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G.R. No. 189776 Present:
gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate * PERALTA, estate. Thus it disposed: - versus BERSAMIN, WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby ** MENDOZA, and rendered declaring that: SERENO, JJ. FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL 1. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 of the Register PASCUAL, of Deeds of Makati as part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual; Respondents. Promulgated: 2. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 to be subject to December 15, 2010 collation; x-------------------------------------------------- x 3. 1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at the rd DECISION mezzanine and the 3 floor of Unit 1110 Tanay St., Makati City form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual; CARPIO MORALES, J.: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his 4. The following properties form part of the estate of Angel siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her N. Pascual:  daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents  Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. a. 1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110 Tanay St., Rizal Village Makati TCT No. 348341 and 1/3 share in In a petition for ―Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters the rental income thereon; of Administration,‖ docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034, filed by respondents on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, b. 1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of 271 respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in square meters located at Tanay St., Rizal Village, Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent Makati City, TCT No. 119063; to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, ―may be considered as an advance legitime‖ of petitioner. c. Agricultural land with an area of 3.8 hectares located at Puerta Galera Mindoro covered by OCT Respondent’s nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as No. P-2159;  Administrator of the estate by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC. d. Shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation covered Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by by the following Certificate Numbers: A0011036, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati, which A006144, A082906, A006087, A065796, A11979, respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posite d that it ―may be considered A049521, C86950, C63096, C55316, C54824, as an advance legitime‖ to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate court, held that C120328, A011026, C12865, A10439, A021401, it was precluded from determining the validity of the donation. A007218, A0371, S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309; Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedent’s  estate, the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on to hold that it is  subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which reads: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other e. Shares of stocks in Paper Industries Corp. covered by the following Certificate Numbers: S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309, A006708, 07680, A020786, S18539, S14649; ¼ share in Eduardo Pascual’s shares in Baguio Gold Mining Co.; Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No. 2 014 12292 4 in the name of Nona Arellano;
Property previously covered by TCT No. 119053 now covered by TCT No. 181889, Register of Deeds of Makati City; and Rental receivables from Raul Arellano per Order issued by Branch 64 of the Court on November 17, 1995.
V . . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. EQUALLY AMONG HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE  HEIRS. (underscoring supplied) By Decision of July 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals found petitioner’s appeal ―partly meritorious.‖ It sustained the probate court’s ruling that the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation in this wise: Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule on equality of division, We hold that the property subject of donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor of the decedent and we believe that under the circumstances, the value of such immovable though not strictly in the concept of advance legitime, should be deducted from her share in the net hereditary estate. The trial court therefore committed no reversible error when it included the said property as forming part of the estate of Angel  N. Pascual. (citation omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
5. AND the properties are partitioned as follows: a. To heir Amelia P. Arellano-the property covered by TCT No. 181889; To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual-the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 348341 and 119063 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City and the property covered by OCT No. 2159,to be divided equally between them up to the extent that each of their share have been equalized with the actual value of the property in 5(a) at the time of donation, the value of which shall be determined by an independent appraiser to be designated by Amelia P. Arellano, Miguel N. Pascual and Francisco N. Pascual. If the real properties are not sufficient to equalize the shares, then Francisco’s and Miguel’s shares may be satisfied from either in cash property or shares of stocks, at the rate of quotation. The remaining properties shall be divided equally among Francisco, Miguel and Amelia. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding that I . . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF THE ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR. II . . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the probate court, herein petitioner ―was able to submit prima facie evidence of shares of stocks owned by the [decedent] which have not been included in the inventory submitted by the administrator.‖ Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135 in Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the order of inclusion of properties of the Intestate Estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as well as the partition and distribution of the same to the co-heirs are concerned. The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings in accordance with the disquisitions  herein. (underscoring supplied) Petitioner’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the  appellate court by Resolution of October 7, 2009, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed, ascribing as errors of the appellate court its ruling
III . . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF DECEASED ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AS HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. On the first issue: The term collation has two distinct concepts: first. the illegitimate children. .I . . The secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs. Branch 135 of the Makati Regional Trial Court. . are not entitled to any legitime – that part of the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserv ed it  for compulsory heirs. he was at liberty to donate all his properties. THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE. Arellano. the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. . Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood. they shall inherit in equal shares. and second. .  there is no legitime to be safeguarded. EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS. JR. is deemed as donation made to a ―stranger. or a surviving spouse. He was only survived by his siblings. therefore. and thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally among the parties. . On the second issue: The decedent’s remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives. legitimate children and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. herein petitioner and respondents. it is the return to the hereditary estate of  property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime. WHEREFORE. . (underscoring supplied) The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary. Amelia N. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs. it is a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate. is SET ASIDE. and whether the property of the estate should have been ordered equally distributed among the parties. THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR DECEASED BROTHER ANGEL N. There being no compulsory heir. after finding the legitime. 1004. which is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining what finally forms part of the estate. or concurring compulsory heirs. assuming that it was  valid. If there is no compulsory heir. The Court of Appeals Decision ordering the collation of the property donated to petitioner. . TO PETITIONER AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS ESTATE AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH. 1003. AND ARE ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES. so  that inofficious donations may be reduced. The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime. SO ORDERED. THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. JR. pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code. the petition is GRANTED. If there are no descendants. however. and to determine the free portion. the legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible. secondary. II . who are his collateral relatives and. Pascual. IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs. AS HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE  HEIRS. (2) secondary. viz: Art. PASCUAL. The records do not show that the decedent left any primary. III . . PASCUAL. one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. (underscoring supplied) Art. to the estate of the deceased Angel N. illegitimate children. His donation to petitioner. Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin. Jr. The concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs. PASCUAL JR. and the  surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs. IV . (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation. and (3) concurring. ascendants. the donated property is not subject to collation.‖ chargeable against the free  portion of the estate.
PERALTA.. J. Proc. VICENTE. FERRER.JARABINI G. No.: This case pertains to a gift. which in law is the equivalent of a will. J. the CA held that the donation. 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales  executed a document entitled ―Donation Mortis Causa‖ in favor of their two children. reversing that of the RTC. of this property herein donated and accepted and this Disposition and Donation shall be operative and effective upon  the death of the DONORS. the RTC erred in deciding the case the way it did. possession and administration That the document in question in this case was captioned ―Donation Mortis Causa‖ is not controlling. The Court’s Ruling  . otherwise denominated as a donation mortis causa. signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of the document. * BERSAMIN. and ** PEREZ. executed a deed of assignment of his rights and interests in subject property to their daughter Asuncion. ANGELITO. G. the donors’ intention being to transfer title over the property to the donees during the donors’ lifetime. being one given mortis causa. through her petition for the probate of the deed of donation mortis causa. 1968 deed of donation mortis causa‖ before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Sp. ABAD. given its irrevocability. Jarabini (daughter of their predeceased son. 187056 Present: CARPIO.R. the donor wife. and Jarabini was a donation mortis causa. if a donation by its terms is inter  vivos. and immediately transmitting ownership of the donated property to the latter. the donor husband. since no proceeding exists for the allowance of what Jarabini claimed was actually a donation inter vivos. The CA further held that. Leopoldo. The Facts and the Case On August 27. It is our will that Jarabini Gonzales-del Rosario and Emiliano Gonzales will continue to occupy the portions now occupied by them. and MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA. The deed of donation reads: It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse. she filed the present petition with this Court. and their granddaughter. Emiliano. the Court held that ―irrevocability‖ is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa. this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. however. did  not comply with the requirements of a notarial will. finding that the donation was in fact one made inter vivos. Promulgated: September 20. Chairperson. It is our further will that any one surviving spouse reserves the right. 2010 x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. Issue Presented The key issue in this case is whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe’s donation to Asuncion. Leopoldo died in June 1972. Court of Appeals. Respondents. 1968.versus - ASUNCION G. said the RTC. Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interest in the property was void since he had nothing to assign. A few months later or on December 19. Guadalupe. where  . FERRER. The RTC thus directed the registration of the property in the name of the donees in equal  shares. thus precluding a subsequent assignment thereof by one of the donors. In 1998 Jarabini filed a ―petition for the probate of the August 27. 2008. which in reality is a donation inter vivos made effective upon its execution by the donors and acceptance thereof by the donees. rendering the same  void. Asuncion opposed the petition. DEL ROSARIO. Zoilo) covering the spouses’ 126 -square meter lot and the house  on it in Pandacan. Manila in equal shares. Consequently.x DECISION ABAD. Following the CA’s denial of Jarabini’s motion for reconsideration. ownership. Petitioner. In Austria-Magat v.. The CA held that Jarabini cannot. It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall not in any way affect any other distribution of other properties belonging to any of us donors whether testate or intestate and where ever situated. the RTC rendered a decision dated June 20. FELIXBERTO. all surnamed G. invoking his father Leopoldo’s assignment of his rights and interests in the property to her. the latter rendered a  decision on December 23. The named donees. 2003. or in fact a donation inter vivos. substituted by her heirs. Although denominated as a donation mortis causa. collaterally attack Leopoldo’s deed of assignment in Asuncion’s favor. After trial. On Asuncion’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA). as it was denominated.  98-90589. This Court has held that. died in September 1968. JJ. JR. PILAR. the deed had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only two persons. Finally. Asuncion and Emiliano.
