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Pineda 9 SCRA 631 3. MERALCO vs Board of Assessment Appeals 114 SCRA 273 4. Serg’s Products Inc. vs PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. 338 SCRA 499 5. Leung Yee vs. Strong Machineries 37 Phil. 644 6. Board of Assessment Appeals vs. MERALCO 10 SCRA 68 7. Toledo-Banaga vs. CA 302 SCRA 331 8. Davao Saw Mill Co vs. Castillo 51 SCRA 709 9. People’s Bank and Trust Co. vs. Dahican Lumber Co. L -15700 16 May 1967
Mindanao Bus Co. vs The City Assessor and the Treasurer L-17870, 29 Sept 1962 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-17870 September 29, 1962 MINDANAO BUS COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE CITY ASSESSOR & TREASURER and the BOARD OF TAX APPEALS of Cagayan de Oro City, respondents. Binamira, Barria and Irabagon for petitioner. Vicente E. Sabellina for respondents. LABRADOR, J.: This is a petition for the review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Case No. 710 holding that the petitioner Mindanao Bus Company is liable to the payment of the realty tax on its maintenance and repair equipment hereunder referred to. Respondent City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4,400 petitioner's above-mentioned equipment. Petitioner appealed the assessment to the respondent Board of Tax Appeals on the ground that the same are not realty. The Board of Tax Appeals of the City sustained the city assessor, so petitioner herein filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a petition for the review of the assessment. In the Court of Tax Appeals the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts: Petitioner and respondents, thru their respective counsels agreed to the following stipulation of facts: 1. That petitioner is a public utility solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks, over its authorized lines in the Island of Mindanao, collecting rates approved by the Public Service Commission; 2. That petitioner has its main office and shop at Cagayan de Oro City. It maintains Branch Offices and/or stations at Iligan City, Lanao; Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur; Davao City and Kibawe, Bukidnon Province; 3. That the machineries sought to be assessed by the respondent as real properties are the following: (a) Hobart Electric Welder Machine, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "A"; (b) Storm Boring Machine, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "B"; (c) Lathe machine with motor, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "C"; (d) Black and Decker Grinder, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "D"; (e) PEMCO Hydraulic Press, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "E"; (f) Battery charger (Tungar charge machine) appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "F"; and (g) D-Engine Waukesha-M-Fuel, appearing in the attached photograph, marked Annex "G". 4. That these machineries are sitting on cement or wooden platforms as may be seen in the attached photographs which form part of this agreed stipulation of facts; 5. That petitioner is the owner of the land where it maintains and operates a garage for its TPU motor trucks; a repair shop; blacksmith and carpentry shops, and with these machineries which are placed therein, its TPU trucks are made; body constructed; and same are repaired in a condition to be serviceable in the TPU land transportation business it operates; 6. That these machineries have never been or were never used as industrial equipments to produce finished products for sale, nor to repair machineries, parts and the like offered to the general public indiscriminately for business or commercial purposes for which petitioner has never engaged in, to date. 1awphîl.nèt The Court of Tax Appeals having sustained the respondent city assessor's ruling, and having denied a motion for reconsideration, petitioner brought the case to this Court assigning the following errors: 1. The Honorable Court of Tax Appeals erred in upholding respondents' contention that the questioned assessments are valid; and that said tools, equipments or machineries are immovable taxable real properties. 2. The Tax Court erred in its interpretation of paragraph 5 of Article 415 of the New Civil Code, and holding that pursuant thereto the movable equipments are taxable realties, by reason of their being intended or destined for use in an industry. 3. The Court of Tax Appeals erred in denying petitioner's contention that the respondent City Assessor's power to assess and levy real estate taxes on machineries is further restricted by section 31, paragraph (c) of Republic Act No. 521; and 4. The Tax Court erred in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
