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Andy Dong The University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia Emma Collier-Baker The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia Thomas Suddendorf The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
Observations of animal innovations range from tool making by chimpanzees to elaborately decorated nests made by bowerbirds. Such behaviors raise fundamental questions about the evolutionary origins of design thinking. While none of these behaviors constitute what we would describe as design per se, specific cognitive mechanisms that make up what we describe as design thinking may exist in other species, even if they do not exist as a complete ‘package’ or to the same degree of skill as in humans. Animal innovations thus provide a unique window into the human faculty of design. In this paper, we discuss two cognitive characteristics, meta-representation and curiosity, and argue that they have a central role in the origins of design thinking.
1. The origins of design thinking
Designing is a paragon of a highly complex functional capacity in humans because it entails the capability to mentally imagine and plan out a material artifact de novo in the absence of any prior sensing or knowledge of that artifact. By as early as 100,000 years ago, when the earliest evidence of symbolic design appears in engraved ochre (Henshilwood, d’Errico & Watts 2009), it is likely that early humans (homo sapiens) were modifying the world to suit their needs for survival; in other words, they were designing. By 70,000 years ago, they were making bone tools following deliberate production methods (Henshilwood et al. 2001) and using complex adhesive compounds to attach handles to tools (Wadley, Hodgskiss & Grant 2009). They were also beginning to create ornamental objects using, for example, shell beads (Henshilwood et al. 2004). These findings raise two important questions relevant to design thinking. The first question is why human beings design many more artifacts than other animals. It has been argued that cultural preference for novelty can drive variation (Martindale 1990). The concept of culture is not exclusive to human societies though and has been attributed to chimpanzees (e.g., Whiten et al. 2001) and orangutans (e.g., van Schaik et al. 2003). Since culture is often defined by variations in patterns of behavior in the absence of plausible environmental explanations, an innate capability for representational variation must logically precede culture. Others have argued that sexual selection would have led to a reproductive advantage for those with creative skills (Miller 2001). Their explanation necessarily entails that females are the ‘choosy’ sex, and that males must display behaviors that females prefer. Males who are creative, that is, have the ability to produce an idea or behavior that is both novel and useful (Simonton 1999), would have a reproductive advantage. This advantage generated a selection for brain
intermediary steps in the evolution of homologous cognitive skills underlying the type of design-led innovations exhibited by humans. who discovered the process of washing sweet potatoes (Kawai 1965). The ability of the male bowerbird to build a nest of high quality and aesthetics (Wojcieszek. we look to other species that exhibit creative and innovative behaviors as a way to identify the cognitive processes that may underlie human design thinking . there has been growing attention towards the capacity of nonhuman animals to innovate. Chimpanzees can introduce behaviors that are otherwise absent in other chimpanzee populations. is what set of design thinking skills are also skills animals possess to behave creatively and thereby produce innovations . Second. Ever since Masao Kawai published the first observation of animal innovation by the female monkey (macaca fuscata). there is evidence of animal innovation not attributable to mimicry  or accidental discovery in nonhuman animals. the intraculture variation. The bowers may be up to 3m high and up to 4m in diameter. for example ‘rain dances’ (Whiten et al. and the ‘choosiness’ of the males in selecting materials to get different nest objectives ‘right’ suggests that the cognitive skills displayed by bowerbirds in bower-making appear similar to the kind of design thinking skills employed by humans while designing. Orangutans produce innovations in the way that they obtain food. The second question. In this paper. Unique behavioral traditions have also been observed in chimpanzees. such as bowerbirds. which is a requirement of a cognitive view of design thinking. recruit and modify objects for comfort and protection (such as leaf umbrellas). Nicholls & Goldizen 2007) correlates with its mating success (Coleman. make nests for sleeping and resting. The high genetic similarity between humans and the great apes demands an explanation for the gradual. We define animal innovation as the cognitive mechanisms and social processes that enable nonhuman animals to produce novel and useful behaviors (creativity). They exhibit a wide variety of cultural variations in tool use. The skills most parsimoniously assumed to be homologous traits between humans and primates are the focus of this paper. however. Bowerbirds build elaborate bowers (nests) to attract females. While a more complete discussion of the ‘package’ of cognitive mechanisms for design thinking based on biological evidence is treated elsewhere (Dong 2010). designing requires a cognitive capacity for novelty that cannot be pre-determined by social or environmental factors alone. have been recorded. Innovation processes in orangutans take multiple pathways including applying old knowledge to new problems and independently working out a solution to a problem (Russon et al. and produce signals for social communication (van Schaik. for example in their preference for using wood or stone hammers and anvils to crack nuts. and are normally decorated with a diverse range of materials (Diamond 1986). The high-level of craft. innovations have been recorded for all great ape species. If there is any overlap between the skills that allow bowerbirds to behave creatively and for humans to design. leading to runaway selection for creativity and hence increasing variety in cultural artifacts and practices. Animal innovations provide a unique window into the evolution of the human capacity to design in two ways. van Noordwijk & Wich 2006). innovations by species outside the human lineage. Creative outcomes can arise through a variety of behaviors. and the main concern of this article. 