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RULE 129 (Sec 1-4) Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-54886, September 10, 1981) Makasiar, J.

FACTS: An expropriation proceedings was initiated by the Republic over a 15,000 square meter lot owned by Turandot, Traviata, Marcelita, Marlene, Pacita, Matthew, Victoria and Rosary, all surnamed Aldaba, situated in Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Said parcel of land is needed by the Republic to set up a permanent site for the Bulacan Area Shop, Bureau of Equipment, Department of Public Highways, a punlic purpose authorized by law to be undertaken by the Ministry of Public Highways. Thereafter, the lower court issued a writ of possession of the land in question, upon its deposit of the amount of P7,200 as provisional value. On March 31, 1978, counsel of the Aldabas filed a motion praying for the creation of a three-man committee in accordance with Sec 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, to study and submit a report as to the just and reasonable compensation for the parcel of land subject of expropriation. On July 31, 1978, the lower court issued an order naming the chairman and members of the committee of three. On November 12, 1978, the three-man committee submitted a joint report to the lower court, recommending that the just compensation of the expropriated land be fixed at P50.00 per square meter. The Solicitor General claims that he was not served copies of the aforementioned March 31, 1978 motion of private respondents, July 31, 1978 order of the respondent lower court and the November 17, 1978 report of the three-man committee. The records reveal that the Solicitor General authorized the provincial fiscal of Bulacan to represent him in that proceedings. Parenthetically, private respondents in their comment to this petition, alleged "that the Provincial Fiscal, being duly authorized by the office of the Solicitor General to represent the latter in this case, the court merely furnished the office of the Provincial Fiscal with all the pleadings and other papers of the case." On December 18, 1978, the Solicitor General received a copy of the lower court‘s order dated December 8, 1978 which provides that the joint report filed by the three man committee is approved, such that the just compensation of the land described is fixed at P30.00 per square meter. On December 22, 1978, the SG filed through the mail a notice of appeal, as well as a first motion for extension of time of 30 daysfrom January 17, 1979 within which to file record on appeal. Said motion for extension was granted by the lower court. On February 13, 1979, the lower court, acting upon the manifestation filed by the petitioner, allowed the SG to borrow the records of the expropriation case under proper receipt, the Clerk of Court taking the necessary steps to index and number the pages thereof and to ensure its integrity; and granted a second extension of thirty (30) days from February 17, 1979, within which to file the record on appeal of the Republic of the Philippines. Again, on March 22, 1979, the lower court granted petitioner's third motion for an extension of thirty (30) days from March 19, 1979 within which to file its record on appeal. Subsequently, the lower court, in an order dated April 24, 1980, acted favorably upon petitioner's motion for a fourth extension of thirty (30) days from

April 19, 1979 within which to file its record on appeal and petitioner's request that the records of the expropriation case be forwarded to the Solicitor General. In a motion dated May 17, 1979, the petitioner, invoking heavy pressure of work, asked for a fifth extension of thirty (30) days from May 18, 1979 or until June 17, 1979, within which to file its record on appeal. On June 7, 1979, when its motion for a fifth extension has not yet been acted upon by the lower court, petitioner filed its record on appeal. Eight days after petitioner had filed its record on appeal, or on June 15, private respondents filed an opposition to the fifth motion for extension, and an objection to petitioner‘s record on appeal, on the ground that the same was not filed beyond the reglementary period, because petitioner's motion dated May 17, 1979 for extension to file record on appeal was mailed only on May 21, 1979. On June 27, 1979, petitioner filed its opposition to the aforesaid objection to its record on appeal, contending that the said May 17, 1979 motion for extension of time was actually mailed on May 18, 1979, which was the last day of the extended period allowed by the lower court's order of April 24, 1979. In an order dated August 13, 1979 but received by the Solicitor General only on September 10, 1979, the lower court dismissed the appeal of petitioner on the ground that the fifth motion for extension of time dated May 17, 1979 within which to file the record on appeal and the record on appeal were filed out of time. The lower court found that the said fifth motion for extension of time was actually mailed on May 21, 1979 and not on May 18, 1979 as claimed by petitioner. The Court of Appeals sustained said dismissal order. Reiterating its claim that the motion dated May 17, 1979 was filed on time as shown by a certification of the postmaster, petitioner filed the instant recourse. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals itself committed a grave abuse of discretion in not finding that the respondent trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's appeal. (2) Whether or not the post office practice of immediately stamping the envelope with the date of its receipt is a proper subject of judicial notice. HELD: (1) YES. The records reveal that a favorable action on the aforesaid fifth motion for extension of time is warranted by the following circumstances: (1) the record on appeal was filed by petitioner even before the lower court could consider the questioned motion for extension of time; and private respondents objected to the said motion only after petitioner had filed the record on appeal; (2) the order of the lower court granting the fourth extension of time did not contain any caveat that no further extension shall be allowed; (3) the fact that the CFI records of the case were sent to the Solicitor General only on May 3, 1979 and ostensibly handed to the Solicitor assigned to the case only on May 16,1979 or barely two (2) days before the expiration of the extended appeal period; and (4) pressure of work in the undermanned Office of the Solicitor General who is the counsel of the National Government and all other governmental agencies and instrumentalities; and (5) and the unconscionable amount of P450,000.00 for a parcel of 1.5 hectares situated in a barrio of Malolos, Bulacan, with only a provisional value of P7,200.00 obviously based upon its assessed value appearing on its tax declaration. No sugar, rice or coconut land of only 15,000 square meters could command such a fabulous price. WE therefore rule that the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in affirming the disputed orders of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.

But even assuming that the motion for extension to file record on appeal dated May 17, 1979 was filed not on May 18, 1979 but on May 21, 1979 as claimed by private respondents, which is a delay of only one (1) working day, May 19 and 20 being Saturday, and Sunday, respectively, that circumstance alone would not justify the outright dismissal of the appeal of petitioner Republic of the Philippines, especially so in the light of the undisputed fact that petitioner had already filed with the lower court the record on appeal at the time the questioned dismissal order was issued by the lower court. For, as ruled in one case, ". . . the delay of four days in filing a notice of appeal and a motion for an extension of time to file a record on appeal can be excused on the basis of equity and considering that the record on appeal is now with the respondent judge.‖ (2) NO. The Court of First Instance of Bulacan dismissed herein petitioner's appeal on the bases of the foregoing provisions upon its finding that the record on appeal of petitioner was filed out of time as it was filed only on June 7, 1979 or twenty (20) days after May 18, 1979, the last day of the appeal period as extended; petitioner's fifth extension of time of thirty days from May 18, 1979, not having been favorably acted upon by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan upon its finding that the same was also filed late or three days after the last day of the extended appeal period. The implication of the questioned orders of the Court of First Instance is that since the fifth extension of time was filed out of time, no action may be taken thereon by it; hence, petitioner Republic had only up to May 18, 1979 within which to file the record on appeal. Consequently, the filing thereof only on June 7, 1979 was too late. The petitioner, however, herein contends as it did before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and before the respondent Court of Appeals, that its fifth extension of time was actually filed on May 18, 1979, not on May 21, 1979 as found out by the Court of First Instance and Court of Appeals and in support thereof, pointed to the certification of the postmaster of the Central Office of the Bureau of Posts, dated September 25, 1979 (p. 47, rec.) to the effect that the said motion for extension of time as contained in registered mail No. 3273 addressed to the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Malolos) " was received by this office late Friday afternoon, May 18, 1979. The letter was not included in the only morning dispatch of May 19, to Bulacan and was dispatched May 21, 1979, Monday (May 20 being a Sunday) under the Manila-Malolos Bill No. 202, page 1, line 15." But the Court of First Instance of Bulacan opined that said certification cannot override the prevailing practice in post offices "that a registered letter when posted is immediately stamped with the date of its receipt, indicating therein the number of the registry, both on the covering envelope itself and on the receipt delivered to the person who delivered the letter to the office" of which it took judicial notice. WE entertain grave doubts that the aforesaid post office practice is a proper subject of judicial notice. Section 1 of Rule 129 on judicial notice provides that "The existence and territorial extent of states, their forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, the geographical divisions and political history of the world and all similar matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable

demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions, shall be judicially recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the court may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section stated, when it shall find it necessary for its own information, and may resort for its aid to appropriate books or documents or reference." Undoubtedly, the post office practice of which the Court of First Instance took judicial notice is not covered by any of the specific instances cited above. Neither can it be classified under "matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions . . ." For a matter to be taken judicial notice of by the courts of law, it must be a subject of common and general knowledge. In other words, judicial notice of facts is measured by general knowledge of the same facts. A fact is said to be generally recognized or known when its existence or operation is accepted by the public without qualification or contention. The test is whether the fact involved is so notoriously known as to make it proper to assume its existence without proof. The fact that a belief is not universal, however, is not controlling for it is very seldom that any belief is accepted by everyone. It is enough that the matters are familiarly known to the majority of mankind or those persons familiar with the particular matter in question. Furthermore, a matter may be personally known to the judge and yet not be a matter of judicial knowledge and vice versa, a matter may not be actually known to an individual judge, and nevertheless be a proper subject of judicial cognizance. The post office practice herein involved is not tested by the aforestated considerations, a proper matter of judicial notice. Moreover, the certification issued by the very postmaster of the post office where the letter containing the questioned motion for extension of time was posted, is a very clear manifestation that the said post office practice is not of unquestionable demonstration. Indeed, the doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. It is therefore manifest from the foregoing that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan committed a palpable error amounting to a grave abuse of discretion in relying on the alleged post office practice aforementioned over the uncontroverted certification of the postmaster earlier referred to. That being so, the dismissal of petitioner's appeal therefore lacks factual basis. It should have acted on petitioner's fifth motion for extension of time which WE find to have been filed on time.

