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PUNSALAN, JR. V. VDA. DE LACSAMANA G.R. No.

L-55729 March 28, 1983 FACTS: Punsalan was the owner of a piece of land, which he mortgaged in favor of PNB. Due to his failure to pay, the mortgage was foreclosed and the land was sold in a public auction to which PNB was the highest bidder. On a relevant date, while Punsalan was still the possessor of the land, it secured a permit for the construction of a warehouse. A deed of sale was executed between PNB and Punsalan. This contract was amended to include the warehouse and the improvement thereon. By virtue of these instruments, respondent Lacsamana secured title over the property in her name. Petitioner then sought for the annulment of the deed of sale. Among his allegations was that the bank did not own the building and thus, it should not be included in the said deed. Petitioners complaint was dismissed for improper venue. The trial court held that the action being filed in actuality by petitioner is a real action involving his right over a real property. ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue. W/N the warehouse is an immovable and must be tried in the province where the property lies. HELD: Warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an immovable or real property. Buildings are always immovable under the Code. A building treated separately from the land on which it is stood is immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a contract seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as immovable property.

Tsai v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 120098, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 324 FACTS: On November 26, 1975, respondent Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained a three million peso (P3,000,000.00) loan from petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom). As security for the loan, EVERTEX executed in favor of PBCom, a deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where its factory stands, andt h e c h a t t e l s l o c a t e d t h e r e i n . O n A p r i l 2 3 , 1 9 7 9 , P B C o m g r a n t e d a s e c o n d l o a n t o EVERTEX. The loan was secured by a chattel mortgage over personal properties enumerated in a list attached thereto. After April 23, 1979, the date of the execution of the second mortgage mentioned above, EVERTEX purchased various machines andequipments.U p o n E V E R T E X ' s f a i l u r e t o m e e t i t s o b l i g a t i o n t o P B C o m , t h e l a t t e r c o m m e n c e d extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against EVERTEX. On December 15, 1982, thefirst public auction was held where petitioner PBCom emerged as the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor on the same date. On March 7, 1984,PBCom consolidated its ownership over the lot and all the properties in it. In November 1986, it leased the entire factory premises to petitioner Ruby L. Tsai. On May 3, 1988,P B C o m s o l d t h e f a c t o r y , l o c k , s t o c k , a n d b a r r e l t o T s a i , i n c l u d i n g t h e c o n t e s t e d machineries.On March 16, 1989, EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and damages with the Regional Trial Court against PBCom. EVERTEX claimed that norights having been transmitted to PBCom over the assets of insolvent EVERTEX,therefore Tsai acquired no rights over such assets sold to her, and should reconvey the assets. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE INCLUSION OF THE QUESTIONED PROPERTIES IN THE FORECLOSED PROPERTIES IS PROPER. HELD: Yes. While it is true that the questioned properties appear to be immobile, aperusal of the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties gives acontrary indication. In the case at bar, the true intention of PBCOM and the owner,E V E R T E X , i s t o t r e a t m a c h i n e r y a n d e q u i p m e n t a s c h a t t e l s . A s s u m i n g t h a t t h e properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing detracts the parties fromtreating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel. It has beenheld that an immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulationas when it is used as security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgageis executed over it, as in the case at bar