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SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997] MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G.

REYES, LYN AGAPE, MARITES AGAPE, ESTABANA GALOLO, and CELSA AGAPE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES, respondents. DECISION TORRES, JR., J.: Unless legally flawed, a testator’s intention in his last will and testament is its “life and soul” which deserves reverentia l observance. The controversy before us deals with such a case. Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes, Lyn Agape, Marites Agape, Estebana Galolo and Celsa Agape, the oppositors in Special Proceedings No. 112 for the probate of the will of Torcuato J. Reyes, assail in this petition for review the decision of the Court of Appealsi[1] dated November 29, 1995, the dispositive portion of which reads: “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from allowing or admitting the will of Torcuato J. Reyes to probate an d directing the issuance of Letter Testamentary in favor of petitioner Julio A. Vivares as executor without bond is AFFIRMED but modified in that the declaration that paragraph II of the Torcuato Reyes' last will and testament, including subparagraphs (a) and (b) are null and void for being contrary to law is hereby SET ASIDE, said paragraphs (a) and (b) are declared VALID. Except as above modified, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."ii[2] The antecedent facts: On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament declaring therein in part, to wit: “xxx II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion “Oning” R. Reyes the following properties to wit: a. All my shares of our personal properties consisting among others of jewelries, coins, antiques, statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the building; b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all the real estates I own in common with my brother Jose, situated in Municipalities of Mambajao, Mahinog, Guinsiliban, Sagay all in Camiguin; real estates in Lunao, Ginoong, Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc, Kinoguinatan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines, Caesta, Talisayan, all in the province of Misamis Oriental.” iii[3] The will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Private respondent Julio A. Vivares was designated the executor and in his default or incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares. Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for probate of the will before the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin. The petitioner was set for hearing and the order was published in the Mindanao Daily Post, a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three consecutive weeks. Notices were likewise sent to all the persons named in the petition. On July 21, 1992, the recognized natural children of Torcuato Reyes with Estebana Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila, and Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and the deceased’s natural children with Celsa Agape, namely Lyn and Marites Ag ape, filed an opposition with the following allegations: a) that the last will and testament of Reyes was not executed and attested in accordance with the formalities of law; and b) that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator at the time of the execution of the will. The opposition further averred that Reyes was never married to and could never marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will, because the latter was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their marriage was never annulled. Thus Asuncion can not be a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public morals.

In both cases. which constituted the sole and primary consideration for the devise or legacy. the court merely inquires on its due execution. himself.xii[12] The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the probate of the will of the late Torcuato Reyes. as void for being contrary to law and morals. Petitioners further alleged that Oning Reyes was already married to Lupo Ebarle at the time she was cohabiting with the testator hence.vi[6] The petition is devoid of merit. Thus. allowed the presentation of evidence. and the testamentary capacity of the testator. As a general rule. Petitioners contend that the findings and conclusion of the Court of Appeals was contrary to law. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the will’s intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired upon by the probat e court. There are. the trial court gravely erred in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject Last Will and Testament. the common denominator is the immoral meretrecious. Petitioners argued that the testimonies of the witnesses as well as the personal declaration of the testator. As a result.On July 22.”v[5] Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals. and. Said declarations are not sufficient to destroy the presumption of marriage. documentary or otherwise during the trial to show that Asuncion “Oning” Reyes’ marriage to the testator was inexistent or void. their relationship was an adulterous one. thus making the will intrinsically invalid. public policy and evidence on record. petitioners attached a copy of the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle. she could never contact any valid marriage with the latter. whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law. and confirmed by the direct testimonies of the petitioner himself and his two “attesting” witnesses during the trial. the rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute. On November 29. Witness Gloria Borromeo t estified that Oning Reyes was her cousin as her mother and the latter’s father were sister and brother. Thus. the lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will.”iv[4] The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except for paragraph II (a) and (b) of the will which was declared null and void for being contrary to law and morals. Torcuato Reyes and Asuncion “Oning” Reyes were collateral relatives up to the fourth civil degree. the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. To further support their contention. the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision which affirmed the trial court’s decision admitt ing the will for probate but the modification that paragraph II including subparagraphs (a) and (b) were declared valid. the trial court issued an ordering declaring that it had acquired jurisdiction over the petition and. either because of a pre-existing marriage or adulterous relationship. based on the testimonies of the witnesses. Perforce. the trial court issued its decision on April 23. the only issues to be settled in the said proceeding were: (1) whether or not the testator had animus testandi. . notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. therefore. They were also nieces of the late Torcuato Reyes. is further bolstered. Thus: “The admission in the will by the testator to the illicit relationship between him and ASUNCION REYES EBARLE who is somebody else’s. however. was never married to the deceased Reyes. however. strengthened. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of th e will’s provisions. It. Under exceptional circumstances.viii[8] The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. 1993. the declaration of the testator that Asu ncion “Oning” Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings.ix[9] The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because “practical considerations” demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are doubtful legality. and (3) whether or not the formalities of the will had been complied with. the probate court may also do so. wife.xi[11] Parenthetically. After the presentation of evidence and submission of the respective memoranda. ruled that Asuncion Reyes. The appellee court stated: “Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent. the purported marriage of the deceased Reyes and Oning Reyes was void ab initio as it was against public policy pursuant to Article 38 (1) of the Family Code. 1992. adulterous and adulterous and illicit relationship existing between the testator and the devisee prior to the death of the testator. the oppositors filed this petition for review. Julio Vivares filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals with the allegation that the oppositors failed to present any competent evidence that Asuncion Reyes was legally married to another person during the period of her cohabitation with Torcuato Reyes. Hence. (2) whether or not vices of consent attended the execution of the will. The trial court declared that the will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. were sufficient to destroy the presumption of marriage. 1995. Nor is it enough to overcome the very declaration of the testator that Asuncion Reyes is his wife. therefore.x[10] Where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined. courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated.vii[7] Thus.