(Civil Code of the Phil. the tools and equipments in question in this instant case are. (Emphasis ours. those movable which become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry for those which may not be so considered immobilized because they are merely incidental. in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 415 of the New Civil Code which provides: Art. etc. as petitioner has carried on. 415. Berkenkotter vs. and thus retain their movable nature. usually found and used in hotels. and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works. by their nature. are merely incidentals and are not and should not be considered immobilized by destination. Meralco Securities installed from Batangas to Manila a pipeline system consisting of cylindrical steel pipes joined together and buried not less than one meter below the surface along the shoulder of the public highway. though movable in nature. Said equipments may not. 415). typewriters. instruments or implements intended by the owner of any building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade or industry . in lieu of the other of less capacity existing therein. restaurants. Thus in the case of Berkenkotter vs. without such equipments. jeep-wagons. and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works. They are merely incidentals — acquired as movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. and the sawing is conducted in the land or building. instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land.) Aside from the element of essentiality the above-quoted provision also requires that the industry or works be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. Thus. etc. Inasmuch as the central is permanent in character. converted them into real property by reason of their purpose. The pipes are embedded in the soil while the . 61 Phil. not essentials. the decision subject of the petition for review is hereby set aside and the equipment in question declared not subject to assessment as real estate for the purposes of the real estate tax.) So that movable equipments to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be "essential and principal elements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be "unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established." If the installation of the machinery and equipment in question in the central of the Mabalacat Sugar Co.. So ordered.) Note that the stipulation expressly states that the equipment are placed on wooden or cement platforms. therefore. receptacles. its business may be carried on. as essential and principle elements of a sugar central. The law that governs the determination of the question at issue is as follows: Art. Without costs.. (Emphasis ours. so said equipment may not be considered real estate within the meaning of Article 415 (c) of the Civil Code. Similarly. supra. therefore. Even without such tools and equipments. which are incidentals. the Supreme Court said: Article 344 (Now Art. not essential and principal. gives the character of real property to "machinery. cash registers. H. be deemed real property. the "machinery. instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. 663. liquid containers. for these businesses can continue or carry on their functions without these equity comments. — The following are immovable properties: xxx xxx xxx (5) Machinery.Respondents contend that said equipments. Airline companies use forklifts. IBM machines. the necessary machinery and equipment installed for carrying on the sugar industry for which it has been established must necessarily be permanent. etc. Republic Act No. as demanded by the law. before the war. 387. without them the sugar central would be unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established. are immobilized by destination. But in the case at bar the equipments in question are destined only to repair or service the transportation business. Meralco vs CBAA114 SCRA 273 Facts: Pursuant to a pipeline concession issued under the Petroleum Act of 1949. pressure pumps. WHEREFORE. On the other hand.. A sawmill would also be installed in a building on land more or less permanently. for its sugar and industry. They can be moved around and about in petitioner's repair shop. 415. tenement or on a specified land. paragraph (5) of the Civil Code. liquid containers. and petitioner's business is not carried on in a building. Inc. In the case of B." We may here distinguish. Cu Unjieng. but the delivery trucks and adding machines which they usually own and use and are found within their industrial compounds are merely incidental and retain their movable nature. we hold that the equipments in question are not absolutely essential to the petitioner's transportation business. it cannot be said that their incorporation therewith was not permanent in character because. receptacles. which is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land . The transportation business could be carried on without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another. Resuming what we have set forth above. machineries of breweries used in the manufacture of liquor and soft drinks. are immobilized because they are essential to said industries. not essential and principle municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. The following are immovable property: xxx xxx xxx (5) Machinery. Cu Unjieng. and instruments or implements" are found in a building constructed on the land. tho movable. theaters.