L. and 3.―revocability‖ is precisely the essence of the act. (Underscoring supplied) The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express ―irrevocability‖ of the donation is the ―distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos. B. 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. 2. Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos. Finally. 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. That before his death. the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation. Branch 19. The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the donee’s acceptance of the donation. Peñaflorida. in Sp. the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa. Moreover. that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive. ownership. 98-90589. the Court GRANTS the petition. in opposing the petition for probate and in putting the validity of the deed of assignment squarely in issue. maintaining only beneficialownership of the donated  property while they lived. Asuncion or those who substituted her may not now claim that the trial court improperly allowed a collateral attack on such assignment. 2008 Decision and March 6.‖ The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Reyes said in Puig v. The  acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property donated. by then. and administration of the property‖ and made the donation operative upon their death. need not  be accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime.R. the validity of the document as a donationinter vivos and the nullity of one of the donor’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property. Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property  to Asuncion should be regarded as void for. since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations. The donors in this case of course reserved the ―right. The Court has held before that  the rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute.‖ Here. Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter vivos. as Justice J. Donations mortis causa. the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will. being in the form of a will. in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed. The trial court cannot be faulted for passing upon. CV 80549. This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos. SO ORDERED. Consequently. ad nutum. possession. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor. or. the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos. in a petition for probate of what was initially supposed to be a donation mortis causa. Nemo dat quod non habet. That the transfer should be void if the  transferor should survive the transferee. Proc. and REINSTATES in toto the June 20. but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed. what amounts to the same thing. he had no more rights to  assign. WHEREFORE. in case of doubt. Notably. He could not give what he no longer had. SETS ASIDE the assailed December 23. . A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics: 1. the donors plainly said that it is ―our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse. it was immediately operative and final. But this Court has consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with their naked title. which  acceptance the deed required.
by these presents. Petitioners in their Amended Answer.one located in Cogon. ―A-1‖. RICHIE NATIVIDAD. petitioners. Cebu (307 sq. that petitioners. and JULIA L. PROCEEDED TO INTERPRET THE DONATIONS  IN QUESTION IN A MANNER CONTRARY THERETO. HOWEVER. seeking the annulment of said four (4) deeds of donation executed on January 14. OLGA NATIVIDAD. bestowing upon: (a) petitioner Estela C. the court a quo rendered a partial judgment on the pleadings on December 2. docketed as Civil Case No. The facts of the case are as follows: On February 17. inter alia. two (2) parcels of land . through their The court a quo ruled that the donations are donations mortis causa and therefore the four (4) deeds in question executed on January 14.[G. transfer. (b) petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan. ABELLA.‖ Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as these were made by the late Conchita Cabatingan ―in consideration of the love and affection of the donor‖ for the donee. convey.) and the other. 1995 are null and void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 806 of the Civil Code on solemnities of wills  and testaments. ESTELA MAGLASANG. as mandated under Art. RAYMUND NATIVIDAD.  m. petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan. These deeds of donation contain similar provisions. June 5. Respondents prayed that a receiver be appointed in order to preserve the disputed properties. m. OPHELIA NATIVIDAD. x x x the DONOR does hereby. that in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR. 1997 in favor of respondents. alleging that: ―THE LOWER COURT PALPABLY DISREGARDED THE LONG-AND-WELLESTABLISHED RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ON THE CHARACTERIZATION OF DONATIONS AS INTER VIVOS OR MORTIS CAUSA AND. ODETTE NATIVIDAD. respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue. SO ORDERED. to become effective upon the death of the DONOR. 1995. NAVADA. OSCAR C. DECISION sinister machinations and strategies and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingan’s fragile condition.). ESTRELLA M. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant and unwilling co-plaintiff with regards (sic) to the four Deeds of Donation Annexes ―A‖. 1992. 777 of the New Civil Code. and. INSTEAD. m. the present donation shall be deemed automatically  rescinded and of no further force and effect. MAYOL. CAÑETE.000 sq. HEIRS OF GENOVIVA C. an action for Annulment And/Or Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Donations and Accounting. Cabatingan.: Posed for resolution before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the sole issue of whether the donations made by the late Conchita Cabatingan are donations inter vivos ormortis causa.). CABATINGAN. deny respondents’ allegations conte nding that Conchita Cabatingan freely. Cebu. Raising questions of law. and. ALFREDO CABATINGAN and JESUSA C. 1995.000 sq. knowingly and voluntarily caused the preparation of  the instruments.). SONIA NATIVIDAD and ENCARNACION CABATINGAN VDA. petitioners elevated the court a quo’s decision to this  Court. THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN. 806 of the New Civil Code. Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations. together with petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan. On respondents’ motion. MAN-2599. DE TRINIDAD. 2002] MA. m. 131953. considering that these are  donations mortis causa. NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S. Maglasang. Conchita Cabatingan died. NATIVIDAD namely. unto the DONEE the above-described property.232 sq. Branch 55. that the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments. Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14. with the following dispositive portion: ―WHEREREFORE. a ―Deed of Conditional of Donation (sic) Inter Vivos for House and Lot‖ covering one-half (½) portion of the former’s house and lot located at  Cot-cot. b) To declare the plaintiffs and defendants as well as unwilling co-plaintiff as the heirs of the deceased Conchita Cabatingan and therefore hereditary co-owners of the properties subject of this partial decision.R. LUZ M. to wit: ―That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE. caused the execution of the deeds of donation. a portion of a parcel of land located in Masbate (80. respondents. RICHARD NATIVIDAD.‖  AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. Liloan. J. together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon. a portion of the Masbate property (80. YUSON. ―B‖ and Annex ―C‖ which is the subject of this partial decision by: Declaring the four Deeds of Donation as null and void ab initio for being a donation Mortis Causa and for failure to comply with formal and solemn requisite under Art. and there is nothing in the deeds which indicate  that the donations were made in consideration of Cabatingan’s death. LOURDES M. PROVIDED. NATIVIDAD. PERLA M. that they be declared as co-owners of the  properties in equal shares. vs. x x x‖ (Emphasis Ours) On May 9. and (c) petitioner Merly S. namely. Respondents allege. by way of donation. and in consideration of all the foregoing. Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother. BOQUIA. . 1995. No. a portion of a parcel of land in Masbate (50. In addition.
in the presence of the In the present case. meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee because of the donor’s death. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will. the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass  proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan’s death. The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written . 95 Phil. and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and  testament. and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof. Further: ―As the donation is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition. her heirs and assigns a portion of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (100. 1 and 2. the said Donor by these presents does hereby give. The phrase ―to become effective upon the death of the DONOR‖ admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will.‖ xxx ―SIGNED by the above-named DONOR and DONEE at the foot of this Deed of  Donation mortis causa. and that the above quoted provision establishes the donor’s intention to transfer the ownership and possession of the donated property to the donee only after the former’s death.000) SQUARE METERS. to wit: ―ART. and (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.‖ We apply the above rulings to the present case. to wit: ―That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing donation mortis causa under the terms and conditions set forth therein. If she really intended that the donation should take effect during her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated be transferrred to the donee or independently of. 481). As we have held in Alejandro v. Vda. on the left margin. transfer. and convey . the following characteristics must be taken into account: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor. Every will. As stated in Reyes v. and not by reason of her death. the formalities of a will should have been complied with under Article 728 of the Civil Code. must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator’s name wri tten by some other person in his presence. ad nutum. The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be rescinded in case petitioners predecease  Conchita Cabatingan. (Citing Bonsato v. the questioned donation contained the provision:  In "That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE. but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed. Court of Appeals. to become effective upon the death of the DONOR.253). Psu-109393). each and every page thereof.  (italics supplied.  unto the DONEE. on the southeastern part Pro-indiviso of the above described property. (The portion herein donated is within Lot 2-B of the proposed amendment Plan Subdivision of Lots Nos. the foregoing provision is similar to that contained in the donation executed by Cabatingan. and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. 805. that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive. or caused some other person to write his name. Well in point is National Treasurer of the Phils. Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the following Acceptance and Attestation clauses. as aforesaid.‖ That the donations were made ―in consideration of the love and affection of the donor‖ does not qualify the donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis  causa may also be made for the same reason. with all the buildings and improvements thereon. which consists of two (2) pages x x x. said case. except the last.)" Notably. under his express direction. ―If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor’s death.‖ In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa. and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. Mosqueda. In a donation mortis causa.petitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case petitioners die ahead of Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the donation as inter vivos. ―the right of disposition is not transferred to the  donee while the donor is still alive. (2) That before his death. or what amounts to the same thing. one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. Geraldez (78 SCRA 245. shall also sign. said deeds must be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code. Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis causa. Petitioners’ arguments are bereft of merit. the donation is void and would produce no effect. v. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in her donations. and avail herself of this occasion to express her profound gratitude for the kindness and generosity of the DONOR. and by his express direction. de Meimban. otherwise. other than a holographic will. the same  partake of the nature of testamentary provisions and as such. she would have not expressed such proviso in the subject deeds. uniformly found in the subject deeds of donation. We held in Meimban case that the donation is a mortis causa donation. then it is at that time that the donation takes effect.