Puno. whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love an [sic] affection. that while Sofia J. the supposed husband of Asuncion.The lower court erroneously invoked the ruling in Nepomuceno vs. the trial court gravely erred in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject Last Will and Testament. for all the things which she has done for me. There was never an open admission of any illicit relationship. (Chairman). Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent. in truth and in fact. Court of Appeals (139 SCRA 206) in the instant case. Testator Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will that he was bequeathing some of his personal and real properties to his wife. as well as in the eyes of the law. IV. which petitioners have not shown in this case. 1995. concur. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law. we sustain the findings of the appellate court it appearing that it did not commit a reversible error in issuing the challenged decision. SO ORDERED.. That since 1952. The settled rule is that the factual findings of the appellate court will not be disturbed unless shown to be contrary to the evidence on the record. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. JJ. . This Court would no try the case a new or settle factual issues since its jurisdiction is confined to resolving questions of law which have been passed upon by the lower courts. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Petitioners tried to refute this conclusion of the Court of Appeals by presenting belatedly a copy of the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle. Thus: “The foregoing testimony cannot go against the declaration of the testator that Asuncion “Oning” Reyes is his wife. I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage. much less in this petition for review. permitted them to do so. with one Sofia J. documentary or otherwise during the trial to show that Asuncion “Oning” Reyes’ marriage to the testator was inexistent or void. now and in the past.” (Santos vs. is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. ACCORDINGLY. xxx All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator’s having mean t just what he said. I have been living. to wit: “Art. Asuncion “Oning” Reyes. City Government of Tacloban (supra) the Supreme Court stated that the declaration of the husband is competent evidence to show the fact of marriage. In Alvarad o v.” Thus. the testator admitted that he was already previously married and that he had an adulterous relationship with the devisee. 209). Their failure to present the said certificate before the probate court to support their position that Asuncion Reyes had an existing marriage with Ebarle constituted a waiver and the same evidence can no longer be entertained on appeal. The testimonies of the witnesses were merely hearsay and even uncertain as to the whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle. as man and wi fe. Said declarations are not sufficient to destroy the presumption of marriage.xiii[13] To remand the case would only be a waste of time and money since the illegality or defect was already patent. the testator himself. In the case of Nepomuceno. In the case aforesaid.xv[15] Considering the foregoing premises. the very tenor of the will invalidates the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing of the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage. did comfort and represent myself as her own husband. Regalado. Nor is it enough to overcome the very declaration of the testator that Asuncion Reyes is his wife. 27 Phil. and Mendoza. as void for being contrary to law and morals. This case is different from the Nepomuceno case. Manarang.”xiv[14] In the elegant language of Justice Moreland written decades ago. decision appealed from dated November 29. Nepomuceno. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court relied on uncorroborated testimonial evidence that Asuncion Reyes was still married to another during the time she cohabited with the testator. acknowledged his illicit relationship with the devisee. by the creation of that instrument. Romero. Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent evidence. he said“A will is the testator speaking after death. either because of a pre -existing marriage or adulterous relationship.