The steel towers were considered personalty because they were removable and merely attached to square metal frames by means of bolts and could be moved from place to place when unscrewed and dismantled. Pursuant to the Assessment Law. 484 which authorized the Municipal Board of Manila to grant a franchise to construct. Respondent paid the amount under protest. Laguna and is transmitted to the City of Manila by means of electric transmission wires. are fastened to insulators attached on steel towers constructed by respondent at intervals. and SERGIO T. INC. J. the Court dismissed the petition and the questioned decision and resolution of the lower court is affirmed. Note: Poles . the provincial assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real property and issued Tax Declarations. The Case .: After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable property be considered as personal or movable. maintain and operate an electric street railway and electric light. DECISION PANGANIBAN. In so far as the pipeline uses valves. SERG‟S PRODUCTS. respondent. These electric transmission wires which carry high voltage current. The City Assessor of Quezon City declared the aforesaid steel towers for real property tax under Tax.. 470. Commonwealth Act No. and they can be separated without breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to which they are attached. The respondent Meralco has constructed 40 of these steel towers within Quezon City. and filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals. such property is a proper subject of a writ of replevin obtained by the other contracting party. a party is estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise. Board of Assessment vs Meralco 10 SCRA 68 Facts: The Philippine Commission enacted Act No.valves are welded to the pipes so as to make the pipeline system one single piece of property from end to end. heat and power system in the City of Manila. GOQUIOLAY.was used to denote the steel towers of an electric company engaged in the generation of hydro-electric power generated from its plant. on land belonging to it. vs. it is in its sense machinery within the meaning of the Real Property Tax Code. from its hydroelectric plant in the province of Laguna to the City of Manila. Thus. Issue: Whether or not the Meralco poles constitute real properties so as they can be subjected to a real property tax? Held: The SC ruled that Meralco's steel towers were considered poles within the meaning of paragraph 9 of its franchise which exempts its poles from taxation. PCI LEASING AND FINANCE. It is attached to the land in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without dismantling the steel pipes which are welded to the pipeline. pumps and control devices to maintain the flow of the oil. INC. running from the province of Laguna to the said City. they are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner. Furthermore. Meralco's electric power is generated by its hydro-electric plant located at Botocan Falls. Hence. Issues: Whether or not the Meralco Securities Pipeline System in Laguna is a subject to a realty tax? Held: The Court ordered that CBAA did not with grave abuse and discretion and acted within its jurisdiction in sustaining the holding of the provincial assessor that Meralco Securities Pipeline System in Laguna is subject to a realty tax for the following reasons that the pipes are machinery or improvements and regarded as realty because they are constructions adhered to the soil.. petitioners.
”4 In its February 18. 1999 Resolution3 denying reconsideration. Q-98-33500 are hereby AFFIRMED. 1998 Order. The writ of preliminary injunction issued on June 15. Rizal and to return to their original place whatever immobilized m achineries or equipments he may have removed.” 9 The Facts The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:10 . the assailed Order dated February 18. praying that the deputy sheriff be enjoined “from seizing immobilized or other real properties in (petitioners‟) factory in Cainta.5 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Branch 218)6 issued a Writ of Seizure. The decretal portion of the CA Decision reads as follows: “WHEREFORE. 1998 in Civil Case No. 1998 is hereby LIFTED. 47332 and its February 26. 1998 and Resolution dated March 31. premises considered.Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the January 6.7 The March 18. 1999 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)2 in CA-GR SP No. 1998 Resolution8 denied petitioners‟ Motion for Special Protective Order.
” Hence. They further stated that PCI Leasing [was] estopped from treating these machineries as personal because the contracts in which the alleged agreement [were] embodied [were] totally sham and farcical. this Petition. They argued that to give effect to the agreemen t would be prejudicial to innocent third parties. since the merits of the whole matter are laid down before us via a petition whose sole purpose is to inquire upon the existence of a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the [RTC] in issuing the assailed Order and Resolution. the sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the remaining properties.” Observing that Petitioner Goquiolay was an experienced businessman who was “not unfamiliar with the ways of the trade. 1998. It also ruled that the “words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties. He was able to take two more. not owned. 1998. on the ground that the properties [were] still personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ of replevin.” Ruling of the Court of Appeals Citing the Agreement of the parties. respondent PCI Leasing and Finance. but was prevented by the workers from taking the rest. praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin. “On March 24. and [its] validity is attacked by the other – a matter x x x which respondent court is in the best position to determine. 1998. by petitioners. the sheriff proceeded to petitioner‟s factory. Whether or not the contract between the parties is a loan or a lease. 12 ” . “This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing (Annex „F‟). Whether or not the machineries purchased and imported by SERG‟S became real property by virtue of immobilization.11 The Issues In their Memorandum. in implementation of said writ. 1998. B. 1998. to accord merit to this petition would be to preempt the trial court in ruling upon the case below. petitioners filed a motion for special protective order (Annex „C‟). petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration: “A. petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be seized [were] immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code. “On April 6.” it ruled that he “should have realized the import of the document he signed. they went to [the CA] via an original action for certiorari. 1998. upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing.” The CA further held: “Furthermore. invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its processes. seized one machinery with [the] word that he [would] return for the other machineries.“On February 13. “On April 7. and that they had only been leased. with an application for a writ of replevin docketed as Civil Case No. respondent judge issued a writ of replevin (Annex „B‟) directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses. The contract is being enforced by one. necessitating presentation of evidence by both parties. the appellate court held that the subject machines were personal property. (“PCI Leasing” for short) filed with the RTC -QC a complaint for [a] sum of money (Annex „E‟). Inc. “On March 25. Q -9833500. the parties‟ agreement to the contrary notwithstanding. The issues raised herein are proper subjects of a full-blown trial. “In their Reply. “On March 6.
