This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
Act No. 387, Meralco Securities installed from Batangas to Manila a pipeline system consisting of cylindrical steel pipes joined together and buried not less than one meter below the surface along the shoulder of the public highway. The pipes are embedded in the soil while the valves are welded to the pipes so as to make the pipeline system one single piece of property from end to end. Pursuant to the Assessment Law, Commonwealth Act No. 470, the provincial assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real property and issued Tax Declarations. Issues: Whether or not the Meralco Securities Pipeline System in Laguna is a subject to a realty tax? Held: The Court ordered that CBAA did not with grave abuse and discretion and acted within its jurisdiction in sustaining the holding of the provincial assessor that Meralco Securities Pipeline System in Laguna is subject to a realty tax for the following reasons that the pipes are machinery or improvements and regarded as realty because they are constructions adhered to the soil. It is attached to the land in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without dismantling the steel pipes which are welded to the pipeline. In so far as the pipeline uses valves, pumps and control devices to maintain the flow of the oil, it is in its sense machinery within the meaning of the Real Property Tax Code. Thus, the Court dismissed the petition and the questioned decision and resolution of the lower court is affirmed. Board of Assessment vs Meralco, 10 SCRA 68 Facts: The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 484 which authorized the Municipal Board of Manila to grant a franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric street railway and electric light, heat and power system in the City of Manila. Meralco's electric power is generated by its hydro-electric plant located at Botocan Falls, Laguna and is transmitted to the City of Manila by means of electric transmission wires, running from the province of Laguna to the said City. These electric transmission wires which carry high voltage current, are fastened to insulators attached on steel towers constructed by respondent at intervals, from its hydroelectric plant in the province of Laguna to the City of Manila. The respondent Meralco has constructed 40 of these steel towers within Quezon City, on land belonging to it. The City Assessor of Quezon City declared the aforesaid steel towers for real property tax under Tax. Respondent paid the amount under protest, and filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals. Issue: Whether or not the Meralco poles constitute real properties so as they can be subjected to a real property tax? Held: The SC ruled that Meralco's steel towers were considered poles within the meaning of paragraph 9 of its franchise which exempts its poles from taxation. The steel towers were considered personal because they were removable and merely attached to square metal frames by means of bolts and could be moved from place to place when unscrewed and dismantled. Furthermore, they are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to which they are attached. Note: Poles - was used to denote the steel towers of an electric company engaged in the generation of hydro-electric power generated from its plant. Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Company, 37 Phil. 644 Facts: The “Compañia Agricola Filipina” bought a considerable quantity of rice-cleaning machinery company From the defendant machinery company, and executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase price. It included in the mortgage deed the building of strong materials in which the machinery was installed, without any reference to the land on which it stood. The indebtedness secured by this instrument not having been paid when it fell due, the mortgaged property was sold by the sheriff, in pursuance of the terms of the mortgage instrument. A few weeks thereafter, on or about The 14th of January, 1914, the “Compañia Agricola Filipina” executed a deed of sale of the land upon which the building stood to the machinery company, but this deed of sale, although executed in a public document, was not registered. The machinery company went into possession of the building at or about the time when this sale took place, that is to say, the month of
levied execution upon the building. that the judgment must be sustained on the ground that the agreed statement of facts in the court below discloses that neither the purchase of the building by the plaintiff nor his inscription of the sheriff’s certificate of sale in his favor was made in good faith. however. Serg’s Products v. thesheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory. PCI Leasing and Finance. On 7 April 1998. the petition for review on certiorari. Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. He was able to take two more. Vicencio). Article 1544 of the New Civil Code. praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin. and it appearing further that the machinery company’s claim of ownership was well founded. Hence. with an application for a writ of replevin. and lifted the preliminary injunction issued on 15 June 1998. Inc. . At or about the time when the chattel mortgage was executed in favor of themachinery company. and that the machinery company must be held to be the owner of the property. by petitioners. third persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as personal. boughtit in at the sheriff’s sale on or about the 18th of December. not owned. invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its processes. said machines are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure (compare Tumalad v. and further. Issue: Whether or not the trial judge erred in sustaining the machinery company on the ground that it had its title to the building registered prior to the date of registry of plaintiff’s certificate? Held: We conclude that the ruling in favor of the machinery company cannot be sustained on the ground assigned by the trial judge. Hence. Hence. 1914. a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. and that they had only been leased. not personal. 1913. the plaintiff secured judgment for that amount.December. upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing. The holding that the machines should be deemed personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. the appellate court held that the subject machines were personal property. and the 31 March 1998 Resolution of the lower court. property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code. separate and apart from the land On which it stood. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on 26 February 1999. real.This action was instituted by the plaintiff to recover possession of the building from themachinery company. the sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the remaining properties. it appearing that the company first took possession of the property. On 6 April 1998. But it appearing that he had full knowledge of the machinery company’s claim of ownership when he executed the indemnity bond and bought in the property at the sheriff’s sale. We are of opinion." It thus affirmed the 18 February 1998 Order. On 24 March 1998. He took the risk and must stand by the consequences. that the building and the land were sold to the machinery company long prior to the date of the sheriff’s sale to the plaintiff. After agreeing to such stipulation. The decision of the trial court is hereby affirmed." The machines are thus. they went to the CA via an original action for certiorari. On 25 March 1998. the “Compañia Agricola Filipina” executed another mortgage to the plaintiff upon the building. this appeal. and it is in this sense that we find that he was not a purchaser in good faith. although each of them was movable or personal property on its own. In the present case. The trial judge gave judgment in favor of the machinery company. Thus. Citing the Agreement of the parties. the mortgagor. but was prevented by the workers from taking the rest. Hence. judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses. petitioners filed a motion for special protective order. there is no showing that any specific third party would be adversely affected. and it has continued in possession ever since. filed a complaint for sum of money. Upon the failure of the mortgagor to pay the amount of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage. and ruled that the "words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties. while the parties are bound by the Agreement. Under the principle of estoppel. Issue: Whether the machines are personal or real property? Held: The machinery were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making industry. however. On 6 March 1998. he cannot be said to have been an innocent purchaser for value. all of them have become "immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry. PCI Leasing Facts: On 13 February 1998. seized one machinery with word that the return for the other machineries.
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
We've moved you to where you read on your other device.
Get the full title to continue reading from where you left off, or restart the preview.