The CFI ordered the following: Defendants should vacate the premises and pay the unpaid rents and costs. The houses and constructions constitute nuisance per se. 2. FACTS: Plaintiff (City of Manila) is the owner of parcels of land in Malate.because he is duty bound to take-judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. However. again without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff. the Certification of the Chairman Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. The Mayors did not have authority to give permits written or oral to defendants. The reason being that. Manila. In the onset of the hearing. RULING: 1. Whether the defendants have acquired the legal status of tenants. Whether the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes. The city‘s dominical right to possession is paramount. ISSUES: 1. the need for the expansion of the Epifanio de los Santos elementary school arose. 1967 Sanchez. The public purpose of constructing the school building annex is paramount. the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. Defendants challenge the jurisdiction of the CFI. February 21. defendants are squatters. . from 1945 to 1947. The rest of the 23 defendants were not issued any permits. The city‘s evidence on this point was Exhibit E. in the decision under review.26053. They say that it should have been instituted the MTC. It is beyond debate that a court can alter its ruling while the case is within its power to make it conformable to law and justice. it must be noted that the case was commenced after the one year period in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In a language familiar to all. J. The constructions are illegal. They also built houses of second-class materials. Shortly after the liberation. that Ordinance 4566 was passed in which the amount of Php100.City of Manila v. the trial judge reversed his views. The Mayor through the City Engineer demanded the defendants to vacate the premises and the City Treasurer also required the defendants to pay the unpaid rents. Defendants appealed. On September 1961. defendants entered upon these premises without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff. The selfish interests of the defendants must yield to the general good. Garcia NO. For the trial judge. But then. the CFI ruled out the admissibility of the said document. The defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. An elimination of the certication (which served as the basis of the decision) would not benefit the defendants still. the permits granted are null and void. The courts may very well take judicial notice of the fact that housing elementary school children in the elementary grades has been and is still a perennial problem in the city. the school was close though not contiguous. others were issued permits by Mayor DelaFuente in 1948. in reversing his stand could have well taken. Their homes were erected without city permits. L.000 had been set aside for the construction of the school building. and 2. Some of the defendants were issued written permits by Mayor Fugoso in 1947.

did occupy and take private properties in the City of Manila and elsewhere in the country without the consent of their respective owners. that from 1914 up to the date of the sale. and the Philippine Property Act of 1946. 1947. 1944 under duress and due to the threats of the Japanese army.000. administered. Held:YES. that at the time of the sale (April 1944). Issue:WON appellee executed the Deed of Sale of April 12.000. the expenses it had incurred for the rehabilitation and repair of the building in question in the amount of P24.000. unaccompanied by any particular coercive action on the part of the latter. that Laperal collaborated or had ever intended to collaborate with the enemy. or the failure or refusal of the trial court to take into consideration some important and material fact. in his capacity as Attorney General of the United States.00. The record further shows that at the time of the sale. he had not disposed of a single property by sale.000.000. On April 12. as amended. It is not only (a) because of the well settled rule and judicial appellate practice that. it was improbable – to say the least – that he would dispose of such valuable property as the one in question.995. intervenor-appellant.00 paid for the property was adequate consideration. the Alien Property Custodian of the United States. liquidated. this would have meant around P2. and that. It was executed under duress.00 in Japanese Military notes was grossly inadequate. that the sum of P500.00 in Japanese military notes. sold or otherwise dealt with by the latter in accordance with the provisions of the Trading With the Enemy Act. Philippine currency. No. at the time.800. January 30. direct or indirect. for their use in the prosecution of the war. or the equivalent of something around P35. On April 22. he executed a deed of sale conveying said property to the occupation Republic of the Philippines. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. L-16590 Facts:Roberto Laperal was the registered owner of a residential lot and building. after finding that the occupation Republic was an instrumentality of the Japanese Army of occupation during the war. was a very rich man with extensive real state holdings principally in Manila. 1965 G. before the war and at the time of the execution of the questioned sale. a pre-war Philippine peso was worth fourteen Japanese military pesos. vs. the property was transferred to the Philippine Alien Property Administrator.ROBERTO LAPERAL. for the sum of P500.00.00 in Japanese Military War Notes. If he had been in need of money at all. WILLIAM P. divested the occupation Republic of its title to the aforementioned property. but also (c) because of the following circumstances: (1) It is of common knowledge that.000. in the event that the court should order the return of the property to the plaintiff.300. and that the consideration of P500. including that of his . We must also consider the fact that the pre-war assessed value of the property did not represent its real or actual value which could easily be around P200.00. HON. was grossly inadequate.R. It has been agreed.00 (Japanese military notes). 1944. the evidence of record shows that the pre-war assessed value of the property in question was P92. resorting in some cases to the expedient of making the owners execute deeds of sale or contracts of lease. on January 9. One may believe that the sale in question was voluntary only by assuming that Laperal sold the property involved to collaborate in the attainment of the ends pursued by the Japanese army of occupation – an assumption completely unjustified in this case in view of the absolute absence of evidence. The main allegations of the complaint were that appellee executed the deed of sale of April 12. 1946. that the conditions thereof were favorable to the vendor because the property was bought to be used as the official residence of the Speaker of the National Assembly. Highly solvent as he was at the time. On the other hand. Reduced to its equivalent in Japanese military notes.000. to be held. the Japanese army of occupation in the Philippines. if reduced to its equivalent value in terms of Japanese military notes as of April 1944. The intervenor answered the complaint.030. defendant-appellant.000. during the second world war. namely the sum of P500. The transaction involved in this case is not covered by the theory of ―collective‖ or ―general‖ duress. (3) The consideration paid for the property.00 which. he was merely paid P500. the trial court said the following: The evidence for the plaintiff has unmistakably shown that Roberto Laperal was inspired by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of suffering an imminent and serious injury to his person or property. Regarding the threats faced by appellee. the general feeling of fear which Filipinos felt for the Japanese during the years of occupation. would have amounted to around P1. plaintiff-appellee. according to which. alleging that the sale of the property to the occupation Republic was voluntary. he was in possession of a considerable amount of money. does not invalidate a contract which would otherwise be valid if entered into freely during peace time. its findings of fact must be acceptednot only (b) because appellants presented no evidence to disprove the facts testified to by appellee and his witnesses – thus making such facts virtually undisputed. 1944 in favor of the occupation Republic of the Philippines under duress and due to the threats employed by the representatives of the Japanese Military Administration. The record discloses in this connection. both in genuine Philippine currency and in Japanese military notes. Laperal filed a claim for the return of the property. he would probably have sold some other much less desirable property. Instead.000. in the absence of evident error or abuse of discretion in the evaluation of the evidence. used. However. for the purpose of this case. (2) It is not denied that appellee.00 in Japanese military notes.75 be reimbursed. ROGERS.