2010). these skills are more likely the result of convergent evolution due to the distant relationship between bowerbirds and hominids. the number of variables involved. Imo. we will discuss 122 . First. Not all are necessarily based on a mental representation of the external world and of processes acting on the world to achieve a desired outcome. even when both materials are available. while social factors are recognized as an important extrinsic factor for novelty production. Patricelli & Borgia 2004). with which we share a common ancestor.functions that facilitate creativity. and for social groups to then adopt these new behaviors or cultural artifacts (innovation). 2001). Thus. in this paper.
insightful problem solving). toddlers begin to go beyond the immediate present and entertain multiple models of the same referent. or could be. that models of the artifact and behavior to realize the artifact are represented within the mind (Schön 1988). we wish to draw together evidence to establish a cline for capabilities that are likely to have the most significant effect on design thinking. This recursion is a crucial part of the human mind.7).g. In addition to primary representations of the world as it is. These mental representations have a direct semantic relation to the world. secondary representations allow us to imagine how the world was. Such a definition presumes a mind that has symbolic. Meta-representation Designing. and can use information from one to inform about the other. and even the nonexisting and to reason hypothetically” (1991. Only now do they protest when a picture book is read to them upside down (DeLoache. At this stage children begin to form representations of representational relations. This is known as meta-representation and is evident. for example. and we thus require. Indeed. meta-representation and curiosity. Mental representation of design artifacts and processes is essential for designing (Purcell & Gero 1998). These so-called secondary representations are evident. Uttal & Pierroutsakos 2000). They do not typically (though exceptions prove the rule) actually eat their mud pies. for instance. The earliest stage is one characterized by a capacity for forming so-called primary representations only. p. in that children begin to appreciate that others might mis-represent the world. Thus.two characteristics. where the child holds both a representation of the world as it is as well as a representation of imaginary identity. “secondary representations are purposely detached or “decoupled” from reality and are at the root of our ability to think of the past. in early pretend play. object permanence. drawing a picture of themselves drawing a picture. Secondary representations are fundamental to our cognition as they allow us to entertain and compare multiple ways of seeing the same thing. in a strong cognitive definition of design thinking. The study of the development of representational abilities suggests that humans progress through at least three stages (Perner 1991). the possible future. has been characterized as the construction of representations (Visser 2006). Because the definitions of these two capabilities may not be familiar to the design thinking research community. Secondary representation also allows toddlers to interpret the representational content of symbols. This skill only emerges around age three to four. At this stage in development.. As Perner explains. even 24 month olds can be informed about the true location of a hidden object by an adult pointing out its location on a picture or video of the hiding place (Suddendorf 2003). we first start by defining them and then present a discussion of why they are essential to the evolution of design thinking. Thus. However. and it is possible to design solely using mental imagery in the absence of external representations (Bilda & Gero 2007). Before proceeding. they do not quite yet appreciate how a representation represents. Finally we compare these capabilities in light of innovations in nonhuman animals. In the second year of life. The infant creates a single model of its environment that is constantly updated in light of new incoming information. representational abilities. and like the emergence 123 . from a cognitive viewpoint. and yet the child is not mistaking the real object and the pretend identity. will be. for instance. 2. because of their central role in generating design situations and in framing those situations in alternative models. Instead. children demonstrate a variety of other evidence for secondary representational skills (e. we wish to emphasize that our aim is not to conclude that only humans design and animals do not design . they now appreciate that one thing (say a picture) can stand for another (say one’s house). mirror self-recognition. a stick can become a sword or a horse. Children at this stage appreciate the representational relation between a symbol and its referent—even.