415..” On the other hand. not immovable. 3......” 13 While Judge Laqui should not have been impleaded as a respondent. -.. The Court‟s Ruling The Petition is not meritorious...Upon the filing of such affidavit and approval of the bond. militate against a contrary characterization. motu proprio.x x x..14 substantial justice requires that such lapse by itself should not warrant the dismissal of the present Petition... the Court will resolve whether the said machines are personal.. Serious policy considerations. because they were in fact real property.. As a preliminary matter. the name of Judge Laqui from the caption of the present case... Order.......... the Court will also address briefly the procedural points raised by respondent... Preliminary Matter:Procedural Questions Respondent contends that the Petition failed to indicate expressly whether it was being filed under Rule 45 or Rule 65 of the Rules of Court................. the Court deems it proper to remove...In the main. Main Issue: Nature of the Subject Machinery Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory were not proper subjects of the Writ issued by the RTC.. In this light. It further alleges that the Petition erroneously impleaded Judge Hilario Laqui as respondent... they argue... Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued for the recovery of personal property only...... Article 415 of the Civil Code enumerates immovable or real property as follows: “ART.. property which may be a proper subject of a writ of replevin.x x x ....15 Section 3 thereof reads: “SEC.. The following are immovable property: x x x....... There is no question that the present recourse is under Rule 45... This conclusion finds support in the very title of the Petition... the court shall issue an order and the corresponding writ of replevin describing the personal property alleged to be wrongfully detained and requiring the sheriff forthwith to take such property into his custody. which is “Petition for Review on Certiorari.
.. or at least. Vicencio.. was a proper subject of a writ of replevin because it was treated as personal property in a contract. instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land...” .. so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise..18 After agreeing to such stipulation... there is absolutely no reason why a machinery. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage. we disagree with the submission of the petitioners that the said machines are not proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure... Hence.. property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code........... they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise...... not personal.. and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works.. The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. Although there is no specific statement referring to the subjec t house as personal property....... although each of them was movable or personal property on its own....... like what was involved in the above Tumalad case. Under the principle of estoppel.... may not be likewise treated as such.(5) Machinery. the Court in Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. v.. x x x.. the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built on their own land. a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein..x x x” In the present case.. Pertinent portions of the Court‟s ruling are repro duced hereunder: “x x x.... as in the present case. yet by ceding.19 the Court upheld the intention of the parties to treat a house as a personal property because it had been made the subject of a chattel mortgage. Hence. Wearever Textile Mills20 also held that the machinery used in a factory and essential to the industry... If a house of strong materials. petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines are real. they were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making industry.x x x.. which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose.. The Court ruled: “x x x. intended to treat the same as such... selling or transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage defendants-appellants could only have meant to convey the house as chattel... Indisputably......” Applying Tumalad.. all of them have become “immobi lized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry.. in Tumalad v..” 16 In that sense.. receptacles.17 Be that as it may. may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby...