for we know that a refusal to obey it would certainly result in the invader‘s committing inhuman and barbaric acts too well known and horrible to be ignored by all Filipinos during the occupation. with a group of Japanese soldiers headed by a Japanese officer noted for their arrogance and ruthlessness. The incidents which took place between the plaintiff. In the case of Laperal. In the case of plaintiff. etc. The members of the Japanese Army and Navy were sensitive of such things as non-cooperation with them in getting food for their own use.family. How many were tortured and killed by the Japanese invaders on flimsy reasons or on signs of lack of cooperation? The Court has not forgotten incidents during the Japanese occupation which indicate in no uncertain terms the brutality which characterized the dealing of the Japanese with Filipinos. Wachi shouted at Laperal when the latter reasoned out that be could not sell his property because he had already given it to his daughter. with or without reasons. failure to attend meetings organized by them. A mere failure to bow to a Japanese sentry was the cause on many occasions of Filipinos being subjected to inhuman treatment. refusal to accept the occupation currency. for no one at that time could ignore the fact that the Japanese would not accept ―no‖ for an answer and that the moment they were displeased. and once in that Office. yet the warnings of the Japanese officers and of General Wachi that his refusal to sell his property was bad and constituted a hostile act. on one hand. prior to plaintiff‘s going to Malacañang to affix his signature on the Deed of Sale. an order from a mere Japanese soldier would inspire a well-grounded fear. and the Japanese soldiers. the Japanese officers and General Wachi did not have to tell him that his unwillingness to sell his property which they urgently needed for the theater commander. While plaintiff was not actually threatened with being sent to the dreaded Fort Santiago or to some places in Manila which were then death or torture chambers known by all Filipinos during the occupation. who reminded Laperal that non-cooperation was bad. officers and General Wachi. he was dealing not with an ordinary Japanese soldier but. he was in contact with two high-ranking Japanese officers. The Court could just imagine how Laperal must have been terrified when he was shouted at. It is of common knowledge that during those war days. were sufficient to give plaintiff an inkling of what would happen to him and his family if he show non-cooperation. on the other. might subject him to severe penalties. who were equally overbearing and who warned Laperal that his refusal to sell his property constituted a hostile act. nonsupport of government programs by them. with General Wachi. instilled genuine fear in a man in Laperal‘s condition. first. and who cowed him to go to the Office of the Japanese Military Administration. lastly. . General Teraochi. and. they would commit all sorts of highly inhuman acts.

By hiring Scott out in a free state. Facts:Dred Scott was born a slave in Virginia between 1795 and 1800. he was taken by his owner. An act of Congress. Moreover. but merely property. Missouri. a slave could never be legally married. In 1820. Peter Blow. In 1832. Once again though. But it is curious that the Scotts made the trip to Louisiana at all: they made the trip down the Mississippi unsupervised and along the way they passed various free towns. Secondly. noting both that it was not necessary to decide the question. Secondly. In 1837. the Wisconsin Enabling act reaffirmed and supplemented the Missouri Compromise.S. the Scotts could have once again sued for their freedom. John Emerson purchased Scott. 393. Blow died and the next year U. Congress passed the Wisconsin Enabling Act. Plaintiff did not become free by going into a state. as Louisiana courts had previously granted slaves their freedom so long as it was shown that they had lived in a free state for a time. which was located in Illinois. which also prohibited slavery. Because Eliza was born in free territory. Emerson's wife. the legal recognition of marriage would undermine the property interest of the slaveholder. Emerson was breaking the law in three distinct ways. which deprives a citizen of his property merely because he brought his property into a particular part of the United States does not comport with due process of law. This was Louisiana state precedent for over 20 years. Scott's daughter Eliza was born on a steamboat underway along the Mississippi River between the Iowa Territory and Illinois. Scott remained there until 1836. Plaintiff is clearly not a citizen and not entitled to sue. which prohibited slavery. which was located in part of the Wisconsin territory. Issue: Can a slave be considered a citizen and as such become entitled to all the rights. had been free as a territory under the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. and also that none of the authors of the Constitution had ever objected on constitutional grounds to the United States Congress' adoption of the antislavery provisions of the Northwest Ordinance passed by the Continental Congress. and not pass judgment on the merits of the claims. Louis while Emerson served in the Seminole War. which was a free state. In all likelihood. and had prohibited slavery in its constitution in 1819 when it was admitted as a state. The Constitution never intended to confer on slaves or their posterity the blessings of liberty. Toward the end of 1838. on the ground that once the Court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Scott's case. Emerson took him to Fort Armstrong. This was so for three reasons. a free state. the Army ordered Emerson to Jefferson Barracks Military Post. 691. Before the end of the year. Emerson left the Army. Of course. Dred attempted to purchase his and his family‘s freedom. He died in the Iowa Territory in 1843. govern the new territory. In 1842. the Scotts continued to work as hired slaves. Scott was legally married to Harriet Robinson. Louis. Louisiana. Slaves were not intended to be included under the word ‗citizens‘ in the Constitution. including Scott. where Emerson rented them out for profit. south of St. which was a direct violation of the Missouri Compromise. At the time the Constitution was written. 19 HOW 393. On top of all of this. First of all. in dissent. In 1836. or the subsequent acts that barred slavery north of 36°30' N. Scott was once again taken to a territory where slavery was ―forever prohibited‖ by the United States Congress under the Missouri Compromise. Finally. After purchasing Scott. Scott made no attempt at his freedom. Scott was again relocated.SCOTT VS SANFORD 60 U. During his stay at Fort Snelling. The Scotts could easily have left the ship and taken their freedom. to Missouri. Dissents by Justice Curtis and Justice McLean Curtis. . and the Wisconsin Enabling Act. Illinois. slaves were considered an inferior and subordinate class. the Northwest Ordinance. the act mandated that the laws of Michigan. the Enabling Act made the Northwest Ordinance applicable in the territory. First. It is also remembered for voiding the Missouri Compromise. While in St. Scott. Emerson then sent for Scott and Harriet. The dissents by Curtis and McLean also attacked the Court's overturning of the Missouri Compromise on its merits. By 1840. No state can introduce a new member into the political community created by the Constitution. with the knowledge and consent of Emerson.S. Emerson left Scott and Scott's wife Harriet at Fort Snelling. So. but did not. For three years after Emerson‘s death. This provided Scott with a legitimate basis on which to claim his freedom in court. they did not. who proceeded to Louisiana to serve their master and his wife. she was technically born as a free person under both federal and state laws. In 1846. The Declaration of Independence clearly never intended to include slaves. This potentially provided Scott with an additional basis for claiming his freedom because under the laws of most southern states. This case is remembered for the decision that blacks were not citizens. privileges and immunities granted to citizens under the United States Constitution? Held: NO. But once again. which prohibits a citizen from owning slaves in any territory in the United States is void. although Scott did not act on this opportunity. As a result. upon entering Louisiana. prompting Dred to finally resort to legal recourse. Louis. This time he was taken to Fort Snelling. Ed. effectively making slavery illegal in the Wisconsin territory under three distinct statutes. by taking Scott to this territory and keeping him there for two and a half years. it makes sense that the Scotts would not pursue their freedom in Louisiana: there is no reason to believe that they would be aware of this Louisiana state precedent. two weeks before he entered the Wisconsin territory. Army Surgeon Dr.S. it must simply dismiss the action. and Harriet returned to St. The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. There Emerson married Eliza Irene Sanford in February 1838. such as the right and duty to protect one‘s wife from assault by others (including the slave owner). While en route to Louisiana. or any of the personal rights so carefully provided for the citizen. attacked that part of the Court's decision as obiter dicta. Moreover. they were once again hired out and Emerson was once again breaking federal law. the Army again assigned Emerson to Fort Snelling. the Scotts would have been granted their freedom by a Louisiana court. his widow Eliza inherited his estate. 1856 U. the Army reassigned Emerson to Fort Jessup. Emerson was effectively bringing the institution of slavery into a free state. recognition of slave marriages could prompt slaves to demand and claim other rights. 15 L. but Eliza Irene Emerson refused. An act of Congress. Thus. slaves could not enter legally binding contracts and marriage is a contract.

Nor. these justices argued." . was there any Constitutional basis for the claim that blacks could not be citizens.[20] Therefore. Justice McLean concluded that the argument that Scott was not a citizen was "more a matter of taste than of law. This made them citizens not only of their states but of the United States. At the time of the ratification of the Constitution. black men could vote in five of the thirteen states.

