Plantscape .......................................................................................................... 74 Loss of Ventilation Alarms ................................................................................. 75 LQ Sprinklers Flow Alarms ................................................................................. 75 Hand-held Radios ............................................................................................... 75 External Communications .................................................................................. 75

3.16

UTILITIES ...................................................................................................................... 81

General ............................................................................................................... 77 Fuel Oil ............................................................................................................... 78 Hazardous Materials & Inventory ..................................................................... 79 Bulk Liquid Nitrogen .......................................................................................... 79 Toxic Chemicals ................................................................................................. 80 Explosives .......................................................................................................... 80 Radioactive Material .......................................................................................... 80 General ............................................................................................................... 81 Potable Water .................................................................................................... 81 Drill water .......................................................................................................... 81 Seawater Cooling ............................................................................................... 82 Treated Fresh Water System ............................................................................. 82 Lube oil System .................................................................................................. 82 Wash-down System ........................................................................................... 83 General ............................................................................................................... 83 Hazardous Area Classifications ......................................................................... 83 Electrical Equipment .......................................................................................... 84 Third Party Equipment ....................................................................................... 84 Fire Detection ..................................................................................................... 84

3.17

FIRE AND EXPLOSION PROTECTION ....................................................................................... 83

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3.18 3.19 3.20

3.17.6 Gas Detection ..................................................................................................... 85 3.17.7 Detection Devices .............................................................................................. 86 3.17.8 Power Supply ..................................................................................................... 87 3.17.9 Portable Gas Detection ...................................................................................... 87 3.17.10 Emergency Shut Down Systems..................................................................... 87 3.17.11 Active Fire Protection ..................................................................................... 88 3.17.12 Fire Hydrants .................................................................................................. 89 3.17.13 Deluge System ................................................................................................ 89 3.17.14 Sprinkler System............................................................................................. 90 3.17.15 Novec System ................................................................................................. 90 3.17.16 Portable Fire Extinguishers ............................................................................ 91 3.17.17 Miscellaneous Fire-fighting Equipment ......................................................... 91 3.17.18 Passive Fire Detection .................................................................................... 91 3.18.1 Temporary Refuge Description .......................................................................... 92
EVACUATION AND ESCAPE SYSTEMS ...................................................................................... 92

TEMPORARY REFUGE ......................................................................................................... 92

3.19.1 System Description ............................................................................................ 92 3.20.1 3.20.2 3.20.3 3.20.4 3.20.5 3.20.6 3.20.7

ACCOMMODATION ............................................................................................................ 93

3.21 3.22 3.23

3.21.1 Well Testing ....................................................................................................... 97 3.22.1 Installation of Equipment onboard ................................................................. 100 3.23.1 3.23.2 3.23.3 3.23.4 3.23.5 3.23.6 3.23.7 3.23.8
THIRD PARTY EQUIPMENT ................................................................................................ 100 SURFACE BOP SYSTEM .................................................................................................... 100

DRILLING OPERATIONS & FLUIDS TO SURFACE ......................................................................... 97

General ............................................................................................................... 93 Upper Deck Living Quarters............................................................................... 93 Navigation Deck ................................................................................................. 94 Lower Level ........................................................................................................ 94 Upper Deck Living Quarters Fire and Safety Plans ........................................... 95 Main Deck Living Quarters Fire and Safety Plans ............................................. 96 Navigation Deck Living Quarters Fire and Safety Plans ................................... 97

3.24 3.25

3.25.1 Documentation................................................................................................. 107

DRAWINGS................................................................................................................... 105 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................. 107

Overview .......................................................................................................... 100 SBOP System Hardware ................................................................................... 100 Surface BOP Stack ........................................................................................... 101 Seabed Isolation Device .................................................................................. 101 Station Keeping and Movement ...................................................................... 102 SBOP HAZOP .................................................................................................... 102 SBOP Familiarisation and Training .................................................................. 103 SBOP External Components Schematic; (Permission of Shell Americas) ...... 104

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3. 3.1 3.1.1

ARCTIC I DESCRIPTION Introduction Purpose

3.1.1.1 Part 3 of the HSE Case provides brief description of the rig and equipment installed to onboard and their functionality within the overall intent of reducing risk potential to a minimal acceptable level. 3.1.1.2 The section provides background details of critical systems that impact upon the daily operation of the and by their nature form an barrier within the management of risk. The description will identify the implied hazards and the barriers and formal practices and procedures established to control any risk 3.1.1.3 The text will relate to the hazards and environmental impacts which will be covered in the Risk Managements section of the case (Part 4) 3.1.2 Document Update

3.1.2.1 The text within this section of the case has been updated in the light of the change of ownership of the ARCTIC I and the integration of the unit into the Transocean Management system. In some areas it is necessary to describe the original systems in place and where appropriate reference regarding sections of the Corporate Management system is reference in terms of the current system as applied.

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3.1.3 Abbreviations 3.1.3.1 As identified with text. Definition Alternating Current Air Handling Unit Anchor Handling vessels As Low as Reasonably Practicable American Petroleum Institute British Approvals Service for Electrical equipment for Flammable Atmosphers Ballast Control Operator Ballast Control Room (Primary Control Centre) Bottom Hole Assembly Blow Out Preventer Ballast Pump Rooms Direct Current Down Hole Safety Valve Det Norsk Veritas Department of Energy (UK Regulatory Body) Digital System Calling Drill String Compensator Emergency Positioning Indication Radio Beacon (Float Free Device) Emergency Shut Down Emergency Shut Down Valve General Alarm Gallons per minute GlobalSantaFe Global Maritime Distress Safety System Global Positioning System Hydrogen Sulphide Gas Helicopter Landing Officer High Pressure High Pressure/High temperature (Wells) Health and Safety Executive (United Kingdom Regulatory body) Health Safety and Environmental (Management System) Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning International Association of Drilling Contractors International Air Transport Association Internal Blow Out Preventer Internal Diameter Institute of Electrical Engineers International Maritime Dangerous Goods International Maritime Organisation Job Risk Analysis Kinetic Energy Monitoring System Measurement of height of Rig Centre of gravity above Keel Lower Explosive Limit Lower Marine Riser Package
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Abbreviation AC AHU AHVs ALARP API BASEEFA BCO BCR BHA BOP BPRs DC DHSV DNV DoE DSC (VHF) DSC EPIRB ESD ESDV GA Gpm GSF GMDSS GPS H2S HLO HP HP/Ht HSE (UK) HSE HVAC IADC IATA IBOP ID IEE IMDG IMO JRA KEMS KG LEL LMRP

ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 3 Description & Supporting Information

LQ LWD MF MGS MODU MPI MSDS MWD NDT OBM OIM PA PIC POB PRVs PSI PTT PTW PVT QA QC RCD RMS ROP ROV RPM SART SBV SCR SPM Stbd SWL TEMPSC UPS VDU VHF VMS WOB

Living Quarters Logging While Drilling Medium Frequency Mud Gas Separator Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Magnetic Particle Inspection Material Safety Data Sheets Measurement While Drilling Non destructive Testing Oil Based Mud Offshore Installation Manager Personnel Address (System) Person in Charge Persons onboard Pressure Relief Valve Pound Per Square Inch Press To Talk Permit to Work Pit Volume Totaliser Quality Assessment Quality Control Residual Current device Rig Management System Rate of Penetration Remote Operated Vehicle Revolutions Per Minute Search and Rescue Transponder Stand By Vessel Silicon Controlled Rectifier Strokes Per Minute Starboard Safe Working Load Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft/Capsule Uninterruptible Power Supply Video Display Unit Very High Frequency (Radio Transceiver) Ventilation Management System Weight on Bit

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 3 Description & Supporting Information

3.2 3.2.1

Overview General Information

3.2.1.1 The ARCTIC 1 mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) was built in by Rauma Repola Oy at Mantyluota Shipyard in Finland in 1983. The unit is a Friede and Goldman model L907 series enhanced Pacesetter design 3.2.1.2 Crew accommodation for 116 persons is located at the forward end of the rig at main deck level and is divided into two decks located as far away as reasonably practicable from the drilling area. There is an additional accommodation block located on the starboard forward bow, two smaller four man module is located at the bow of the rig, port side 3.2.1.3 The layout and mobility of ARCTIC I make it suited for drilling operations in connection with the following: Exploratory drilling Appraisal drilling Development drilling Work-overs Well tests Early production Subsea completions High pressure/high temperature

3.2.1.4 If necessary the ARCTIC I could also be used for certain offshore construction operations and modified for use in an accommodation role. 3.2.1.5 As required by Flag state, Class Society and Coastal state, the full scope of annual survey and accompanying certification is maintained, ensuring continued compliance of the units systems to the wide scope of Classification, Flag and Coastal state compliance standards. 3.2.1.6 ARCTIC I has been awarded a full term SMC certificate indicating ISM compliance valid until 2014 by DNV. The Corporate office Houston holds the DOC for the ISM system 3.2.2 Classification and Registration

3.2.2.1 The ARCTIC I is classed and surveyed by the Det Norsk Veritas (DNV) society for compliance to the standard notation:

+1A1 column stabilised Drilling Unit HELDK, CRNS Non-self propelled.


3.2.2.2 The ARCTIC I is registered with the Flag State administration of the Port of Vila in Vanuatu

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3.2.3

Layout

3.2.3.1 As an enhanced Pacesetter designed unit, the ARCTIC I is a twin hull, single deck structure supported by six pontoon mounted vertical caissons which are tied together by three transverse submerged horizontal tubular members and at main deck level by two longitudinal and three transverse box girders. A system of diagonal members is used to provide additional bracing between the main deck and the lower hull and at lower hull level. 3.2.3.2 Each hull is divided into ballast tanks, fuel tanks, drill water tanks, a propulsion space and a ballast pump room (BPR). 1 base oil tank is provided in the starboard hull. The hulls are fully submerged at operating and survival drafts. 3.2.3.3 The BPRs are surrounded with drill water tanks that act as a double skin, protecting the pump room in the event of collision. 3.2.3.4 Rising from each hull are three caissons attached to box girders supporting the main deck. Each caisson is horizontally divided to create three vertical spaces;

Space Height above keel 25 ft to 50Ft 50 ft to 90Ft

Designation of space Colum Ballast tanks in PC1 SC1 - PC3 2 SBM or Brine tanks Additional Bulk storage facilities Potable water Tensioner Bottles

Each caisson is surrounded from the 50 ft to 90 ft level by void spaces that provide additional protection against collision or vessel impact These double skin areas are sub-divided vertically at the 65 ft level 90 ft to Main Deck level Houses utilities-related equipment, workshops and material stores.

3.2.3.5 The upper deck structure approximately 48 ft above the water line at drilling draft. 3.2.3.6 The living quarters (LQ) have been recently been extended and are now able to provide berths for 116 persons. The Living quarters extend across the forward end of the vessel immediately under the Helideck, which is rated for a Sikorski S-61 aircraft with maximum 9.0T lift off weight 3.2.3.7 The Helideck forms the deck-head of the LQ, overhanging and protecting the primary muster area, two forward TEMPSC and embarkation points. There are four access stairs to the Helideck, three from the pipe deck and one from starboard side of the Helideck. 3.2.3.8 ARCTIC I is equipped with 2 davit-launched totally enclosed motor propelled survival craft (TEMPSC), (each of 58 person capacity) forward. The location of the TEMPSC is such that they are as far separated from the drill floor as possible with the accommodation block forming a suitable barrier in between. 3.2.3.9 Five Life rafts are located aft, four are 25 man davit launched units, the fifth being a throw over 20 man type, total Life raft capacity being 120 persons. The rafts provide an alternative means of escape. In addition a davit launched 23 person MOB boat with remote (in boat brake release function) and on load launching capability is located on the centre line of the ARTCIC I right aft at main deck level.

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3.2.3.10 The main deck level of the Living Quarters contains; SCR Room Engine Room Ballast control room Mud pump room Mud Pit room Sack Store Warehouse Workshops Emergency Generator room

3.2.3.11 All spaces above and below main deck are mechanically ventilated with all ventilation mushrooms being located at main deck level or above, enabling ease of closing if required. Access to these working spaces is directly from the walkway at main deck level. There is one internal corridor leading from engine space/SCR room on the port side and mud pump room on starboard side, to the LQ by the mess room, then on to primary muster area via escape windows in Cabin No 1.9 or 2.9 for the upper accommodation. 3.2.3.12 The main deck provides stowage for; Containers and other drilling related materials Starboard main deck Well test equipment aft main deck.

3.2.3.13 The pipe deck located forward of the drill floor, is laid out in bays bordered by Sampson posts to facilitate the secure stowage of drilling Tubulars and related equipment. 3.2.3.14 Access to the BOP Handling area is from the main deck aft. purpose-built carrier at the port aft end of the Moonpool when not in use. The BOP is stowed on a

3.2.3.15 The BCR (Ballast Control Room) is located adjacent to the SCR room aft of the LQ mid-ships on the lower level. 3.2.3.16 The Pilot house on the Navigation deck is located at the starboard forward end of the upper accommodation, provides the centre for the limited navigational duties including propulsion system control. The Pilot house and Navigation deck area provide the facilities for the Emergency Control Centre. 3.2.3.17 The Cement unit is housed in a purpose-built enclosure aft of the pipe deck starboard side. Other small mezzanine decks above and adjacent to the cement unit are used to locate the mud logging & MWD /LWD unit and to store other items of drilling equipment 3.2.3.18 The Drill floor is above the pipe deck and can be accessed from the pipe deck forward from the main deck aft via the riser deck and from the logging deck starboard using stairs from the starboard pipe deck or from starboard aft. 3.2.3.19 ARCTIC I is designed such that the retention of significant hydrocarbon inventories onboard will be limited, the volume of such inventories being confined to small amounts in transient systems e.g. pipe work, leading to Well test spreads and flares booms. The mitigation for the risk of a significant event leading to combustion and explosion of a hydrocarbon source is provided by a suitable mix of natural and mechanically ventilation within the deck and hull areas, together with suitable strength of design and internal subdivisions. Additionally critical services are protected either passively through local strengthening or actively through the use of back-up systems.

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3.2.3.20 Where possible throughout the rig Self closing doors are utilised to enhance the maintaining of the compartmentalisation standard.. 3.2.3.21 The Maximum operating POB of 116 persons includes regular crew members, Operators representatives and service personnel. Depending on the mode of operation, the following qualified personnel may be on board: o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) Performance Toolpusher Day & Night Toolpushers Stability Technician/Helicopter Landing Officer (HLO) Ballast Control Operator (BCO) Maintenance Aupervisor Mechanic Electrician Electronic Technician Lifeboat Crew Fire fighting Crew Crane Operator/Helicopter Landing Officer (HLO) Welder Medic Mechanic Radio Operator Crews (as appropriate)

3.2.3.22 A general outline of the practices and procedures that govern the ARCTIC Is operations are detailed in the Operations Manual and the Critical Procedures Manual. In addition a Ballast Operators Manual is also provide for the use of the BCOs 3.2.3.23 The ARCTIC I and its equipment are covered by an extensive maintenance programme. The world-wide computerised maintenance tracking system (RMS), contains a record of all equipment onboard the rig and provides a means for scheduling maintenance and recording work carried out from which a maintenance history can be tracked. 3.2.4 Modifications and Upgrades

3.2.4.1 The unit was originally built to UK HSE 3rd Edition Guidance and subsequently upgraded to 4th Edition. 3.2.4.2 A number of major modifications have been made to the MODU since building, which have been carried out in conjunction with the Certifying and Classification Authorities. These include Upgrading the drilling facilities for high pressure high temperature drilling Installation of a Varco TDS-4H Top drive and derrick extension KEMS system A Refined solids control system Installation of four column blisters to increase Rig stability Installation of starboard midship deck infill extensions to improve deck storage

3.2.4.3 In 1996 / 1997 further upgrades were carried out including:

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Installation of a 3rd Mud pump to provide back up and higher pumping rates/volume Installation of an accommodation annex located forward of the existing accommodation to the stbd side. This accommodates 12 persons. Mud Storage tanks and transfer system were installed in Port caisson #3 and stbd caisson #3 to increase capacity of onboard liquid mud capability. Addition of 2 Accommodation Modules (8 beds) Additional Office space Change out of aft crane

3.2.4.4 In 2007 further upgrades were carried out including: 3.3 3.3.1

Primary Structure Environmental Operating Limits/Design Criteria

3.3.1.1 Environmental design capabilities are identified within the ARCTIC Is Operations Manual , which contains data and sample worksheets to supporting the necessary calculations to undertake the work. 3.3.1.2 Environmental operating limits for the rig working on a specific location depend on the individual effects of a number of variables. Unit stability is the controlling criteria, in particular the maximum allowable centre of gravity, KG, and a curve of allowable values. More extensive information relating to the governing stability criteria for specific environmental conditions are located within the ARCTIC I Operations Manual. 3.3.1.3 ARCTIC I has been designed for global operations in water depths of 150 to 3400 ft. Specific design structural parameters can be found in the Operations Manual. The rig was designed to withstand the combined effect of the following conditions as established by the regulatory bodies limiting criteria. 3.3.1.4 The table below indicates the environmental limitations. OPERATING MODE NOMINAL DRAFT (FT) Environmental Limitation: Maximum Steady Wind (kt) Current (kt) Significant Wave Height (ft) Maximum Wave Height (ft) 70.0 3.0 26.8 50.0 110.0 3.0 54.0 100.0 100.0 16.1 30.0 100.0 26.8 50.0 DRILLING 68 STORM 50 OCEAN TRANSIT 39 FIELD TRANSIT 60

3.3.1.5 The rigs stability has been analysed and updated by its designers, Friede and Goldman, against the requirements of the 4th Edition and on the basis of this work the Operations Manual for the unit has been upgraded to reflect the resulting revision to the safe operating envelope. As required within the corporate management system this latest analysis was submitted to the Classification society for acceptance as an assurance of the ARCTIC I continued compliance to fitness for purpose. 3.3.1.6 As required within the Company Management System a mooring analysis is undertaken prior
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to commencing work at any new location. This suitability assessment is based on local environmental criteria, seabed criteria, water depth and expected deck loading at that location. 3.3.1.7 Typically such assessments are undertaken by accredited external service providers who undertake the role of independent warranty surveyors. 3.3.1.8 For every Rig Move a specific check list will be completed and distributed by the OIM. Completion approval of the check list by an authorised competent body will be required before the commencement of the rig move operation. Examples of such check lists are provided in the Rigs Operation manual. 3.3.2 Structural Integrity

3.3.2.1 The ARCTIC I structure meets classification and flag-state requirements and is certified fitfor purpose in accordance with 4th Edition requirements by the classification society based on the appropriate re-analyses of the structure undertaken by the designers Friede and Goldman. Analyses relating to dynamic effects, fatigue and accidental loads resulting from vessel collision, have been submitted and independently reviewed by the classification society. 3.3.2.2 The construction of the MODU was monitored and controlled utilising strict QA/QC procedures drawn up by Ltd, Rauma Repola Oy, Friede and Goldman and approved by the owner and the Classification society. 3.3.2.3 At the original design stage of the unit, using conservative assumptions, the minimum (based on the worst case) fatigue life for the ARCTIC I was estimated at 20 years. However as part of the rigs compliance to remain in class and therefore in compliance with the requirements of its classification society, DNV, the structure is subjected to a 5 year special survey routine which includes extensive structural inspection and NDT testing to ensure the integrity of the structure is in good order with no indications of defects. The structural inspection regime by the classification society becoming more demanding extensive with the increasing age of the unit. 3.3.2.4 The design notation indicates ARCTIC I was constructed under the standard of Class survey, i.e. DNV Class representatives in attendance throughout construction. All construction materials were to standards specified by DNV as the certification body. Within the construction process critical material was tested for compliance to these standards. Details of the ARCTIC I construction are to be found in the Rig Construction Portfolio, which is maintained onboard. 3.3.2.5 Specific details and drawings are contained in Section 8 of the Rig Operations Manual. 3.3.2.6 The Marine Department, as represented by the Ballast Control Operator and Stability Technician are responsible for day to day structural control in terms of monitoring the variable loads onboard the rig. These personnel have a suitable level training and are deemed competent and responsible for ensuring the ARCTIC I is not loaded beyond the design criteria, taking into account design deck loadings, operational loads and environmental loads. 3.3.2.7 In order to minimize the likelihood of collision during supply boat handling, all vessel movements are closely monitored and controlled. 3.3.2.8 Regular structural inspections are undertaken by third parties as a requirement of continued operation. DNV as the classification authority undertake regular annual survey to ensure compliance to the relevant deign and operational standards. The requirement for dry-docking is replaced by a sheltered water in water hull and structural inspection twice every 5 years. A thorough inspection covering the critical joints and utilising NDT is carried out as required by Class. The workscope for this inspection requires replacement of any anode with a material wastage of greater than 50%.
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3.3.2.9 Corrosion protection is undertaken in all spaces except fuel tanks by the use of suitable paint coatings and sacrificial anodes. The internal surfaces of all void spaces and braces are coated with a suitable protective coating. In support of the corrosion and structural monitoring policy all tanks and void spaces are inspected annually by a competent person. 3.3.2.10 All structural alterations and modifications are handled in accordance with the system outlined in Part 2 Section 2.7 Standards and Procedures and Part 2.10 Operational Standards and Procedures. Any damage to the MODUs structure is reported to Transocean shore-based office and to the Classification Society. 3.3.3 Marine Integrity - Stability

3.3.3.1 Competent Marine personnel are responsible for ensuring that ARCTIC I is not loaded beyond the design criteria, taking into account design deck loadings, operational loads and environmental loads. 3.3.3.2 To assure the integrity of the Stability data the following barriers are in place; Formally Trained Competent Stability Personnel Formally Trained Competent Ballast Control Operator Accredited and proven Stability calculation software Company procedures requiring the day to day calculation of rig stability

3.3.3.3 As a requirement of continued operation regular annual survey are undertaken by DNV as the Classification society to ensure compliance to the relevant deign and operational standards. 3.3.3.4 In addition to the mandatory surveys a monthly water ingress check of all void spaces in all horizontal and vertical braces is completed. 3.3.4 Marine Integrity - Watertight Integrity

3.3.4.1 Watertight integrity is maintained through; Rig design Established procedures Mechanical local/remotely operated closing systems Monitoring systems with audible alarm and means of location identification Compartmental and general Rig space CCTV Monitoring System verification through Class audit and routine inspection System operability checks through Rig Maintenance regime.

3.3.4.2 As part of the established procedures post pre-tensioning of moorings at a new location and as part of the clearance procedures for drilling operations a full void space and watertight check is completed. 3.3.4.3 The ARCTIC I has 8 electro-hydraulically operated watertight closures; One from each ballast pump room to propulsion space One at 50 ft level of each caisson No 2-P No 2-S One each Port & Starboard access to BPRs

3.3.4.4 All doors can be closed locally hydraulically remotely at the panel in the SCR or manually locally. 3.3.4.5 Indicator panels in the SCR provide a status indication for the doors or hatches. In addition
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twice daily compartment integrity checks are completed to verify compartment integrity status. The mechanical means of closing are covered within the Rig Maintenance system. 3.3.4.6 In the event of a sudden loss of containment causing flooding, sudden change of heel or trim, alarms will be initiated by the Tank monitoring and or the Bilge alarm warning systems. Indications of the area of the loss of containment will be provided through the system. 3.3.4.7 In addition to Status indicator panels and bilge and flooding alarm systems a CCTV monitoring system is installed enabling the Ballast Control Operators to monitor the Ballast Pump Rooms. 3.3.4.8 All below deck ventilation systems with supply and extraction shafts located above deck have manually operated lever type means of closure fitted. 3.3.4.9 By design, the Spurling pipes extend several feet above the main deck, preventing any migration of water from the main deck level down into the lower hulls. 3.3.4.10 Specific procedures are in place to ensure that in the event of a tank requiring to be opened for inspection with the ARCTIC I in the ballast condition, only one tank will be operated on at any time. 3.3.5 Ballast System

3.3.5.1 The ARCTIC I Ballast system was designed in accordance with UK DoE Guidelines 4th edition, and meets the requirements for certification under the DNV requirements for class compliance. 3.3.5.2 The ballast system is designed to; Maintain vessel at desired draft Operating Survival Transit Change rig draft upon change of requirement Counteract weight changes due to change of weight distribution

3.3.5.3 .The ARCTIC I can be de-ballasted from drilling draft to survival draft in approximately 3 hours with a further 1 hour to transit draft 3.3.5.4 The system can be operated from; BCR main console for Honeywell monitoring and control system Auxiliary Ballast control station on Navigation deck. Auxiliary Ballast Control station in Wheelhouse

3.3.5.5 The BCR is the prime Ballast system control point being manned 24 hours per day by qualified competent Ballast Control operators 3.3.5.6 The remote stations can also be used to display the tank level status of all lower hull and caisson tanks that are used to store ballast, drill water, mud, fuel oil, base oil, bilge and waste water. 3.3.5.7 Identical Ballast pumping arrangement in each hull consist of; 2 Goulds vertical turbine pumps each rated at 3300 Gpm. Pumps are located amidships ensuring full availability in the event of the rig sustaining an adverse attitude of heel or trim. Each pump supports its own manifold

3.3.5.8 In essence the Ballast system is supported by a single dedicated pump which is nominated as Ballast pump. However in support of the need for redundancy a second similar pump named BILGE
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PUMP is connected onto the Ballast system and physically located by the main Ballast pump in the pontoon Ballast Pump room. This BILGE pump has similar connections onto the main Ballast suction and discharge manifolds as the nominated Ballast pump. In an emergency, the salt water service pump (1 in each pump room) can be used to perform the same functions. Thus providing further redundancy 3.3.5.9 The Ballast system therefore has two pumps available although one unit is identified with a Bilge function. 3.3.5.10 As part of the rig Contingency planning, the marine crew undertake regular training exercises simulating a system failure. System failure procedures are posted in the BCR to cover a computer or system failure. 3.3.5.11 As part of the structural and corrosion protection program all sea chests are equipped with sacrificial anodes. The sea chests are inspected and overhauled along with the valves at each special survey (every 5 years). At the bi-annual survey (every 2 years) they undergo a visual inspection utilising diver-held video cameras. 3.3.6 Ballast System Valves

3.3.6.1 The ballast manifold consists of - Pneumatic actuated butterfly suction and discharge valves for each tank which can be used interchangeably. 3.3.6.2 Tank valves and intermediate sea chest valves are of the pneumatic open/close butterfly type. Valves fail close on loss of power unless selected to manual mode. 3.3.6.3 All main hull side sea valves are manual operation with remote operated secondary valves inboard of the skin valve. The remote operated sea chest valves are double acting valves. Sea chest valves fail as is on loss of power. In the event of the loss of the control system in the BCR the PIU can be isolated from the control box in the BCR and the secondary sea valves will close. 3.3.6.4 As a standard procedure, all valves are kept in the closed position when not in use. 3.3.6.5 In the event of electrical power being lost to the system or local control panels, the valve actuators may be manually operated at their local position. 3.3.6.6 In the event of a failure of air supply to the valve the following means of emergency operation are available; Use of a local 32cu ft Local Air accumulator unit- Each pontoon is supplied with central accumulator and necessary back up connections to the valve actuators. The Ballast control consol is provided with an alarm indicating any air loss in these back up air lines. 2 Local Air bottles in each pump room supplying air through a flexible hose connection system onto the Schrader valve on the valve actuator Hand Air Pump A local hand pump is provided for operation in a similar manner as the local air bottle supply. In addition to the above, in each pump room a crank handle is located which can be used to operate the valve provided the air actuator is removed

3.3.6.7 In the event of a complete power failure the Honeywell Experion Ballast control system configurations are designed to automatically fail valves closed and stop pumps as already stated. Similarly sea chest valves will fail as is. The propulsion system cooling valves also controlled through the Experion will fail as is.

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3.3.7

Arctic 1 Ballast Control System

3.3.7.1 The following is a brief description of the components, locations and system architecture of the Honeywell Experion System. 3.3.7.2 Two Experion Servers are located in a Server cabinet complete with two Cisco Hubs and a LCD screen; the server cabinet is in the Electronic Technicians (ETs) workshop. This screen can be used as a workstation if required. 3.3.7.3 Two Honeywell Plantscape C200 Controllers and the two Honeywell PLCs are located in PIU7 (Process Interface Unit 7). This PIU is the Main I/O box for all the Digital, analog inputs and outputs for the 85-foot levels, Blisters, Main deck, Engines and Machinery above decks. This PIU7 is also in the ETs Workshop. Unknown at this time 3.3.7.4 Two Honeywell PLCs are located in the Port Pump Room PIU5 3.3.7.5 This PIU is the Main I/O box for all the Digital, analogue inputs and outputs for the Ballast valves and Tank Gauging system for the Port Legs below the 85 foot level and the Port Pump and Propulsion rooms. 3.3.7.6 Two Honeywell PLCs are located in the Starboard Pump Room PIU6 3.3.7.7 This PIU is the Main I/O box for all the Digital, analogue inputs and outputs for the Ballast valves and Tank Gauging system for the Starboard Legs below the 85 foot level and Starboard Pump and Propulsion rooms. 3.3.7.8 Each PIU has Dual Power supply PCB modules. 3.3.7.9 Two Honeywell PC Work Stations are located in the Ballast Control Room 3.3.7.10 These PC Work Stations Have Dual Screens and each screen is designated as an Operator Station. 3.3.7.11 Each Operator Station can work independent of the other screens as long as the Workstation is Operational. 3.3.7.12 One Honeywell PC Workstation is located on the Bridge and this PC is the emergency Ballast Control Station to be used in the event the Ballast control room becomes inoperative. This PC has two screen. 3.3.7.13 One further PC Workstation is located in the Ballast Control Room and this is designated for Main Engine and Machinery Alarms. 3.3.7.14 This PC also has dual screens one screen in the ballast control room and the other in the SCR room for engineering department use 3.3.8 Communication System Operational Overview

3.3.8.1 The workstations are operating under the Honeywell Experion software and Windows 2000 PRO. 3.3.8.2 The Servers are operating on Windows 2000 server software. 3.3.8.3 The two C200 Controllers are the heart of the system.
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3.3.8.4 These Controllers communicate with the Plantscape Servers and PIU5 PLCs by coax control net cables. 3.3.8.5 These Controllers communicate with the Port PIU7 and Starboard PIU6 by Fibre Optic Cables. Each PIU has two separate Fibre optic Cable Runs. Each run has been kept as far as possible away from each other. 3.3.8.6 The two Servers communicate with the PC Workstations via the two Cisco hubs (A & B) with Ethernet cables. 3.3.8.7 Each run has been kept as far as possible away from each other. 3.3.8.8 Each Server and PC Workstation has dual Ethernet cards. 3.3.8.9 Normal operation is for a Server, Controller, Control net, Hub and associated Ethernet cables, and Fibre optic cable run to the PIUs. 3.3.8.10 A failure of any one of the above or combination of single items of the above will result in a hot swap to the redundant controller, server Hub etc without interruption to the Ballast control system. 3.3.8.11 The PLCs in the PIUs have no redundancy as each point on the PLC cards is designated t a field component. 3.3.8.12 Each PC Workstation has dual Ethernet cards so any failure of an Ethernet link will not stop the Workstation performing its task. 3.3.8.13 The Dual Power supply PCBs in the PIUs operate in tandem so a failure of one PCB will not stop the PIU from continuing to work. 3.3.9 Power Supplies for the Ballast System

3.3.9.1 The Ballast control system is operated on 120 volts A.C. 3.3.9.2 A new UPS has been fitted for the Plantscape Ballast Control System and this is a Master Power 8 kva LM-1080 series True On-line UPS Fed from the Emergency Switchboard MCC7 2 g 480 v supply. 3.3.9.3 This UPS was load tested on the ballast system on the 13 Feb 2003 under normal operating load and was found to be good for in excess of 5 hours with new batteries. 3.3.9.4 The Ballast System will normally be run from the Master Power UPS but in the even of a failure then two alternative supplies are available. 3.3.9.5 One from the Main Switchboard MCC7 2 a and one from the Emergency Switchboard MCC7 1 g 480 v supplies. 3.3.9.6 Both Alternative supplies have SOLA transformer to reduce spikes on the systems and to bring the voltage down to the operational voltage of 12 v A.C 3.3.10 Bilge System

3.3.10.1 Each ARCTIC I pontoon pump room has a bilge system and a dedicated bilge sump pump
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which is started from the BCR as the effluent level in the sump rises. All pump room drains flow into this sump. The contents of the sump are discharged either overboard thru an oil water content monitor or directly to a bilge settling tank. An alarm is generated in the BCR to inform the BCO that this pump is running. 3.3.10.2 As already identified one of the large pumps connected directly onto the Ballast system is also termed as Bilge Pump. 3.3.10.3 The Bilge system manifold is connected directly to the Ballast system suction manifold, enabling either the Bilge/Ballast or Main Ballast Pump to take suction from the bilge system. 3.3.10.4 All pumps associated with the bilge system are primarily controlled remotely from workstations located in the BCR and SCR. These pumps and associated valves can also, if required, be operated locally at the MCC panels located in the BPRs. 3.3.10.5 The Bilge and Ballast piping arrangements and commonality of systems allows for extensive capability in the event of either pump failure or in the event of a loss of containment leading to flooding into the Pump room or machinery room space. 3.3.10.6 The Pontoon Bilge manifold system serves the following spaces; Area
1 - Port & Starboard Caisson 2 Port and Starboard Caisson 1 Port and Starboard Caisson 3 Port and Starboard Caisson

Bilge Suctions
85 Ft Level 55 Ft Level 85 Ft Level 50 Ft Forward Chain Locker

Valve Type

No of suctions
1 2 Suctions available 1 2 Suctions available 1

Screw 85 Ft Level 55 Ft Level Aft Chain Locker Wing suction Pump room Wing suction Elevator shaft Hydrophone Well Cofferdam Propeller Machinery Room Shaft Alley Down Check Valve 1 2 Suctions available 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Pump Room Port and Starboard

3.3.10.7 All spaces below main deck level (caissons, voids, flats, pump room passageways, sheave boxes and propulsion spaces) are drained through piping, manifolded in the BPRs. The piping contains screw down check valves for protection against cross-flooding of the spaces manifolded together in the BPR. 3.3.10.8 Two dedicated suctions are provided in the main Pump room and Propulsion Machinery spaces with connection to the Bilge/Ballast Pump to provide additional capacity in the event of a flooding situation 3.3.10.9 All vertical and horizontal braces have piping and valve arrangements leading into the lower
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hulls for the detection and draining of water. The void spaces can be drained into the bilge system. These drain lines are checked weekly along with a check performed twice daily of all interior caissons, BPRs and propulsion spaces in the lower hull. 3.3.10.10 All bilge spaces are continually monitored by the Plantscape system. In addition, a visual and audible alarm will be generated should the water level reach a pre-set level. Sensors are also provided to detect flooding in the BPRs and the passageways to the propulsion rooms. 3.3.10.11 The ballast and bilge systems, including the alarm and monitoring systems, are maintained in accordance with the ARCTIC Is maintenance programme. 3.3.11 De-Watering System

3.3.11.1 As an additional emergency function a De- Watering System is provided through a dedicated suction in each Pump room. This system is a contingency system for cross connecting the pump room bilge through a dedicated suction to the Ballast system suction Manifold in the opposite pontoon. The connection being achieved through a crossover line in the central bracing. 3.3.11.2 The mode of operating the dedicated suction valves is from the panel on the aft bulkhead in the SCR Control area. In addition to using rig air and emergency hand pump connection is available for manual activation of the valves. 3.3.12 Mooring and Station-keeping Systems

3.3.12.1 The mooring system was designed in accordance with the IMO MODU Code and DNV Class Rules for MODUs. The system is certified fit-for-purpose in accordance with the requirements contained in Section 32 of the 4th Edition, by DNV and also to the requisite sections of the DNV Class rules for mooring systems. The system is designed for operations in water depths of 200 to 3400 ft. 3.3.12.2 The mooring system and jewellery is subject to annual inspection by DNV. In addition the Company policy for development drilling that each anchor is recovered for inspection at regular intervals. At such times the chains and associated jewellery are also inspected. A comprehensive log is maintained of all inspections and includes details of all tests, repairs and any relevant certification requirements. 3.3.12.3 The anchor winches and associated monitoring and control devices are maintained in accordance with the rig maintenance programme. 3.3.12.4 The ARCTIC I is equipped with a single screw propulsion unit in each pontoon consisting of; Motors 2 GE CD 9664 Total rated power 2000HP each Fixed pitch propeller in Kort nozzle Shaft fitted with pneumatic break to prevent unintentional rotation

3.3.12.5 At design stage, ARCTIC I mooring system was analysed with the standard POSMOOR software by DNV and found compliant for North sea operations. Since the original analysis independent mooring analysis are performed during contract evaluation processes by both the Owners internal and external consultancy groups 3.3.12.6 During the mooring analysis process any special mooring operational requirements brought about by specific local conditions, subsea templates, subsea obstructions, or specific environmental requirements, will be identified and evaluated and then incorporated into the overall mooring plan. 3.3.12.7 The ARCTIC I Operations Manual Part 3 Section F provides details regarding anchor
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deployment, tensions and length of line required. 3.3.12.8 On all occasions prior to tensioning up the system to the working tension all anchor lines will be pre-tensioned in accordance with the specific location requirements, to demonstrate anchor holding has been proven commensurate with underwriters requirements. 3.3.12.9 ARCTIC I mooring system consists of; 8 point composite mooring system Chain Diameter - 3 K4 Grade chain Breaking strain proximately 613 tonnes Chain Length 4,800 ft Anchor type 12 tonne Bruce anchor. 4 Skagit WMD-48 double wildcat units Winch control from 3 remote stations (winch huts at each corner of the unit) Emergency release control from Master control station in Pilot houses DC Drive motors with chain tension indicators Chain locker capacity 5100 ft 3 chain

3.3.12.10 The system arrangement is such that the chain comes from the winches up through the Spurling pipes to the main deck and overboard to an underwater fairlead sheave from where the mooring lines lead to the anchor. In the stowed mode the anchors are tightly secured on bolsters (anchor racks) which ensures the anchors are well clear of the caissons and hulls. 3.3.12.11 Power is assigned to the anchor winches through the operation of master selector switches in the SCR room. Power can be assigned to either marine operations, drilling operations or may be shared between the two. Operational requirements are considered when designating power assignments. 3.3.12.12 In the event of a rig black out and loss of power, the control system will fail, but the winch band brakes will remain applied and can be secured by screw down style hand brakes These static brakes, the clutches and dogs, if engaged, can be released in an emergency utilising pneumatic emergency controls which are located inside the pilot house or locally at each anchor winch. 3.3.12.13 Anchor winch pawls prevent inadvertent winch drum movement and are normally engaged. Exceptions to this are when adjustments to the mooring system are anticipated, such as balancing moorings during heavy weather, or moving from one slot to another when working over a template. Positive pawl position indication is displayed on the winch control panels in the winch houses. 3.3.12.14 The Emergency Mooring System Release is enabled through the release of the pawls through the application of air from a pre-charged accumulator bottle to a piston device. This enables the chain to run free to the bitter end. The final link is designed as a weak link and will part at a lower tension than the remaining chain. The Emergency release can be initiated in a dead ship condition. 3.3.12.15 Emergency mooring release drills are carried out regularly as operational requirements permit to ensure that crew members, particularly marine crews, are fully conversant with procedures and equipment operations. 3.3.12.16 Mooring operations are conducted in line with location specific procedures and undertake that strict operational monitoring and control is maintained to; Damage to the mooring system or to the MODU itself Control movement of anchor handling tugs (AHVs)

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Precise location of anchors using GPS Prevention of contact between Rig Mooring Equipment Anchor Handling vessel Correct securing of anchors on bolster during recovery operations.

3.3.12.17 Risk mitigation is a major consideration during mooring operations, factors supporting this are; Presence of suitably competent and experienced personnel Formal procedures Use of dedicated equipment permanent chasing collars Use of TSTP (Task Specific Think Plan)

3.3.12.18 The control system enables monitoring of the following at each control station; Line speed Drum speed Line tension (Analogue output in kips also fed into & displayed through Experion system) Deployed line length Motor amperage

3.3.12.19 Acoustic beacons fitted on the BOP are used for rig positioning management. Hydrophones suspended under the hull receive the signals transmitting the data to a Nautronx RS 914 processor in the Ballast Control room. The positioning data being displayed in the BCR. 3.3.12.20 Weather forecast used for operational planning purposes are received twice daily or if necessary as required by the OIM from accredited Weather forecast companies. 3.3.12.21 Weather monitoring and logging is a regular activity onboard. Data is logged in accordance with the Transocean Management system requirements. Actual and forecasted conditions are compared as a means of detecting any early warning of a potential deteriorating condition. 3.3.12.22 As part of the Contingency planning process adverse weather response procedures are available, complete with necessary check lists for initiating heavy weather procedures to maintain watertight integrity. 3.3.12.23 A TSTP detailing actions to be taken for securing deck cargo for heavy weather also exists as part of the severe weather procedures. 3.3.12.24 Clear procedures cover the necessary response to a deteriorating weather forecast indicating a risk of conditions exceeding normal operating conditions. In this event the marine riser will be unlatched and the rig moved off the well head location. Management of the mooring system will be required to ensure line tensions are not exceeded. The propulsion system may be utilised dependent upon weather direction to minimise surge and static line tensions. However these units are at their most effective when the weather is directly on the bow or stern and remain effective up to approximately 30 degrees off the bow or stern. 3.3.13 Towing and Propulsion System

3.3.13.1 ARCTIC I is not classed as self propelled, and the propulsion system is utilised during towing operations only to assist in maintaining an effective towing speed. The system is also made ready for use during any departure/arrival to/from a location.

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3.3.13.2 Control and monitoring of the propulsion system is from the Pilot house and SCR room, the Honeywell Experion system being utilised to monitor propulsion system parameters; Bearing temperatures Lube oil temperatures Lube oil pressure Lube oil level Cooling system temperature Lube media (Seawater) flow to the propulsion shaft rubber bearing

3.3.13.3 As a standard procedure the propulsion system requires to be tested prior to use, particularly if adverse weather is forecast. The system is maintained in accordance with the rig maintenance programme with records kept onboard. 3.3.13.4 Rig move procedures are location/transit specific and will cover details such as; Site specific data Towing arrangements Tug requirements Personal Responsibilities Operating Criteria Tidal Information

3.3.13.5 Pre rig move formalities will follow the general process as identified below; Meeting Location
1 Onshore

Participants
Owners Clients

Purpose
Discuss clarify rig move procedures Confirm Tow vessel requirements and Company policy for Towing vessel Agree suitability of proposed vessels Obtain Rig Move Approval from Insuring agency Confirm special tow requirements Confirm procedures Confirm PIC Confirm any special mooring requirements or need for additional risk assessment Weather limitations Review rig move procedure Confirm suitability of pre move checklists Identify contingency issues Confirm operational window Pre move departmental briefing and safety review

Onboard move

Pre

OIM Senior Personnel Positioning Team OIM Vessel Masters Marine Team

Onboard vessels

Tow

3.3.13.6 It is the Company policy that the OIM as person responsible for towing operations, will be a suitably qualified and experienced mariner with suitable marine qualifications. The OIM will ensure correct deployment of the towing vessels and shall ensure that the towing arrangement and equipment are suitable for the towing requirements. 3.3.13.7 As senior Company representative the OIM is responsible for the safety of the vessel and personnel during the rig move operation. The OIM will communicate with the towing vessels ensuring

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that the pre-determined routing is being followed and that towing requirements are being met. Watch-keeping will also be carried out by a suitably qualified person onboard the rig to ensure safety of the vessel. The OIM will also ensure that the lead tug is carrying out normal watch-keeping practices including the broadcast of regular towing bulletins on VHF. 3.3.13.8 At least two vessels will be required for the tow, one vessel towing and the second stood by ready to take the tow. For long tows anchors 1 and 8 are removed and chains rigged as emergency towlines 3.3.13.9 The ARCTIC I has one tow bridle rigged ready for deployment as identified within the rigs operation manual. 3.3.13.10 Four Tugger winches are located at the forward end of the ARCTIC I to facilitate deployment and recovery of the tow bridle. Tow bridles are changed out at regular intervals to coincide with the MODUs bi-annual survey, at which time the towing brackets located on the hulls are inspected and subject to NDT by an independent competent body. All tow bridles and towing jewellery are certified and approved suitable for their purpose. 3.4 3.4.1 Drilling and Well Control Overview

3.4.1.1 The Drilling package, Derrick and associated equipment is at main deck level, aft of the mid ship position. The location of the system is separated by deck storage area from the more sensitive Living quarters and public areas of the vessel. This storage area provides a degree of barrier separation between the operational risk areas and the living quarters. 3.4.1.2 The major equipment features are; 25,000Ft drilling capacity 3000 HP Draw-works 49 Rotary Table Varco TDS-4H c/w Varco PH-85 pipe handler 3 x Oilwell A 1700PT Triplex mud pumps 18 Cameron BOP rated to 15,000PSI Solid Control system with 2047 bbl active mud storage capacity 12 x 80,000Lb rated Riser Tensioner system 6 x 16,000Lb guideline/pod line tensioning system BOP Handling system with 230Ton carrier

3.4.1.3 Where appropriate Safe Working Loads and Safe Working Pressures are marked on all items. 3.4.1.4 Transocean ensure that all aspects of the drilling system are designed manufactured, and installed in line with industry standards and are certified as fit for purpose by the DNV as the certification society. 3.4.1.5 Drilling is carried out using a top drive supported from a derrick rated at 1,400,000 lb. The high pressure side of the mud system is suitable for working at 5,000 psi and on the return side the mud is processed such that both solids and gas are removed prior to the mud being returned to the pits. Mud materials are stored either in bulk or packaged form and as mud is circulated from the pits through the mixing hoppers it is treated with bulk material and returned to the pits. 3.4.1.6 The primary elements of the ARCTIC I well control system are designated as;
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3.5 3.5.1

BOP Choke and Kill system Mud Gas Separator Hoisting and Pipe Handling Mud and Cement system BOP System and Riser

3.4.1.7 The drilling system will be described within the following groups;

Hoisting and Pipe Handling Derrick

3.5.1.1 The derrick supports the drill string tubulars. The weight of the drill string is transmitted through the top drive to the swivel which is in turn supported by the hook attached to the travelling block. The travelling block is raised and lowered using the draw-works and drilling line. The drill line storage is located external to the derrick wind walls and to starboard of the drill floor. The drill line comes off the storage drum, passes through the deadline anchor and is reeved between the crown of the derrick and the travelling block before being wrapped around the drum of the draw-works a sufficient number of times to allow the block to travel the height of the derrick. Once an adequate quantity is fed on to the draw-works drum, the drill line is secured at the deadline anchor using bolts. 3.5.1.2 The derrick and drill floor is supported by a sub-structure with a rated capacity of 1,400,000 lb. 3.5.1.3 The derrick is built to API standard as follows; Height 195 ft Base 40 ft x 40 Ft Crown Opening 18ft x 18 ft Nominal capacity 1,400,000 Lbs Weather protection cladding extending 20ft above drill floor and at monkey board level (85 -100ft above drill floor) Crown block and sheave system to take 14 lines Access to crown block by vertical ladders internal then external to derrick above weather cladding Illumination provided by combination of strip lights and flood lights Hazard Warning lights fitted at crown Derrick marked as required by DNV Class Society Casing Stabbing board located mid derrick port side

3.5.1.4 The derrick is equipped and rigged for leading safety lines to and from various items of equipment such as rotary tongs, mud buckets, etc. All derrick-mounted rigging is fitted with safety lines. All derrick rigging, including safety lines are included in the various derrick inspections as well as being included as part of the inspections carried out by an independent body in accordance with the management system requirements. 3.5.1.5 The derrick is manually operated with two auxiliary air winches to assist in racking back tubulars. Both fingerboards are equipped to handle 5.5 inch drill pipe. Each board has drill collar racking facilities and is capable of storing safely up to 22,900 ft of 5 Drill pipe. 3.5.1.6 A dolly guide rail system is provided for the travelling block, top drive and compensator
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assembly. Service stand pipes are incorporated into the derrick structure to provide supplies for the top drive and other drilling related equipment. These supply stand pipes are rigid, and flexible umbilical are used to interface between the stand pipes and all moving equipment. 3.5.2 Crown Block

3.5.2.1 The crown block assembly is an 800Ton Dreco Flat crown block with 7 x 60 tandem sheaves. The sheaves are arranged to put both fastline and deadline outside of the derrick. All sheaves are grooved for a 1 1/2 wire. The bearings are Timken roller units mounted on a 12 diameter shaft. 3.5.3 Drill Line

3.5.3.1 The Drill Line is a certified 1 inch drill line housed on a drum external to the wind walls on the starboard side of the drill floor. The line is lead from the drum and deadline anchor to the drawworks via the crown and travelling block. 3.5.3.2 Records of drill line ton-miles are logged daily and a slip-and-cut programme ensures that the drill line is maintained in good condition. Visual checks of the drill line and drill line spool are carried out regularly and care and maintenance of the wire carried out accordingly. A cut-off sample of drill line is destructively tested regularly by an independent competent body. 3.5.4 Deadline Anchor

3.5.4.1 The deadline anchor has an SWL rating of 1000000 lb. 3.5.4.2 A weekly visual inspection of all securing bolts is carried out and all load bearing surfaces are subject to regular NDT inspection by an independent competent body. 3.5.4.3 The weight indicator reading is based on monitoring the hydraulic pressure at the deadline anchor located in the starboard forward corner of the drill floor. The gap at the deadline anchor is checked after each slip-and-cut and the weight indicator is calibrated periodically by an independent competent body in accordance with management system requirements. 3.5.4.4 The deadline anchor is built in accordance with API standards and approved by the Classification Society. Visual inspections and tightness checks on the anchor bolts and weight indicator load cell are included in the weekly rig inspection. 3.5.5 Crown Safety Device

3.5.5.1 The Crown-O-matic is a safety device attached to the draw-works designed to reduce the risk of the Driller inadvertently hoisting the travelling block assembly too high into the derrick leading to potential damage of the crown block structure. 3.5.5.2 The safety feature consists of a toggle-type trigger device installed above the draw-works. The drill line is spooled on to the draw-works drum when hoisting the blocks. If an excessive amount of wraps are spooled on to the drum, the drill line comes into contact with the toggle which triggers a shut-down sequence. Contact with the toggle activates an air operated piston which applies the draw-works brake and shuts off the air supply to the draw-works clutch controls. This sequence disengages the draw-works clutch and, by applying the brake quickly, stops the upward movement of the travelling block assembly. 3.5.5.3 The electric brake is also activated and has to be manually reset in the SCR room by the Electrician.

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3.5.5.4 The Crown-O-matic is maintained in accordance with the rig maintenance programme and is function-tested and reset each shift. The shift-related activities are logged on the IADC drilling report. 3.5.5.5 After each slip-and-cut of the drill line, the Crown-O-matic is tested, reset and visually inspected in accordance with management system requirements.

