You are on page 1of 5

Vda. da Bataclan v.

Medina Facts:  The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the passengers of Medina Transportation, driven by Conrado Saylon and operated by Mariano Medina.  On its way from Cavite to Pasay, the front tires burst and the vehicle fell into a canal. Some passengers were able to escape by themselves or with some help, while there were 4, including Bataclan, who could not get out.  Their cries were heard in the neighbourhood. Then there came about 10 men, one of them carrying a torch. As they approached the bus, it caught fire and the passengers died. The fire was due to gasoline leak and the torch.  Salud Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, in her name and on behalf of her 5 minor children, sought to claim damages from the bus company. Issue: What was the proximate cause of the death of Juan and the other passengers? Ruling:     The SC held that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. There was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding. The proximate cause is the cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. SC held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. The burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. The driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

 

In such a case. the obligation is created by law itself. alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Issues: WON the proximate cause in this case is material? Held:       It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. the owner of the Isuzu truck. it is the parties themselves who create the obligation. and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. The jeepney was not properly parked. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen. As the jeepney was already full. filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva.[3] This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor’s will. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga. The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas. but also. not in actions involving breach of contract.CALALAS vs CA Facts:     Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva and driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable. the presumption of negligence at once arose. though foreseen. Therefore. its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway. and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. on the other hand. or which. the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner’s contention that Sunga’s taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict. But. was inevitable. and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. Sunga was injured. Upon the happening of the accident. Along the way. and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to . Calalas. As a result. where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. This is also true of petitioner’s contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. Calalas gave Sunga an wooden stool at the back of the door as an extension seat.

as subrogee of the rights and interests of Concepcion Industries.  FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU). WON GPR.  GPS asserted that they were the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion Industries. paid to Concepcion Industries. sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to the latter from GPS. whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in particular.[4] Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway. WON the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor is applicable in this case? Ruling: 1. water. causing it to fall into a deep canal. the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify. prima facie.the creditor.. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver 30 refrigerators.  FGU. Issue: 1.  While the truck was traversing the north diversion road. Inc. the value of the covered cargoes. Inc. GPS. to Dagupan City. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the promisee that may include his: . driven by Lambert Eroles. it collided with an unidentified truck.P.” 2. Given accepted standards. recognizing the obligatory force of contracts. an insurer of the shipment. offering their services to the public. and it was not so engaged in business as a common carrier. The law.. Metro Manila. GPS scarcely falls within the term “common carrier. from the plant site of Concepcion Industries. Inc. may be presumed to have been negligent when the good it undertook to transport safely were subsequently damaged while in its protective custody and possession. either as a common carrier or a private carrier. for hire or compensation. FGU Insurance Corp. The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods. rendering or offering its services to no other individual or entity. WON GPS may be considered as a common carrier 2. being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries. Facts:  G.  Since the trucking company failed to pay the claim. will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. vs G.P. resulting in damage to the cargoes. In culpa contractual. a corresponding right of relief. but never on an exclusive basis.. providing space for those who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee. FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage against GPS. Sarmiento Trucking Corp. or air. Inc. Inc.. upon which the action of petitioner rests as being the subrogee of Concepcion Industries. GPS cannot escape from liability. cannot be considered a common carrier. corporations. Inc... 3. by land. firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both. Common carriers are persons.

Res ipsa loquitur holds a defendant liable where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the latter’s management and the accident is such that. it affords reasonable evidence that the accident arose from want of care. while the truck driver. it is regarded as a mode of proof. for some of which the defendant could not be responsible. In the absence of the defendant’s explanation. cannot be expected to happen if those who have its management/control use proper care. whose civil liability is predicated on culpa acquiliana. on the other hand. for the inference of negligence arises from the circumstances and nature of the occurrence and not from the nature of the relation of the parties. it is not equally shown that the accident has . such contract can neither favor nor prejudice a third person. Nevertheless. Instead. Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios acta aliis neque nocet prodest. not being a party to the contract of carriage between petitioners’s principal and defendant. It is not a rule of substantive law and does not create an independent ground of liability. would require the claimant for damages to prove negligence or fault on the part of the defendant. A contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors who have assumed their personality or their juridical position. the requirement that responsible causes (other than those due to defendant’s conduct) must first be eliminated should be understood as being confined only to cases of pure (non-contractual) tort since obviously the presumption of negligence in culpa contractual immediately attaches by a failure of the covenant or its tenor. On the other hand. may not be held liable under the agreement. unlike culpa contractual. or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for. 3. Restitution interest – interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party. Thus. Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant. (b) other responsible causes are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence (includes the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons). Reliance interest – interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made. and relieves the plaintiff of. the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. The maxim simply places the burden of going forward with the proof on the defendant. which. Expectation interest – interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed. may not himself be ordered to pay petitioner.1. Respondent driver. resort to the doctrine may only be allowed when: (a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence. it is not applicable when an unexplained accident may be attributable to one of several causes. in the ordinary course of things. The driver. and (c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff.for the doctrine to apply. 3. However. can be said to have been in control & management of the vehicle. Petitioner’s civil action against the driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana. without concrete proof of his negligence or fault. 2.

. If it were so. clearly this is not the case. However. the negligence could allow res ipsa loquitur to properly work against him.been exclusively due to his negligence.