prescription as an affirmative defense was seasonably raised by SLI in its answer. As already stated. On this point. 1992 PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO. non-delivery or misdelivery shall be instituted within 60 days from date of accrual of right of action. SWEET LINES. some bags were either shortlanded or were missing. In no case shall carrier be liable for any delay.'s Answer. vs. except that the bills of lading embodying the same were not formally offered in evidence. respondent carrier duly raised prescription as an affirmative defense in its answer setting forth paragraph 5 of the pertinent bills of lading which comprised the stipulation thereon by parties. as co-defendants in the court a quo. the vessel SS "VISHVA YASH" belonging to or operated by the foreign common carrier. the foreign carrier awaited and made use of the services of the vessel called M/V "Sweet Love" owned and operated by defendant interisland carrier. (SLI) and Davao Veterans Arrastre and Port Services. Claims for non-delivery. both consigned to the order of Far East Bank and Trust Company of Manila. in effect dismissing the complaint of herein petitioners. shows that: of said shipment totalling 7. only a total of 5.I. consequently upheld on the strength of mere references thereto. misdelivery. in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In or about March 1977. they are inevitably involved and their provisions cannot be disregarded in the determination of the relative rights of the parties thereto.‖ In their reply thereto. as plaintiffs. no evidence being required to prove the same. without proof. and defendants S. In the present case and under the aforestated assumption that the time limit involved is a prescriptive period. Inc. with arrival notice to Tagum Plastics. (DVAPSI)." Due to the reversal on appeal by respondent court of the trial court's decision on the ground of prescription. attorney's fees and costs allegedly due to defendants' negligence. consisting of 600 bags Low Density Polyethylene 631 and another 6.I.I. non-delivery. Inc. (TPI) against private respondents Sweet Lines. The position taken by the consignee was that even those bags which still had some contents were considered as total losses as the remaining contents were contaminated with foreign matters and therefore did not longer serve the intended purpose of the material. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion to dismiss grounded on said amicable settlement and the case as to S. by Bills of Lading Nos. accompanied the shipment. Inc. The shipments were discharged from the interisland carrier into the custody of the consignee. and the denial of their motion for reconsideration. faulting respondent appellate court with the error of upholding. loss or damage must be filed within 30 days from accrual. Inc. hence they impliedly admitted the same when they merely assailed the validity of subject stipulations. since that defense was so considered and controverted by the parties. 14 and 15 of defendant Sweet Lines. J. damage. Such loss from this particular shipment is what any or all defendants may be answerable to.080 bags. LA. Inc. misdelivery... the contents thereof partly spilled or were fully/partially emptied. seeking recovery of the cost of lost or damaged shipment plus exemplary damages. Inc. by their own assertions that — ―In connection with Pars. originally contained in 175 pallets. petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. and TAGUM PLASTICS. and cannot be contradicted unless shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Suits arising from shortage.080 bags were torn. INC.E. Tagum. For this purpose. to wit: ―Claims for shortage. Failure to file claims or institute judicial proceedings as herein provided constitutes waiver of claim or right of action. consequently. Petitioners' failure to specifically deny the existence. loss of damage to cargo while cargo is not in actual custody of carrier. Zuellig.C.820 bags were delivered to the consignee in good order condition. Zuellig was consequently "dismissed with prejudice and without pronouncement as to costs. two consignments of cargoes for shipment to Manila and later for transshipment to Davao City. the litigation obviously revolves on such bills of lading which are practically the documents or contracts sued upon.E. of the instruments in question amounts to an admission. but. Inc.. when the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse party's failure to make a specific verified .G.400 bags Low Density Polyethylene 647. No. along with S. INC.C. a compromise agreement was entered into between petitioners. Madaum. Said cargoes were covered. Inc. the existence of the so-called prescriptive period. the contents thereof contaminated with foreign matters and therefore could no longer serve their intended purpose. the Court of Appeals resolved that although the bills of lading were not offered in evidence. hence. HELD: Respondent court correctly passed upon the matter of prescription. petitioners. plaintiffs state that such agreements are what the Supreme Court considers as contracts of adhesion and.R. much less the genuineness and due execution. made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive.E. Line and F. and some of the 1. ISSUE: Whether or not prescription can be maintained as such defense and. as well as the Commercial Invoices. Before trial.C. FACTS: A maritime suit was commenced by herein petitioner Philippine American General Insurance Co. Davao City. worse. Judicial admissions.‖ -thereby failed to controvert the existence of the bills of lading and the aforequoted provisions therein. A later survey conducted upon the instance of the plaintiff. INC. INC.. The said vessel arrived at Manila and discharged its cargoes in the Port of Manila for transshipment to Davao City. leaving a balance of 1. must be made at the time of delivery to consignee or agent. Line (The Shipping Corporation of India Limited) and F. with plaintiff Philippine American General Insurance Co. REGALADO. herein petitioners.. In the case at bar. Line and F.. Petitioners contend that it was error for the Court of Appeals to reverse the appealed decision on the supposed ground of prescription when SLI failed to adduce any evidence in support thereof and that the bills of lading said to contain the shortened periods for filing a claim and for instituting a court action against the carrier were never offered in evidence. The cargoes were likewise insured by the Tagum Plastics Inc. 6 and 7 issued by the foreign common carrier. (Philamgen) and Tagum Plastics. Moreover.000 bags. DAVAO VETERANS ARRASTRE AND PORT SERVICES.. and HON. respondents. 87434 August 5. took on board at Baton Rouge. the provisions therein which are contrary to law and public policy cannot be availed of by answering defendant as valid defenses. if container shows exterior signs of damage or shortage. as in this case. damage or loss. COURT OF APPEALS. This issue may accordingly be taken cognizance of by the court even if not inceptively raised as a defense so long as its existence is plainly apparent on the face of relevant pleadings. verbal or written. The necessary packing or Weight List. Zuellig. respectively.

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It is in effect an admission of the averment it is directed to. particularly on the time limitations for filing a claim and for commencing a suit in court. as their excuse for non-compliance therewith does not deserve serious attention. The instant petition is DENIED and the dismissal of the complaint in the court a quo as decreed by respondent Court of Appeals in its challenged judgment is AFFIRMED. the instrument need not be presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact. the existence of the bills of lading and said stipulations were nevertheless impliedly admitted by them.denial thereof. it has the procedural earmarks of what in the law on pleadings is called a negative pregnant. Even granting that petitioners' averment in their reply amounts to a denial. . be considered a fatal procedural lapse as would bar respondent carrier from raising the defense of prescription. The non-inclusion of the controverted bills of lading in the formal offer of evidence cannot. Thus. under the facts of this particular case. Petitioners' feigned ignorance of the provisions of the bills of lading. that is. while petitioners objected to the validity of such agreement for being contrary to public policy.

1967. DEOGRACIAS R.) an office assistant of Ariosto SANTOS (the Third transfer). praying for the declaration of nullity of all the Five Transfers and the cancellation of all titles issued pursuant thereto on the ground that they were all simulated. By . Then VERROYA ARROYA executed a deed of transfer of the properties to respondent DeograciasNatividad. Later JUAN CUENCAS and the JOSE CUENCAS. In their Answer. married to Frank Gardner.: Facts:A chain of successive transfers of real property. The GARDNERS and the spouses Ariosto C. and that they had paid good and valuable consideration. P5. petitioner caused the inscription of an Adverse Claim on the titles of the CUENCAS with the Register of Deeds of Laguna. Upon learning of the Transfer of the properties to the CUENCAS.688 square meters more or less. with the SANTOSES binding themselves to advance to the GARDNERS the amount of P93. for short). 1984 MELENCIO-HERRERA.00 in installments. SANCHEZ. They executed the following documents all on the same date and referring to the same parcels of land: (1) Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the SANTOSES (the First Transfer. NATIVIDAD and JUANITA A. which encumbrance was registered on the existing titles. and requiring the Five Transferees but not mortgagees. Issue: Whether the respondents‘ contention is tenable as supported by evidence. before the Court of First Instance of Laguna.. Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalima.R. ordering the GARDNERS to reimburse the SANTOSES the total cash advances of P36. fictitious. the GARDNERS continued to remain in possession. the GARDNERS were still denominated in the Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement and in the Supplemental Agreement as "owners" and Ariosto SANTOS merely as "broker". and that the deed of sale was to be registered for the protection of the SANTOSES considering the moneys that the latter would be advancing. cultivation and occupation of the disputed properties. respondents. and to pay the costs.712. Laguna. and another lot to Juan Cuenca.000.000. and (3) Supplemental Agreement .". an American (the GARDNERS. the NATIVIDADS transferred the lots to Ignacio Bautista and Encarnacion de los Santos (the BAUTISTAS).80 which the GARDNERS had received.RUBY H. five in all. GARDNER. J. SANTOS (the SANTOSES) entered into an agreement for the subdivision of the two parcels. No. The evidence also establishes that the Second Transfer to the CUENCAS was fictitious and simulated for not having been supported with any consideration. (2) Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement.00 exemplary damages. VERROYA. thus invalidating the claim of the petitioner? Ruling:No. Unknown to the GARDNERS. that the sale to them was conditional in the sense that the properties were to be considered as the investment of the GARDNERS in the subdivision venture and that in the event that this did not materialize they were to reconvey the lots to the GARDNERS upon reimbursement by the latter of all sums advanced to them. It should be noted that from the titles of the CUENCAS (the Second Transferees) to the titles of the NATIVIDADS (the Fourth Transferee). Titles were thereafter issued in their respective names. No titles were issued to the BAUTISTAS. the Supreme Court affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court. GARDNER and FRANK GARDNER. Petitioner Ruby H. the CUENCAS filed their Answer contending that their transfer to VERROYA of the properties in question was not simulated and was supported by valuable consideration. the Adverse Claim of the GARDNERS continued to be carried. L-59952 August 31. The Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the GARDNERS declaring as null and void the five Transfers. is involved.Despite the "sale. ordering the deletion from the titles of the mortgage executed by VERROYA. Juanita Sanchez (wife of DeograciasNatividad). and without consideration. JR.00 actual damages. respectively. Titles were issued in VERROYA's name with the adverse Claim carried over. Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalima. and that throughout the successive transfers. was the registered owner of two adjoining parcels of agricultural land situated at Calamba. or over a span of approximately six years. Respondents NATIVIDADS contended that they were purchasers in good faith notwithstanding the adverse claim as the titles were not shown to them by VERROYA at the time of the sale. and the BAUTISTAS were declared in default for their failure to seasonably file their responsive pleadings. G. Aggrieved by the series of transfers. the SANTOSES transferred one lot to Jose Cuenca. to pay the GARDNERS P90. authorizing the cancellation of the corresponding titles issued pursuant to the deeds of sale and the issuance of new ones in favor of the GARDNERS. COURT OF APPEALS.000. denied the allegations in the Complaint and counterclaimed for damages. including the mortgagees. vs. rescinding the Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement (Exhibit "D") as well as the Supplemental Agreement (Exhibits "E".with an aggregate area of 93. the GARDNERS filed suit for "Declaration of Nullity. the SANTOSES claimed. transferred the lots to Michael C. On September 30. married to Juanita Sanchez (the NATIVIDADS). Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalina. considering the nature of the document). VERROYA constituted a mortgage on both lots in favor of Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalina. The mortgagees. Rescission and Damages" against the Five Transferees. which the GARDNERS answered. Jr. in brief. After the lifting of the Order of default against them. VERROYA (Exhibits "P" & Ibid. petitioners.