24 Submitting documents supposedly showing that they own the subject machines. therefore. the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be considered as personal property.1 The PROPERTY is. A resolution of these questions. however.that the machines should be deemed personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement – is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. real property or any building thereon.should be determined in the trial. petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the subject machines as personal property. or attached in any manner to what is permanent. Under the circumstances. is effectively a resolution of the merits of the case. while the parties are bound by the Agreement.”25 In their Reply to respondent‟s Comment.In the present case. Indeed. The validity and the nature of the contract are the lis mota of the civil action pending before the RTC. petitioners contend that the Agreement is a loan and not a lease. or hereafter become. they are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure. 26 These arguments are unconvincing.1 of the Agreement reads as follows:21 “12. Section 12. they should be threshed out in the trial. they further allege that the Agreement is invalid. not in the proceedings involving the issuance of the Writ of Seizure. CA.23 In any event. It should be stressed. third persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as personal. petitioners also argue in their Petition that the Agreement suffers from “intrinsic ambiguity which places in serious doubt the intention of the parties and the validity of the le ase agreement itself. Validity of the Lease Agreement In their Memorandum. in La Tondeña Distillers v. or permanently resting upon.27 the Court explained that the policy under Rule 60 was that questions involving title to the subject property – questions which petitioners are now raising -. and shall at all times be and remain. in any manner affixed or attached to or embedded in. there is no showing that any specific third party would be adversely affected. personal property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be. that our holding -.” Clearly then. Hence. Specifically.22 Hence. In .
at any . Return of property. but on the petitioners for failing to avail themselves of the remedy under Section 5 of Rule 60. Neither is it disclosed that steps were taken to nullify the same. which characterized the subject machinery as personal property. Petitioners‟ arguments do not preclude the implementation of the Writ. for nothing on record shows that it has been nullified or annulled.If the adverse party objects to the sufficiency of the applicant‟s bond. the above-mentioned consequences. or of the surety or sureties thereon. petitioners assailed it first only in the RTC proceedings. which had ironically been instituted by respondent. law and jurisprudence support its propriety. he cannot immediately require the return of the property. the policy apparently being that said matter should be ventilated and determined only at the trial on the merits. he may. it must be presumed valid and binding as the law between the parties. As earlier discussed.” The Court rejected the argument and relied on the Deed. -. both of which have no place in a petition for certiorari in the CA under Rule 65 or in a petition for review in this Court under Rule 45. Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation30 is also instructive on this point. There is nothing on record to show that the mortgage has been annulled. Moreover. the law does not allow the defendant to file a motion to dissolve or discharge the writ of seizure (or delivery) on ground of insufficiency of the complaint or of the grounds relied upon therefor. as in proceedings on preliminary attachment or injunction. by a proper action in court. x x x” Alleged Injustice Committed on the Part of Petitioners Petitioners contend that “if the Court allows these machineries to be seized. to invoke the title to the subject property. The provision states: “SEC. but can only be a ground for rendering said contract voidable. such fact alone does not render a contract void ab initio. if they come true. the Court noted that the remedy of defendants under Rule 60 was either to post a counter-bond or to question the sufficiency of the plaintiff‟s bond. these questions require a determination of facts and a presentation of evidence. In that case. but if he does not so object.29 Reliance on the Lease Agreement It should be pointed out that the Court in this case may rely on the Lease Agreement. The Court ruled: “In other words. and thereby put at issue the matter of the title or right of possession over the specific chattel being replevied. the Deed of Chattel Mortgage.that case. or annullable pursuant to Article 1390 of the new Civil Code. should not be blamed on this Court. Accordingly. In fact. Verily. even granting that the charge is true.”31 They also allege that the seizure would nullify all efforts to rehabilitate the corporation.”28 Besides. 5. however. was also assailed because respondent had allegedly been required “to sign a printed form of chattel mortgage which was in a blank form at the time of signing. They were not allowed. which allows the filing of a counter-bond. ruling as follows: “x x x. then its workers would be out of work and thrown into the streets.