Like human toddlers before the age of 4. meta-representation is implicated in one of the key skills in design thinking—analogical reasoning. mentally compare multiple objects that may solve the same design problem. this meta-representation appears to be a uniquely human trait. Thus. wherein the representational relation can provide a ‘design solution’ to a familiar problem type. the designer is making a representational relation between a designed object and its representation. for example. Yet.of secondary representation. Whiten & Suddendorf 2007). Unlike monkeys and lesser apes. is associated with a great range of new behaviors and capacities (Suddendorf 1999).g. processes of learning and knowledge reproduction were instrumental in generating them. The emphasis on the role of novelty (neophilia and neophobia) in societies (Martindale 1990) reflects a tendency to downplay the fact that when variations occur. however. Curiosity We have good reason to believe that our insatiable ‘thirst’ for knowledge is what partially drives humans to undertake an extraordinary range of activities to gather information that explains the world around us. one can. 3. have thus far failed to demonstrate a capacity for meta-representation. what is known as case-driven analogizing in design (Ball. This is a fundamental aspect of design thinking since it is at the root of developing alternative useful representations of the same imaginary object that is to be designed. or transfer the exact design representation in its entirety to a new context. The designer could invoke the representational relation as the schema for a new representation. it has been argued that it is most parsimonious that great apes and humans have inherited this trait from their common ancestor some 14 million years ago (e. and consider the veracity of various representational relations. they can recognize themselves in mirrors. and construct new design situations for which the object is more suitable. This allows us to compare alternatives. and reason about the past trajectory of an object. Even our closest living relatives. The education of designers requires that students acquire and reproduce the form of knowledge that is valued and cultivated within a discipline so that the student can perform design activities according to the written and unwritten rules of the discipline (Carvalho. design thinking is uniquely human and must have evolved after the split from the line that led to modern chimpanzees over the last 5 million years. Suddendorf & Collier-Baker 2009). having meta-representation means understanding that representations have an interpretation. It follows that in this analysis. chimpanzees. what is known as schemadriven analogizing. solve problems through insight.. but we believe that curiosity is a central component to design thinking. In short. For instance. In making an analogy. Thus. is this ‘thirst’ the same one that drives us to produce artifacts with an exuberant range of variation and sophistication? A wide range of developmental factors and traits could play a role in creating the potential to produce functional and aesthetic diversity and complexity in cultural artifacts (Simonton 2003). Perhaps most crucially. they have consistently failed tasks involving the appreciation of a mis-representation. Given this distribution of secondary representational capacity. the great apes (Suddendorf & Whiten 2001. Ormerod & Morley 2004). bonobos. gorillas and orangutans show some capacity for pretend play. they appear to share a package of these fundamental representational capacities with humans. Dong & Maton 2009). There is considerable evidence of secondary representational skills in our closest living relatives. Since it is spontaneous variation which matters in the generative processes of design wherein a designer responds to the current design situation or produces a new design situation to give rise to an expansion or 124 .