who are his "compadres". his testimony is deserving of weight and credence. had repudiated the defenses he had raised in his Answer and against his own interest.his own admission. the disputed properties. Under the circumstances surrounding their transaction they knew that their title was flawed and they were not. but it is not evidence. facts alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that party and binding upon it. which the party filing it expects to prove. . No wonder then that the CUENCAS did not even dispute the validity of the adverse claim pursuant to Section 110 of the Land Registration Act. but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule ." It was SANTOS who had caused the execution of those deeds of sale (Exhibits "H" & "I") and had them notarized by his own counsel. therefore. As a general rule. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court believed in his credibility and the Court find no reason to overturn their findings thereon. together with others that he owned. Ariosto SANTOS transferred to the CUENCAS. merely to conceal his ownership and "to protect them from persons who had filed suits against him and were running after the properties registered in his name. As Ariosto SANTOS himself. in open Court. The subsequent registration of the adverse claim on their titles. buyers in good faith. An Answer is a mere statement of fact. and cannot be considered. and during the trial they merely adopted SANTOS' testimony. having paid no consideration for the sale. could not but serve as notice and warning to all subsequent buyers that someone was claiming an interest in the properties or a better right than the registered owners.

but merely allowed their brother to build a house on the land on the condition that the latter would pay for the realty taxes due. As this fact was stipulated by the parties.R.1962. After which Jose Bautista Santiago one day accompanied his sister Estrudes Bautista to stay in that house. but as the latter had no money. CA G. Francisco Bunag and pay the latter reasonable rentals and land taxes. it need not be proven. unless it is shown that the admission was made through a palpable mistake Thus. this Court finds merit in petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals's conclusion is not supported by the record. andhe had been paying the land taxes thereonand he denies that her sister Estrudes requested ApolonioBunag to allow her to stay on the property as her sister had a house of her own then. has been paying the land taxes due on the aforesaid property. that be only learned about this agreement from his father. eggplants.1988 CORTES. that an exception obtains in the instant case. . and September 24. to vacate the lot and remove the houses thereon but to no avail. trees. chicos. Bruno Bautista.1962 he sent written demands to defendant Bruno Bautista. however. a nephew-in-law. and that Santiago was allowed by his father to build a house on the lot on condition that he would pay for the land taxes as compensation for the use of the land. In 1925 their house thereon was demolished as it was old and from that time. which support petitioner's contention that his father did not sell the disputed property to private respondents' father. A stipulation of facts was already provided even before the trial has started. ConsolacionCapati. While the Court agrees with private respondents that. L-39013 February 29. and it is conclusive upon the parties. J. it cannot be contradicted by evidence to the contrary. .00 as consideration of the sale and so the sale was consummated between his father and Bunag. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in making a conclusion which is not in accordance with the evidence on record. HELD:Yes. Pampanga. ordinarily. Pampanga and had been living with his father until 1920 when they transferred their residence to Tarlac. He admitted.: FACTS: Plaintiff Bunag filed a case for recovery of possession of a parcel of land against defendant Bautista. Parties have already stipulated and agreed that the defendant. for the period from 1940 to 1964which was shown by the corresponding official land tax receipts duly issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Guagua. Defendant Bruno Bautista contends thathe is the owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale. However on appeal. thru his lawyer. Jose Bautista came down from Baguio and had the house repaired and he stayed there with his family until liberation when they left the house and allowed his sister Estrudes Bautista to live therein and planted bananas. Betis. however. for said conclusion is contrary to the stipulated fact and the evidence offered by private respondents. the Court finds. 1941. calamansi. The trial court sided with ApolinarioBunag ordering Bruno Bautista and Estrudes Bautista to vacate the property herein described and to deliver possession thereof to the plaintiff. the Supreme Court should not review questions of fact in appeals of this nature. he referred the matter to his father which sent from Baguio the P100.Jose Bautista Santiago erected a house on said lot and lived therein until he became a widower when he transferred to another house . Plaintiff‘s main contention is that it was originally owned by his father ApolonioBunagAguas the land located at San Nicolas. personally or thru his wife. No. On September 15. for clearly evident is a misapprehension of facts. signed by ApolonioBunag with his thumbmark when Bunag first offered it for sale to his brother Jose Bautista.Francisco Bunag v. the CA reversed the lower court contending that the deed of sale was validly executed. of January 3.

and pleaded as a special defense.. and the respondent ipso facto assumed the obligation of a purchaser.SANCHEZ VS. L-25494 June 14. an offer to sell. and without giving the opposing party an opportunity to introduce evidence. and alleging. plaintiff Nicolas Sanchez and defendant SeverinaRigos executed an instrument entitled "Option to Purchase. on March 12. the holder of the option is not bound to buy. (77 Corpus JurisSecundum. be withdrawn arbitrarily. v. Indeed as early as March 14. unless the former establishes the existence of said distinct consideration." Accordingly. that the contract between the parties "is a unilateral promise to sell. more specifically. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co.Rigos..Rigos. 210).510. (La Yebana Company vs. . it is a mere offer of a contract of sale. 1972 FACTS:On April 3. See also 27 Ruling Case Law 339 and cases cited. in his favor. whereas the second paragraph of Article 1479 refers to "sales" in particular. this Court said: Furthermore. is null and void" — on February 11. that the promise be "supported by a consideration distinct from the price. promised and committed . to "an accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell. decided later thatSouthwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. however. without consideration distinct from the price. and other costs. He is free either to buy or not to buy later. a parcel of land situated in the barrios of Abar and Sibot. by force of the New Civil Code.00.) "It can be taken for granted. if none there was before (arts. If. Mrs. . province of Nueva Ecija. municipality of San Jose. No. the lower court rendered judgment for Sanchez. 652. and the same being unsupported by any valuable consideration. "If the option is given without a consideration.. Casas.00. plaintiff has impliedly admitted the truth of said averment in defendant's answer.) . Plaintiff herein has not even alleged the existence thereof in his complaint. likewise. denying other allegations thereof. Defendant explicitly averred in her answer. Cesar Bengzon.00. and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. (Emphasis supplied. Article 1354 applies to contracts in general. 44 Phil.Rigos to accept the sum judicially consigned by him and to execute. in Bauermann v. the requisite deed of conveyance. on February 28. 1964. CuaHianTek. ordering Mrs. however. must be understood to admit the truth of all the material and relevant allegations of the opposing party. After the filing of defendant's answer — admitting some allegations of the complaint. But it was. The concurrence of both acts — the offer and the acceptance — could at all events have generated a contract. and of the acceptance the offerer had knowledge before said offer was withdrawn. Kroll and Co. 331. In this case. in the case of Atkins. as contended by the defendant." (Zayco vs.It cannot be withdrawn arbitrarily. an option is unilateral: a promise to sell at the price fixed whenever the offeree should decide to exercise his option within the specified time. treating such promise as an option which. to sell" to Sanchez the sum of P1. RIGOS G.. the promisee has the burden of proving such consideration. at least. both parties. Inasmuch as several tenders of payment of the sum of Pl. the absence of said consideration for her promise to sell and. Hence. later Chief Justice. by joining in the petition for a judgment on the pleadings. it had been held. After accepting the promise and before he exercises his option. However..Rigos "agreed. HELD:No. 1961. He did not just get the right subsequently to buy or not to buy. nevertheless generated a bilateral contract of purchase and sale upon acceptance.Rigos was. it constitutes a binding contract of sale. and. for specific performance and damages. although not binding as a contract in itself for lack of a separate consideration. 1963. which was accepted by letter. as special defense. upon accepting herein petitioner's offer a bilateral promise to sell and to buy ensued. as attorney's fees.R. that: One who prays for judgment on the pleadings without offering proof as to the truth of his own allegations. were rejected by Mrs. which is not binding until accepted. this appeal by Mrs. Serra. p. made by Sanchez within said period. Article 1479 requires the concurrence of a condition. Sevilla. 1908. 1964. It was not a mere option then. Lower court relied on Article 1354 of the Civil Code and presumed the existence of the said consideration ISSUE:Whether an accepted unilateral promise to sell.) Accordingly. assisted by their respective counsel." In other words. the former deposited said amount with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and commenced against the latter the present action. and to rest his motion for judgment on those allegations taken together with such of his own as are admitted in the pleadings. 9 Phil. acceptance is made before a withdrawal. the promisee cannot compel the promisor to comply with the promise. within two (2) years from said date with the understanding that said option shall be deemed "terminated and elapsed. In other words. Article 1479 is controlling in the case at bar. it was a bilateral contract of sale. Inc. NT-12528 of said province.. Speaking through Associate Justice. 1254 and 1262 of the Civil Code)." whereby Mrs. saw no distinction between Articles 1324 and 1479 of the Civil Code and applied the former where a unilateral promise to sell similar to the one sued upon here was involved. In order that said unilateral promise may be "binding upon the promisor.510. sentenced to pay P200. namely." if "Sanchez shall fail to exercise his right to buy the property" within the stipulated period. jointly moved for a judgment on the pleadings. that the option contract was not valid for lack of consideration. even though the option was not supported by a sufficient consideration.

