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# Preprints of the 18th IFAC World Congress Milano (Italy) August 28 - September 2, 2011

A Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Control methodology for HVAC electrical grids connected to multiterminal HVDC networks

E. Ciapessoni* D. Cirio* S. Massucco** A. Pitto* * Ricerca sul Sistema Energetico - RSE S.p.A., Milan, Italy (Tel: +390239921; e-mail: {emanuele.ciapessoni; diego.cirio; andrea.pitto}@rse-web.it) ** Naval and Electrical Engineering Department, University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy (Tel: +39 010 3532718; e-mail: stefano.massucco@unige.it) Abstract: Probabilistic techniques are raising more and more interest in power systems operation and planning, due to the fact that they allow to quantitatively consider power system uncertainties and contingency impact, combined into risk indices. This paper presents a probabilistic technique to assess and control the operational risk of High-Voltage Alternating Current (HVAC) power systems connected to Multi-Terminal High-Voltage Direct Current (MT HVDC) networks like those envisaged for the integration of future, large off-shore wind farms. The proposed method minimizes the operational risk by re-dispatching the active power outputs of conventional generators and by shifting the power injections from the HVDC network, taking into account the operating limits of the HVDC network (in particular, cable current limits). Results of the methodology applied to an IEEE test system are presented and discussed, and some conclusions are drawn. Keywords: multi-terminal HVDC grids, optimal control, Power-system control, Quadratic Programming, Risk AC system congestions, and greater operational flexibility, as pointed out by Bell K. et al. (2010). Moreover, offshore installations such as DC networks may encounter less public opposition than onshore projects. Much R&D effort is currently ongoing, to cover the existing technology gap (e.g. regarding DC breakers) and make such systems viable (Yao L. et al. (2010)). This paper presents a probabilistic risk-based methodology to assess and control the operational risk of AC grids connected to MT-HVDC networks. In Section 2 the basis of the methodology is illustrated, while Section 3 describes the control strategy to reduce the operational risk. In Section 4 the test system is described, and some simulation results are reported and discussed. At last, in Section 5 conclusions are presented. 2. OUTLINE OF THE METHODOLOGY Risk assessment techniques rely on the concept of risk, which is basically defined as the product of an event probability by its impact on the system. The power system event is called contingency. This section focuses on some aspects concerning contingencies, AC grid and DC network models, and indices to measure the operational risk. 2.1 Contingency modeling The power system risk assessment methodology herein described focuses on the contingencies affecting the AC systems. On-going developments will include the simulation of contingencies affecting the HVDC network components (like converters and DC cables) to evaluate their effects on the overall operational risk of the AC bulk power system.

1. INTRODUCTION The increasing uncertainties in power system operation, particularly related to the deregulated environment and the penetration of variable renewable generation, raise more and more attention to security issues, as pointed out e.g. by CIGRE C4-WG 601 (2007) and Cirio D. et al. (2008). Interestingly, one of the most urgent research activities, proposed in the EEGI European Electricity Grid Initiative Implementation Plan (2010), concerns “Innovative tools and approaches for the Pan European network reliability assessment”, with the aim to evaluate options to complement or replace the current N-1 preventive security doctrine in the design and operation stages of the transmission network. Within this context probabilistic techniques can provide an important contribution, thus allowing higher operational flexibility without affecting the reliability levels. In recent years some probabilistic techniques have been proposed to support power system operation: in this regard one may consult the works by CIGRE WG C4-601 (2010), Ni M., McCalley J. D., et al. (2003), Uhlen K. et al. (2000), Ciapessoni E. et al. (2009; 2010). At the same time, the integration of larger and larger amounts of renewable power is a major target of the European Commission as recalled in EWEA (2009) and ENTSO-E (2010). To this aim, innovative HVDC technologies may provide cost-effective solutions for the connection of large, remote off-shore wind farms to the continental AC grid. The perspective is indeed to realize multi-terminal (MT), possibly meshed, offshore HVDC networks. The latter would present several advantages over AC solutions and/or point-to-point connections, in terms of higher reliability, support to relieve

Copyright by the International Federation of Automatic Control (IFAC)