3.5.6

Draw-works

3.5.6.1 The draw-works consist primarily of a revolving drum with the drill line spooled on, driven by up to three explosion proof GE series 752 DC motors through a low or high clutch assembly. The number of motors used is dependent upon operational requirements. The primary function of the draw-works is to draw pipe out of the hole or lower pipe into the hole. 3.5.6.2 The total input power of the Draw works motors is 3,000 HP. The number of motors used is dependent upon operational requirements. For cooling purposes, blower motors are fitted which take their air supply from a safe area. 3.5.6.3 The draw-works has four gear selections, with a capacity in low gear with 14 lines reeved of 1,478,900 lb. 3.5.6.4 The Elmagco brake is the secondary braking system and is equipped with a brake monitor system and battery back-up. The brake monitor system monitors the braking system, in the event of a fault or loss of rig electrical power and braking effort is called for (operation of the brake handle). The monitor will apply battery voltage to the brake, giving maximum brake until the system is reset. Operation of the emergency stop button will also cause the monitor to trip into back-up. 3.5.6.5 The Kinetic Energy Monitoring system (KEMS) monitors the speed of the blocks. If the speed exceeds the set parameters, the KEMS unit will apply the Elmagco brake to bring the block descent speed back within the limits. This will not affect the normal operation of the Elmagco brake monitor. Loss of the KEMS unit will not affect the operation of the Elmagco brake and brake monitor system. 3.5.6.6 The draw-works have a low and high transmission and a low and high clutch to give various load/speed combinations. In the event of the air system clutch failure, the clutch can be connected mechanically for use in an emergency. 3.5.6.7 Control of the draw-works brake is achieved using eddy current braking system which is operated by the Driller. The eddy current braking system is inspected weekly. 3.5.6.8 Power to the eddy current braking system is supplied from the main distribution panel. In the event of a power failure, the system has a battery back-up facility that cuts in automatically upon loss of power. This system is alarmed giving both visual and audible warning to the Driller. 3.5.6.9 A manual brake is also installed for primary control and for additional braking capability. Checks on the wear rate of the draw-works brake bands are carried out regularly. 3.5.6.10 The Driller has an emergency brake set lever that activates the Crown-O-matic and applies the emergency-assist power manual brake. 3.5.6.11 The draw-works brake cooling system consists of a plate heat exchanger system and two circulating pumps. It is a fresh water system which has a corrosion inhibitor added. The system is checked daily and the corrosion inhibitor content is tested on a monthly basis. The system is equipped with a system that monitors the flow and water temperature of the cooling system. Audible and visual alarms in the Drillers control cabin provide indications of a system malfunction.
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3.5.6.12 The draw-works are controlled from the Drillers control cabin by either a foot or a hand throttle. During operation of the draw-works, the Driller is able to monitor the following parameters: Each blower motor is equipped with running lights Air supply to the high drum clutch and low drum clutch Supply of rig air to the draw-works Brake pressure Oil pressure for chain lubrication system

3.5.6.13 The draw-works has been manufactured to API standards and certified by the Classification Society. Drawings and maintenance procedures can be found in the draw-works Operations and Maintenance Manual and Parts Book. The draw-works and associated equipment are maintained in accordance with the maintenance system routines. 3.5.7 Drill String Compensator

3.5.7.1 The Drill String Compensator (DSC) has a capacity of 600,000 lb in the compensation mode and 1,5000,000 lb in the locked mode, with a maximum stroke length of 25 ft. The DSC is attached to the block assembly which, is connected to the dolly and guide rails in the derrick. The DSC is equipped with a monitoring system that indicates whether the DSC is in the locked/unlocked mode and displays the air supply pressure and hook weight loss. 3.5.7.2 The DSC also has the facility through the use of canister shut-off valves that will automatically lock the DSC in order to prevent it dropping open should a sudden loss of air pressure be experienced. During well test operations this is a critical function to ensure that the valve tree being used for the test is not damaged. The speed control valve prevents excessive energy transfer and minimises the possibility of damage to the DSC, and other drilling related equipment thus considerably reducing the risk of injury to personnel should the drill string part. 3.5.7.3 The DSC is operated from a control panel located in the Drillers control cabin. 3.5.7.4 The DSC stand manifold, which is located outside the control cabin, is equipped with both a right hand and left hand manifold pressure gauge and a power air pressure vessel. The manifold is protected from being damaged by bumper bars. All lines from the air receivers to the DSC manifold are made of stainless steel and are either welded or flanged. 3.5.7.5 The DSC has a maximum working pressure of 2,300 psi with the low pressure side of the system operating at between 30 psi and 90 psi. Both systems have pressure relief valves (PRVs) installed to protect against over-pressurisation. The compensator bottles also have PRVs installed which are set at 2,400 psi. 3.5.7.6 The flexible supply hoses from the manifold to the DSC are independent of one another. Each hose incorporates a safety cable which passes through its centre. Additionally, each hose is equipped with canister shut-off valves at each end which close should the volume of air passing through the hose exceed a pre-set value. 3.5.7.7 Air to the hydraulic accumulator bottles located on the DSC is supplied from the bank of high pressure air receivers located in caisson PC2 which are kept charged by the high pressure air compressors. The hydraulic fluid used in the accumulators is a water soluble glycol based fluid. 3.5.7.8 The DSC is maintained in accordance with the rig maintenance programme and is normally serviced by the drill crew and/or subsea engineer during each slip-and-cut of the drill line. At this time hydraulic fluid levels are checked and the system is bled. A full visual inspection is carried out weekly.
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3.5.8

Riser and Guideline/Podline Tensioner

3.5.8.1 Six pairs of riser Tensioners are available for tensioning the marine riser system. The actual number in use at any time depends on operational requirements. The tensioners, connected to support lines from opposite sides of the marine riser, are operated in pairs with the same tension being applied to each. Each tensioner is capable of providing up to 80,000 lb of mid stroke line pull with 50 ft of line travel at line speeds of up to 600 ft/min. In the event of the 1 inch line breaking, the tensioners have a speed control mechanism which ensures that the speed of travel of the tensioner rod does not exceed design limits. 3.5.8.2 Each riser tensioner has a maximum working pressure of 2,400 psi and is protected by PRVs, both on the air pressure vessels and on the tensioner accumulator. Rupture discs are also fitted to each tensioner. The PRVs are tested at regular intervals. Air to the accumulator bottle located on the tensioner is supplied from the bank of high pressure air receivers located in caisson PC2 which are automatically kept charged by the HP air compressors. The hydraulic fluid used in the accumulators is a water soluble, glycol-based fluid. All supply lines are stainless steel with either welded or flanged connections. 3.5.8.3 The tensioners are maintained in accordance with the rig maintenance programme and toncycles records are kept in connection with the wire lines. A slip-and-cut programme ensures that wire lines are maintained in good condition. 3.5.9 Top Drive

3.5.9.1 The drilling package is equipped with a two-speed 650 ton SWL top drive system complete with pipe handler. The top drive is electronically powered. 3.5.9.2 The top drive has one air operated safety valve (IBOP) fitted, remotely operated from the Drillers control. In addition a manual fully open safety valve is situated below both of which are tested with the other surface equipment and is MPI tested at regular intervals by an independent competent body. 3.5.9.3 The top drive is capable of drilling with tubulars from 3 to 6 1/8 drill pipe via the means of a cross over saver sub. The main pipe handler is equipped to be able to break drill pipe from the saver sub and break off the saver sub and lower manual IBOP. The pipe handler is controlled from the Drillers control cabin and takes its power supply from its dedicated hydraulic unit. 3.5.9.4 The top drive is assisted during drilling operations by the rack back system which provides a handling and holding system for making connections. 3.5.9.5 The top drive is controlled by the Driller with all functions, although the direction of the make-up/break-out functions of the pipe handler, have to be selected manually. Drilling torque is controlled by means of a potentiometer which can be pre-set to limit the torque based on the required drilling parameters. 3.5.9.6 The top drive is equipped with a monitoring and alarm system located in the Drillers control cabin, which monitors loss of purge pressure, oil pressure and gas at the motor blower intake. In the event of system failure or sensed gas an audible and visual warning will be given to the Driller. 3.5.9.7 This type of top drive system enables back reaming and circulating while pulling out of the hole, and is particularly advantageous when dealing with stuck pipe. 3.5.9.8 The top drive is normally equipped in the drilling and tripping mode with 350 ton elevator links and elevators. These are changed out for 500 ton links and elevators for other operations, e.g.
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running casing, running or pulling the BOP. 3.5.9.9 The load carrying components are MPI tested as per the manufacturers recommendations and the HSE Top Drive Review Manual. The inspections are carried out by an independent competent body in accordance with management system requirements. The top drive is also inspected each 12hour shift and is covered by the rig maintenance system. A record of operating hours is maintained onboard. 3.5.9.10 The top drive is designed and manufactured to API standards by the Classification Society. 3.5.10 Swivel Type and certified fit-for-purpose

3.5.10.1 The swivel has a load capacity of 650tons SWL 3.5.11 Rotary Table

3.5.11.1 A 49 inch rotary table with an 800 ton dead-load capacity is driven by an electric motor through a two speed transmission unit into the rotary drive. 3.5.11.2 The drive motor is cooled by a blower motor which utilises its air/exhaust path to and from safe areas. The table is used primarily to rotate drill collars and line up directional assemblies. 3.5.11.3 The rotary table is designed and manufactured to API standards by and certified fit-forpurpose by the Classification Society. Drawings and maintenance procedures can be found in the Operations and Maintenance Manual and Parts Book for the rotary table. This equipment is covered by the rigs maintenance system. 3.5.12 Iron Roughneck

3.5.12.1 The Iron roughneck is used for making up and breaking out components of the drill string and can handle sizes of drill pipe and drill collars from 3 inch to 9. It has a torque output of up to 100,000 ft/lb on make-up and up to 120,000 ft/lb on break-out. The torque output can be adjusted. The Driller has a remote readout that can be used to verify that the correct torque parameters are being applied. 3.5.12.2 The iron roughneck runs on rails from the well centre to port of the well centre, is powered from a hydraulic unit and is operated from the control panel on the unit itself. 3.5.13 Casing Stabbing Board

3.5.13.1 The Casing Stabbing board is an adjustable work platform travelling vertically between the 28 ft and 47 ft levels above the drill floor. It is mounted mid derrick on the starboard side of the structure and consists of a moveable carriage mounted on dolly rollers and rails which is hoisted by an air-operated winch mounted at the top of the guide frame. The stabbing board travels with a speed of approximately 15 ft/min upward and 56 ft/min downwards. The operation of the board is by means of a control lever located at the back of the platform. The boards primary function is to provide a workstation for gaining safe access to the top of tubulars when running casing or tubing. Its operation is covered by a TSTP. 3.5.13.2 Safety features of the board include double independent spring assisted locking dogs, one via a foot pedal and the other via a hand lever mounted at the aft of the stabbing board.

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3.5.13.3 Personnel working with and operating the stabbing board wear a full body safety harness attached to an inertia reel safety line. A belly line is also used for control purposes by the personnel working the stabbing board. Only experienced personnel with sufficient knowledge of the equipment and operation are permitted to carry out operations involving the casing stabbing board 3.5.13.4 The stabbing board is certified fit-for-purpose by the classification society and complies with recommendations laid down by the regulatory authority. The SWL of the board is 500 lb. 3.5.13.5 When the board is not in use the toe board is racked back vertically, clear of all drill floor operations complete with locking dogs engaged. 3.5.13.6 A record of inspections, services and any repairs is kept in the stabbing board register. 3.5.14 Hydraulic Power Units

3.5.14.1 ARCTIC I is equipped with a central hydraulic control unit located below the drill floor on the port side of the Moonpool area, above the riser deck. The unit houses skid mounted, electric-driven, hydraulic pumps which service varying items of drilling equipment. 3 x 2000 psi hydraulic pumps supplying the Topdrive & Iron Roughneck 3 x 1000 psi pumps supplying the Auxiliary Drill floor Equipment. Note each pair of 1000 & 2000 psi pump is driven by a double ended electric motor. The BOP Transporter is provided with 2 electric driven hydraulic pumps located in the auxiliary machinery room

3.5.14.2 All hard piping is stainless steel and where flexible hoses and fittings are used, they are of the correct pressure rating. The hydraulic units are maintained in accordance with the rig maintenance programme. 3.6 3.6.1 Mud and Cement System Mud System

3.6.1.1 The Mud System is designed to provide a large, highly flexible storage and treatment facility together with a high pressure system capable of pumping at the flow rates and pressures required for the drilling of deep HP/HT wells. In addition, the system has been provided with the monitoring capabilities compatible with the efficient and safe management of the mud system and drilling operations. 3.6.1.2 The mud system includes materials storage, mixing facilities, mud pits and pumps, mud system supply and return pipe work, shale-shakers, degassing unit and vents. The system is designed and manufactured to API standards and certified fit-for-purpose by the Classification Society. 3.6.1.3 The capacity of hazardous chemicals is kept to a minimum and a system of segregation is used to ensure that the contamination of non-hazardous chemicals is avoided. All chemicals onboard are controlled in accordance with Transocean HSE Procedures 3.6.2 Minimum Requirements

3.6.2.1 At the well planning stage, limits are agreed between Transocean and the Operator as to the minimum requirements of mud materials to be held onboard. The minimum requirements will be at least those set out in the management system well control manual. A pre-spud meeting is held both onboard and ashore to ensure that these limitations are clearly understood and will be adhered to. It

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is the responsibility of the rig supervisory personnel to ensure that sufficient quantities of materials are stocked onboard in the event there is a requirement to kill the well. Records of stock levels are maintained onboard and are also reported daily to the shore base. 3.6.3 Bulk Storage System

3.6.3.1 Mud materials are stored either in bulk or packaged forms. Bulk material, normally Barite or Bentonite, are stored in six bulk storage tanks. 3.6.3.2 Each silo has two access hatches; one top and one bottom, and are equipped with internal and external access ladders. The silos are periodically inspected internally at regular intervals with particular attention being paid to the condition of the spiders, pipe work and interior metal surfaces. 3.6.3.3 Compressed air is used as the transportation medium for Bulk materials. When loaded from supply vessels, the material is transported under pressure through loading hoses and via the loading manifold into the ARCTIC I bulk pipe work system. All bulk lines have a purge facility to ensure they remain clear of any material. 3.6.3.4 Bulk material can be transferred from the bulk tanks to the surge tanks and mixing hoppers using compressed air to pressurise the storage tanks, opening the discharge line to the hoppers and allowing bulk material to flow. 3.6.3.5 Bulk air is primarily supplied by the bulk air compressor. One 800cfm unit supplying compressed air through an air dryer to the bulk air receiver at a regulated pressure of 45psi. The bulk compressor is fitted with a PRV set at 45 psi. Each bulk tank is equipped with a PRV set at 45 psi. All PRVs are certified and tested and inspected regularly. 3.6.3.6 Each bulk tank has its own fill, discharge, air supply and vent line and they are segregated from one another by either one manually operated valve or a series of valves. The fill and discharge lines can be made common through a series of cross-over valves which gives the system greater flexibility. The air supply lines are totally segregated and non-return valves are incorporated at the inlet to each tank or at any connection into the bulk system to prevent contamination of the air system by bulk material. Bulk air is supplied into the bottom of each tank through a spider system that both pressurises the tank and aerates the bulk product. The silos are fluffed weekly, when not in use, to prevent settling and to ensure that the spiders are kept clear. The load and discharge lines are equipped with air purge lines to assist in the transfer of material and blowing the lines clear on the completion of each transfer. The tank vent lines all feed into a common line that vents below main deck level on the starboard side. 3.6.3.7 The bulk system is operated from an air/electric control panel located in the Mud Pump Room store which enables the tanks to be vented, pressured up and bulk material to be shipped up to the hopper or back through to the loading manifold for discharge back to a supply vessel. Incorporated into the panel are tank high level indicator lamps. 3.6.3.8 The contents of each silo are monitored by manual measurement using a sounding tape and weight indicators. If necessary, in order to improve stability, bulk material may be blown over the side. 3.6.3.9 The bulk system is operated only by competent personnel who have been given instruction on its use and are familiar with the relevant procedures and TSTPs that are to be followed for the safe and efficient operation of this system. Periodic inspection of each tank is carried out in addition to maintenance carried out in accordance with the rig maintenance programme. 3.6.4 Sack Storage
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3.6.4.1 Mud material in package form normally comes in sacks that are stored in the sack storage area which has a storage capacity of 3,500 sacks. Sack material is moved around the sack storage area and up to the mixing hoppers with the use of a forklift truck, minimising the need for manual labour. 3.6.5 Transfer of Bulk Material

3.6.5.1 There is no access to the sack room hoppers from the bulk tanks, the bulk is shipped to the pit room, one of which can be supplied from the 70 ft surge tank with bulk mud chemicals if these are require to be added to the mud, and the other hopper is primarily used for adding the sack material. The surge tank is equipped with weight scales and a sight glass. 3.6.5.2 As mud is circulated from the mud pits through the mix hoppers, it is treated with bulk material and then returned to the mud pits. Additionally, dry bulk material can also be added directly into the four surface pits through the quick mix system should there be a need to rapidly increase the mud weight. 3.6.6 Protective (Safety) Gear

3.6.6.1 In accordance with Transocean policy and rig procedures, it is mandatory that protective safety equipment is worn at all times while mixing chemicals. Attempts are made to contain dust release at the mixing area and the ventilation system is kept running continuously. The mixing hoppers are equipped with atmospheric extractor units and fixed ducting in order to reduce dust levels. Personal protective equipment is kept in the vicinity of the mixing hoppers. 3.6.6.2 An eye-wash station and a shower are provided at the mixing platform. stations are maintained by the Medic. The eye-wash RMS

3.6.6.3 The safety equipment, the eye-wash station and the shower are covered in the Schedules 3.6.7 High Pressure Mud System

3.6.7.1 The high pressure side of the mud system comprises three triplex mud pumps capable of delivering mud at pressures up to 5,000 psi, dependent upon the liner size installed. The pumps can be used individually or in parallel, dependent upon flow requirements. The liner size installed is logged in the pump record book. Each pump is driven by two electric motors that are equipped with blower motors that take their sir supply from a safe area. Each pump is also equipped with an individual PRV which has an adjustable setting, depending on liner size and pressure rating and which discharges directly back into the mud pits. The PRVs are tested and re-calibrated after each liner size change. Each pump has a pulsation damper in order to help reduce pressure surges and minimise vibration. 3.6.7.2 The mud pumps can be stopped and started from the drill floor and the mud pump room. Alternatively, total shutdown is possible from the BCR and the SCR room. Each mud pump has two stop buttons which, when pinned, will not allow the drive motors to operate. Each mud pump has a DC isolation switch that allows the corresponding SCRs to be used for drilling operations while maintenance/ repairs are being made to the pumps. 3.6.7.3 An emergency stop button is fitted to each pump that isolates power to that pump. 3.6.8 Mud Lines

3.6.8.1 Mud from the mud pits can be gravity fed directly to the mud pumps. As a standard practice,
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gravity fed Charge Pumps are used to feed the mud. The stand pipe manifold is of the H type providing two outlets which can be isolated from one another and providing redundancy in the event of one failing. 3.6.8.2 The high-pressure side of the mud system is pressure tested periodically in accordance with the BOP test programme. The lines and hoses are certified to 5,000 psi. All high-pressure hoses have safety chains, hobbles or clamps attached. 3.6.8.3 To ensure the integrity of all high and low pressure pipe work, particularly on the mud system but also on other systems, regular wall thickness checks are carried out by an independent competent body in accordance with management system requirements. All gauge lines and valve control lines under the drill floor are of stainless steel. 3.6.8.4 From the stand pipe manifold, the mud flows through a flexible (kelly/rotary) hose to the swivel, top drive, down through the drill string to the drill bit. 3.6.9 Shale Shakers

3.6.9.1 On surface, the mud flows from the well bore down the flow line, passing sensors for H2S and combustible gas, and also the flow sensor (flo-sho) and over any number of 8 shale-shakers located, 4 in the upper shaker house and 4 in the lower shaker house. Depending upon which screen size is fitted, the shale-shakers will remove unwanted solids. The solids are either processed by the cuttings wash system, if the programme requires it, or discharged directly overboard. 3.6.9.2 The mud then flows from the shakers through the three mud-processing pits where the finer solids can be removed. The shaker house is a hazardous area and all equipment located in this area is correctly rated for use in this area. 3.6.9.3 If the level of gas concentration in the mud is such that the normal process associated with passing the mud over the shakers is insufficient to break out the gas, the mud is deemed to be gascut. The mud is then degassed. 3.6.10 Degasser

3.6.10.1 ARCTIC I is equipped with a stand-alone vacuum degasser. The gas-cut mud is sucked out of the process pit by the degassers integral centrifugal pump. The circulating flow travels up the suction pipe against a baffle plate where the gas in the mud is liberated. The displaced gas is then removed with a booster pump and is discharged into the vent line and expelled approximately 20 ft above the crown. The mud can also be processed through a centrifugal system located above the shaker house. After removal of the gas, the mud flows from the shaker house, down the flow line, returning to the active pit to be treated and re-circulated back through the system. 3.6.10.2 All surface equipment, which includes the HP mud piping system, mud pump room valve manifold, stand pipe manifold and valves, kelly hose, IBOPs and stab-in safety valves, are pressured tested in conjunction with BOP tests. Records of these tests are maintained onboard. 3.6.10.3 Continuous monitoring of the surface equipment during drilling operations through reference to trend sheets may give initial warning of equipment failure. The kelly/rotary hose is visually inspected regularly for any signs of damage or chaffing and is tested in conjunction with other surface equipment. All hoses are certified. 3.6.10.4 When gas is detected in the mud at a level where the concentration of hydrocarbon gas is greater than three per cent of the sample analysed by the Mud Loggers gas monitoring system, a PA announcement is made cancelling all hot work permits until the stability of the situation can be
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assessed and a decision made regarding continued suspension of such permits. 3.6.10.5 Mud treatment equipment is maintained in accordance with the rig maintenance programme. The degassers are run and tested weekly and are normally run continuously when drilling through the hydrocarbon bearing formation. 3.6.10.6 The design of the system is such that the ARCTIC I has the capability to keep a large amount of drilling fluid and material onboard while being able to extensively build or treat different parts of the total volume. This means that critical reserves, e.g. kill mud, reserve drilling mud and cement spacers, can be prepared in advance. All operations can be closely monitored without affecting the active mud system. 3.6.11 Mud Pit Areas

3.6.11.1 The Mud is stored in four main pits, two active pits totalling 734bbl and two reserve pits totalling 1578 bbl. Both the slug pit and chemical pit are used to mix any special mud requirements or small volumes. The total storage capacity of the pit room is 1690 bbl. The working volume of mud in the process pits is 212 Bbls. The mud pits are totally covered with fibreglass grating allowing access to all valves, agitators and instrumentation. Ventilation in the pit room is by forced air. Air is forced into the mud pit area at one end of it, above the tank top, and works its way through the room and over the top of the mud in the pits before being exhausted at the other end. The mud pit area is maintained at a negative pressure relative to the mud pump room and an alarm sounds on loss of pressure differential. Access to the pit room is through doors at the forward and aft end of the port bulkhead of the mud pump room. 3.6.11.2 The mud pit area is equipped with 4 gas sensors, 2 for H2S and 2 for combustible gas, both of which display and alarm in the BCR. The mud pit room is a hazardous area and all equipment is rated for use in this area 3.6.12 Low Pressure Mud System

3.6.12.1 The low-pressure mud system is used to mix, transfer and provide a pressurised suction to the mud pumps using the centrifugal mixing pumps and a network of low pressure piping. 3.6.12.2 Each of the mud pits is interconnected through the suction pipe work and mix lines. Any of the four dedicated centrifugal mixing pumps can take suction from any pit and discharge into any pit. The lines are manifolded in such a way to provide maximum flexibility in terms of taking suction from and discharging to the mud pits. Additionally, the mud pump charge pumps may also be used for mixing purposes, if required. 3.6.12.3 The mix system is designed to take mud from any particular mud pit, circulate it through a combination of lines which pass through the mixing hoppers and then return to the same pit or an alternative pit. As the mud is passing through the hoppers, bulk materials or chemicals can be added to produce the properties required by the drilling programme. 3.6.12.4 The mixing pumps may also be used to transfer mud to the drill floor, trip tank, shale-shaker tanks, hot loop system on the MGS, cement unit and, if required, to a supply vessel through transfer hoses at the bulk loading stations on either side of the 3.6.13 Mud Storage System

3.6.13.1 There are two 2100 bbl liquid mud storage tanks (15 P/15 S) located in Port and Starboard aft columns fitted with both level indication and high level alarms monitored in BCR. Maximum fluid weight is 16 lb/gal. The system consists of 1 each transfer pump 1 each Agitation pump located in
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pontoons, and 1 each Booster pump either side at the 85 ft levels to assist in discharge of fluid. The agitation and transfer pumps can be interchanged to serve either purpose via a crossover line. The tanks can be filled either from a supply vessel/pumped from pits or gravity fed from pits. Loading and discharge lines located at bulk loading stations on port and starboard side main deck level. The agitation system consists of three gun lines fitted with nozzles. The system is controlled remotely from BCR with local/manual control at pumps/valves 3.6.14 Bulk Cement System

3.6.14.1 The bulk cement system is similar to the bulk mud system but totally separate. There are 3 cement tanks located in Caisson No 2-S with a total capacity of 126.7 m. 3.6.14.2 Bulk cement is transferred from the silos to the cement hopper in the cement unit where it is mixed and pumped down hole via the cement manifold on the drill floor. The cement hopper has a capacity of 40 ft. The bulk cement system is operated from an air/electric control panel located in the cement room that is similar to that for the bulk mud system. 3.6.14.3 The cement unit, with its own independent power source, is able to pump mud to the well through the cement hose and manifold system to the choke manifold. The stand pipe manifold is connected to the choke manifold through a series of valves and this connection can be used for pressure less than 5,000 psi. In addition, for pressure less than 5,000 psi, mud can be pumped directly to the stand pipe manifold by installed the appropriate cross-over. 3.6.15 Base Oil and Oil Based Mud Handling

3.6.15.1 Oil based mud (OBM) is normally delivered in bulk by supply vessel. ARCTIC I has facilities and capacity to mix store OBM onboard. Transfer procedures are in place in the form of TSTPs. 3.6.15.2 Prior to the use of OBM, crew safety meetings are focused on the precautions to be taken when using OBM mud, with particular emphasis being placed on the environment, personal hygiene and the risk of fire. 3.6.15.3 To reduce the possibility of any accumulation of gas or other sources of fuel being present in an almost empty pit, the pit is fitted to approximately one quarter full with seawater, flushed and emptied. When the contents of the pit have been dumped and access is required to clean out any mud residue, a confined space entry permit and an electrical isolation certificate for the agitator will first be issued. If it becomes necessary to weld or burn in the areas that have previously contained mud, additional precautions are taken, as listed on the hot work permit. 3.6.15.4 Base oil is loaded from supply vessels using a self-sealing connection of a recognised standard, 180 ft of flexible hose and the loading manifolds starboard side of the MODU. 3.6.15.5 The base oil storage tank is situated in the starboard hull and occupies 5 S tank. There is one dedicated base oil pump located in the starboard ballast pump room. The pipe work from the pumps leads through the BPR and up to mud pump room. The base oil can then be transferred into either of the dedicated wash-down tank outside the shaker room or to the mud pits. Transfer procedures are in place in the form of TSTPs. 3.6.16 Mud Monitoring

3.6.16.1 The mud monitoring system comprises a Pit Volume Totaliser (PVT) which continuously displays mud pit volumes, flow rates, pump strokes per minute, total pump strokes, trip tank volumes and trip tank status. Output from the monitoring system is displayed on a VDU at the Drillers console, in the Toolpushers office and elsewhere, as required.
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3.6.16.2 A temperature monitoring system installed on the flow line provides output at the Drillers control console to ensure that the systems working temperatures are not exceeded. 3.6.16.3 Each mud pit is equipped with a level sensor which enables information regarding the volume of mud in each pit and the total volume of the four mud pits to be displayed at the Drillers console. The volume monitor can be programmed to check for losses or gains and has adjustable alarm limits that give both audible and visual indication. Each mud pit is also equipped with a manual level indicator. 3.6.16.4 The Mud Monitoring display shows trip tank levels and incorporates high and low adjustable alarm settings for these also. There is also a manual indicator rigged up from the trip tank to the side of the drill floor. If both of these fail, a visual hole inspection may be undertaken to determine if the hole is full and the well static. Flow checks are normally carried out be circulating the hole on the trip tank. 3.6.16.5 The flow rate sensor (flo-sho) indicates percentage flow. The alarm function indicates any increase or decrease in flow rate within adjustable set alarm limits. 3.6.16.6 The mud pump strokes and total strokes pumped are monitored from the Drillers console and also from the choke control panel on the drill floor. Additional, the Derrickman checks the pump strokes manually, as required. 3.6.16.7 The mud pump pressure is displayed at the Drillers console and also at several other positions on the drill floor, such as the choke control panel, mud manifold and choke manifold as well as at the mud pump control panels in the pump room. 3.6.16.8 The Drillers panel also has facilities to indicate that the shale-shakers are running. 3.6.16.9 The drilling and mud monitoring instrumentation package is linked to two chart recorders which monitor flow (mud returns), pump strokes, mud losses or gains and total mud volume in order that historical data is collected for further trend analysis. 3.6.16.10 All the monitoring equipment in the Drillers console is equipped with a purge air system that is certified fit-for-purpose by the Classification Society. The purge air system is fitted with a loss of purge alarm and backed up by a nitrogen supply fed from a bottle located outside the Drillers control room. 3.6.16.11 The BCR plays a major role by keeping the relevant personnel informed of any ballasting or lifting operations which may have an effect upon the mud pit volume readings as a result of a change in heel or trim. 3.6.16.12 The mud system is equipped with gauges that aid in the effective management and monitoring of the mud process: Each mud mix and charge pump is equipped with a pressure gauge All mud pumps are equipped with 5,000 psi pressure gauges Mud pressure is monitored on the drill floor at the stand pipe manifold which has a 5,000 psi pressure gauge attached. The readouts at the Drillers console are fed from three remote sensors attached to the stand pipe. During normal drilling operations these sensors feed a total of five monitoring points, a 6,000 psi gauge on the Drillers console, a 10,000 psi gauge on the choke control panel and a bank of three gauges above the choke control unit which are only

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used for taking slow circulating rates (SCRs). One 0-1,000 psi, one 0-3,000 psi and one 0-5,000 psi gauge are situated above the choke control panel unit. 3.6.16.13 All gauges are subject to calibration against a master gauge that is calibrated by an independent competent body in accordance with management system and QA requirements. Lines for pump sensors are made of HP braided hose. 3.6.16.14 Monitoring equipment, alarm settings and gauge readings are checked by the Drillers at each shift change. The Toolpusher will verify monitoring equipment status during visits to the drill floor. 3.6.16.15 In addition to the automated systems, regular checks are made manually by the Derrickman and Assistant Derrickman. The frequency of these checks depends on the condition of the hole. The Derrickman monitors and records and checks pit levels manually, and regular checks of the mud weight and its viscosity. A log is also maintained of pit volumes, mud weights and any mud mixing and transfer operations performed in order that historical data may be referenced and trends analysed. The Assistant Derrickman also carries out regular mud weight checks and observes the flow of mud over the shakers for changes in flow rates, changes in cutting sizes and possible signs of gas. Any discrepancies are reported to the Driller immediately. The mud engineer periodically carries out a complete mud analysis to monitor trends in mud properties. 3.6.16.16 The Driller maintains a trend sheet on the drill floor with mud weight, in and out of the hole. The state of the mud cleaning equipment is relayed to the Driller by the Derrickman and Assistant Derrickman. The Driller also monitors rate of penetration, weight on bit (WOB), pump strokes per minute, pump pressure, gas levels and drilling torque. 3.6.16.17 The Derrickman and Shakerhand are trained in the operation of all mud mixing and monitoring equipment. At the beginning of each shift the correct line up of such systems and equipment is checked and its operational status verified. Any deficiencies or defects are reported to the appropriate supervisor immediately. 3.6.16.18 Independent of the ARCTIC Is own monitoring system, mud logging is undertaken by a third party company utilising monitoring equipment of their own which monitors similar, essential drilling parameters to those monitored using the units equipment. The mud loggers data is monitored and recorded around the clock. The mud loggers have their own dedicated unit which is normally situated on the starboard side of the drill floor at pipe deck level. Their equipment has alarm setting capabilities for the majority of parameters being monitored. Drilling information from their displays is displayed in the Drillers control cabin, the Toolpushers office and elsewhere, as required. 3.6.16.19 Some of the drilling parameters normally monitored by the mudloggers are as follows: Total gas Gas components (methane to propane) rotational speed Weight on bit Torque Flow in Flow out Temperature in Temperature out Rate of penetration Mud volumes Trip tank volumes

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Mud weight (in) Mud weight (out) Hookload H2S Choke manifold pressure Cement unit pressure/strokes

3.6.16.20 Data comparisons are made frequently between both the units and the mud loggers systems. There is constant communication between the mud loggers and the Driller. If any discrepancies are identified, immediate corrective action is taken to prevent the potential escalation of well control problems. 3.6.16.21 Combustible gas and H2S detectors are distributed at strategic points throughout the mud system. The main positions are the flow line, shaker house and mud pits. Both systems are monitored constantly and are alarmed. 3.6.16.22 The maintenance and calibration of third party equipment is undertaken by the third party companys own personnel in accordance with their maintenance system. Rig personnel are responsible for monitoring those aspects of the third party companys maintenance programme which are safety critical as regards the overall operation of the ARCTIC I.

3.6.17

Mud Gas Separator

3.6.17.1 The Mud Gas separator (MGS) is a 10 inch discharge diameter unit which vents to atmosphere at the top of the Derrick. The MGS is located on the starboard side of the rig external to the wind wall at drill floor level. The MGS and associated system is capable of handling up to 27 million ft of gas per day. 3.6.17.2 If the mud becomes gas-cut to the extent that the mud weight is significantly affected, there is potential for the development of a situation where, as a result of under-balance, an influx from the formation into the well bore could occur. 3.6.17.3 Should the monitoring of the gas content in the mud indicate that the potential for underbalance exists, the well would be shut in using the secondary means of well control, the BOP. The monitoring of gas content is undertaken by both drill crew and the loggers and any escalation is the signal for the Driller to close in the well. It is the Drillers responsibility to monitor trends and he has the authority to make the decision. 3.6.17.4 In such a situation well control procedures are invoked and followed. The Driller begins the process of bringing the well under control using the approach developed as a result of consultation with his supervisors. The Toolpusher will be at the work site to supervise the operation. 3.6.17.5 With the well shut in, the mud returns are routed through the choke manifold and the MGS. When the mud enters the MGS, it passes over a series of baffle plates which break out the gas and discharge it through the derrick vent line with the mud being routed back into the normal surface mud processing system. The routing of the vent line up the derrick helps to limit the likelihood of the line plugging. 3.6.17.6 The discharge line taking the mud back to the surface system contains a dip tube arrangement which remains full of mud, thus providing a mud seal which prevents gas from migrating downstream to the mud processing area and ending up in the pits. To maintain the integrity of the

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mud seal an additional line is connected to the dip tube to enable the freshly weighted mud to be regularly circulated through the tube. If the volume and expansion rate of the gas produces a pressure exceeding the hydrostatic pressure of the mud in the dip tube, there is potential for this mud seal to be lost. This is prevented by isolating the flow of mud to the MGS and diverting the flow through the choke manifold buffer chamber overboard lines which run forward and tie into the lines running port and starboard underneath the drill floor. The direction for diversion is pre-selected by the Driller going on shift and changed as required. The overboard line is 4 inch and rated at 5,000 psi. 3.6.17.7 The isolation and diversion of the mudflow to the MGS is achieved through the correct sequencing of the relevant valves on the choke manifold and the closing of the valve to the MGS. The correct sequencing of the valves is initiated automatically when the pressure in the MGS reaches a pre-set value which is slightly less than the hydrostatic head of mud in the dip tube. The automatic sequencing of the valves is alarmed and this is the signal for the drill crew to close the well in on the choke in order that they can regroup and decide the next course of action. The pressure in the MGS is measured using a sensor mounted in the MGS that transmits a signal to the control panel located in the Drillers control cabin. 3.6.17.8 The system is fitted with a manual push-button over-ride facility which can be used to activate the correct sequencing on the valves in the event that the pressure sensor fails or a wash-out occurs in the line to the MGS. 3.6.17.9 Diverting the flow of gas-cut mud overboard is only undertaken, until such time as the drill crew closes the well in on the choke, to limit the amount of gas being dispersed. 3.6.17.10 Output from the pressure and temperature sensors are displayed in the Drillers control cabin and the main controls for the valves are located on the choke control panel on the drill floor. Operation of the system is based on a 24 volt supply which is provided by the BOP control system with the battery pack in question being charged from the emergency generator distribution panel. 3.6.17.11 The MGS and the overboard lines are in compliance with SN 11/90. The system is designed on the basis that the vessel vents to atmosphere, is hydro-tested to 150 psi, certified fit-forpurpose by the Classification Society and covered by the rig maintenance programme. The likelihood of failure of the MGS is extremely low due to the simplicity of the design and the fact that there are no moving parts. 3.6.17.12 The use of the MGS is not limited to well killing operations. Any high concentrations of gas can be circulated through the MGS. Rig policy during certain operations, the use of OBM for example, may include circulating the last 25 per cent of annular contents through the MGS as a precautionary measure. The use of the MGS in this way will be included as part of the safe system of work in accordance with the North Sea well control manual. 3.6.17.13 All drilling supervisors are in receipt of well control certificates issued by the International Well Control Forum who provide testing in well control techniques to an industry approved standard. This includes full use of the choke manifold and MGS. Only personnel with well control training are allowed to line-up the MGS. 3.6.17.14 A purpose-built simulator was purchased and is available for the training of drilling crews to ensure that personnel are fully cognisant with the MGS equipment and its operation. The simulator forms part of our normal well control training programme. 3.6.17.15 All mud mixing, pumping and monitoring systems are maintained in accordance with the rig maintenance programme.

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3.7 3.7.1

BOP Systems. Diverter

3.7.1.1 The ARCTIC 1 is equipped with a 49 inch diverter rated to 500 psi comprising a ball joint, support housing and a diverter assembly. The diverter is controlled from the hydraulic diverter panel located on the drill floor using hydraulic pressure in the BOP control room. If this supply fails, back-up is achieved by switching to the accumulator bottles located in the subsea shop. 3.7.1.2 The piping for the diverter system is a combination of stainless steel and fire-retardant hoses. All diverter functions can be operated individually from the master control facility at the Drillers console which allows operation of the diverter panel using a push button switch. Pressing this switch button causes the lock-down dogs to lock, the diverter line valve to open and the flow line and fill-up valves to close. The diverter element then closes. The system is hydraulically interlocked to prevent the diverter element closing before the flow line and fill up line valves close and the diverter line opens. 3.7.1.3 The full bore 12 inch overboard line, after initially rising above the flow line level, slopes downward to the forward starboard corner of the Moonpool area, where it splits into 2 isolation valves. These valves are designated as port and starboard over board valves. The lines minimize the extent of bends, thus reducing the likelihood of blockage or washout resulting from erosion. The overboard flow direction is chosen depending on the wind direction. 3.7.1.4 The diverter is installed using the diverter running tool after the BOP has been run and landed and is always installed and locked down. A visual check is made to ensure that all the dogs are in place. 3.7.1.5 Operation of the diverter system is controlled using the diverter panel located on the drill floor. The main features of the panel include Diverter packer Flowline seal Lower ball joint supply Panel supply Slip-joint Insert packer lock-down dogs Diverter lock-down dogs Flow line/shaker valve Trip tank valve Degasser valve Overboard line valves Load ring to diverter housing dogs Load ring to slip joint rotating dogs

3.7.1.6 Diverting drills are held prior to commencing drilling operations to ensure that drill crews are fully familiar with the operation of the diverter system and shallow gas procedures. 3.7.1.7 The diverter and associated equipment is function-tested when it is installed and at any other time it is deemed necessary, in accordance with Transocean policy and well specific procedures. The diverter system is maintained in accordance with the rig maintenance programme and manufacturers recommendations 3.7.2 Slip Joint
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3.7.2.1 A dual packer telescopic or slip-joint is used to compensate for the effect of the relative motion between the rig and wellhead on the marine riser. The inner barrel of the slip-joint is 21 inch in OD and the outer diameter of the outer barrel is 24 inch. The slip-joint has the same pressure rating as the marine riser and is capable of handling a SWL of 2,000,000 lb in the locked position. The slip-joint is held in the locked position with 4 manual dogs. 3.7.2.2 The slip-joint has a 50 ft stroke and is connected to the marine riser using a connector identical to that used for assembling the marine riser. A dual packer arrangement is used to preserve the pressure integrity of the telescopic joint in its operational mode. The primary and secondary packers are regulated by rig air( with back up from 4 emergency air APVs located in PC2 column) and controlled by an electrical control panel. If the primary air pressure drops below a predetermined pressure the secondary packer is energized by the operation of electrical solenoid valves. This system has manual back up valves in case of emergency loss of electrical power. Termination goose-necks for the choke-and-kill lines are an integral part of the slip-joint. 3.7.2.3 The slip-joint is equipped with a specially prepared profile for latching the riser tensioning ring on to the slip-joint. The riser tensioning ring has the capacity to accommodate six pairs of riser tensioners which would be attached to the slip joint by open wedge sockets with a SWL of at least 80,000 lb. There are 2 sets of hydraulic dogs on the tensioner ring. One set is used for latching and unlatching the riser tensioning ring to the slip-joint and the other set is used for latching and unlatching that same ring into its storage position under the diverter housing. The operation of these dogs is controlled from the BOP control panel. Checks are carried out to ensure that dogs are in position before continuing with running or pulling the slip-joint. 3.7.2.4 The slip-joint is dismantled, re-built and pressure-tested periodically. It is pressure-tested after connecting the choke-and-kill flexible hoses and tested in connection with the requisite pressure tests on the stack while it is deployed. The end connections of the slip-joint are subject to NDT inspection by an independent competent body. 3.7.2.5 The slip-joint is never used for handling equipment while in the unlocked mode. 3.7.3 Marine Riser

3.7.3.1 The ARCTIC 1 is equipped with a marine riser that comes in joints of 50 ft in length and 21 inch in OD. The riser joints are available in 5/8 inch wall thickness. The actual configuration used depends on the location-specific requirements. The rig is equipped with enough riser to work in water depths up to 3400 ft. 3.7.3.2 Pup joints are available to ensure that the correct location-specific space-out is achieved. Each box and pin connection in the riser assembly has lip seals on totally separate sealing faces. 3.7.3.3 The choke-and-kill lines are attached to the joints of marine riser and come in the same lengths. The choke-and-kill lines are 3 inch ID and are rated to 15,000 psi. The pressure integrity of the choke-and-kill connections is achieved through the use of lip seals. 3.7.3.4 The riser, including the choke-and-kill lines, is inspected regularly by an independent competent body. This inspection includes the NDT inspection of box and pin connectors. The riser joint and choke and kill connection lip seals are checked and changed regularly as required. 3.7.3.5 The choke-and-kill lines are pressure-tested at regular intervals when running the stack and in connection with the requisite pressure tests on the stack after it is installed. 3.7.4 Riser Boost Line Valve

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3.7.4.1 This valve is used, in the main, to increase upward flow through the riser to the surface. The valve is hydraulically operated and can be opened or closed from the BOP control panels 3.7.5 Flex Joint

3.7.5.1 The Flex joint is designed to provide a flexible connection between the stack and the marine riser. It is part of the LMRP and is connected to the upper annular preventer at one end and the marine riser at the other through the appropriate riser adapter. 3.7.5.2 It is designed to operate in the vertical position but can tolerate a maximum Omni-directional offset of 10 degrees. 3.7.6 LMRP Connector

3.7.6.1 ARCTIC I is equipped with an 18 inch flanged riser connector rated to 15,000 psi. The riser connector has stainless steel ring grooves that undergo regular inspection by an independent competent body. The connector is visually inspected and maintained periodically. It has a normal operating pressure of 1,500 psi and the maximum operating pressure is 3,000 psi. Each pod on the stack has a primary and secondary function that can be used individually to unlock the connector. Both the primary and secondary functions are capable of unlocking the connector. 3.7.6.2 The riser connector has a maximum unlock angle of up to 30 degrees. The angle of the riser is monitored and controlled in the manner outlined earlier. The riser connector is tested prior to being run and at regular intervals thereafter. 3.7.7 Blow-out Preventer Stacks

3.7.7.1 ARCTIC I is provided with an 18 inch BOP stack rated to 15,000 psi. The stack consists of two principal elements comprising: LMRP: - one 18 Flex joint - one 18 annular preventer rated to 10,000 psi - one 18 riser connector rated to 15,000 psi BOP: - one 18 annular preventer rated to 10,000 psi - two 18 double ram preventers rated to 15,000 psi - one 18 wellhead connector rated to 15,000 psi.

3.7.7.2 Choke-and-kill lines run down to the stack as integral parts of the marine riser. These lines are connected below each set of rams and are closed off by two valves that fail-safe in the closed position. These lines are manifolded at the surface to allow either line to be used as a choke or a kill line. 3.7.7.3 The actual number of choke-and-kill valves used will depend on operational requirements and well control procedures. A block, complete with lead targets, is placed between each set of valves to help reduce the likelihood of erosion. The valves are tested from above and below to ensure that they can be operated in either the choke or kill mode. 3.7.7.4 The BOPs are controlled by two subsea control pods located on the lower marine riser package (LMRP). The two pods are identical in terms of functional capabilities and as a consequence there is total redundancy. In the unlikely event of one failing, the other pod can be utilized while the incapacitated pod is retrieved for maintenance. The installation of an integral 3 conduit line on the

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riser connects the surface accumulators to the control pods on the LMRP. This system eliminates the need of subsea accumulators, reducing stack weight and removing the need for pre-charge calculations and checks. 3.7.7.5 The BOP is pressure tested to the appropriate pressure rating and function tested fully on both pods at surface. After running, it is pressure tested on one pod and function tested on the other. At this time the ROV will be used to observe any evidence of leakage. These tests are performed as regularly as operations permit and in accordance with Transocean policy. All pressure tests are documented and records maintained on-board and ashore. 3.7.7.6 The upper and lower annulars are normally visually inspected upon retrieval of the stack. Annulars are tested before returning the preventers to service and then again at regular intervals. 3.7.7.7 Any repairs made to the BOP or associated well control equipment, other than that considered as part of the routine maintenance, are carried out in accordance with API standards and certified fit-for-purpose by the classification society in accordance with the requirements of the certificate of conformity. Records are maintained both on-board and ashore. Maintenance carried out on BOP equipment is undertaken by experienced and competent personnel and is covered by the PTW system. 3.7.7.8 All replacement hardware and consumables are procured to API standards and suitably rated for their purpose in accordance with QA procedures. 3.7.7.9 Every precaution is taken to prevent causing damage to the BOP. To limit the possibility of damaging a ram, rams are never opened without checking for pressure below the rams in question. When the BOP/LMRP is run it is landed using the compensator to avoid shock loads due to rig heave. It is equipped with a bulls-eye for monitoring stack alignment and rig positioning, and this is undertaken both while running and operating the stack.

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3.7.8

Riser Angle Indicator

3.7.8.1 During normal drilling operations it is important to ensure that the marine riser stays as near vertical as possible. This reduces the likelihood of wear on the drill string, wellhead, wear bushing, BOP, diverter packer and rotary bushing. Wear on the wear bushing needs to be kept to a minimum to enable the bushing to be retrieved and to protect the wellhead and BOP. 3.7.8.2 Riser angle limits are based on both operating experience and physical limitations associated with use of such pieces of equipment as the ball joints. These limits are provided in the procedures outlined in the Mooring Analysis and Severe Weather Conditions Manual. Typical maximum limits will be an offset of 3 degrees, at which time drilling operations will be suspended. 3.7.8.3 When the guide-base is run initially, it will not be cemented in place unless the bulls-eye indicator, located on the base, demonstrates that the angle of inclination is one degree or less. 3.7.8.4 The BOP, LMRP and Flex joint, are fitted with bulls-eyes in order to monitor the installation of the stack on the guide-base and the riser angle during normal operations. The bulls-eye on the flexjoint indicates riser angles from 0-5 degrees and it is monitored on a daily basis by the ROV. In addition, there are 3 transponders: 1 attached to the riser adapter and the other 2 attached to the lower BOP package. These are used to monitor the relative horizontal displacement between the MODU and the wellhead and also the differential riser angle. The transponders form part of an acoustic positioning system. The positioning system has a display in the BCR. The acoustic positioning system has an audible alarm that sounds in the BCR. There are 2 alarms; 1 monitoring the relative MODU position to the wellhead and 1 monitoring the riser angle. These can be set according to the specifications of the client. 3.7.8.5 Continuous management of the mooring system ensures that the riser is kept within the limits defined within the procedures for Mooring Analysis and Severe Weather Conditions. Reduction of the rotational speed of the drill string ensures that wear, as a result of horizontal movement of the ARCTIC I is brought under control. 3.7.8.6 The ROV is launched daily, weather permitting, and used to observe the angle of the ball joint and the BOP. It is normal practice to make video recordings of both. 3.7.9 BOP Control System

3.7.9.1 The main purpose of the BOP control system is to operate the hydraulic functions on the BOP stack when the stack is on the seabed. The controls that operate the BOPs are initiated at the surface and transmitted through a control hose bundle to the control pods. 3.7.9.2 The Subsea pod function control valves require a pilot signal before they can supply their particular function. This pilot signal originates from the master hydraulic BOP control panel located in the BOP control room that houses the primary controls but is not considered the primary control station. 3.7.9.3 The BOP control system can be remotely operated from two separate stations: The Drillers BOP control panel located on the drill floor. The Toolpushers BOP control panel located in the Toolpushers office.

3.7.9.4 The Drillers control panel permits operation of the controls on the hydraulic master panel from a remote location. This panel is positioned on the drill floor and is used as the primary control

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station. 3.7.9.5 The push-and-hold-to-operate button must be pushed and held when operating any of the other panel push-button switches that control the BOP stack. This is a safety feature that prevents the accidental operation of a BOP function. 3.7.9.6 Both remote control panels contain red flashing lamps for the following abnormal system conditions Low level alarms for; Accumulator pressure Rig air pressure Mix fluid level Purge air pressure Concentrate level Battery voltage Glycol level

3.7.9.7 In addition, a warning horn sounds when a warning light comes on. To turn the horn off when the conditions are corrected, the alarm light will be pushed on each control panel. 3.7.9.8 The lamp test button is provided to test the lamps in the lighted push-buttons and warning lights. 3.7.9.9 The Drillers and Toolpushers panels use electric push-buttons to operate the master hydraulic control panel and has indicator lights and fluid count to show function positioning. The ability to remotely operate the BOP system from both the Drillers and the Toolpushers panels serves not only as a convenience but also as a second and even third point of control. 3.7.9.10 All functions can be controlled from the drill floor and the Toolpushers panel. All the control panels incorporate flow meters that enable the volume of fluid used to be monitored and full closure/opening of each function to be confirmed. Both electric panels have push and hold interlock buttons to prevent inadvertent operation of the ram functions. 3.7.9.11 Electrical initiations of functions are independently sent from either panel to central junction boxes located in the BOP control room. 3.7.9.12 The master BOP control panel will remain operational should the electrical or air supply be interrupted. 3.7.9.13 The pilot system fluid is different from BOP power fluid in the sense that the pilot fluid is a closed loop whereas the BOP power fluid is vented to the ocean. Pilot signal pressure is set by the hydraulic panel pressure regulator sufficiently to operate all the function control valves in the subsea pod. Pressure regulation of the hydraulic fluid is accomplished by operating surface controlled regulators. 3.7.9.14 Accumulators at the surface store large amounts of pressurized fluid for subsea use in operating the BOP stack. The 3 conduit line gives a constant higher volume of fluid at the control pods as is required for any given function, therefore reducing the function times without the need of subsea accumulators. On running and pulling of the BOP, the control fluid is sent to the control pods via a 1 line in the Umbilical hoses and when the BOP is landed and latched, the supply is changed over to the 3 conduit line. 3.7.9.15 This fluid supply is directed through to the control regulators via a Tri Valve Assembly. This assembly is controlled from the BOP control panel and directs fluid to the selected pod or flushes the conduit line with BOP control fluid on initial landing and latching.
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3.7.9.16 Fluid count is monitored using a flow meter incorporated in the system and measures the volume of fluids used for each function. Flow meter counters are provided on the master hydraulic panel, the Drillers panel and the Toolpushers panel. 3.7.9.17 Operation of the BOP control system requires hydraulic fluid pressure and control fluid, ethylene glycol, compressed air, and electricity. 3.7.9.18 The fluid mixing system comprises of: 2 holding tanks for Erifon 856 and Monoethylene Glycol 1 Day tank of Monoethylene Glycol 1 Day tank of Erifon 856 1 Mix Tank with fluid as determined by mixing pumps.

3.7.9.19 There are 3 pumps in the mixing system and by controlling the ratios of the Erifon 856 pump and the Monoethylene pump the correct mix of control fluid is achieved. 3.7.9.20 All sections are equipped with vents, filling ports, drains, clean out ports and fluid level sight gauges. In addition, each reservoir is equipped with a float-operated pneumatic level switch that activates a warning lamp on the electric remote panels and a horn alarm when the fluid level becomes low. 3.7.9.21 The BOP control system comprises two, 60HP GASO triplex pumps, pumps and three airoperated pumps. The two 60 HP triplex pumps draw fluid from the mix tank, pressurize it and move it to the accumulator banks for use by the BOP control system. These pumps are horizontally mounted on separate skids. The cut in pressures are adjustable and there is a facility to change over between lead/standby pump when required. 3.7.9.22 The three air-operated pumps assist or take over the pumping operation when the triplex pumps cannot operate or keep up with fluid demand. Like the triplex pumps, the air-operated pumps draw fluid from the mix tank, pressurize it, and move it to the accumulator banks for storage. The air supply that operates the pumps is controlled by two air manifolds for the pump assembly. 3.7.9.23 The accumulator banks, located in the BOP control room, store a water, hydraulic control fluid and ethylene glycol (in winter) mix under pressure for use by the control system. The air pumps are run from normal rig air. They have a cut-in pressure of 2,400 psi and a cut-off pressure of 2,700 psi that is controlled by a pump governor. 3.7.9.24 To protect the system from being damaged by high fluid pressure, both pump assemblies are equipped with PRVs. These valves are set to relieve pressure back to the reservoir should the hydraulic fluid pressure rise above 3,200 psi. There are also bursting discs on the discharge side of the triplex pumps set to burst at 3500psi. 3.7.9.25 The BOP control system is provided with a dedicated battery back-up located in the BOP control room which is charged through the emergency distribution panel. 3.7.9.26 The flow meter counter measures the flow in litres of all hydraulic fluid from the accumulator unit to the BOP stack functions. This meter has an electric reset button. 3.7.9.27 The stainless steel shuttle valves control the flow of regulated hydraulic supply pressure from the subsea control pods to the BOP stack and LMRP equipment. When one pod is in use, the shuttle valves prevent the hydraulic pressure from venting to the other pod. The shuttle valves are installed at the hydraulic outlets on the BOP stack and LMRP. 3.7.9.28 The BOP control system is maintained in accordance with the rig maintenance program and
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manufacturers recommendations. 3.7.10 Choke and Kill System

3.7.10.1 The choke-and-kill system consists of: one 15,000 psi choke manifold situated on the drill floor comprising a buffer chamber, two hydraulically operated chokes and two manual chokes choke-and-kill lines rated to 15,000 psi between the manifold and the BOP consisting of: o 2 x 15,000 psi rated co-flexip hoses attached directly to the slip-joint o 2 inch fixed pipe, an integral part of the marine riser that runs from the slip-joint down the riser to the BOPs o choke-and-kill valves rated to 15,000 psi upstream and 10,000psi downstream o Overboard lines rated to 10,000 psi.