ConsorciaMelendres was already dead when the dying declaration was prepared. According to the defendants. up to 9:00 P. RomualdoCapillas pleaded guilty. that on the occasion of the said robbery they stab one Pablo Amante with a pointed bolo.R. Gutay further strengthened the testimony of Cordova that ConsorciaMelendres was already dead when the dying declaration was taken. Whether or not the lower court erred in not giving credence to the defense of alibi of defendants Antonio Capillas and JulianitoCapillas. the latter asked the victim if she was willing to affix her thumbmark on the declaration. Defendants contend that the testimony of Pablo Amante that Antonio Capillas and JulianitoCapillas participated in the commission of the crime is uncorroborated because the testimony of MenecioAmante. confederating together and mutually helping one another all armed with pistols and pointed bolos. October 23. CAPILLAS G. at the Poblacion on San Antonio from 7:00 P. Moreover. it does not exclude the probability that the victim had survived for more than thirty (30) minutes. VictorianoPernito to the effect that ConsorciaMelendres made a dying declaration that she was shot by RomualdoCapillas was impeached by the testimony of defense witness Melecio Cordova.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. conspiring. Dr. It is difficult to believe that Cordova witnessed the ―irregular‖ taking of the dying declaration without as much protesting especially because the persons implicated were related to him by marriage. stole and carried away cash and articles of value amounting to P1050. What appears on record are mere assumptions that there were delays in bringing the victim to the dispensary. which was intended to corroborate that of Pablo Amante was disregarded by the lower court for being unsatisfactory. The testimonies of Antonio Capillas and JulianitoCapillas. the two were included in the information just because Antonio is his younger brother and Julianito is his uncle. he stated that his co-accused. A few minutes after affixing her thumbmark on the instrument the victim expired. NO. Dr. These assumptions do not establish the fact that thirty (30) minutes had elapsed from the time the victim was wounded up to the time she expired. In his testimony RomualdoCapillas confessed that at the time of the commission of the crime he was in company with ThelmoGenotiva. not one of them protested and complained. According to him. it is quite surprising that despite the presence of several persons at the time the declaration was taken. 1981. likewise. mentioning Antonio and Romualdo as her assailants. Vicente Gutay. The Chief of Police of the town VictorianoPernito. According to Cordova. and that the testimony of the Chief of Police of San Antonio. the internal iliac artery has been hit.M. testified that the victim was still alive when the dying declaration was thumbmarked by said victim. Samar. J Accused RomualdoCapillas. be demonstrated that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of . husband and wife respectively. two of whom are without interest to perjure. ConsorciaMelendres. Whether or not testimony of Pablo Amante is uncorroborated and VictorianoPernito was impeached by defense witness Melecio Cordova. 2. It is also significant that the defense never presented any evidence that thirty (30) minutes had elapsed from the time the wound was inflicted up to the time that the declaration was taken. After all the questions and answers to which the Chief of Police reduced to writing. FelicisimoGenotiva and MerlitoPariol. assault. Antonio Capillas and JulianitoCapillas are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of robbery with homicide and physical injuries.M. corroborated by the testimony of BrigidoBobles a witness for the defense that they were in the gambling den at Puntahan District.00. and that the Chief of Police held the hand of the deceased woman and had her thumb pressed on the paper. HELD: 1. During the trial prosecution witness. told her husband that she felt she was going to die. this testimony of Dr. This is without merit. in the evening. Antonio Capillas and JulianitoCapillas were not with him at the time of the robbery. The trial court correctly observed that the credibility of Pablo Amante was augmented by the dying declaration of ConsorciaMelendres. The testimony of VictorianoPernito that ConsorciaMelendres was still alive when she affixed her thumb mark to the dying declaration was more credible than that of Cordova. Gutay did not categorically state that it was impossible for the victim to have survived for more than thirty (30) minutes. testified that the victim could not have survived for more than thirty (30) minutes because ―a very important blood vessel. Philippines abovenamed accused. three persons. being then also present propounded questions to the victim which the latter answered.L-27177. NO. That on or about the 25th day of October 1964. and the victim say yes. 2. At the health center of San Antonio where she was brought. in Sitio Lagbangan San Antonio. For alibi to prosper. VictorianoPernito was impeached by the testimony of Melecio Cordova. Furthermore. In fact. the due execution of which was clearly shown by the records of the case. Hence. This testimony was further reinforced by the declaration of rebuttal witness. of October 25. Samar. Judge Noynay. VictorianoPernito take down the declaration of his wife who was then alive. a witness for the prosecution. FERNANDEZ. that the victim affixed her thumbmark to her dying declaration when she was still alive. while Antonio Capillas and JulianitoCapillas pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. that it was Pablo Amante who answered the questions. forcibly enter the house of Pablo Amante and ConsorciaMelendres. Pablo Amante positively declared that there were many people who witnessed the Chief of Police. it is not enough to prove that the defendants were somewhere else when the crime was committed but it must. shot and fire at ConsorciaMelendres. 1964 was not believed by the lower court. The defendants are not correct in alleging that the testimony of the Chief of Police. thereby inflicting upon him incised wounds which required medical attendance for a period of more than 5 days and then and there treacherously attack. ISSUES: 1. No.

or after the time they were at such other place. during. . The alibi of Antonio and Julianito is further weakened by the positive identification by Pablo Amante that they were responsible for the crimes committed in his house.the crime either before. Hence. This gambling den is about two (2) kilometers from the farm of the Amantes. Both Antonio and JulianitoCapillas testified that at tile time the crime was committed they were at a gambling den located at puntahan District at the poblacion of San Antonio. it was not physically impossible for Julianito and Antonio to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