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2. i. HVDC terminal nodes (interface with the mainland AC network). thus the subsequent intervention of backup protections leads to the loss of the entire busbar. in order to evaluate the impact it is necessary to perform contingency simulation. the risk index associated with that contingency is the expected loss of load. Grid losses are taken into account in the solution procedure. protection and defense systems (line and transformer overcurrent. (2) loss of load associated to the contingency. In any case. simulates the steady state response of the main controls (speed control of the generating units). This demonstrates the possibility of manual load shedding actions. and the other controls the DC power. highlighting different security aspects.g. simultaneous double circuit line faults. because it is stuck) with subsequent intervention of backup protections. Based on the above discussion. generators and load under. • Breaker failure (e.) are being investigated in current research. the loadflow on the DC network can be performed by means of classical Newton-Raphson algorithm. Typically wind generated power nodes belong to this set. in order to find the unknown quantities (V at type 2 nodes. • Failed operation of the bus differential protection: due to the malfunctioning it is not possible to isolate the faulty half-busbar.2 Cascading modeling Contingency impact can be defined in different ways. The evaluation of the contingency probabilities is carried out by combining the probabilities of the elementary events (i. depending on the assumed intervention of primary or backup protections: • “Correct” operation: protections identify the fault. in case a “lumped” slack is adopted. − Voltage-Power (VP) droop node (type 3): voltage Vj and power output Pj are linked via the following control strategy: V j = V ref j + k j × Pj − Pref j .e. etc. Thus. The model herein considered provides three different types of nodes: wind generation nodes. circuit breaker fault. The fault is cleared by tripping the minimum number of components. In the proposed approach. In fact. The methodology allows to associate an “impact” also to the contingencies which lead to situations which cause the loadflow algorithm to diverge. when instability occurs. transit nodes.September 2.4 Loss-of-load risk indices According to the adopted definition of contingency impact (see Section 2. line fault. The contingencies consisting of a fault with at most a further malfunctioning (circuit breaker.e. this solution does not seem adequate for reliability and control performances reasons. The obvious extension to n-terminal systems consists of having one terminal performing voltage control. pump and load underfrequency shedding). By expressing the contingency impact as the loss of load at the end of the cascading. Voltage-Power droop control. It must be recalled that within two-terminal Voltage Source Converter HVDC (VSC-HVDC) systems. the simulation is carried out by evaluating the sequence of “steady state” conditions which occur at each step of the degradation process of the grid.Preprints of the 18th IFAC World Congress Milano (Italy) August 28 . etc. It acts as the slack bus of the DC network. appears a good solution. It is assumed that these protections correctly intervene. to be applied to several DC/AC converters acting as a “distributed slack” for active power. droop control. different control strategies (e. generators under. tripping the minimum number of components in order to compensate for the failed tripping. − P-controlled node (type 2): power output P is set as a constant. different risk indices result. The developed “cascading engine”. or automatic intervention of defense systems. ( ) this control strategy is the typical solution adopted by the HVDC terminal nodes. according to the rare event approximation. further multiple contingencies are not taken into account.g. generally one converter controls the DC voltage. The amount of load shedding necessary for convergence restoration is used to quantify the impact of the contingency. voltages). (3) cost associated to the contingency. Transit nodes are not inverter-controlled. Typical expressions for the impact are in terms of: (1) functions of the post-fault (possibly violated) operating quantities (e.3 DC network modeling A static model of meshed DC networks for the connection of off-shore wind farms is considered within the methodology. and the other n-1 converters performing power control. 1728 . allowing to emphasize different aspects relevant for system operation.g. However. defined in (1). while protections progressively trip grid components. load reduction strategies (based on the evaluation of the active nodal residuals) are adopted in order to restore loadflow convergence. The analysis of these typologies of protection systems responses allows to consider a significant set of multiple and extreme faults. 2. but they obviously belong to the same set. loss of generating units or whole power plants. The simultaneous loss of several generating units can occur owing to problems in the power plant process or for severe faults at the power plant substation. unlike conventional power flow programs. The first three typologies are assumed to be caused by permanent faults. once recognized the non-convergence. 2011 The current methodology considers the following contingency typologies: single line and transformer faults. bus differential protection BDP) are also considered. three alternative control types can be assigned to the DC nodes: − V-controlled node (type 1): Voltage is set to a setpoint Vref. The default settings of the implemented approach provide that all transit and wind generation nodes are type 2 nodes. In the following.2). The following possible protection system behaviours are identified in case of transmission system faults (short circuits). carried out by operators in proximity to collapse conditions. Once the control options have been set for all the nodes. while the HVDC mainland terminal nodes are type 3 nodes.and over-frequency.). V and P at type 3 nodes) and other derived quantities (like the current and power flows along the DC cables of the MT-HVDC network). busbar faults. line minimum impedance.and overvoltage. 2. voltage margin control. currents. send a tripping command to the involved circuit breakers which correctly operate.