RUFINA GOMEZ. that at the time of the execution of the Will. L-62952 October 9. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G. that while I have been estranged from my above-named wife for so many years. IV. Myrna C.. his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. 1982 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Oscar. whom I declare and admit to be legally and properly entitled to inherit from me. the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16. The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court. Caloocan City and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary. but since 1952. On May 13. He left a last Will and Testament duly signed by him at the end of the W ill on page three and on the left margin of pages 1. 2 and 4 thereof in the presence of Celestina Alejandro. the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein. petitioner. letters testamentary should not be issued to her. that while Sofia J. as amended by the resolution dated August 10. Oscar and Carmelita. the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. as man and wife with one Sofia J. Branch XXXIV. now and in the past. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. 1982. as well as in the eyes of the law. 1952. 2 and 4 of the Will in the presence of the testator and of each other and the Notary Public. Sofia J. In fact. namely. III. 1974 in Malabon. 1982. both surnamed Jugo. 1974. on December 5. respondents. who in turn. whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love and affection. and Leandro Leano. On January 6. 1985 SOFIA J. In the said Will. and daughter Carmelita. That I have the following legal heirs. Martin Jugo died on July 16. GUTIERREZ. OSCAR JUGO ANG. The testator devised to his forced heirs. namely: my aforementioned legal wife. That since 1952. did comport and represent myself as her own husband. in truth and in fact. Cortez. 1974. the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator. .: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now intermediate Appellate Court) dated June 3. On August 21. I cannot deny that I was legally married to her or that we have been separated up to the present for reasons and justifications known fully well by them: Art. NEPOMUCENO. the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident. 1 have been living. she is wanting in integrity and thus.R. for all the things which she has done for me. I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage. Nepomuceno. 1976. 1975. vs. affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1. No. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children. JR. The Will reads in part: Art. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent. Rufina Gomez. the Will's admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo Escareal by the testator and his three attesting witnesses. CARMELITA JUGO. declaring as null and void the devise in favor of the petitioner and the resolution dated December 28. J. Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner. Rizal. the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. the legal wife of the testator. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. and our son.

it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The properties so devised are instead passed on in intestacy to the appellant in equal shares. it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner. The testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. On June 15. the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. xxx xxx xxx True or not. Dimagiba.39247.. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last Will and testament. Respondents also submit that the admission of the testator of the illicit relationship between him and the petitioner put in issue the legality of the devise." The motion was granted by the respondent court on August 10. 21 SCRA 428) The petition below being for the probate of a Will. the will in question declared valid except the devise in favor of the appellant which is declared null and void. without pronouncement as to cost. The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot be passed upon and decided in the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings because the only purpose of the probate of a Will is to establish conclusively as against everyone that a Will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator has the mental capacity to execute the same. Probate is one thing. without pronouncement as to costs. merits the application of the doctrine enunciated in Nuguid v. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. No.R. the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. (G. irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion for Correction of Clerical Error" praying that the word "appellant" in the last sentence of the dispositive portion of the decision be changed to "appellees" so as to read: "The properties so devised are instead passed on intestacy to the appellees in equal shares. 1982. The rule is expressed thus: xxx xxx xxx . the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will and Testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and the petitioner and the fact that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator. 1975). the second relates to descent and distribution ( Sumilang v. Felix Nuguid. The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator. 1982. We agree with the respondents. 1982. The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn. et al. the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. (Fernandez v..On June 2. (17 SCRA 449) and Felix Balanay. On August 23. v. Antonio Martinez. Ramagosa. which led private respondents to present contrary evidence. 21 SCRA 1369) xxx xxx xxx . the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. Jr. the declaration of its nullity could only be made by the proper court in a separate action brought by the legal wife for the specific purpose of obtaining a declaration of the nullity of the testamentary provision in the Will in favor of the person with whom the testator was allegedly guilty of adultery or concubinage. The general rule is that in probate proceedings. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn. 1982. This was denied by the respondent court in a resolution dated December 28. June 27. 1982. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature. et al. L. Hon. the decision a quo is hereby set aside. The petitioner further contends that even if the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were applicable.

It can not decide. 1527. We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will. Jugo. in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will. (Section 2. Alemany. for example. the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. The petitioner states that she completely agrees with the respondent court when in resolving the question of whether or not the probate court correctly denied the probate of Martin Jugo's last Will and Testament. 426) The rule. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. and once for all. In Nuguid v. 13 SCRA 693). (Castaneda v. effort. expense. nothing will be gained. Invoking "practical considerations". And for aught that appears in the record. Annex A of Petition. the Court in Balanay . the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.Jr. Udan L-19996. the will is declared validly drawn. which are of dubious legality. 625). waste of time. Compare with Sumilang vs. probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Rule 1. December 26. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon. Nuguid. even before it is probated. Ramagosa L-23135. is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will. On the contrary. et al. in the record. and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. et al. v. 517. 522). A will of this nature.) On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals' decision in toto. 3 Phil. plus added anxiety. no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically. the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. Given exceptional circumstances. before ruling on its allowance or formal validity. is not inflexible and absolute. Article 739 of the Civil Code provides: The following donations shall be void: . Rules of Court. Cacho v. therefore. We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. would be null and void. The probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution. it ruled: This being so. Nuguid. 21 SCRA 1369.. April 30. however. that a certain legacy is void and another one valid.. 1967. (Page 4. the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions. There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will. (supra): We pause to reflect. Even before establishing the formal validity of the will. (Sec. 64 O. we stated: The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will. this litigation will be protracted.. 17 SCRA 449. Both parties are agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities required by law and that the testator had the mental capacity to execute his Will. and in declaring it void. v. Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be superfluous. Result. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon the validity of its intrinsic provisions. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. 1965. After all.To establish conclusively as against everyone. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court. The only issue. Decision.G. 77 Phil. in the probate of a will. the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will. We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because. Case. is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the testamentary provision in favor of the petitioner as null and void. . As stated in Nuguid v. The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more.