Maureen continued to be hysterical. However. He. pulled out a gun and fired at him. while eyewitness identification is significant. The accused was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of 3 eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the gunman. Fourth. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. staggered for a moment. As a result of the incident. thus: Identification testimony has at least three components.. came up from behind them and stopped on the middle of the road. When they entered the village. and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. dug into his shirt. it could still be used. the lone surviving victim of the crimes at bar. Eyewitness identification and out-of-court identification. Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. Will somebody help us?‖ All the while. During that period. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio. His senses were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer he imbibed that night. Accused claimed that during the shooting incident. fell backwards on the sidewalk.RULE 130 (Sec 1) People vs. Jr. however. the accused turned his back from the two. Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk. First. G. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone. he vigorously assails his out-of-court identification by these eyewitnesses. He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. Eyewitness identification constitutes vital evidence and.‖ When Leino handed his I. but in his house in Pasig. Accused conceded that although the car was not in good running condition. When she came to her senses.D. She strayed to the side of accused‘s car. Makati. When Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of confinement at the hospital and during the course of the trial. He pointed gun at him and asked: ―Do you want a trouble?‖ Leino said ―no‖ and took a step backward. trying to put some distance between them. a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car. Jr. Second. warning the latter to shut up. Roland John Chapman went with them. Accused alighted from his car. She could not stay still. For a moment. he was not anywhere near the scene of the crime. his gaze could not have been fixed only on the gunman‘s face. Appellant urges: First. that Leino could not have remembered the face of the accused. without bothering to look at it. approached them. and asked: ―Who are you? (Show me your) I.. Eventually. his Lancer car had been parked in the garage of his mother‘s house in Dasmarinas Village. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Chapman saw the incident. He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Leino. as she wanted to walk the rest of the way for she did not want her parents to know that she was going home that late. he‘s got a gun. Accused averred that he only came to know the 3 victims in the Dasmarinas shooting when he read the newspaper reports about it. Accused tried but failed to grab her. that the sketch of appellant based on the description given by Leino to the CIS agents was suppressed by the NBI. silver metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer. 111206-08/ 6 October 1995 Facts: In 1991. decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution. She repeatedly shouted: ―Oh. Nos. Accused admitted ownership of a box-type. JussiOlaviLeino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home at Campanilla Street. and. the Information for Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: ―Why are you bothering us?‖ Accused pushed Chapman. He‘s gonna kill us. Leino was hit on the upper jaw. The shooting initially shocked Maureen. Claudio Teehankee. in most cases. Third. The ruling: 1. but did not lose consciousness. Maureen asked Leino to stop about a block away from her house. whether as a victim or a bystander. Accused then turned his ire on Leino.D. that Leino‘s interview at the hospital was never put in writing. he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN. my God. It is understandable for the accused to assail his out-of-court identification by the prosecution witnesses in his first assignment of error. He noticed at least 3 people who saw the incident. He lifted his head to see what was happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away. 3 separate criminal cases were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee. involves perception .. Chapman felt his upper body. Initially. He has not used this car since then. Until the day of the shooting. accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen. Some authors even describe eyewitness evidence as ―inherently suspect. lastly. The short chase lasted for a minute or two. it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or DNA testing.‖ The causes of misidentification are known. While Leino and Maureen were walking. It is surmised that the sketch must have been among the evidence turned over to the NBI when the latter assumed jurisdiction over the investigation. claimed that said car ceased to be in good running condition after its involvement in an accident. and asked: ―Why did you shoot me?‖ Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. witnessing a crime. The shooting lasted for only five (5) minutes. driven by accused Claudio Teehankee. she became hysterical and started screaming for help. Yet. that Leino‘s identification of him outside an unoccupied house in Forbes Park was highly irregular.D. Jr. The defense: Accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi.R. that Leino saw his pictures on television and the newspapers before he identified him. accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. the accused grabbed and pocketed the I. Dasmarinas Village. Maureen circled around accused‘s car. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him.

If Leino identified the accused. The incident happened for a full 5 minutes. He was being fed through a tube inserted in his throat. The scene of the crime was well-lighted by a lamp post. (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness.of an event actually occurring. (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. Leino‘s fear for his safety was not irrational. the witness must memorize details of the event. courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case. It could not have been somebody else. In this case. (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification. his initial reluctance to reveal to the authorities what he witnessed was sufficiently explained during the trial – he feared for his and his family‘s safety. The accused was merely 2-3 meters away when he shot Leino. When asked how sure he was that the accused was responsible for the crime. It is often done in hospitals while the crime and the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim. There is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are identified by witnesses. categorically stated that. He. The Court has taken judicial notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in the solution of crimes considering the risk to their lives and limbs. It was sufficiently established that Leino‘s extensive injuries. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. viz: (1) the witness‘ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime. Leino had no ill-motive to falsely testify against the accused. he was still physically unable to speak. embassy security officials and brought to the house where he was to make the identification. (2) the witness‘ degree of attention at that time. it must be because the accused was the real culprit. eyewitnesses. There is also no rule of evidence which requires the rejection of the testimony of a witness whose statement has not been priorly reduced to writing. The records show that while Leino was still in the hospital. retain. He never wavered in his identification of the accused. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects. especially the victims to a crime. The natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. The victims and the accused were unknown to each other before their chance encounter. His testimony at the trial was straightforward. Accused can‘t also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and TV accounts of the shooting before he personally identified him. Using the totality of circumstances test. He identified the accused as the gunman from these pictures. he confidently replied: ―I‘m very sure. The records reveal that this mode was resorted to by the authorities for security reasons. supposedly safe subdivisions in the metropolis. Third. however. and. for whenever people attempt to acquire. The Leinos refused to have the identification at the NBI office as it was cramped with people and with high security risk. limited his mobility.S.‖ The accused cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators to reduce to a sworn statement the information revealed by Leino during his hospital interviews. He and his companions had been shot in cold blood in one of the exclusive. Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. The SC also rejected the accused‘s contention that the NBI suppressed the sketch prepared by the CIS on the basis of the description given by Leino. and retrieve information accurately. especially the injury to his tongue. There is no reason to doubt the correctness of the accused‘s identification by Leino. The burden is on accused to prove that his mug shot identification was unduly suggestive. He was unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of the defense counsels. he was shown 3 pictures of different men by the investigators. Failing proof of impermissible suggestiveness. there is absolutely no improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to the accused. Five minutes is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of the accused. the court has not considered the initial . the witness must be able to recall and communicate accurately. Second. There is nothing on the record to show that said sketch was turned over by the CIS to the NBI which could warrant a presumption that the sketch was suppressed. Identification may be done in open field. The SC was also not impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to have remembered the accused‘s face when the incident happened within a span of 5 minutes. the alleged irregularities cited by the accused did not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due process. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. he cannot complain about the admission of his out-of-court identification by Leino. In light of these all too real risks. The SC also gave credence to the testimony of the other two witnesses. It is unmitigated guesswork. The day he identified appellant in the lineup. As to the testimony of Cadenas. courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors. Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three stages. the face end body movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory. The suspicion that the sketch did not resemble the accused is not evidence. The need for security even compelled that Leino be fetched and escorted from his house in Forbes Park by U. Experience shows that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes. There is nothing wrong in Leino‘s identification of the accused in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. he has not seen any picture of accused or read any report relative to the shooting incident. they are limited by normal human fallibilities and suggestive influences. can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals. Most often. before the mug shot identification. (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification.