The proposed methodology adopts a parametrized formula which allows to introduce different severity functions by adjusting suitable parameters. ∆R is the risk variation.5 Risk indices based on post-fault operative quantities Other risk indices linked to operative quantities like line/transformer currents or node voltages are calculated. result of the cascading analysis).September 2.k (ik ) = 2 ⋅ ikN 1 + ikM (2) M and N in (2) are parameters: in order to calculate the total “high current risk” due to a contingency j (a function of vector i containing branch currents ik).k ⋅ ⋅ ∆i k di k ATOT dSev j . …. aimed to minimize the risk of high currents on lines/transformers after the first step of cascading. …. The rationale for this definition of the OF is to minimize the risk. Analogously. and eventually its cost. NinjTOT = Ng + NHVDCterm the number of redispatchable active power injections (conventional generators. et al. The approach can be extended to estimate.Preprints of the 18th IFAC World Congress Milano (Italy) August 28 .k = ∑ Anom k 3.k the severity for branch k in case of contingency j. The algorithm seeks a trade-off between risk reduction and generation redispatch. Objective Function The objective function to be minimised is: ∑ pr × ∑ j j =1 Nctg j k =1 ctg N br j Anom k dSev j . lines and transformers. is the identification and evaluation of control actions. k ∆Tk ⋅ ⋅ = di k Anom k ATOT ∑ pr × ∑ j =1 Nctg j k =1 ctg N br j N injTOT hk ∑ pr × ∑ j =1 k =1 ⋅ ∑S h =1 × ∆Ph = ∑K h =1 h × ∆Ph (6) where prj is the probability of contingency j. Pq with q = 1. RISK CONTROL TECHNIQUE The next stage. = α ⋅ ∑ ∆Ph2 + β ⋅ h =1 N HVDCterm q =1 ∑ ∆P 2 q +µ×R (4) Sev j . Shk the sensitivity factor of injection h towards power flow in branch k [MW/MW]. Ng are the power injections of Ng conventional generators. (2009) and it is illustrated in the sequel. identified on the basis of the absolute value of parameter Kh defined for each redispatchable power injection h (conventional generator or HVDC injection) as in (7) below. D. 2011 ρ ctg = pctg ⋅ Lctg [ MW ] (1) Ng pctg is the probability of occurrence of the contingency in a specified time interval and Lctg is the estimated lost load for the contingency (MW..k × Anom k ∆R indicated in (6). by means of generation redispatch. Conventional generators considered in the optimization process are selected as the most “effective” in risk control. The mathematical formulation is based on quadratic programming described in Zhu J. 2. where the weights are the capacities of the individual branches (see (3)). by means of correlation models. Nctg the number of contingencies considered in the list. Constraints The constraints which bound the search space are: 1) Expression of the overall overload risk R R − ∆R = R 0 with (5) Nctg j ctg N br j Sev j . while minimizing the power redispatch. McCalley J. Sevj. ATOT the sum of all the branch capacities [MVA]. Moreover. The goal of the control is to minimize the power shift of conventional generators and HVDC terminal power injections while guaranteeing the minimum risk of high currents on longitudinal branches at the end of the first step of cascading. after assessment. the unsupplied energy (MWh) associated with a contingency. ik the power flow through branch k. k dik dSev j . Parameter µ is a penalty factor which weights the importance of R in the objective function. The severity function herein adopted is referred to as “proximity” model and shown in (2). HVDC injections). it is desired to change the generation profile as little as possible. Tk the active power flow along branch k. This feature allows to develop a risk minimization function. (2003). Parameters Kh indicate the post-fault “sensitivity” of injection h towards the grid lines over the contingency set under study. NHVDCterm are the power injections of NHVDCterm HVDC terminals and R is the overall operational risk for overloads. O.tot = ∑ pr × ∑ j j =1 §§ Nctg j j =1 k =1 Anom k ATOT ctg N br j ⋅∆Sev j .F . which exploits the sensitivity of generator nodes with respect to the longitudinal branches of the