through the BANK.00. 1950 . the Board of Directors of DALCO. Pursuant to the provision of the mortgage deeds quoted theretofore regarding "after acquired properties.000. a West Virginia corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines sold and assigned all its rights in the Dahican Lumber concession to Dahican Lumber Company . 1950 DALCO executed in favor of the BANK a deed of mortgage covering five parcels of land situated in the province of Camarines Norte together with all the buildings and other improvements existing thereon and all the personal properties of the mortgagor located in its place of business in the municipalities of Mambulao and Capalonga. the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. 1952. SO ORDERED. Upon DALCO's and DAMCO's failure to pay the fifth promissory note upon its maturity.000.R. as of July 13. the BANK paid the same to the Export-Import Bank of Washington D. As security for the payment of the abovementioned loans. a foreign corporation and a stockholder of DALCO. Subsequently.286 shares of DAMCO to secure the same obligation. executed by both DALCO and the Dahican America Lumber Corporation.the date of execution of the mortgages mentioned above . and by serving a copy bon d on the applicant. to P200. Both mortgages were registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte. and for the payment of such sum to him as may be recovered against the adverse party. to develop the concession.” WHEREFORE. In addition.00 was paid. spare parts and supplies in addition to.C. in a special meeting called for the purpose..c After July 13.a domestic corporation who was acting as the general purchasing agent of DALCO -the sum of P452.00 from the Export-Import Bank of Washington D. a loan of $250. the sum of P2. On January 13. L-17500 May 16.hereinafter referred to as DALCO .time before the delivery of the property to the applicant. demanded that said agreements be cancelled but CONNELL . require the return thereof.860. Costs against petitioners. in double the value of the property as stated in the applicant‟s affidavit for the delivery thereof to the applicant. DAHICAN LUMBER COMPANY G. 1967 Facts: On September 8. or in replacement of some of those already owned and used by it on the date aforesaid.DALCO purchased various machineries. the BANK gave DALCO and DAMCO up to April 1. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company of Manila. by filing with the court where the action is pending a bond executed to the applicant.678.R.000.55 and to DAMCO. evidenced by five promissory notes of $50.00. DALCO executed a second mortgage on the same properties in favor of ATLANTIC to secure payment of the unpaid balance of the sale price of the lumber concession amounting to the sum of $450. No. PEOPLE'S BANK AND TRUST CO. Camarines Norte. L-17500 May 16. and the latter assigned to the former its credit and the first mortgage securing it. DALCO obtained. 1967 PEOPLE'S BANK AND TRUST CO. equipment. On the same date. Company (Philippines) .296 shares of stock of DALCO and 9. the BANK.000. of which only the amount of $50.chan On December 16. maturing on different dates.00. 1950.34. spare parts and supplies by CONNELL and DAMCO to it. there appeared in the books of DALCO as due to Connell Bros. if such delivery be adjudged. In connection with these purchases. DAHICAN LUMBER COMPANY G." the BANK requested DALCO to submit complete lists of said properties but the latter failed to do so.00 each. vs.151. DALCO obtained various loans from the People's Bank & Trust Company amounting. 1948.for the total sum of $500. Both deeds contained a provision extending the mortgage lien to properties to be subsequently acquired by the mortgagor.. passed a resolution agreeing to rescind the alleged sales of equipment.C. No. in its own behalf and that of ATLANTIC.000.000. Thereafter. on July 13. vs. 1953 to pay the overdue promissory note. In addition thereto DALCO and DAMCO pledged to the BANK 7. 1953.
CASES IN LABOR STANDARDS 1. ATLANTIC and the BANK. Comia GR No. Such stipulation is neither unlawful nor immoral. and the other half as representing those obtained from the sale of the "after acquired properties". equipments. tools. the Court ordered the sale of all the machineries. to upon. Assuming that they are subject thereto. they came within the operation of Art.00 which was deposited in court pending final determination of the action. HELD: Under the fourth paragraph of both deeds of mortgage. therefore. Upon motion of the parties the Court. construct. vs. the characterization of the "after acquired properties" as real property was made not only by one but by both interested parties. Datu and Co. the lower court held that inasmuch as "the chattels were placed in the real properties mortgaged to plaintiffs. and the same were subsequently sold for a total consideration of P175. or in connection with the premises .and DAMCO refused to do so. 47800 2. paragraph 5 and Art. NLRC 253 SCRA 112 3. On the strength of the above-quoted legal provisions. the original value of the properties given as security.00) of this amount was considered as representing the proceeds obtained from the sale of the "undebated properties" (those not claimed by DAMCO and CONNELL). By a similar agreement one-half (P87. it is crystal clear that all property of every nature and description taken in exchange or replacement. on September 30. or use in. L. fixtures. Williams GR. NLRC 256 SCRA 735 6. NLRC 260 SCRA 589 8. 415. Williams (GR 47800. People vs. vs. 1953. its lumber concession . on February 12. 2127 of the New Civil Code". instruments or replacements intended by owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. receptacles. Laurel (J): 4 concur Facts: . ISSUE: WON the "after acquired properties" were subject to the deeds of mortgage mentioned heretofore. and shall tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works. Honrada 243 SCRA 640 10. 