SO ORDERED. the documents were not executed in the manner provided for under the above-quoted provisions of law. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will. . (n)‖ The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary public of the donor and the donee. the trial court did not commit any reversible error in declaring the subject deeds of donation null and void. the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. WHEREFORE. Thus. (n) ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.instrumental witnesses. If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses. it shall be interpreted to them. and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
February 1. MAMERTO SUMPELO and RICARDO SUMPELO. Block no. Trias. On December 17. Filipino.R. San Antonio. Consolacion Austria. balo naninirahan sa 809 L. Bagong Pook. Cavite City. FLORENTINO LUMUBOS. 1055. San Antonio. Lungsod ng Kabite. balo. dated August 15. TEODORA CARAMPOT. SEGUNDA SUMPELO.) APOLINARIA AUSTRIA Tagatanggap-pala HER MARK CONSOLACION AUSTRIA . naninirahan sa Pasong Kawayan. at nakatala sa pangalan ko sa Titulo Torrens bilang TCT-T-3268 (RT-4036) ng Lungsod ng Kabite.: Before us is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of   Appeals. may asawa. ERNESTO APOLO. In 1953. Lungsod ng Kabite. known as Cavite Beach Subdivision. Hen. Lungsod ng Kabite. San Antonio. At kaming apat na anak na nakalagda o nakadiit sa kasulatang ito ay TINATANGGAP NAMIN ang kaloob-palang ito ng aming magulang na si Basilisa Comerciante. HER MARK BASELISA COMERCIANTE Tagakaloobpala HER MARK ROSARIO AUSTRIA Na alang-alang sa mabuting paglilingkod at pagtingin na iniukol sa akin ng apat kong mga tunay na anak na sila: (Sgd. at sa ilalim ng kondision na: Magbubuhat o babawasin sa halaga ng nasabing lupa at bahay ang anumang magugul o gastos sa aking libing at nicho at ang anumang matitira ay hahatiin ng APAT na parte. with an area of 150 square meters. 1989 reversing the Decision. Leonardo. Florentino Lumubos. no. HON. may sapat na gulang. Branch 17. 2002] ROSARIO AUSTRIA. JR. Bagong Pook. vs. ngayong ika17 ng Disyembre taong 1975. SA KATUNAYAN. Filipinas. J. reconveyance and damages. RT4036 (T-3268) and known as Lot 1. CONSOLACION AUSTRIA. located in Bagong Pook. may sapat na gulang. Basilisa bought a parcel of residential land together with the improvement thereon covered and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. and one of herein respondents. Javier. being a portion of Lot No. namely. Filipina. respondents. may sapat na gulang. ang aking isang lupang residential o tirahan sampu ng aking bahay nahan ng nakatirik doon na nasa Bagong Pook din. 106755. Filipina. ay nilagdaan o diniitan namin ito sa Nobeleta. Lungsod ng Kabite.1. asawa ni Encarnacion Magsino. San Antonio. dated June 30. San Antonio. COURT OF APPEALS and FLORENTINO LUMUBOS. Filipina. at nakikilala bilang Lote no. parepareho isang parte sa bawat anak kong nasasabi sa itaas nito upang maliwanang (sic) at walang makakalamang sinoman sa kanila. The facts of the case are as follows: Basilisa Comerciante is a mother of five (5) children. DECISION DE LEON. Bagong Pook. Basilisa executed a document designated as ―Kasulatan sa Kaloobpala (Donation)‖. Javier. APOLINARIA AUSTRIA. 4426 which is an action for annulment of title. 1975. petitioner. Carlos Viniegra. ay  APOLINARIA AUSTRIA-MAGAT. San Antonio. si BASELISA COMERCIANTE. sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito’y NAGSASALAYSAY Kusang loob na ibinibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at hindi na mababawi sa naulit ng apat na anak ko at sa kanilang mga tagamagmana (sic). Leonardo died in a Japanese concentration camp at Tarlac during World War II. Javier. balo. may sapat na gulang. No. naninirahan sa 809 L. herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat. Na ang Kaloob palang ito ay magkakabisa lamang simula sa araw na ako’y pumanaw sa mundo.. of Subdivision Plan Psd-12247. may sukat na 150 metros cuadrados. Kabite. reads as follows: KASULATANG SA KALOOBPALA (DONATION) TALASTASIN NG LAHAT AT SINUMAN: Na ako. The Decision of the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 1986 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite. GLRO Cadastral Rec. Cavite Beach Subdivision. 7. Block 1. 9539. at naninirahan din sa 809 L. 809 L. at tuloy pinasasalamatan namin siya ng taos sa (sic) puso dahil sa kagandahan look (sic) niyang ito sa amin. The said document which was notarized by Atty. DOMINGO COMIA. at naninirahan sa blg. Javier Bagong Pook. may sapat na gulang. Lungsod ng Kabite. Filipina.[G. Rosario Austria. of the Cadastral survey of Cavite. Kabite.
The appellate court declared in its decision that: In the case at bar. Basilisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject house and lot in favor of herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat for Five Thousand Pesos (P5. Viniegra at dalawang saksi. ay nagpapahayag ng sumusunod: Na ang titulo numero TCT-T-2260 (RT-4036) ng Lungsod ng Kabite. the sale by the donor of the said property was valid since she remained to be the absolute owner thereof during the time of the said transaction. T-10434 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite City in favor of petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat on February 8. that the provision stating that the donor reserved the right to revoke the donation is a feature of a donation mortis causa which must comply with the formalities of a will. ay mananatili sa poder o possession ng Ina. 1975. SO ORDERED. ang aking lupang residential o tirahan sampu ng aking bahay nakatirik doon xxx.(Sgd. On appeal. RT-4036 in the name of the donor was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. na lumagda o dumiit sa kasulatang kaloob pala. the dispositive portion of which reads. the appealed decision is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one rendered: 1. T-10434 and other relevant documents. in view of the foregoing. the decision of the trial court was reversed by the Court of Appeals in its subject decision. and that inasmuch as the donation did not follow the formalities pertaining to wills.000.  On August 15. docketed as Civil Case No. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE.T. Carlos T. declaring null and void the Deed of Sale of Registered Land (Annex B) and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1975.00). Domingo Comia. Ika-17 ng Disyembre. pawang may mga sapat na gulang. SO ORDERED. No pronouncement as to costs. Hence.  Basilisa and her said children likewise executed another notarized document denominated as ―Kasulatan‖ which is attached to the deed of donation. 1983.  On February 6. na si Basilisa Comerciante habang siya ay nabubuhay at Gayon din ang nasabing Titulo ay hindi mapapasangla o maipagbibili ang lupa habang maybuhay ang nasabing Basilisa Comerciante. As the result of the registration of that sale. and Ernesto Apolo (representing their deceased mother Consolacion Austria). at Florentino Lumubos. and for reconveyance and damages. herein respondents Teodora Carampot. this Court hereby renders judgment for defendant dismissing this case and ordering plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3. bahay sa loteng tirahan ng Bagong Pook na nababanggit sa nasabing kasulatan.)FLORENTINO LUMUBOS Tagatanggap-pala (Acknowledgment signed by Notary Public C. Apolonio Austria. (emphasis supplied) . Sa katunayan ang nagsilagda kaming lahat sa labak nito sa harap ng abogado Carlos T. Mamerto and Segunda. 4426 per its Decision. the donation is a donation mortis causa pursuant to Article 728 of the New Civil Code inasmuch as the same expressly provides that it would take effect upon the death of the donor. in view of the foregoing.1986. Kabite. 4426 against the petitioner for annulment of TCT No. the decisive proof that the deed is a donation inter vivos is in the provision that : Ibinibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at hindi mababawi sa naulit na apat na anak ko at sa kanilang mga tagapagmana. the same is void and produced no effect whatsoever. T-10434 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite City (Annex E) and ordering the cancellation thereof. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT for brevity) No. Viniegra is omitted). declaring appellants and appellee co-owners of the house and lot in question in accordance with the deed of donation executed by Basilisa Comerciante on December 17. Ricardo. 1979. Consolacion Austria. all surnamed Sumpelo (representing their deceased mother Rosario Austria) and Florentino Lumubos filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite an action. 1979. On September 21. the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. and 2.000. The said document states that: KASULATAN TALASTASIN NG MADLA: Na kaming mga nakalagda o nakadiit sa labak nito – sila Basilisa Comerciante at ang kanyang mga anak na sila: Rosario Austria.  According to the trial court. na sinangayunan namin sa harap ng Notario Publico. to wit: WHEREFORE. Nobeleta. Viniegra.00 as attorney’s fees and the costs of suit.