grid model.k di k ∆ Tk ⋅ TOT = A ⋅ 1 A TOT N injTOT = ∑ pr × ∑ k =1 Anom k dSev j . Passage §§ in (6) is justified by the DC loadflow approximation: I T ik = k MAX ≅ k Anom k Ik 1729 . In fact. the introduction of redispatching unitary costs into the OF may allow to formulate the problem in terms of minimization of the total redispatching cost. tot (i ) = ∑ Sev k =1 j . the individual severities of the branches are combined together through a weighted average. i. ctg j N br ) includes all of the grid branches not affected by contingency j. similar to the ones proposed by Ni M.e. these indicators are used to assess the power system conditions (in terms of currents and voltage profiles) just after the application of the initiating contingencies. particularly in the operational stage. Factors α and β allow to weight the contributions of conventional generation and of HVDC power injections. The inner summation (i = 1. This information is relevant to identify the possible inception of a cascading process. mainly because of economic reasons (resorting to the ancillary services market is costly). Nctg Nctg j k =1 Nbranches (3) ∆R = Nctg ∑ ∆R = ∑ pr j =1 j =1 ctg N br j × ∆Sev j . …. In particular. The optimal problem formulation takes advantage of the definition of risk indices expressed in terms of analytical functions of operative quantities like voltages or currents. the risk associated with a set of independent contingencies is defined as the sum of the individual risk indices related to each contingency of the set. Nbranches where Ph with h = 1.. A preventive control strategy is proposed.

a too small µ value determines very limited generated power shifts. 2. and DC sensitivity between HVDC terminal injection q and DC ∆I qHVDC and ∆PqHVDC are respectively the N HVDCterm q =1 current and power injection of HVDC terminal q. Nctg Kh = ∑ pr × ∑ j j =1 k =1 ctg N br j dSev j . N term.September 2. 4.44 kV AC bus 17 Grid Side VSC 6 ∼ AC system = ∼ AC bus 20 Fig. a well-known test system widely used for comparing risk methodologies and techniques. 1. the control module initializes the factor at a value µ0 and iterates the optimization algorithm by multiplying the current µ value by 10 until at least one power shift at a generating unit overcomes a MW threshold (defined by the user) or an upper limit for µ is reached.25 kV 1 ∼ = ∼ = 2 DC system 3 152. DC I MAXp is the maximum current limit for HVDC cable Fig.k dik ⋅ 1 ⋅ S hk ATOT (7) 2) Invariance of the total generation NinjTOT ∑ ∆P h =1 N term . On the other hand. IEEE Reliability Test System The RTS has been extended by adding injections into two nodes. is 10 minutes. while cable p. Thus. WF I DC 0p is the initial current flowing in cable p. The power injections simulating the HVDC terminals are compensated by reducing conventional generation of the area hosting the terminals in proportion to their initial active power outputs.Preprints of the 18th IFAC World Congress Milano (Italy) August 28 . before control DC ∆I p is given by (13) where Λ qp is the deployment. DC ∆I p = N HVDCterm q =1 ∑ Λ qp ⋅∆I qHVDC = ∑ Λ qp ⋅ ∆PqHVDC VqHVDC (13) The choice of penalty factor µ affects the results of the optimal control. a typical time frame for the operator in the control room. N OW (9) where N OW is the total number of (independent) MT-HVDC networks. The time interval for risk assessment. The base case scenario used in the present analysis is characterized by the peak load. The most suitable parameter value depends. 1. in order to identify a suitable µ value. w h =0 (8) IEEE Reliability Test System.. namely the Wind farms Wind Plant VSC WF 153. Base case loadflow and topology of the DC network An interesting research topic is dedicated to shape the most suitable topology for the MT-HVDC network of the future.. while tot ∆Pz( w) represents the power injection at HVDC terminal z of MT-HVDC network w. 4) Operational limits of the generating units Phmin ≤ Ph ≤ PhMAX 5) Range of overload risk R (10) (11) 0 ≤ R ≤ R0 6) Current limits on the DC cables of MT-HVDC networks DC DC DC (12) − I MAXp ≤ ∆I p + I 0DC p ≤ I MAXp where p.w the total number of connections of MTHVDC network w to AC mainland system. thus simulating the HVDC contribution. shown in Fig. 2 together with few significant loadflow results. The GridSide VSC (GSVSC) converters are connected to nodes 17 and 20 in all the performed simulations. 