the reference by the trial judge to reports about the troublesome character of appellant is a harmless error. These alleged discrepancies amount to no more than shades of differences and are not meaningful. the accused was convicted mainly because of his identification by 3 eyewitnesses with high credibility.‖. ANDERS HULTMAN. the result of the paraffin test conducted on appellant showed he was negative of nitrates. however. In the case at bar. The accused points to other possible suspects. and Cadenas testified it was silver metallic gray. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco. As to the testimony of Mangubat. Claudio Teehankee III. these slight discrepancies in the description of the car do not make the prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy of credence. the accused could not have been the gunman. Allegedly. I promise Mommy. Clearly. the NBI failed to conduct an examination to compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of the crime with the bullets recovered from the body of Chapman.reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with authorities as an authorities as an indicium of credibility. since one of the eyewitnesses was quoted in the newspapers as having overheard Maureen plead to the gunman: ―Huwag. however.‖ The accused also contends that a maid in a house near the scene of the crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard Maureen say: ―Daddy don‘t shoot. Second. in Makati. pharmaceuticals. demonstrates that Anders Hultman could not have been the gunman. the court examines its damaging quality and its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. wears gloves at the time of the shooting. viz: when the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun. and alfalfa. Leino is a reliable witness. This rule has long been laid to rest. Quezon City to Dasmarinas Village. and leguminous plants such as peas. referring as they do to colors white. the NBI towed accused‘s car from Dasmarinas Village to the NBI office which proved that the same was not in good running condition. deserves scant consideration. the accused‘s son. the trial court erred in not holding that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The omission. Lastly. There is also little to the contention of the accused that his Lancer car was not in running condition. and. The accused‘s attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman.‖ The evidence on record. the argument is negated by the records which show that said car was towed because the NBI could not get its ignition key which was then in the possession of the accused. Huwag.‖ In numerous rulings. Again. where it was parked. the adoptive father of Maureen Hultman. he claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement in previous shooting incidents. If the impact is slight and insignificant. fireworks. don‘t shoot me and don‘t kill me.‖ Moreover. also bearing license plate number 566. Even the accused‘s evidence show that said car could run. beans.‖ Fifth. It cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. such as explosives. 2. for Mangubat said that he overheard the victim Hultman plead to the gunman. The only thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. Fourth. however. The harmless error rule is also followed in our jurisdiction. drove it from the repair shop in Banawe. Mangubat declared the car was white. the SC found nothing in the records to suspect that Mangubat would perjure himself. cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge violated the rule on res inter aliosacta (RES INTER ALIOS ACTA. another resident of Dasmarinas Village. evidence. this was vicariously proved when the NBI towed his car from Dasmarinas Village where it was parked to the NBI office. the prosecution eyewitnesses described the gunman‘s car as white. Leinooutrightly dismissed this suspicion. The accused. The accused cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was negative of nitrates. NBI . Proof beyond reasonable doubt According to the accused. fertilizers. . This is a technical phrase which signifies acts of others. Third. Daddy. First. After its repairs. Daddy. Don‘t. While still in the hospital and when informed that the Makati police were looking into this possibility. Leino described the car as light -colored. Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was NOT the gunman. who had a white Lancer car. The accused cites a newspaper item where Maureen was allegedly overheard as saying to the gunman: ―Huwag. we have also recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman. or transactions between others) when he considered his involvement in previous shooting incidents. Considering the speed and shocking nature of the incident which happened before the break of dawn. Daddy. proved extremely unreliable in use. or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. and she addressed Anders Hultman as ―Papa.‖ not ―Daddy. Nor was the SC impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the eyewitnesses‘ description of the color of the gunman‘s car. but the trial court found it to be silver metalic gray. In the case at bar. Daddy. The reference is not the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence appreciated by the trial judge in convicting the accused. viz:. It was clearly established that Maureen could not have uttered said statement for two (2) reasons: Maureen did not speak Tagalog. In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial. . The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal gun with the bullets found at the scene of the crime. As aforestated. (b) JOSE MONTAÃ‗O. cannot exculpate the accused. somewhat white and silver metallic gray. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has ―. the court disregards the error as it will not overcome the weight of the properly admitted evidence against the prejudiced party. the car was towed not because it was not in running condition. The omitted comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the positive identification of the accused. Florece said the car was somewhat white (―medyoputi‖). thus: ―Please. The person may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites.

not simply that they might be. especially in the criminal field . of the crime of Murder. responsible reporting enhances an accused‘s right to a fair trial for. our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.00. of the crime of Frustrated Murder. The defense‘s documentary evidence consists mostly of newspaper clippings relative to the investigation of the case at bar and which appeared to cast doubt on his guilt. nothing in the conduct of the proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality against the trial judge. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting in the police. more than 72 hours has already lapsed from the time of the alleged shooting. Nor did he consent to or condone any manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or conduct inside the courtroom during the trial of the case at bar. Teehankee was pardoned in 2008. for the shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman. . The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day. and. testified and confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of hands with the use of warm water or vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the skin. The SC had previously rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity. we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. The accused has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden. The accused blames the press for his conviction as he contends that the publicity given to his case impaired his right to an impartial trial. At best. for the shooting of JussiOlaviLeino.000 as exemplary damages. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial.000 as indemnity for his injuries. both as actual damages. prosecutors. In all three cases. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation.000. gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. He submits that the trial judge failed to protect him from prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences which attended the prosecution of the cases. by the barrage of publicity. It‘s true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity. there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced. 3. qualified by treachery.000. In the case at bar. There is no evidence showing that the trial judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a carnival.000. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life.369. .$55. just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. The right to an impartial trial. Penalties: (1) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland John Chapman. directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the administration of justice. by such time.000. Forensic Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when the accused was tested for the presence of nitrates.84 and equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U. For one. it would not be amiss to stress that the trial judge voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing the case.000. or a total of P3. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. the accused should be the last person to complain against the press for prejudicial coverage of his trial. to pay each of the 3 offended parties the sum of P1. and to pay the said offended party the following amounts: P30.000 as moral damages. The press cannot be fair and unfair to appellant at the same time. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. For another.000. for attorney‘s fees and expenses of litigation. He postulates there was pressure on the trial judge for high-ranking government officials avidly followed the developments in the case (as no less than then Vice-President Estrada and then DOJ Secretary Drilon attended some of the hearings and. the accused can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. Then and now. In the Report on the paraffin test conducted on appellant. . and to pay the costs in all 3 cases. Finally. the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case.600. To be sure. The SC did not sustain the accused‘s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. P2. P1. qualified by treachery. Parenthetically.S.Forensic Chemist. as well pointed out. Leonora Vallado. She likewise opined that the conduct of the paraffin test after more than seventy-two (72) hours from the time of the shooting may not lead to a reliable result for. it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases.‖ Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. but the SC. Mr. President Aquino even visited Hultman while she was still confined at the hospital). The records reveal he presented in court no less than 7 newspaper reporters and relied heavily on selected portions of their reports for his defense. P118. the nitrates could have already been removed by washing or perspiration. ―a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration.

2007 in Criminal Law and Digests.This is not my work. Source: http://jlp-law. Fred October 4th.com/blog/people-vs-claudio-teehankee-jr-casedigest/ -Hanz . Published by Atty.

At that time. the person who was deeply offended by the insult was the one who believed he had a right to demand explanations of the perpetrator of that insult. therefore. . As a result of the commotion. Subsequently. Conrado struck him from behind. the girl whom Jose Laurel is courting for a year. article 8 of the Penal Code.No. slightly injuring him in two places on the head. According to Castillo.US vs. through the instrumentality of several persons. and the other merits of the case. in view of the antecedents aforerelated. and make the explanations which he believed he had a right to exact. Laurel testified that he was in the parochial building the night of the incident for the purpose of attending an entertainment. the conviction is acquired. However. Issue: 1: who provoke the encounter? 2: whether or not Laurel is responsible for the serious injury inflicted to Castillo. who upon hearing the commotion. He ran but Castillo tried to pursue him. the real suitor. Notwithstanding the large number of persons who must have been eyewitnesses to what occurred. the conclusions reached from the evidence. he was suddenly struck a blow by Castillo with a cane or club. the prosecution was only able to present the witness. seriously affected and offended by the insult to his sweetheart. Before making an explanation. and that it was the perpetrator of the offense who was invited to come down from the parochial building to the ground floor thereof to make explanations regarding the insult to the girl Lat.R. he took hold of his pocketknife and defended himself. In response. there are two contradicting stories as to the subsequent incidents. 1912 G. a relative of Exequiel Castillo. to testify as to how and by whom the assault was begun. he was informed that Laurel wished to speak with him and explain his having kissed Lat. must be held to be the one who brought about the encounter gave the invitation and provoked the occurrence. He was the person who would consider himself aggrieved or highly offended at the kiss given the girl Lat. Laurel was walking at an ordinary gait and carrying the bloody pocketknife in his hand. Castillo struck Laurel with the cane he was carrying but the latter immediately dodge and started to run. Held: 1: The Court held that Castillo provoked the encounter. the conclusion is certain that the assault was commenced by Exequiel Castillo. this appeal. and other merits of the present case. Primitivo Gonzalez. 2: No. After giving his explanation why he kissed Lat (because she was very fickle and prodigal of her use of the word ―yes‖ on all occasions). and the assaulted man. where he was. by the force of probability. in the natural order of things. Jose Laurel March 15. Lucio Villa. In turn. Laurel was seen and arrested by a policeman. There he was informed by three different messengers that Castillo wanted to talk to him. Laurel suddenly struck him a blow in the left side of the breast with a knife when he refused to answer the latter‘s question o whether or not he is in possession of some letters addressed by Laurel to Lat. Vicente Garcia and Domingo Panganiban and cousin Conrado Laurel. who struck Jose Laurel two blows with a cane. wounded his assailant with a pocketknife. Subsequently. accompanied by several people including one Exequiel Castillo. thus. herein defendants were convicted of the crime. given through the medium of several individuals. Exequiel Castillo.L-7037 Facts: It was undisputed that while Concepcion Lat. On the other hand. she was suddenly approached and kissed by Laurel. her other suitor. If. came from the man who was offended by the incident of the kiss. in self-defense. it is quite probable that the aggrieved party was the one who. Castillo was seriously wounded. invited the insulter to come down from the upper story of the parochial building. The police intervened in the fight. as the infliction of the wounds attended by the three requisites specified in paragraph 4. Concepcion Lat. Jose Laurel committed no crime and is exempt from all responsibility. Hence. went to the scene. and having weighed and considered as a whole the testimony. that the invitation. Upon this premise. was walking along the street. circumstantial evidence. and if this be so. while he was attending an entertainment in the parochial building of Tanauan. he was assaulted by Laurel‘s companions.