3.7.10.2 The system is a fundamental part of the ARCTIC Is well control equipment and has an important part to play in a situation where an influx has been taken and the well has been made safe by closing one of the rams on the BOP stack. With the well closed in, the choke side of the system is used to contain and maintain constant bottom hole pressure as well as to circulate out the influx through the appropriate choke. This is carried out in a manner that enables primary control to be regained by weighting up of the mud through the drill string. The kill side of the system is for use in the event that weighting up of the mud using the drill pipe is neither possible nor desirable. 3.7.10.3 Under these conditions, the influx can either be bull-headed back into the formation or circulated out through one of the chokes. The approach adopted depends on the actual location of the influx. The choke-and-kill lines can be used interchangeably. 3.7.10.4 The manifold is fitted with buffer blocks to protect it against erosion-related washout and is equipped with temperature sensors to monitor for potential problems with hydrates. Facilities for glycol injection are fitted to the manifold. The valves isolating the choke manifold from the MGS and the overboard lines are remotely operated. The connections with the stand pipe manifold and the cement unit enable the mud pumps and the cement pump to be used to kill wells, if required. 3.7.10.5 The hydraulic chokes are controlled from the control panel located in the Drillers control cabin. Both pumps are located in the Drillers control cabin. Under normal operating conditions the valves on the manifold are lined up based on a preferred routing through the manifold taking into consideration well conditions at the time. The well would be initially closed in on the BOP and the relevant choke-and-kill valves on the stack. The alignment of the valves on the manifold would be confirmed and checked before opening the valves on the stack. The hydraulic control unit for the chokes is equipped with gauges for monitoring well control parameters while manipulating the chokes. 3.7.10.6 The choke-and-kill system is maintained in accordance with the rig maintenance program and is tested along with the BOPs. Wall thickness checks are carried out on the choke manifold and associated fixed pipe-work in accordance with management system requirements. All pipe work has been installed in order to reduce the potential for dropped-object damage and the number of rightangled bends. Any such bends are fitted with lead targets and pilot hole drilled. 3.7.11 Co-flexip Hose

3.7.11.1 Four Co-flexip hoses connect the services from the Moonpool area to the slip joint by means of goose neck fittings with lip seals. Two are for the Choke and Kill lines, 1 is for the riser boost line and 1 is for BOP control fluid conduit line. At the LMRP end of the system, flexible hoses are used as
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continuations of the choke-and-kill lines and BOP control conduit by way of the flex joint. 3.7.11.2 The flexible choke-and-kill hoses have a 3 ID and are rated to 15,000 psi. The hoses, which have a survival condition of 160 C in excess of one hour, are rated for temperatures in the range of -20 C to 130 C and have a stainless steel wrap to protect the hoses from damage caused by abrasion. The riser boost hose is 3 ID and has a working pressure of 5,000 psi The conduit hose is 3 ID and has a working pressure of 5,000 psi 3.7.11.3 The hoses are visually inspected and tested in connection with the requisite pressure tests on the stack. They are also subject to inspection testing and re-certification by an independent competent body in accordance with management system requirements. 3.7.12 Wellhead Connectors

3.7.12.1 The rig is equipped with a suitably rated wellhead connector, depending upon the well program, up to a maximum of 15,000 psi. The Connector is pressure tested on surface prior to running and then again each time the BOP is tested. The ring gasket is normally changed using the ROV. All ring grooves undergo regular inspection by an independent competent body. In the event of the complete loss of hydraulic control, the connector can be released using the facility available on the connector to stab in a hot line using ROV assistance and hydraulic power from the pilot system supplied directly from the ARCTIC I. 3.7.12.2 Each pod on the stack has a primary and secondary function that can be used individually to unlock the connector. Both the primary and secondary functions are capable of unlocking the connector. 3.7.13 Subsea Running Equipment

3.7.13.1 Handling tools for running the riser are fitted at one end with the same box connector for latching into the riser joints and the slip-joint. The other end of the tool is a 4 inch IF tool joint which allows the tool to be handled by a dedicated set of elevators rated at 1,120,000 lb. The tool is also equipped with separate attachments and test caps for pressure testing choke-and-kill lines to the rated pressures. 3.7.13.2 A riser spider rated to 1,000,000 lb is installed in the rotary to support the marine riser while it is being run. The spider has two positions that enable it to be used for handling, both, joints of riser and the slip joint. 3.7.14 Well Control Practices

3.7.14.1 All drilling operations are carried out in accordance with Transocean Field Drilling Operations Manual and the Well Control Manual HQS-OPS-HP 01 3.7.14.2 The early detection of any well kick situation is vital; a slow response to a minor situation can rapidly develop into a full scale blow-out if not responded to immediately. Once the well is shut in and the situation analysed, a carefully planned response can be initiated. A copy of the shut-in procedure is posted in the Drillers control cabin. 3.7.14.3 The Driller is the first line of defence in any well control situation. It is essential that the Driller takes the correct action to close in the well and prevent a kick from becoming a blow-out. The Drillers experience and well control training, both in-house and ashore, are the pre-requisite to the Driller holding a well control certificate. All of this is aimed at providing the Driller with the level of competence required to carry out the drilling task safely. Personal experience and training ensure early recognition of the first signs of a change in well control/drilling parameters. If any doubt exists,
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operations will cease and the well will be flow-checked. 3.7.14.4 The appointment to a position as Driller is based on the individual attaining a certain level of competency. With this responsibility comes the authority to close in the well when required in the Drillers opinion. The Driller has the full authority to make this decision alone. 3.7.14.5 Training support in the form of frequent drills are held in order that the Driller and his crew maintain the high level of awareness required to detect and shut in a kick. Minimising any well bore influx is paramount to reducing the risk involved in controlling and killing the well. Drill floor crew members are sufficiently trained to respond correctly in the event that the Driller becomes incapacitated, securing the drill floor and raising the alarm. 3.7.14.6 The Driller and other supervisory staff are made aware of any specific features of the well that are relevant to effective well control through the drilling programme and pre-spud meetings. The well programme will detail formation structures enabling drilling personnel to plan and anticipate drilling parameter changes. This is particularly important in the prevention of stuck pipe. The MODU is equipped with a top drive system that is invaluable, especially when drilling through difficult formations, in preventing stuck pipe. Good BHA selection and mud control also contribute to the prevention of stuck pipe. 3.7.14.7 When well is shut in, the Toolpusher is required to supervise subsequent operations associated with bringing the well under control. The Day Toolpusher has to be competent in many different areas but throughout the years of training prior to taking up the post, emphasis is placed on training the Day Toolpusher to deal with well control problems. Transoceans well control manual is available as a guide, and contains specific instructions for particular well control operations, such as stripping. 3.7.14.8 Rig personnel are encouraged to discuss any difficult or non standard well control situations with the appropriate shore based personnel who can enlist additional expert advice, should this be necessary. 3.7.14.9 All supervisory drilling personnel have attended an approved well control school and hold industry recognised well control certificates, as well as having completed in-house training programmes, both on-board the and ashore. A copy of all relevant certificates is kept on-board. 3.7.14.10 A trend sheet is maintained by the Driller to monitor any changes or abnormalities in drilling parameters. Values are recorded approximately every 30 minutes, or more frequently should any significant change occur. Data recorded include in depth, PVT, ROP, WOB, rpm, amps, spm, psi, gas, mud weight (in and out) and string weights up, down and rotating. 3.7.14.11 Drilling operations are strictly controlled based on the parameters established as a result of the programme and prevailing well conditions. Particular emphasis is placed on ROPs in order to minimise any influx when drilling through difficult formations. Any sudden change in the ROP, also referred to as drilling break, is a trigger for flow-checking the well. 3.7.14.12 Prior to drilling into any known reservoir, consideration would be given to present and forecasted weather. If weather conditions are unfavourable, operations may be suspended until such times that it was deemed prudent to continue. 3.7.14.13 Should the BOP be pulled before completing the well, the well would be secured by installing at least two permanent barriers and tested before the stack was unlatched and pulled. 3.7.14.14 When drilling top hole with a pin connector and riser assembly, it is the Transocean practice to flow-check and pump heavy mud before disconnecting and pulling riser in accordance with

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the shallow gas guidelines. 3.7.14.15 The choke-and-kill lines are flushed daily, operating conditions permitting. Clean mud is used and flushing ensures that the valves are kept free of debris and that, in the event the chokeand-kill lines are required to be used, the mud properties are kept stable. 3.7.14.16 The well is monitored at all times. A flow-check will be made using the trip tank if there is any sign of an influx into the annulus from the formation or there is a drilling break. The Driller installs a safety valve if tripping, connects the top drive and spaces out the drill string. If the well is flowing, it is shut in, in accordance with Transoceans well control procedures. 3.7.14.17 Protection against inflow through the drill string is provided by one, or a combination, of the following non-return valves: Float valve at the bit Dart subs Stab-in valve at surface

3.7.14.18 It is a legal requirement to notify the authorities of a charge or over-pressurised formation and consequently, the checks and balances are there to ensure that the likelihood of drilling into such a formation without knowing of its existence is greatly reduced. 3.7.14.19 In the event that gas is breaking out of the mud in the shaker area, drilling would be stopped to assess the severity of the situation. If the problem relates to gas-cut mud, the degasser would be run, the mud weight raised and circulating continued. If the gas became too great a problem for the mud degasser, the annular would be closed, the mud weight increased at the pits by the Derrickman and the returns circulated through the MGS via the choke manifold until the mud is homogeneous and gas levels have reached an acceptable level. Drilling would then continue with caution. 3.7.14.20 A well control kick sheet is displayed in the Drillers control cabin which is updated every shift or at more frequent intervals, depending upon well conditions. All well control calculations are checked by more than one person. The format for well control calculations is standardised and all supervisory drilling personnel are familiar with this format. Consequently, the possibility of errors creeping into the calculations is reduced. The Driller also has the facility to carry out well control calculations on a PC using a standard spreadsheet format. 3.7.14.21 When coming off bottom at start of a trip, the Toolpusher is present on the drill floor. In this situation, the first ten stands are always pulled slowly with the draw-works in low gear to reduce the potential for swabbing particularly when pulling through any tight spots. Mud properties are altered, if deemed necessary, to help reduce any swabbing tendencies. 3.7.14.22 When tripping out of the hole, a trip sheet is filled out in order to check actual hole fill against calculated volumes. Any discrepancies in mud volumes are cross-checked with the mud loggers and any corrective actions immediately instigated. The use of the trip tank and trip tank pumps gives greater hole fill accuracy. However, it is also possible to use a mud pump to fill the hole. 3.7.14.23 It is normal practice to perform a flow-check in connection with any of the following: Drilling break Change of formation Mud temperature rise Presence of gas cut during connections Any gain or loss of mud from the system Prior to starting a trip
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At the shoe during a trip Prior to pulling the BHA through the BOPs Anytime the Driller is in doubt of the well behaviour If the mud loggers have a discrepancy with mud volumes or any of the above

3.7.14.24 As a backup, in the event of all electrical and manual indicators failing on the trip tank, a visual inspection of the hole can be carried out to check that the hole is full and that the mud is being circulated.

3.7.15

Drilling Procedures

3.7.15.1 In accordance with management system requirements, Transocean is required to provide written instructions specifying the procedures to be observed in order to ensure that personnel working on the installation are carrying out their activities within the framework of safe systems of work. 3.7.15.2 In accordance with these requirements, the rig crews have produced an extensive set of task specific THINK Plans(TSTPs). The basis of the development of TSTPs is that, having assessed the risk associated with undertaking the tasks in question and ascertained there is cause for concern regarding the level of risk, the use of TSTPs should provide a consistent and reasonably practicable way of reducing that risk. The risk assessment is experience-based and reflects the potential for deviation from standardised safe working practices that have developed within the industry over many years of operation. The development of TSTPs also covers the need to customise industry-recognised standard safe working practices to take into account the specific requirements of the specific well operation, and, they cover operations that are not part of the normal core activities. 3.7.15.3 The TSTPs are reviewed regularly by both rig and shore management, particularly upon receipt of industry-related safety notices that may affect recognised safe drilling practices. Where necessary, corrective action is taken immediately and TSTPs modified to reflect equipment upgrades, procedural changes, and operational requirements taking account of current legislation. All changes to TSTPs are implemented in accordance with management system requirements. 3.7.16 Float Valves

3.7.16.1 In accordance with Transoceans shallow gas guidelines, a float valve is installed in the drill string when drilling the top-hole section of a well. The valve acts basically as a non-return valve in the drill string to reduce the likelihood of a shallow gas kick being brought up on through the drill string. The valve should be non ported.[Ref WCM: Section 8 SS1 item 8.5] 3.7.16.2 Care is taken at the surface to ensure that the valve is inserted the proper way. The installation of the valve is supervised by the Driller or the Toolpusher. While running in the hole regular stops are made to fill the drill string with mud to maintain the maximum hydrostatic head.The interval between fill ups of the dill string must not exceed 3000ft [Ref WCM: Section 4 SS4 item 1.4.3] 3.7.17 Stab-in Valve

3.7.17.1 Stab-in valves are kept on the drill floor to enable the drill string to be closed off in an emergency. The Stab In valve consists of a FOSV (Fully Opening Safety Valve = Ball valve e.g. TIW) and an inside BOP (IBOP = surface installed back pressure valve, e.g. Gray Valve), specific parameters. All safety valves are tested to the same pressure and frequency as all other critical well control equipment (Ref WCM Section 9 , SS 6)
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3.7.17.2 If the Driller should notice the well flowing while tripping in or out of the hole, the drill crew will be alerted and they will be instructed to install the stab-in valve and close it off. Consequently, the well is secured and, with the valve in place, the top drive can be reconnected. (ref WCM Section 4, SS4, item 1.2.1 & 1.4.5) 3.7.17.3 The stab-in valve is also used as a safety measure in connection with such operations as slipping and cutting drill line. The valve is installed in, in the open position, the drill string prior to the start of the operation. If the well should start to flow the valve will be closed to secure the well. 3.7.17.4 Stab-in valves are regularly pressure tested as part of the requisite tests carried out on all well control equipment. If faulty, they are repaired or replaced and then re-tested. There is always at least one back-up stab-in valve. Independent inspection, including NDT, is carried out by a competent body in accordance with management system requirements.(Ref WCM Section 9, SS6) 3.7.17.5 Regular training and trip drills are carried out to ensure that the drill crew is familiar with the correct procedure for installing and operating the stab-in valve. These drills are held by the Driller when going in or out of the hole. These drills involve the use of the horn, well-specific valves and the relevant cross-overs with the objective being to get the best speed of response practicable. The training and drills given to all drill crew members makes all the relevant personnel aware of the need to identify things such as thread types and reduces the likelihood of human error when installing stabin valves. Only the relevant threaded connections and cross-overs are kept on the drill floor.(Ref WCM Section 4, SS 2 Well control drills) 3.7.18 Casing and Handling

3.7.18.1 Casing handling is integral to well control procedures. Normal practice is that the specification of the casing and casing shoe depth is undertaken as part of the well design work performed by the Operator. During the well planning phase of the work, the choice of casing and location of casing shoe depths is reviewed by Transocean as part of the assessment of the well programme. 3.7.18.2 As the casing arrives on board, it is laid out, the threads cleaned and inspected and the casing is drifted to ensure it is of the appropriate inside diameter (ID) and that no mechanical damage has occurred during transit. The lengths of the casing joints are also measured and recorded. The measurements are taken by both Transoceans and the Clients representatives. 3.7.18.3 The casing is transferred from the deck to the catwalk using the rig cranes. From the Myrex cart a combination of the draw-works and air hoists is used to manoeuvre the casing into the rotary table where it is made up utilising power tongs. The correct torque is applied through the use of calibrated torque gauge on the tongs. 3.7.18.4 During the drilling operation, the shoe location is verified by sampling and analysing the solids returned to surface in the mud and extracted by the shale-shakers. The correct location of the shoe and a good cement job are essential in order to reduce the likelihood of formation failure. A good cement job is the result of thorough planning. If there is any doubt as to the actual hole configuration as a result of such things as under-reaming, the hole size may be checked by undertaking a calliper log prior to running the casing. This is carried out in order to ascertain the correct amount of cement required to be pumped. The cement calculations are carried out independently by the Toolpusher and the cementer and the results cross-checked. 3.7.18.5 Once the cement has set, the casing is pressure tested to a level in excess of the projected pressure levels likely to be experienced in the formation below the shoe in order to confirm the integrity of the casing. The pressure test is carried out by pumping drilling fluid into the casing with a preventer closed around the drill pipe. In some situations a cement bond log is also run to confirm the
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success of the cement job. If necessary, a squeeze job may be performed to improve the integrity of the cementing process. After each cement job the drill string is circulated clean. 3.7.18.6 After a successful test on the casing, drilling through the cement and drilling a few feet of new hole, the integrity of the formation is tested by performing a leak-off test or formation integrity test. 3.7.18.7 Casing operations are normally carried out with the assistance of a specialised third party casing crew working under supervision of rig personnel. 3.7.18.8 The handling of casing and casing operations are covered by TSTPs. 3.7.18.9 Every precaution is taken to minimise casing damage while drilling to the extent that in some situations drill pipe rubbers may be used. Casing wear is monitored. The use of ditch magnets to pick up metal shavings provides a good indication of casing wear. Additionally calliper logs may be run, particularly on deep angled holes, to gauge the IDs of casing. 3.7.19 Shallow Gas

3.7.19.1 A Shallow Gas Plan and contingency plans must be in place and fully risk assessed before spudding the well 3.7.19.2 If, after a thorough review of the site-specific data by Transocean personnel, it is decided that the residual risk associated with encountering shallow gas is acceptably low and that drilling will proceed. Transocean will place limitations on the spudding and/or drilling ahead on top hole section during the hours of darkness and based on the availability of a suitable weather window for completing the activities associated with establishing casing and formation integrity. In all cases spudding the well at night, and the availability of a suitable weather window must be addressed in the Shallow Gas plan. (ref WCM Section 8, SS 1, item 3.4) 3.7.19.3 The top hole section of a well is drilled in accordance with Transoceans shallow gas guidelines which form part of the Company Management System Well Control Manual (Ref WDM Section 8, SS1). 3.7.19.4 Prior to and during the drilling of top-hole sections a supply of sea water to the pits is lined up and made available for immediate use. The slug pit is normally kept topped up with seawater during the drilling of top hole. Kill mud is prepared for immediate use and stored in the reserve pit. The pump room is manned continuously while mud pumps are running or on standby. A bubble watch is maintained using the ROV and, if drilling riserless, a deck watch is instigated. Drills will be held to ensure that everyone is familiar with the actions or duties that they will be required to perform.(Ref WDN Section 8, SS1, item 5.1(Heavy Mud), item 3.4 (Shallow Gas Plan Position of People and drills) and item5.8 Monitor returns with ROV). 3.7.19.5 The ROV will be positioned on the seabed and bubble watchers will be posted around the as required in connection with top-hole drilling. Additionally, the SCR room is manned in preparation for switching electrical load to the anchor winches should it be necessary to relocate the Rig. Plans are also drawn up as to which way to winch-off, taking wind direction into account. Once all the safety measures are in place, including how to discard the drill pipe, the well is ready for spudding. 3.7.19.6 Depending on the water depth, consideration will be given to utilising a riser fill-up valve when using a pin connector. This would enable the full hydrostatic effect of the seawater to act on the formation and prevent collapse and evacuation of the marine riser. 3.7.19.7 On detection of shallow gas, the Driller will immediately pump the kill mud without stopping

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pumps. The Derrickman will line up the kill mud supply to the main pump and close off the sea water supply. The kill mud will be pumped to displace the volume of the annulus. As mentioned earlier, the seawater in question is supplied to and stored in the main mud pits for drilling top hole. If top-hole section is being drilled riser-less, The aim is to pump all the Kill mud at maximum pump rate to try and dynamically kill the well (i.e frictional back pressure at high flow rate plus increased hydrostatic head). If this does not work the move off plan will be initiated. 3.7.19.8 The well bore would be kept under observation by the ROV or sub-sea camera to confirm that the well flow had stopped. 3.7.19.9 During shallow gas kill procedures the following other procedures are implemented: All non essential watertight doors and hatches shall be secured to prevent invasion of voids by inflammable gas. All fire monitors, deluge and sprinkler systems should be checked and lined up. The fire pumps and fire main systems shall be tested and the operation verified Use Sea water and ballast suction on up-current side of rig Work boat activity shall be minimized and, if possible, all supplies should be taken onboard prior to spud in. If it is necessary for the work boat to come alongside, it shall use the side where it is possible to drift away for the rig with engines shut down. The Stand by vessel must be positioned upwind of the rig Drilling Operations must be suspended and a risk assessment conducted if the rigs gas detection system fails. Drilling operations must be suspended and a risk assessment conducted if the rigs mud monitoring system becomes unavailable while using a closed mud system The Driller or his designee must check diverter and overboard line valves for the correct setting at the beginning of each tour. The driller will be held accountable for this responsibility. The diverter insert packer must always be in and locked down after the riser is run (except during handling of the BHA) Ignition sources; When drilling out into known shallow gas reservoirs the rig must have the following procedures in place to prevent ignition of any gasses coming to surface. All work on the electrical system must be done using a lock out procedure and work permit. At no time during the drilling of shallow gas will the rig allow any form of hot work with concerns to electrical systems. For surface stack / jack up rig operations, any crane work carried on during this time must be by work permit only. If the cranes are diesel powered, they must be fitted with spray systems on the exhausts. In circumstances where a spray system can not be fitted such as when the exhaust is pointing upwards, a correctly sized and properly maintained spark arrestor is considered an acceptable alternative to the spray system. It should be noted that the handling of equipment onbard the rig by a crane has a high potential for sparks No person on the rig floor will eb allowed to use a hamer or any device which may cause a spark. If maintenance is required for equipment where potential sparks may occur, this maintenance must be postponed until the rig is in a position to ensure no gas is present.

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3.7.19.10 A bubble watch is instigated if not already in place and maintained around the MODU during well kill procedures to monitor for indications of potential escalation of gas flow. 3.7.19.11 After pumping the kill mud, if gas becomes a serious problem and starts breaking out at surface with no sign of it depleting at the seabed, the top drive would be disconnected and drill pipe dropped. SCRs would be selectively switched to allow the winches to be operated from the BCR and the unit would be winched off location in accordance with the plan formulated prior to beginning the operation. 3.7.19.12 A shallow gas situation could develop very quickly. Control and mitigation of the situation depends on a quick response. Transoceans WCM, Section 8, subsection 1, addresses this, the philosophy being to utilise the attributes and equipment to remove the rig from the scope of any uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons. Normal operating anchor tensions vary from 250 -350 kips, depending on the mooring spread. During drilling operations in which shallow gas is considered a residual risk, anchor tensions are kept at a level that is higher than normal. This increased level of tension provides sufficient stored energy to enable the ARCTIC I to be propelled off location rapidly on release of tension on the appropriate side of the rig. Simply releasing or slacking leeward anchors enables the high tensions in the windward anchors to quickly pull the clear of escaping shallow gas. 3.7.19.12 Should additional clearance be needed between the rig and escaping gas, the spare wire kept on the winch drums is sufficient to ensure that the Rig is winched to a temporary location, a safe distance from the well. 3.7.19.13 All masters of stand-by vessels (SBVs) are issued with standing orders immediately they come on location. Part of those standing orders relate to vessel positioning relative to wind direction and the semi-submersibles position. The Master of the SBV is instructed to ensure that the SBV is kept well clear of the downwind funnel of the rig. This is particularly important during shallow gas operations. The OIM ensures that the master of the SBV is aware of these standing orders and understands the importance of following them. 3.7.19.14 All SBV personnel are informed of the possibility of shallow gas and are instructed on what to do in the event that shallow gas in encountered. 3.7.20 Communications

3.7.20.1 During drilling, tripping, logging or at any other time when the hole is open, there is continuous communication between the mud loggers and personnel on the drill floor. Since the Driller and mud loggers monitor the same parameters using diverse approaches and equipment, either system can be used to cross-check the other in the event of discrepancies. Due to the effect of ballasting on mud pits, it is essential for the BCO to keep personnel on the drill floor in close touch with what is happening to the Rig from a marine view point. Any ballasting that has to be carried out will be explained to the Driller over the telephone in order that the Driller can take the effect of this into account when monitoring the mud system for gains or losses. 3.7.20.2 In the same way, personnel on the drill floor will contract the BCO when casing slings are about to be landed in the wellhead, when pulling on stuck pipe or landing the BOP stack. In the event of a significant change in mud weight or when the well is displaced to different mud weights or dumping water base, the BCO is informed so that the rig can be ballasted to counteract the change in distribution of variable deck load. 3.7.20.3 Good lines of communication are essential to maintain safe systems of work and the flow of information between rig supervisors and rig personnel is paramount to the efficient, safe, day-to-day

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operation of the ARCTIC I. The operational programme is discussed at the OIMs daily meeting that is attended by all senior rig supervisory staff. Modifications to the well programme, generated by shorebased management, and/or alterations to the scheduling of rig-based activities for the subsequent 24hour period, are discussed and operational requirements adjusted within the framework of a safe system of work. This meeting is minuted with copies going to all senior rig supervisors and a synopsis outlining the 24 hour look-a-head is posted on the mess room notice board in order to inform all crew member of the rigs operational status. 3.7.20.4 In addition to the daily meeting, the Day Toolpusher will issue instructions, daily, to the Drillers detailing the current requirements with regard to the drilling programe. 3.7.20.5 Each crew supervisor receives a detailed handover from their relief and the Drillers maintain a handover log on the drill floor. Boards are available in the Drillers control cabin, the mud pit room and shaker house, and notices providing information on the current operational status and any special operational requirements are posted thereon. 3.7.20.6 The crew hold regular safety meetings, tool box talks and pre-tour five minute safety meetings to discuss pre- or post- operations and to bring to the attention of all concerned any special operational requirements and their impact on our safe systems of work. If deemed necessary, operations will be stopped and a five minute safety meeting held in order to ensure personnel are familiar with the next phase of safety critical operation. Crew awareness and the importance of team work is continually highlighted at crew meetings. Additionally, there is a free interchange of information between the rig and shore-based management. Morning reports detailing operational activity during the previous 24-hour period, and other operational specific data, are forwarded to the shore-based office each morning. 3.7.21 Pre-shift Checks

3.7.21.1 At shift change the On and Off going Drillers have a formal handover where the Driller going on shift checks the Drillers handover log and identifies the important information required to ensure operational consistency. The BOP panel is checked by the Driller in order that the valve sequence is understood. The Assistant Driller checks the line-up of the choke manifold, ensures that the stab-in safety valves and cross-over subs are available and that safety valves operate and are open. Keys for all sizes of valves are checked to confirm that they are available when required. The Driller and subsea person check wind direction and line-up the overboard lines from the diverter and MGS lines accordingly. Pressure and indicator gauge lights on the B0P panel are checked. 3.7.21.2 The alarm settings for monitoring equipment are checked by the Driller going on shift and continuously during the shift and adjusted, if required. Regular communications between the Driller, mud loggers and Derrickman ensures the effective monitoring of mud pits and mud weights. Well data is kept up-to-date in the event of well problems. 3.7.21.3 On-the-job training and supervision are provided by senior personnel to ensure that Drillers and Assistant Drillers are capable of carrying out SCR tests and all other relevant checks. 3.8 3.8.1 Lifting Equipment & Material Handling General

3.8.1.1 All lifting equipment throughout the rig is certified, uniquely identified, has SWLs clearly marked and is inspected immediately prior to use. All cranes and items of lifting equipment, including loose gear, are subject to regular inspection and load testing by an independent competent body in accordance with Transoceans management system requirements. The cranes are covered by this

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independent inspection and non-destructive testing is an integral part of this inspection work. The boom foot pins are inspected at regular intervals. In addition, lifting equipment is covered by the rig maintenance programme. 3.8.1.2 Some of the maintenance activities relevant to cranes are; Controlling of corrosion and the maintenance of protective coatings Weekly testing of the crane hydraulics system, including the recording of the charge pump pressure Greasing of slew rings on a weekly basis Taking of grease samples monthly for analysis Renewal of 20 percent of slew ring bolts each year Performing of deflection tests regularly to confirm the integrity of the slew ring bearing

3.8.1.3 The thorough examination system for lifting equipment is based on a time interval being set at 6 monthly frequencies. 3.8.1.4 The appointed competent persons prepare formal reports and immediately bring defects to the attention of Rig Management, such items, dependent on severity are taken out of service, repaired or replace. A defect list is established and is annotated with corrective action taken. 3.8.1.5 Where specialised repair or refurbishment of lifting equipment is required, this is conducted by approved vendors selected on the basis of capability. 3.8.1.6 Lifting equipment reports are reviewed by shore-based management and appropriate corrective actions taken based on the advice of the competent person 3.8.2 Cranes

3.8.2.1 ARCTIC I is equipped with three Liebherr pedestal mounted cranes, one port, one starboard and one aft. All of the cranes are diesel-driven and hydraulically operated. The crane operating characteristics are as follows; Starboard Crane Manufacturer Boom Length Max SWL 120 Ft 154,300 Lbs (68.8 Tons) At Boom Radius 3o Ft Main Hoist Maximum Radius SWL 13.5 Tons At Max Radius Aft Crane Liebherr 100 Ft 220,000 Lbs (100 Tons) AT Boom Radius 52 Ft 58 Tons At Max Radius 120 Ft 154,300 Lbs (68.8 Tons) At Boom Radius 3o Ft 13.5 Tons At Maximum Radius Main Hoist; Lift / Radius Details for Onboard Lifts Port Crane

Main Hoist; Over-side Lift Details for 1.5m Significant Sea (3Metre Max Sea Height) Maximum Radius Maximum Lift 120 Ft Lift 13.5 Tons 54 Tons Boom Radius 30 Ft 100 Ft 38 Tons 70 Tons Boom Radius 46Ft 120 Ft Lift 13.5 Tons 54 Tons Boom Radius 30 Ft

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Auxiliary Hoist SWL Working Radius

10 Tons 120 Ft

15 Tons 100 Ft

10 Tons 120 Ft

All three cranes are capable of working supply boats, the port and starboard cranes are most frequently used for this task. Both the port and starboard cranes are capable of servicing the pipe deck and the drill floor, while the aft crane services the aft deck and BOP area. 3.8.2.2 Each crane is equipped with a load monitoring system to reduce the likelihood of the cranes being operated beyond the appropriate limits. The system consists of a CPU control unit with a display and an alarm unit. The display provides information on boom radius, actual load and allowable load limits for both the main and auxiliary hoists, with alarm functions activating when the loads reach 80 percent of the allowable limit. Load capacity charts are sited in each crane cab. The dynamic effects associated with off-loading a moving supply vessel using a rig-borne crane have been taken into account and reflected in the capacity charges and load limits. 3.8.2.3 The load monitoring equipment is maintained in accordance with the ARCTIC Is maintenance programme and is calibrated against known weights. The crane limits are tested daily by the Crane Operator. 3.8.2.4 In the event of the rig experiencing power failure, The emergency generator in back feed mode will allow the cranes to be operated Hazard warning lights are fitted to each crane. 3.8.2.5 The cranes have hydraulically operated brakes on all functions which operate on loss of hydraulics/power. 3.8.2.6 In an emergency, should there be a requirement to use the cranes they may be operated up to a list of 3 degrees maximum. 3.8.2.7 The cranes are approved to classification and flag-state requirements and certified fit-forpurpose by the classification society. 3.8.2.8 The cranes are maintained in accordance with the rig maintenance programme. A weekly Crane Inspection Report is compiled by the Crane Operators. A lube oil, grease and hydraulic oil sampling program is in place in accordance with the recommendations of the lubricant suppliers and adjusted on the basis of the analysis results. 3.8.3 Pipe Handling

3.8.3.1 The handling of pipe in the derrick, tripping and making up of stands while circulating are operations covered by TSTPs. The drill string is visually inspected by the drill crew at each trip in and out of the hole. 3.8.3.2 When stored on the pipe deck or being transferred from the pipe deck to the catwalk and Myrec cart, all drill pipe and drill collar threads are protected by means of screw-on protectors. 3.8.3.3 Drilling tubular handling equipment, such as elevators and bails and slip, are checked on a regular basis by an independent competent body and is regularly checked and maintained by the drill crew as part of normal working practice. All defective equipment is removed and taken out of service immediately. 3.8.3.4 All tubulars are manufactured in accordance with API standards and a complete history of rotating hours and inspections is maintained on board. A thorough inspection of tubulars is carried out by an independent inspection company in accordance with management system requirements.

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3.8.3.5 Drilling personnel complete a pipe-handling module as part of the in-house rigging and slinging training programme and a competence assessment. 3.8.4 BOP Transporter

3.8.4.1 The BOP is handled using a carrier with SWL capacity of 230 tons. This carrier is a trolley mounted forklift that runs on rails and is driven hydraulically through a rack and pinion drive. When the BOP is pulled to surface it is suspended below the rotary and the carrier is then manoeuvred below it. The BOP is then set down on a skid cart that is anchored to the carrier. The riser is disconnected and the carrier is manoeuvred to the aft end of the Moonpool. The BOP is then elevated to the deck level using the hydraulic jacking system. When level with the deck, skid beams are swung in and the skid cart is unpinned. The BOP and skid cart are then skidded over to the storage areas to port of the carrier using a hydraulic piston to jack it across. 3.8.4.2 Due to the size of the loads involved, only trained and competent personnel operate the carrier. 3.8.4.3 The carrier is maintained in accordance with the rig maintenance programme and the load bearing elements of the ARCTIC I are subject to regular NDT inspection by an independent competent body in accordance with Transocean and classification society requirements. 3.8.4.4 The operating limitations for the BOP Carrier are; 3.8.5 Man riding Wind Speed 39 Knots Heel or Trim Maximum angle 3

3.8.5.1 The use of air hoists for man riding purposes is strictly controlled. Only competent and trained personnel are allowed to operate air hoists when being used for man riding purposes. 3.8.5.2 All man riding winches are fitted with a range of safety devices including a loadlimiting/rendering device that restricts the maximum pulling force to 330lbs. The control panel is an integral part of the winch assembly and typically houses the following functions. Hoist operating automatic return to neutral after release from operating position. Upper and lower limit switches. Slack wire detector. Emergency stop. Automatic braking system, application of which will occur when the operating lever is returned to neutral or on loss of power. A secondary braking device.

3.8.5.3 Periodic testing of the load-limiting device is undertaken as part of the inspections and maintenance regime for the winch. The test comprises an arrangement whereby the winch line is attached to a fixed anchor point via a load indicating sensor/display unit. The winch is operated in this mode and any adjustments necessary to ensure that the maximum pull (330 lbs) is not exceeded are made. The pulling force of the winch is directly proportional to the pneumatic drive mechanism air inlet pressure. Periodic checks are undertaken to verify that the air pressure is in accordance with manufacturers recommendations. 3.8.5.4 Over speed devices are tested by manually increasing the drive motor speed until the trip mechanism is activated at the manufacturers recommended set point.

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3.8.5.5 Man riding air hoists are checked daily and are included as part of the weekly rig inspection. In addition, they are independently inspected by a competent body in accordance with management system requirements. They are maintained in accordance with the rig maintenance programme. 3.8.5.6 For all rig floor man riding operations a means of secondary retention is in place to prevent a person falling from height in the event of failure of the primary man riding winch, wire or other component. This involves the man aloft being attached to an independently rigged man-riding winch line by way of a lanyard and a climbers clamp on to a mountaineering type rope. 3.9 3.9.1 Power Plant and Supporting Systems Power Distribution

3.9.1.1 The power system comprises main and emergency power generation. 3.9.1.2 Main power on the ARCTIC I is supplied by 4 diesel/electric generators, 2 rated at 2100 kW and 2 rated at 1600 kW. They are located in the main engine room, and power is distributed through the main switchboards in the SCR room. Main engine cooling is provided by sea water cooling pumps located in each pontoon. Cooling water is supplied from the sea chests in the Pontoons to the main engine heat exchangers and then dumped overboard. The cooling system is equipped with sacrificial anodes to help minimise corrosion. These anodes, along with heat exchangers, are inspected regularly and changed out as required. The cooling system supply is continually monitored and alarmed through the Honeywell Ballast Control System. 3.9.1.3 Power is generated at 600 volts AC 3 phase 60 Hz. ARCTIC I utilises silicon controlled rectifier (SCR) power to rectify 600 volts AC to 0-750 volts DC in order to drive and run the drilling motors, anchor winches and propulsion motors. Each generator supplies the main bus through a 2525 amp circuit breaker. From the 600 volt bus, power is available to seven SCR drives. The advantage of the SCR power assignment is its flexibility. The power is normally assigned to the drill floor operations but in heavy or adverse weather conditions, when drilling may be suspended, it may be quickly and selectively re-assigned to the propulsion system and winches. The propulsion system is controlled from either the pilot house or the SCR room. Each SCR is capable of driving one propulsion motor. There are two propulsion motors per hull and four of SCR Nos 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 needs to be assigned in order to run all the propulsion motors. 3.9.1.4 The 600 volt bus supplies the three main 600/480 volt 1333 KVA transformers. Each transformer supplies the 480 volt ship services switchboard bus A, B and C. Each transformer feeds its respective switchboard through a 1,600 amp circuit breaker but, if necessary, one transformer can feed both switchboards via a 1,600 amp but tie-breaker. In order to minimise short circuit currents, the secondary transformer circuit breaker and bus tie-breaker are interlocked using a key system in order that all three breakers cannot be closed together. Most pump motors operate and run at 480 volts and are fed through sub-boards from the ship services switchboards. 3.9.1.5 From the 480 volt ship services switchboards the electrical power is transformed from 480 volts to 220/127 volts for lighting and hotel use. 3.9.1.6 During the drilling of top hole, the demand will normally peak at around 4,000 kW. In Hotel mode alone, the load requirement is around 850kW. 3.9.2 Emergency Generator

3.9.2.1 An 825 kW emergency generator is located in its dedicated compartment, starboard aft main deck . The generator starts automatically if main power is lost. Under normal operations, the main

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generators supply power through the Bus B switchboard to the emergency switchboard, located in the emergency generator room The Emergency board power is distributed to the various pumps, lights communications equipment designated as emergency units.. The emergency generator has a selfcontained radiator cooling system. 3.9.2.2 In the event of main power failure, the bus tie circuit breaker loses power and drops out. This isolates the emergency switchboard. The emergency generator power monitoring circuit takes over after sensing loss of power. 3.9.2.3 There is an interconnection between the ship services switchboard in the SCR room and the emergency switchboard such that, when the emergency generator is not running, power to the emergency switchboard is supplied from the 480V Bus B switchboard. Emergency power can be fed back to the 480V ship services switchboards, if required. This allows certain items of equipment to be run form the emergency generator, subject to sufficient emergency generator capacity. The emergency generator has sufficient power to drive all of the normal emergency power assignments, but if additional power assignments are required, some of the normal emergency assignments need to be shut down. Back feed breakers can only be set by competent personnel (e.g. Chief engineer, Electrician or Electronic Technician). An incident in the SCR room would not, in general, affect the integrity of the emergency power supply or equipment on the emergency switchboard. 3.9.2.4 The emergency generator is inspected and function-tested once a week. The engine is started electrically from 2 banks of dedicated rig batteries. The emergency generator fuel tank (located in the emergency generator room) is checked after each test. The emergency fuel tank capacity is sufficient to run the emergency generator for over 24 hours on full load. The running of the emergency generator is recorded on the IADC report. 3.9.2.5 In the event of the rig listing, the generators have been designed to continue operating up to an angle of 15 degrees in both longitudinal and transverse directions. 3.9.2.6 The emergency switchboard supplies the following major items of emergency equipment: MAIN EMERGENCY SWITCHBOARD (VIA VARIOUS MCCS) Emergency fire pump No. 1 Fire Booster Pump No. 1 Foam Fire Pump Helideck BOP control pump No 2 Sea water service pump (port) Ballast Control System Stbd Pump room Dewatering Booster Pump Port & Stbd Pump room Bilge Sump Pumps Sea water service pump (starboard) Stbd Pump room personnel elevator (2 x 7.5KW) Port Pump room personnel elevator (2 x 7.5KW) Main engine emergency start air compressor Emergency Generator Supply Fan 220 volt transformer (emergency) Fuel Oil Purifier No 2 Fuel Oil Service Pump Main Engine Pre-Lube Pumps 40KW 18.6KW 56KW 45KW 112KW 8KW 15KW 2 x 15KW 112KW 15KW 15KW 22.4KW 5.6KW 150KW 3.7KW 2.2KW 4 x 0.75KW
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Comms & Navigation Transformer Regulated Control Power (BCR Back-up)

15KW 22.5KW

3.9.2.7 Power is also supplied from 220 volt and 127 volt transformers to various 220 volt and 127 volt distribution panels supplying lighting and systems that have battery back-ups, including: GA PA system Telephone system Radios Emergency lighting Fire and gas detection system Navigation lights and horns Novec 1230 System Electric draw-works brake Drillers communications BOP controls

3.9.2.8 Battery locker located adjacent to Cement House serves Nav 1 obstruction lights and fog horn, Elmagco brake, BOP panel and main generator controls. 3.9.2.9 Battery locker located adjacent to pilot house serves GMDSS, pilot House Radios & Novec System

3.9.3

Emergency Lighting

3.9.3.1 The ARCTIC 1 is equipped with several different makes of battery powered emergency light fittings. Each has a minimum operating life of 90 minutes and up to a maximum of 120 minutes. These light fittings form part of the lighting system fed from the emergency power supply. 3.9.3.2 Battery powered lights are strategically located to provide adequate lighting at embarkation areas, control panels or operational stations and to illuminate escape routes to allow personnel to follow the safest and quickest route to the primary muster areas, embarkation points and effect evacuation of all personnel. 3.9.3.3 All emergency lighting systems are maintained in accordance with the rig maintenance programme. The lighting of escape routes satisfied classification and flag-state requirements and has been certified fit-for-purpose by the Classification Society. Strategically located light fittings are supplied from the emergency switchboard and backed up by suitably rated integrated battery packs. 3.9.4 Motor Generators

3.9.4.1 Engine/generators are controlled by AC electronic control modules via electro/hydraulic controlled actuators with integral back-up mechanical governors. The AC module controls generator voltage, load sharing, speed and kW output of the engine. The engine also has an independent control panel for stop/start which contains the engine safety alarms and shut-downs. Engine instrumentation includes visual and/or audible monitoring of the following: Engine speed Charge air temperatures and pressures Coolant temperatures, pressures and levels
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Lubricant temperatures, pressures and levels Exhaust temperatures Fuel and oil filter differential temperatures Starting air pressure Overload Electrical over speed Mechanical over speed

3.9.4.2 The primary safety shutdowns for the main engine are mechanical or electrical over-speeds, low lube oil pressure and high coolant temperature. Engine safety shutdowns are checked regularly as part of the rig maintenance programme. 3.9.4.3 The engines may be shut down remotely from outside the engine room using the equipment shutdown controls on the SCR Room propulsion panel & Pilot House panel. 3.9.4.4 Generator instrumentation monitors the following: Kilowatts KVAR Voltage Amps Frequency Generator winding temperatures Generator air temperatures

3.9.4.5 The primary generator safety shutdowns, initiated by the AC module protection circuits, cover over speed (over frequency), under frequency, over voltage, under voltage, over current, reverse power and loss of pulse pick-up. 3.9.4.6 The generators are also protected from inadvertent overloading (causing blackouts) by a power limit system that monitors and reduces power outputs to the DC drilling loads. 3.9.4.7 All main Engines can be shut down through initiation of Emergency Shutdown buttons located on the Manoeuvring consol in the SCR Control room and Pilot House. On shut down of the main engines the Emergency Diesel will start. All engines also have a facility for the shutting of the rig saver valve to the turbo blowers from the stop panel above the aft facing window in the SCR Control area. 3.9.4.8 The engine blowers take air via ducting from the passageway at the upper deck level directly aft of the LQ. Manual dampers are incorporated in this ducting. The emergency generator air intake is also on the engine, air being fed from the starboard side of the ARCTIC I at main deck level. The main engine exhausts discharge below main deck level at the port side of the unit. To reduce the potential for ignition as a result of sparking, all engine exhausts are fitted with spark arrestors. The engine exhausts are lagged in all deck house areas. 3.9.5 System Instrumentation & Automation

3.9.5.1 Using the instrumentation system, engine and generator parameters undergo frequent monitoring during the day, these parameters being recorded in the daily machinery report. This monitoring allows action to be taken in the event that any of the safe working limits of these parameters are in danger of being exceeded. 3.9.5.2 The rig maintenance programme incorporates frequent checks of both safety systems. The control module is checked with the aid of an oscilloscope as per the manufacturers recommendations.
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The engine alarms and shutdowns are function-tested with the engine running, using a heat sink and instrument pressure pump for the set points. Both mechanical and electrical over speeds are tested by taking the engine to the tripping speeds and ensuring shutdown. 3.9.6 Electrical System Monitoring

3.9.6.1 The electrical system on the ARCTIC I is maintained under the rig maintenance programme by the rig Electrician. Main circuit breakers are also inspected and tested by an independent competent body in accordance with the requirements of the management system. 3.9.6.2 Both ship services switchboards are monitored by separate earth leakage detection devices. Should a ground fault occur, audible and visual alarms are activated and a clear indication is given as to which switchboard has developed the fault. The alarms can only be reset when the fault is cleared. Main circuit breakers are fitted with overload and short current protection, as are the control cubicle circuit breakers. 3.9.6.3 Low power (220/127 volt) is supplied through distribution-boards fitted with Mobs that protect each individual circuit against over load. All 220/127 volt socket outlets are protected by RCD devices. 3.9.6.4 The protection of electric motors is provided through the use of overload relays. Failure of a device of this type could cause the loss of a motor and its removal from service. In order to combat this, a programme of current injection is in operation. Each overload relay is removed and tested for operation whilst being injected with fault level current. Results of these tests are recorded 3.9.7 Equipment Location and Manning

3.9.7.1 During the design stage, extensive thought was given to the location of equipment in order to provide mechanical protection, i.e. protection from damage from dropped loads. Personnel are particularly vigilant when moving or lifting equipment in or around machinery. 3.9.7.2 The engine room is manned by suitably qualified, experienced and competent personnel. Good communication between maintenance crews in the form of handovers ensures that all personnel are fully conversant with the operational status of all plant and machinery. Additionally, the MODU has a comprehensive monitoring system (Honeywell) that incorporates an alarm system giving both audible and visual indications of problem areas with the power system. 3.9.8 Fuel Oil System

3.9.8.1 Fuel received onboard the from a supply vessel is pumped from the boat to the bulk loading manifold located port and starboard, amidships, through a 3 inch certified flexible transfer hose complete with self-sealing connections and approved lifting arrangements. When not in use, these hoses are racked in a designated storage location. The loading of diesel fuel is covered by a TSTP, Permit and Checklist. 3.9.8.2 The fuel loading piping is routed from the loading manifold on the main deck through a fuel meter and then to the storage tank. All fuel lines are colour-coded. 3.9.8.3 Fuel is transferred from these hull tanks through high or low level suction valves using one of four electric pumps and fuel meters deposited in the settling tank. The transfer of diesel from the hull tanks to the diesel oil settling tank is controlled from the BCR. During any fuel transfer operations, the level of the diesel oil settling tank is continually monitored by the BCR. All fuel oil tank levels are monitored though the Honeywell system or manually using fail-safe sight glasses inside the engine room. A high level alarm sounds if the diesel oil settling tank level is greater than a pre-set value.
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3.9.8.4 The active diesel fuel storage system is located at main deck level in the main engine room and comprises a diesel oil settling tank and diesel oil day tank. All tanks are vented and located inside suitable save-alls. The tanks are vented at the pipe deck level. 3.9.8.5 Fuel oil purifiers are used to clean the fuel, and discharge clean fuel to either tank. Clean fuel to the engines is gravity supplied either from high or low suctions in either tank or directly from the purifiers in an emergency. A Fuel oil service pump uses a gravity feed from either of the engine room tanks to supply the local service tanks. The day tank and settling tank are checked weekly and any sediment is drained off. 3.9.8.6 The BCO transfers fuel up to main deck level, ie. the settling or day tanks and controls the operation of the fuel service transfer pump used for supplying fuel to the various consumers around the MODU. The emergency generator, cranes cement unit and wireline unit tanks are examples of such consumers. High level alarms sound in the BCR and SCR room when the pre-set day tank and settling tank levels are met or exceeded. All other consumer tanks on the MODU must be visually monitored during fuelling operations . 3.9.8.7 All diesel fuel lines are, so far as is reasonably practicable, routed along protected locations. All connections above main deck level are welded. The pipe work is adequately coated against external corrosion. Upon installation the system was hydro-tested in accordance with classification requirements. The emergency generator tank, located in emergency generator room contains sufficient fuel for at least 24 hours. 3.9.8.8 Fuel oil pump stop switches are located in the BCR and locally as indicated below;
Reference No S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 Pump Fuel Oil Purifier No 1 Fuel Oil Purifier No 2 Fuel Oil Service Lube Oil Purifier Fuel Oil Transfer Pump No 1 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump No 2 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump No 3 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump No 4 Sack Store Aft Bulkhead 3.9.8.9 Auxiliary Machinery Room Access to Column P 2 Main deck port side outside on elevator trunk Switch Location

3.10 3.10.1

Rig Air System Overview

3.10.1.1 There are three air system onboard ARCTIC I 2 x 200 PSI Cold Start Air compressors 3 x 120 PSI Rig Air Compressors 2 x HP 70 cuft/min 3000 PSi Compressors for Tensioner system 1 x 40 PSI 800cuft/min Bulk Air compressor

3.10.1.2 All compressors are fitted with dryer units.

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3.10.2

Cold Start System

3.10.2.1 Two cold start units are provided to maintain the two Air Start bottle accumulators to their set pressure of 165 PSI. these accumulators are all fitted with PRVs which are set to 200PSI and discharge to the atmosphere. 3.10.2.2 For contingency purposes the cold start compressors may be used for the main rig air system through a pressure reduction system. 3.10.3 Dry Air system

3.10.3.1 Dry compressed air is provided by three rotary screw air compressors via a ring mains. 3.10.3.2 All air receivers are equipped with check valves and are protected by PRVs. Isolation valves are incorporated into the piping system with the main shut-off valves being located in the engine room. The system was hydro-tested and NDTs on installation. All PRVs are tested and re-certified biannually. 3.10.3.3 Several of the MODUs rig air users may be classed as safety critical, although those systems that may be affected by the loss of rig air have a back-up system or protection device fitted. 3.10.3.4 A typical example which best demonstrates the above is the BOP control system. This system is fitted with three air-operated pumps and two electrically driven pump in order to maintain the systems pressure. In the event that both types of pump should fail, then the capacity of the accumulator bottles would be sufficient to operate all BOP functions at least twice. 3.10.3.5 The rig air system was designed and built to meet the requirements of DNV Classification Rules, 4th Edition and IMO MODU code. The maintenance of such equipment also reflects the criticality of that equipment in terms of its availability from both safety and operational viewpoints. 3.10.4 Air System for Tensioners

3.10.4.1 ARCTIC I is equipped with two electrically-driven compressors rated at 2,250 psi. The compressors supply air to the receivers that supply the drill string compensator and the tensioner systems. The air is cooled and dried, on entry to the system, to minimise corrosion and water ingress into control equipment. 3.10.4.2 The shut-off valves are of the ball type and are located at the outlet end of each pressure vessel. This manually-operated valve permits isolation of the air pressure vessel but is normally left in the open position. 3.10.4.3 The bleed valve is of the needle type and is used to drain any moisture from the air pressure vessel. The bleed valves are located at the bottom of the air pressure vessels. 3.10.4.4 Two frangible disc/fusible plug safety caps are provided to prevent the vessel from bursting due to excessive pressure or temperature. There is one at the top and bottom of each cylinder. 3.10.4.5 All pipe work from the air pressure vessels is butt welded, appropriately rated stainless steel pipe. Regular inspection and testing of the pipe work is carried out. 3.10.4.6 There are pressure gauges installed at each compressor. Additionally, a pressure gauge is located in the Drillers console and Auxiliary machinery space 3.10.4.7 All air receivers and bulk tanks are inspected in accordance with classification society requirements for pressure vessels, and are also included in the rig maintenance programme.
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3.10.5

Bulk Air Compressor

3.10.5.1 A single 800cu ft/min 40 PSI bulk air compressor is located in the auxiliary machinery room for the provision of transferring bulk material.. 3.10.5.2 The Bulk air is cooled and dried prior to use. 3.10.5.3 For contingency purposes a cross connection exists between the main rig air and bulk air system, although the Rig air is reduced and dried before use. 3.11 3.11.1 Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning Systems General

3.11.1.1 The heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) on board the ARCTIC I is segregated into a number of independent systems which can be collectively categorised under one of the two following types: LQ Living Quarters Working Spaces

3.11.1.2 The systems are approved in accordance with classification and flag-state requirements and have been certified fit-for-purpose by the classification society to 4th Edition standard. The basic philosophy is that the systems should maintain a temperate, healthy atmosphere, free from gas and pollutants in all enclosed spaces during normal operations. The LQ and its ventilation system are arranged in such a way that the LQ can provide a safe and healthy temporary environment for all personnel during an emergency situation should the need arise and the OIM deem it an appropriate response under the prevailing and possible escalating conditions. 3.11.1.3 All electrical equipment is suitable rated for its zone of operation and all parts of the HVAC system are covered by the rig maintenance programme. 3.11.1.4 All HVAC and ventilation system are tested in accordance with the rig maintenance programme and are regularly tested by the Classification Society in accordance with classification requirements. 3.11.2 Living Quarters