3) Invariance of the total HVDC terminal power injection for each MTDC network w ∑ ∆P z =1 ( w) z =0 tot ∀ w = 1. the more important the weight given to risk minimization goal with respect to the limitation of generation shift. for example.. The topology chosen for the DC network adopted in the current study case is reported in Fig. on the dimension of the grid under study. In this condition the North area (which has a generation surplus) exports large amounts of power towards the South characterized by a power deficit.35 kV 1305 A 5 0A 4 1305 A = 151. In this way it is not necessary to know a priori the setting of µ. SIMULATION RESULTS This section presents some results of the application of the proposed methodology to an IEEE test system. 2011 The parameters Kh have been defined in (7).. which makes redispatching not convenient due to the modest risk reduction achieved. From the OF structure it is straightforward that the larger the µ value. taking into account technical constraints (like actual DC 1730 . System data from RTS TF (1999) have been adapted for the purposes of the work. used to set the contingency probability.

e. The deployed control strategy has also a beneficial effect on the low voltage risk which undergoes a slight decrease for all the analysed contingencies. Wind power generation fluctuations in the time interval of study (i.u.8 12. A general reduction of the high current risk index is detected for both high risk contingencies (typically N-1 line and transformer outages. while in the initial state its current flow is negligible. After the control application.2 Risk Control Results Initially. set for conventional generation and HVDC terminal contributions. 4. The overall overload risk index passes from 3. Equal weights are Due to the different active power injections at the HVDC terminals the DC cable between nodes 3 and 4 is characterized by a current equal to 66 A. Table 1.4 -17. The considered DC network consists of two wind farm connection nodes (nodes 1 and 2).5 x 10 3 -3 Current-based Severity Value Fig.8 Fig.Preprints of the 18th IFAC World Congress Milano (Italy) August 28 . Table 2 compares the risk indices relevant to all the examined contingencies before and after the control strategy deployment.8 20.0 184.2 146. grid and converters losses.0 197. The time interval of analysis is 10 minutes. 4 compares the overload impact of all the contingencies before and after the control strategy deployment.4 ∆P [MW] -13.0 20.1 172.8 -8. The analysis in this subsection is focused on high current risk indices. far beyond their initial currents: in fact the most loaded DC cable has an initial current equal to 1305 A. Moreover the “proximity” severity function is adopted. 4. 4.September 2. 3. 3 shows the ranking list of the contingencies sorted according to the risk indices calculated by the methodology. Given these assumptions. Proposed generators redispatching for the analyzed cntg set (Imax for DC cables = 1500 A) Generator (G)/ HVDCTerminal (H) B15Y215 (G) B16Y216 (G) B22W222 (G) B01I301 (G) B02K302 (G) B17W217 (H) B20X220 (H) P0 [MW] 215. The power shifts determine an overall reduction of the injected power from conventional generation into the Northern part of the RTS equal to 40 MW and a corresponding increase of generation in the Southern part. 11 and 12.0 192.0 155.6 Pfinal [MW] 201. Each DC cable is 50 km long and has a resistance equal to 0. the current flows along the DC cables of the MT-HVDC network have changed: the cable from node 4 to node 6 undergoes a 66 A current increase from 1305 A to 1371 A. two transit nodes (nodes 3 and 4).94*10-8 to 2. 