‖ The stipulation is a reiteration of the irrevocability of the dispossession on the part of the donor. Basilisa Comerciante. the donor and her children stipulated that: Gayon din ang nasabing titulo ay hindi mapapasangla o maipagbibili ang lupa habang may buhay ang nasabing Basilisa Comerciante. Lungsod ng Kabite xxx xxx Na ang Kaloob palang ito ay magkakabisa lamang simula sa araw na ako’y pumanaw sa mundo. On the other hand. the other relevant provisions therein must be read in conjunction with the rest. the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will. but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed. bahay sa loteng tirahan ng Bagong Pook na nababanggit sa nasabing kasulatan. that such intent was shown when she actually sold the lot to herein petitioner. and that the donation shall take effect only when she dies. ad nutum. IGNORED THE RULES OF INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE DONATION IN QUESTION ASINTER VIVOS. WITH DUE RESPECT. the prohibition to encumber. that must be interpreted in the light of the provisions providing that the donation cannot be encumbered. In Bonsato v. Anent the first assignment of error. It has been held that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends on whether the donor intended to transfer ownership over the   properties upon the execution of the deed. na si Basilisa Comerciante habang siya ay nabubuhay at Gayon din ang nasabing Titulo ay hindi mapapasangla o maipagbibili ang lupa habang maybuhay ang nasabing Basilisa Comerciante xxx. the donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the house and lot in question. By the words ―hindi mababawi‖. that it was the intent of the donor to maintain control over the property while she was alive. II THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS. alienated or sold by anyone. Petitioner cites the testimony of Atty. xxx xxx Na ang titulo numero TCT-T-2260 (RT-4036) ng Lungsod ng Kabite. Hence. or. the petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the donation was a donation inter vivos. In Cuevas v. alienate or sell the property during the lifetime of the donor is a recognition of the ownership over the house and lot in issue of the donees for only in the concept of an owner can one  encumber or dispose a property. That before his death. to wit: (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor. The irrevocability of the donation is a characteristic of a donation inter vivos. xxx We affirm the appellate court’s decision. Court of Appeals. that the property donated shall remain in the possession of the donor while she is alive. xxx xxx xxx In the attached document to the deed of donation. Also. ay mananatili sa poder o possesion ng Ina. we ruled that when the deed of donation provides that the donor will not dispose or take away the property donated . that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive. who notarized the deed of donation. the petitioner claims that the donation is mortis causa for the reason that the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the donor. xxx. ownership of the house and lot was already with the donees even during the donor’s lifetime. San Antonio. ang aking lupang residential o tirahan sampu ng aking bahay nakatirik doon na nasa Bagong Pook din. She claims that in interpreting a document. showed such intention. this Court enumerated the characteristics of a donation mortis causa. AGAIN WITH DUE RESPECT. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. as follows: xxx xxx xxx(I)binibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at hindi mababawi sa naulit na apat na anak ko at sa kanilang mga tagapagmana. While the document indeed stated that the donation was irrevocable. The provisions in the subject deed of donation that are crucial for the determination of the class to which the donation belongs are. what amounts to the same thing. Viniegra. The right to dispose of a property is a right essential to full ownership.This is a clear expression of the irrevocability of the conveyance. ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PRESENT ACTION  HAS PRESCRIBED UNDER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. Cuevas. Hence this appeal grounded on the following assignment of errors: I THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS. xxx xxx xxx (2) (3) Significant to the resolution of this issue is the irrevocable character of the  donation in the case at bar.
are proofs that the donation is mortis causa. to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old  Civil Code. it is clear that the donees were already the owners of the subject property due to the irrevocable character of the donation. are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donor’s lifetime. If the donor intended to maintain full ownership over the said property until her death. a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act. Furthermore. this Court held that the prohibition to alienate does not necessarily defeat the inter vivos character of the donation. the provision in the deed of donation that the donated property will remain in the possession of the donor just goes to show that the donor has given up his naked title of ownership thereto and has maintained only the right to use ( jus utendi) and possess (jus possidendi) the subject donated property. New Civil Code. sold the property to the petitioner who is one of the donees. Another indication in the deed of donation that the donation is inter vivos is the acceptance clause therein of the donees. she could have expressly stated therein a reservation of her right to dispose of the same. The prohibition on the donor to alienate the said property during her lifetime is proof that naked ownership over the property has been transferred to the donees. The express irrevocability of the same (―hindi na mababawi‖) is the distinctive standard that identifies that document as a donation inter vivos. In the case at bar. Both the donor and the donees were prohibited from alienating and encumbering the property during the lifetime of the  donor. After the petitioner in turn redeemed the property from respondent Domingo. a court action is necessary to be filed within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the condition violated. Respondent Domingo Comia testified that sometime in 1977 or prior to the sale of the subject house and lot. we find and so hold that in the case at bar the donation is inter vivos. that she was disregarding the provision in the deed of donation prohibiting the alienation of the subject property. The act of selling the subject property to the petitioner herein cannot be considered as a valid act of revocation of the deed of donation for the reason that a formal case to revoke the donation must be filed pursuant to Article 764 of the Civil  Code which speaks of an action that has a prescriptive period of four (4) years from non-compliance with the condition stated in the deed of donation. his naked title of ownership has been passed on to the donees. the donor. the latter would still enjoy the right of possession over the property. Basilisa. the don ees would get all the rights of ownership over the same including the right to use and possess the same. Atty. Consolacion Austria. being in the form of  a will. Basilisa. In the Bonsato case. We have ruled that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. It remains to be a donation inter vivos despite an express provision that the donor continues to be in possession and enjoyment of the donated property while he is alive.‖ In Gestopa v. Court of Appeals. 828). but. It also supports the irrevocable nature of the donation considering that the donor has already divested herself of the right to dispose of the donated property. and that upon the donor’s death. and that the act of the donor was a manifestation that she was acknowledging the ownership of  the donees over the property donated. He parts away with his naked title but maintains beneficial ownership while he lives. We disagree. he in effect is making a donation inter vivos. Domingo Comia. we arrive at no other conclusion in that the petitioner’s cited provisions are only necessary assurances that during the donor’s lifetime. on the contrary. Thus. which the latter did. Consolacion Austria. the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated property. As regards the ground of estoppel. The other provisions therein which seemingly make the donation mortis causa do not go against the irrevocable character of the subject donation. violated the prohibition to encumber the property. free from all liens and encumbrances. We disagree. Viniegra testified that when the donor sold the lot to the petitioner herein. the donor in the case at bar. or sell the same. We now rule on whether the donor validly revoked the donation when one of her daughters and donees. asked one of the respondents herein. his grandmother. Moreover. the provisions which state that the same will only take effect upon the death of the donor and that there is a prohibition to alienate. It even highlights the fact that what remains with the donor is the right of usufruct and not anymore the naked title of ownership over the property donated. delivered the title of the said property to him. the Court held that the said statements only mean that ―after the donor’s death. when the said donor asked respondent Domingo Comia to redeem the same. it also appeared that the provision in the deed of donation regarding the prohibition to alienate the subject property is couched in general terms such that even the donor is deemed included in the said prohibition (―Gayon din ang nasabing Titulo ay hindi mapapasangla o maipagbibili ang lupa habang maybuhay ang nasabing Basilisa Comerciante‖). According to the petitioner.(thus making the donation irrevocable). Thereafter. The said provisions should be harmonized with its express irrevocability.737. Basilisa likewise asked respondent . the donor. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. dispose. Basilisa Comerciante. In Bonsato where the donation per the deed of donation would also take effect upon the death of the donor with reservation for the donor to enjoy the fruits of the land. we held that: (W)hat is most significant [in determining the type of donation] is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations. for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land  donated. When ConsolacionAustria mortgaged the subject property to a certain Baby Santos. and that she knew that the prohibition covers her as well as the  donees. encumber. On the other hand. However. the prohibition on the donees only meant that they may not mortgage or dispose the donated property while the donor enjoys and possesses the property during her lifetime. the donor. Art. donations mortis causa. the deeds expressly declare them to be ―irrevocable‖. cannot invoke the violation of the provision on the prohibition to encumber the subject property as a basis to revoke the donation thereof inasmuch as she acknowledged the validity of the mortgage executed by the donee. On the other hand. to redeem the property. The rule that there can be automatic revocation without benefit of a court action does not apply to the case at bar for the reason that the subject deed of donation is devoid of any provision providing for automatic revocation in event of non-compliance with the any of the conditions set forth therein. The petitioner argues that the subsequent and contemporaneous acts of the donor would show that her intention was to maintain control over her properties while she was still living. the donor. she was not doing so in accordance with the agreement and intent of the parties in the deed of donation. Construing together the provisions of the deed of donation. Thus. Art.