3.11.2.1 The LQ, consisting of upper and lower decks, is protected on the aft side by the pump room and the engine room and from above by the Helideck. A very small area of the LQ directly faces the drill floor and therefore provides quite extensive protection against the direct effects of blast or fire. 3.11.2.2 Each level of the LQ is provided with two Air Handling Units (AHUs) that distribute air through ventilation trunking to the various cabins, communal areas and work spaces with the LQ. 3.11.2.3 All air intakes for the LQ face forward and exhaust fans vent to port starboard. Each inlet and outlet is fitted with a damper that effectively seals the ventilation trunking when closed. These dampers are air operated and all fail-closed automatically on loss of air supply power. 3.11.2.4 Accommodation dampers may be operated using the CLOSE push button on individual damper control boxes located to their physical location on the external bulkhead around the LQ. In addition all Living Quarters dampers may be closed through the actuation of a shut down button in the BCR.. All inlets are monitored by the fire and gas detection system. Should an alarm condition be sensed, the signal from the detection system alarms in the BCR. BCO then activates the ventilation shutdown system which closes the dampers, effectively sealing the LQ.
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3.11.2.5 The LQ ventilation system is designed such that, in the event of a fire in the LQ generating substantial smoke, upon extinguishing the fire the smoke may be cleared by over-riding the closed dampers and selectively re-instating the appropriate fan. 3.11.2.6 Testing of all ventilation shutdown is carried out on a weekly basis in conjunction with fire/emergency drills. Once the ventilation system has shut down it has to be reset manually. 3.11.2.7 The laundry area is covered by the HVAC system with direct extraction to the outside and automatic shutdown in the event of fire. HVAC shutdown will also shut down power to the laundry driers. 3.11.2.8 The detection of CH4 or H2S at any caisson sensor again alarms in the BCR at which point the BCO will shut down all caisson ventilation fans. 3.11.2.9 All LQ fire dampers close automatically upon operation of any HVAC stop button, the detection of CH4, H2S or smoke by any sensor located in the LQ ventilation inlet, and activation of the galley hatch stop button. The override functions on the system enable the BCR to open all fire dampers. Engine room personnel must restart all ventilation fans. The fire dampers may be opened on an individual basis through the utilisation of the local pneumatic controls. The dampers are also provided with a fusible link that will fail and allow the damper to close automatically if the air temperature in the duct exceeds 60C. The damper is required to be opened manually in case of a failed link. 3.11.2.10 Individual ventilation system shutdown can be achieved through the BCR or through the SCR room. 3.11.3 Mud Pit Room

3.11.3.1 The mud pits are grated over and the mud pit area ventilation consists of supply to, and exhaust from, the area above the tank top grating, the mud pit room and the area below the grating, the pits themselves. 3.11.3.2 The mud pit room ventilation system maintains the space at negative pressure and consists of one supply and one exhaust fan. The motors are single speed and the control panels are interlocked. Should the supply side fail, the exhaust side will continue to operate, but should the exhaust fan fail, the alarm will be triggered. A flow sensor is fitted inside the exhaust fan ducting which shuts down the supply fan should the exhaust fan fail. The pressure in the pit room is maintained at a lower level than the pressure in the mud pump room. There are visual and audible alarm indications at the entrance to the mud pit room as well as a visual alarm in the Drillers house in the event that the pressure differential between the mud pit room and mud pump room fails to be maintained. 3.11.3.3 The space is equipped with self-closing gas tight doors forming airlocks which are kept closed at all times. 3.11.4 Shale-Shaker

3.11.4.1 The Lower shale-shaker ventilation system consist of two exhaust fans and a separately mounted supply fan, allowing for a negative pressure in the space. The Upper Shale Shaker area contains a similar system, All supply and exhaust fans are fitted with locally operated fire dampers. 3.11.5 Paint Locker

3.11.5.1 The paint locker is located on the aft main deck and SC3 and is totally enclosed with a
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lockable door. The paint locker is classed as a hazardous area. The electrical equipment is rated accordingly. Both paint locker spaces are covered by Novec fire suppression systems. 3.11.6 Loss of ventilation

3.11.6.1 The loss of ventilation alarm system covers several key areas on the MODU. Audible and visual indications are provided in the BCR for ventilation system malfunctions in the battery lockers. The shale shakers mud pump room and mud pit room alarm in the Drillers house. The objective is to ensure that failure in the ventilation system to maintain negative pressure as far as the shaker house mud pit area, and battery lockers are concerned, is identified as early as is reasonably practicable after a system malfunction. 3.11.7 Temporary Ventilation

3.11.7.1 Portable fan units and flexible trunking are available on-board for use in connection with the temporary ventilation of normally enclosed spaces and is used in accordance with management system requirements. All HVAC and ventilation systems are tested and maintained in accordance with the rig maintenance programme and are regularly inspected by the classification society in accordance with class requirements. 3.11.8 Natural Ventilation

3.11.8.1 The layout of the ARCTIC I is such that most of the working areas at main deck pipe deck level are well served by natural ventilation. Areas chosen for use in connection with specialist activities such as well testing are, by virtue of the location of the associated dedicated site, naturally ventilated. 3.11.9 Emergency Shut Down

3.11.9.1 A ventilation system shut down panel is located in the BCR. The panel contains Fan stop button switched for all ventilation fan groups on the rig and has the relevant level 1 gas shut down fans identified. 3.11.9.2 As identified above the Living Quarters HVACs fans and dampers may be shut down and stopped through the use of the Emergency shutdown button in the BCR. 3.11.9.3 The fan stop groups are provided in the following table.
Fan Group No S 31 S 32 S 33 S 34 S 35 S 36 S 37 Ventilation Areas Engine and Machinery Room Mud Pit Room Mud Pump Room and Sack Store Emergency generator Room BOP Hose Shop Battery Room Main Deck Paint Locker Mud Processing & Shale Shaker Area Port Side Workshops BOP Control Novec Room YES YES Level 1 Shut Down

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S 38 S 39 S 40 S 41

Caisson 1 Port Caisson 1 Starboard Port Caisson 2 Port Caisson 3 Pump Room Starboard Caisson 1 Starboard Caisson 2 Starboard Caisson 3

YES YES YES

YES

S 42 S 43 S 44

Drillers House SCR Room AC Unit Living Quarters

3.12 3.12.1

Drain Effluent and Waste Systems Drainage

3.12.1.1 The ARCTIC Is drainage system can be categorized as either contaminated or noncontaminated drains. 3.12.1.2 Contaminated drains from the hulls and machinery spaces discharge into the rigs port drain tank located in the port aft caisson. The bilge holding tank is then processed through an oily water separator which separates the oil from the water. The water is pumped overboard and the oil is discharged into the waste oil holding tank. All waste oil is then pumped to a transportable waste oil tank for disposal ashore. 3.12.1.3 In addition, all fuel oil tanks and lube oil tanks are located in bunded areas that drain into the contaminated drain system. The bilge tank level and bilge sump levels are alarmed and continually monitored from the BCR using the Honeywell system. 3.12.1.4 The drainage system covering the drill floor area is a closed system and prevents spillage of mud to the sea. The drill floor drains discharge to a holding tank located in the Moonpool. The contents of the holding tank are pumped back into the mud system at the shaker area. These drains are cleaned regularly to prevent the possibility of gas build-up. 3.12.2 Sewage

3.12.2.1 The sewage system consists of a sewage treatment plant located in caisson No 1-P. All waste and soiled drains discharge into the sewage treatment plant, where they are treated before being discharged overboard. All main deck and helideck drains can, if necessary, discharge directly into the sea. 3.12.2.2 The drainage and sewage systems are approved to classification and flag-state requirements and certified fit-for-purpose by the classification society. The systems are covered, where appropriate, by the rig maintenance programme. 3.12.3 Environmental Impact

3.12.3.1 Normally, the impact of the MODU on the environment is limited, so far as is reasonably practicable, to emission from diesel engine exhausts, in general, and the main engine exhausts in particular. Most diesel engines on-board exhaust directly into naturally ventilated spaces and have
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little impact on the working environment on the ARCTIC I. 3.12.3.2 The port drain tank is protected by high level alarms and can be emptied by processing the contents through the oily water separator with the water being discharged overboard and the oil to the waste oil tank located in the Pc 2. 3.12.3.3 All flammable materials are well segregated when accumulated on-board the . Accumulations of such materials are kept, so far as is reasonably practicable, to a minimum. 3.13 3.13.1 Communications Alarms, PA Systems and Internal Communications

3.13.1.1 The alarm, PA and internal communications systems are approved in accordance with classification and flag-state requirements and are certified fit-for-purpose by the Classification Society. 3.13.1.2 All alarm and internal communications systems are maintained in accordance with the s maintenance programme and are subject to periodic testing and inspection by the Classification Society in accordance with classification requirements. 3.13.2 General Alarm/Public Address System

3.13.2.1 The rig is fitted with a general alarm system, a PA system operated via a dial telephone system, six station sound powered telephone system and various fixed and portable VHF and UHF radios. The general alarm system covers all machinery spaces and accommodations areas ensuring both visual and audible indications. There are strategically placed contact makers with break glass actuation and manual contact makers that allow generation of alarm signals according to the Station Bill instructions. 3.13.2.2 The PA system is operated via a Acet/18/NK Spector Luminex station dial telephone system with integrated Electronic Code Call facility. All machinery spaces and accommodation areas are covered by this system. This system has three power sources, main, emergency and battery, all of which supply the exchange via the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) system. 3.13.2.3 The telephone stations located in Class 1, Div. 1 (Zone 1) hazardous areas are suitably certified. The telephone stations on the weather deck or other vulnerable areas have been upgraded to Class 1 Div 1 (Zone 1) type. The locations of telephones are shown on the Installation Safety Plan at the end of this section. 3.13.2.4 Hand held radios are kept in the radio room with a full set of charged batteries. 3.13.3 Fire and Gas Alarms

3.13.3.1 Alarms are generated by audible alarm modules located in the BCR room via the relevant Fire Panels, Gas Panel and through the Honeywell System to the BCO. The chain of events would be as follows: Activation of a sensor or manual call point in any one of the zones covering the MODU Indication in the BCR relating to the relevant zone module, an alarm sounds in the BCR and the channel in alarm state can be observed by visual indicators.

3.13.3.2 Accommodation dampers operation are automatically activated if smoke is detected in the quarters Air Intakes and also if H2S and combustible gasses are detected in the accommodation air

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intakes. The quarters ventilation automatically shuts down also. 3.13.3.3 The BCO will assess whether the alarm is genuine and take the appropriate action. For fire and combustible gases sound the General alarm, via his activation point. For toxic gasses sound the toxic gas alarm, via his activation point. Appropriate announcements would then be made on the reason and responses required.

3.13.3.4 Fire alarms are located throughout the rig and are supported by additional flashing lights in high noise area. 3.13.4 Telephone Exchange/Public Address System

3.13.4.1 The telephone exchange is located in the upper deck accommodation and can accommodate up to a minimum of 120 extensions, 8 of which can be used simultaneously. It also has the capacity for eight incoming lines Incoming calls are monitored in the radio room during daylight hours and BCR after 6pm. Once a call is received, the page system is employed to notify the individual of a call holding. The call is then answered at any one of the office spaces 3.13.4.2 The PA system is divided into zones and is accessed through the telephone exchange by dialling and selection of assigned numbers. The area of coverage of the PA system, under normal operating conditions, includes all working spaces including the LQ. To allow access to the system in an emergency situation, Dialling a specific code from any phone will result in overriding the PA to allow for announcements. This system covers all areas of the rig enabling all personnel to be informed of the nature of the emergency. 3.13.4.3 Each telephone has a directory posted next to it providing the locations and numbers of other telephones on the exchange and the PA selection numbers. 3.13.4.4 In high noise areas there are visual alarm signals to inform personnel that the telephone is ringing. Telephones fitted in hazardous areas are suitably rated and certified by the classification society. 3.13.4.5 Power supply to the telephone exchange is 120 volt from the UPS. 3.13.4.6 Independent drill floor communications is provided by an intrinsically safe talk-back system. This system consists of microphone and speaker stations which covers the confines of the drillers house, drill floor, Moonpool, monkey board, cement room and Stabbing board. All stations are tied to a paging facility in order that there is open communications between all the stations on a continuous basis, eliminating the need for continuous switching during operations involving more than one station. The system can be accessed as follows: 3.13.5 Plantscape The Drillers console has a PTT and microphone or can select voice activation in order to provide hands free operation. The remaining stations only have a PTT and microphone. Speakers for the system are located by each access station.

3.13.5.1 The Plantscape system provides facilities for setting alarm level and checking the status of the alarms monitored by the system. Many of the ARCTIC 1s major support systems are either controlled and/or monitored by the system. The main power generation and ballast systems are two

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prime examples of such systems. 3.13.5.2 The levels used to trigger alarms are all set in the program and can, therefore, be set to reflect the levels associated with the operating conditions that prevail. They are set by the BCO and access to the operating software is restricted by the use of a password system. Critical alarms relating to the main engines of the generators set off alarms in the BCR. 3.13.6 Loss of Ventilation Alarms

3.13.6.1 Various areas on the rig are protected by alarms that indicate ventilation system malfunction. The main areas are; Shale Shaker Houses Mud Pit Room Mud Pump room

3.13.6.2 These alarms are based on the specific areas fan operation. 3.13.7 LQ Sprinklers Flow Alarms

3.13.7.1 The Accommodation Sprinkler System is a continuously pressurised automatic system fitted with Marine Pattern, UK regulatory authority approved, frangible bulb type sprinkler heads located on the deck-heads throughout the areas covered. 3.13.7.2 The system is divided into three sections: Upper Accommodation (Frangible bulbs activate at 68C) Lower Accommodation (Frangible bulbs activate at 68C) Galley (Frangible bulbs activate at 141C) Navigation Deck( Frangible bulbs activate at 68C)

3.13.7.3 The system is fed from salt water service pressure, via a non-return valve, maintained at 8 bar. Once the system pressure falls below approximately 6 bar, the activation valve opens allowing sea water to flow to the sprinkler. The resultant flow sets off an alarm that is registered in the SCR room. 3.13.8 Hand-held Radios

3.13.8.1 There are several hand-held radios, complete with charging units, located in the Toolpushers office, BCR, and the Stab Techs office The radios are capable of being used on a number of channels. In the event of all internal communications failure, runners may be used. All radios are intrinsically safe. 3.13.8.2 All alarm, PA and internal communications systems are tested and maintained in accordance with the rig maintenance programme. All such systems are also subject to periodic testing and inspection by the classification society in accordance with class requirements. 3.13.9 External Communications

3.13.9.1 ARCTIC I is equipped with the following external communications facilities and in compliance with IMOs Global Marine Distress Safety System (GMDSS) requirements. 3.13.9.2 The primary station is installed in the wheelhouse and the secondary station/backup is located in the ballast control room). VHF marine facilities are installed in the BCR. 3.13.9.3 The main MF Long Range GMDSS station is in the wheel house and BCR. This is supplied
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from a 24v Battery Bank located outside on deck. This in turn is charged from a power supply from the emergency bus. The MF GMDSS station in the wheel house can also be accessed from a console in the BCR Two emergency distress signal activation points are located in the radio room and BCR. The GMDSS station covers a frequency range of 1.6 mHz to 30 mHz and can be programmed to receive and transmit on 76 pairs of frequencies. The equipment contains the two tone radio-telephone alarm signal generator and single key selection of 2182 kHz, which is the primary emergency frequency. 3.13.9.4 The main VHF DSC station is located in the radio room. This is supplied from a 24v on the deck battery locker. This in turn is charged from the emergency bus. A VHF DSC Station is located in the BCR, supplied locally from 220v and its own 24v battery backup. 3.13.9.5 The main InMarsat is located in the radio room; this can also be accessed via an ordinary telephone handset in the radio room. The InMarsat system in the BCR is powered by a UPS which is supplied from the emergency bus. There is a Distress button that automatically connects through to a Rescue Co-ordination Centre. 3.13.9.6 The vessels telephone exchange gives access to KU Band satellite telephones located in the company second office in the LQ. Both the Owner and the customer can use the KU band for network traffic. 3.13.9.7 VHF transceivers capable of transmitting on Channel 16 are located throughout the ARCTIC as follows: BCR ( GMDSS back up) Radio room Pilot house Starboard crane Port crane Aft crane Port lifeboat Starboard lifeboat Fast Rescue Boat

3.13.9.8 In addition to the permanently installed transceivers in the lifeboats, two portable waterproof emergency GMDSS VHF hand-held lifeboat transmitter/receivers are located in the radio room and one in each lifeboat. 3.13.9.9 ARCTIC I is equipped with of a full set of International Code of Signals flags and approved pyrotechnics. Rig emergency position indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs) is located at forward end of pilot hose. A search and rescue transponder (SART) is also located in each lifeboat along with one spare at the aft life-raft position and 1 spare at fwd lifeboats. 3.13.9.10 All radio equipment is approved in accordance with classification and flag-state requirements and certified fit-for-purpose by the Classification Society. The equipment is also subject to survey by an independent body in accordance with management system requirements. 3.13.9.11 All radio communications equipment onboard the MODU as well as being function-tested daily, or weekly in the case of the life boat equipment, is subject to routine maintenance in accordance with the units maintenance programme. The maintenance involves regular frequency and power output checks.

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3.14 3.14.1

Helideck Facilities Helideck

3.14.1.1 The helicopter deck is situated directly above the Living Quarters. It is of steel construction and is cantilevered out over the bow of the rig. 3.14.1.2 Access from the Helideck for personnel arriving by helicopter is to the Pilot house, which is immediately to starboard of the deck. In the event of a need to evacuate the Helideck in a hurry, aggress is possible via Stairway - Port aft end to Upper deck level and aft entrance to LQ Stairway - Stbd aft end to Upper deck level and aft entrance to LQ Stairway Stbd side forward to Main deck level Stairway Stbd side deck aft of Pilot house

3.14.1.3 The position and elevation of the helideck maximises protection of rig personnel in connection with evacuation as a result of a rig-borne incident, and minimises the potential impact of a helicopter incident on both rig-borne personnel and drilling operations. 3.14.1.4 The Helideck is 72ft x 88ft and is designed for helicopters up to A Sikorski S-61 with a gross weight of 9 tons. 3.14.1.5 The fixed fire-fighting facilities consist of a fixed foam system via monitors sited; Starboard side centre Port Side aft Stbd Side Aft

3.14.1.6 The Helideck Foam pump is located aft of the Helideck and below it in the space bounded by the aft bulkhead of the upper level of the LQ and the forward bulkhead of the pipe rack deck. The foam pump water supply is from the rigs fire main system. 3.14.1.7 The foam is applied using the dedicated monitors and hoses. In addition to the fixed firefighting system, both trolley mounted CO2 and dry chemical extinguishers are located aft of the Helideck level. Emergency crash equipment is stowed in a locker adjacent to the helicopter deck immediately behind the Pilot houses 3.14.1.8 The Helideck is designed to cope with rainwater and possible fuel spills with the system arranged such that the resulting fluid can either be contained or discharged directly overboard. 3.15 3.15.1 Storing and Handling of Explosives/Flammables and Other Hazardous Substances General

3.15.1.1 All flammable materials are well segregated on-board and accumulations of such materials are kept, so far as is reasonably practicable, to a minimum. 3.15.1.2 The movement and handling of chemicals onshore and offshore is controlled in accordance with the requirements for controlling substances hazardous to health, the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code (shipment by sea) and International Air Transport Association (IATA) Code (shipment by air). All chemicals delivered to the rig will be in containers marked with hazardous material labels and packaged in accordance with relevant regulatory requirements.

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3.15.1.3 Hazardous materials in this context include corrosive, combustible, inflammable, toxic, explosive and radioactive materials. 3.15.1.4 Under normal operating conditions, the types of combustible and inflammable products kept on-board the rig include fuel oil, engine oil, paint/thinners and oxygen/acetylene. The only time hydrocarbons are processed on-board the ARCTIC I is in connection with well testing operations and even during this operation the inventory involved is very small. 3.15.2 Fuel Oil

3.15.2.1 Note Section 3.9.8 also refers 3.15.2.2 Marine Diesel oil is stored in No 4 Tank in the Port and Starboard Pontoon. At 95% capacity the tanks are rated; Tank No 4S 4P Net Volume Cu Ft 27,050.4 27,050.4 Weight Long Tons 622.0 622

3.15.2.3 Fuel is transferred periodically from the hull tanks to either of the two tanks in the Engine room, (Settling or Day). 3.15.2.4 The active diesel fuel storage system is located at main deck level in the auxiliary machinery space and comprises a diesel oil settling tank and two diesel oil day-in/day-out tanks. All tanks are vented and located inside suitable save-alls. The tanks are vented at main deck level. The diesel fuel is pumped from the settling tank through one of two diesel oil purifiers into the day tanks. All the storage tanks are adequately protected virtue of their location.

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3.15.2.5 The Diesel Oil Storage tank capacities are as follows; Tank Purpose Location Net Volume Cu Ft (95%) D.O. 1 D.O. 2 D.O. 3 Day Tank Settling Tank Emergency generator supply Drilling Engine Maindeck Engine Maindeck Room Room 523.8 512.5 262.6 Weight Long Tons (95%) 12.9 12.6 6.1

Emergency generator Room Maindeck Cementing Main deck Room

D.O. 4

12.6

0.3

3.15.2.6 All fuel oil storage tanks are clearly marked for ease of identification and have warning notices displayed to prevent hot work being carried out on or in close proximity to these tanks. 3.15.3 Hazardous Materials & Inventory

3.15.3.1 Hazardous inventories maintained on the ARCTIC I during normal operations include flammable, combustible, toxic, radioactive and explosive materials. 3.15.3.2 All hazardous materials are stored in compliance with the appropriate dangerous goods code, and Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) are available for all personnel who are required to handle or may be exposed to a hazardous substance. 3.15.3.3 The Chief Engineer/Storekeeper carries out weekly inventories of the combustible materials stored in the gas racks. The Chief Engineer carries out weekly inventories of the diesel, lube oil, etc stored in the engine room areas. 3.15.3.4 The third party wireline company carries out regular checks and inventories of the contents of their respective boxes/lockers 3.15.3.5 The third party responsible for the use of radioactive sources carries out regular checks and inventories of the contents of the radioactive store. 3.15.4 Bulk Liquid Nitrogen

3.15.4.1 Nitrogen is used to energise stimulation fluids. Tanks containing liquid nitrogen are normally placed at a suitable location externally on deck along with pumping units and heaters. The liquid nitrogen is pumped through a heating unit to the drill floor then down the production/test string via a flow head. 3.15.4.2 The provision of bulk liquid nitrogen for use offshore will normally be undertaken by a third party company, contracted by the Client in order to fulfil a specialist function, e.g. well testing. In accordance with Transocean policy, the provision of such a service is reviewed and assessed during the initial well planning and interfacing period in order to ensure adequate procedures and instructions are in place which encompass its transportation, storage and use. The safety requirements of the contractor supplying this service must be, at least, to the same standard as Transocean.
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3.15.4.3 A formal TSTP will be carried out prior to the placement of such a facility on-board the to ensure that the risks associated with the use of nitrogen have been notified, and that measures are in place to control the risks involved to a level that is considered ALARP. 3.15.4.4 Systems designed for use with liquid nitrogen are normally operated and maintained by competent personnel employed by the third party company. 3.15.4.5 In conjunction with a TSTP, the use of liquid nitrogen is controlled under the PTW system. 3.15.4.6 The potential for large-scale releases of liquid nitrogen is improbable on the MODU due to the minimum quantities on-board at any given time. However, the storage and use of liquid nitrogen is subject to TSTP/PTW covering asphyxiation risks, the results of which will determine the protection measures required at the time. Protection measures that are put in place at the liquid nitrogen storage areas include: 3.15.5 tanks located in well ventilated, unrestricted open areas surround by numerous walkways/escape routes tanks suitably rated for pressures/temperature, double skin tanks fitted with temperature and pressure gauges tanks located in bunded areas to contain liquid nitrogen spillage drip trays and buckets on hand to contain/remove spillage regular maintenance undertaken by specialist personnel constant monitoring and checking for drips and leaks fire hoses available at location to rapidly disperse any minor nitrogen spillage

Toxic Chemicals

3.15.5.1 Toxic chemicals used as additives when mixing drilling mud are transported to the rig by supply boats in containers in accordance with relevant regulatory requirements. Furthermore, each individual package is marked with the appropriate warning sign. Data sheets for each chemical are provided by the supplier and kept on file in the shore-based warehouse and on board the rig. All chemical substances which, when mixed, may produce a chemical reaction are kept separated. 3.15.5.2 Mud chemicals are stored in the sack storage room or just outside in containers on the main deck. An inventory of sack chemicals is maintained by the mud engineer who supplies a copy to the BCR. Protective clothing is kept in the protective clothing locker in the sack room. Chemical data sheets are posted on the bulkhead. 3.15.6 Explosives

3.15.6.1 There is no provision for explosives to be stored on the ARCTIC I. Explosives are brought on board by 3rd party contractors just prior to use and are removed from the rig once the task has been completed. While onboard, all necessary precautions are taken as to location and movement of the explosives. 3.15.6.2 The movement and use of explosive materials is controlled under the PTW system. All explosives are removed from the rig prior to a rig move 3.15.7 Radioactive Material

3.15.7.1 Shipment of radioactive material offshore is the responsibility of the third party company providing this material. Responsibility for compliance with the requirements regarding the handling and use of radioactive material offshore rests with the OIM.

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3.15.7.2 The OIM himself, or a responsible person appointed by the OIM, is responsible radiation and who liaises with the qualified radiation protection supervisor from the company using the radioactive source. Names and addresses of persons responsible for safety, contactable for advice in case of an incident, are kept on board the rig by the person appointed by the OIM.

for ionising third party radiological responsible

3.15.7.3 Radioactive material is stored in a suitably constructed container in an assigned safe area located on the starboard aft corner of the unit. Procedures for the safe-keeping and handling of radioactive material are included in the above referenced document and operations requiring the use of such material are controlled through the PTW system. It is a requirement that all radioactive material are removed from the rig prior to a move off location. 3.16 3.16.1 Utilities General

3.16.1.1 Utility systems are, where appropriate, approved in accordance with classification and flagstate requirements and certified fit-for-purpose by the classification society. 3.16.1.2 All rotating equipment is suitably guarded and, so far as is reasonably practicable, protected against damage from dropped objects. Piping systems, so far as is reasonably practicable, have been routed internally. Piping external to the structure is, so far as is reasonably practicable, protected from impact. 3.16.1.3 All utilities equipment is operated based on manufacturers requirements and maintained in accordance with the ARCTIC I s maintenance programme. Particular attention is paid to ensure that design tolerances are maintained and that structural supports are adequate. All operations and safety critical equipment are checked daily 3.16.2 Potable Water

3.16.2.1 Potable water may be loaded from supply vessels into the potable water tanks, located in the port and starboard hulls, using the bulk loading stations. In addition ARTIC I utilises waste heat from the diesel generators to converts sea water to Potable water using a flash evaporation process. 3.16.2.2 Water is transferred from the storage tanks, using the two transfer pumps to a supply tank. The suction of any one of the two pressure set pumps draw from the supply tank. These pressure sets maintain the potable water system pressure throughout the rig. The supply tank is located in caisson No 2-P. Storage and supply tank levels are monitored through the Honeywell system in BCR. 3.16.2.3 Water purity is monitored by taking weekly samples and the samples are tested onboard the rig. Records of the results are maintained on-board. Water samples are sent ashore for bacteriological analysis on a monthly basis and the potable water storage tanks are inspected periodically. The potable water pass from the pressure set through a UV sterilizing unit and a Brominator and then to the service points in the system. 3.16.3 Drill water

3.16.3.1 Drill water is loaded from supply vessels through flexible transfer hoses into tanks located in port and starboard hulls. The drill water fed directly from the active hull tank using the drill water transfer pumps, one located in each hull. 3.16.3.2 Two drill water pumps are located in the Port and Starboard pontoon

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3.16.4

Seawater Cooling

3.16.4.1 SW cooling is undertaken using the two SW Service pumps one located in each pump room. These pumps are supplied from the Emergency switchboard. All remote operated valves within their systems are Fail Safe. If both the on line and offline pump fail the main ballast pumps can be used on the SW system. The fire pumps can also provide sea water cooling to the main engines in an emergency via a crossover. The system is operated remotely from the Ballast Control Room via the Ballast control system panel. 3.16.4.2 The main consumers for the system are; 3.16.5 Main Engine cooling system Fresh water generator Sanitary system Propulsion gearbox coolers Prop shaft packing cooling Deck service outlets Mud Pits if required

Treated Fresh Water System

3.16.5.1 A closed loop Treated Fresh water system is supplied from the dedicated pumps in the Port pump room, which are supplied from two dedicated tanks, 6P and 10P. The system supplies cooling to the following items; 3.16.6 Rig Air Compressors Windlass Eaton Brake System Drill Floor hydraulic system Bulk Air Dryer Bulk air Compressor Drawworks Tensioner Air Compressor

Lube oil System

3.16.6.1 The lube oil system consists mainly of storage tanks. All tanks are equipped with sight glass level gauges and are as follows: Main engine room storage tank Mud pump room storage tank (two) Starboard propulsion room storage tank Port propulsion room storage tank Drill floor storage tank

3.16.6.2 Oil for the main engines is shipped to the ARCTIC I in bulk containers and is fed into the lube oil storage tank in the main engine room. Oil is then used for topping up the main engines during service. 3.16.6.3 The lube oil storage tanks in the starboard and port propulsion rooms can be gravity filled from the main deck but this facility is not normally used. All other lube oil storage tanks are filled using an air operated barrel pump.
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3.16.6.4 Hydraulic oil is stored in a tank located above HPU room. The oil is shipped to the MODU in bulk containers. 3.16.7 Wash-down System

3.16.7.1 A base oil wash-down system is used to clean the shaker screens while OBM is in use. The system consists of a tank mounted above the lower shakerhouse with piping into the shakerhouse It has limited capacity of approximately 2 barrels. 3.17 3.17.1 Fire and Explosion Protection General

3.17.1.1 The accumulation of explosive or toxic gases is minimised through the use of such features as adopting open lattice construction for the derrick, legs, crane booms and crane rest pedestals and circular shaped vent mushrooms which reduce the likelihood of dead pockets behind them. 3.17.2 Hazardous Area Classifications

3.17.2.1 All working and living spaces on the ARCTIC I are classified as one of the following four types of spaces: Safe Area Zone 2 Zone 1 Zone 0 Under normal operating conditions explosive gas/air mixtures will not occur, e.g. LQ Under normal operating conditions explosive gas/air mixture is unlikely to occur, e.g. mud pits Under normal operating conditions explosive gas/air mixture is likely to occur, e.g. shale shakers Under normal operating conditions explosive gas/air mixture will occur the MODU has no Zone 0 areas

3.17.2.2 Details of the distribution of such spaces around the MODU can be found in the hazardous area drawing contained in the Operations Manual for the unit. Both the drawing and the manual are approved by the rigs classification society. 3.17.2.3 The classification of areas in the above manner is undertaken to facilitate the strict control of the type of equipment allowed to be operated in particular areas, the intent being that the likelihood of ignition in a specific area is greatly reduced by only permitting equipment suitable for that area to be operated there. All equipment whether permanent or temporary, must comply with the area classification requirements of a specific location. The control and mitigation protection levels with regard to gas detection and shutdown logic are there to augment the protection provided by compliance with are classification requirements. 3.17.2.4 In the event of any engineering design review process being initiated onboard the ARCTIC I , the impact of the proposed design change within a particular hazardous area is closely reviewed. Details of the intended modification, including the effect of the modification on the area classification and/or the impact of area classification on the modification, are submitted to the classification society for approval. 3.17.2.5 The hazardous areas are defined in accordance with the classification society requirements and all electrical equipment used on the ARCTIC I is certified for a particular area based on meeting the BASEEFA or equivalent requirements for that area. In some spaces the equipment is rated for use
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in an area at least one level of classification more severe than the actual area merits. 3.17.2.6 Whilst hazardous areas are defined in accordance with Classification Society requirements and detailed in the hazardous area drawing, additional hazardous areas may be identified during certain operations and activities as a result of the work being carried out. Examples include the area in which well testing equipment is located at which time rig/site specific drawings are produced by the service provider, or the area on deck at which vapour release may occur when a tank containing flammable materials is opened for use/access. Activities to be conducted in these temporarily defined hazardous areas are subject to Transoceans Permit-to-Work system, and System for the Control of Third Party and Sub-contractors Equipment. 3.17.3 Electrical Equipment

3.17.3.1 The likelihood of ignition resulting from electrical faults is reduced by placing emphasis on equipment located in hazardous areas. All electrical equipment throughout the ARCTIC I is covered by the rig maintenance programme. Junction boxes rated for use in hazardous areas are given special attention during planned maintenance irrespective of where they are located. 3.17.3.2 All major cable runs are located in positions that make physical damage a remote possibility and the cable is further protected by ladder racks. Cables in hazardous areas are armoured in accordance with IEE requirements or equivalent and decks or bulkheads are penetrated using either glanding or multi-cable transits suitable for the type of barrier being penetrated. If transits are opened in connection with maintenance or alterations, this is carried out in a controlled manner and the time a transit is opened is kept ALARP. 3.17.3.3 All electrical equipment is earth bonded with circuit protection in place for all systems. This includes fuses, circuit breakers and overloads. Circuit breakers have fuse protection. All switchboards have ground detection circuits with indication on the board itself and on the central alarm panel located in the SCR room. 3.17.3.4 Maintenance work on electrical equipment is completed under the control of a PTW , following Transoceans electrical procedures. Electrical maintenance personnel receive a high degree of in-house/shore-based training and are experienced with regard to the equipment they are working with. 3.17.4 Third Party Equipment

3.17.4.1 In addition to being certified suitable and fit-for-purpose, all third party equipment, including electrical equipment and combustion engines located in hazardous areas, must be suitably rated for operations in a particular area. The certification will stipulate the level of hazardous zone the equipment can be operated in. The equipment must be installed to the satisfaction of responsible rig personnel appointed by the OIM. Records of all relevant certification and maintenance are kept on board. Third party operators cabins are earth bonded to the rig structure. 3.17.4.2 The maintenance of all third party equipment is the responsibility of the appropriate contractor and is covered by the contractors maintenance system. Performance of the contractors maintenance programme and continuous compliance of contractors equipment with hazardous area requirements is monitored by rig personnel in accordance with management system requirements. 3.17.5 Fire Detection

3.17.5.1 Fire detection is undertaken by a system located in the Ballast Control room. The equipment covers all areas where machinery is running and areas where personnel work and sleep.

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3.17.5.2 If the rig were to lose main power during an emergency situation, the emergency generator automatically comes on line to provide the necessary power to maintain the fire detection panel in an energised state. In addition, both the fire and smoke detection panels have been fitted with an internal standby battery power source. 3.17.5.3 Manual fire alarm stations are installed in all areas of the rig. 3.17.5.4 As all of the different types of detectors and manually operated call points in the fire and smoke detection systems are grouped and wired into separate zones and control modules, it is considered extremely unlikely that the rig would lose its entire detection system as a result of a fire or explosion in any particular area. However, it was recognised that an uncontrollable fire in the Ballast Control Room could affect the continued operation of the detection panels. As the Control Room is normally manned, it was accepted that early detection would limit the damage to an acceptably low level with little danger to the integrity of the alarm panels. All cables for this system are suitably protected against mechanical damage and installed in such a manner as to minimise the possibility of damage arising from fire or other physical causes. 3.17.6 Gas Detection

3.17.6.1 This is a continuous monitoring system comprising a main alarm panel and 15 zoned sensors capable of picking up a leakage of Methane and Hydrogen Sulphide. Upon activation of any of these sensors, an audible and visual alarm is initiated at the panel. Two types of sensors are used: a combustible gas detector (Methane) which operates on the catalytic principle; and an electrochemical cell element that produces logarithmic micro-amp signals (for Hydrogen Sulphide); both of which operate in conjunction with electronic control equipment to initiate alarms when gas concentrations exceed the predetermined levels. This is used to measure gas concentrations. Explosive gases are indicated within the LEL (Lower Explosive Limit) range. The Warning, Alarm and Failure modes are indicated visually and acoustically on the main control panel. 3.17.6.2 Gas detection covers Hazardous Area Zones 1&2 where potential for gas to be present has been identified. The sensors are sufficient in number and suitably sited so as to provide effective monitoring of these areas during working conditions. Particular attention has been given to ensuring the location of the sensors is in accordance with the anticipated pattern of air movements. 3.17.6.3 The Gas and H2S detection system located in the Ballast Control Room covers the following areas;

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3.17.6.4
AREA Living Quarters Intake Port Air Intake Starboard Air Intake Moonpool Mud Pits Aft Mud Pit Forward Mud Pump Room Aft Mud Pump Room Forward Dog House Drawworks Shale Shakers Cascade Shakers Welding Shop Engine Room Emergency generator LEL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes H2S Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A

3.17.7

Detection Devices

3.17.7.1 Fire and gas detectors have been located in areas where it has been evaluated that the risk of fire or the accumulation of gases is greatest. These include drilling areas, mud processing areas, machinery spaces etc. The gas detection devices have been strategically located, in particular: to detect gas which becomes disengaged from drilling mud, and to prevent accumulation in confined spaces where gas could form an explosive mixture or present a toxic atmosphere to personnel. This category includes air intakes to the hull pump rooms, machinery spaces and the LQ.

3.17.7.2 In areas where the continuous availability of detection is vital, more than one sensor has been installed. 3.17.7.3 The ARCTIC I was designed and built to UK requirements which are prescriptive in this area. Consequently, the basic philosophy adopted, as far as fire detection is concerned, was that each space on the MODU, whether or not it represents a significant fire risk, should be provided with a detector. The type and number used in each space reflect the nature of the foreseeable risk. 3.17.7.4 The area classification and the environment determine the particular type of device to be employed in a specific area. Intrinsically safe versions of these detection devices are utilised in hazardous areas. 3.17.7.5 The following type of detectors are used onboard; Ionisation chamber smoke detector Fixed temperature heat detector H2S gas detector Combustible gas detectors

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Flame detectors

3.17.7.6 The gas detection is designed so that the amplified signals received from the sensors are conditioned by an electronic controller and displayed as concentration levels, in the case of the H2S detectors, and percentages of lower explosive limit (LEL) in the case of combustible gas. 3.17.7.7 The electronic controller is equipped with adjustable low and high alarm settings that can be anywhere on the scale covered by the output meter. Regarding H2S, this covers the range 0-60 ppm and in the case of combustible gas the meter registers 0-100 percent LEL. 3.17.7.8 The electronic controller is fitted with a fail-safe supervisor function that monitors the signal loop from the sensors. A failure of this function illuminates and LED indicator. 3.17.8 Power Supply

3.17.8.1 The fire and gas panel is supplied with mains power through the emergency bus. This is being backed up by an adjacent UPS unit located in the SCR room, rated at 220 volt 50Hz and proven for over 3 hours operation to support the panel on dead ship scenarios. During the period of battery operation a chirping tone warns of the power loss and it is accompanied by an LED indication. 3.17.9 Portable Gas Detection

3.17.9.1 In addition to fixed gas detection equipment, the rig is equipped with portable gas detection equipment, in accordance with Marine Policy and Procedures. The units are held and maintained by the BCO in the BCR. 3.17.10 Emergency Shut Down Systems 3.17.10.1 In the event of an emergency situation arising where the equipment must be shut down, switches are provided in the Drillers control cabin and in the BCR. 3.17.10.2 The ESD system comprises six remote control stations from which various pieces of equipment may be shut down in the case of an emergency. 3.17.10.3 The stations and the equipment, which can be shut down remotely from each of the associated stations, are as follows: Drill Floor: BCR: Drilling SCR drive motors only Machinery space ventilation systems LQ ventilation BCR ventilation Ventilation valves in port and starboard BPRs SCR Room: Main Engines Emergency diesel generator Machinery space ventilation systems Diesel oil service pumps Diesel oil purifiers Lower hull watertight doors Fuel system valves remote shutoff

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Pilot House:

Main Engines Emergency diesel generator Machinery space ventilation systems Anchor winch brake and dog release Ships whistle

Toolpushers office:

BOP - auxiliary control centre

3.17.10.4 When undertaking Well Test Operations, a stand-alone ESD control panel, specific to the shutdown of well testing operations, is located on the drill floor. Drilling personnel are trained in its use prior to well testing operations and have instructions to activate the system in the event of an incident. 3.17.10.5 All cabling installed on-board the ARCTIC I as original equipment is of a marine type ships wiring cable and suitably protected by armour as required in hazardous areas. The cables comply with type tests in accordance with IEC 92-3 and flame retardant tests in accordance with IEE 45. Type approval certificates for these cables are available from DNV. 3.17.10.6 All retrofitted cables are of marine type ships wiring cable (armoured in hazardous areas) and comply with the standards specified within the management system. Cable support systems, ampacity values, volt drop calculations are all in accordance with the IEE recommendations for mobile and fixed offshore installations. 3.17.10.7 All of the system is covered by the rig maintenance programme, and the maintenance staff operating and maintaining the system and its equipment are authorized and competent to do so. New personnel, who are qualified, are given on-site training by the more experienced maintenance personnel until they are fully conversant with and competent at operating the equipment. 3.17.10.8 Alterations to the system and the calibration of instrumentation used for maintaining the system are handled in accordance with the appropriate QA procedures. 3.17.11 Active Fire Protection 3.17.11.1 The MODU has a range of active fire-fighting systems installed to provide the necessary fire fighting resources commensurate with the outline emergency scenarios and provide suitable and sufficient protection to enable personnel to deploy a suitable fire control pattern. 3.17.11.2 The system includes; Fire-water throughout the rig Automatic Sprinkler system for; Living quarters upper deck Living quarters main deck Galley Navigation deck Manual Sprinkler system for; Radio Room Auxiliary Ballast Control Room Drilling Office Foam for use on the Helideck, Novec for Paint locker

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Engine Room SCR Room Pilot House BCR Emergency Generator Room Propulsion Motor Rooms Deluge in drilling and well test areas, Dry chemical in the galleys Portable extinguishers strategically located throughout the MODU.

3.17.11.3 The active fire-fighting systems are approved in accordance with classification and flagstate requirements and certified fit-for-purpose by the classification society. 3.17.11.4 All active fire protection equipment is inspected and maintained in accordance with the rig maintenance programme and the ARCTIC Is safety equipment inspection programme. The systems are regularly maintained by an independent body in accordance with management system requirements. Additionally, all appliances are surveyed regularly by the classification society in accordance with class requirements. 3.17.11.5 The fire main is supplied by two Goulds VIT-FF fire pumps, one located in each pump room and each capable of delivering 400 U.S. gallons/min. Additional booster pumps are located at the 85Ft level in the Port and Starboard centre caisson 3.17.11.6 The fire main services all hydrants, Helideck foam monitors, deluge systems. Sections of the fire main may be isolated to allow for maintenance or isolation of damaged pipe work. 3.17.11.7 The fire main supplies water to the fire hydrants, sprinkler system and Helideck foam system. 3.17.12 Fire Hydrants 3.17.12.1 52 hydrants are located around the MODU, located so that at least two fire hoses may be brought to bear on a fire in any part of the normally accessible to those on-board. 3.17.12.2 All hydrants equipped with 2 inch diameter x 60 ft long hoses. 1 inch diameter hoses are used in accommodation 3.17.13 Deluge System 3.17.13.1 A fixed sea water deluge system is installed and covers the following areas of the unit. Drill floor Moonpool Well test area (fire monitors) Forward lifeboats Mud pits Anchor chains (for spark suppression in the even of the rig having to move off location in an emergency situation)

3.17.13.2 Water to the deluge system is supplied via the salt water ring main which can be fed from up to 6 high volume pumps, two of which are powered from the emergency switchboard. 3.17.13.3 The Pumps comprise 2 x ballast pumps and 1 x salt water service pump located in each hull pump room and can be started from the BCR or locally.
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3.17.13.4 Deluge to drill floor and Moonpool is via remotely controlled valve located in the shaker house which can be activated from the Toolpushers office, BCR, Drillers doghouse or from either of the port or starboard aft drill floor access points. There is no automatic deluge function. 3.17.13.5 Activation of all other protected areas via dedicated manually controlled valves. 3.17.14 Sprinkler System 3.17.14.1 The accommodation is covered by a flangible Quartzoid bulb sprinkler system which is maintained under pressure and filled with potable water. The control unit is situated in the dry stores in the Galley area. The sprinkler system is divided into 4 areas fitted with individual flow switch alarms. Galley and Dry store Lower accommodation Upper accommodation, new accommodation and link corridor Navigation (Bridge) deck

3.17.14.2 Upon activation the system is supplied from the saltwater service system. 3.17.14.3 Sprinkler system in the Radio Room and Toolpushers office do not activate automatically because of the sensitive electronics in these spaces. 3.17.15 Novec System 3.17.15.1 The main and auxiliary machinery rooms are fitted with a fixed Novec extinguishing system. The Novec cylinders are situated in the main engine room. 3.17.15.2 The control room, paint lockers and emergency diesel room, are fitted with an independent Novec system. The cylinders are situated outside the respective room. 3.17.15.3 The propulsion motors are fitted with an independent Novec system with Novec injection in the blower air channel. The Novec cylinders are situated in the propulsion motor room. 3.17.15.4 The Novec system is actuated manually by pressing the actuator locally outside the space.
Actuator Location Alleyway between room and store Auxiliary machinery Activation Group Machinery Room Control Room Propulsion Room

Outside Control Room Port On Novec cylinders, located on starboard side of propulsion motors in starboard pontoon and port side of the propulsion motors in port pontoon. Aft bulkhead of respective room Staircase at elevation 95 ft in starboard aft column.

Main Deck Paint Locker Emergency Diesel Room

Starboard aft column paint locker

3.17.15.5 Each Novec system can also be actuated from the respective cylinder. Upon actuation of a system a horn will sound and a flashing light will be shown in the effected protected space and

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ventilation to that space will shut down. Actuation of the engine room Novec system will also shut down the main engines. 3.17.15.6 The systems are subject to annual inspection by an independently third party. 3.17.16 Portable Fire Extinguishers 3.17.16.1 Portable fire extinguishers are placed at strategic points throughout the ARCTIC 1, including the LQ. The type of portable extinguisher selected for each location has been based on the type (class) of fire expected to occur in that area. The types of extinguishers in use include dry powder, foam and carbon dioxide. The locations and types of fire extinguishers can be found marked on the fire fire-fighting and safety equipment plans. A comprehensive stock of spares and refills is maintained on-board. 3.17.17 Miscellaneous Fire-fighting Equipment 3.17.17.1 Breathing apparatus (BA) sets are situated in groups at locations where they are most likely to be of use. 3.17.17.2 In addition to the BA sets and Firemans outfits, which are located in the emergency locker. At the Helideck access, there is a crash equipment box containing axes, hacksaws, a grab hook and bolt cutters and various other tools. 3.17.18 Passive Fire Detection 3.17.18.1 The passive fire protection on the ARCTIC I was designed and constructed in accordance with the DNV Class Rules and relevant legislation. 3.17.18.2 All insulating materials on the MODU are fire retardant to meet design criteria prescribed by class, flag state and local statute. Various types of insulation materials and devices are used throughout the rig for passive structural fire protection, which is used to encapsulate spaces within the accommodation structure. Bulkheads and decks separating the accommodation and service spaces are insulated to A-60 standard. Windows in the accommodations facing the drill floor were steel plated to provide continuous bulkhead for protection from explosions. 3.17.18.3 Passive fire protection on the ARCTIC I is provided by various types of fire-rated structural protection in accordance with recognised and accepted international maritime standards. The passive fire protection is approved in accordance with classification and flag-state requirements and certified fit-for-purpose by the classification society. 3.17.18.4 The aft facing LQ bulkhead is suitably rated (A-60) to withstand the worst foreseeable design fire scenario. The bulkhead and the area forward of it provide suitable and sufficient arrangements for protecting rig personnel for the period required to respond to an emergency situation, prepare them for evacuation and evacuate them from the unit should such an incident occur. 3.17.18.5 In addition, several other areas are protected by suitably rated bulkheads, decks, deckheads, windows and doors. Such areas include the: Mud pits Engine room Emergency generator room Electrical workshop/boiler room BCR

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Battery lockers Radio room Pilot house

3.17.18.6 Within the LQ itself, sufficient segregation is provided by suitably rated internal decks and bulkheads. This segregation allows the OIM to operate with a certain degree of flexibility when deciding on where to locate the personnel temporarily in the event of an escalating situation. 3.17.18.7 Furnishings supplied to outfit the LQ are in accordance with good marine practice and consequently reduce the likelihood of rapid escalation of any domestic incident. 3.17.18.8 Other types of passive fire protection around the MODU take one of the following forms: Equipment layout Equipment selection Working practices

3.17.18.9 Machinery spaces are laid out in order to minimise the potential for heat/hot surfaces causing problems in the event of fuel line failure or similar. Spark arrestors are fitted to all combustion engine exhausts, exhausts are shielded and all pipe work carrying hot fluids is lagged. 3.17.18.10 Similarly, in terms of equipment selection, care is taken when procuring tools to observe the need to limit the use of aluminium on the rig. 3.17.18.11 The risk of fire is reduced considerably by adopting work practices that are based on minimising inventory or reducing the likelihood of ignition. A good example of this is the placing of strict control limits on hot work during periods when small quantities of combustible background gas are detected in the mud returns. 3.17.18.12 Areas such as the main store and galley manage this risk through good house-keeping, separation of materials and the limiting of stocks held. Similarly, the paint supervisor is responsible for operating a system whereby hazardous waste products are separated before disposal 3.17.18.13 All A-60 boundaries are maintained in accordance with classification society requirements. Any modification to an A-60 boundary will only be completed by a certified A-60 licensed installer. 3.17.18.14 It is normal practice in every day operations to eliminate any accumulation of materials that can cause combustion. These items include paper, wood, rags, oily rags, garbage spills and other materials. 3.17.18.15 Smoking is only permitted in designated areas within the LQ and lighting materials are not allowed to be taken outside the LQ or designated smoking areas. 3.18 3.18.1 Temporary Refuge Temporary Refuge Description

3.18.1.1 The temporary refuge is described in Part 5 Section 6 of this case 3.19 3.19.1 Evacuation and Escape Systems System Description

3.19.1.1 The Evacuation and escape systems are described in Part 5 Section 8 of this case. It is established that Helicopter is the preferred means of evacuation, the secondary means being by Lifeboat.
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3.19.1.2 In brief the Evacuation systems comprise; Means


Lifeboat Life raft (Davit Launched)

Number
2 5

Capacity
58 Persons 4 x 25 Persons 1 x 20 Persons Total 120 Persons

Location
Forward End of Maindeck Nos 1, 2, 5 Stbd side aft end of Maindeck Nos 3, 4 Port side aft end of Maindeck

3.19.1.3 In brief the Escape systems comprise; Means


Rescue Boat 23 Person capacity Vertical ladders to sea Knotted Ropes Personnel Transfer Basket 1 4 4 2 4 Person Bill Pugh X 904

Number

Location
Aft Maindeck on centre line of rig. Forward and Aft columns Port and Starboard At each Lifeboat and Life raft Station Inboard of Pilot House Storage container below V door

3.20 3.20.1

Accommodation General

3.20.1.1 Accommodation for 116 persons is located at the forward end at main deck level and is divided into three decks located as far away as reasonably practicable from the drilling area. 3.20.1.2 The aft facing bulkhead is A-60 rated which provides protection from a well bore related fire. The LQ layout is such that there is no exterior bulkhead directly exposed to the drill floor. The upper level is countersunk below the level of the pipe deck that acts as a buffer between the drill floor and the aft bulkhead at this level. 3.20.2 Upper Deck Living Quarters 3.20.2.1 The upper level comprises; 28 Cabins Hospital Toolpushers Office 3rd Party office External Accommodation annex of 6 Cabins

3.20.2.2 A self closing door on the Port and Starboard side provides access/ingress from an external deck. A similar door on the centreline aft leads into the passageway below the pipe deck. In both cases the access into the Accommodation block is through a lobby with an internal Class B door. 3.20.2.3 An escape window is provided through an emergency escape window in the central cabin (2.9) on the forward end. This window provides an exit directly onto an external deck area above the Lifeboat area. 3.20.2.4 The external accommodation unit is located at the forward starboard side of the Upper deck
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with 6 staterooms. The unit is provided with two exits one on each side with direct egress to an external walkway located forward of the main living quarters block. 3.20.3 Navigation Deck 3.20.3.1 A stairwell in the starboard entrance lobby leads upwards to the Navigation deck complex which comprises; Radio Room Pilot House Chart Room Auxiliary Ballast Control Room OIMs Cabin/Office 2 Man cabin Company Office (Separate from main area)

3.20.3.2 Emergency escapes from this deck are provided direct to the external deck through exits on the Port and starboard forward bulkheads. 3.20.4 Lower Level 3.20.4.1 The lower level of the accommodation comprises; 18 Cabins located on Forward end Changing Room Laundry STC Office Recreation Room Conference Rm Maintenance Office Mess Room Galley Provisions Area Dry stores Coolers- Freezers

3.20.4.2 The lower level of the LQ can be accessed through either the door in the LQ bulkheads, one port and one starboard, through a door on the aft bulkhead which leads from a passageway connecting the SCR room, engine room and mud pump room. There is a central communicating stairwell between both levels of the LQ. 3.20.4.3 An emergency escape is provided from the accommodation block via an emergency window in the central cabin (1.9) to provide egress directly to the Lifeboat area.