there is an intrinsic curiosity that is satisfied simply by ‘thinking’ about designing. Humans consistently direct more attention toward the novel over the familiar when given a choice (Berlyne 1960). but are generally absent in amphibians. Parker (1974) examined the response diversity of primate species by attaching a knotted rope outside of the animals’ enclosure and observing how subjects explored the object (including body parts used and actions performed). This was replicated by Torigoe (1985). but they must also be ‘useful’ in order to have value and spread as innovations. are displayed by birds and advanced mammals. Curiosity may be a primary motivator in the mental activation of alternative representations that provide some advantage in functional or aesthetic utility. to adjust to changing or impoverished environments. This is known as behavioral flexibility (Reader & Laland 2003). zoo animals were given novel objects in their cages. Primate species were the most ‘curious’ in terms of the number of responses to the novel objects. Curious behaviors. Animals invent a new behavior or use existing behaviors in a novel context as a way to adjust to a novel context or to respond to environmental stressors or ecological challenges. p. In other words. We can derive satisfaction from mentally imagining an artifact without building it. We define this predisposition as design curiosity. particularly those with opportunistic lifestyles. In what is perhaps the most comprehensive study of curiosity in nonhuman animals across species (Glickman & Sroges 1966). however. especially primates. for example. This curiosity may have been of critical importance in allowing species. The combination of curiosity and meta-representation would help to explain how humans loosen the rigid stimulus–response bonds and inhibit a pre-existing representation to try a new one. Great apes showed the greatest curiosity and tried out the most diverse range of actions in their object manipulations. such as investigating novel objects (Mayeaux & Mason 1998). McInnes & Davies 2005). who examined 74 primate species. There is evidence for creativity and innovation in many different species. possibly to investigate the material potentials of the objects. Primates tend to be more curious about animate objects than inanimate objects (Jaenicke & Ehrlich 1982). and. the degree to which these behaviors show variation or complexity may rest in part on representational capacity. curiosity and behavioral 125 . Similar types of exploration of the properties of potentially useful materials are. That is. their behaviors are not merely ‘new’. The widely cited models of curiosity (Berlyne 1954. such as designing our dream home in our heads. the generative properties of associated cognitive mechanisms merit special explanation. One possible reason for designers’ capability to give rise to new situations may be that the brain is innately predisposed “to seek and create novelty and change” (Mesulam 1998. the goal of design is not sated simply by the discovery of new (to the information-seeker) ideas or information-seeking behavior. we have a ‘design curiosity’ that can only be sated by the realization (mental or material) of a novel and useful artifact.projection of possibilities (Dong. Clearly. While curiosity can incite the goal of seeking out new information. asking questions about a stimuli would be an important factor in developing meta-representation skills in children (Maw & Maw 1961). to even have an ability to appreciate different representational relations.1044). Litman 2008) simply avoid the issue of the type of feeling one obtains during discovery and invention (Csikszentmihalyi 1996) and that the goal of design is not mastering a subject. we also need to have an explanation for why the brain would expend the energy to generate new representations in the first place and how the brain evaluates representations to distinguish the mundane and superfluous representation and the novel and useful one. The most ‘interactive’ responses were reported for baboons and macaques who physically manipulated the objects by rubbing or stretching them. Beyond Berlyne’s model of perceptual and epistemic curiosity or Littman’s model of Itype and D-type curiosity. orienting themselves or contacting the objects more often and for a longer duration of time than the other animals. central to the study of materiality in design. Curiosity encourages new ways to model the environment through exploration of novel stimuli and information-seeking behavior. of course.
the ability to imitate is itself part of a cluster of representational skills supporting innovation (Suddendorf & Whiten 2001). nonhuman animals may not ‘design’ because they simply have no need for this behavior. but perhaps to a different degree. In terms of the evolution of language. 126 . this capacity would have been similarly crucial in shaping the modern world. Other cognitive skills may be of an entirely different quality. We conclude with a brief comment about why we think this is an important question for the design thinking research community. When compared to our capacity for language. framing and creating situations.flexibility. yet. 4. Identifying these will help us narrow the search for the origins of cognitive mechanisms underpinning design thinking. Concluding remarks We have presented a basic model wherein two key aspects of design thinking. we know surprisingly little about the evolutionary origins of the capacity for design. A principal challenge in making this distinction is. At present. knowledge about the evolution of design thinking is scant. The design thinking research community is particularly absent in the debate. of course. but certainly design thinking is crucial to our survival today just as it was to our early ancestors. Further. However. Innovation is a behavior that is shown in some populations or individuals but not in others and the absence is attributable to lack of knowledge rather than state-dependent or ecological factors (Reader & Laland 2003). that there is no agreement on a ‘test’ for ‘designing’. 4. Yet. even great apes appear to be lacking the full ‘package’ of capabilities essential to design thinking. 2. evidence for and theories of its origins are extensive. Notes 1. The cline in representational capabilities and curiosity from the great apes to humans cumulated in the ability to radically change the world to suit our needs. Some of the cognitive skills that allow animals to innovate may be shared with humans. Our closest living relatives show the curiosity and representational skills that are rudiments of the fundamental cognitive abilities that allow humans to design. are supported by meta-representation and curiosity. surely. 3. evidence for representational skills is more complete (Suddendorf & Collier-Baker 2009) than for curiosity (Glickman & Sroges 1966). Evidence that representational skills and curiosity are homologous traits shared with the great apes is emerging. While imitation is a key part of the social communication involved in innovation diffusion.
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