Thus. against the petitioner. and the petitioner ever intended to defraud the respondents herein with respect to the sale and ownership of the said property. not inter vivos. T-10434 and other relevant documents. an implied trust is created by law in favor of the true owner. the sale was grounded upon their honest but erroneous interpretation of the deed of donation that it is mortis causa. . The petitioner contends that an action for reconveyance of property on the ground of alleged fraud must be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of fraud which is from the date of registration of the deed of sale on February 8. more than four (4) years have passed since the sale of the subject real estate property was registered and the said new title thereto was issued to the petitioner. for annulment of TCT No. an action for reconveyance of the title to the rightful owner prescribes in ten  (10) years from the issuance of the title. (3) Upon a judgment. the petitioner asserts that the action. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (1) Upon a written contract. Anent the second issue. 1979 and its registration was made on February 8. On the other hand. Basilisa. The findings of fact of the appellate court which are entitled to great respect.Florentino Lumubos and the petitioner herein to redeem the same. 1979. 1979. It is only when fraud has been committed  that the action will be barred after four (4) years. the action for reconveyance prescribes in ten (10) years. The records do not show that the donor. for reconveyance and damages. the appealed Decision dated June 30. RT-4036 in the name of the donor was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. 1979 when TCT No. However. SO ORDERED. No pronouncement as to costs. the filing of the complaint in the case at bar in 1983 was well within the ten-year prescriptive period. filed by the respondents on September 21. are devoid of any finding of fraud. Those acts implied that the donees have the right of control and naked title of ownership over the property considering that the donor. The sale happened on February 6. 1983 on the ground of fraud and/or implied trust has already prescribed. (n) Thus. T-10434 in the name of the petitioner and covering the subject property was issued only on February 8. 1989 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. T10434 in the name of the petitioner was issued. and that the donor still had the rights to sell or dispose of the donated property and to revoke the donation. When one’s property is registered in another’s name without the former’s consent. therefore. committed no reversible error in its appealed Decision. and that the same prescriptive period also applies to a suit predicated on a trust relationship that is rooted on fraud of breach of trust. Consolacion Austria. (2) Upon an obligation created by law. Article 1144 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. Considering that TCT No. There being no fraud in the trust relationship between the donor and the donees including the herein petitioner. WHEREFORE. 1144. the four-year prescriptive period is not applicable to the case at bar for the reason that there is no fraud in this case.  The Court of Appeals. Basilisa condoned and acknowledged the validity of the mortgage executed by one of the donees.
transferring to them several parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. A division of five of the Court of Appeals took the case under consideration. ET AL. petitioners. J. that the deeds were of donation inter vivos without any condition making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor.. Balderrama for petitioners. 1953. Both deeds (Exhs. vs. 1954 HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO. with the exception of the names of the donees and the number and description of the properties donated.. Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donancion y el donatario Felipe Bonsato tendra todos los derechos de dichos terrenos en concepto de dueño absoluto de la propiedad libre de toda responsibilidad y gravamen y pueda ejercitar su derecho que crea conveniente. answered averring that the donations made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato. 1939 by the late Domingo Bonsato in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato. The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Case No. Province of Pangasinan. Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the requisite formalities. 1949. The donees then sought a review by this Court. 5652. After trial. had been induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations (Exhibits 1 and 2) in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato. Inocencio Rosete for respondents.L. vecino de Agno. 8892) on June 27. by respondents Josefa Utea and other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario.B. The sole issue submitted to this Court. por la presente hagor y otorgo una donacion perfecta e irrevocable consumada a favor del citado Felipe Bonsato de dos parcelas de terreno palayero como se describe mas abajo. assigning as primary error the holding of the court below that the donations are inter vivos. el donatorio Felipe Bonsato tomara posesion inmediatamente de dichos terrenos a su favor. 12049. J. Thereupon the plaintiffs duly appealed to the Court of Appeals. REYES. claiming that the said donations should be considered as donations inter vivos and voted for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of First Instance. the Court of First Instance rendered its decision on November 13. The principal provisions are the following. vencino y residente del municipio de Agno. casado.G. en consideracion de su largo servicio a Domingo Bonsato. 1 and 2) are couched in identical terms. Domingo Bonsato. Two Justices dissented. and ordered the defendantsappellees Bonsato to surrender the possession of the properties in litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants. the majority rendered judgment holding the aforesaid donations to be null and void. (Description omitted) Que durante su menor de edad de mi citado sobrino Felipe Bonsato hasta en estos dias. y por esta razon bajo su pobriza sea movido mi sentimiento para dar una recompensa de sus trabajos y aprecios a mi favor. because they were donations mortis causaand were executed without the testamentary formalities prescribed by law. 1945. that the same were executed freely without the use of force and violence. then already a widower. both deceased. to be void for being donations mortis causa accomplished without the formalities required by law for testamentary dispositions. por la presente declaro lo siguiente: Que mi osbrino Felipe Bonsato. Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato. having been acquired during the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario. and on January 12. appellants contending that they were mortis causa donations. finding that the deeds of donation were executed by the donor while the latter was of sound mind.F. respondents. L-6600 July 30. Que en este de 1939 el donante Domingo Bonsato ha entregado a Felipe Bonsato dichos terrenos donados y arriba citados pero de los productos mientras vive el donante tomara la parte que corresponde como dueño y la parte como inquilino tomara Felipe Bonsato. misrepresentation or intimidation.. tambien mayor de edad. Que en vista de la vejez del donante.F. without pressure or intimidation. therefore. situated in the municipalities of Mabini and Burgos..: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals holding two deeds of donation executed on the first day of December. the donations were only valid as to an undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land described therein. but as the properties donated were presumptively conjugal.000. respectively. ESCRITURA DE DONATION Yo.R. Their complaint (for annulment and damages) charged that on the first day of December. The defendants. I. Pangasinan. and prayed for the dismissal of the case and for damages in the sum of P2. No. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA UTEA. I. is the juridical nature of the donations in question. viudo de Andrea Nacario. 1949. siempre me ha apreciado y estimado como uno de mis hijos y siempre ha cumplido todas mis ordenes. Domingo Bonsato. and 12052. . mayor de edad. Benedict C. both donations having been duly accepted in the same act and documents. Pangasinan. and invalid because they had not been executed with the formalities required for testamentary disposition.
that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal vs. Las tesis de la desaparcion de las donaciones mortis causa en nuestro Codigo Civil. La asimilacion entre las donaciones por causa de muerte y las transmissiones por testamento es perfecta.. by merging the erstwhile donations mortis causa with the testamentary dispositions. November 18. 83. or. 573.) Illegible The majority of the special divisions of five of the Court of Appeals that took cognizance of this case relied primarily on the last paragraph. por lo tanto: 1. Despite the widespread use of the term "donations mortis causa. 67 Phil. then the documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics: (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor. (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. expresses the same opinion: "La disposicion del articulo 620 significa. casado. (2) That before his death. incluso los mas recientes. (Sgd. Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter. 2 parte.. que toda disposicion de bienes para despues de la muerte sigue las reglas establecidas para la sucesion testamentaria.o. p.. 108.. 1939. 575 says: No ha mucho formulabamos esta pregunta: Subsisten las donaciones mortis causa como institucion independiente. Sabiniano. broke away from the Roman Law tradition.o. V.0 de Diciembre. Vol. Guzman vs. Vecino de Mabini. (b) Subsisten hoy en nuestro derecho las donaciones mortis causa? De lo que acabamos de decir se desprende que las donaciones mortis causa han perdido en el Codigo Civil su caracter distintivo y su naturaleza y hay que considerarlos hoy como una institucion suprimida. Manresa. Strictly speaking. 58 Phil." it is well-established at present that the Civil Code of 1889.. what amounts to the same thing. in his Derecho Civil. and consummated donation" of the properties to the respective donees. pp. We have insisted on this phase of the legal theory in order to emphasize that the term "donations mortis causa" as commonly employed is merely a convenient name to designate those dispositions of property that are void when made in the form of donations.) Felipe Bonsato SIGNADO Y FIRMADO EN PRESENCIA DE: (Sgd. And Castan. p.) Illegible (Sgd. . petitioners herein. mayor de edad. I. hoy dia 1. 633).. Vol. Pangasinan. con propia autonomia y propio compo jurisdiccional? La respuesta debe ser negativa.En Testimonio de todo lo Cual. wherein the donor states that he makes "perfect. . ART. 620. irrevocable. or else legacies void for failure to observe the formalities of wills (testaments). in its Art. 620. 2. declaro por la presente que acepto la donacion anterior otorgado por Domingo Bonsato a mi favor. Vol. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of disposals of property by will and shall be governed by the rules established for testamentary successions. que han desaparecido las llamas antes donaciones mortis causa por lo que el Codigo no se ocupa de ellas en absoluto. acusada ya precedentemente por el pryecto de 1851 puede decirse que constituye una communis opinion entre nuestros expositores. 1953). in his Commentaries (5th ed. refundida en el legado . IV (7th Ed. . XI. Pangasinan. Posadas. the issue is whether the documents in question embody valid donations. ad nutum. while the minority opinion lay emphasis on the second paragraph.). . I. the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will. and followed the French doctrine that no one may both donate and retain ("donner at retenir ne vaut"). R. Commenting on this article. signo la presente en Agno. Domingo (His thumbmark) Bonsato xxx xxx xxx Las donaciones mortis causa se consevan en el Codigo como se conserva un cuerpo fosil en las vitrinas de un Museo. but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs.F. 176. reiterates: Yo. Ibea. L-4326.. thus suppressing said donations as an independent legal concept. 1952). stressing the passage: Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion ..F. Mucius Scaevola (Codigo Civl. G. Felipe Bonsato.