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3.20.5 Upper Deck Living Quarters Fire and Safety Plans


(Note Company Office centre aft now Third Party Office)

* New Plan under development to reflect modifications made to accommodation during shipyard 2007

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3.20.6 Main Deck Living Quarters Fire and Safety Plans * New Plan under development to reflect modifications made to accommodation during shipyard 2007

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3.20.7 Navigation Deck Living Quarters Fire and Safety Plans * New safety Plan currently under development will reflect modifications made to accommodation Note following; Company Office now external and to port of Stab Tech Office and Radio Room Stab Tech Office now allocated to Deck Pusher 4 Man SR now OIMs Cabin and Office

3.21

Drilling Operations & Fluids to Surface

3.21.1 Well Testing 3.21.1.1 Well testing operations are well specific and undertaken onboard the rig by specialist contractors using specialist equipment with trained competent personnel following established procedures. 3.21.1.2 The equipment used to test a well includes a number of basic components and a variety of optional ones, depending on the special needs of a particular well. Working in the direction of the flow, these components will usually include: Tester valve located near the bottom of the test string which closes when the annular pressure holding it open is released
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Lubricator valve, located below the drill floor level and remotely controlled. Surface test tree, located on the drill floor Emergency shut-down valve (ESDV), located on the drill floor and remotely controlled from strategic points on the MODU Flexible hose, passing from the equipment on the drill floor to the flowline manifold Flowline manifold, normally located on the drill floor or at the test area, provides points for attaching measuring/logging equipment and serves as a pressure control device and a means of reducing the pressure of produced fluids before they reach downstream equipment Oil/gas separator, located in the well test area. Storage tank, located in the well test area. Pipe work to flare booms, running port and starboard from a manifold in the well test area. Flare booms, of sufficient length to minimise radiated heat to the rig, located just aft of the bulk loading stations port and starboard; when deployed, both booms are horizontal and are directed perpendicular to the ARCTIC Is longitudinal centre-line.

3.21.1.3 The flare booms normally have propane pilot lights and electric igniters, the propane bottles being stored at a safe distance from flaring operations usually on the pipe deck or riser deck. 3.21.1.4 The burners and booms are cooled by seawater supplied through a deluge line connected to the salt water service/ballast pump or mud pump systems via a deck outlet at starboard side pipe deck. 3.21.1.5 Sea water, from the sea water system, is supplied to the flare burner tips, which have a ring of water spray nozzles which spray sea water into the flame for cooling purposes. Hand rails on Upper and lower decks fitted with deluge nozzles and water monitors are also used to direct a water curtain outwards to provide a radiation screen and cooling for those parts of the unit closest to the flare booms. Hoses are used to augment these cooling sprays if required. The well test area is protected by a water deluge system. The deluge coverage consists of two deck-mounted monitors. 3.21.1.6 The design and selection of well test equipment is made with reference to the expected flow rates, pressure and solids content of the well to be tested. Once the layout and composition of the well test equipment has been decided, details are received by Transocean for review and approval, in accordance with management system requirements. During the review, emphasis is placed on the impact of the ARCTIC I safety systems. The equipment must be covered by an acceptable maintenance system and adherence to the system is monitored. 3.21.1.7 The equipment selection, testing and planning procedures in force prior to and during well test operations recognise the risk of toxic release and are organised to minimise the risk and to affect a speedy response should one occur. Each operation is considered in light of the specific equipment used and the expected consistency of the formation fluids being brought to the surface. 3.21.1.8 Well test equipment is subject to independent verification by an industry recognised independent verification body (IVB) and cannot be operated until the appropriate documentation confirming the equipments suitability and fitness-for-purpose has been sighted by the OIM. The equipment must also be covered by an acceptable maintenance system and adherence to that system is monitored in accordance with management system requirements. 3.21.1.9 The specialist well test crew install, hook-up and commission the well test gear under the

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supervision of responsible rig personnel appointed by the OIM. Once all of the equipment is sited, hooked up and the surface lines properly secured, prior to operations commencing, it is functiontested, flushed through and pressure tested with specific attention being paid to the operation of all emergency shut-down (ESD) systems and back-up fail-to-safety valves. All commissioning tests are carried out in accordance with the well test companys procedures and Transoceans management system requirements. 3.21.1.10 Prior to operations commencing, the well test and drill floor deluge systems are tested. While conducting drill stem tests, stand-alone compressors and steam generators are used in order to eliminate the possibility of inter-connection between the well test equipment and the MODUs own air and steam systems. 3.21.1.11 The hydrocarbon inventory on the rig during well testing is limited to the total capacity of the well test lines, the separator and the scrubber tank. 3.21.1.12 The well testing plan is similar in structure to the drilling programme. This plan is discussed at a pre-operation meeting attended by all personnel. The plan is augmented by detailed instructions that cover the immediate tasks ahead. Special emphasis is placed on safety. Both well testing and other rig operations are totally integrated so that there are no operational conflicts. 3.21.1.13 Communication, either by telephone or portable radio, is routed through the Driller who acts as a central control point for the well testing operations. During well-testing operations, 24-hour cover is provided by two complete rig crews. Rig supervisors and personnel constantly monitor well test operations to ensure that safety procedures are being adhered to. Once well testing operations commence, the well test areas are barriered off, warning sign are posted and PA announcements made informing all personnel of intended operations. All POB not essential to the operation are kept well clear. Well test equipment is manned throughout. The well is closed in immediately upon any equipment malfunction. 3.21.1.14 All shut-down valves (DHSV, lubricator and ESDV) are normally controlled from a panel located on the drill floor. 3.21.1.15 Personnel are trained in the position of and use of the ESD controls. The ESD control units are normally located at the well test area on the drill floor, on the cantilever above the well test area and outside the LQ. All control points for the well testing equipment are provided with coverage by the rigs telephone system and are consequently an integral part of the PA system. 3.21.1.16 In cases where methanol is required for testing the well, special consideration is given to both its transportation and storage. The methanol is stored in a safe area and used under strict supervision. Methanol is only to be brought on board immediately prior to use and removed as soon as practicable after use. 3.21.1.17 The well testing operation is conducted under the PTW system and at such times certain activities are restricted. Crane activities and hot work in the vicinity of well test equipment are examples where restrictions are in force during a drill stem test. TSTPs are also in place to cover specific aspects of the well testing operation. 3.21.1.18 The emergency procedures in connection with a response to a well testing incident are a combination of the procedures relating to a well control incident and a non-blow-out related fire. The response is outlined to rig personnel at the meetings referred to above and the well test crew are made aware of the important role they have to play in ensuring an effective and speedy response.

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3.22

Third Party Equipment

3.22.1 Installation of Equipment onboard 3.22.1.1 Whenever temporary or transportable equipment is brought on-board the , e.g. third party equipment such as logging cabins, wireline units, well test equipment, cuttings handling equipment etc, then equipment suitability and location of installation must be in compliance with the rigs hazardous area plans. 3.22.1.2 Equipment must arrive on-board fit-for-purpose accompanied with the appropriate certification and, where appropriate, competent and responsible personnel. Checklists for third party equipment are provided for guidance and use by the OIM and must be competed in accordance with management system requirements. 3.22.1.3 Third party provided equipment deemed safety critical in accordance with the ARCTIC Is operating criteria is subject to further independent verification by an industry recognised independent verification body. This role can be undertaken by a Classification Society in accordance with the requirements stipulated in Transoceans management system. These requirements apply to safety critical equipment provided direct to Transocean for use offshore or through the Operator. 3.22.1.4 For details of the rig-specific procedures, refer to Transoceans System for the Control of Third Party and Sub-contractors Equipment and Hazard Management. Whenever temporary or transportable equipment is brought on-board, e.g. third party equipment such as logging cabins, wireline units, well test equipment, cuttings handling equipment etc, then equipment suitability and location of installation must be in compliance with the rigs hazardous area plans. 3.23 Surface BOP System

3.23.1 Overview 3.23.1.1 In order to extend the ARCTIC Is operating envelope to encompass the deep water at the BC 10 location in Brazil with water depths in excess of 6300ft the rig is to be fitted with a surface BOP system. (SBOP) 3.23.1.2 This section is intended to provide a brief overview of the SBOP system and the supporting hardware. 3.23.1.3 The application of an SBOP system to extend the ARCTIC I capability is considered as a operational modification that does not enhance or present any potential for increased risk and does not involve novel or unproven procedures already employed within the industry. This statement is supported by virtue of the findings from the extensive SBOP HAZOP undertaken at the Shell Houston Offices in August 2007 and the parallel data available within the IADC Publication covering SBOP Operating Guidelines. 3.23.2 SBOP System Hardware 3.23.2.1 The schematic on the following page identifies the main components of the SBOP system as; Surface BOP Stack Riser SBOP Control system Seabead Isolation device (SID)

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3.23.2.2 It should be noted that the prime difference of the SBOP riser system is the absence of any flex joint above the SID which therefore impacts upon the need for enhanced rig positioning control and limitations during drilling operations. Riser stress joints are located immediately below the SBOP and immediately above the SID. In addition a three barrel telescopic joint is part of the interface to the rig above the SBOP stack. 3.23.3 Surface BOP Stack 3.23.3.1 The SBOP remains designated as the primary well barrier and is located immediately above the upper stress joint of the high pressure drilling riser in the ARCTIC I moonpool. The SBOP is composed of the following components from bottom to top; Hydraulic Wellhead connector Kill Line inlet port Lower Pipe Rams Choke Line outlet port Upper Pipe Rams Shearing Blind Rams Annular Preventer Overshot Mandrel

3.23.3.2 The system incorporates the original ARCTIC I Diverter and Choke and Kill manifold. 3.23.3.3 The SBOP can be controlled from 3 panels located in; Moon Pool Hydraulic Panel Driller Cabin Electric Panel Toolpushers Office Electric Panel

3.23.3.4 The SBOP is fitted with two hydraulically operated Choke and kill valves fabricated as single units to save space on the SBOP structure and reduce risk of interference between themselves and the riser tensioner wires. The kill line comprises two hydraulically operated valves located below the Lower Pipe Rams, which enables utility beyond simply closing the well. The choke line also comprises two hydraulically operated valves which are located below the upper Pipe Rams. The Kill and Choke lines are routed via pipework to exit the BOP frame at similar positions to conventional operations. The SBOP Kill and Choke line outlets mate with the rigs existing flexible choke and kill line hose through matching gooseneck connectors. 3.23.4 Seabed Isolation Device 3.23.4.1 The SID is designed as an emergency system to isolate the well and to disconnect the riser. The unit is composed of the following components from bottom to top; Wellhead Connector equipped with downward facing guide funnel Lower pipe ram (Fixed ram for sealing on spanner joint during completion operations) Upper Shearing Blind Rams Riser Connector (upward facing with guide funnel

3.23.4.2 The Pipe Ram and Shear ram are spaced out so that a drill pipe tool joint will fit between the two rams (closed spacing 63.3 ins). The close and lock functions for the SID rams are activated by the MUX/Acoustic control system, and can also be actuated by ROV, but can only be actuated open hydraulically by the ROV. The ram locks are mechanically interlocked to prevent premature operation of the wedgelock when closing the rams and prevent premature operation on opening, avoiding the possibility of damage to the ram components. Mechanical indicator rods are available to indicate the
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open/close status of each ram and the lock/unlock status of each wedgelock. These indicators provide an ROV monitoring facility. 3.23.4.3 The SID is not designed as the prime well control barrier and does not carry a requirement for regular operability, although it does have an inbuilt capability through two small diameter hydraulic supply lines in the control system umbilical from the surface. The ROV is provided with a capability to replenish the Hydraulic accumulators on the SID in the event of a failure of one of the surface supply lines. The SID is controlled by a multiplex electric over hydraulic control system in conjunction with an acoustic signal transmission system. The SID can be controlled from two locations; Master Control Panel in Toolpushers Office Drillers Panel located in the drillers cabin Acoustic transmission from a surface mounted transducer to 2 identical receivers and electronic control pods on the SID. At any one time one electrical pod will remain on line and the second in stand by mode. Electrical signals through a Mux cable in the control umbilical attached to the riser.

3.23.4.4 Communication between the surface and the SID control systems is achieved by;

3.23.4.5 It has been designated that Electrical signals will be selected as the prime means of providing SID control. In the event of a surface power blackout a UPS is provided with sufficient battery back up for 2 hours operation. Both Acoustic and Electrical communications systems are fitted with alarms at their control panels in the event of a system failure. 3.23.5 Station Keeping and Movement 3.23.5.1 The intent of the mooring system is to maintain the ARCTIC I within a specified distance of the well centre such that safe drilling operations may be continued. In this particular instance the SBOP configuration does impact several restrictions that heightened the need for accurate station keeping which will be verified through the use of a (D)GPS (Differential Global Positioning System) fitted onboard the rig. 3.23.5.2 The two main factors limiting offset from the surface well centre position being; Limited stroke of Telescopic Joint for set down required leading to a maximum rig excursion prior to the requirement for a rig disconnect The riser making an angle at surface which could lead to excessive SBOP and riser wear and potentially an inability to pull or run pipe in/out of the riser.

3.23.5.3 In order to ensure that neither of these factors can compromise the safety of the operation a series of watch circle or rig offsets from well centre are defined which determine safe boundaries in which the rig should operate. 3.23.5.4 Due to the use of a semi taut polyester mooring system the adherence to the watch circles, although of high importance will be superseded by the criticality of rig heave in any seaway and the corresponding useable telescoping joint stroke. Hence limitations for vessel heave have also been set to ensure the design criteria of the telescopic joint are not exceeded. 3.23.6 SBOP HAZOP 3.23.6.1 A HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) study was undertaken in August 2007 to verify that the HSE risks associated with the Surface BOP operation were fully identified and assessed as manageable and thereafter prioritized as per the scenario. The HAZOP was attended by both Shell and the GSF ARCTIC I Management teams and a selection of the Senior Supervisory Offshore Operational
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personnel to be involved in the project operation. 3.23.6.2 The study considered the 5 main nodes of the operation; Installation procedures Operation of the SBOP, riser system and seabed isolation device Planned disconnect operations Well control equipment pressure testing Well control operating scenarios

3.23.6.3 The HAZOP study was conducted along parallel guidelines to the HAZID consultative process identified in Part 4 of this case for the identification of the ARCTIC I Hazard Sources. In this respect the same SIEP Risk Assessment Matrix was used for the formal risk ranking of scenarios and activities. 3.23.6.4 The results of this HAZOP are recorded in the Shell Document BC-10 SBOP Hazop Study Rev 0. As has been stated the HAZOP established that subject to the completion of limited remedial activities the risks involved with the use of the SBOP were found to be within the same order and no more than the risks involved with operations utilising the conventional sub surface BOP/LMRP configuration. 3.23.7 SBOP Familiarisation and Training 3.23.7.1 As part of the risk mitigation process and within the Transocean Management system (the Owners of the vessel at the time) requirements, personnel associated with the operation of the SBOP system were provided with a suitable level of familiarisation and training commensurate with their tasks associated with the operation of the SBOP system

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3.23.8

SBOP External Components Schematic; (Permission of Shell Americas)

BC-10 Surface BOP Drilling/Completion System External Components


Design Parameters W ater Depth to 6,500ft for BC-10 (development); to 7,500ft Brazil (potential exploration) Rig interface Arctic 1 12 x 80 kips tensioners, total 960 kips installed tension Three barrel 24 OD Cameron telescopic joint 17ft primary stroke, 13ft secondary stroke Top connection - Diverter housing/ball joint adapter Bottom connection 16 ID Vetco overshot packer Vetco SDL Tensioner support ring with 12 x 80 kip tensioner attachment points Drape hose bundle for hydraulic supply to individual surface BOP stack functions Drape hoses for surface BOP stack choke and kill lines 3 x 10,000psi 13 5/8 Surface BOP stack (top to bottom): Size 13 5/8 Nominal ID 13.635 API 16A drift diameter 13.595 13-5/8 Telescoping Joint overshot mandrel (16 Vetco overshot mandrel x 13-5/8 5m flange) 13 5/8 x 5m annular BOP (Cameron DL) 13 5/8 x 10m single boosted ram (Cameron Type UM) shear/blind 13 5/8 x 10m double ram (Cameron Type UM) 5 to 6-5/8 FLEX ram (top) 4-1/2 to 7 VBR (bottom) 13 5/8 x 10m hydraulic connector (Cameron M-70) Riser Upper transition joint with split SDL tension rig insert attached Top connection - 13 5/8 x 10m Cameron M-70 hub Bottom connection 16 x 14.5 ID Merlin box 50 ft joints 16 OD, 0.75 wall, X80 riser with Merlin connectors; 6,000psi test pressure 24 OD Strakes on top 500 ft of bare riser 32 OD Buoyancy to suit 16 riser configuration (3,000 ft, 5,000 ft & 7,500 ft rated) External lines strapped to riser test/flush line (1 x 5,000psi wp hose) SID control umbilical (MUX, electrical power & 2 x hydraulic fluid re-charge) Lower transition joint Top connection - 16 x 14.5 ID Merlin pin Bottom connection 13 5/8 x 10m Cameron M-70 hub SBOP/SID Controls: SBOP direct hydraulic using rigs HPU with SBOP hydraulic distribution manifold and electric remote panels (drillers station and toolpushers office). SID Electrical cable in control umbilical (with broadband acoustic back-up) to operate SID EH control pod functions. ROV with hydraulic hot stab to operate all SID functions, including back-up control of E-H (surface) controlled SID functions. Hydraulic fluid stored in accumulators on SID and recharged by hydraulic supply line in control umbilical (or by ROV mounted pump system if umbilical fails). 13 5/8 Seabed Isolation Device (SID) (top to bottom): Size 13 5/8 Nominal ID 13.635 API 16A drift diameter 13.595 13 5/8 x 10m connector (inverted Cameron M-70) fitted with re-entry funnel 13 5/8 x 10m single boosted (Cameron Type UM w/ wedge locks) shear/blind 13/5/8 x 10m Fl x Fl spool 13 5/8 x 10m single boosted (Cameron Type UM, rod reversed) 7-5/8 pipe Pressure test/circulation line outlet with dual failsafe valves (W OM 3-1/6 x 10m) 13 5/8 x 18 x 10m Double studded adapter 18 x 10m hydraulic connector (Cameron HC with Vetco H4 profile) Tubing Head Spool and Wellhead FMC Tubing head spool with ROV operated AAV 18 x 10m Vetco H4 hub x connector Sourcing spacer spool 18 x 10m Vetco H4 hub x connector for use during drilling ops. 18 x 13 5/8 x 10 m wellhead (Vetco slimbore system with 9-5/8 casing hanger profile) BC-10 SBOP System Configuration Rev Aug 6, 2007

Annular Shear FLEX VBR

Shear Pipe

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3.24 Drawings The Following Drawings are available in this Part; Drawing Title
Outboard Profile Pontoons General Arrangements Caissons Main Deck and Second Levels General Arrangements Upper Deck Cranes Helideck Freeboard Plans Crane Radius Markings Legend Arrangements Arrangements Side Elevation Hazardous Area Plans Stern Profile Upper Decks Main Deck Radio Equipment Fire Pump Cabling Diagram Radio Equipment Heli Foam Pump Schematic

Number
ART 1 A001 ART 1 A002 ART 1 A003 ART 1 A004 ART 1 A005 ART 1 A018 ART 1 A021 D916 A030 D916 A030 D916 A030 ART 1 A016 ART 1 A016 ART 1 A016 ART 1 A016 D916 E050 D916 E038

Additional Reference

Sheet 1 Sheet 2 Sheet 3 Sheet 1 Sheet 2 Sheet 3 Sheet 4

The Following System schematics are available in this Part;


Salt water system Fire System Engine Cooling Bilge system port Bilge system starboard Ballast Port & Starboard Pump Roo Potable Water System Drill water System Engine Room Lube Oil System Waste Oil System Fuel Oil system Tensioner Air Rig Compressor Air Cement Manifold Choke and Kill Manifold 49 550 49 530 49 - 520 49 510A 49 510B 49 500 49 480 49 470 49 466 49 465 49 460 49 - 459 49 450 49 433 49 430 0-19-3002S 0-19-3003M 0-19-3002S 0-19-3001Q 0-19-3001Q 0-19-3001Q 0-19-3012J 0-19-3008K 0-19-3013I V-19-3010B 0-19-3005L 0-19-3010J V-19-3009P 0-19-3076G CG- 350 2/3

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Mud Pump Discharges Mud Pump Room Suction Mud Pits Dumps and Equaliser Trip tank system Shaker area Suctions and Discharges Cement Receiving and Shipping Bentonite Receiving and Shipping Barite Receiving and Shipping Fill Manifolds

49 421 49 420 49 418 49 414 / 429 49 412 49 405 49 403 49 400 49 399

0-19-3053B 0-19-3053B

V-19-3011T 0-19-3011P 0-19-3011P 0-19-3011P

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3.25 3.25.1

REFERENCES Documentation Iss 04 Jan 31st 2009 Iss 03 Jan 8th 2009 Transocean Company Management System Health and Safety Policy and Procedures Manual Performance Procedures Monitoring Audit and Assessment

HQS-CMS-GOV HQSHSEPP-01

HQS-CMSPR02 Iss 03 Dec 31st 2008 HQS-HSE-PR-01 HQS-HSE-PR-02 HQS-HSE-PP-02 HQS-HRM-PP-01 HQS-OPS-PR-01 HQS-OPS-PP-01 HQS-OPS-HB-03 HQS-OPS-HB 05 Iss 01 Oct 31st 2007 Iss 02 Oct 12th 2007 Iss 01 Sept 30th 2007 Iss 02 Mar 1st 2009 Iss 02 Nov 1st 2007 Iss 01 Nov 1st 2004 Iss 02 Nov 11th 2004 Iss 01 Nov 11th 2005

Emergency Management Procedures Manual Medical Protocols Manual Environmental Management System Human Resources Policies and Procedures Manual Maintenance Manual Operations Policies and Procedures Manual Certificate and Survey Manual Field Operations Manual

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 4 RISK MANAGEMENT

PART 4 Risk Management

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 4 RISK MANAGEMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 4. PAGE

ARCTIC I RISK MANAGEMENT ....................................................................................... 4 4.1

4.2

4.1.1 4.1.2 4.1.3 4.1.4 4.1.5 4.1.6 4.1.7 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 4.2.4 4.3.1 4.3.2 4.3.3 4.3.4 4.4.1 4.5.1 4.5.2 4.6.1 4.6.2 4.6.3 4.6.4 4.7.1 4.7.2 4.7.3 4.7.4 4.7.5 4.7.6 4.7.7 4.8.1 4.9.1 4.9.2 4.9.3 4.9.4

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 4

RISK MANAGEMENT COMPONENTS .......................................................................................... 7

Purpose ................................................................................................................ 4 Document Update ................................................................................................ 4 Approach .............................................................................................................. 4 Risk Ranking ........................................................................................................ 5 Inter-relation of Hazards and Operations ........................................................... 5 Inter-relation Major Hazards and Events ........................................................... 5 Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... 6 Risk Analysis Overview ..................................................................................... 7 The Risk Management Process ............................................................................ 8 Structured Hazard Identification and Control Process (SHIDAC) ...................... 9 Integration of HSE Management and Operations ............................................... 9

4.3

IDENTIFICATION AND SOURCES OF HAZARDS ........................................................................... 10

4.4 4.5 4.6

RISK ACCEPTANCE............................................................................................................ 13 RISK ESTIMATION ............................................................................................................ 14 RISK EVALUATION ............................................................................................................ 15

Hazard - Definitions and Groups ....................................................................... 10 Hazard Identification Process ........................................................................... 11 Hazard Descriptions Groups .............................................................................. 12 Hazard Scenarios ............................................................................................... 13

Stated Criteria .................................................................................................... 13 Risk Assessment Matrix ..................................................................................... 14 Risk Screening ................................................................................................... 15

4.7

RISK TREATMENT ............................................................................................................. 17

Risk Tolerability ................................................................................................. 15 ALARP ................................................................................................................. 15 Application of Screening Criteria....................................................................... 16 Inter-relation of Major Hazards and Events ..................................................... 16 The process ........................................................................................................ 17 Risk Avoidance ................................................................................................... 17 Risk Optimisation Strategy ................................................................................ 17 Risk Transfer ...................................................................................................... 17 Risk Retention.................................................................................................... 18 Summary of Operation Boundaries (SOOB) ...................................................... 18 Bow Tie Study .................................................................................................... 18 The HSE Case ..................................................................................................... 20

4.8 4.9

RISK COMMUNICATION ...................................................................................................... 20

ARCTIC I SCOPE OF OPERATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT........................................................... 20

4.10

RISK ESTIMATION ............................................................................................................ 21

Matrix Client/Operation Specific ....................................................................... 20 Hazard ID Process.............................................................................................. 20 Personnel ........................................................................................................... 21 Continuous Review ............................................................................................ 21

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4.11

4.10.1 4.10.2 4.10.3 4.10.4 4.11.1 4.11.2 4.11.3 4.11.4 4.11.5 4.11.6 4.12.1 4.12.2 4.12.3 4.12.4 4.12.5

ARCTIC I BOW TIE STUDIES.............................................................................................. 26

Risk Matrix ......................................................................................................... 21 Screening Criteria .............................................................................................. 22 Risk Evaluation .................................................................................................. 22 Tolerability and ALARP ...................................................................................... 24 Consultation Team ............................................................................................. 26 Threat Analysis The Process ........................................................................... 26 Consequence Analysis The Process ................................................................ 28 Screening Criteria & Significance ...................................................................... 28 Effectiveness Rating .......................................................................................... 29 Mitigation and Documentation .......................................................................... 31 Supporting Studies ............................................................................................ 32 Hydrocarbons in Formation ............................................................................... 33 Sea States and Weather .................................................................................... 35 Dropped Object .................................................................................................. 37 Loss of Stability .................................................................................................. 38

4.12

BOW TIE STUDIES - MAJOR HAZARDS AND EVENTS .................................................................. 32

4.13

4.14

4.13.1 Acceptance ......................................................................................................... 39 4.14.1 Documentation................................................................................................... 41


REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 41

RISK ACCEPTANCE............................................................................................................ 39

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 4 RISK MANAGEMENT

4. 4.1 4.1.1

ARCTIC I RISK MANAGEMENT Introduction Purpose

4.1.1.1 Part 4 of the ARCTIC I HSE Case describes the original Risk Management Process undertaken prior to the unit commencing the scope of work for SIEP in the Brazil area of operation and when owned and operated by Transocean. The description of this Risk Management process describes the process for assurance that risks associated with the operations for SIEP were reduced to a level that is considered as tolerable to both the Transocean Corporation and their client. This process will consider the HSE management objectives described in Part 2 and the equipment and systems identified in Part 3. 4.1.1.2 This section of the Case is amended in light of the new ownership structure and the implementation of the Transocean Corporate Management System, but the process of risk management with specific reference to the key processes of Hazard Identification and Risk mitigation is a retrospective activity undertaken prior to the current SIEP contract and the description of the processes and definitions of the philosophies remain unchanged. 4.1.2 Document Update

4.1.2.1 The text within this section of the case has been updated in the light of the change of ownership of the ARCTIC I and the integration of the unit into the Transocean Management system. In some areas it is necessary to describe the original systems in place and where appropriate reference regarding sections of the Corporate Management system is reference in terms of the current system as applied. 4.1.3 Approach

4.1.3.1 Risk Management is defined as the coordinated activities to direct and control an organization or activity with regard to risk. 4.1.3.2 To provide a suitably justifiable philosophy for the consideration of the Risk Management Process it is important that this process is; Consistent Verifiable against declared standards Participative - Utilising input from all levels of both Workforce and Management

4.1.3.3 The effectiveness of the Risk Management regime depends upon accurate identification of Hazards as an initial base line. The formal risk assessment process will then serve to determine the potential threat to the operation, people, the asset or the business, but it will not alone control that risk. 4.1.3.4 The Risks will be reduced by the adoption of a participative process engaging the workforce within the discussions. This will ensure the workforces are able to adopt the necessary controls at the work place based upon their specialist knowledge of the ongoing operation and the context of that operation and that specific location. 4.1.3.5 At the time of the original Risk Management process the original owners system was utilised, so that key assumptions and decisions made will be clearly highlighted. This process is described
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within this document to ensure that the original process is shown to be valid and verifiable and that the conclusions reached remain valid for the current operation. 4.1.3.6 Within this updated section of the ARCTIC I HSE Case the Risk assessment process although originally referenced to the relevant components of the GSF ISM/ISO14001 management system, will be crossed referenced to the Transocean Company Management System where necessary to ensure the element of a fully justifiable process and the ability for verification against established and accredited management system criteria remains established. 4.1.3.7 The output from the assessment process will be described with clear indication/justification that identified risks have sufficient mitigation in place , and that the operation may continue subject to the specific controls being applied and monitored. 4.1.4 Risk Ranking

4.1.4.1 As risk assessment is an essential part of an accredited Management system , it is important that for prioritisation purposes, in terms of risk mitigation requirements, the risks are ranked so that they can be suitably managed 4.1.5 Inter-relation of Hazards and Operations

4.1.5.1 Any hazardous operation has a potential to; Release a hazard Defeat a safety barrier (Dropped object Loss of containment) (Maintenance of Safety system system failure)

4.1.5.2 The table below provides an illustration of both of the above relationships.
Hazardous Operation with potential to release a Hazard Running Casing Helicopter Operations Supply vessel Operations Heavy Lifts over Rig structure Pooling out of Hole (Tubulars) Hot work in Hazardous Areas Ballasting Slip and cut drill Line Well Testing and Flaring Hazardous Operation with potential to defeat a Barrier Top Drive Maintenance Breathing Air Compressor Maintenance GMDSS Radio Maintenance BOP Inspection and Maintenance Fire & Gas system (alarm & Panel) Maintenance Accumulator Maintenance Diesel Fuel system maintenance Emergency Generator testing Hydraulic system Maintenance

4.1.5.3 The Hazard Identification and Risk assessment process will reflect these relationships within the documented evaluation. 4.1.6 Inter-relation Major Hazards and Events

4.1.6.1 The initiation of a major hazard is unlikely to be a stand-alone occurrence but may well result in a further de-stabilising event leading to the defeat of additional boundaries of control. 4.1.6.2 The prime example of such a chain of events or domino effect being the loss of the Piper Alpha and the 267 lives, due to a chain of events initiated by a lack of administrative communication.

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4.1.6.3 An example of such a domino effect is shown in the illustration below.

FIRE
Helicopter Crash

EXPLOSION

Major Mechanical Failure

Blowout

Toxic Release

Dropped Object

Structural Failure

Mooring Failure

Ship Collision

Loss of Stability

Towing Incident

4.1.6.4 As a result of the potential for such domino effects the Risk Management process will be orientated so that the full scope of such events is covered within the established ARCTIC I Risk assessment process. 4.1.7 Abbreviations 4.1.7.1 As identified with text Abbreviation ALARP HSE IADC ISO JRA LPG OIM PIC PPE RAM SHIDAC SIEP SOOB Definition As Low as Reasonably Practicable Health Safety and Environment International Association of Drilling Contractors International Standards Organisation Job Risk Assessment Liquid Propane Gas Offshore Installation Manager Person In charge Personal Protective Equipment Risk Assessment Matrix Structured Hazard Identification and Control Shell International Exploration and Production Summary of Operational Boundaries

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4.2 4.2.1

Risk Management Components Risk Analysis Overview

4.2.1.1 A simple schematic of the relationship of Risk management terms is shown below.
RISK MANAGEMENT

RISK ASSESSMENT Risk Analysis Source (Hazard Identification) Risk Estimation Risk Evaluation
RISK TREATMENT

Risk Avoidance Risk Optimization Risk Transfer Risk Retention


RISK ACCEPTANCE RISK COMMUNICATION

4.2.1.2 Risk Management is a critical component of daily operational management and is driven through Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis. 4.2.1.3 The identification and evaluation of Hazards is undertaken at every level of Management. The adoption of a formal structured process providing the ability to ensure that all level of sensible hazards are captured for assessment 4.2.1.4 The activity of Risk Analysis and the ensuing process of Risk Mitigation are key component of operational safety. As such these processes must follow consistent templates if they are to be considered valid for supporting the ongoing operations. 4.2.1.5 Risk Analysis is the combined activity of Hazard Identification and Risk Estimation. Without the process of Estimation there is no perception of the potential threat to the operation or work force. 4.2.1.6 Within Risk Management the process of Ranking or Evaluation identifies hazards with respect to their significance to the business or operation and without this knowledge the level or method of treatment or means of establishing boundaries or controls cannot be identified or prioritised. 4.2.1.7 It is an important to the validity of the integrated Risk Analysis, that a suitably realistic and pragmatic approach is pursued to ensure, both the establishment of potential, mitigating controls or barriers, and the final evaluation of residual risk meeting the criteria of ALARP, are all within the context of the unit, the management systems in place, persons involved and the operation to be undertaken.

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4.2.1.8 Within Risk Analysis the involvement of persons to ensure the contextual approach is a fundamental criteria.

4.2.2

The Risk Management Process

4.2.2.1 The process of Risk Management is well established, and is fully detailed within ISO 17776. A schematic of the process is shown below.

Step 1

Identify Hazards

Step 2

Evaluate Risks

Screening Criteria

Identify Risk-reduction measures

Step 3

Set Functional requirements

4.2.2.2 The essential steps within the risk management process are; Identify the hazards including source, and environmental hazards if applicable Assess the risks from the hazards and consider the risk tolerability Eliminate or reduce the risk

4.2.2.3 The model must be applied in the context of the business for which is intended to ensure the appropriateness of the results it reaches. Hence the model must take into account; Geographical location Rig equipment and systems Management system and controls in place Operating environment Clients prescribed operations Supporting infrastructure (including people)

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4.2.2.4 The effective application of the process will require the availability of sound judgement and informed decision processes, identifying appropriate screening criteria; defining effective and achievable risk management barriers; and determining when risk levels are tolerable. 4.2.2.5 It is important that the participants within the consultative process have an understanding of the internal and external business aspects, as well as the necessary HSE management and risk management processes and are able to translate this knowledge into their own specialist disciplines.

4.2.3

Structured Hazard Identification and Control Process (SHIDAC)

4.2.3.1 ISO 17776 establishes the formal accepted Risk management process as Structured Hazard Identification and Control (SHIDAC). For a more appropriate application within the offshore drilling industry additional sub steps have been identified and applied. Identification of Hazards Evaluation of Risk Identification of Risk Reduction Measures (Control defence & recovery) and set Functional (Performance) Requirements.

4.2.3.2 The key deliverables from this process are the determination of major hazards, other workplace hazards, and the critical activities/tasks to implement, monitor and maintain barriers related to a drilling Contractors scope of operations. 4.2.3.3 The SHIDAC process is iterative, requiring multiple passes of each step to ensure effective and inclusive evaluation of the potential of the Risk Management process 4.2.3.4 Within this HSE Case the SHIDAC is undertaken in two stages, an initial risk assessment and mitigation process based upon the Hazard Source Register, and a secondary detailed examination of the barrier control process. 4.2.3.5 From the initial Hazard Source risk assessment those Hazards evaluated as presenting a potential for risk of such significance the controls or barriers in place may be identified as being at their limit, are subjected to the more intensive assessment through the application of the Bow Tie Study process. 4.2.4 Integration of HSE Management and Operations

4.2.4.1 The document has considered the elements of HSE Risk Management and will provide additional clarity on the components of each of the elements. The relationship between HSE Management and Operations requires to be identified as a totally integrated system, with HSE Management providing a critical tool (assessment - control or barrier) with which to support the safe completion of the operation at hand. 4.2.4.2 This ARCTIC I HSE case clearly defines the various system components within the management of the safe operation, and the relationship between HSE Management and Operations is shown in the schematic shown on the following page.

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RISK LEVEL HIGH


Major Hazards Major Incident - or Major Process Loss

HSE Management
Structured Hazard Identification & Control process (SHIDAC)

OPERATIONS

Barriers

Management system controls

Task Specific Procedures

Potential to defeat barriers for 1 or more hazards Hazardous Operations

Barriers

Management system controls

MEDIUM
Workplace Hazards Moderate Incident Medium Drilling Loss Management System Controls

Approved Workplace Practices/Procedures

Written Job Hazard Analysis

LOW
Workplace Hazards Minor Incident Minor Drilling Loss

Individual and verbal Job Hazard Analysis General Management System Procedures/Workplace Assessments

No potential to release or defeat controls for Major Hazards

4.2.4.3 The definitions of the levels of risk follow in section 4.6 4.3 4.3.1 Identification and Sources of Hazards Hazard - Definitions and Groups

4.3.1.1 For the purpose of the Case a Hazard is defined as;

An intrinsic property of anything with the potential to cause harm.


4.3.1.2 Harm includes Ill-health and injury Damage to property or plant Products of the environment Process losses Increased liabilities

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4.3.1.3 A Hazard Source is described as; Anything with the potential to release a hazard, or A condition that can defeat a barrier leading to an increase on the realisation of a hazard being released Multiple fatalities or permanent total disabilities Extensive damage to structure at the installation Massive effect on the environment (persistent and severe environmental damage that may lead to loss of commercial or recreational use, loss of natural resources over a wide area or severe environmental damage that will require extensive measures to restore the beneficial uses of the environment).

4.3.1.4 Major Hazards are defined as those with a potential to result in;

4.3.1.5 The table below identifies typical major hazards associated with offshore drilling operations TYPICAL MAJOR HAZARDS Blow Out Toxic Release Towing Incident Major Mechanical Failure Weather/Environment Diving Explosion Loss of Stability Structural Failure Ship Collision Electrical Fault Seismic Activity Epidemic Fire Mooring Failure Dropped Objects Helicopter Crash

Other Possible Major Hazards

4.3.1.6 Other Work place hazards are defined as those that have a potential to result in; 4.3.2 Injury or ill health up to or including a single fatality Significant damage to structure or equipment at the Rig Limited environmental damage that will persist or require remedial action

Hazard Identification Process

4.3.2.1 The Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment study work for the ARTIC 1 is identified within this HSE Case as applying to the operation to be undertaken for SIEP offshore Brazil. The identification and assessment matrices to be used in the process have been based upon the wealth of proven experience by SIEP in these areas and are in line with the IADC standards identified within their HSE Global Case guidelines. 4.3.2.2 In order to formally document the full Hazard Identification and Risk assessment process a Hazard Register template was drafted. This Register provides a brief but complete summary that demonstrates that hazards have been identified, assessed and that barriers are in place. At this initial stage only the Management system control will be identified not the full scope of the barrier within that system. 4.3.2.3 The Format adopted for the ARCTIC I Hazard register is shown below;

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4.3.3 4.3.3.1

Hazard Descriptions Groups The ARCTIC I Hazard Registry considered the following main Hazard groups
Reference No H 01 H 02 H 03 H 04 H 05 H 06 H 07 H 08 H 09 H 10 H 11 H 12 H 13 H 14 H 15 H 16 H 17 H 18 H 19 H 20 H 21 H 22 H 23 H 24 H 25 H 26 H 27 H 28 H 29 H - 30 Hazard Hydrocarbons Refined Hydrocarbons Other Flammable Materials Explosives Pressure Hazards Hazards Associated with Height difference Objects under induced stress Dynamic situation Hazards Environmental Hazards Hot Surfaces Hot Fluids Cold Surfaces Cold Fluids Open Flame Electricity Electromagnetic Radiation Ionizing radiation open source Ionizing radiation closed source Asphyxiates Toxic Gas Toxic Fluid Toxic Solid Corrosive Substances Biological Hazards Ergonomic Hazards Psychological Hazards Security related Hazards Use of natural resources Medical Structural Integrity

4.3.3.2 Within each group a number of specific subgroups were identified. In total 184 hazards were identified with a potential for risk within a generic offshore Operation.

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People

Assets

Ref No

Hazard Description

Scenario

Controls

Reputation

Environme nt

Comments

ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 4 RISK MANAGEMENT

13

4.3.3.3 An example is given below of a typical sub groups of hazards;


Reference No H 02 H 02.01 H 02.02 H 02.03 H 02.04 H 02.05 Hazard Description Refined Hydrocarbons Lube and seal oil Hydraulic Oil Diesel Fuel Petroleum spirit/gasoline Kerosene

4.3.4

Hazard Scenarios

4.3.4.1 The relevance of the hazard source within the specific context of the ARCTIC I drilling operation in Brazil was considered in the light of a possible operational scenario. In the event that such a hazard source was found to be of relevance the scenario was identified within the Hazard register. 4.4 4.4.1 Risk Acceptance Stated Criteria

4.4.1.1 The ARCTIC I HSE Case has been drafted against established criteria which have been identified within the document. These criteria have been used within the processes of Hazard source identification and risk assessment for the determination that the ARCTIC I will be able to undertake drilling operations for SIEP in such a manner that all risks have been reduced to an ALARP state. 4.4.1.2 The presence of residual risk after the application of any form of controls or barriers is inevitable. This discussion assumes that the level of risk has been deemed as acceptable, and it is the aim to identify how this level of acceptance may be defined within the operational criteria for ARCTIC I 4.4.1.3 The global standard for the acceptance of risk has been the term ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable however this definition lacks an overall quantifiable definition, hence it is supported through the adoption of a formal structured assessment process and the use of clearly defined risk matrices providing practical quantification of severity in terms of consequence and likelihood of occurrence in terms of historical instances in the industry. 4.4.1.4 The adoption of such a Risk Matrix provides the initial step in defining the level of acceptance of the risk through the application of clearly defined criteria. 4.4.1.5 In the event that some items are found to be deemed a major risk they are subjected to further analysis through the extensive process of Bow Tie review. Within this process a secondary set of matrices are applied with clearly defined categories identifying that effectiveness of the critical barriers. The acceptability (or not) of the hazard is then determined by the overall ranking of the effectiveness within the tabulated criteria.

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4.4.1.6 The process of Risk assessment is a consultative procedure, involving representatives from all parties involved including Management, Workforce, and Client; hence acceptance of risk will be unanimous. (Whole section (2.6) is in the wrong place and needs moving up the chain to a more logical and introductory position of lead-in: around or maybe before section 2.3) 4.5 4.5.1 Risk Estimation Risk Assessment Matrix

4.5.1.1 In order to provide a defined and sustainable basis for the systematic estimation of risk, the standard approach adopted is to apply a Risk Matrix. The Risk Matrix adopted within the ARCTIC I case is based upon standard format closely reflecting the IADC standard with more definition for enhanced clarity. 4.5.1.2 Risk is defined as the combination of;

Probability of Occurrence of a Consequence AND Severity of that Consequence


4.5.1.3 The Risk Matrix is therefore developed with consequence severity on the Y axis and probability on the X axis. The level of risk can then be determined qualitatively at the intersection of the relevant row and column for a given scenario 4.5.1.4 A Standard Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) is shown below
CONSEQUENCE INCREASING PROBABILITY B A C D E Multiple Multiple Never Has Occurred occurrence per occurrence per occurred in Has Occurred year in year at Industry in Industry in Company compnay location

en

Severity rating

Pe op le

En vi ro nm

se ts

0 1 2 3 4 5

ZeroHarm

Zero Effect

Zero damage Slight Damage Minor Damage Local Damage Major Damage Extensive Damage

Zero Impact Slight Impact Limited Impact Considerabl e Impact National Impact International Impact MEDIUM RISK Incorporate riskreducing measures HIGH RISK Fail to meet screening criteria LOW RISK Manage for continued Improvement

Slight Harm Slight Effect Minor Harm Minor Effect Major harm Local Effect Single Fatalaity Multiple Faqtalities Major Effect Massive Effect

4.5.1.5 The RAM is systematically applied to define the severity rating against each established criteria i.e.; Severity Severity Severity Severity to to to to People Environment Assets Reputation

R ep ut

As

at io

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4.5.1.6 The simplistic way of representing the evaluation is given through a defined notation for each criteria which is then assessed in terms of the probability of such event happening against the defined standards. Hence a 4B (A) would indicate that the risk to the Asset is Minor, but with a probability rating placing it as Medium Risk. 4.5.2 Risk Screening

4.5.2.1 The Screening criteria are the defined values, targets or performance standards used to evaluate or compare the significance of an identified hazard, event or associated risk and determine tolerability. 4.5.2.2 Screening criteria may be based upon; Legislation requirements Industry Guidelines Client requirements Company Requirements

4.5.2.3 The use of the clearly defined and established screening criteria will ensure the consistency of the approach and a clear and pragmatic assessment of the overall risk levels. 4.6 4.6.1 Risk Evaluation Risk Tolerability

4.6.1.1 Risk evaluation is the process of comparing the estimated (assessed) risk for each hazard source against established screening criteria. 4.6.1.2 Risk Tolerability identifies that the operation can progress but that some risk does exist. Risk Tolerability accepts that the Risk can be managed. 4.6.2 ALARP

4.6.2.1 ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable indicate that; The subject risk has been reduced to a level where the effort, cost and practicality of further reduction measures become disproportionate to the additional amount of risk reduction that could be gained

4.6.2.2 The concept of ALARP is therefore not controlled by any prescribed theory but by the pragmatic analysis of the Hazard sources, the consequence of the event and the controls in place and therefore determining that the controls are sufficient and within the terms of practicality. 4.6.2.3 The final determination of the ALARP status will only be valid if suitably appropriate prescribed screening criteria are used in any evaluation process, i.e. within the concept of the Risk Assessment Matrix or Barrier Effectiveness Matrix. Hence the use of the Matrices will provide a method of rating either the severity of the risk or the effectiveness of the controls in such a manner that an immediate indication of the status of the ALARP is provided.

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4.6.2.4 The ALARP schematic is show below;

HIGH RISK

Risk cannot be justified except in extraordinary circumstances

ALARP Region

Tolerable Risk

Tolerable only if Risk reduction is impractical or if its cost is grossly disproportionate to benefit gained Tolerable if cost of reduction would exceed improvement gained

Negligible Risk

Necessary to maintain assurance that risk remains at this level

4.6.3

Application of Screening Criteria

4.6.3.1 Within the ARCTIC I HSE case the SIEP screening criteria have been included to the standard RAM to provide clarity with regard to levels of risk tolerability and requirements for additional risk evaluation 4.6.3.2 Within the ARCTIC I Case the SIEP Screening criteria have been applied the final highest risk items being clearly identified as in need of greater investigation, i.e. those considered in the lower right hand corner or Red section of the RAM. 4.6.3.3 The application of the screening criteria identify the active management processes that have to be continued either for the hazard to be accepted or for further investigation and analysis under separate studies as the current analysis has established an unacceptable level of severity of probability. 4.6.4 Inter-relation of Major Hazards and Events

4.6.4.1 The format of the ARCTIC I Hazard Registry identifies an extensive range of Hazard sources, and subsequent scenarios in which their potential may be realised. 4.6.4.2 The effect of an escalated event/scenario which encompasses a combination of Hazard sources will defeat the usual barriers or controls, and will require analysis through an additional process as in many cases the operation is deemed as routine with the suitable barriers in place but will require additional assessment because of the widespread escalation that could occur, in the event of any one of numerous failures within that hazard source, an instance being the routine of Helicopter operations for the transfer of personnel.

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4.6.4.3 An illustration of a major hazard and events escalation is provided in section 1 of this part. 4.7 4.7.1 Risk Treatment The process

4.7.1.1 Risk Treatment provides the process within Risk Management where all previous identification and assessment work is used to determine effective barriers that will result in a level of risk, acceptable and tolerable to the Case Owner, workforce, and all interested parties 4.7.1.2 The Risk Treatment process is simply defined as the selection of four distinct paths to follow; Risk Risk Risk Risk Avoidance Optimisation Transfer Retention

4.7.1.3 Risk Avoidance results for a decision not become involved in, or incurs action to withdraw from, a risk situation. 4.7.1.4 Risk Optimisation is the process to minimise the negative and to maximise the positive consequences and their respective probabilities of occurrence. 4.7.1.5 Risk Transfer leads to the sharing of the burden of loss or the benefit of gain, from a risk, and the measure to reduce the risk. 4.7.1.6 Risk Retention is the acceptance of the burden of loss, or benefit of gain, from a risk, and the measures to reduce the risk. 4.7.2 Risk Avoidance

4.7.2.1 Risk Avoidance is unlikely to be an alternative strategy within the operational context and for the purpose of this operational based case cannot be considered . The ability to avoid a risk implies the availability of an alternative approach with less risk attached in which case this path would have been considered at an early stage. 4.7.3 Risk Optimisation Strategy

4.7.3.1 Within this HSE Case the Risk Optimisation Strategy will be the prevailing entity. This strategy is the most suitable due to the availability to the workforce of a wide selection of controls or boundaries that each provides their own element of risk mitigation. The additional balance being that the controls should be in proportion to the risk so that a pragmatic approach may be applied and the operation be pursued effectively. As will be seen the Risk Optimisation for one particular hazard may be supported by numerous controls, i.e. Permit to work Procedures Lockouts Observational Practices. 4.7.4 Risk Transfer

4.7.4.1 Within the HSE Case discussion surrounding operational risk, Risk Transfer is not an option for consideration, unless applied to shared risk reduction through the utilisation of a specialised workforce to undertake specialist high risk tasks.

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4.7.5

Risk Retention

4.7.5.1 Risk Retention will always be a consideration as residual risk will always be apparent. Risk can rarely if ever reduced to zero. It is this residual risk that requires to be judged by the Operational Teams as being at a tolerable level, or if not, what other mitigation can be applied to reduce it to the state of ALARP. 4.7.6 Summary of Operation Boundaries (SOOB)

4.7.6.1 The Summary of Operation Boundaries is a record of the defeated barriers that have the potential to exceed the tolerability limits for a safe operation. 4.7.6.2 Within the active Hazard identification and Risk Assessment only the management system processes are outline in a generic format as providing an element of control. The SOOB documentation and process provides a method of identifying the nature of the defeated barrier through an enhanced and more extensive form of analysis. 4.7.6.3 Typically the SHIDAC process will identify the barriers that are required to ensure risks are reduced to a tolerable level and resources required to maintain the barriers or controls intact. The analysis of some dynamic or simultaneous operations may indicate that the effectiveness of some barriers have been compromised, potentially creating situations of increased risk. 4.7.6.4 The SOOB is vital in establishing the operational boundaries when operating close to the levels of accepted tolerability. 4.7.6.5 Through the depth and format of the SOOB there is increased clarity with regard to the identity of critical barriers and hence the senior personnel on site will have greater awareness with regard to the limiting criteria governing the safe pursuit of the operation. 4.7.6.6 Within the ARCTIC I HSE Case, the process for undertaking such an intensive assessment of individual barriers has utilised the Bow Tie methodology which is documented in ISO 17776. 4.7.7 Bow Tie Study

4.7.7.1 A simple diagram of the elements of a Bow Tie study is shown on the following page.

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ESCALATION FACTORS THREAT 1

ESCALATION FACTORS
Control of Escalation factor Control of Escalation factor

CONSEQUENCE 1

H A Z A R D

Barriers to Prevent Threat

Recovery Preparedness
THREAT 2 Top Event

Recovery Preparedness Measures

Me
CONSEQUENCE 2

HAZA

THREAT 3

CONSEQUENCE 3

4.7.7.2 The components of the study as outlined within the established SIEP standard used for this HSE case are; Hazard Top Event Threat Barrier Consequence Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Control The element with the potential to cause Harm The Result if the Hazard occurs The element of potential if the Top event does occur The element that prevents the threat from occurring The potential result of the Top event does occur Minimises or helps recovery from the consequence Reduces/prohibits the effect of the barrier or recovery measure Prevents or reduces the chance of escalation

4.7.7.3 In a similar structured manner as the original Risk assessment and Risk severity assessment the Bow tie study utilises an established matrix to determine the Effectiveness of the barriers that are in place. 4.7.7.4 This Barrier effectiveness is clearly defined in against the following elements; In place being used (Hardware & Supervision) within prescribed percentage frequency Reliability In terms of percentage of time reliable Human Factors Involvement and level of Stress

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4.7.7.5 The effectiveness of the Bow Tie depends upon the breadth and depth of analysis undertaken from the initial Hazard Identification process through to the identification of the necessary barriers in the form of; Critical Critical Critical Critical Tasks Task Action Party Procedures Equipment

4.7.7.6 Through this positive identification process the study is directly integrated into the rig operation, and reflects the full application of this HSE case. 4.7.7.7 The deliverable from the Bow Tie study provides a clear indication of the overall effectiveness rating of the barriers in place, and either their acceptance as providing a suitable risk management process with an accepted level of residual risk, or the Bow tie will indicate that remedial activities will be required before such particular operations can commence. 4.7.7.8 As an inherent part of the Bow Tie studies the review of the Barriers will provide a clear indication of specific requirements that must be complied with at the time of the occurrence and therefore the study provides an indication to the management Team of the necessary controls required and relevance to the ongoing operation. 4.8 4.8.1 Risk Communication The HSE Case

4.8.1.1 The HSE case identifies the risk management process within the context of the ARCTIC I, and has been based upon consultation and discussion within formal seminars to pursue the process of Hazard Identification and Risk analysis. 4.8.1.2 The documented results from the consultative processes are therefore available to all parties. 4.8.1.3 The responsibility of the communication of the results from the studies documented within the case is identified within the Company Management System [HQS-CMS-GOV] identifies the Company Designated persons as being responsible for the communication of all safety issues to the ARCTIC I, and thereafter it is the responsibility of the OIM to ensure his workforce is informed of the HSE Case and encouraged to become acquainted with its contents with particular reference to the Risk management sections. 4.9 4.9.1 ARCTIC I Scope of Operation and Risk Assessment Matrix Client/Operation Specific

4.9.1.1 The Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment study work for the ARTIC 1 is identified within this HSE Case as applying to the operation to be undertaken for SIEP offshore Brazil. The identification and assessment matrices used in the process have utilised SIEP experiences and IADC standards identified within their HSE Global Case guidelines. 4.9.2 Hazard ID Process

4.9.2.1 The formal process for the study work consisted of two stages; Identification of Hazards completion of table of ALARP
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Additional 4 Bow Tie Studies in consideration of specific hazards where tolerability of residual risk was considered as unacceptable and in need of further investigation.