10 minutes) are considered negligible. Current-based Severity Index (time interval = 10 minutes) TR_B24YT2 SB_B03I303 SB_B11Q211 SB_B12Q212 SSB1_B11Q211 SSB1_B12Q212 LIN_B11Q211_B14Y214 TR_B11QT4 LIN_B12Q212_B23X223 TR_B12QT5 SSB2+DT_B12Q212_L_QU21 SSB2+DT_B11Q211_L_QU23 DT_QU21_QU23 TR_B12QT3 SSB2_B12Q212 LIN_B11Q211_B13U213 SSB2_B11Q211 TR_B11QT1 LIN_B12Q212_B13U213 LIN_B03I303_B09Q309 LIN_B01I301_B03I303 0 0.8 210.73 MW (about 1% of total power injected into the AC mainland grid). Ranking list of the contingencies according to the technical risk indices calculated by the methodology It can be noticed that all the three indices show that the highest contribution to the operational risk comes from the N-1 line contingency applied to the AC cable between buses 6 and 10.3 192. protection selectivity). In particular the first two contingencies at the top of the loss-of-load risk based ranking list affect the aforementioned cable and determine the loss of the load at bus 6 for undervoltage problems.5 2 before control after control 2. Overload impacts for all the contingencies analyzed before (blue bars) and after (red bars) the control deployment Table 1 shows the power shifts suggested by the risk-based control.0 -12. the current limits for all the DC cables are set to 1500 A. Loadflow has been carried out under the assumption that the voltage setpoints Vref at nodes 5 and 6 are set to 1.0 180. and the two HVDC terminals equally share the amount of power injected into the AC grid. length of DC cables in the grid. the prototype is run over an exhaustive set of single and multiple (also dependent) contingencies applied to AC buses 3. providing a 49% reduction of the overall risk index. Moreover. Fig. and two VP droop-controlled HVDC terminal nodes (nodes 5 and 6). The resulting total DC grid losses (excluding converter losses) are equal to 4.1 Risk Assessment Results The risk assessment phase of the methodology is used to evaluate the operational risk associated with a comprehensive set of single and multiple (dependent) contingencies affecting buses 10 and 11.00*10-8.6 162. 2011 breakers technology.01 p. see for example a 61% reduction for N-1 contingency applied to line 11-14) and to 1731 .0139 Ω/km.5 1 1. Fig. the two wind farms connected to the DC network are producing 200 MW both.6 197. while the current on the cable from node 3 to node 5 decreases from 1305 A to 1238 A.0 172.

22*10-10 -38.94*10-8 to 2. Wiley-IEEE Press Series on Power Engineering Sum and related variation Imax risk indices Variation % After control 1. The IEEE Reliability Test System . which decreases from 3. Seattle.0 1. Gaglioti E. G. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. Multiterminal HVDC grid for network interconnection and renewable energy integration. CONCLUSIONS The paper presented a methodology for risk assessment and control for AC systems also connected to multiterminal HVDC networks.12*10-10 2. as indicated in the described simulations. Risk is measured via both loss of load risk indices and other technical indices based on operative quantities (current and voltages). E. Løvås.47*10-13 2. L.3 7. Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe Conference..86*10-9 1. (2010). Power System Conference and Exposition (PSCE) 2009.9 5.06*10-13 1. H. CIGRE Session.16*10-14 -47. 784-801 EEGI European Electricity Grid Initiative (2010). Sweden Ciapessoni. 1732 . REFERENCES Bell. Denis. 18..85*10-9 -61.6 3. Xu. McCalley. which is close to the initial currents in the most loaded DC cables. K.. Massucco. Breidablik. Cirio D. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. (2009). CIGRE Session. European Wind Energy Association (2009). Roadmap 2010-18 and Detailed Implementation Plan 2010-12 ENTSO-E. Massucco. Panciatici P.. S. Gothenburg. Paris CIGRE WG C4-601 (2007). No.14*10-9 9.79*10-10 -33. M.4 1...34*10-13 -38.5 1.35*10-9 7. Cirio.81*10-13 2. contingency applied to halfbusbar SSB1 at node 11).2 4.. pp.. The drastic reduction (around 50%) of the risk indices for the most risky contingencies causes a significant decrease of the overall risk index. It also takes into account the current limits of the DC cables on the MTHVDC network.39*10-10 -45.77*10-12 -59. (2009). Paris Ni. G.7 2.40*10-12 1. D. G. Vol.4 