Hence. That the conveyance was due to the affection of the donor for the donees and the services rendered by the latter. As the properties involved were conjugal. specially provided that "without the knowledge and consent of the donor. the deeds expressly declare them to be "irrevocable". when full title would become vested in the donees. the donor not only reserved for herself all the fruits of the property allegedly conveyed. and it is undisputed that these were duly complied with. executed by the late Domingo Bonsato. Art. not only were the properties not to be given until thirty days after the death of the last of the donors. to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code. Any other interpretation of this paragraph would cause it to conflict with the irrevocability of the donation and its consummated character. Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that would disappear upon the donor's death. In Bautista vs. the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated property. Art. on the contrary. Nevertheless. I. 92 Phil. but what is even more important. or control over. (Dec. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations. the Court of First Instance correctly decided that the donations could not affect the half interest inherited by the respondents Josefa Utea. 749 of the new Code. Thus. The donor only reserved for himself. is of no particular significance in determining whether the deeds Exhibits 1 and 2 constitute transfers inter vivos or not. No similar restrictions are found in the deeds of donation involved in this appeal. casado. However. a conflict that should be avoided (Civ.. Art. 1374. and limited the donation "to whatever property or properties left undisposed by me during my lifetime". but the deed also referred to the donees as "those who had been mentioned to inherit from us". as expressed in the first part of the deeds of donation. Gaz. F. free from all liens and encumbrances. a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act. the circumstances clearly indicated the transferor's intention to defer the passing of title until after his death. en consideracion de su largo servicio a Domingo Bonsato. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 1946) 3155. Pangasinan. the properties donated. and thus taken. during his lifetime. in Cariño vs. 182. 59. 244. por la presente hago y otorgo una donacion perfecta e irrevocable consumada a favor del citado Felipe Bonsato de dos parcelas de terreno palayero como se describe mas abajo. 1285. thereby denying to the transferees the most essential attribute of ownership. said expression must be construed together with the rest of the paragraph.. Rules of Court). from the predeceased wife of the donor. and reinforces the conclusion that the act was inter vivos. Que mi sobrino FILIPINO BONSATO. the owner's share of the fruits or produce ("de los productos mientras viva el donante tomara la parte que corresponde como dueño"). . Being donations inter vivos. sec. Code of 1889. the alleged donor expressly reserved the right to dispose of the properties conveyed at any time before his death. Art. While in David vs.. and that of the Court of First Instance is revived and given effect. the verb "to inherit" clearly implying the acquisition of property only from and after the death of the alleged donors. Sabiniano. for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Exhibits 1 and 2. 70 Phil. the donated properties could not be disposed of in any way". because a legacy may have identical motivation.None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation. 42 Off.. the power to dispose of the properties. It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after the death of the donor the aforesaid donation shall become effective" (que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion"). In the cases held by this Court to be transfers mortis causa and declared invalid for not having been executed with the formalities of testaments. vecino de Agno. New Civil Code. the solemnities required for them were those prescribed by Article 633 of the Civil Code of 1889 (reproduced in Art. a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. 549. 737. its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donor's death. Sison. Rule 123. thus clearly retaining their ownership until his death. Abaya. Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion y el donatario Felipe Bonsato tendra todos derechos de dichos terrenos en concepto de dueño absoluto de la propiedad libre de toda responsibilidad y gravamen y puede ejercitar su derecho que crea conveniente. the existence of such consideration corroborates the express irrevocability of the transfers and the absence of any reservation by the donor of title to. tambien mayor de edad. New Civil Code. Gaz. 49 Off. 828). et al. Costs against respondents. it was error for the Court of Appeals to declare that Exhibits 1 and 2 were invalid because the formalities of testaments were not observed.
Ursula Pascual executed a deed of absolute sale over the Tondo property in favor of Benjamin. 73241-42 July 23. 1976. On May 2. private respondent in G. HON. G. accepting the gift and donation for and in her behalf. On November 6. the defendants occupied two (2) doors PEDRO DALUSONG. located at 1109-1111 R. She then filed a motion for exclusion in Special Proceedings No. pp. excluded from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Dr. 45262. vs HON. 73241-42 a minor with her mother. L-45262 July 23. 1976.respondents.Ruperto Reyes and Jose Reyes. until the issue of ownership is finally determined in a separate action. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.R. However. however. 17854. LORENZO R. 2324) The Order is now the subject of G. Ofelia Parungao filed a complaint for recovery of possession over the Tondo property against Benjamin Reyes and his nephew Oscar Reyes with the Court of First Instance of Manila. petitioners. No. respondents. Ursula alleged that Dr. (3) Josefa Pascual Reyes-Augusto Reyes and Benjamin Reyes. PASCUAL. Parungao. in view of all the foregoing discussion. 1978. vs. Emilio Pascual executed a deed of donation of real property inter vivos over the abovementioned lot in Manila in favor of Ofelia D. Nos. and Manna Reyes Manalastas. 1990 OFELIA D. Benito Reyes. 15 of the subdivision plan Psd-3231. petitioners.R. SAN JUAN. replaced by Reynaldo San Juan. petitioner in G. L-45394 July 23. Pascual filed Special Proceedings No. 1976. 1973.R. Manila as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. In the meantime.R.1972. 73-30-M. No. Dr. Nos. the trial court issued an order excluding from the inventory of the estate the properties donated to Ursula. 1969. to wit: WHEREFORE. 1990 RUPERTO REYES and REYNALDO C. Atty. and (4) Escolastica Pascual Dalusong (half. PASCUAL. BRANCH VII. 73241-42 filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. Pascual (subject of Special Proceedings No. on September 23.R. she tried to have the donation registered. in his capacity as Special Administrator. Benjamin Reyes. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA. Pascual thru counsel be. 17854 and issued in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1976 Order. Pampanga (Branch VII). the heirs of Dr. and URSULA D. MOSQUEDA. Block No. When Parungao reached the age of majority or on December 20. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue on November 18. 1976 filed by Ursula D. JUDGE. THE HON. Tondo. The records show that on May 15. Pascual. Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters as follows: (1) Maria Pascual Reyes. Papa St. Parungao also alleged that as early as 1973. respondents. LORENZO R.. In their answer with compulsory counterclaim Parungao and Duncil. let the properties listed in paragraph 2 of the motion of February 12. Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude some properties from the inventory of Pascual's estate and to deliver the titles thereto to her. with the then Court of First Instance of Manila.R. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Register of Deeds of Manila and/or reconveyance of deed of title against Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil.R. On December 3. MOSQUEDA. as it is hereby ordered. 1976. 45262 and 45394. (2) Ines Pascual Reyes-Jose P. all surnamed Reyes. 73-30M in the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the administration of his estate. BENJAMIN P. He was survived by his sister. G. 73-30-M) and therefore should be excluded from the inventory. Rosario Duncil. The petition was granted in October 1977.. without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. Parungao registered the deed of donation with the Register of Deeds of Manila who cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the trial court from enforcing the August 1. Special Administrator Reynaldo San Juan is hereby ordered to return to Court the custody of the corresponding certificates of titles of these properties. Among the properties included in the "donation mortis causa" in favor of Ursula was Lot 24. Pascual during his lifetime or on November 2. . J. REYES and OSCAR REYES.blood Pedro Dalusong. Reyes. she found out that the certificate of title was missing from where it was supposed to be kept. 115164. 1966 executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" in her favor covering properties which are included in the estate of Dr. (G. Jose and Emmanuel. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT. 129092 in the name of Ofelia Parungao. 119359. On February 12. (Third Civil Cases Division). On January 5. vs. Clerk of Court of Branch VII was appointed special administratrix.G. In her complaint. 1978. denied Reyes' assertion of ownership over the Tondo property. Emilio D. prompting her to file a petition for reconstitution of title with the Court of First Instance of Manila. 1977. 129092. Nos. 1990 On August 1. PARUNGAO and ROSARIO DUNCIL. Nos. No. and URSULA D. Marcela Macapagal. Macapagal was. petitioner. Oscar.: The instant petitions have been consolidated as they arose from the same facts and involve similar issues. GUTIERREZ. Judge of CFI. JR.