4.9.2.2 The ARCTIC I Hazard Register identified 184 Hazard sources within 30 main groups. 4.9.3 Personnel

4.9.3.1 To ensure the full application of the risk assessment studies to the ARCTIC I a series of Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment studies were commenced in November 2007. To ensure the application of the broadest range of ARCTIC I Operational experience a succession of meetings were undertaken ensuring that both on and off tour personnel might provide input to the formal process. In addition to Management and Client personnel it was deemed that the following scope of senior personnel had both the operational knowledge and management skills to provide the depth of input required by the Hazard identification and risk assessment process. 4.9.3.2 ARCTIC I Risk Assessment Team; 4.9.4 Rig Manager Drilling Superintendent Driller Toolpusher Stability Technician Safety Training Coordinator Chief Engineer Barge Engineer Crane Operator

Continuous Review

4.9.4.1 The process of Hazard Identification and risk assessment is iterative in terms that any hazard source is reviewed within a specific operational context. If that source is found to impact within the criteria of a specific scenario its potential will be assessed, however should that scenario identify a potential for a second hazard source to have a potential that hazard source will be assessed within the new context. Hence the Assessment process is extensive and inclusive with a possibility of a single scenario being affected by numerous hazard sources. 4.10 4.10.1 Risk Estimation Risk Matrix

4.10.1.1 Within the Hazard Registry the Risk Matrix developed for the ARCTIC I HSE Case is based upon the SIEP Standard and closely parallels the IADC format but has some additional definitions to determine the level of acceptable risk or requirement for additional studies. 4.10.1.2 The SIEP Matrix used for the evaluation process at the time of the consultative analysis is shown on the following page.

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CONSEQUENCES Severity

INCREASING PROBABILITY A B C D Happens Never Has Occurred several times occurred in Heard of in a year in in SEPCO EP Industry EP Industry
SEPCO

En vi ro nm e t n

R ep ut at io n

E
Multiple occurrence per year at location

Pe op le
No helath efect/injury Slight health effect/injury Minor health effect/injury Major health efect/injury PTD or 1 to 5 fatalities Multiple fatalties

0 1 2 3 4 5

Zero Damage Slight Damage Minor Damage Local Damage Major Damage Extensive Damage

As se ts

Zero Effect Zero Impact Slight Effect Minor Effect Local Effect Major Effect Massive Effect Slight Impact Limited Impact Considerabl LOW RISK e Impact National Impact International Impact MEDIUM RISK Major Hazard Zone

INCREASING RISK

A5

B5

HIGH RISK

4.10.1.3 Within the process of determining ALARP the RAM provides the ability for the practical determination of a risk rating associated with each Hazard Source within the context of a specific scenario. 4.10.1.4 The SIEP RAM identifies 5 levels of severity, level 5 being defined as Major Hazard of High Risk potential requiring further formal documented analysis through the application of the Bow Tie Philosophy. 4.10.2 Screening Criteria

4.10.2.1 The SIEP Ram utilises the same criteria for the determination of Severity of the consequences with regard to PEOPLE ASSETS - ENVIRONMENT REPUTATION, as the IADC template. 4.10.2.2 The determination of probability is related to occurrences within the Exploration and Production industry and upon increase probability to specific cases within the SEPCO (Shell Exploration Operating Company). 4.10.3 Risk Evaluation

4.10.3.1 The process of the Evaluation of the ARCTIC I status of risk for operations in Brazil initially commenced with the compilation of the Hazard Source Register, and the identification of the scenarios in which each Hazard might occur. 4.10.3.2 The second stage of review utilised the RAM to identify the status of Severity of the Consequence and the potential risk of probability for every Hazard source. An overall Risk rating was applied on the basis that this rating reflected the worst case potential of any of the included elements.

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4.10.3.3 The extract below shows Hazard Source H01.03 LPGS Propane as being assessed as having a single Medium risk element in terms of the probability of an occurrence of a Fatality to persons, whilst the rating of risks to the Asset, Environment and Reputation has been adjudged as of Low risk. Hence the overall rating reflect the worst criteria and the overall rating is adjudged as of Medium risk

Ref. # H-01

Hazard Description Hydrocarbons

Scenario

Controls
- Permit to Work - JRA - Pre-job safety meeting - FOCUS - Engineeering procedure - flare booms - additional fire protection

Min. Criteria HSE MS Met

O verall

R epu ta tion

P eop le

A ssets

E nviro nm ent

Risk Reduction Ideas (RRI's)

ALARP

H-01.03

LPGs (Propane)

B4

B2

B2

B2

B4

4.10.3.4 In the following instance Hazard Source h 01.01 Crude Oil under pressure has been assessed in the context of a Well test scenario. The Risk rating in the case of Asset and Reputation has been identified as Low Risk, of Minor Severity. The Impact upon People and the Environment has been assessed as a C3 a health effect and local environmental effect, and the Hazard has materialised within SEPCO. Hence the overall rating is assessed as C3 and the presence of Crude Oil during Well Test operations is assessed as of Medium Risk.
Ref. # H-01 Hazard Description Hydrocarbons - Permit to Work - JRA - Pre-job safety meeting - FOCUS - Engineeering procedure - flare booms - water curtain - additional fire protection - stand-by boats - Environmental spill kit Scenario

Controls

Min. Criteria HSE MS Met

O verall

R ep u ta tio n

P eo p le

A ssets

E n viro n m ent

Risk Reduction Ideas (RRI's)

ALARP

H-01.01

Crude oil under pressure

Well Testing

C3

C2

C3

C2

C3

Yes

4.10.3.5 The full documented record of the Hazard Register is contained in Appendix 1 at the end of this section. 4.10.3.6 The analysis determined that of the 183 Hazard sources assessed the following applied. Of the total Hazard sources, 101 were found not to be relevant to the operation to be undertaken for SIEP in Brazil. 4.10.3.7 A Low Risk Rating was assessed of 41 Hazard Sources of which 7 rated as B3 or less 26 rated as C2 or less 5 rated overall at D1 or less 2 rated as E0

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4.10.3.8 A Medium Risk Rating was assessed of 31 Hazard Sources of which 8 were rated as B4 18 rated C4 C2 3 rated D3 D2 1 Rated as E2 On shore transportation by vehicle was reviewed within SIEP

4.10.3.9 A High Risk Rating was established on 7 Specific Risk Sources


Ref No H 01- 06 Source of Hazard Hydrocarbon Gas Overhead Equipment Boat collision hazard to other vessels and offshore structures Scenario Loss of well control /blow out (gas blow out Dropped Objects SIMOPS with multiple vessels including crew/supply boats located on site Adverse weather conditions ( Hurricane) Risk Rating C 5 Extensive damage to the asset C 5 - Multiple fatalities and extensive damage to the asset D4 Fatalities Major Impact Major Environmental Impact with National Impact to Reputation C 5 High risk and extensive damage to the asset C 5 High risk and extensive damage to the asset Environmental impact of Oil spill/release to water D4 - Major impact on environment with national Impact to reputation C 5 Potential for multiple fatalities extensive damage to asset major Environmental Impact and damage to reputation Comment Bow tie to be completed Bow Tie to be completed

H 06 03

H 08 04

Bow Tie to be completed

H 09 01

Weather Sea state /river/currents

Bow Tie to be completed Bow Tie to be completed Bow Tie to be completed

H 09 02

H 28 02

Water

H 30 01

Stability Loss

Bow Tie to be completed

4.10.3.10 In addition to the above an external SIEP study has been completed on the use of air transportation (Helicopters) for the transportation. The study requiring particular specialist evaluation outside the remit of the ARCTIC I Risk Assessment Team. 4.10.4 Tolerability and ALARP

4.10.4.1 The findings from the assessment process using the Matrix are identified within the previous section. The process of the determination and documentation of the Hazard source through to the assessment and rating of the risk potential of the hazard source are recorded in the document defined as the Hazard Register. 4.10.4.2 By extending the process from assessment to a comparison of the risk against the controls in place and making a pragmatic judgement on the extent of the controls in the management of the
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risk an appreciation of the achievement of ALARP is made. 4.10.4.3 To assess the ALARP status every Hazard source was now reviewed in terms of the Controls that would be in place during the scenario in which the Hazard may occur. 4.10.4.4 At the time of the Analysis process the typical scope of controls available to provide the necessary barrier to limit the risk and reduce the likelihood of such an event were documented from the Owners Management system. These barriers have since been enhanced through the application of the Transocean CMS as shown in the table below;
Original Barriers
Permit to Work JRA Job Risk Analysis Pre Job Safety Meetings

Current CMS Barriers


Permit to Work THINK Process including; THINK Plan THINK Procedure THINK Task Risk Assessment

FOCUS Engineering or Other formal procedures Isolations PPE Segregation

START Operational procedures Isolations PPE Segregation

4.10.4.5 In all cases the necessary controls were noted against the Hazard. Additional ideas for further Risk Reduction were also noted. Hence the process becomes pro-active in terms of seeking additional controls and continually seeking to limit risk. 4.10.4.6 Some examples of identified controls for some hazard sources are shown below. In addition Ideas for risk reduction methods are also formally identified.
Ref. # H-01
H-06

Hazard Description Hydrocarbons


Hazards associated with height difference

Scenario

Controls

Min. Criteria HSE MS Met

O v e ra ll

R e p u ta tio n

P e o p le

A s s e ts

E n v iro nm ent

Risk Reduction Ideas (RRI's)

H-06.01

Personnel at height >2m

Personnel working greater that 2M (6 ft).

C4

C1

C0

C3

C4

H-06.02

Personnel at height <2m

Slips, trips and falls

C3

C1

C1

C1

C3

- Permit to Work - JRA - Pre-job safety meeting - FOCUS - Harness - Fall protection (inertia reels - "SALA") - Dedicated man-riding winch - JRA - Pre-job safety meeting - FOCUS - Non-skid tread plates

Identify opportunities for installing ladders and platforms on frequently used atheight areas Install non-skid paint in high traffic areas. Identify trip hazards with black/yellow paint

4.10.4.7 The inclusion of the Controlling parameters and the identification of additional pro-active Risk Reduction Ideas now enable a more precise determination to be made of the status of ALARP for the particular Hazard Source in that particular operating scenario.

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4.10.4.8 Within the established criteria the determination of the effect of a single hazard source within a single operating scenario can be clearly achieved, only when viewing the controls/barriers that have been documented within the table and a decision made as to the status of ALARP. 4.10.4.9 Dynamic events or those events having a potential for an escalation of a deteriorating situation cannot be assessed as being at an ALARP status, these are documented as the 7 High Risk events. 4.10.4.10 The High Risk events identified by the ARCTIC I Risk Assessment Team were therefore subject to a second stage review in the format of the BOW Tie Studies. 4.11 4.11.1 ARCTIC I Bow Tie Studies Consultation Team

4.11.1.1 The ARCTIC I Bow Tie Studies were completed using the same rig based consultative format as that for the previous Risk Assessment and rating work. The same team content/personnel being involved throughout the full process which the consistency of approach and the application of the same expertise and specialist skills. 4.11.2 Threat Analysis The Process

4.11.2.1 Those events which were identified from the initial Hazard Source Risk Assessment analysis and rated, to be of a High risk rating and also having a sufficient potential for hazard escalation due to the dynamic source of the nature, were subjected to the Bow Tie Analysis. 4.11.2.2 The Assessment Team determined that although 7 Hazards were noted for further evaluation three were of a common nature and could be included within one overall group. 4.11.2.3 Therefore the Bow Tie Studies were conducted for the following Hazards; Hydrocarbons in Formation Sea States and Weather Dropped Objects Loss of Stability

4.11.2.4 The full documented results from these studies can e found in Appendix 2. 4.11.2.5 Within the structured process the Team used the SIEP template already identified in section 2.5.7 and shown below.

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ESCALATION FACTORS THREAT 1

ESCALATION FACTORS
Control of Escalation factor Control of Escalation factor

CONSEQUENCE 1

H A Z A R D

Barriers to Prevent Threat

Recovery Preparedness
THREAT 2 Top Event

Recovery Preparedness Measures

Me
CONSEQUENCE 2

HAZA

THREAT 3

CONSEQUENCE 3

4.11.2.6 In line with the SOOB process the BOW TIE review undertakes to establish the status of the barriers in place for each hazard and thereafter determine what controls are in place to control the escalation. Hence the process followed a structured step analysis. For each threat all event/scenarios in which such an event could arise was derived and considered. 4.11.2.7 Having determined the format for the threat, the barriers/controls that might limit the effect of such a threat were considered, however as Barriers have themselves weaknesses the Escalation prevention factor within each scenario required to be identified. 4.11.2.8 In this way a clear understanding of the full extent of every barrier could be determined for its degree of effectiveness in the overall prevention of the TOP EVENT. 4.11.2.9 The schematic below represents the necessary levels of analysis in the first stages of the Bow Tie assessment for the identification and evaluation of the Threat. The schematic replicates the colours used within the BOW TIE Documentation for each level of analysis work recorded in the BOW TIE studies contained in Appendix 2. The schematic identifies potential scenarios within the parenthesis.

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4.11.2.10 Ultimately it is the Escalation control that provides the last element for analysis as an individual line item.
THREAT IDENTIFY THREAT (Mechanical Failure) (Design/Maintenance) ( Design Error/Zero Maintenance) ( JRA/Supervision)

IDENTIFY BARRIERS

ESCALATION FACTOR

Escalation Control

4.11.3

Consequence Analysis The Process

4.11.3.1 Having completed the process for detailed review of the effectiveness of the barriers to control the potential of a Top Event the Consequence of the event was reviewed to determine the effectiveness of the systems in place to provide a suitable level of mitigation. 4.11.3.2 The schematic below represents the necessary levels of analysis in the second stages of the Bow Tie assessment for the identification and eventual evaluation of the Consequence. The schematic replicates the colours used within the BOW TIE Documentation for each level of analysis work recorded in the BOW TIE studies contained in appendix 2. The schematic identifies potential scenarios within the parenthesis. 4.11.3.3 Similar to conditions discussed within the Threat section of the BOW TIE study: it is the Escalation of Control line item that is fundamental component of the potential for recovery.
CONSEQUENCE IDENTIFY THREAT IDENTIFY BARRIERS (Multiple Fatalities) ( Medical facilities) ( Inadequate Training) ( JRA/Supervision)

ESCALATION FACTOR Escalation Control

4.11.4

Screening Criteria & Significance

4.11.4.1 Having established the factors affecting the nature of a threat and the consequence of those factors, an evaluation is required to be made to clearly establish the acceptability of that hazard and its potential within the operational concept. 4.11.4.2 The Hazard, was assessed through the Hazard Register as being of High Risk. The Bow tie has provided the means to provide extensive evaluation of the Controls of Threat and the Controls in place to limit the Consequence of the threat. The Evaluation criteria for the determination of a standard judgment with regard to acceptability of the hazard is based upon the Effectiveness Rating of the controls.

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4.11.4.3 The Effectiveness Rating Matrix used within the ARCTIC I BOW TIE Study is provided by SIEP as their standard matrix and is show below. 4.11.4.4 The Matrix provides the basis for the determination of the Effectiveness rating of every Barrier/Control identified within the Bow Tie study in terms of; In place and being used applying to Hardware and Supervision Reliability in terms of Ability to work Design intent Safety devices Human Factor Involvement procedures Stress Competency- Training

4.11.4.5 In all cases a clear definition of the rating is provided for recording within the Bow Tie Study document.

Effectiveness

IN Place and Being Used Hardware & Supervision

Reliability Will it work? Does it meet design intent easy to Defeat? Very Reliable (Works >99%* of time)

Human Factors

++

> 95%* of time in place

No human involvement, simple instructions, easy to operate, intuitive, proven operator performance, or errors practically impossible Clearly defined task, defined operating procedures, operator is trained and experienced, or errors conceivable but very unlikely Operating under stress, multitasking, complex procedures, difficult to operate, operator is trained, or errors possible Operating under high stress, complex or unclear procedures, inadequate training or errors quite possible Personnel familiar with the task, very complex procedures, no training, errors might well be expected, or emergency situation Unknown

> 75%* of time in place

Reliable (Works >95%* of time) Fairly reliable (Works >75%* of time) Unreliable (Works >50%* of time) Very Unreliable (Works <50%* of time) Unknown

> 50%* of time in place

< 50%* of time in place

__ ?

< 25%* of time in place Unknown

* These percentages are to be used as guidance by the individual/team qualitatively rating the effectiveness of a control or recovery measures fashion based on specific knowledge of the operation and their experience.

4.11.5

Effectiveness Rating

4.11.5.1 The Effectiveness Matrix provides the necessary screening criteria to enable an objective assessment of the effectiveness of controls/barriers identified within each BOW TIE study and the individual elements within the barrier/control groups under assessment. 4.11.5.2 The process of Effectiveness Rating is undertaken for every element identified under the grouping of Escalation Control using the above matrix.

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4.11.5.3 As was the case with the original Risk Assessment and following the philosophy of SHIDAC the overall effectiveness of each element is rated against the lowest rated component within that element. 4.11.5.4 In a similar way every Barrier is then allocated an overall rating identified in line with the weakest element within each control Barrier. Hence the overall effectiveness of the Barriers is clearly defined against the status of the effectiveness of the three fundamental elements of the barrier; In place and being used applying to Hardware and Supervision Reliability in terms of Ability to work Design intent Safety devices Human Factor Involvement procedures Stress Competency- Training

4.11.5.5 A typical set of documented analysis is shown below for the Threats associated with the Bow Tie for Sea states and weather.

Threats / Barriers / Rec. Escalation Factor Consequences Measures


Exposure to High Seas or Swells
Experience Lack of experience

Escalation Controls

Comments

Barrier Description

In Pl. Rel. HF Overall

+
Preplanning Pre job meetings are conducted. This helps to make sure that those without adequate experience know what to do. JRAs are created to make sure the hazards are known. Rig based training by the STC

++

++

+ + + ++ +

Competency Operating Manual procedures Procedures not followed JRA Rig based supervision Monitoring Lack of monitoring Weather forecasts from BCOs Designated area for posting weather forecast with crew accessibility Planning Poor / not following the plan JRA Supervision Inspection

++

++

JRA should comply with operating manual Supervise adherence to operating manual

++

++

++

Ensured by the OIM Ensure that Crane Operator checks weather forecast daily for up coming sea conditions to foreman a job plan for unloading or loading equipment. Ensure all rig equipment on boat is properly secured. Ensure the JRA is adequate, informative and complete as per the job at hand. Ensure the JRA is adequate, informative and complete as per the job at hand. Ensure all rig equipment on boat is properly secured.

++ ++
++

++ +
+

++ +
+

++ + +

++ ++

++ ++

+ +

+ +

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4.11.5.6 A typical set of documented analysis is shown below for the Consequences associated with the Bow Tie for Sea States and weather.

Threats / Barriers / Rec. Escalation Factor Consequences Measures


Multiple Fatalities
Mustering of non-essential personnel Lack of communication

Escalation Controls

Comments

Barrier Description

In Pl. Rel. HF Overall

+
Management supervision Rig based accountability STC Accountability Orientation upon arrival to rig Management stresses the use of JRAs Ensured by the OIM Ensured by the safety supervisor All personnel new to rig Ensure the JRA is communicated to all appropriate personnel Conduct mustering drills All personnel new to rig Rosetta stone & teacher

++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ + ++ ++ + + + + +

+ + + + + + + + +

+ + + + + + + + + + + ++ ++

Instructions not understood JRA Pre-tour meetings Drills Orientation upon arrival to rig Foreign language lessons Escape route compromised Emergency response team Alternate escape routes Alternate escape methods Emergency resopnse team trained to determine best escape route Have alternate muster area pre-determined Ropes, etc 100% escape vessel redundancy via life rafts & life boats

++ +

+ +

+ ++

++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++

Equipment Redundancy

4.11.6

Mitigation and Documentation

4.11.6.1 Reflecting the original Risk Assessment process and following the formal process of a Structured Hazard Identification and Control (SHIDAC) the relevance of any barrier in any specific scenario will be assessed and the task suitably identified as a Critical Task requiring the allocation of responsibility to ensure suitable completion. 4.11.6.2 In a similar manner where appropriate the opportunity is also provided to identify Critical Procedures and Critical Equipment. 4.11.6.3 Where a necessity for Remedial action is identified and documented the Action Party and Due date for completion is also formally recorded. Finally the provision is made for the simple identification of the state of ALARP being reached and also an requirement regarding additional documentation.

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4.11.6.4 The column heading categories allocated to the SIEP Bow Tie study format are as follows; Threats/Consequences Barriers/Recorded Measures Escalation Factor Escalation Controls Comments Barrier Description In Place and Being Used Reliability Human Factors Overall Update Date Update Comment Critical Task Identification Critical Task Action Party Critical procedures Critical Equipment Remedial Action Action Party Due Date ALARP RTC

4.12 4.12.1

BOW Tie Studies - Major Hazards and Events Supporting Studies

4.12.1.1 The documentation derived from the consultancy process is contained in a supporting document ARCTIC I HSE Case Supporting Studies. The document provides extensive detail regarding the consultative process. 4.12.1.2 The two initial Bow Tie studies were completed in depth and produced similar results in terms of the Escalation Barriers/ Recovery Measures and demonstrated the responsibilities upon the whole ARCTIC I organisation and supporting management team. 4.12.1.3 The results from the initial studies endorsed the criticality of individual activity and associated critical tasks which are identified within the scope of the GlobalSantaFe Management system. In this respect the Bow Tie identifies and reinforces the suitability of the Practices and procedures and levels of accountability set within the GlobalSantaFe management system. 4.12.1.4 studies. The details shown on the next page identify the similarity of the finding from the initial

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4.12.2

Hydrocarbons in Formation

4.12.2.1 Within the study to determine the availability and sustainability of controls required when engaged in operations relating to Hydrocarbons in formation the following positions were identified as being the action party for the specific critical task that forms the controlling barriers;

Hazard Threat - Escalation Barrier Critical Positions


The Operator Rig Manager OIM Drilling Superintendent Chief Engineer Toolpusher Driller Assistant Driller STC Supervisors Rig Crew Subsea Engineer Shell Shallow Hazards Team 3rd Party ET BCO Derrickman

Consequence Escalation Barrier Critical Positions


The Operator GSF Country Manager Rig Manager OIM Drilling Superintendent Chief Engineer Toolpusher Driller STC Supervisors Rig Crew Subsea Engineer Medic 3rd Party Stability Technician ABs

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4.12.2.2 Within the Bow Tie analysis process for Hydrocarbon in Formation, the analysis of the HAZARD identified the following with regard to overall effectiveness rating.
THREAT
Drilling into Shallow Gas

BARRIER
Well Plan Pre-spud / DWOP Meeting Seismic shallow survey Historical well data On sight ROV monitoring Back up fluid to pump into well Diverter Trip tank Mud Logger Pit Tank monitor Trip sheet fill up log Training Pipe rate movement Proper mud weight ECD Monitoring Well Plan LCM use Planned ROP Leak Off / F.I.T test PVT / Trip Tank Monitoring Pipe Tripping Speed Historical Information Following drilling procedures Leak off / F I T test Calibrate scales Weight up schedule Derrick-man / AD Monitoring mud system Weight material Degasser Monitoring of solids control equipment Well Plan Government Regulations PVT equipment BOPs Mud weight Schedule Sufficient Kill weight mud onboard Training PM Program Testing Drills Audits Redundant Equipment Equipment Design BOP Stack Kill Mud Diverter system Drill floor BOP Equipment Well control Training

EFFECTIVENESS RATING
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Shallow Gas blow out No 1

Improper fill Up/swab and surge

Loss of circulation

Drilling into Existing Well Insufficient Mud Weight

Drilling into HP Formation

Well control Equipment Failure

Uncontrolled flow of hydrocarbons (with BOP)

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4.12.2.3 Within the Bow Tie analysis process for Hydrocarbon in Formation the analysis of the CONSEQUENCES identified the following with regard to overall effectiveness rating.

CONSEQUENCE
Multiple Fatalities Medics Medical facilities Medivac Fire / Abandon Plan Secure Well Extensive damage to Rig Rig design Secure Well

BARRIER
Emergency Response & Damage control Team

EFFECTIVENESS RATING
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Emergency shut downs Fire Fighting Plan Fire Abandon / Plan Operations Manual & 4.1 Manual Technical Support Major Environmental Impact International reputation Damage to Emergency Spill Response Plan Secure Well (source of fuel) Media Consultant

4.12.3

Sea States and Weather

4.12.3.1 Within the study to determine the availability and sustainability of controls required when engaged in operations relating to Hydrocarbons in formation the following positions were identified as being the action party for the specific critical task that forms the controlling barriers;

Hazard Threat - Escalation Barrier Critical Positions


The Operator Rig Manager OIM Drilling Superintendent Ballast Control Operator STC Storekeeper Radio Operator

Consequence Escalation Barrier Critical Positions


The Operator Rig Manager OIM Drilling Superintendent Stability Technician Toolpusher Driller STC Subsea Engineer All Rig Crew ABs

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4.12.3.2 Within the Bow Tie analysis process for Sea States and Weather, the analysis of the HAZARD identified the following with regard to overall effectiveness rating.

THREAT
Exposure to excessive current Planning Forecasting Monitoring

BARRIER

EFFECTIVENESS RATING
+ + + + + + + + + + +

Adequate Hull structure Exposure to High Seas or swells Experience Operating manual procedures Monitoring Planning Squall Line Radar on Rig Radio Communications Monitoring

4.12.3.3 Within the Bow Tie analysis process for Sea States and Weather, the analysis of the CONSEQUENCES identified the following with regard to overall effectiveness rating.

CONSEQUENCE
Multiple Fatalities

BARRIER
Mustering of Non Essential Personnel Emergency response & damage Control Team Medics Medical facilities Supply / AHV Vessels assist in evacuation of Rig

EFFECTIVENESS RATING
+ + + + + + + + + + + +

Extensive damage to rig

Rig Design Disconnect Riser Mooring Line Management (slack off down side heel/trim) Operations manual & 4.1 Technical Support

Major Environmental Impact International reputation damage to

Emergency Spill Response Team Secure Well Media Consultant

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4.12.4

Dropped Object

4.12.4.1 Within the Bow Tie analysis process for Dropped Object the analysis of the HAZARD identified the following with regard to overall effectiveness rating.

THREAT
Mechanical Failure

BARRIER
Equipment Manufactured, Designed Tested certified for anticipated loads Operator Training / Competency Equipment Maintenance Equipment Inspection

EFFECTIVENESS RATING
+ + + + -+

Human Error

Training Competency / certification Adequate / Sufficient Communication while Conducting Lifting Operations

Weather Sea States Hugh Winds Written Procedures for Crane Activity (Boat / Host) Dynamic Positioning (DP) System Mooring + + +

4.12.4.2 Within the Bow Tie analysis process for Dropped Object the analysis of the CONSEQUENCES identified the following with regard to overall effectiveness rating.
CONSEQUENCE
Multiple Fatalities Medics Medical facilities Medivac Extensive damage to rig Rig Design Secure Well Emergency Shut Downs Fire Fighting Equipment Fire Abandon Plan Fire Abandon Drills Operations Manual Technical Support Major Environmental Impact International reputation damage to Emergency Spill Response Plan Secure Well Media Consultant

BARRIER
Emergency response & Damage Control Team

EFFECTIVENESS RATING
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

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4.12.5

Loss of Stability

4.12.5.1 Within the Bow Tie analysis process for Loss of Stability the analysis of the HAZARD identified the following with regard to overall effectiveness rating.

THREAT
Breach of Hull causing downflooding Radar Max environmental alongside Dropped Objects

BARRIER

EFFECTIVENESS RATING
+

conditions

for

supply

vessel

+ ++ + + + + + +

International Ship Security System Adequate Hull structure Periodic Inspection Loss of Watertight Integrity Watertight bulkheads Protected down flooding points Ballast control system Weather Wind Waves See Sea State & Weather bow tie Deck Surveys Loading Computer Lightship corrections Active weight management Subsea shallow Gas Release See Hydrocarbons in Formation)

+ + + +

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4.12.5.2 Within the Bow Tie analysis process for Loss of Stability the analysis of the CONSEQUENCES identified the following with regard to overall effectiveness rating.

CONSEQUENCE
Multiple Fatalities

BARRIER
Mustering of Non Essential Personnel Emergency response & damage Control Team Medics Medical facilities Supply / AHV Vessels assist in evacuation of Rig

EFFECTIVENESS RATING
+ + + + + + + + + + + +

Extensive damage to rig

Rig Design Disconnect Riser Mooring Line Management (slack off down side heel/trim) Operations manual & 4.1 Technical Support

Major Environmental Impact International reputation damage to

Emergency Spill Response Team Secure Well Media Consultant

4.13 4.13.1

Risk Acceptance Acceptance

4.13.1.1 A total of 19 Threats were analysed in the course of the 4 Bow Tie High Risk Hazard studies. These 19 threats identify 81 barriers. One barrier was identified as not meeting the overall effectiveness anticipated. 4.13.1.2 A total of 16 Consequences were identified with a total of 57 barriers to mitigate the risk of an event deteriorating. However due to the nature of some of the hazards the Consequences were identical in nature, i.e. the use of the Emergency Response processes involving the full breadth of the ARCTIC I emergency response resources. 4.13.1.3 The level of acceptance was identified as a minimum criteria of; + which is defined from the above table as; Hardware and Supervision in place and being used > 75% of the time Reliability estimated in operation greater than 95% of the time Human Factors tasks and Operating Procedures clearly defined and Operator experienced. Errors are conceivable but very unlikely.

4.13.1.4 One item of non compliance was established within the Dropped Object Bow Tie study. The Threat of Human Error to which a Barrier was determined as Training Competency and Certification was detailed as having a less than effective escalation control in terms of the process of Dispensation. The process of Dispensation was judged to be in place less than 25% of the time. 4.13.1.5 Mitigation for this has been identified as a written requirement from Shore Management.

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4.13.1.6 All other Barriers assessed were established as meeting the minimum criteria. 4.13.1.7 Clarification is being sought on one barrier for the prevention of an event escalation for loss of stability. As yet no information is provided on the radar based Automatic Identification System AIS. The barrier can be further defined when the information is available. As this system will assist in collision prevention it should be seen as providing enhanced control and not detracting from the current barriers in place.

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4.14 4.14.1

REFERENCES Documentation Iss 04 Jan 31st 2009 Iss 03 Jan 8th 2009 Transocean Company Management System Health and Safety Policy and Procedures Manual Performance Procedures Monitoring Audit and Assessment

HQS-CMS-GOV HQSHSEPP-01

HQS-CMSPR02 Iss 03 Dec 31st 2008 HQS-HSE-PR-01 HQS-HSE-PR-02 HQS-HSE-PP-02 HQS-HRM-PP-01 HQS-OPS-PR-01 HQS-OPS-PP-01 HQS-OPS-HB-03 HQS-OPS-HB 05 Iss 01 Oct 31st 2007 Iss 02 Oct 12th 2007 Iss 01 Sept 30th 2007 Iss 02 Mar 1st 2009 Iss 02 Nov 1st 2007 Iss 01 Nov 1st 2004 Iss 02 Nov 11th 2004 Iss 01 Nov 11th 2005

Emergency Management Procedures Manual Medical Protocols Manual Environmental Management System Human Resources Policies and Procedures Manual Maintenance Manual Operations Policies and Procedures Manual Certificate and Survey Manual Field Operations Manual

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 5 EMERGENCY RESPONSE

PART 5 Emergency Response

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 5 EMERGENCY RESPONSE

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 5. PAGE

ARCTIC 1 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ................................................................................. 4 5.1

5.2

5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.2.1 5.2.2 5.2.3 5.3.1 5.3.2 5.3.3

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 4

EMERGENCY RESPONSE MANAGEMENT ..................................................................................... 6

Purpose ................................................................................................................ 4 Document Update ................................................................................................ 4 Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... 5 Philosophy ............................................................................................................ 6 Emergency Response Analysis ............................................................................ 8 Emergency Response Plan ................................................................................. 10 Command during Emergencies .......................................................................... 11 Chain of Command ............................................................................................. 13 Essential Personnel List ..................................................................................... 13

5.3

COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION ......................................................................................... 11

5.4

5.5

5.4.1 5.4.2 5.4.3 5.4.4 5.4.5 5.4.6 5.4.7 5.4.8 5.4.9 5.4.10 5.4.11 5.4.12 5.4.13 5.4.14 5.4.15 5.4.16 5.4.17 5.4.18 5.4.19 5.4.20 5.5.1 5.5.2 5.5.3 5.5.4 5.5.5 5.5.6 5.5.7 5.5.8 5.5.9 5.5.10

ARCTIC I EMERGENCY TEAM ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES .......................................................... 15

TRAINING FOR EMERGENCIES .............................................................................................. 26

General ............................................................................................................... 15 OIM ..................................................................................................................... 15 Radio Operator ................................................................................................... 16 Drilling Emergency Response Team .................................................................. 16 Performance Toolpusher ................................................................................... 16 Emergency Response Coordinator .................................................................... 17 Fire Teams .......................................................................................................... 17 Environmental Spill/Incident Response Team ................................................. 17 Lifeboat/Life raft Commander........................................................................... 17 Lifeboat Coxswains ............................................................................................ 18 Muster Checkers/Controller .............................................................................. 18 Log Keeper ......................................................................................................... 18 Marine Supervisor .............................................................................................. 18 Medical Response Team Muster Checkers ........................................................ 18 Schematic - ARCTIC I Offshore/Onshore Emergency Response Interface..... 20 External Emergency Response Support ............................................................ 21 Area Emergency Support Organigram .............................................................. 22 Client Interface Arrangements .......................................................................... 23 External Support Services ................................................................................. 23 Communications ................................................................................................ 23 Emergency Response Training .......................................................................... 26 Drills and Exercises ............................................................................................ 26 Onshore Emergency Response Team ................................................................ 27 Offshore Personnel ............................................................................................ 27 Fire Training ....................................................................................................... 27 H2S ..................................................................................................................... 28 Well Control ....................................................................................................... 29 Man Overboard................................................................................................... 29 Abandon Rig ....................................................................................................... 30 Third Party Contractors ..................................................................................... 30

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5.6

5.5.11 HSE Inductions................................................................................................... 31 5.5.12 ARCTIC I Drill Matrix ......................................................................................... 32 5.6.1 5.6.2 5.6.3
TEMPORARY REFUGE ASSESSMENT ........................................................................................ 33

5.7

5.8

5.7.1 5.7.2 5.7.3 5.7.4 5.7.5 5.7.6 5.7.7 5.7.8 5.7.9 5.7.10 5.7.11 5.7.12 5.7.13 5.7.14 5.8.1 5.8.2 5.8.3 5.9.1 5.9.2 5.9.3 5.9.4

DETAILS OF EVACUATION AND ESCAPE EQUIPMENT.................................................................... 37

Temporary Refuge (TR) Concept and Design ................................................... 33 Impairment of the Temporary Refuge .............................................................. 35 Temporary Refuge Integrity Requirements ...................................................... 35

MEANS OF EVACUATION ..................................................................................................... 45

General ............................................................................................................... 37 Evacuation and Escape Systems........................................................................ 37 Escape Routes .................................................................................................... 37 Pontoon Escape Routes ..................................................................................... 38 Aft Columns ........................................................................................................ 38 Main Deck - Rooms ............................................................................................ 38 Drill Floor............................................................................................................ 39 Port Side Mezzanine Deck ................................................................................. 39 2nd Deck level .................................................................................................... 39 Accommodation Deck ........................................................................................ 39 Muster Points ..................................................................................................... 43 Personal Protective Equipment ......................................................................... 43 Life Jackets ........................................................................................................ 43 Lifebuoys ............................................................................................................ 44 Helicopter ........................................................................................................... 45 Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft............................................... 46 Liferafts .............................................................................................................. 47 Rescue Boat ....................................................................................................... 48 Escape Ladders .................................................................................................. 48 Personnel Transfer Baskets ............................................................................... 48 Knotted Ropes.................................................................................................... 49

5.9

ESCAPE TO SEA ............................................................................................................... 48

5.10 5.11 5.1

5.10.1 Means of Recovery to a Place of Safety ............................................................ 49 5.1.1

RECOVERY ..................................................................................................................... 49 DRAWINGS..................................................................................................................... 50 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 51

Documentation................................................................................................... 51

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 5 EMERGENCY RESPONSE

5. 5.1 5.1.1

ARCTIC 1 EMERGENCY RESPONSE Introduction Purpose

5.1.1.1 This section of the Safety Case identifies the Management system objectives to demonstrate that emergency response arrangements have been systematically assessed and that suitable plans are in place to respond to all unforeseeable emergency situations 5.1.1.2 The HSE Management objectives are organised by the following elements of Emergency Response 5.1.2 Emergency Response Management Command and Communication Training Drills for Emergencies Temporary Refuge Details Details of evacuation and escape equipment Means of recovery to a place of safety

Document Update

5.1.2.1 The text within this section of the case has been updated in the light of the change of ownership of the ARCTIC I and the integration of the unit into the Transocean Management system. In some areas it is necessary to describe the original systems in place and where appropriate reference regarding sections of the Corporate Management system is reference in terms of the current system as applied.

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5.1.3 Abbreviations 5.1.3.1 As identified with the text. Definition As Low as Reasonably Practical Breathing Apparatus Ballast Control Operator Blow Out Preventer Company Designated Person (ISM Authorised Person) Emergency Control Centre Emergency Position Indicator Beacon Emergency Response Coordinator Emergency Response Manual Emergency Response Plan Fire and Evacuation Assessment Fast Rescue Craft General Alarm Global Maritime Distress Safety System Hydrogen Sulphide Gas High Frequency Helicopter Landing Officer International Safety Management System Living Quarters Medium Frequency Man Over Board Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Non Essential Personnel Onshore Emergency Response (Guidelines) Onshore Emergency Response Centre Onshore Emergency Response Team Offshore Installation Manager Public Address System Prepare to Abandon Platform Alarm Persons On Board Search And Rescue radar Transponders Stand by Vessel Self Contained Breathing Apparatus Silicon Control Rectifier Shell International Exploration and Production (Company) Single Side Band Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft Temporary Refuge Ultra High Frequency United States Coastguard Very High Frequency

Abbreviation ALARP BA BCO BOP CDP ECC EPIRB ERC ERM ERP FEA FRC GA GMDSS H2S HF HLO ISM LQ MF MOB MODU NEPs OER OERC OERT OIM PA PAPA POB SART SBV SCBA SCR SIEP SSB TEMPSC TR UHF USCG VHF

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5.2 5.2.1

Emergency Response Management Philosophy

5.2.1.1 The fundamental principle of any form of emergency preparedness is to minimize the exposure of personnel to the risks associated with the occurrence of a sudden escalating threat to their personal safety or well being 5.2.1.2 Arrangements for handling emergencies are based upon hazard specific scenarios which have been formally documented to detail a process of reducing the risk to personnel to a suitable level of ALARP 5.2.1.3 As far as is reasonably practicable, everything should be done that can be done to prevent emergency situations from developing. However there is still a likelihood of incidents developing which place personnel at risk. Foreseeable credible events with the potential for severe consequences drive a requirement for planned responses to be developed with the objective of mitigating the consequences. 5.2.1.4 The Company policies and procedures to secure an effective emergency response for dealing with emergency situations are set out primarily in the Emergency Response Manual[HQS HSE PR 01]. However reference should also be made to; ARCTIC I Operations Manual ARCTIC I Emergency Response Manual Transocean Company Management System Manual [HQS CMS GOV] Transocean Corporate HSE Manual [HQS HSE PP 01] Transocean Environment Management System Manual [HQS HSE PP 02 EMS] Transocean Field Operations Manual [HQS OPS HB 05]

5.2.1.5 In support of providing an effective emergency response organisation onboard ARCTIC I, individual roles and responsibilities are outlined during the onboard induction process and practised during the weekly Emergency Drill training. 5.2.1.6 In the event of an emergency occurring, the Company will take every step necessary to resolve the incident, either in support of the clients response or independently. The emergency response capability of Transocean is verified and scrutinised via training exercises both in-house and in conjunction with client organisations. 5.2.1.7 It is the responsibility of the ARCTIC I OIM to ensure that all personnel are aware of, and comply with, the procedures documented in the ERM. In line with this requirement, every person new to the ARCTIC I undergoes an induction tour as part of the induction process which includes and explains where to find information regarding emergency response and emergency procedures. 5.2.1.8 All personnel are made aware of the importance of complying with the emergency procedures. As such, it is a requirement of all personnel that upon detection of a potential emergency situation and the raising of the alarm, normal operations shall cease immediately until operating conditions are returned to normal. 5.2.1.9 The key activities of Emergency Response are;

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Early Detection Immediate Response Effective Mustering POB Verification

5.2.1.10 The ERM provides the framework of the response criteria and is sufficiently flexible to enable the OIM to formulate his decisions on the basis of the information he receives about the incident. 5.2.1.11 In particular the ERM provides the method of expediting the decision process for maximising the options to ensure the timely evacuation of personnel. It is generally accepted that the prime method of evacuation will be by Helicopter but all options must be considered in the event the incident removes one of the chosen options. 5.2.1.12 In the event evacuation, is undertaken by the totally enclosed motor propelled survival craft (TEMPSC), it is fundamental to the limitation of risk exposure to ensure that recovery from the TEMPSC is only undertaken when the weather and sea conditions permit a safe recovery. 5.2.1.13 Essential to the successful execution of the ERM is the provision of suitable and sufficient arrangements for evacuation, means of escape and arrangements for recovery and rescue. The provisions made in this respect both on-board and beyond the ARCTIC I are described in section 5.8, 5.9,and 5.10 of this part, which details elements that reflect the strategy of risk exposure reduction. 5.2.1.14 The ERM provides the vehicle for communicating to all personnel on the ARCTIC I and personnel assisting in implementing the ERM, the role they are expected to play on an incidentspecific basis. 5.2.1.15 The ERM also provides the key in the interfacing of the Companys management system with those of SIEP as the client and Transoceans contractors in terms of defining what is required in the way of co-operation to emergency response. 5.2.1.16 Training in the ERM activities assists in personal familiarisation and promotes confidence in the Emergency Response organisation. The OIM and the others in the chain of command are given the authority and the training to ensure that, should the potential for a sudden state of danger exist, the minimization of the consequences to the personnel on the ARCTIC I is their first priority. 5.2.1.17 The Rig Manager is responsible for ensuring that the required arrangements are made with the appropriate persons beyond the ARCTIC I to enable the ERM to be executed in the event it is required. The formal mechanism for achieving this is through the use of the management system interfacing process that forms part of the pre-spud proceedings. An important aspect of the interfacing is to make certain, through the Operator, that the various third party contractors with roles to play in the ERM are fully aware of this role and able to provide the appropriate equipment and competent personnel to fulfil the requirements of the role.

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5.2.2

Emergency Response Analysis

5.2.2.1 Appropriate evacuation arrangements are essential to reducing personnel exposure to risk; the premise behind this approach being that the loss of any part of these arrangements would result in an increase in risk to personnel. Consequently, the rig evacuation arrangements are defined as follows: Escape routes from work stations to muster areas Primary and secondary muster areas Routes from muster areas to areas of temporary refuge Areas used for refuge temporarily Escape routes from muster or refuge areas to embarkation points Embarkation points Rig evacuation equipment.

5.2.2.2 A study for the identical sister rig, ARTIC III operating in the North West European area have established a set of performance standards for the above elements, and also the likelihood of the impairment of these arrangements. These standards were set in line with the GlobalSantaFe, as the original owner, management system requirements for managing risk. (Reference ARCTIC III Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Analysis Report No. L16822/NDE/MJW Rev0) 5.2.2.3 The Endurance capability has been set against the risk industry time model standard of risk per 10,000 years. The areas for consideration has been assessed in line with the Hazard Identification study undertaken through the ARCTIC I consultative process detailed in Part 4 of this case. For each Major hazard the impairment frequency of the following key safety contributors functions has been assessed Temporary Refuge Access Route Temporary Refuge Survivability (for design events only) Evacuation Facility 5.2.2.4 The study was completed for ARCTIC III but is equally valid for ARCTIC I being of an identical design and from the same construction yard. (Document Fire & Evacuation Analysis report L16822/NDE/MJW Rev 0) 5.2.2.5 The following table identifies an assessed annual impairment frequency for the loss of a safety function, and it can be clearly seen that the main contributor to the impairment of the escape route to the Temporary Refuge are Loss of Stability Structural Failure

5.2.2.6 It can be seen that the largest contributor to impairment to the Temporary Refuge is assessed as a helicopter crash, on the Helideck area which may cause impairment by direct impact and smoke. 5.2.2.7 In the event of a major accident event resulting in a potential capsize impairment of the Temporary Refuge is not considered as being invalid.

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5.2.2.8 Table showing assessed potential for impairment or reduction in availability of Temporary Refuge

IMPAIRMENT FREQUENCY (Impairment/10,000 yrs) MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARD TR ACCESS ROUTE % TR (Design Events Only) % EVACUATION FACILITY %

Blowout

Drill Floor Subsea Shallow Gas

0.0048 0.0019 0.0026 0 0 0.0092 0.00001 0.0421 0.0065 0.0034 0.0003 0.3940 0.0024 0.0672 0.1860 0.0002 0.0068 0.0101 0 0.0189 0.1680 0 0.925

0.52 % 0.21 % 0.28 % 0% 0% 0.99% 0.00 % 4.55 % 0.70 % 0.36 % 0.04 % 42.64 % 0.26 % 7.26 % 20.12 % 0.02 % 0.74 % 1.10 % 0% 2.05 % 18.16 % 0% 100 %

0.0007 0.0025 0.0101 0.0181 0.0009 0.0230 0.1820 0.2800 0.0095 0.0006 0.0001 0.0356 0.0004 0.0583 0.1090 0.00002 0.0107 0.0011 0.1680 0.1750 2.4600 0 3.54

0.02 % 0.07 % 0.28 % 0.51 % 0.02 % 0.65 % 5.14 % 7.91 % 0.27 % 0.02 % 0.00 % 1.00 % 0.01 % 1.65 % 3.09 % 0.00 % 0.30 % 0.03 % 4.74 % 4.95 % 69.33 % 0% 100 %

0.0030 0.0047 0.0065 0.00001 0.0034 0.0275 0.0055 5.5700 0.0005 0.0002 0.00002 0.5690 0.0030 0.0672 0.2120 0.0001 0.0077 0.0136 0 0.0222 0.3530 0.0307 6.90

0.04 % 0.07 % 0.09 % 0.00 % 0.05 % 0.40 % 0.07 % 80.72 % 0.01 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 8.26 % 0.04 % 0.97 % 3.07 % 0.00 % 0.11 % 0.20 % 0% 0.32 % 5.12 % 0.45 % 100 %

Fire/ Explosion Fire

Mud Pit Room Shale Shaker House Engine Room Quarters Helifuel

Toxic Release

Drill Floor Shale Shaker House Mud Pit Room

Loss of Stability Mooring Failure Loss of Tow Structural Failure Dropped Objects Major Mechcal Failure Ship Collision Helicopter Crash Extreme Weather Total Drawworks Crane Well Test Lifting

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5.2.3

Emergency Response Plan

5.2.3.1 The Emergency Response Manual is intended to be used as a guide providing quick reference to critical response procedures to offshore emergencies on the ARCTIC I. The Emergency Response Manual contains: Manning and organization including roles and responsibilities Command structure Contact information Emergency signals and drills Emergency events flowcharts and checklists (see below)

5.2.3.2 In addition, the manual contains detailed action plans for the initial alert and response to the following specific emergency scenarios: Operational Emergencies Fire/Explosion Person Overboard Collision Flooding & Damage Control Helicopter Crash on the Rig Helicopter Crash near the Rig Search and Rescue Evacuation/Abandon Ship Well Control H2S Emergency Move-off Location Moored Equipment/Structural Emergencies Ballast Emergency Structural Failure Machinery Damage/Breakdown Propulsion Failure/Grounding Medical Emergencies Minor/Major Injuries/Illness/Death Medical Evacuation Contagious Disease Security Emergencies Bomb Threat Criminal Activity Weather Emergencies Heavy Weather Pollution Emergencies Operational Spills Tank Overflow Hull Leakage Spill Response 5.2.3.3 The procedures are applicable during operations on location, while in transit and during nonoperational periods.

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5.2.3.4 Initiation of emergency response procedures can be generated through the relevant senior supervisor and authorised by the OIM or his deputy. However, all personnel have the authority to raise an alarm and initiate emergency response. 5.2.3.5 It is mandatory that the OIM and department heads are familiar with this manual and ensure that responses to emergencies are drilled, practised, and planned for by their work groups. Where applicable, this must include client personnel. 5.2.3.6 All emergency response procedures are under constant review based on the experience and operational and technological change. Ideas for improvement of the emergency response procedures onboard ARCTIC I are generated continually as a result of the safety/environmental meetings, weekly drills, audit programme, in- house training and additionally as a result of external safety briefs, trade publications and training courses. 5.2.3.7 Any modifications to the manual identified by offshore personnel are communicated to the onshore Rig Manager via the OIM. The Manager for the Brazil region is required to approve the ARCTIC I Emergency Response Manual and any changes to that manual [HQS HSE PR 01 Sec 2 2 8.3] 5.3 5.3.1 Command and Communication Command during Emergencies

5.3.1.1 Effective handling of emergency situations on-board the ARCTIC I depend on three main areas of responsibility: OIM, - as person in command he provides the overall direction and leadership to the response, using his experience to deploy his resources , who comprise; Personnel with emergency duties including all regular personnel on duty at the time of the emergency, as well as some off-duty personnel Other persons not specified including off-duty regular personnel (unless given on-call emergency duties), visitors, casual contractors and all others without a specified emergency role.

5.3.1.2 All persons on-board the ARCTIC I are required to familiarise themselves with their emergency stations and duties assigned to them. This information is available from the ARCTIC I Station Bill, conspicuously displayed throughout the rig. 5.3.1.3 Tasks for persons to perform are practised regularly so that in the event of an emergency these basic duties are carried out quickly and efficiently to avoid any delay in reacting to the emergency 5.3.1.4 In an emergency situation, the Navigation deck, specifically the Pilot house area, becomes the emergency control centre (ECC). The OIM proceeds to, and takes overall charge of the incident from the ECC. 5.3.1.5 The following rule apply on the General Alarm being sounded; All work will stop Equipment to be secured Work sites to be made as safe as reasonably practicable No smoking or naked lights anywhere
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All personnel to report to designate muster points, unless otherwise directed by PA announcements.

5.3.1.6 The alarm status is indicated by an audible alarm throughout the ARCTIC I supplemented with flashing lights in high noise level areas. The alarm state may also be announced through use of the Public Address (PA) system. The various alarm signals are shown on the Station Bill. The location and description of the alarm and communication systems provided on the ARCTIC are detailed in Part 3, Section 3.13 Communications. 5.3.1.7 All attending vessels and those in the proximity will be advised of the occurrence and requested to relocate to a suitable position if they are on location. A suitable holding area would be upwind of the ARCTIC I. 5.3.1.8 Onboard ARCTIC I, the initial response of personnel to the GA alarm will be dependant upon the individuals role onboard; Personnel with duties assigned execute the duties required to secure the rig and muster at the appropriate location. Remaining personnel report to the primary muster stations or as redirected by the OIM to secondary locations, depending on the level of impairment, if any, of the primary areas. 5.3.1.9 The OIM will require the Radio Operator to notify the shore base in order that the Onshore Emergency Response Team is mobilised. When the situation merits the mustering of personnel onboard the ARCTIC I additional shore authorities and organisations should be informed as required. 5.3.1.10 The OIM will execute each stage of the emergency procedure as the situation develops but he will have to take into account external factors that will influence his decision such as; Weather conditions Proximity of other platforms and installations Helicopter availability Proximity of shipping

5.3.1.11 Power isolation is a critical aspect to be addressed onboard the ARCTIC I and the OIM will instruct the maintenance personnel to isolate all necessary systems that are not required in controlling the situation. It may be necessary to shut down the main engines and revert to the emergency generator. 5.3.1.12 The combination of these external factors, in addition to the development of the situation on the rig will affect the OIM's decision-making in terms of accelerating the process forward to the point in the emergency procedure where evacuation is instigated. 5.3.1.13 The role of third party personnel is made clear through the management system interfacing process but, in addition to this, those personnel with specific roles to play in executing a particular procedure are given instruction on their duties on the sounding of the GA. In the majority of cases, third party personnel will have equipment that has to be made safe by isolation. Compliance with these duties will be tested by drills and exercises and it is the responsibility of the OIM to verify that third party contractors comply to these requirements. 5.3.1.14 The OIM will determine the suitability for initiating either a precautionary or full evacuation and will at all times endeavour to ensure a suitable time frame for this activity is maintained within the activity of dealing with the incident.