testified at length on the meretricious relationship of his brother and petitioner. the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee. Martin Jugo and Sofia J. There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. descendants and ascendants. the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the will to petitioner by the deceased testator at the start of the proceedings. Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will. executed on August 15. by reason of his office. it was petitioner who opted to present evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying the testator. Nepomuceno now contends that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married to the testator. and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action. the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made a decisive issue right at the inception of the case. Testator Jugo declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. in consideration thereof. 62-64). In Article III of the disputed Will. There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will. as already married.1975). Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator. Nepomuceno contracted a marriage before the Justice of the Peace of Victoria. 1982. 1952. Second. In the case referred to in No. Private respondents. In short. naturally. It is also a fact that on December 2. Sebastian Jugo. . was an important and specific issue brought by the parties before the trial court. Confronted by the situation. Clearly. which led private respondents to present contrary evidence. 1. (2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense. he stated that he had been living as man and wife with the petitioner since 1952. 56-57 and pp. the devisee. I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage. concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions. pp. or almost six years before the testator's death on July 16. the man he had lived with as man and wife. Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez was his legal wife from whom he had been estranged "for so many years. (Testimony of Petitioner. the trial court had to make a ruling on the question. (TSN of August 18.(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. and passed upon by the Court of Appeals." He also declared that respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate children. 1974. The man was then 51 years old while the woman was 48. The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private respondents: First. 1968. (3) Those made to a public officer or his wife. He stated that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own husband but "in truth and in fact. Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides: The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739. Jugo lived together in an ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until his death. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and petitioner. presented evidence that would refute the testimony of petitioner on the point. Tarlac. younger brother of the deceased testator. In Article IV. Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo. TSN of August 1. as well as in the eyes of the law.

During those 30 years. could it be believed that she did not even wonder why Martin Jugo did not marry her nor contact her anymore after November. They are.facts that should impel her to ask her groom before she married him in secrecy. to say the least. the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. then private respondents respectfully offer the following analysis: FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased testator in a town in Tarlac where neither she nor the testator ever resided. it was a finding that petitioner was not the innocent woman she pretended to be. is AFFIRMED. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo. 1975. is it possible that she would not have known that the mother of private respondent Oscar Jugo and Carmelita Jugo was respondent Rufina Gomez. 1923 (Exh. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. pp. inherently improbable. it maybe argued that the marriage of the deceased with private respondent Rufina Gomez was likewise done in secrecy. That would be in 1922 as Martin Jugo married respondent Rufina Gomez on November 29. considering that the houses of the parents of Martin Jugo (where he had lived for many years) and that of respondent Rufina Gomez were just a few meters away? Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are unbelievable.When the court a quo held that the testator Martin Jugo and petitioner 'were deemed guilty of adultery or concubinage'. It would be a story that would strain human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not know that Martin Jugo was already a married man in view of the irrefutable fact that it was precisely his marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez that led petitioner to break off with the deceased during their younger years. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage. 1952. the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. . knowing that her groom had children. xxx xxx xxx 3. for they are against the experience in common life and the ordinary instincts and promptings of human nature that a woman would not bother at all to ask the man she was going to marry whether or not he was already married to another. THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in 1923 is by itself conclusive demonstration that she new that the man she had openly lived for 22 years as man and wife was a married man with already two children. 3). now Intermediate Appellate Court. TSN of August 18. FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the parents of the deceased testator. especially so when she was already about 50 years old at the time of marriage. is it possible that she would not have asked Martin Jugo whether or not they were his illegitimate or legitimate children and by whom? That is un-Filipino. why the concealment' ? Of course. Petitioner married the testator only on December 5. The decision of the Court of Appeals. If a review of the evidence must be made nonetheless. FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children of respondent Rufina Gomez. SO ORDERED. 29-30) SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when they were still both single. There was a space of about 30 years in between. Moreover. It is the donation which becomes void. If there was nothing to hide from. But it should be remembered that Rufina Gomez was already in the family way at that time and it would seem that the parents of Martin Jugo were not in favor of the marriage so much so that an action in court was brought concerning the marriage. WHEREFORE. No costs. 1923 .