1953. Flores vs. among them being machinery.2 December 1940)Calalang vs. NLRC 253 SCRA 440 4. upon motion of all the parties. Raycor Air Control Systems vs. machineries. to the extent allowed by circumstances. attach. In the present case. Article 415 does not define real property but enumerates what are considered as such. more reason to hold that such consensus impresses upon the properties the character determined by the parties who must now be held in estoppel to question it. North Davao Mining Corp. 109761 1 Sept 1994 Summary: Calalang vs. On August 30. Calalang vs. JMM Promotions and Management Inc. equipment and supplies of DALCO.T. City Fair Corporation vs. its obvious purpose being to maintain. NLRC 254 SCRA 721 98 5. Williams [GR 47800. install.000. CA 260 SCRA 319 7. People vs. As a result. and other property that the mortgagor may acquire. Samson vs. 1958."shall immediately be and become subject to the lien" of both mortgages in the same manner and to the same extent as if already included therein at the time of their execution. vs. as well as all buildings.that is. issued an order transferring the venue of the action to the Court of First Instance of Manila.500. commenced foreclosure proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte against DALCO and DAMCO. NLRC 243 SCRA 572 9. WON the mortgages are valid and binding on the properties aforesaid inspite of the fact that they were not registered in accordance with the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. There is. 2 December 1940]First Division.
for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. through the adoption of measures legally justifiable. brought before theSupreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. nor atomism. through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in theinterrelations of the members of the community. Williams . must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally andevenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life. and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street. constitutionally. therefore. in pursuance of the provisionsof Commonwealth Act 548. D. On 2 August 1940. Vicente Fragante. consistent with the fundamentaland paramount objective of the state of promoting the health. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people." but the humanization of laws andthe equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. and from 1:30 p. comfort. as Chairman of the National TrafficCommission.This case is known primarily for the words of Justice Jose P. to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of andtraffic on national roads. recommended tothe Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution.. as Acting Chief of Police of Manila. and of bringingabout "the greatest good to the greatest number. from 7:30a.m. nor despotism. the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to ensure economic stability of all thecomponent elements of society. . with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications." Calalang vs. A citizenchallenged this regulation. in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila. to 5:30 p. Laurel defining social justice: :³ S ocial justice is neither communism.Social justice is "neither communism.. with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic toanimal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the membersof the community. theadoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society. in its resolution of 17 July 1940. nor despotism. as Acting Secretary of Public Worksand Communications.m. 726 (1940) . recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by theChairman of the National Traffic Commission.but is remembered because it contains a definition of social justice.The National Traffic Commission.m. Sergio Bayan. Eulogio Rodriguez. nor atomism. Issue Was the regulation valid? Ruling Yes. 70 Phil. which authorizes said Director of Public Works. but the humanization of lawsand the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. the Director of Public Works. Williams The classic case of Calalang vs. and quiet of all persons. Social justice. and Juan Dominguez. Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe upon theconstitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of allthe people. nor anarchy. or extra-constitutionally.through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of saluspopuli est suprema lex. Maximo Calalang. The Mayor of Manilaand the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thusadopted. resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibitedfrom passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street. through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governmentson the time-honored principle of salus populi est supremo lex. on 18 July 1940. or extraconstitutionally. On 10 August 1940. constitutionally.m. in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.m. approved the recommendation of the latter that RosarioStreet and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles. Held: The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Williams. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission. Facts A traffic regulation in Manila banned calesas from some streets in Manila during certain afternoon hours. to 11 p. in his secondindorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works. as Mayor of the City of Manila. as Director of Public Works. from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.m. tackled the issue of police power for public welfare. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people. from 7 a. The Supreme Court upheld the regulation as a valid exercise of police power in the interest of public welfare. to 12:30 p. between the points and during the hours asindicated. through the adoption of measures legally justifiable. nor anarchy.
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