7324142) question the appellate court's finding that the "Donation Mortis Causa" executed by Emilio Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual was actually a Donation Inter Vivos. the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court.R. 1976. Reyes the sum of Two Thousand (P2. 73241-42 Ruperto Reyes. Branch 8 rendered a joint decision. The resolution became final and executory on March 10. Nos. Salas.i•t•c-aüsl Similarly. The Intermediate Appellate Court decision is now the subject matter in G. L. In Civil Case No. The questioned August 1. Mallari. The decision was. the then Court of First Instance. Nos. Ramolete (129 SCRA 495 ) which we cited in the case of Morales v. well and good. the counterclaim is dismissed. de Rodriguez v. and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so (Mallari v. However. 73241-42. 119359 — 1) Dismissing the complaint for want of merit. (91 SCRA 540) we held that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. ordering Ofelia Parungao to pay defendant defendants the sum of Two Thousand (P2. 1976. June 14. and to pay the costs of suit including all fees which the Register of Deeds may prescribe for the full implementation of this decision. For lack of merit. the trial court has a lengthy discussion reflecting adversely on the authenticity of the 1969 donation to Parungao. Reynaldo C. This was stressed in the case of Cuizon v. and 2) On the counterclaim. 115164 — 1) Declaring TCT No. but if there is. Parungao prayed that the defendants be evicted from the premises.000. it may be noted that the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the authenticity of the 1969 donation to Parungao because of its finding that the 1966 donation to Pascual was inter vivos. and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel said title and to restore. We first discuss the issue on jurisdiction. the administrator. 71 SCRA 262. L-45262 and G. Pascual was "without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. and (2) In G. . in lieu thereof. Amihan.R. Emilio Pascual. 1987 on the ground that the January 29. 1986 and on this same day the entry of judgment was effected. Nos.45262). 92 Phil. TCT No. judgment is hereby rendered: In Civil Case No.R. 501). Parungao to pay plaintiff Benjamin P. 1978 when she formally demanded that the defendants vacate the premises. petitioner Pedro Dalusong questions the jurisdiction of the probate court to exclude the properties donated to Ursula Pascual in its Order dated August 1. 1970 Edition. Dr. No. No. The entry of judgment was however set aside in the resolution dated January 19. 129092 in the name of Ofelia Parungao null and void. however. Emilio D. The two cases were consolidated. On June 3. No.000.' Parungao appealed the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. On January 29. 694. in his capacity as special administrator of the estate of Emilio Pascual (petitioner in G. 266). The petitioners do not press the authenticity of the 1969 donation as their challenge centers on whether or not the 1966 donation was inter vivos. as and for attorney's fees. L-42257. Branch V (146 SCRA 373 ): It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. The motion for reconsideration is now before us for resolution petition." The provisional character of the exclusion of the contested properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the probate court. 1986. On the second issue. 1986 resolution was not received by the petitioners' counsel of record. affirmed.00) Pesos as and for attorney's fees.P.R. Pascual. Proc. 2) Ordering Ofelia D. No. 73-30-M categorically stated that the exclusion from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Dr.00) Pesos. 17854 in the name of Emilio D. If there is no dispute. 1976 order of the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga in S. Baquial v. 1982. The issues raised in these petitions are two-fold: (1) In G. with costs against the appellant.R. The petitioner was granted leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the January 29. Court of Appeals . Court of First Instance of Cavite. and later by her until April 8. then the parties. pages 448449 and 473. 1986 resolution.of the apartment situated at the Tondo property by mere tolerance of the previous owner. 92 Phil. we issued a minute resolution denying the above petition for lack of merit. in Valero Vda.R. San Juan. Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil (petitioners in G. Lachenal v. L-45394.
and DONATE MORTIS CAUSA unto the said DONEE URSULA D. and as a token of my affection toward him and of the fact that he stands high in my estimation. v. et al.R. No. Pampanga.R. hereinafter called the DONOR and Ursula D. Pascual.R. In the case of De Guzman et al. L-45262. It was for past services rendered. That the said donor has reserved for himself sufficient property to maintain him for life. resident of and with postal address at Apalit. 73241-42 insist that the donation of real property inter vivos in favor of Ofelia Parungao be given effect. Pampanga. as in payment of a legal obligation. and also to defray the expenses of my burial and funerals. of age and resident of Apalit. Chief Justice Avancena said that if a donation by its terms is inter vivos. Manta. and that the said DONEE does hereby ACCEPT and RECEIVE this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA and further does express his appreciation and gratefulness for the generosity of said DONOR.. The donation instead of being onerous or for a valuable consideration. and not the title that should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor. to wit: That the said DONOR. to the following. we find that the donation was of a nature remunerative rather than onerous. the donation is entitled and called donacion onerosa mortis causa. 668). and in the province of Rizal.. Pampanga.But. L-45262 insist that the donated properties should revert to the estate of Emilio Pascual while the petitioners in G. this Court through Mr. such as San Simon. Emilio D. the petitioners in G. Filipino. single. this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.The petitioners assert that the 1966 donation was null and void since it was not executed with the formalities of a will. Pascual. There. Mata. GRANT. Nos. hereinafter called the DONEE. have agreed. 668 ) this Court ruled that the dispositions in a deed of donation-whether "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation but on the provisions stated in such deed. and in the event of her death the said donee shall be under obligation to cause a mass to be held annually as a suffrage in behalf of my sold. et al. also of age. besides being partly motivated by affection. for and in consideration of the love and affection which he has and bears unto the said DONEE. This Court explained inConcepcion v. Dr. however. the donor Severa Magno y Laureta gave the properties involved as — . a reward for the services which he is rendering me.. (44 Phil. her heirs and assigns. The subject deed of donation titled "DONATION MORTIS CAUSA" duly notarized by a certain Cornelio M. Concepcion (91 Phil. Pascual. all of my rights. was more of remuneratory or compensatory nature. Ibea et al. does hereby by these presents voluntarily GIVE. and his real properties situated in other towns of Pampanga. services which may not be considered as a debt to be paid by the donee but services rendered to her freely and in goodwill. Filipino. Emilio D. single... I hereby donate 'mortis causa to said youth all the properties described as follows: xxx xxx xxx I also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the donee cannot take possession of the properties donated before the death of the donor. (44 Phil. as also for the personal services rendered by the said DONEE to the said DONOR. in and to the following parcels of land with all the improvements thereon. the court held that the donation involved was inter vivos. title and interest. now a settled rule that the title given to a deed of donation is not the determinative factor which makes the donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" As early as the case of Laureta v. and more particularly described and Identified as follows: xxx xxx xxx (Enumerated herein are 41 parcels of land) Also included in this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA are all personal properties of the DONOR in the form of cash money or bank deposits and insurance in his favor. PASCUAL. as they do hereby agree. It is. In the case of Laureta v.' It will be observed that the present case and that of Laureta above cited are similar in that in both cases the donation was being made . We should not give too much importance or significance to or be guided by the use of the phrase 'mortis causa in a donation and thereby to conclude that the donation is not one of inter vivos. Sigua states: That Dr. No. 823 ) — . (67 Phil. 633). pp. situated in the Municipality of Apalit. (Rollo of G. San Francisco del Monte and in the City of Manila. Therefore. Here. 12-16) xxx xxx xxx Considering the provisions of the DONATION MORTIS CAUSA the appellate court ruled that the deed of donation was actually a donation inter vivos although denominated as DONATION MORTIS CAUSA. it is a rule consistently followed by the courts that it is the body of the document of donation and the statements contained therein. From the body.