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5.3.2

Chain of Command

5.3.2.1 In an emergency situation should the OIM be incapacitated the Performance Toolpusher is identified as the second in command and will assume the OIMs role to take charge of the situation. 5.3.3 Essential Personnel List

5.3.3.1 Onboard the ARCTIC I all Transocean permanently appointed persons have specific roles within the Emergency Response organisation. During a muster it will be important that all designated personnel report to their appointed muster location to commence their emergency role at the earliest possibility. 5.3.3.2 Service Hands and Visitors have no appointed duties and therefore they will report to their Lifeboat/Life raft Muster station immediately on hearing the alarm. In some specialist circumstances it may be that some service hands will be operating equipment that is fundamental to the well operation and they will identified as having specific roles at the time of their induction. In this case these persons will be formerly identified by the Muster personnel as having special emergency roles. 5.3.3.3 The list of essential personnel as identified on the Station Bill is not mandatory and may be affected by the nature of the ongoing operation. 5.3.3.4 The Station Bill identifies the following personnel as essential personnel with specific duties; see following page

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Position
OIM Drill Superintendent Tool Pusher - On Tour Tool Pusher - Off Tour Day Company Man Night Company Man Stability Technician BCO - On Tour BCO - Off Tour AB Seamen On Tour AB Seamen Off Tour Medic Radio Operator STC Store Keeper Sub Sea Engineer Driller On Tour Driller Off Tour Assistant Driller - On Tour Assistant Driller - Off Tour Derrickman - On Tour Derrickman Off Tour Roughneck On Tour Roughneck Off Tour Crane Operator On Tour Crane Operator Off Tour Assistant Crane Operator On Tour Assistant Crane Operator Off Tour Roustabouts On Tour Roustabout Off Tour Chief Engineer Assistant Engineer Motorman Electrician Electronic Technician Mechanic Welder Chief Steward Day Cook Night Cook Utilities Service Hands Visitors

Emergency Duty
Reports to ECC In Charge Drill Floor Secure Well Drill Floor Secure Well Drilling Office BOP Controls Drill Floor Secure Well Drilling Office BOP Controls At Scene On Scene Commander Emergency Response Co-ordinator Ballast Control Room ECC Liase with Muster Checkers Advise OIM on status of POB Checks Fire Team 1 Fire Team 2 Hospital I/C Medical Response Team ECC Notifies Shore Base Coordinates with ECC Fire Team 1 Muster Point Take Muster Drill Floor BOP Panel Drill Floor Secure Well Muster Point Take Muster Drill Floor Secure Well Hospital Medical Response Team Drill Floor Secure Well Hospital Medical Response Team Drill Floor Secure Well Hospital Medical Response Team Team Leader Fire Team 1 Team Leader Fire Team 2 Fire Team 1 Fire Team 2 Fire Team 1 Fire Team 2 SCR Rm Plant Status isolations Power ventilation Advise ECC Muster SCR Personnel SCR Rm As directed SCR Rm As Directed SCR Rm As Directed SCR Rm As Directed SCR Rm As Directed Shut down all Hot Work Secure Equipment Report to Muster Clear Accommodation Report to ECC Report to Muster Secure Galley Report to Muster Secure Galley Report to Muster Clear Quarters report to Chief Steward Report to Muster Point Report to Muster Point

Team
ECC Drill Floor Drill Floor Drill Office Drill Floor Drill Office Tm OSC BCR ECC F Tm 1 F Tm 2 Medical Team ECC F Tm 1 Muster Checker Drill Floor Drill Floor Muster Checker Drill Floor Medical Team Drill Floor Medical Team Drill Floor Medical Team F Tm 1 F Tm 2 F Tm 1 F Tm 2 F Tm 1 F Tm 2 SCR SCR SCR SCR SCR SCR Muster Accommodation Galley Galley Accommodation Muster Muster

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5.3.3.5 It should be noted the above table provides an outline of the standard Emergency muster requirements onboard ARCTIC I. In some case additional permanent staff may be allocated to back up existing teams, i.e. in the event of additional Stability Technician being onboard they may be located to the ECC or to the BCR. 5.4 5.4.1 ARCTIC I Emergency Team Roles & Responsibilities General

5.4.1.1 The table in the previous section outlines the duties as per the existing ARCTIC 1 Station bill. The key roles and responsibilities are documented below. It should be noted that although security of the well may be a prime concern, the ongoing emergency may not in fact be well related but an external incident requiring a more extensive ECC team in which case the OIM will use his discretion to ensure he has the appropriate specialists to advise him in the ECC. 5.4.1.2 The responsibilities of the key Emergency Response groups on ARCTIC I are provided below. 5.4.2 OIM

5.4.2.1 The OIM is; Appointed by Transocean to be in overall charge of the ARCTIC I (PIC) and has total responsibility and accountability for the safety and welfare of all personnel onboard will ensure companys policies and procedures are followed at all times. Secondary responsibility for the safety and protection of the rig and the surrounding environment. Supported in Emergency duties by team of specialist supervisors - responsible and accountable for the technical safety of operations on and around the rig. These supervisors are accountable to the OIM for the execution of their emergency response duties Designated with responsibility to decide when it is prudent to prepare for and evacuate the rig either partially or totally All emergency response duties have been assigned Station bill is current and displayed All new arrivals aware of their emergency roles All personnel know their emergency roles and responsibilities Personnel received appropriate training and instruction to undertake their roles. Emergency Coordinator Onshore is advised when emergency has occurred Third party support and any communications with external agencies is requested

5.4.2.2 The OIM is responsible to ensure;

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5.4.3

Radio Operator

5.4.3.1 The Radio Operator is Trained in the use of Marine communication systems Appointed to operate ARCTIC Is external radio & telephone system Located in the ARCTIC Is communication centre - Radio Room and reports to the OIM Responsible to send any distress message when detailed by the OIM Responsible for testing and ensuring all emergency radio equipment remains operable To ensure he remains conversant with international & coastal state emergency communications procedures for the ARCTIC Is current location

5.4.3.2 The Radio Operators emergency response role is initiating, receiving, & dispatching all external communications with the companys Emergency Response Coordinator onshore, and all surface and airborne units and third party agencies 5.4.3.3 The Radio operator will maintain the log of events. 5.4.4 Drilling Emergency Response Team

5.4.4.1 The team is formed by the On Tour Drill crew who will be located on the Drill floor when drilling operations are in progress. 5.4.4.2 The team is led by the duty Driller who reports to and is accountable to the Drilling supervisor for the actions and safety of his personnel. The duty driller must be conversant with the drilling Emergency response plan and its completion in line with established procedures 5.4.4.3 The Duty driller is responsible for ensuring his Drill crew know their emergency roles and are suitably trained to execute them. 5.4.5 Performance Toolpusher

5.4.5.1 The Performance Toolpusher is the appointed drilling specialist onboard the ARCTIC I and is responsible and accountable for; Advising the OIM of all Drilling related emergency situations Safety of all drilling personnel including Company, Contractor, Specialist & vendors Safety of the Drilling Emergency Response Team Safe execution of all drilling activities Performance of all activities in accordance with company procedures Ensuring all drilling personnel are aware of their emergency response roles & adequately trained & drilled in their roles and responsibilities

5.4.5.2 The Performance Toolpushers emergency response station is the Drill floor. 5.4.5.3 The role is to co-ordinate the activities of the Drilling Team and assist and inform the OIM.

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5.4.6

Emergency Response Coordinator

5.4.6.1 As the On Scene Commander, the Barge Supervisor fulfilling this position will be responsible for; Safety of Emergency Response and Medical Teams Coordination of the Emergency and Medical response Teams to any emergency on the ARCTIC I Ensuring that Team Members are aware of their roles and are adequately trained & exercised in their roles & responsibilities At a secondary level ensuring the integrity of the evacuation and escape routes until evacuation has been completed Advising the OIM of all progress in dealing with the emergency or when it can no longer be maintained.

5.4.6.2 The Emergency Response Coordinators station will be at the scene of the incident and he will report to the OIM. The ERC must be conversant with the Company Emergency response Procedures, the ARCTIC I ERP, the onboard equipment, should be trained and conversant with current response techniques. 5.4.7 Fire Teams

5.4.7.1 The team is appointed by the OIM and leader will be conversant with and responsible to the ERC for performing the actions with his team. The Crane Operators as Team Leaders will be responsible for the safety of their team. The leader will also be required to inform the ERC for the progress of the activities designated to the team and whether the situation is remaining in a controlled state. 5.4.7.2 The teams duties will include the wide range of incident control techniques that may be required onboard the ARCTIC I in order to preserve the safety of all persons onboard. 5.4.7.3 The Crane Operators as Team Leaders are responsible for ensuring all his team are aware of their emergency response roles & adequately trained & drilled in their roles and responsibilities and the use of the equipment to which they have access. 5.4.8 Environmental Spill/Incident Response Team

5.4.8.1 As the prime response teams, the Fire Teams will undertake this activity. The OIM is responsible for ensuring all members of the ARCTIC Is Oil Spill response team have had suitable Hazcom training to undertake the necessary environmental cleanup activities associated with a spill of a hazardous substance onboard the unit. 5.4.8.2 The personnel within the team will be suitably trained to recognise the materials spilt, the method of clean up and the use of the appropriate PPE to undertake the activity. Disposal, and storage of the material and the contaminated material must also be understood by the team to ensure their activity is undertaken with minimal risk of exposure to themselves or personnel onboard the ARCTIC I. 5.4.9 Lifeboat/Life raft Commander

5.4.9.1 The Barge Supervisor is designated as in charge of the Lifeboats of Life rafts in an evacuation situation. The Barge Supervisor will be supported by the Chief Engineer as his deputy. In the event the Barge Supervisor is incapacitated the Chief Engineer must be prepared to take over the command
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of the evacuation process at the boats. 5.4.9.2 The person in charge of the Lifeboats/Lifer rafts is responsible for the safety of all persons onboard the boat in their charge and he will confirm with the Muster Checker that the correct persons are located at his boat. 5.4.9.3 The boats will not be launched until the person in charge has a direct order from the OIM or his nominated deputy. 5.4.10 Lifeboat Coxswains

5.4.10.1 The Ballast Control Operators are designated as Lifeboat Coxswains. These persons are trained competent lifeboat handlers, and are responsible to the OIM for ensuring the boats are available at all times. 5.4.10.2 As members of the marine department the BCOs and their department have the responsibility for the maintenance of the boats and ensuring they are available to be launched at all times. 5.4.11 Muster Checkers/Controller

5.4.11.1 The Muster Checkers undertake the POB check at the Muster Point and Emergency Station to quickly identify that all personnel are accounted for or if possible identify the last known location of any missing personnel form their work colleagues. The Muster Checkers report to ECC and the OIM will identify actual POB status against the expected status to identify any missing persons 5.4.12 Log Keeper

5.4.12.1 The Log keeper is appointed by the OIM to record the significant activities during any emergency incident on the status boards provided in the ECC. The Log keeper ensures all personnel are kept updated on those ongoing activities. The Off duty BCO will assist the Radio Operator undertake the log duties. 5.4.13 Marine Supervisor

5.4.13.1 The ARCTIC I OIM is also the Senior Marine person onboard and is therefore accountable for the safe execution of all marine activities which includes; 5.4.14 Ballasting Anchoring Stability Supply vessel operations ARCTIC I General Seaworthiness Maintenance of all evacuation, escape, rescue and abandonment equipment in a suitable state of availability

Medical Response Team Muster Checkers

5.4.14.1 The team is led by the ARCTIC I Medic and appointed by the OIM and comprises first aid qualified personnel and personnel designated for stretcher carrying.

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5.4.14.2 The Team will report to the Emergency Response Coordinator, who designates the emergency duties to them and will organise a suitable guide in the vent the team are unfamiliar with a part of the rig space to which they have been directed. 5.4.14.3 The Medic as Team Leader will communicate to the ERC regarding the status of any casualties and his progress with attending to multiple casualties, and if additional support is required. The Medic is ultimately responsible to the OIM for the execution of his duties. 5.4.14.4 The medic is responsible for ensuring the competency of his team and may enhance their basic first aid training with additional onboard training. The Medic is responsible for the maintaining of a suitable level of first aid competency in his team. 5.4.14.5 The Stretcher party are also required to have a basic level of first aid skills and be familiar with the rig layout.

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5.4.15

Schematic - ARCTIC I Offshore/Onshore Emergency Response Interface

BOP Panel SSE

Drill Floor Team Drill Supt I/C

Tool Pusher - Off Tour Drill Office - BOP Controls Technical Support Next of Kin Governement Agency

Rigs / Platforms

SCR Room Chief Engieer I/C E.C.C


Aircraft Radio OP Logistics

OIM
BCO

Radio -Satcom Link Ballast Control Rm - B C O

ONSHORE Emergency Control Centre

Onshore Emergency Team Coordinator

Onshore Emergency Team

Media

Support vessels

ON SCENE Stability Tech - I/C Hospital Medic Medical Party


Operations Medical Spill Resonse Team

Medical Support

Fire Team 1 Aft Muster Point Crane Op

Chief Steward Accommodation Utilities Accommodation Fire Team 2 Ford Muster Point Crane OP ONSHORE SUPPORT ORGANISATION Galley Day - Night Chef

ARCTIC 1 Rig Based Communications and Support Teams

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5.4.16

External Emergency Response Support

5.4.16.1 Transocean have established an Emergency Support structure at both Area and Corporate level whose function is to co-ordinate essential back-up services in the event of an Emergency on the ARCTIC I. As far as practicable, the plan is that any serious situation that arises on-board the ARCTIC I will be dealt with by the Branch Emergency Response Team that is headed by a Team Leader with Operational Experience.[HQS HSE PR 01 Sec 2 3]. The extent to which outside organisations become involved is determined by the extent and seriousness of the situation. 5.4.16.2 Emphasis is placed on trying to relieve the OIM and Radio Operator on the ARCTIC I of as many duties as possible in order to leave them free to concentrate on dealing with the emergency. In any event if the seriousness of the situation warrants a request for immediate assistance from the OIM that request should be initiated irrespective of the status of the onshore Response Team. 5.4.16.3 The flow of communication will be initially from the OIM to the Rig Manager (the 'Primary Contact') who will contact the designated onshore manager. The onshore Team will be mobilised upon the decision of the duty manager. The Rig Manager should proceeds directly to the Onshore Emergency Response Centre, and will establish communication links with the Operator's office, where appropriate, coastal state marine authorities, and any central or local government agency 5.4.16.4 In the event of a developing situation, the shore base will make as many contacts and callouts as deemed appropriate. In the event of a muster being called onboard the ARCTIC I, the OIM will notify the authorities as indicated within the Rig Location Emergency Response list. 5.4.16.5 The onshore Team will respond to a call-out in accordance with the instructions given in the management system which are intended to ensure that vital time is not wasted, onshore or offshore, in obtaining the necessary assistance. These guidelines are intended as a checklist to ensure that vital duties are accomplished even though they may duplicate the Operator's responsibility. Where action to be taken appears in this manual that is also the responsibility of the operating company, inclusion in the manual does not absolve the Operators from any responsibility on their part. 5.4.16.6 Guidelines as to the prime responsibilities of key onshore personnel are summarized below. The actual responsibilities in any particular case will be governed by its needs, and through action taken by others. 5.4.16.7 Typically the onshore team will consist of consists of the following members: Team Leader (with Operational Experience) ERC Co-ordinator Rig Liaison External Liaison Personnel Co-ordinator Media Representative.

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5.4.17

Area Emergency Support Organigram

5.4.17.1 The schematic below reflects the area support organigram which is fully supported through the area Emergency support plan as documented in the Area Support Plan Supplement for Brazil issued July 1st 2007.

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5.4.18

Client Interface Arrangements

5.4.18.1 The pre-operational requirements identified the criticality for establishing an emergency response support philosophy and the documentation of a suitable bridging document between Transocean and SIEP. An SIEP Emergency response bridging document is provided to identify the necessary interfaces for support in the event of an incident onboard the ARCTIC I 5.4.19 External Support Services

5.4.19.1 In the Brazil operating area the Corporate Onshore Response Organisation will be able to supplement their requirement with local Specialist medical support established through the area office and client emergency support structure. 5.4.19.2 As has been identified the ARCTIC I OIM has the authority to contact any required services in the event of an emergency being declared, however in the need to relieve the OIM of as many duties as possible and provide more decision time to be directed at the immediate emergency the requirement for external support will be directed through the initial onshore contact at the area support base, and hence will be through the Rig Manager or his nominated deputy in the area onshore support team. 5.4.19.3 In the event of medical support being required, a rota of Duty Doctors to provide a 24 hours medical back-up service onshore is established. The Duty Doctor must be informed of any emergency offshore involving injury or illness, and in an emergency this contact will normally be made by the Rig Manager onshore. In very urgent cases the ARCTIC I Medic might contact the doctor direct on the OIMs authorisation. 5.4.19.4 Dedicated call numbers have been provided through International Health Care together with a Medical Emergency Response Plan. 5.4.19.5 Details of the injury, and any treatment given should be provided. If it is decided that a doctor is required on the installation, the OIM along with the clients representatives will be responsible for making the necessary arrangements as soon as the decision is made. 5.4.19.6 In the event a Hospital evacuation is required it would be routine for the closest hospital to be used for evacuation of casualties. However the onshore support organisation will liaise the hospital evacuation process to ensure the casualtys progress to treatment is expedited. 5.4.20 Communications

5.4.20.1 Communication is a vital part of the infrastructure upon which ARCTIC I will create its emergency response arrangements. All communication systems are required to be as robust as possible. Emergency alarms and signals are described in the ARCTIC Is Station Bill. 5.4.20.2 The alarm signals onboard the ARCTIC I are detailed for all personnel to view on the Station Bill as follows;

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5.4.20.3 ARCTIC I Emergency Alarm Status & Activities


Emergency Status Alarm
All Hot work to stop immediately

ACTIONS
All persons to cease all activities and make job sites safe. All Smoking to stop immediately Emergency Teams to Muster and then proceed as directed by On scene Commander All persons with designated duties to proceed to their Emergency stations All other persons to immediately don Lifejackets & report to their assigned lifeboat muster area and await announcements All persons to don Lifejackets & proceed directly to their assigned lifeboat muster area and report to the Checker In Event that assigned Lifeboat is unavailable persons will directed to alternate muster station new muster held & Coxswain will direct Liferaft embarkation Lifeboat Coxswain will direct persons in boarding & launching the survival craft All persons will immediately cease their normal duties, don SCBAs and proceed to their H2S assembly point When working in areas of known H2S, all persons will report to their H2S(Toxic Gas) Muster station as detailed in the H2S Contingency poster Persons hearing the Hail to locate the hailer throw nearest life ring to the man overboard - and on-pass location of man to control room

Fire and Emergency


(Including combustible Gas)

Intermittent / short sounding of the General Alarm for a period of at least 10 seconds with RED Flashing light or rotating beacon in high noise areas followed by PA Announcement

Prepare to Abandon Abandon Rig Hydrogen Sulphide Gas

Continuous sounding of the general alarm for a period of at least 10 seconds with RED Flashing light or rotating beacon in high noise areas followed by PA Announcement Direct instructions from Offshore Installation Manager All Gas alarms are indicated by White Strobe light supplemented with PA Announcement

Man Overboard

Hail and Pass the word Man Overboard to the control Room

Bridge/Control room to deploy nearest smoke float sound emergency signal and contact any support vessel OIM to direct operations Rigs MOB boat only to be deployed at OIMs direction

Secure from Emergency Stations

Three short soundings of the general alarm supplemented with a PA Announcement

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5.4.20.4 During the emergency all communications are controlled and this is normally achieved by routing communications through a central control point. 5.4.20.5 Internal communications should flow to and from the emergency control centre (ECC) - all other communications are secondary to these and are kept to a minimum. All external communications are approved by the ECC and where possible direct line communications with the onshore emergency response centre will be established and maintained throughout the emergency. 5.4.20.6 When the alarm sounds on the ARCTIC I, all telephone communication, except that directly associated with the emergency, are requires to stop immediately. 5.4.20.7 Communications between the ARCTIC I and shore base or other platforms and vessels will be co-ordinated by the Radio Operator under instruction from the OIM. Due to the nature of the operation the rig will be equipped with an extensive direct, satellite base voice communications to the shore base. These will form the first line of external communication in any emergency. 5.4.20.8 In addition to the private satellite based communication links the following commercial systems will be available; HF/MF SSB radio VHF radio Satellite radio/facsimile (InMarsat B) Aeronautical radio Hand-held VHF and UHF radios and hand-held aeronautical radios

5.4.20.9 ARCTIC I Telephones/PA System - Information relating to any emergency situation must immediately be communicated to the rigs ECC. During the course of the emergency, emergency announcements will be made over the ARCTIC Is public address (PA) system. 5.4.20.10 Radio Communications - Radio communications during distress and emergency situations are to be in accordance with GMDSS protocol. 5.4.20.11 ARCTIC I to Shipping - Communications between the rig and shipping in the area will be conducted by radio telephone. During an emergency, communication will be conducted on the international distress and calling frequencies. 5.4.20.12 ARCTIC I to Shore Services - Communication to shore may be conducted via InMarsat satellite link, KU-band V-sat telephone link, or by any other established links international marine channels. Satellite facsimile links are often fitted giving direct dial telephone communications. 5.4.20.13 Air to ARCTIC I - Communications will be on VHF with the ARCTIC I on the assigned helicopter operator frequency or on a marine VHF frequency. 5.4.20.14 Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon - An emergency position indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) is located on the forward handrail above the Pilot House. When activated, by contact with seawater or if required by hand, the beacon will transmit an emergency distress signal picked up by satellite and re-transmitted to a shore base rescue centre. The EPIRB on the ARCTIC I is mounted above the Pilot House. In a structural failure type incident the EPIRB container is designed to float free once water borne.

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5.5 5.5.1

Training for Emergencies Emergency Response Training

5.5.1.1 Emergency Response Training is undertaken in accordance with the Company Policy contained in the HSE Manual HQS HSE PP 01 Section 4 3.2 and within the context of the ARCTIC I Training Matrix. The training is required to enable personnel to fulfil a specific role as part of an emergency response team and is provided through a combination of external and internal training resources to industry standards. 5.5.1.2 Standards of Training have been developed to enable those with specific duties in an emergency situation to be able to perform those duties to the standards expected. [HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 1.3 4.1] 5.5.1.3 Regular practice of emergency drills is a major feature of emergency preparedness and the weekly practice drills provide a practicable test the local arrangements in place to respond to an emergency situation. 5.5.1.4 The emergency training, drills and exercise needs of personnel are identified from one of three main sources: Legislation, Approved Codes of Practice and Guidance Notes Contracts and Industry Standards Transocean management system requirements

for each of the above, the need is identified as it relates to: 5.5.2 Emergency response of the ARCTIC I as a whole Type of emergency duties to be performed Safety of the individual.

Drills and Exercises

5.5.2.1 Emergency Response drills and exercises are conducted to test all elements of the ARCTIC I Emergency Response plans and procedures. The scenarios of these drills and exercises are varied to encompass different aspects of the responses required for that particular emergency. As a routine, the following support functions, where appropriate, are practiced as part of each exercise: Mustering and evacuation Starting and operating of lifeboat engines Performing first aid Fire fighting Well Control Gas Release Rescuing man overboard Using breathing apparatus Coordinating with standby and emergency service vessels Using emergency equipment (ring buoys, exposure suits, life jackets, life boats, life rafts, etc) Handling casualties Entering enclosed space Flares and other emergency signals Fixed and portable fire extinguishing systems EPIRB and other emergency communication equipment
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5.5.3

Onshore Emergency Response Team

5.5.3.1 The training requirements of the Onshore Emergency Response Team (OERT) are in accordance with the Company requirements. The onshore arrangements in their entirety are exercised regularly and elements of those arrangements are tested at frequencies greater than that used for the total onshore Emergency Response Team in order to maintain these elements at the level of performance required by the management system. 5.5.4 Offshore Personnel

5.5.4.1 The emergency response training requirements for rig personnel are divided into three basic levels.
Personnel with no Emergency Duties Personnel assigned to Emergency Response Team Personnel assigned to Command Response Team
Require a minimum level of training to enable them to cope with the demands of such responsibility. Rig Manager responsible for identifying the training requirements of the members of the ARCTIC I's chain of command. The training will accordance with requirements of management system be in the the

Training Requirements

Conforms to minimum standard set by the management for personnel working offshore. This is obtained through recognised onshore training facilities.

In addition to basic level, personnel given such training as may be required to equip them for the role they have to play. Achieved using a combination of onshore and rig-specific training. Rig Manager responsible for ensuring that training levels are maintained in accordance with the training matrix.

5.5.4.2 Exercises or drills are a vital aspect of testing the emergency response arrangements and ensuring the continuing competency of all personnel. Drills are designed to be as realistic as possible and will be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the management system. 5.5.4.3 Records are kept of all exercises performed. After reviewing the performance of the arrangements on the ARCTIC I, the OIM is required to submit a Drill Scenario and Critique Sheet for evaluation by the Rig Manager. 5.5.5 Fire Training

5.5.5.1 Transocean recognise there are limitations within the scope of shore-based fire training for personnel to be provided with rig specific training. However the shore base scenario can provide the suitable basis for developing the necessary skills associated with the control of fire and heat, and operating under dense smoke conditions. In support of the shore training regular fire training exercises are held onboard the ARCTIC I to ensure the fire teams continue to develop their skills in the context of the unit and the operation in which it is involved. All drill are recorded and debrief is undertaken upon the completion of each exercise. 5.5.5.2 The onshore training is supported onboard ARCTIC 1 with suitable onboard training to ensure that fire teams become in the fire control operation. A collection of emergency drill scenarios has been developed in line with this training. For each area or compartment, a scenario, based on the most likely source of fire, is outlined utilizing layouts of the compartment surrounding areas. Hazards such as pressure vessels, fuel tanks etc and the locations of the fire-fighting equipment in the vicinity are
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highlighted on the layouts associated with each space, or available plan. The OIM in conjunction with the ERT uses the fire drill scenarios to plan and execute the emergency drills. 5.5.5.3 Fire drills are held weekly and a scenario is chosen to exercise the ERT and fire teams in dealing with that particular scenario. The fact that a particular fire team has practised dealing with that specific scenario is logged and the next drill, involving that fire team, may be based on a different scenario in order that each team has undertaken exercises relating to, and is capable of, dealing with fires anywhere on the rig. 5.5.5.4 Scenarios are updated as required and new scenarios developed for previously unidentified or new hazard potentials. 5.5.5.5 Helideck crews receive shore- and rig-based training in the use of Helideck fire-fighting and emergency equipment and they are drilled on Helideck fire-fighting and rescue techniques as part of the fire scenario training. 5.5.5.6 A debrief is carried out after each drill where members of the fire teams discuss the drill and identify areas for improvement. All personnel are encouraged to express their points of view during the debriefing process. A critique of the drill is then recorded. 5.5.6 H2S

5.5.6.1 Drills for practising response in connection with an H2S related incident are based on the appropriate emergency procedures. 5.5.6.2 Although H2S equipment and procedures are in place as part of the ARCTIC I's fixed hardware and software systems, prior to drilling a known or possible H2S bearing formation, additional equipment is shipped out to the ARCTIC I. Refresher training is provided for the rig personnel by an independent competent third party company that specialises in the management of H2S equipment. This additional equipment can vary in sophistication but consists of the following minimum elements: 5.5.6.3 It is recognised that there are limitations within the scope of shore-based fire training for personnel to be provided with rig specific training. However the shore base scenario can provide the suitable basis for developing the necessary skills associated with the control of fire and heat, and operating under dense smoke conditions. In support of the shore training regular fire training exercises are held onboard the ARCTIC I to ensure the fire teams continue to develop their skills in the context of the unit and the operation in which it is involved. All drill are recorded and debrief is undertaken upon the completion of each exercise. 5.5.6.4 As required according to their duties, personnel making up the ERT will be given training in the use of the working sets and hard line systems. Escape sets are placed in working areas throughout the ARCTIC I and all personnel receive training and instruction in the use of these sets. 5.5.6.5 All personnel arriving on the ARCTIC I prior to, and while drilling in, the H2S bearing formation will receive an H2S briefing from the third party company. These briefings consist of a practical demonstration of the different types of breathing apparatus (BA) in use, location and use of portable detectors and an outline of the characteristics, hazards associated with and response to detection of the gas. A clean shaven policy is introduced prior to drilling into the formation suspected of containing H2S.

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5.5.6.6 Drills are carried out in accordance with management system requirements and the frequency is increased if it is suspected or known that the formation contains H2S. If it is identified that there is a real likelihood of H2S, regular drills, based on the extra equipment referred to above, are held prior to and while drilling into the hazardous zone. 5.5.7 Well Control

5.5.7.1 The early detection of any well kick situation is vital; a slow response to a minor situation can rapidly become a full scale blow-out if not responded to immediately. 5.5.7.2 Although all drilling supervisors have achieved the required level of competence in the classroom, their response to well kick situations in the field is vital. In order to reduce response time to the minimum required to initiate full control over any developing situation, drills are held on a regular basis. 5.5.7.3 The Well Control drills include, but are not limited to Simulation of Pit level gain - Drilling/Tripping Loss of primary control Drilling / Tripping (Loss of circulation)

5.5.7.4 The drills are held regularly irrespective of how fast our drilling supervisors respond. Not only do these drills create fast response time, but they also allow hands-on experience with the functioning of the Blow-Out Preventers (BOPs). 5.5.7.5 When drilling into a known H2S bearing formation which is likely to present a significant risk to personnel on the ARCTIC I, a specialist H2S trainer is used to provide additional training to rig crews over and above that already given by the MODU. Training is given in the use of all H2S equipment and its maintenance until the specialist is satisfied that each individual can safely and efficiently use the equipment provided. 5.5.7.6 The drilling crews regularly execute the following well control exercises: Diverter Drills Trip Drills Kick Drills Choke Drills Stripping Drills.

5.5.7.7 These drills are carried out in accordance with the requirements of the management system. 5.5.8 Man Overboard

5.5.8.1 The Man Overboard boat and crew are exercised on a quarterly basis as a minimum standard in the launching for recovery of a person from the water. 5.5.8.2 The boat is exercised either for practising for the pick up of a single person overboard or for the recovery of numerous persons, simulating an aircraft ditching near the rig. 5.5.8.3 The Boat Coxswain is qualified within the requirements of the STCW 95 requirements for Man Overboard Boat coxswains.

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5.5.9

Abandon Rig

5.5.9.1 'Prepare to Abandon Rig' drills are held regularly, in accordance with the requirements of the management system. 5.5.9.2 When carrying out this drill, the OIM takes up position in the ECC and sounds the prepare to abandon platform alarm (PAPA) making announcements, as necessary. 5.5.9.3 All personnel off-tour are required to don, suitable clothing, footwear and their life-jacket from their cabin and proceed to their assigned muster stations in a brisk orderly manner. 5.5.9.4 All personnel on-tour make the job of work they are engaged in secure and proceed to their muster points, donning one of the life-jackets from the boxes located at the embarkation points. 5.5.9.5 At the primary muster points, personnel will be checked off using a muster check-list. The Muster Co-ordinator will check that all personnel are wearing their life-jackets properly and report in to the Emergency Control Centre (ECC), identifying missing personnel. For drill purposes, personnel required to ensure the continued safe operations of the ARCTIC I are excused. The list of individuals involved is agreed in advance with the OIM. On completion of the muster the OIM notes the time taken to muster all the personnel required to muster. 5.5.9.6 Regular embarkation of the totally enclosed motor propelled survival craft (TEMPSC) is a feature of these drills. The OIM will advise the Muster Co-ordinator to instruct persons mustered to board their assigned lifeboats and prepare for launching. The Lifeboat Coxswain will take command and will have started the engine during the muster. He will ensure that all personnel are seated, evenly distributed about the boat and with seat belts secure. When this is done, a further head count is taken and the Lifeboat Coxswain will report the head count to the OIM using the VHF radio in the lifeboat, and inform the OIM that the boat is ready to be launched. 5.5.9.7 It is a requirement of the management system that regular evacuation drills are held during the hours of darkness. This enables personnel to assess the effectiveness of lighting, signs and escape routes in the dark. These evacuation drills will include; Helicopter TEMPSC Liferaft Immersion suits.

5.5.9.8 Drills are varied to simulate situations where one or more of the TEMPSC is not available in order to help personnel understand how such situations would be handled. 5.5.10 Third Party Contractors

5.5.10.1 Emergency response training of contractors assigned to the ARCTIC I, whether directly contracted to the Company or through the Operator, will conform to the requirements of the minimum standard set by the management system. Contractors with an emergency role to play, either on or beyond the installation, will be given training commensurate with that role. In the case of individuals or companies contracted to the Operator, it is the responsibility of the Rig Manager during the interfacing process to ensure that the Operator has a mechanism for making certain that this requirement is complied with.

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5.5.11

HSE Inductions

5.5.11.1 Personnel first arriving on ARCTIC I are inducted into a regime based on the philosophy that confirmation is an essential step to obtaining the correct response in an emergency. 5.5.11.2 All personnel, on arrival on-board the MODU, are issued with a rig specific Welcome Aboard Card. The card contains information regarding the following: Safety instructions Emergency signals Work permit system Layout of ARCTIC I Telephone numbers.

5.5.11.3 Personnel are required to complete a questionnaire to demonstrate their understanding of the above, which must be returned to the RSTC within 24 hours of their arrival. 5.5.11.4 All personnel are also given instruction in the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) during the induction process.

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5.5.12

ARCTIC I Drill Matrix

5.5.12.1 The Matrix below is identified from the ARCTIC I Emergency Response Manual 4.1 as Policy 3.2. The Matrix provides the background for the offshore Emergency Response training onboard the rig.
Drill
Muster & Response Emergency

Frequency
Weekly

Participants
All persons

Comments
Use of General Alarm All POB to Muster at ER Stations. Test & verify responses to alarms & POB check systems Potential to combine with other drills Use of General Alarm and Prepare to Abandon alarms. All POB to wear lifejackets, appropriate protective clothing & practice lifeboat boarding procedures Test Helicopter, Liferaft and Escape systems. Combine with other drills Develop scenarios designed to use all fire Fighting, Rescue Equipment and systems

Lifeboat Evacuation

Every 4 weeks

All persons

Alternative Evacuation Fire Fighting & BA Casualty Handling First Aid Person Overboard Line Throwing Appliance Well Control Desk Top Exercises

Every 4 weeks Every 2 weeks Every 4 weeks Every 2 weeks Every 4 weeks Every 3 months Every 3 weeks Every 3 Months

All persons ECC & ER Teams Medic, First Aid, ER & Stretcher Teams Medic & First Aiders SBV(IF available) Marine, ER Team, Crane Driver, OIM Marine Crew All Drilling Crew ECC, ER, & On scene Team leaders Marine Crew Helideck & ER Teams Drill Crew, ER Team, All onboard ER Team, Medic & Stretcher Party Spill Response Team

Medic to develop & follow plan of lectures & practical training Perform drill when ARCTIC I arrives on new location, and at suitable intervals when weather permits

Review & discuss all emergency procedures & flow charts in sequence. Objective to ensure Team leaders understand procedures & how they interact with each other Review procedures test main and Stand by systems Consider combining with Fire Fighting & BA Drill Increased frequency if H2S expected. Combine with safety Meeting lecture before drilling in H2S Zone Consider combining with BA & Casualty Handling drill Drill in use of Spill Response equipment

Flooding & Ballast Control Helicopter Crash Gas Release Including H2S Rescue Space from Combined

Every 4 weeks Every Month Every 3 Months Every 3 months Every 3 months

Spill Response Drill

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5.6 5.6.1

Temporary Refuge Assessment Temporary Refuge (TR) Concept and Design

5.6.1.1 The TR provides an area protected from the effects of heat, smoke and gas for sufficient length of time to muster, assess the emergency, decide on a course of action and implement decisions to either bring the situation under control or evacuate the ARCTIC I. 5.6.1.2 The designated TR is defined as both levels of the accommodation block. The TR incorporates the emergency control centre which is defined as the pilot house, radio room and BCR. 5.6.1.3 Within the TR, the Navigation Deck, comprising the following spaces comprise the ECC; Pilot Houses Chart Room Radio Room Stability Technicians Office Auxiliary Ballast Control centre

5.6.1.4 As the largest space, the Pilot house is used as the hub of the Control centre with the availability of the necessary Whiteboards and communication systems. 5.6.1.5 The ECC on the Navigation deck supports the following Emergency facilities;

Facility
Radio Communication Anchor Emergency Release Auxiliary Ballast Control Panel Radar Facility Hospital Alarm Hardwire Emergency phone

Location
Radio Room Navigation Deck Pilot House Auxiliary Ballast Navigation Deck Chart Room Pilot House Pilot House Control Room

Comments
Has access to all Private and Commercial satellite radio links vessel & aircraft communications Note Change over panel in Stability Techs Office

Emergency hardwired phone to critical control centres

5.6.1.6 The OIM is able to communicate direct with the Ballast Control Centre and the SCR room so that he will have the following other facilities available to him in determining the status of the emergency and the application of so form of incident control

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Ballast Control Room


Ventilation Stop Panel 1st Stage gas alert Shut down Fuel Pump Stop Panel PIU Isolation for setting status of Ballast Valves in event of loss of Control Power Fire and Gas Detection Panels Main Ballast Control panel

SCR Room
Accommodation Sprinkler Alarm Water Tight Door Control Diesel Oil and Lube Oil Tank Quick Closing Valve device Hospital Alarm Dewatering Control

Caisson ventilation Shut down system Mud Pit deluge Activation Rig CCTV system Secondary Communication Radio

Halon Release system alarms Main engine Stop Buttons Rig Saver Shut down control

5.6.1.7 In addition to the fixed gas detectors the ARCTIC I carries 5 portable gas detectors (for hydrocarbon gases, hydrogen sulphide and carbon monoxide). These units are located in the Ballast Control room available for use. It is established that at least two available in the Control Room for use within the Temporary Refuge. 5.6.1.8 A-60 rated bulkheads around the accommodation module and pilot house provide fire protection to the TR and ECC. 5.6.1.9 Critical well-related information, remote BOP controls and emergency communications are duplicated within the Toolpusher's office in the accommodation. This space may serve as a command and communications control point for emergency operations associated with well-related activities. 5.6.1.10 The layout of the ARCTIC I is such that the aft bulkhead of the LQ marks the aft boundary of an area where, in an emergency, personnel can be provided with a selection of refuges which will, on a temporary basis, protect them from the hazards of explosion, fire, heat and toxic gas or fumes. This area is far from the source of the most potentially dangerous hazard. The facility provides the OIM and his Emergency control Team and ability to direct personnel to this area for mustering while the emergency situation is assessed and suitable decisions made. 5.6.1.11 The main deck area of the ARCTIC I forward of the accommodation block provides the facilities for evacuating the rig, hence this area is provided with a suitable level of protection to provide an enhanced time frame for evacuating the rig. 5.6.1.12 On the sounding of the emergency alarm the first area of all personnel will proceed to their allocated muster area. The primary muster areas have been chosen in order to locate personnel at a suitably remote location from a potential incident, or at a location where manpower is required to perform a set of control functions to limit incident escalation. 5.6.1.13 All non essential personnel will be mustered to a location as far as possible from the possible cause of the incident and suitable for a potential evacuation scenario, lifeboats forward, or liferafts aft.

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5.6.1.14 If the OIM, after assessing the situation, decides that the safety of personnel is better served by moving them out of the elements, further temporary refuge can be sought in the LQ which has been designed to provide a high level of protection against explosion, fire, heat and toxic gas or fumes. 5.6.2 Impairment of the Temporary Refuge

5.6.2.1 The study identified in section 2.1.2 of this part had identified that the most significant cause of loss or impairment of the TR is due to Thermal radiation, the prime potential being from a Helicopter crash on the Helideck above the accommodation block. A helicopter fuel fire resulting either from a crash or from a Helicopter refuelling operation is also the main potential cause for a loss or impairment of the evacuation facilities due to smoke, heat, and fire. 5.6.2.2 A loss of stability is a prime reason for loss or impairment of the TR. These risk have been highlighted in Part 4 Risk Management and the necessary risk identification and Bow Tie Studies have concluded the overall residual level of risk is within the bounds of acceptability given the mitigation processes in place through the application of the original GlobalSantaFe Safety Management process, which is now integrated within the Transocean CMS. 5.6.2.3 It is to be identified that the study and analysis undertaken is based upon industry averages for each major event and do not account for the measures GlobalSantaFe as the original owners of the ARCTIC I established to reduce risk. They also assume a worst case scenario for each event with conservative assumptions made throughout, particularly with respect to the availability of evacuation facilities and personnel survival. 5.6.3 Temporary Refuge Integrity Requirements

5.6.3.1 The integrity of the LQ on the ARTCIC I is maintained at all times by keeping fire doors closed. All doors have self-closing mechanisms. The sick bay is located in the upper level of the accommodation starboard forward. Access is possible from inside the LQ or directly from the main deck. 5.6.3.2 The living quarters will support the following performance standards as a temporary refuge; Provide adequate protection from impairment due to fire and/or ingress of smoke or gas for a period no less than 30 minutes. Provide the means of controlling and coordinating emergency response and communicating with external parties and personnel on board the MODU from inside the TR. Full time available. Sufficient integrity to survive the initial effects of fire and explosion and withstand the effects of fire for 30 minutes. A credible fire within the accommodation space should not impair the overall integrity of the temporary refuge. Sufficient oxygen levels to be maintained within the TR whilst in the sealed condition, i.e. the minimum acceptable concentration of oxygen is 17% based on maximum possible complement of personnel. Minimisation of carbon dioxide levels, i.e. an allowable carbon dioxide concentration of 2%.

5.6.3.3 In addition the following habitability criteria apply to the temporary refuge:

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Internal temperatures not to threaten personnel seeking refuge within TR, i.e. the average internal temperature of the A-60 bulkhead not to exceed 139C after one hour exposure to a standard fire test.

5.6.3.4 The LQ forms a significant barrier between Rig Floor and forward muster area, and there may well be some situations where the use of areas forward of the LQ would provide personnel with additional protection in the event that the integrity of the aft bulkhead is impaired. Telephone facilities are available on the fore-deck for communications with the ECC. 5.6.3.5 The lifeboats can by virtue of their design provide further protection, if required, and are equipped with an independent air supply, lighting and radio communications. 5.6.3.6 In the event of a major incident which appears to be beyond immediate control where rig evacuation is an increasing probability, the areas forward of the aft LQ boundary will be used to protect personnel on the ARCTIC I. In supporting the full range of activity to protect personnel from the effects of fire, heat and toxic gas or fumes a rig heading change may be an important consideration if at all achievable. 5.6.3.7 All the refuge areas referred to above are equipped with lighting fed from the emergency switchboard and backed up by suitably rated integrated battery packs. 5.6.3.8 The identical sister rig, the ARCTIC III was subjected to a full Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Analysis for the provision of a similar HSE Case for North West European operation. In this respect, the worst case scenario for the preparation for abandonment with casualties established that the time required for alarms to be activated, personnel to respond, a full muster to be completed and for personnel to reach their embarkation points prior to evacuation, was of the order of one hour. Allowing time at the front end of this process for decision-making and at the back-end for evacuation, an endurance time of two hours was arrived at. 5.6.3.9 The aft bulkhead of the LQ is the fundamental barrier within the strategy for protecting personnel from the hazards of explosion, fire, heat, smoke, toxic gas or fumes and the integrity of the bulkhead was assessed as part of the FEA. 5.6.3.10 The bulkhead is capable of providing protection for up to two hours providing the heat flux does not significantly exceed 50 kW/m2. 5.6.3.11 By considering an ignited blow-out, the analysis demonstrated as a result of the consequence modelling that radiant heat levels at the aft end of the LQ are at most in the order of 12 kW/m2. Similarly, for non-blow-out fires the worst-case scenario, representing a short duration well test fire, resulted in heat levels, at the bulkhead, of the order of 10 kW/m2. 5.6.3.12 As part of the Fire and Explosion Analysis the impact of a drill floor explosion on the integrity of the aft bulkhead of the LQ was also assessed. It was demonstrated that the effect of both explosion over-pressure and missile damage on the integrity of the bulkhead is minimal. 5.6.3.13 In the event that the OIM decides to use the LQ as temporary refuge to protect the personnel on the ARCTIC I, it is essential that the integrity of the LQ is not impaired, within the endurance time, to the extent that it is unable to fulfil its role as part of the evacuation arrangements. 5.6.3.14 Apart from the impact of fire, heat and explosion on the aft bulkhead of the LQ, the threat of smoke, gas or toxic fumes on the habitability of the LQ was assessed as part of the FEA. The suitability of the LQ as temporary refuge was evaluated from the point of view of breath-ability of air, space, internal temperature and heat stress as part of the review of the impact of fire-related major accident hazards on the evacuation arrangements.

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5.6.3.15 The conclusion from the smoke, gas and toxic fume ingress study was that, as a result of: Automatic shutdown of ventilation dampers and fans Insignificant risk of ingress due to LQ boundary failure, and Segregation between different LQ levels

the necessary features for protecting the LQ from smoke, gas and toxic fumes ingress were demonstrated to be in place. 5.6.3.16 Additionally, with the LQ in its sealed condition, the independent studies have shown that there is adequate life support for the duration of the LQ endurance period. 5.6.3.17 With regard to facilities for the monitoring and control of an escalating incident and for organizing evacuation, all of these are as indicated earlier in this section located within the ECC with the most important being continuous internal communication once the major incident has become established. 5.6.3.18 The locations forward of the aft LQ bulkhead which has the potential to provide refuge temporarily for personnel, prior to evacuation, are all well served by emergency lighting and the ARCTIC Is telephone system. 5.6.3.19 Supervisors with hand-held radios would be assigned to the groups of non-essential personnel and these supervisors would be in continuous contact with the ECC using the hand-held radios if necessary. 5.6.3.20 The vulnerability of the facilities for monitoring and controlling incidents and for organizing evacuation were assessed as part of the FEA and it was concluded, as part of that independent study, that the facilities in question can be expected to perform their required functions for the required endurance time following a major accident. 5.7 5.7.1 Details of Evacuation and Escape Equipment General

5.7.1.1 The speedy and efficient mustering of all personnel onboard the ARTIC I provides the initial barrier in the preservation of life in the event of an emergency. The rapid check of the presence of all personnel will guide the OIM decision path in the planning of the deployment of his resources; i.e. whether there is a need to deploy a search and rescue team in order to save life, or whether incident control can be given priority. Search and rescue training is inherent in all our drills and in both inhouse and external fire team training and courses. 5.7.2 5.7.3 Evacuation and Escape Systems Escape Routes

5.7.3.1 Within the original basis of design and in compliance with the Classification authorities construction rules, ARCTIC I has been designed to facilitate ease of escape from all work areas in the event of any emergency. The escape routes are detailed on the Safety Plan which is displayed at various locations around the rig and are included at the end of this section. All personnel are made aware of and familiarize themselves with escape routes to the muster points during the rig induction briefing and the rig induction tour.

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5.7.3.2 Wherever possible areas have two means of escape to the TR, however in some cases, rooms lack two means of escape, this being due to the fact they are either not normally manned or are too small and judged not practical to have two emergency exits. 5.7.3.3 Escape routes in the accommodation are defined with photo-luminescent tape which shows direction to TEMPSC, life rafts and escape ladders to the sea. These routes are required to remain clear at all times. The emergency lighting throughout the MODU is capable of providing an adequate level of illumination to offer a safe means of escape from any area. 5.7.3.4 It is an established requirement that for the escape routes to be effective to provide the necessary means of access they should fulfil the following standard of performance; Availability of access/egress at all times Routes to be suitably illuminated and clearly marked to show the most direct route to the muster area(s) from all areas of the ARCTIC I. Protection against the immediate effects of fire and explosion, and maintain fire integrity to enable personnel surviving an event to escape. Emergency lighting installed to be supplied through the emergency switchboard to maintain operation for 18 hours. Battery backup provided to energise selected lights on loss of emergency power.

5.7.4

Pontoon Escape Routes

5.7.4.1 Pump rooms each have escape routes at either end leading directly into either the aft column or the central columns. The aft propulsion rooms have an escape route via the aft columns leading to a vertical ladder that exits through a hatch at the 85 Foot flat. Exit to the upper deck is then via a stairway. 5.7.4.2 The central columns have both an elevator and a staircase. The elevator and the staircase on the port side lead into a vestibule within the auxiliary machine room. The elevator and staircase on the starboard side lead into a vestibule within the sack store. Both vestibules are A0 rated and have two exits into the room in which they are situated. 5.7.5 Aft Columns

5.7.5.1 The aft columns on each side have a vertical escape ladder only. On the port side, this staircase leads into the storeroom aft of the control room. On the starboard side, the staircase leads into the drilling equipment store. 5.7.6 Main Deck - Rooms

5.7.6.1 Each room on the main deck has two or more escape routes, with the exception of the following: Electricians workshop, Paint locker Material office Subsea office and lab

5.7.6.2 There are a total of 15 exits leading from rooms within the main deck onto the open deck. These exist at the following rooms: Engine room (2 exits), Changing room,
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Welding shop, Machine shop, BOP control room, Mud process area, Emergency generator room, Sack store, Subsea Engineers workshop Hydraulic room Stores (2 exits) Engineers workshop (escape hatch) SCR room.

5.7.6.3 From the main deck level, persons may enter the accommodation without traversing the open deck, using the door at the port or starboard side. Alternatively, once on the 2nd deck they may enter the accommodation through the doors on either side or in the aft bulkhead. 5.7.7 Drill Floor

5.7.7.1 There are five escape routes leading away from the drill floor. The first, in the port aft corner, leads via a staircase to the riser stowage area at upper deck level. The second, in the starboard aft corner, leads via a staircase to the roof of the shaleshaker house; from here, persons may descend either to 2nd deck level via a staircase forward of the shaleshaker house, or to the main deck level via a staircase aft of the shaleshaker house. The third escape route, in the port forward corner, leads via a staircase again to the roof of the shaleshaker house. The fourth escape route, forward of the drill floor, leads via a staircase to the piperack area on the 2nd deck. The fifth escape route leads forward across Myrex Cart leading to the Helideck. 5.7.8 Port Side Mezzanine Deck

5.7.8.1 The port side of the mezzanine deck has escape routes leading forward and aft to the pipe deck. The starboard side of the mezzanine deck has a single escape route leading to the aft of the shaleshaker house and from there via a staircase to the main deck. 5.7.9 2nd Deck level

5.7.9.1 At 2nd deck level, the shaleshaker house has one escape route aft leading to a staircase to the main deck, and a further doorway leading forward onto the pipe deck. The cement unit room has two exits, each leading onto the 2nd deck. The electric logging unit has single escape route to the 2nd deck. 5.7.9.2 On the 2nd deck, persons may enter the accommodation either through the door in the aft bulkhead adjacent to the internal staircase, or through the doors at each end of the accommodation. 5.7.10 Accommodation Deck

5.7.10.1 The accommodation is on two levels, the lower being on the main deck level and the upper level being slightly below the level of the Helideck. A central internal stairwell connects the two levels of the accommodation block. The upper level of the accommodation block is segregated from the lower by a Class A Fire door with self closing mechanism. Internal Access from the upper level of the LQ to the Navigation deck is via the internal stairway located in a lobby served by a Class B fire door on the starboard side of the upper level.

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5.7.10.2 All public rooms on the lower level have escape panels in their exit doors to the main alleyways affording escape to external areas. In addition the centreline cabin on the lower level as a suitably large escape window with external step down for escape directly to the forward lifeboat area. 5.7.10.3 The lifeboats are located forward. The accommodation is served by external walkways on the periphery at every level. The lifeboat station may thus be reached from any of the doors in the accommodation. There are external staircases covering each level of the accommodation both at either end, and forward of the accommodation on the port side of the lifeboat stations. 5.7.10.4 In the event that it is necessary to access the aft Liferafts there are internal escape routes on either the port (preferred route) or starboard sides of the rig. The route taken is peripheral and uses the structure of the rig to protect personnel from thermal radiation. 5.7.10.5 Port side protection is afforded by the generator room and auxiliary machinery room, control room, welding shop and workshop and stores room as shown on the following page.