1. Massucco. This allows to keep the currents on all the DC cables within the maximum limit of 1320 A. (2008). Silvestro.1 Before control The implemented control allows again to reduce the overload risk index for the contingency set under test. the simulations have been repeated under the same assumptions except for the current limits of the DC cables which have been set to 1320 A.15*10-13 -38. Bazargan.10*10-8 5. undergoing a 46% reduction (less significant than 49% with larger current limits).53*10-12 2.5 5. Research & Development Plan EWEA. 2011 low risk contingencies (like. L. Report “Oceans of Opportunity: Harnessing Europe’s largest domestic energy resource” Yao.17*10-9 7.11 *10-8.27*10-10 -36. by exploiting the generator-branch sensitivities weighted with the probability of occurrence of the contingencies under study. Risk evaluation in power system contingency analyses. D.8 3.70*10-12 -51.3 MW.22*10-9 -49.. Vittal.32*10-9 2. S. the shift of injected powers from bus 17 to bus 20 passes from 13 MW to 2. European Transactions on Electrical Power (ETEP). F.22*10-10 3. A. Lucarella.... Vol. Critchley..3 2. Pitto.94*10-9 -46. D. (2000). Online Risk-Based Security Assessment.0 3. (2010). A Probabilistic Security Criterion for Determination of Power Transfer Limits in a Deregulated Environment. In order to test the effect of DC cable current limits on the effectiveness of the risk-based proposed control. 14. G. Pitto.M. E. (2003).. D. T. Liu. No. 5.75*10-13 9.. The lower current limits on the DC cables allow a lower shift of power between the two HVDC terminals: in particular.01*10-9 -53. Ø.18*10-9 1.. 3 Uhlen.3 4....3 2. A Probabilistic Risk Assessment Approach to support the operation of large electric power systems. P constant control) typically adopted at the HVDC terminals. Economic and technical criteria for designing future off-shore HVDC grids.3 5..61*10-10 -36. A.24*10-9 -33. 2009. L. (2010).72*10-10 3.1 1. Table 2. The subject is raising interest in view of the integration of large off-shore wind farms into AC grids. 2009 in compliance with the Decree of March 19. CIGRE Session.. which partially reduces the effectiveness of the risk-based control. Comparison of the risk indices before and after the preventive control implementation Contingencies description LIN_B12Q212_B23X223 TR_B24YT2 LIN_B11Q211_B14Y214 LIN_B01I301_B03I303 TR_B11QT4 TR_B12QT5 LIN_B03I303_B09Q309 DT_QU21_QU23 LIN_B11Q211_B13U213 LIN_B12Q212_B13U213 TR_B12QT3 TR_B11QT1 SB_B03I303 SSB1_B12Q212 SSB1_B11Q211 SSB2_B12Q212 SSB2_B11Q211 SSB2+DT_B12Q212_L_QU21 SSB2+DT_B11Q211_L_QU23 The control algorithm effectively reduces the operational risk of high currents in the power systems. Kjølle. He.1 5. A. Migliavacca. D. J. R.00*10-8 -49. C. 1 RTS TF (Reliability Test System Task Force) of the Application of Probability Methods Subcommittee (1999). Tayyib. Paris Zhu J..1996. S.. On-line Dynamic Security Assessment to Mitigate the Risk of Blackout in the Italian Power System.44*10-11 -49.54*10-10 -38.September 2.73*10-13 -43. M. K.. V.85*10-11 1.7 3. Vol.03*10-8 5. Optimization of Power System Operation. European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (2010). Technical Brochure “Review of On-line Dynamic Security Assessment Tools and Techniques” CIGRE WG C4-601 (2010). Moreira C. 18. Technical Brochure “Review of the Current Status of Tools and Techniques for Risk-Based and Probabilistic Planning in Power Systems” Cirio...94*10-8 2. No. 8. thus identifying the contingencies which most contribute to the overall risk index of the contingency set. Cirio. WA.Preprints of the 18th IFAC World Congress Milano (Italy) August 28 .12*10-10 3. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This work has been financed by the Research Fund for the Italian Electrical System under the Contract Agreement between ERSE and the Ministry of Economic Development General Directorate for Energy and Mining Resources stipulated on July 29. C. The proposed methodology takes into account the topology of the MT-HVDC network and the controls (droop control. USA Ciapessoni.75*10-10 -54.