R.as a reward for services rendered and being rendered. and as a token of affection for the donee. 'Did the donor intend to transfer the ownership of the property donated upon the execution of the donation? If this is so. In said case of Laureta this Court held that the donation was in praesenti and not a gift in futuro. SO ORDERED. 633). the phrase 'mortis causa was used. the donee to take possession of the property donated only after the death of the donor. L. ad nutum. that the transferor should retain the ownership (fun or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal v. 481 ) this Court. (2) That before his death. Padilla and Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE.R. 1955. L-7064 and L-7098. the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will. v. 73241-42. Court of Appeals (27 SCRA 1076 ). it is merely mortis causa.R. (95 Phil. Guzman v. make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter. G. Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual out of love and affection as well as a recognition of the personal services rendered by the donee to the donor. but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista v.. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on January 5. The donation in both cases were duly accepted. Ibea 67 Phil. or made to take effect after death. as reflected from the provisions contained in the donation. Court of appeals. the motion for reconsideration is DENIED..R. 1952). including church fees. Posadas. 108. 45262 and 45394 the petitions are DENIED. this Court hereby renders judgment as follows: 1) In G. November 18. . then the documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics: (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor. The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to the donee was immediate and independent of the death of the donor. what amounts to the same thing. This DENIAL is FINAL. 1977 is hereby LIFTED. then it is inter vivos. No. 58 Phil. These principles were repeated in the case of Castro v. With these findings we find no need to discuss the other arguments raised by the petitioners. distinguished the characteristics of a donation inter vivos and "mortis causa" in this wise: Did the late Domingo Bonsato. (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.4326. to wit: Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the disposition made. and 2) In G. et al. No. Nos. In the later case of Bonsato et al.' (Howard v. Sabiniano. or. otherwise. The donation was executed by Dr. G. The provision as regards the reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership of the properties to the donee immediately after the execution of the deed of donation. Nos. Applying the above principles to the instant petitions. April 22. there is no doubt that the socalled DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation inter vivos. the donee was under obligation to defray the expenses incident to the celebration of the anniversary of the donor's death.
held that the above-quoted survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did not comply with the formalities of a 8 valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code. The trial courts upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion to sell some of the estate of Dolores L. On January 13.27 and P90. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA FAUSTINOCORONA. petition) is hereby set aside insofar as it granted private respondent's motion to sell certain properties of the estate of Dolores L." But it not infrequently happens that a person deposits money in the bank in the name of another.R. assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos.834. Vitug. one of mortis causa. but the same order is sustained in all other respects. Makati.147.40 spent for the payment of estate tax." and secondly.66. for any payment or withdrawal made for our above-mentioned account 1 shall be valid and sufficient release and discharge of the BANK for such payment 5 or withdrawal. he withdrew the sums of P518. first of all. respondent Judge is directed to include provisionally the deposits in Savings Account No. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states: WHEREFORE. Metro Manila. and after the death of either or any of us shall belong to and be the sole property of the survivor or survivors. and P90... We further agree with each other and the BANK that the receipt or check of either. Makati. there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement. As found by the Court of 2 Appeals. who died in New York. the alleged advances consisted of P58. and Macam v.. the 15 bequest or device must pertain to the testator. The conveyance in question is not. . in the petition for certiorari filed by the herein private respondent. P518. J. 12 Gatmaitan in which we sustained the validity of "survivorship agreements" and 13 considering them as aleatory contracts. the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the 7 personal funds of Romarico Vitug in the total sum of P667. A will has been defined as "a personal. but simply. 35342-038 with the Bank of America. Vitug. 10 6 In his petition.. VITUG. assails the appellate court's ruling on the 11 strength of our decisions inRivera v. and in the instant case it also appears that Ana Rivera served her master for about nineteen years without actually receiving her salary from him. Romarico G. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. Vitug. Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds withdrawn from savings account No..731. Rivera v. and hence.66 . or the receipt or check of the survivor or survivors. U. 82027 March 29. which should be embodied in a will. 1980. Vitug's) widower. On April 12. on November 10. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate in the sum of P667. revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and 14 declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death. SARMIENTO. The fact that subsequently Stephenson . the surviving spouse. S.99 from savings account No. any or all of us during our lifetime. in the inventory of actual properties possessed by the spouses at the time of the decedent's death.749. that all money now or hereafter deposited by us or any or either of us with the BANK in our joint savings current account shall be the property of all or both of us and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of us during our lifetime. 1985 (Annex II. vs. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds In the case 16 relied on.27 as deficiency estate tax. 1985. 35342-038 were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate. the monies subject of savings account No.: This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court involving the probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug. respondents. and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor or survivors.731. She also sought his ouster for failure to include the sums 4 in question for inventory and for "concealment of funds belonging to the estate.. we rejected claims that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one party's separate properties in favor of the other. 1985. In this case. plus interests. the order of respondent Judge dated November 26." In other words.A. Vitug. In addition. With costs against private respondent. solemn. it is a prohibited donation under the provisions of 9 Article 133 of the Civil Code. the Court of Appeals. Such conclusion is evidently predicated on the assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive owner of the funds-deposited in the bank. 1970. Vitug for reimbursement of his alleged advances to the estate. The agreement provides: We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to as the BANK).G. People's Bank and Trust Co. People's Bank and Trust Co." On the other hand. The petition is meritorious.99 as "increment 3 thereto." Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19. which he claimed were personal funds.749.834." According to Mr. petitioner Romarico G. their joint holdings: xxx xxx xxx . naming private respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. pending probate. 1990 ROMARICO G. we upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte as cospecial administrator of Mrs. No. petitioner. which assumption was in turn based on the facts (1) that the account was originally opened in the name of Stephenson alone and (2) that Ana Rivera "served only as housemaid of the deceased. In our said decision.
26 xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party. or which is to occur at an indeterminate time. it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased. Juana would become the owner of the house in case Leonarda died first. In the case at bar. upon the death of either. In the case at bar. and that either of them could withdraw any part or the whole of said account during the lifetime of both. or. In this manner Leonarda and Juana reciprocally assigned their respective property to one another conditioned upon who might die first. the latter thereupon acquired the ownership of the house. Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos. they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a moneymaking venture. Being the separate property of petitioner. one of the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or do something as an equivalent for that which the other party is to give or do in case of the occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will happen at an indeterminate time. the decision of the respondent appellate court. 35342-038. Vitug having predeceased her husband. xxx xxx xxx This Court is of the opinion that Exhibit C is an aleatory contract whereby. while a contract for life annuity or pension under Article 25 2021. the latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No." A survivorship agreement. dated June 29. 1988. et sequentia. it may be assailed and annulled upon such grounds. Certainly. if it be shown in a given case that such agreement is a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation. by way of a joint and several bank account. a transaction stipulating on the value of currency. In the absence. but in reality. as held by the respondent court.transferred the account to the name of himself and/or Ana Rivera and executed with the latter the survivorship agreement in question although there was no relation of kinship between them but only that of master and servant. By virtue of Exhibit C. if any. and Leonarda would become the owner of the automobile and the furniture if Juana were to die first. the element of risk is present. it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse's own properties to the other. having been acquired during the existence of the 20 marita. . No such vice has been imputed and established against the agreement involved in this case. because it was to take effect after the death of one party. is binding upon the parties thereto. then. has been categorized under the second. that contract imposed a mere obligation with a term. 1987. in the same manner as Leonarda would have acquired the ownership of the automobile and of the furniture if Juana had died first. to transfer property in fraud of creditors. the fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends on either the happening of an event which is (1) "uncertain. and the balance. as held by the Court of Appeals. Inasmuch as Leonarda had died before Juana. and hence it must be presumed to be conjugal. belonged to the survivor. the risk was the death of one party and survivorship of the other. in order to frustrate our laws on wills. and conjugal partnership. relations. more commonly denominated in banking parlance as an "and/or" account. we hold that the court was in error. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. Gatmaitan. However. Secondly. donations. In either case. the sale of a sweepstake ticket.No costs. As already stated. Vitug.SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE. as any other contract. the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest conjugal property. The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Under Article 2010 of the Code: ART. by "mere stipulation" and 23 that it is no "cloak" to circumvent the law on conjugal property relations. Leonarda was the owner of the house and Juana of the Buick automobile and most of the furniture. according to article 1790 of the Civil Code. xxx xxx xxx In Macam v. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other. or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir. The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature. when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No. that they were joint (and several) owners thereof. it can not be said that one spouse could have pressured the other in placing his or her deposits in the money pool. 17 conjugal. of clear proof to the contrary. say. and insurance have been held to fall under the first category. dated February 9. and its resolution. we must give full faith and credit to the certificate of deposit which recites in effect that the funds in question belonged to Edgar Stephenson and Ana Rivera. This contract. are SET ASIDE. It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the 21 22 conjugal partnership." (2) "which is to occur at an indeterminate time. 2010. which would have arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation. the time of death determining the event upon which the acquisition of such right by the one or the other depended. the term 24 being death. nullifies the assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive owner of the bank account. for obvious reasons. one of the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall give or do upon the happening of an event which is uncertain. By an aleatory contract. 19 18 it was held: Under the aforequoted provision. And since the funds were There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for such unlawful purposes. as we have warned: xxx xxx xxx But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law its operation or effect may be violative of the law. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left by Mrs. For instance. Such agreements are permitted by the Civil Code.