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5.7.10.6 Port Side Main Deck Safety Plan

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5.7.10.7 Starboard side protection is afforded by the pump room, sack store and subsea workshop as shown below;

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5.7.11

Muster Points

5.7.11.1 Muster area locations and lists of personnel assigned to the muster area are presented in the Station Bill. Copies of the Station Bill are displayed at every level of the accommodation and reference to this Station Bill is made during the induction process. 5.7.11.2 The primary muster point for Non-Essential Personnel is their assigned Lifeboat Station, located within the TR. The alternative muster point is on the Helideck which has easy access to the TEMPSC. 5.7.11.3 Personnel are accounted for at the primary muster points utilizing a POB T Card check off system. Immediately after every helicopter departure, the Radio Operator is responsible for updating the POB list. The list is prepared in two formats. The first format is an alphabetical list of all the POB with the names of the individuals making up the initial ERT marked. The second format comprises two alphabetical lists identifying the personnel assigned to each of the two main lifeboats. 5.7.11.4 The Radio Operator is responsible for ensuring that the POB lists at the muster point agrees with the updated assignments. Copies of the updated POB lists are printed and placed in the vicinity of the primary muster areas, available for immediate use in the event of a muster 5.7.11.5 Should it be required to muster directly at the TEMPSC embarkation stations, the appropriate alarm accompanied by PA announcement will be made. Muster lists are available in the TEMPSC and good lines of communication are available at the TEMPSC station via portable and fixed VHF sets and telephones. 5.7.11.6 Once the muster is complete and the OIM notified of the results, the situation at the muster points will be continuously monitored and reviewed with a view to deciding whether the muster areas are continuing to provide refuge on a temporary basis or whether exposure to risk would be reduced by providing them with temporary refuge in the LQ or elsewhere on the rig. 5.7.11.7 The OIM will keep all personnel updated with relevant information concerning the situation and his decisions regarding their safety. These announcements will be made by PA or directly by telephone and/or radio to the Muster Coordinator who will relay messages to the assembled personnel 5.7.12 5.7.12.1 Personal Protective Equipment All personnel will be issued with their own day to day PPE which will comprise; Safety Boots Safety Hat Safety Glasses Gloves

5.7.12.2 In an emergency situation this equipment will be supplemented for those personnel with specific fire fighting duties with additional protective clothing, hats, boots and gloves. In all case personnel proceeding to muster for an emergency must don their day to day PPE in order to minimise their exposure to any routine risks dust trips exposure. 5.7.13 Life Jackets

5.7.13.1 280 Life jackets for use in an emergency are available on board the ARCTIC I with jackets available within every cabin of the LQ and. In addition life jackets are positioned at various locations throughout the ARCTIC I including: ECC
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Lifeboat (38 at each Lifeboat) Liferaft embarkation areas (18) Muster points Various work spaces. Hospital (6)

5.7.13.2 The life jackets provided on the ARCTIC I are USCG certified 5.7.13.3 In the event that personnel are required to enter the sea from height personnel are instructed to enter/jump from as low a height as possible, and if possible below 10 metres. 5.7.14 Lifebuoys

5.7.14.1 ARCTIC I is equipped with lifebuoys strategically distributed around the rig for use in the event of a person over-board situation. Lifebuoys are fitted with self-igniting lights, self-activating smoke signals and buoyant lifelines in accordance with international maritime requirements. The actual location of the lifebuoys is; Location Port Lifeboat Forward Starboard Lifeboat Forward Starboard Maindeck forward Port Maindeck amidships Starboard Main deck aft Port main deck aft Starboard Aft Liferaft Platform Port Aft Liferaft Platform Moonpool Starboard side Moonpool Port side Type Light and smoke Light and smoke Light and Line Light and Line Light and Line Light and Line Light and smoke Light and Smoke Line only Line only

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5.8 5.8.1

Means of Evacuation Helicopter

5.8.1.1 Helicopter is the preferred method for evacuating the ARCTIC I. In any emergency situation it will be the responsibility of the aircraft captain to make the decision whether it is safe to land on the vessel as it should be considered a possibility that full manning of the Helideck will not be possible due to the Emergency Team resources requiring the involvement of the designated HLO. Hence communications to the aircraft must establish the nature of the incident and the integrity of the vessel and availability of the Helideck and its safety equipment and personnel. Thereafter it must be left to the helicopter captains discretion as to feasibility of making a safe landing. 5.8.1.2 The HLO and the Helideck team have received suitable formal training which will have included dealing with Helideck emergency scenarios; hence the ARCTIC I OIM may have to consider releasing those specialist personnel from his emergency teams in order to prepare the Helideck for any incident which does not involve a Helideck emergency. 5.8.1.3 The consideration of available aircraft types suitable for evacuation personnel and the flying time to the ARCTIC I will also be a critical consideration as part of the overall contingency planning within the event scenario. The rig is to be supported by a dedicated Sikorsky S76 aircraft with a typical lift of 12 persons. 5.8.1.4 HLO and Helideck crews are formally trained to cope with Helideck emergencies and refuelling operations. The following specific safeguards are in place: 5.8.1.5 If the OIM has sufficient warning he can conduct a precautionary down manning of NEP using helicopters. The time to evacuate the Non Essential Persons is dependent on the flight time to a suitable safe location and the size of the available helicopter(s). However due to time constraints it is unlikely this course of action could be considered in the event of a rapidly escalating event. 5.8.1.6 Any down manning process would be carried out under the overall command of the OIM with organisation of the flight allocation carried out by the Helideck personnel. The last flight would generally comprise essential personnel such as the OIM, Stability Technician Drilling Superintendent and Toolpusher, etc, if it were unlikely that the emergency situation could be brought under control. 5.8.1.7 At the pre-operation stage it will be required of the Rig Manager to ensure, through the interfacing process with the Operator, that the arrangements, equipment and personnel of the company the Operator intends to use, in terms of servicing the MODU by helicopter in an emergency, are consistent with the requirements of the ERP and that the Operator has a mechanism in place for making the contractor supplying the helicopter service, aware of the contents of the ERP. 5.8.1.8 In addition, there are a number of minor but nevertheless important issues that also play a role in terms of the suitability and sufficiency of the arrangements for evacuation by helicopter in an emergency. Rig heading will, where drilling operations permit, be chosen such that the prevailing dominating environmental characteristic, in the context of risk, will be from bow to stern thus limiting the likelihood of fire, heat and toxic gas or fumes preventing the use of the Helideck. Personnel assigned duties as part of the ARCTIC Is Emergency Response Team (ERT) are kept below the number of personnel which can be uplifted by the largest available aircraft in one sortie. In this way, the risk exposure to ERT
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personnel is reduced by minimizing the time required to evacuate this group in the event that the situation they were trying to control escalates out of control very quickly. 5.8.1.9 Precautionary evacuation is the important first step and will always be carried out as early as possible in the development of a situation, bearing in mind the availability of helicopters (24 hours a day), the distance from the helicopter base to the MODU and the places of safety in proximity to the ARCTIC I. 5.8.1.10 In the event of a major incident which denies aircraft or personnel access to the Helideck the ARTIC I OIM will have to consider a helicopter winch off evacuation process which may have to be expedited by use of the TEMPSC. 5.8.2 Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft

5.8.2.1 The TEMPSC is the secondary method of controlled evacuation. The boats are capable of launch at angles up to 15. The unit has 2 x 58 man TEMPSC located forward. 5.8.2.2 The TEMPSC embarkation areas may be accessed directly from the accommodation main deck level exits, Port and Starboard. These areas are protected from the drill floor by the accommodation module. There is adequate space for the mustering and control of personnel and adequate provision for emergency lighting and communications. 5.8.2.3 All embarkation points are provided with lighting that is fed from the emergency switchboard and backed up by integrated, trickle-fed, appropriately rated battery packs. 5.8.2.4 The lifeboats are approved in accordance with classification and flag-state requirements and certified fit-for-purpose by the Classification Society. The lifeboats are made from fire retardant fibreglass reinforced plastic with an external coating coloured international orange. Normal access is through the doors on the side adjacent to the launch platform. The internal structure provides seating for up to the rated capacity of personnel and the boat design includes watertight food and water storage compartments, survival equipment, engine and breathing air, marine diesel engine, bilge pump, fuel tank, lighting, compass, radio and instrumentation. The marine diesel engines have closed cooling systems and heat exchangers. 5.8.2.5 The TEMPSC have release mechanisms of the 'on load' type that only allow release when a hydrostatic safety mechanism has been activated. The safety mechanism is activated by an appropriate head of water at the keel of the TEMPSC and is designed to prevent premature release before the boat reaches the water. If the release fails to operate, it may be manually over-ridden from within the TEMPSC. This is carried out by use of the manual release handles located by the Lifeboat Coxswains station. 5.8.2.6 Deployed at the Lifeboat Coxswain's position is the heading to steer to locate the boat at a safe location away from the ARCTIC I. 5.8.2.7 The TEMPSC are self-righting, providing personnel are strapped in and watertight hatches are closed. Launching is accomplished from inside the TEMPSC by pulling the winch release handle adjacent to the escape hatch position. Once released, the TEMPSC is committed to launch. 5.8.2.8 The boats' air supply is sufficient to provide air for the engine and passenger respiration for a limited period. The air is released at a rate greater than that being used to ensure that smoke and other toxic fumes do not enter the craft. The boats are also equipped with an external water spray system that utilizes the engine driven centrifugal pump to provide a flow of water over the entire surface of the superstructure and the hull. This water blanket serves to cool the craft and prevents it

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from reaching combustion temperatures. 5.8.2.9 The boats are maintained in a constant state of readiness and the boats, winches and davits are covered by the ARCTIC I's maintenance programme. The lifeboat engine is subject to a function test every week in connection with drills and is thoroughly inspected as part of a monthly inspection covering all aspects of the boat and equipment. Any faults identified during the inspection are rectified immediately. 5.8.2.10 In accordance with Class and Flag state requirements, the lifeboat winches and davits were load tested when installed and are also load tested after any modifications are made. They are also inspected by an independent competent body. Lifeboat falls are visually inspected during routine lowering of the boats for test runs and are also inspected by an independent competent body. 5.8.2.11 Each lifeboat is lowered to the water or launched and operated regularly, operations and weather permitting. 5.8.2.12 In an emergency situation where evacuation by TEMPSC is required, delegated competent personnel will make the boats ready immediately after mustering at the embarkation points and prior to the remainder of the personnel assigned to that boat being given instructions to board. 5.8.2.13 In the event combustible gas has collected in way of the boats, the likelihood of the gas being ignited is limited by the fact that the air supply for starting the engines is taken from air bottles in the boat and the engine exhausts are fitted with check valves. 5.8.2.14 Evacuation by lifeboat is identified as the secondary means of personnel evacuation to that of using helicopter evacuation. Evacuation by TEMPSC carries its own risks due to environmental considerations, sea state lifting and launching operations personnel contained in an enclosed space, and as such the OIM must at all time consider the associated risks of using the TEMPSC against the other possible means of evacuation - Helicopter or Liferafts. 5.8.2.15 Search and Rescue Radar Transponders (SARTs) are carried on board the ARCTIC I, one in each TEMPSC and two in the radio room for use in the event of escape using life-rafts. In the event of an evacuation the SARTS can be activated once onboard the craft and then will used by rescue vessels for pin pointing the location of the craft by virtue of the transmitted signals. 5.8.3 Liferafts

5.8.3.1 Five Davit launched Liferafts are located at the aft end of the ARCTIC I, three to the starboard and two to the Port side of the rigs centre line. 5.8.3.2 Four rafts each provide 25 person capacity and the fifth 20 person capacity, therefore total capacity for evacuating the rig by Liferafts is 120 persons. 5.8.3.3 The life-rafts are stowed in dedicated containers and attached to the deck close to the side for launching on dedicated stands. The Liferafts are equipped with a hydrostatic release device to enable them to float free from the rig in a worst case rig sinking scenario. The raft is constructed from two super-imposed buoyancy tubes, each tube being capable of supporting the full complement of the raft, should one fail. The canopy is supported by an inflatable arch and protects the raft's occupants from the environment. Two entrances are provided. 5.8.3.4 Each raft is provided with equipment to aid personnel survival, but in any case if evacuation by raft is deemed a probability the transference of the SARTS to the rafts will aid to the possibility of expedient raft location.

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5.8.3.5 The Liferafts are serviced and re-certified on an annual basis by an independent competent body in accordance with management system requirements and, if required, an equivalent raft is hired and installed on the MODU to replace any of the rafts sent ashore for service in order to maintain 100 per cent capacity at all times. 5.8.3.6 These large Liferafts provide a tertiary means for evacuating from the ARTCIC I in a deteriorating situation which making the unit untenable. Evacuation is to be preferred to escape but, should escape be necessary for any reason, the life-rafts would provide a shelter for escapees and reduce the likelihood of exposure. In the afloat mode the likelihood of successful escape using direct entry to the life-rafts is relatively high and the use of life-rafts under such circumstances may be considered to provide a level of diversity in terms of the evacuation arrangements, which is in excess of that available in the elevated mode. 5.8.3.7 The decision to deploy the life-rafts will be at the discretion of the OIM and the decision will be influenced by the incident's development, the extent and location of fire, heat and toxicity hazards, if any, the weather and the performance limits of the recovery arrangements. 5.9 5.9.1 Escape to Sea Rescue Boat

5.9.1.1 ARCTIC I is equipped with a 23 man Fossmer rigid hull rescue boat with a prime function as a man overboard rescue boat. The boat is equipped with its own davit and may be launched by the boat crew with a remote brake control fitted within the boat. The boat is also equipped with an on-load release system to enable a suitably quick launch into a seaway. Although fulfilling a prime function as a Man overboard rescue boat, in a deteriorating emergency scenario the availability for the boat should always be considered as a possibility for evacuation a limited number of personnel from the rig to the water clear of the incident. It should also be considered that in the event of an incident which renders the Helideck in accessible the rescue boat provides a suitable open boat for the undertaking of helicopter winching operations. However as in the case of any evacuation to the sea, the impact of environmental factors upon the safety of the operation will require to be considered by the OIM. 5.9.2 Escape Ladders

5.9.2.1 ARCTIC I is equipped with 4 means of controlled descent to the sea: Steel ladders permanently fixed on the inside of corner columns that can be accessed at main deck level. These are suitably marked Escape Route. Routes to the embarkation points are from the muster area to main deck and along the main deck to the appropriate leg well. 5.9.3 Personnel Transfer Baskets

5.9.3.1 ARCTIC I is equipped with two Billy Pugh X 904, 4 person transfer baskets. One unit is located ready for use immediately inboard of the Pilot house. A second unit is located in a storage unit close to the derrick floor V door. 5.9.3.2 In some situations arrival of a surface vessel on scene may precede arrival of an aircraft. In this case the OIM may determine that the level of prevailing risk to evacuate personnel by transfer basket may be less than that of waiting for an aircraft. In this situation and providing crane resources are available the use of the transfer basket maybe a prudent option for evacuation of the non essential personnel. 5.9.3.3 If the OIM decides that evacuation by personnel basket is a viable option in terms of risk exposure reduction, under the circumstances and hazards being faced, an embarkation point will be chosen according to the prevailing weather conditions and availability of the rig cranes.
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5.9.4

Knotted Ropes

5.9.4.1 Knotted ropes are provided at each of the Lifeboat locations and at the two Liferaft launching positions. Although available the use of such items is associated with a high risk of personal injury due to the condition of the rope and the stress levels that may be sustained by the individual at the time of the incident. 5.10 5.10.1 Recovery Means of Recovery to a Place of Safety

5.10.1.1 It is not the intention that the ARCTRIC I will be supported by a dedicated vessel on a 24 hour basis. However operational requirements will place two dedicated Anchor Handling Units in close proximity to the rig on a high frequency and one dedicated personnel supply vessel will also be on location on a regular occurrence. In addition the rig will supported by a dedicated helicopter. 5.10.1.2 Additional rescue resources will be dependent on the location of the ARCTIC I with respect to other installations and land based resources. 5.10.1.3 Recovery and rescue of personnel will be required in the event of either evacuation of the ARCTIC I by lifeboat or escape from the rig to the sea by Liferaft, leg ladders, knotted ropes etc. Rescue facilities will be available at all times in the event of a man overboard incident, a helicopter ditching near the rig, or an incident where escape by entry into the sea is used to abandon the rig. The arrangements include those for the taking of personnel, rescued and/or recovered, to a place where suitable and sufficient medical treatment can be administered. Such designated place of safety will normally be the emergency response and rescue vessel (ERRV); where a daughter craft (DC) is provided as a means of rescue, it will not be designated as such. 5.10.1.4 The success of the recovery and rescue provision depends on the Operators arrangements for SBV services to satisfy the requirements dictated by the above duties. It is the responsibility of the Rig Manager in conjunction with the Marine Manager to ensure that they are adequate. 5.10.1.5 In any recovery operation the initial challenge is to identify the location of the survival craft with the personnel onboard and having done that effect a safe and rapids transfer of the personnel, initially those with any form of injury, form the seaborne craft to a helicopter or large vessel. 5.10.1.6 The Location of the survival craft is aided by the use of the SART units and/or the ability of the personnel on those craft to communicate with any form of radio to the rescue units. In addition by tethering survival craft together or even by the securing of a number of personnel in the water together by means of their lifejackets, will greatly assist with expediting the sighting of those craft or personnel, and will reduce the search time for any missing craft or personnel. 5.10.1.7 The activity of the transfer of personnel between surface craft is one that demands a high degree of skill and is also an activity that carries a very high risk of injury in anything but good weather conditions. In this respect the frequency of adverse weather in Brazil waters is far less than in other parts of the world and should provide a degree of risk mitigation.

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5.11 Drawings The Following Drawings are available in this Part; Drawing Title
Legend Starboard Profile Navigation Deck Upper Decks Main Deck Columns Lower Hull Station Bill

Number

Additional Reference
Sht Sht Sht Sht Sht Sht Sht 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 of of of of of of of 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

Safety, Fire, and Escape Plans

D 916 A015

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5.1 REFERENCES 5.1.1 Documentation HQS-CMS-GOV HQSHSEPP-01 Iss 04 Jan 31st 2009 Iss 03 Jan 8th 2009 Transocean Company Management System Health and Safety Policy and Procedures Manual Performance Procedures Monitoring Audit and Assessment

HQS-CMSPR02 Iss 03 Dec 31st 2008 HQS-HSE-PR-01 HQS-HSE-PR-02 HQS-HSE-PP-02 HQS-HRM-PP-01 HQS-OPS-PR-01 HQS-OPS-PP-01 HQS-OPS-HB-03 HQS-OPS-HB 05 Iss 01 Oct 31st 2007 Iss 02 Oct 12th 2007 Iss 01 Sept 30th 2007 Iss 02 Mar 1st 2009 Iss 02 Nov 1st 2007 Iss 01 Nov 1st 2004 Iss 02 Nov 11th 2004 Iss 01 Nov 11th 2005

Emergency Management Procedures Manual Medical Protocols Manual Environmental Management System Human Resources Policies and Procedures Manual Maintenance Manual Operations Policies and Procedures Manual Certificate and Survey Manual Field Operations Manual

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 6 PERFORMANCE MONITORING

PART 6 Performance Monitoring

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ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 6 PERFORMANCE MONITORING

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 6. PAGE

ARCTIC I PERFORMANCE MONITORING ....................................................................... 3 6.1

6.2

6.1.1 6.1.2 6.1.3 6.2.1 6.2.2 6.2.3 6.2.4 6.2.5 6.3.1 6.3.2 6.3.3 6.3.4 6.3.5 6.4.1 6.4.2 6.4.3 6.5.1 6.5.2 6.5.3 6.6.1

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 3

PERFORMANCE MONITORING ................................................................................................. 5

Purpose ................................................................................................................ 3 Document Update ................................................................................................ 3 Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... 4 Performance Monitoring Elements;..................................................................... 5 Periodic Monitoring.............................................................................................. 6 Incident Reporting and Analysis ......................................................................... 6 Behaviour Based Observation Systems ............................................................... 8 Environmental Monitoring and Measurement .................................................... 9

6.3

AUDIT AND COMPLIANCE .................................................................................................... 11

6.4

VERIFICATION OF HSE CRITICAL ACTIVITIES/TASKS AND EQUIPMENT/SYSTEMS ................................ 16

Audit Overview................................................................................................... 11 Audit Team ......................................................................................................... 12 Audit Process ..................................................................................................... 13 Audit Reporting and Circulation ........................................................................ 14 Areas of Non Compliance ................................................................................... 16 List of HSE critical activities/tasks and equipment/systems ........................... 16 Verification process by non Arctic 1 Personnel................................................. 17 Action Tracking process ..................................................................................... 17

6.5

CERTIFICATION ............................................................................................................... 18

6.6

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 20

Maintenance of Class requirements .................................................................. 18 Flag State certification ...................................................................................... 19 Coastal State Verification .................................................................................. 19

Documentation................................................................................................... 20

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6. 6.1 6.1.1

ARCTIC I PERFORMANCE MONITORING Introduction Purpose

6.1.1.1 This section of the case identifies the processes by which Transocean will ensure the effectiveness, both current and future of the management system to meet the objectives which have been designed to establish suitable barriers to control risk within the day to day operation of the ARCTIC I. 6.1.1.2 The activity of Performance Monitoring is an objective itself of the SMS and its effective implementation will ensure that the GlobalSantaFe Management system is effective and suitably resilient to meet the dynamic need of risk mitigation in an ever demanding operational profile. 6.1.2 Document Update

6.1.2.1 The text within this section of the case has been updated in the light of the change of ownership of the ARCTIC I and the integration of the unit into the Transocean Management system. In some areas it is necessary to describe the original systems in place and where appropriate reference regarding sections of the Corporate Management system is reference in terms of the current system as applied.

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6.1.3

Abbreviations

6.1.3.1 As identified within text Abbreviation ABS ASA ASP BOS CDP DNV Doc EAM EMS FAC FAT FOCUS GSF HSE IADC IAPP IMO IOPP IRR ISM ISO 14001 MS MARPOL MSDS MTC OIM RWC SIC SMC SRMR STEA Definition American Bureau of Shipping Advanced Safety Auditing Accident Statistics Program (IADC Industry Standard) Blade Offshore Services Company Designated Person (Corporate ISM Designated Responsible Person) Det Norsk Veritas Document of Compliance (ISM - Shore base certificate of compliance) Environmental Affairs Manager (Global) Environmental Management system First Aid case Fatality Field Observation Continuously Upgrading Safety GlobalSantaFe Health Safety and Environment International Association of Drilling Contractors International Air Pollution Prevention (Certificate) International Maritime Organisation International Oil Pollution Prevention (Certificate) Improvement Request Report International Safety Management (System) International Standards Organisation 14001 Environment Management Management System International Convention for Prevention of Pollution at Sea 1973/1978 Material Safety Data Sheet Medical Treatment Case Offshore Installation Manager Restricted Work Case Serious Injury Case Safety Management Certificate (ISM Certificate for vessel) Subsequent Remedial Measures Report Safety Training and Environmental Affairs

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6.2 6.2.1

Performance Monitoring Performance Monitoring Elements; Periodic Monitoring Audit and Audit Compliance Verification of HSE Critical Activities/Tasks and Equipment/Systems

6.2.1.1 In some aspects the elements identified within this section have been identified within Section 2, Transocean Management system. However this part of the safety case will provide more detail of the activities onboard the ARCTIC I that are employed in support of the Management system and in support of risk mitigation and control of operational tasks. 6.2.1.2 The table below indicates the philosophy of the Performance Monitoring process Process
Periodic Monitoring

Audit Team
Supervisors Other Line Managers Personnel not directly connected with Arctic I Operation Personnel not directly connected with Arctic I Operation And Personnel from an external Organisation Client Class Third Party

Audit Purpose
Ensure Plans and Operations are implemented and maintained Assessing overall effectiveness of the Management system through management review of HSE Performance against HSE Objectives

Work-scope
Verify Barriers that address Major Hazards & other Work place Hazards associated with daily Operations Verify Barriers that address Major Hazards & other Work place Hazards associated with daily Operations

Audit & Audit Compliance

Verification of HSE Critical Activities/Tasks and Equipment/Systems

Ensure implementation and effectiveness of Management system.

HSE Critical Activities/Tasks Equipment/Systems (barriers address major hazards)

and that

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6.2.2

Periodic Monitoring

6.2.2.1 The table below summarises the continuous program of meetings and the implicit consideration of Environmental and Safety related issues as they effect the daily operation of the vessel.
Frequency Job Classification Operating Responsibility
Daily Operations Meeting Reviews planned rig activities highlights task hazards and preventative measures. Minutes passed on for dissemination to all work groups. Also acts as medium for updating Management on night shift works and operational issues Attended by all Department heads and Client Representative Department Heads Pre Tour Meeting Uses minutes and information from Daily Planning Meeting to conduct the pre-tour safety/environmental meeting every shift hand-over using the daily planning minutes, relevant task mitigation procedures and TRAs for the work to be performed Pre-Task Meeting Use of THINK process and plans in TRA pf dailky activities

OIM Department Heads

Daily

Supervisors

6.2.2.2 As part of the pro-active approach, individuals onboard ARCTIC I have been trained as part of their HSE Program to be able to conduct FOCUS observations. All personnel are also familiarised in the use of the THINK and START active risk mitigation and control processes 6.2.2.3 On a weekly basis a General HSE meeting is held at which all available personnel attend, the meeting being repeated during both night and day shift to ensure full crew participation. 6.2.2.4 All HSE meetings are documented and attendance sheets signed by all personnel attending. The OIM and Rig Manager Review and sign each meeting report and ensure appropriate action identified in the meeting is addressed using the FOCUS Improvement Process. Depending on the resources required to implement the improvement/corrective opportunity, utilization of the FOCUS tracking software may also be required.[HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 4.2 4.1] 6.2.2.5 The OIM conducts a general HSE meeting on a periodic basis. General HSE meetings are used for issues that apply to all personnel, such as HSE performance recognition, incident status (Unit, Division, Sector, Branch, installation or facility), and significant change to normal routines. 6.2.2.6 The Company preferred method for documentation of HSE Meetings is located within the Global Reporting System (GRS). Use of this form within GRS provides an avenue for installation/facility management to review meeting content and offer feedback in a more expedient manner. HSE meetings must be forwarded to installation management for review and feedback. 6.2.3 Incident Reporting and Analysis

6.2.3.1 The Company uses guidelines, consistent with industry standards, which classify and separate work related personal injuries and illnesses in accordance with IADC recognized categories, namely: Fatality (FAT) Lost Time Incident (LTI) Restricted Work Case (RWC) Medical Treatment Case (MTC) First Aid Case (FAC).

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6.2.3.2 For both Non and Work Related incidents it is Transocean Policy that the initial factual points must be reported and documented on an Incident Report Form within the Global Reporting System and validated by the Rig Manager within 72 Hours of the event occurring. 6.2.3.3 In the event of a Fatality, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Operating Officer must be notified by the fastest means possible.[HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 6.3] 6.2.3.4 Other types of event reporting not relating to personal injury are identified as; Unsafe Observations - reported to a Supervisor as soon as observed or rectified by the Observer and recorded on a START Card Near Hits and Serious Near Hits - Initial facts to be recorded on Incident Report form in the GRS and reviewed by the Rig Manager within 72 Hours Loss of Containment Report - The initial factual points must be reported and documented within GRS and validated by the Rig Manager before the conclusion of the next business day. Any major Loss of Containment must be reported on the daily operations report and reported immediately to the Division/Unit QHSE Manager [HQS HSE PP 02 EMS Sec 4 1 4.8] Property Damage Report To be reported on an Operational Event Report

6.2.3.5 Upon review of the Incident report the Rig Manager calculates the Actual and Potential Severity based upon the Companys criteria. .[HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 6.3 4.2] which is documented within the GRS. 6.2.3.6 Personnel Incident Severity (consequence) Rating and Values
Severity Rating
FAC MTC RWC SIC <6 mos. off SIC > 6 mos. off FAT

Severity Value
1 3 5 7 15 30

6.2.3.7 Near Hits and Serious Near Hits result in only potential severity and no actual severity. Potential severity of a Serious Near Hit is represented in the shaded areas of Table 1. Potential severity of a Near Hit is represented in the non-shaded areas of Table 1. The Potential Severity value does not determine the classification of Near Hit or Serious Near Hit. The Severity rating determines classification of a Near Hit or Serious Near Hit. There is no relationship between Potential Severity value and the classification of Near Hits or Serious Near Hits. 6.2.3.8 Severity Rate is a leading and lagging safety performance indicator. Severity Rate is derived from the cumulative severity values of a series of incidents that represents relative changes in severity as a function of time. There are two types of severity rates, actual and potential. 6.2.3.9 The Actual Severity Rate represents incident severity over a period of time. The Actual Severity Rate represents the sum of all actual severity values assigned to incidents occurring in the specified time frame. The Working Hours represents the sum of all working man-hours in the specified time frame

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6.2.3.10 The Potential Severity Rate is a representation of incident potential severity over a period of time. The Potential Severity Rate represents the sum of all potential severity values assigned to incidents occurring in the specified time frame. The Working Hours represents the sum of all working man-hours in the specified time frame. 6.2.3.11 In adhering to the IADC format the Company maintain a consistency of reporting internally and in line with industry standards. This enables the company to establish corporate and unit by unit safety performance in line with industry standards. 6.2.3.12 Incident reporting is completed on a monthly schedule, in the format of the current month, year to date and the 12-month rolling recordable rate for all work related medical treatment cases, restricted work cases, serious injury cases and fatalities combined into one figure. Business Units report to Corporate any personnel unable to return to work as the result of a Serious Injury Case, including the actual days the individual is unable to work in any capacity during the reporting period.[HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 6.3 4.4] 6.2.3.13 Through the medium of the various HSE meetings onboard the ARCTIC I onboard incidents will be reviewed to ensure that lessons learnt are cascaded to all personnel for the benefit of the personnel engaged in the operational activities. 6.2.3.14 Onboard the ARCTIC I any person with a responsibility for undertaking Incident investigation is provided with formal training in the required techniques.[HQS HSE PP O1 Sec 4 1.3 4.1]. It is a requirement that all lead Incident investigator are required to have completed the 3 Day Kelvin TOP-SET Training [HQS HSE PP 01 Sec 4 6 4.3.2] 6.2.4 Behaviour Based Observation Systems

6.2.4.1 As described in Part 2 of this Case, the Company have adopted three systems to enhance the proactive approach to Operational risk management in the work place. FOCUS - Field Observation Continuously Upgrading Safety THINK START

6.2.4.2 FOCUS is a behavioural tool adopted and implemented for use by all personnel with the intention to continuously improve its safety performance through the identification, observation and reduction of at-risk behaviours and the elimination of incidents. The FOCUS Improvement Process provides a consistent means to improve Company performance by formulating an action plan, organizing resources to carry out the plan, communicating the action plan, undertaking the action, summarizing the results and capturing lessons learned 6.2.4.3 All individuals onboard the ARCTIC I are required to incorporate the THINK Planning Process into all tasks performed, whether working individually or in teams. The THINK Planning Process is utilized for Risk Management of all activities and tasks carried out throughout the Company [HQS HSE PP01 Section 4 2.1.4] 6.2.4.4 The THINK Planning Process is utilized for Risk Management of all activities and tasks carried out throughout the Company and consists of the following steps: Correctly identifying the hazards (What If?) and associated risks (consequences and likelihood) involved in an activity or task through risk assessment. Utilizing knowledge and experience to demonstrate risks are as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) by applying the appropriate level of risk assessment (THINK planning level).
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Determining the controls (policies, procedures, standards and work practices) required to ensure the risk to people, the environment and property is as low as reasonably practicable throughout the task or activity: 1. Preventive controls prevent an incident by reducing the likelihood an incident will occur. 2. Mitigating controls reduce the consequences of an incident if preventive controls fail or are not effective. Communicating the risks and controls to personnel who may be affected. Anticipating possible deviations from the THINK plan by identifying changes, conditions and in actions (What If?).

6.2.4.5 The START Process is used by all personnel onboard ARCTIC I to observe and monitor work practices, plans and workplace conditions. The START Process provides an ability to monitor and record the effectiveness of a THINK Plan/Procedure. 6.2.4.6 The START process provides the ability for any individual to provide written formal Feedback to the HSE System onboard the ARCTIC I. Observations can be performed on an individual (or individuals engaged in performing the same task) or conditions. An observation on an individual does not necessarily require specific knowledge and responsibility of the task being performed. The individual performing the observation makes the commitment to identify safe conditions and safe behavior and/or interrupt the operation to act on an unsafe condition or at-risk/unsafe behavior. 6.2.4.7 Monitoring a THINK plan is when an individual or group has knowledge and understanding of a plan, and makes the commitment to continually assess the plan in progress. The purpose of monitoring plans is to recognize any change or deviation from the plan. The resulting consequences of not recognizing a change or deviation from the plan can be one or more of the following: An unsafe condition An at-risk/unsafe behaviour A missed opportunity to interrupt An incident (Near Hit, Serious Near Hit, Personnel Injury, Environmental Damage, Property Damage

6.2.4.8 All personnel onboard the ARCTIC I including sub contractors are required and encouraged to participate in these Observations systems with formal training being provided onboard the unit. 6.2.5 Environmental Monitoring and Measurement

6.2.5.1 As a marine unit the ARCTIC 1 is required to comply with the International Maritime Organisation resolutions for environmental controls. In particular ARCTIC 1 complies with the requirements for; Prevention of Oil Pollution Emission Control Ballast Management control

Discharge of Treated Effluent The above are all monitored and enforced through external audit by third part auditors, Classification Society, and Coastal state authorised bodies. HSE Policy 6.2.5.2 As the ARCTIC I Classification society Det Norsk Veritas (DNV) issue certificates of compliance as witnessing the satisfactory arrangements in place and the limitations of the discharge. The IAPP International Air Pollution Prevention certificate indicates compliance with Annex VI of MARPOL 73/78 (International Convention for Prevention of Pollution by ships) whilst the IOPP (International Oil
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Pollution Prevention) indicates compliance with Annex I of MARPOL 73/78. 6.2.5.3 In addition to the statutory controls of discharges Transocean are committed to the safeguarding of the environment through their own Environmental Management System Manual HQS HSE PP 02 EMS. Section 4 5.7 of the HSE Manual HQS HSE PP 01 provides the company requirements for Storage, Segregation, Mixing, and Disposal of Hazardous Material and Waste. 6.2.5.4 In compliance with Brazil Coastal State legislation, incineration is prohibited and hence an Active Waste segregation and storage policy will be enabled onboard ARCTIC I so that all waste will be suitably containerised for transhipment to a suitable shore based environmental handling site. 6.2.5.5 The ARCTIC I is required to have a continual monitoring and improvement process in place to ensure existing environmental performance is meeting Company expectations. Environmental performance must be monitored to ensure full compliance with Company policies, government laws and regulations. HQS HSE PP 02 EMS Sec 5 1 4.1]. 6.2.5.6 Transocean Management conducts audits and assessments to verify compliance to and evaluate performance of people in achieving the expectations and requirements described in the Company Management System Manual. The methods for monitoring include: Executive Management Review Corporate PMAA Unit/Division Management Review Unit/Division PMAA QHSE Steering Committee Monitoring by Rig Manager (Asset/Performance) Daily Monitoring by OIM Green Team Monitoring Environmental Site Survey

6.2.5.7 In support of the ARCTIC I environmental processes, Executive Management (I.E Unit/Corporate VPs, COO, President, CEO) are required to review and monitor Company Environmental Performance at least every 12 months, make decisions for strategic planning and ensure the necessary resources are available to achieve the Company environmental goals and objectives. This review process takes place during Corporate QHSE Steering Committee meetings. The Executive Management Review must include a review of the Corporate QHSE Steering Committee meeting minutes and the Environmental Performance Plan and an evaluation of the EMS Policy Statement and Procedures and any additions made following the PMAA process. {HQS HSE PP 02 EMS Sec 5 1 4.7] 6.2.5.8 In the event that performance monitoring, or other inspection, monitoring or auditing indicates a requirement for corrective action, improvement opportunities or preventive actions, the FOCUS system is utilised for the recording and tracking of the findings and the remedial activities. 6.2.5.9 Any chemical or substance of a chemical nature arriving onboard the ARTIC I is accompanied by a Material Safety Data Sheet. It is a company requirement that a full chemical inventory is kept onboard the rig and that personnel are informed of the arrival of any new chemical within 24 hours of it arriving onboard. The availability of the MSDS to the various HSE Meetings, and the discussing of the arrival of any new chemicals onboard the ARCTIC I will be verified by regular audit.

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6.3 6.3.1

Audit and Compliance Audit Overview

6.3.1.1 As outlined in Part 2 of this case Safety Management Section 2.12.5 Audit and Audit Compliance, Transocean have an extensive Auditing process which consists of assessing the eight management and three personal principles as defined in the PMAA manual as well as auditing selected policies contained in Corporate Level 1 policy and procedure manuals. Reference to ISM Code Elements that correspond to the Company Management System is also provided on the form 6.3.1.2 The Core PMAA scope is posted on the Corporate QHSE website. The Core PMAA Scope is determined by Corporate, Unit and Division management. The purpose of developing the Core PMAA scope is to establish a consistent approach to evaluate the effectiveness of key risk-reducing controls that contribute to safe and reliable performance. 6.3.1.3 At the discretion of Location Management, additional policies and procedures may be included in Division and Installation audits based on managements evaluation of the locations performance and results measured by Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and Key Step Measures (KSMs). Sources for these specific performance requirements may also be from Business Unit and Division Level 2 policies, requests by clients, or local regulatory requirements 6.3.1.4 The total of 11 core principles are as follows;

6.3.1.5 The 8 Management principles are; Leadership in management Policies and Procedures Organisation Resources and Responsibilities Planning and Risk Management Execution and Monitoring Evaluation and Improvement Training and Competence Communications Behaviour Accountability Appraisals and Feedback

6.3.1.6 The 3 Personal principles are;

6.3.1.7 Upon completion of the audit and assessment stage of the PMAA the following steps are taken by the Audit Team under the lead of a Lead Auditor. 1. 2. 3. 4. Consolidate and evaluate the results. Analyze the results. Identify any improvement and corrective opportunities. Communicate the results and, improvement and corrective opportunities to Location management. Utilize the FOCUS Improvement Process to effectively plan and manage the improvement and/or corrective opportunity actions, and summarize the audit results.

5.

6.3.1.8 Follow-up and Close-out is the final step in the PMAA process, and ensures the Locations performance is optimized by carrying out the Improvement and Corrective Actions to completion. Close-out is a management responsibility which is carried out after verifying follow up has been satisfactorily completed
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6.3.1.9 As an additional check on the functioning of the Management System, the Company has appointed 3rd party Certification bodies to verify conformance to the ISM Code (ABS) and the Management System is also subject to regular periodic audit visits by these bodies. 6.3.2 Audit Team

6.3.2.1 The PMAA team members as well as the Lead Assessor id determined by Corporate and Business Unit/Division management through the Annual Corporate and Business Unit PMAA Schedule plan. The Corporate Director of QHSE and the Business Unit Director of Operations and Performance will consult to ensure that PMAA schedules complement each other and that the PMAA Teams are comprised of personnel with the required knowledge, experience and skills. 6.3.2.2 Selection of the PMAA Team Lead Assessor is based on competence in the PMAA Process, knowledge of the Company Management System, and understanding of the expertise required of the PMAA Team Members to perform an effective PMAA. Selection of PMAA team members is based on the individuals expertise and their knowledge and understanding of the Company Management System. All PMAA team members must understand the importance of the PMAA and be willing to fully participate. 6.3.2.3 Corporate team member selection will be determined by Corporate management and Business Unit team member selection will be determined by Business Unit/Division management. This is to ensure the proper knowledge, experience and communication skills will be available for an effective PMAA to be performed. 6.3.2.4 Audit Team Composition [HQS CMS PR 02 Sec 1 Table 1.2]
PMAA Team Participants Job Title / Position
PMAA Team participants must understand and be knowledgeable in the Company Management System. Corporate Management Audit Team Corporate Department Directors or Managers reporting to Department Vice Presidents Managers reporting to Corporate Department Directors

Subject Matter Experts determined by Corporate Vice Presidents PMAA Team participants must understand and be knowledgeable in the Company Management System. Business Unit/Division Management Business Unit/Division Department Managers Division/Sector Operations Managers Managers and/or Supervisors reporting to Business Unit/Division Department Managers Sector Managers and Sector Department Heads Rig Managers Operations Engineers Offshore Installation Managers (OIM) and Masters, including Subject Matter Experts determined by Business Unit/Division Managers

Lead Assessor

Lead Assessor must be a trained and experienced auditor and assessor who understands and is knowledgeable in the Company Management System and ISM code (when applicable) requirements.

6.3.2.5 The Business Unit Director of Operations Performance is required to work with the Business Unit QHSE Manager to ensure the annual PMAA schedules are coordinated between Corporate and Business Unit personnel. The Business Unit Director will also determine additional areas to include in the PMAA scope based upon the relevant Business unit KPI and KSM results. The Director is also responsible to verify that corrective/improvement actions for the ARCTIC I are completed and closed out within the approved target dates.
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6.3.3

Audit Process

6.3.3.1 The PMAA measures the effectiveness of the Company Management System by evaluating performance of people, processes and systems. By evaluating the effectiveness of the management system the Company identifies corrective and improvement opportunities. The PMAA audit and assessment criteria are based on leaderships expectations defined in the management system as policies, procedures and principles. 6.3.3.2 The PMAA process is a formal version of the daily monitoring of activities that managers and supervisors are required to perform to evaluate peoples efforts and the results of their efforts. Managers and supervisors perform daily monitoring to satisfy and assure themselves that their peoples efforts are aligned with the Companys expectations at all levels of the organization. 6.3.3.3 Performing an Installation Level 3 PMAA requires participation of Division management. Installation Level 3 PMAAs must be carried out by PMAA team participants who are independent of those installations being audited and assessed. Installation Level 3 PMAA schedules are developed by Business Unit QHSE Managers in consultation with Division/Sector QHSE managers. The objectives of an Installation Level 3 PMAA as applicable to the ARCTIC I are to: Evaluate Installation performance to determine if performance meets Company expectations as described within the Company Management System. Monitor Installation personnels understanding and application of the Company Management System to ensure effective implementation of Company policies, procedures and processes. Ensure that Company expectations are clearly understood and communicated at all levels. Allow Division management to personally interact with all levels of installation personnel. Audit and assess Installation compliance with the Company Management System. Conduct audits and assessments to meet regulatory requirements, i.e., ISM and ISPS. Provide Division management the opportunity to capture lessons learned that can be applied within the Division and communicated globally As a minimum the PMAA team is required to audit and assess the Principles, Policies and Procedures as per the Core Scope: Management and Personal Principles - Assessment of Management and Personal Principles following essential criteria outlined in the PMAA Criteria Standard, HQS-CMS-STD-01. Level 1 Policies - Audit of Level 1 Policies following the audit criteria outlined in the PMAA Criteria Standard, HQS-CMS-STD-01. Level 2 Policies - Audit of Level 2 Policies, (if applicable) following the audit criteria outlined by the Business Unit / Division and/or departments. Level 3 Installation Specific Procedures - Audit Level 3 Installation Specific

6.3.3.4 The PMAA process is formally documented utilising the Transocean approved format.

6.3.3.5 Procedures (if applicable) to ensure alignment with Level 1 Corporate Policies and Procedures and Level 2 Policies and Procedures. During the planning step, additional Policies to be audited may be identified and added to the scope of the audit. 6.3.3.6 While performing the PMAA, the team may identify additional Level 1 or 2 policies/procedures requiring attention that were not included in the initial plan, nor specified as required in the Annual

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PMAA Core Scope. The PMAA team will observe and assess the effectiveness of Major Emergency Management by the installation, or location (if applicable) by observing an Emergency Response Exercise. The team will assess all open management system implementation plans developed within the FOCUS Planning and Tracking tool to ensure Interim Actions to manage risk are effective and meet the intent of the policy. In addition, the team will determine if the completion dates for the permanent solutions to the requirements to be implemented are realistic, and that the time duration to complete this does not jeopardize the safety and performance of the location. 6.3.3.7 The PMAA team will audit and assess the actual results of peoples efforts, measured against the intent of the policies by assessing peoples understanding of the principles, procedures, and standards which describe how they are expected to achieve the result 6.3.4 Audit Reporting and Circulation

6.3.4.1 The final stage of the Audit and Assessment process is for the Audit Team to consider the results of the process and consolidate and evaluate the finding to provide a fully substantiated and verifiable report to the Installation team. 6.3.4.2 The Team analysis of the PMAA results will; Determine, through objective evidence analysis, if the assessment results are representative of the Locations performance. Compare the Assessment versus Audit results to identify if any relationships exist that could contradict and impact the Locations performance results. Compare the PMAA results versus the Initial Performance Review to determine if the KPIs and KSMs are representative of the Locations performance. Confirm agreement and summarize the PMAA results with the PMAA team before communicating results to Location management. Complete sections of the Corporate Management System Evaluation Form related to team analysis of PMAA results.

6.3.4.3 The PMAA Team is responsible for assembling the Performance Monitoring Report to enable the Management Review to be carried out by Corporate, Business Unit or Division Management. The Performance Monitoring Report consists of the following documents: Principles Assessment Matrix Management System Evaluation Form Management Summary of Corrective and Improvement Opportunities improvement opportunities (if any) corrective opportunities (if any) FOCUS Improvement and Corrective Actions (only if improvement or corrective opportunities have been identified

6.3.4.4 The PMAA team communicate the report finding to the onsite team upon completion of the audit and then progress to meet with the Onshore team to present the same findings to them. 6.3.4.5 The Onshore Management Team will confirm with the PMAA Lead Assessor that corrective and improvement actions identified in the PMAA have been entered in the FOCUS Planning and Tracking tool. 6.3.4.6 A copy of the audit report will be left onboard the ARCTIC I. This report copy is to be made available to both internal and external auditors as required. A further copy of the report is distributed to the operational and executive management having responsibility in the area audited.

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6.3.4.7 The PMAA Process

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6.3.5

Areas of Non Compliance

6.3.5.1 Follow-up and close-out includes the following: Onsite Location management completes the corrective and improvement actions within the planned FOCUS closeout schedule. PMAA Lead Assessor communicates to all relevant persons indicated on the PMAA distribution list Corporate, Business Unit and Division management review the Performance Monitoring Report and forward the Management System Evaluation form to the appropriate QHSE Steering Committee. Review and follow up of Lessons Learned. Follow up of corrective and improvement actions will be managed through the FOCUS Planning and Tracking tool. The time frame for completion and close out of all PMAA Corrective Actions is a maximum of 90 days.

6.3.5.2 If a Location does not complete and close out all PMAA Corrective Actions within the required 90 days, this does not, in any way, relieve Location Management of the responsibility to follow up and close out of all outstanding corrective actions plans. 6.3.5.3 The Verification of Close-Out tables [HQS CMS PR 02 Tables 2.4.1 and 2.4.2) describe the persons responsible to verify follow-up and close-out. In the case of an ARCTIC I PMAA audit the Division Operations Manager is identified as the responsible person, who has the responsibility to communicate to the Lead Assessor the corrective action status at the end of the 90 day period, and upon actual close out of all corrective actions if beyond the maximum 90 day period. 6.4 6.4.1 Verification of HSE Critical Activities/Tasks and Equipment/Systems List of HSE critical activities/tasks and equipment/systems

6.4.1.1 Part 4 of this Case documents the process of Risk Management based upon the identification of the presence either onboard or in association with the ARCTIC I operations, of Hazardous items. A formal consultancy and analysis meeting identified these items under 25 broad major headings each subdivided into additional sub hazard groups.
Hazard No
H-01 H-02 H-03 H-04 H-05 H-06 H-07 H-08 H-09 H-10 H-11 H-12 H-13 H-14 H-15

Hazard Group
Crude Oil under Pressure Refined Hydrocarbons Other Flammable Materials Explosives Pressure Hazards Hazds with a height difference Objects under induced stress Dynamic situation hazards Environmental Hazards Hot surfaces Hot Fluids Cold Surfaces Cold Fluids Open Flame Electricity

Hazard No
H-16 H-17 H-18 H-19 H-20 H-21 H-22 H-23 H-24 H-25 H-26 H-27 H-28 H-29 H-30

Hazard Group
Electromagnetic Radiation Ionizing Radiation- Open source Ionizing Radiation- Closed source Asphyxiates Toxic Gas Toxic Liquid Toxic Solids Corrosive Substances Biological Hazards Ergonomic Hazards Psychological Hazards Security Related Hazards Use of Natural Resources Medical Structural Integrity
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6.4.1.2 The evolvement of the Critical items through the consultancy process involved both operational Personnel, ARCTIC I personnel and Management Team and client representatives, thereby ensuring the broadest spectrum of hazard identification. 6.4.1.3 The use of Senior Arctic I personnel within the consultancy process ensured; Specific ARCTIC I Operational Experience Specific GlobalSantaFe Management System Knowledge as the then owner of the unit. Specific Drilling Operations Knowledge Pragmatic consideration of implementation of Risk Mitigation controls

6.4.1.4 The presence of the Client personnel within the consultancy process provided specific operational information in terms of the envisaged Well Operations. 6.4.2 Verification process by non Arctic 1 Personnel

6.4.2.1 The Risk Mitigation controls identified within Part 4 of this case are all based within the Company Management system. As such these controls and procedures are documented within the Management system into which is integrated the IMO ISM system which is an international accredited system requiring external verification for compliance. 6.4.2.2 To ensure continued accreditation the ISM system is subject to both internal audit and also periodic audit by the external body confirming system compliance to the IMO ISM standard. In this instance American Bureau of Shipping ABS undertake the external compliance audit. 6.4.2.3 The shore based Management system is verified through audit and by the issue of a DOC Document of Compliance on a 5 yearly basis but subject to annual review. The units adjudged compliant offshore are issued with an SMC Safety Management Certificate which ensures the applicability of the onshore system to the ARCTIC I and that the Management System onboard the ARCTIC I reflect the integration of the IMO ISM system. Revalidation of the SMC is subject to one intermediate verification. 6.4.2.4 Within the requirements of the ISM system Transocean undertake periodic Management system reviews as outlined previously in this section which ensures the continuity of the management system and the implementation of the risk mitigation processes. 6.4.3 Action Tracking process

6.4.3.1 The FOCUS Improvement Process is the Companys approved method for developing and tracking corrective and improvement action plans, and capturing lessons learned to improve Company performance. The FOCUS Improvement Process provides a consistent means to improve Company performance through effective planning. FOCUS is used with Management of Change to develop plans, obtain approvals, and monitor and track the progress of plans to completion. 6.4.3.2 The FOCUS system is an integral part of the Transocean Global Reporting system based on the intranet and is therefore widely accessible throughout the company. 6.4.3.3 It is the OIM responsibility to ensure corrective and/or improvement opportunities are planned and tracked in the FOCUS tool when the source of opportunity is classified as mandatory. The Rig Manager is responsible for monitoring the GRS tracking tool regularly to ensure timely implementation and close out is achieved.

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6.4.3.4 The Corrective action flow chart is shown on the following page.

6.5 6.5.1

Certification Maintenance of Class requirements

6.5.1.1 The ARCTIC 1 is classed with Det Norsk Veritas. As such the unit carries the following certification which indicates its compliance to internationally recognised design and equipment standards for specific items. 6.5.1.2 The Class certification covers the following items indication compliance to the associated equipment and system standards; Classification Certificate International Air Pollution Prevention International Oil Pollution Prevention International Load Line International Tonnage MODU Safety MODU Radio

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Lifesaving Appliances

6.5.1.3 All Class certification is maintained in date through periodic annual survey which verifies the continuity of the existing certificate. Typically all certificates are valid for five years only. 6.5.2 Flag State certification

6.5.2.1 The ARCTIC 1 is registered under the Flag of Vanuatu and hence has been surveyed for compliance with the rules and regulations of that state. To that end the unit carries the following certification demonstrating the necessary compliance; Certificate of Registry Minimum Safe Manning Radio Station License

6.5.2.2 The continued validity of the certificate of Registry and Minimum Safe Manning will be dependent upon the continued validity of the Class documentation. The Radio station License is subject to annual renewal as a result of survey. 6.5.2.3 In addition to the above the ARCTIC I has recently undertaken audit for ISM compliance as a pre-entry coastal state requirement under Brazilian Maritime Law. The SMC will be valid for the vessel for 5 years subject to a single periodic review of the ISM processes as integrated onboard the vessel. In addition the SMC is also endorsed through the continued validation of the DOC for the onshore management base. The DOC carries 5 year validity subject to annual verification of the onshore organisation. 6.5.3 Coastal State Verification

6.5.3.1 As the ARCTIC I is operating within Brazil Coastal state waters the vessel has been subjected to inspection by the regions maritime authorities for compliance to the requirements of the state maritime law. An initial certificate of compliance has been issued which is subject to annual renewal through periodic inspection.

Blade Offshore Services Ltd 2009

ARCTIC I HSE CASE PART 6 PERFORMANCE MONITORING

20

6.6

REFERENCES

6.6.1 Documentation HQS-CMS-GOV HQSHSEPP-01 Iss 04 Jan 31st 2009 Iss 03 Jan 8th 2009 Transocean Company Management System Health and Safety Policy and Procedures Manual Performance Procedures Monitoring Audit and Assessment

HQS-CMSPR02 Iss 03 Dec 31st 2008 HQS-HSE-PR-01 HQS-HSE-PR-02 HQS-HSE-PP-02 HQS-HRM-PP-01 HQS-OPS-PR-01 HQS-OPS-PP-01 HQS-OPS-HB-03 HQS-OPS-HB 05 Iss 01 Oct 31st 2007 Iss 02 Oct 12th 2007 Iss 01 Sept 30th 2007 Iss 02 Mar 1st 2009 Iss 02 Nov 1st 2007 Iss 01 Nov 1st 2004 Iss 02 Nov 11th 2004 Iss 01 Nov 11th 2005

Emergency Management Procedures Manual Medical Protocols Manual Environmental Management System Human Resources Policies and Procedures Manual Maintenance Manual Operations Policies and Procedures Manual Certificate and Survey Manual Field Operations Manual

Blade Offshore Services Ltd 2009

HSE- SAFETY CASE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AC1-HSE-PR-01

SECTION: SUBSECTION:

DOCUMENT CONTROL PAGE

APPROVALS
Approved by: Signature Arthur Russi Name Perf. Rig Manager Position

Approved by: Signature

Michel Legrand Name

SAM General Mgr. Position

TABLE OF REVISIONS
(Add or remove rows as needed)

Revision No.
Issue: 01 Revision: 01 Issue: Revision: Issue: Revision: Issue: Revision: Issue: Revision: Issue: Revision Issue: Revision Issue: Revision Issue: Revision Issue: Revision Issue: Revision Issue: Revision: Issue: Revision:

Revision Date
2009

Description of Change
Review & Revision by Blade Offshore

Prepared By
Blade Offshore

Position
BOS Rep

Reviewed By
Arthur Russi

Position
Rig Manager

Hardcopies are printed from an electronic system and are not controlled This controlled document has been produced by ENTER DEPARTMENT CONTROLLING DOCUMENT HERE. Questions relating to this document should be referred to ENTER LOCATION HERE. This document is the property of Transocean Inc. and shall not be copied or used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied without the express written authority of Transocean Inc. COPYRIGHT 2008 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED