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of North America The receipt of goods by the carrier has been said to lie at the foundation of the contract to carry and deliver, and if actually no goods are received there can be no such contract. The liability and responsibility of the carrier under a contract for the carriage of goods commence on their actual delivery to, or receipt by, the carrier or an authorized agent and delivery to a lighter in charge of a vessel for shipment on the vessel, where it is the custom to deliver in that way, is a good delivery and binds the vessel receiving the freight, the liability commencing at the time of delivery to the lighter and, similarly, where there is a contract to carry goods from one port to another, and they cannot be loaded directly on the vessel and lighters are sent by the vessel to bring the goods to it, the lighters are for the time its substitutes, so that the bill of landing is applicable to the goods as soon as they are placed on the lighters. Whenever the control and possession of goods passes to the carrier and nothing remains to be done by the shipper, then it can be said with certainty that the relation of shipper and carrier has been established. A bill of lading is not indispensable for the creation of a contract of carriage. The bill of lading is juridically a documentary proof of the stipulations and conditions agreed upon by both parties. The liability of the carrier as common carrier begins with the actual delivery of the goods for transportation, and not merely with the formal execution of a receipt or bill of lading; the issuance of a bill of lading is not necessary to complete delivery and acceptance. Even where it is provided by statute that liability commences with the issuance of the bill of lading, actual delivery and acceptance are sufficient to bind the carrier. FACTS: October, 1952: Macleod and Company of the Philippines (Macleod) contracted by telephone the services of the Compañia Maritima (CM), a shipping corporation, for: shipment of 2,645 bales of hemp from the Macleod's Sasa private pier at Davao City to Manila subsequent transhipment to Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A. on board the S.S. Steel Navigator. This oral contract was later on confirmed by a formal and written booking issued by Macleod's branch office in Sasa and handcarried to CM's branch office in Davao in compliance with which the CM sent to Macleod's private wharf LCT Nos. 1023 and 1025 on which the loading of the hemp was completed on October 29, 1952. The 2 lighters were manned each by a patron and an assistant patron. The patrons of both barges issued the corresponding carrier's receipts and that issued by the patron of Barge No. 1025 reads in part: Received in behalf of S.S. Bowline Knot in good order and condition from MACLEOD AND COMPANY OF PHILIPPINES, Sasa Davao, for transhipment at Manila onto S.S. Steel Navigator. FINAL DESTINATION: Boston. Early hours of October 30: LCT No. 1025 sank, resulting in the damage or loss of 1,162 bales of hemp loaded therein
Macleod promptly notified the carrier's main office in Manila and its branch in Davao advising it of its liability The damaged hemp was brought to Odell Plantation in Madaum, Davao, for cleaning, washing, reconditioning, and redrying. total loss adds up to P60,421.02 All abaca shipments of Macleod were insured with the Insurance Company of North America against all losses and damages Macleod filed a claim for the loss it suffered with the insurance company and was paid P64,018.55 subrogation agreement between Macleod and the insurance company wherein the Macleod assigned its rights over the insured and damaged cargo October 28, 1953.: failing to recover from the carrier P60,421.02 (amount supported by receipts), the insurance company instituted the present action CA affirmed RTC: ordering CM to pay the insurance co. ISSUE: W/N there was a contract of carriage bet. CM (carrier) and Macleod (shipper)
HELD: YES. Affirmed receipt of goods by the carrier has been said to lie at the foundation of the contract to carry and deliver, and if actually no goods are received there can be no such contract The liability and responsibility of the carrier under a contract for the carriage of goods commence on their actual delivery to, or receipt by, the carrier or an authorized agent. ... and delivery to a lighter in charge of a vessel for shipment on the vessel, where it is the custom to deliver in that way Whenever the control and possession of goods passes to the carrier and nothing remains to be done by the shipper, then it can be said with certainty that the relation of shipper and carrier has been established As regards the form of the contract of carriage it can be said that provided that there is a meeting of the minds and from such meeting arise rights and obligations, there should be no limitations as to form The bill of lading is not essential Even where it is provided by statute that liability commences with the issuance of the bill of lading, actual delivery and acceptance are sufficient to bind the carrier marine surveyors, attributes the sinking of LCT No. 1025 to the 'non-water-tight conditions of various buoyancy compartments
COURT OF APPEALS . FS-176. xxx fire xxx. war. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO.SERVANDO vs. Facts: Clara UY Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board the Philippine Steam Navigation vessel. Issue: Whether or not the stipulations in the bill of lading limiting the liability of carrier is valid. the cargoes were discharged. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage cause by force majeure. morals or public policy. 1963. Negros Occidental. cargoes of rice and colored paper as evidenced by the corresponding bills of lading issued by the carrier. public enemies. unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs.” We sustain the validity of the above stipulation. About 2:00 p. destroying Servando’s cargoes. he is nevertheless bound by t he provisions thereof. and that they did not sign the same. that in the bills of lading issued for the cargoes in question. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed “owner’s risk” unless such damage is due to negligence of carrier. MAERSK LINE vs. However. for carriage from Manila to Pulupundan. Court of Appeals. there is nothing therein that is contrary to law. “Clause 14. Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan in the morning of November 18. of the same day. This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown origin. the loss is chargeable against the appellant.m. Held: The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment on question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736.” There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier in delay in the performance of its obligation nor that was the cause of the fire that broke out in the Custom’s warehouse in anyway attributable to the negligence of the appellant or its employees. Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them because it was printed in fine letters on the back of the bills of lading. complete and in good order. “While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket. parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss or damage that may be caused to the shipment by inserting therein the following stipulation. dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters. and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees. Such provisions have been held to be part of the contract of carriage and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter’s lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation.
delivery of shipment or cargo should at least be made within a reasonable time. The Memorandum of Shipment provides that the shipper advised the consignee that the goods were already shipped on board the vessel of petitioner for shipment to the Philippines via Oakland. The shipper alleged that the mis-shipment was due solely to the gross negligence of petitioner. For reasons unknown. In the case before us. The goods finally arrived in the Philippines on June 10. PAKISTAN BANK was indicated in the bills of lading as consignee whereas GPC was the notify party. California. in the export invoices GPC was clearly named as buyer/importer. SC said that it was necessarily so and that it is a settled rule that bills of lading are contracts not entirely prohibited. CA affirmed said decision. Private respondent alleging gross negligence and undue delay in the delivery of the goods. we gather that he has been transacting with GPC as . unless such common carriers previously assume the obligation to deliver at a given date or time.000 empty gelatin capsules for the manufacture of his pharmaceutical products. there arises no need to execute another contract for the purpose as it would be a mere superfluity. The real issue is whether respondents are liable to petitioner for releasing the goods to GPC without the bills of lading or bank guarantee. 1736 had. 1977 or after two months from the date specified. From the testimony of petitioner. we find that a delay in the delivery of the goods spanning a period of two months and seven days falls was beyond the realm of reasonableness. Petitioner also referred to GPC as such in his demand letter to respondent WALLEM and in his complaint before the trial court. was very well aware of the specific date when the goods were expected to arrive as indicated in the bill of lading itself. the right to receive them was proper. Petitioner alleged that the goods were transported in accordance with the bill of lading(. Macam vs.(shipper) 600. other than the consignee.Facts: Private respondent(consignee) ordered from Eli Lilly. While there was no special contract entered into by the parties indicating the date of arrival of the subject shipment. 1977. destruction or deterioration of the goods as provided for in Article 1734 NCC. This premise draws us to conclude that the delivery of the cargoes to GPC as buyer/importer which.”the Carrier does not undertake that the go ods shall arrive at the port of discharge or the place of delivery at any particular time.”) and that its liability under the la w attaches only in case of loss. USA and then transported back to Oakland. Held: Yes. CA The extraordinary responsibility of the common carriers lasts until actual or constructive delivery of the cargoes to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them. With respect to the ruling that contracts of adhesion are void. In this regard. said cargo of capsules were mishipped and diverted to Richmond. While it is true that common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and to deliver merchandise. Issue: Whether or not respondent is entitled to damages resulting from delay in the delivery of the shipment in the absence in the bill of lading of a stipulation on the period of delivery. The consignee refused to take delivery of the goods. California. 1977. and persons are not vested with the right to prompt delivery. filed an action for rescission of contract with damages against petitioner and shipper.. The RTC dismissed the complaint against the shipper and ruled in favor of the consignee. hence the present petition. Virginia. conformably with Art.. However. The specified date of arrival was April 3. petitioner nevertheless. Inc. RTC ruled that the stipulation in the BOL is in the nature of contract of adhesion and therefore void. An examination of the subject bill of lading shows that the subject shipment was estimated to arrive in Manila on April 3.
85 -29357 against Delsan for loss caused by the spillage.37 for backflow of the diesel oil pursuant to Inland Floater Policy.). bank guarantee is normally required by the shipping lines prior to releasing the goods. being a common carrier. But for buyers using telegraphic transfers. petitioner nevertheless. As insurer.. INC. unloading operations commenced. When mangoes and watermelons are in season. Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. CA While it is true that common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and to deliver merchandise. pursuant to a Contract of Afreightment. in insuring cargoes for transportation within the Philippines. AHAC. Issue: May Delsan be held liable for loss caused by the spillage of the diesel oil? Held: Yes. In his several years of business relationship with GPC and respondents. To overcome the . 149019 August 15. It has been the practice of petitioner to request the shipping lines to immediately release perishable cargoes such as watermelons and fresh mangoes through telephone calls by himself or his "people. and persons are not vested with the right to prompt delivery. The goods are released to GPC. his shipment to GPC using the facilities of respondents is twice or thrice a week. vs. the discharging had to be stopped on account of the discovery that the port bow mooring of the vessel was intentionally cut or stolen by unknown persons. Caltex sought recovery of the loss from Delsan. (Phils.575. On the other hand. among others. but the latter refused to pay. Facts: Delsan is a domestic corporation which owns and operates the vessel MT Larusan. Inc. and P1.986. Inc. AH-IF641011549P and Marine Risk Note No. which caused the diesel oil to spill into the sea. AHAC paid Caltex the sum of P479. we find that a delay in the delivery of the goods spanning a period of two months and seven days falls was beyond the realm of reasonableness. The shipment was insured by respondent AHAC against all risks under Inland Floater Policy No. petitioner dispenses with the bank guarantee because the goods are already fully paid. In this regard.buyer/importer for around two (2) or three (3) years already. In the case before us. While there was no special contract entered into by the parties indicating the date of arrival of the subject shipment." In transactions covered by a letter of credit. DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES. The court declared that Delsan.939. 2006 GARCIA. The shipment arrived in Bacolod City and immediately thereafter.57 for spillage. J.627 k/l Automotive Diesel Oil (diesel oil) at the Bataan Refinery Corporation for transportation and delivery to the bulk depot in Bacolod City of Caltex Phils. the American-International Underwriters. there was not a single instance when the bill of lading was first presented before the release of the cargoes.262. They are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost. As a result of spillage and backflow of diesel oil. instituted Civil Case No. However. No. respondent American Home Assurance Corporation (AHAC for brevity) is a foreign insurance company duly licensed to do business in the Philippines through its agent. Delsan received on board MT Larusan a shipment consisting of 1.R. Maersk Line vs. pursuant to Marine Risk Note. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CORPORATION G. It is engaged. as Caltex’s subrogee. was very well aware of the specific date when the goods were expected to arrive as indicated in the bill of lading itself. unless such common carriers previously assume the obligation to deliver at a given date or time. should have exercised extraordinary diligence in the performance of its duties. destroyed or deteriorated. delivery of shipment or cargo should at least be made within a reasonable time. (Caltex). 34-5093-6. there arises no need to execute another contract for the purpose as it would be a mere superfluity.
M/V “Kapitan Sakharov. Sharp denied any liability on the ground that such liability was extinguished when the vessel carrying the cargo was gutted by fire. On March 11.429. while in transit. DSR-Senator Lines informed Berde Plants that M/V “Kapitan Sakharov” with its cargo was gutted by fire and sank on or about July 4. 1993. destruction or deterioration of the goods. 1994. 1993. On February 8. The carrier still has in it the responsibility to guard and preserve the goods. However. and received by.429. DSR-SENATOR vs. The cargo was loaded in M/S “Arabian Senator. actually or constructively. a foreign shipping corporation. Sharp. In turn Berde Plants executed in its favor a “Subrogation Receipt” dated January 17. FEDERAL FACTS Berde Plants delivered 632 units of artificial trees to C. or to a person who has the right to receive them. Federal Phoenix Assurance filed with the RTC. Saudi Arabia. Sharp.F. Since the peril of fire is not comprehended within the exceptions in Article 1734. in Riyadh.F.61. Sharp demanding payment of P941. the General Ship Agent of DSR-Senator Lines. the cargo was reloaded on board DSR-Senator Lines’ feeder vessel. the vessel and all its cargo caught fire. C. Saudi Arabia.presumption of negligence in case of loss. unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law. The discharging of oil products to Caltex Bulk Depot has not yet been finished.F. When the vessel arrived in Khor Fakkan Port. C. Sharp issued International Bill of Lading for the cargo – the port of discharge for the cargo was at the Khor Fakkan port and the port of delivery was Riyadh.00 and costs. Federal Phoenix Assurance paid Berde Plants P941. ISSUE W/N DSR-Senator is liable – YES RULING Under Article 1734. 1993. Federal Phoenix Assurance sent a letter to C.F. Manila a complaint for damages against DSR-Senator Lines and C. Delsan still has the duty to guard and to preserve the cargo. Saudi Arabia. On July 5.F. via Port Dammam. M/S “Arabian Senator” left the Manila South Harbor for Saudi Arabia with the cargo on board. 1994. compensatory damages of P100. The extraordinary responsibility of common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of.61 on the basis of the Subrogation Receipt. Al-Mohr International Group. On June 7. 1994. the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered. praying that the latter be ordered to pay actual damages of P941. the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence subject to exceptions under Art. Sharp issued a certification to that effect Consequently. by the carrier to the consignee. On December 16. Branch 16.429. .” Federal Phoenix Assurance insured the cargo against all risks. C.000. 1734.F. a duty incident to its having the goods transported. then the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently.” bound for Port Dammam.61 corresponding to the amount of insurance for the cargo. for transportation and delivery to the consignee. Fire is not one of those enumerated under the above provision which exempts a carrier from liability for loss or destruction of the cargo. 1993.
It has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. While JAL was no longer required to defray private respondents' living expenses during their stay in Narita on account of the fortuitous event. private respondents went to the airport to take their flight to Manila. whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred. adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel. destroyed or deteriorated. a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence. 1991. during or after the occurrence of the disaster. Issue: Whether or not JAL was obligated to answer for the accommodation expenses due to the force majeure.The natural disaster must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. Held: No." the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. Pinatubo eruption rendered NAIA inaccessible to airline traffic. Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. Yet it is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected overnight stay on June 15. Corollarily. due to the Mt. there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of "force majeure. private respondents' trip to Manila was cancelled indefinitely. . Accordingly. CA Facts: Private respondents boarded the JAL flights to Manila with a stop over at Narita Japan at the airlines' expense. and there need not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable. Pinatubo eruption. JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on the first available connecting flight to Manila. cannot be charged to JAL. Upon arrival at Narita private respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko Narita for the night. they failed to overcome it by sufficient proof of extraordinary diligence. Respondent Federal Phoenix Assurance raised the presumption of negligence against petitioners. JAL then booked another flight fort the passengers and again answered for the hotel accommodations but still the succeeding flights were cancelled. JAPAN AIRLINES vs. In this regard. when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. However. However. and that the carrier has exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before. Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers when it declassified private respondents from "transit passengers" to "new passengers" as a result of which private respondents were obliged to make the necessary arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila. Hence. the consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect. they are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost. The next day. When the goods shipped either are lost or arrive in damaged condition.
all that a shipper has to do in a suit to recover for loss or damage is to show receipt by the carrier of the goods and to delivery by it of less than what it received. was hired by PPI to determine the "outturn" of the cargo shipped. When petitioner chartered the vessel M/V "Sun Plum". trimming and discharge of the cargo. they were all presumably inspected by the charterer's representative and found fit to take a load of urea. the resident agent of the carrier. SSA explained that they did not respond to the consignee's claim because it was not a formal claim. Issue: 1) Whether a common carrier becomes a private carrier by reason of a charter-party. stowing. After that. and that they had nothing to do with the discharge of the shipment. for the cost of the shortage in the and the diminution in value of that portion contaminated with dirt. its officers and compliment were under the employ of the shipowner and therefore continued . stating that “common carriers are presumed negligent. Accordingly. RTC ruled in favor of plaintiff. relying on the 1968 case of Home Insurance Co.. the Civil Code provisions on common carriers which set forth a presumption of negligence do not find application in the case at bar. PPI filed an action for damages. in the ordinary course of business.PLANTERS PRODUCTS. transporting goods indiscriminately for all persons. operates as a common carrier.” CA reversed the decision. and the defendants considered private carriers. Even if the provisions of the charter-party are deemed valid. After the Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by stevedores hired by and under the supervision of the shipper. vs. Prior to its voyage. The hatches remained closed and tightly sealed throughout the entire voyage. 2) Whether the shipowner was able to prove that he had exercised that degree of diligence required of him under the law. This they failed to do. KKKK. Inc. common or private he may be. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: PPI purchased from Mitsubishi metric tons of Urea fertilizer which the latter shipped aboard the cargo vessel owned by KKKK from US to La Union. It is not disputed that respondent carrier. (CSCI). The defendant carrier argued that the strict public policy governing common carriers does not apply to them because they have become private carriers by reason of the provisions of the charter-party. it was still incumbent upon them to prove that the shortage or contamination sustained by the cargo is attributable to the fault or negligence on the part of the shipper or consignee in the loading. it ruled that the cargo vessel M/V "Sun Plum" owned by private respondent KKKK was a private carrier and not a common carrier by reason of the time charterer-party. in Tokyo. then tied with steel bonds. the ship captain.) Not necessarily. INC. Before loading the fertilizer aboard the vessel. PPI sent a claim letter to Soriamont Steamship Agencies (SSA). The survey report submitted revealed a shortage in the cargo and that a portion of the Urea fertilizer approximating was contaminated with dirt. the steel hatches were closed with heavy iron lids. Japan. a time charter-party on the vessel was entered into between Mitsubishi as shipper/charterer and KKKK as shipowner. A private marine and cargo surveyor. Cargo Superintendents Company Inc. covered with three layers of tarpaulin. Held: 1. v. American Steamship Agencies. the burden of proving that the loss or damage was due to any of the causes which exempt him from liability is shifted to the carrier.
was that the hull of the vessel was in good condition. is misplaced for the reason that the meat of the controversy therein was the validity of a stipulation in the charterparty exempting the shipowners from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent. the rules governing common carriers. This is evident in the present case considering that the steering of the ship.) Yes. Indubitably. Respondent carrier's heavy reliance on the case of Home Insurance Co. a shipowner in a time or voyage charter retains possession and control of the ship. with the duty of caring for his cargo when the charterer did not have any control of the means in doing so. as in the case of a time-charter or voyage-charter. It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall remain as . that a common carrier becomes private. 2. It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall remain as such. as well as the inadequacy of its packaging which further contributed to the loss. transporting goods indiscriminately for all persons. the steel pontoon hatches were closed and sealed with iron lids. notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of a vessel by one or more persons. It was shown during the trial that after the loading of the cargo in bulk in the ship’s holds. the rule in the United States that a ship chartered by a single shipper to carry special cargo is not a common carrier. more particularly. operates as a common carrier. and not the effects of a special charter on common carriers. with the duty of caring for his cargo when the charterer did not have any control of the means in doing so. the ship captain. Moreso. provided the charter is limited to the ship only. as was the case at bar. be the property of the charterer. its officers and compliment were under the employ of the shipowner and therefore continued to be under its direct supervision and control. with a variable weather condition prevalent during its unloading. the determination of the course of the voyage and other technical incidents of maritime navigation were all consigned to the officers and crew who were screened. the manning of the decks. It is not disputed that respondent carrier. by clear and convincing proof. SC agreed that the bulk shipment of highly soluble goods like fertilizer carries with it the risk of loss or damage. chosen and hired by the shipowner. SC held that respondent carrier has sufficiently overcome. for we have observed that the growing concern for safety in the transportation of passengers and /or carriage of goods by sea requires a more exacting interpretation of admiralty laws.to be under its direct supervision and control. does not find application in our jurisdiction. a stranger to the crew and to the ship. When petitioner chartered the vessel M/V "Sun Plum". the RTC’s statement on the requirements of the law was reiterated. Hardly then can the charterer be charged. although her holds may. In an action for recovery of damages against a common carrier on the goods shipped. v. This is evident in the present case considering that the steering of the ship. then covered with 3 layers of serviceable tarpaulins which were tied with steel bonds. for the moment. at least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned. respondent carrier has sufficiently proved the inherent character of the goods which makes it highly vulnerable to deterioration. American Steamship Agencies. Hardly then can the charterer be charged. in the ordinary course of business. the prima facie presumption of negligence. It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew. At any rate. a stranger to the crew and to the ship. chosen and hired by the shipowner. Clearly. This is a risk the shipper or the owner of the goods has to face. Also shown. the determination of the course of the voyage and other technical incidents of maritime navigation were all consigned to the officers and crew who were screened. The hatches remained close and tightly sealed while the ship was in transit as the weight of the steel covers made it impossible for a person to open without the use of the ship’s boom. the manning of the decks. foreclosing the possibility of spillage of the cargo into the sea or seepage of water inside the hull of the vessel.
Jr. filed a Third-Party Complaint against the following: respondent Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance. His wife. Arriesgado then filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage. provided the charter is limited to the ship only. She was later transferred to the Southern Island Medical Center where she died shortly thereafter. 1987. Arriesgado G. Cebu. as in the case of a time-charter or voyage-charter. They alleged that petitioner Laspiñas was negotiating the uphill climb along the national . Poblacion. a shipowner in a time or voyage charter retains possession and control of the ship. the cargo truck marked "Condor Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise" bearing plate number GBP-675 was loaded with firewood in Bogo. Inc. Sergio Pedrano. 2004 Facts: At about 10:00 p. It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew. and respondent Sergio Pedrano.m. 1987. notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of a vessel by one or more persons. the bus rammed into the trucks left rear. was brought to the Danao City Hospital. The petitioners. No. that a common carrier becomes private. Tiu vs. Among its passengers were the Spouses Pedro A. Laspiñas saw the stalled truck. The respondent alleged that the passenger bus in question was cruising at a fast and high speed along the national road. and had come from Maya.. 138060. of March 15. As the bus was approaching the bridge. who were seated at the right side of the bus. D Rough Riders bus operator William Tiu and his driver. Compostela. Daanbantayan. 1987. the registered owner of the cargo truck. He applied the breaks and tried to swerve to the left to avoid hitting the truck. just as the truck passed over a bridge. about 700 meters away. Poblacion. At about 4:45 a. The driver. Pedrano left his helper. one of its rear tires exploded. which was then about 25 meters away. Pedro Arriesgado lost consciousness and suffered a fracture in his right colles. about three (3) or four (4) places from the front seat. The impact damaged the right side of the bus and left several passengers injured. It was about 12:00 a. (PPSII). Felisa. Upon reaching Sitio Aggies. petitioner Tiu’s insurer. damages and attorneys fees before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. Jose Mitante. The passenger bus was also bound for Cebu City. But it was too late. Cebu. for the moment. Virgilio Te Laspiñas on May 27. Cebu. at least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned. D Rough Riders passenger bus with plate number PBP-724 driven by Virgilio Te Laspiñas was cruising along the national highway of Sitio Aggies. then parked along the right side of the national highway and removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized at a nearby shop.m. and that petitioner Laspiñas did not take precautionary measures to avoid the accident. Cebu and left for Cebu City.. Branch 20. against the petitioners. Respondent Pedro A. and instructed the latter to place a spare tire six fathoms away behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning for oncoming vehicles. to keep watch over the stalled vehicle. September 1. although her holds may.such.m. respondent Benjamin Condor. Indubitably.R. Arriesgado and Felisa Pepito Arriesgado. for their part. the driver of the truck. March 16. Compostela. be the property of the charterer. The trucks tail lights were also left on.
The cargo is insured for P3. petitioner. INC. or that the accident was caused by fortuitous event. due to the shifting of the logs in the hold. 1755and 1756.00 against total lost under respondents MarineCargo Policy. the vessel starts its voyage. the presumption of negligence at once arises. 000. Upon the happening of the accident. the M/V Central Bohol. As correctly found by the trial court. but despite his efforts to avoid damage to property and physical injuries on the passengers. After few hours of the trip. It was further alleged that the truck was parked in a slanted manner. only the existence of such contract. and that no early warning device was displayed. Inc. its rear portion almost in the middle of the highway. After loading the logs. No. In actions for breach of contract..highway of Sitio Aggies. It must be stressed that in requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and in creating a presumption of negligence against them. and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. The ship sank. 376 pieces of Round Logs and undertook to transport said shipment to Manila for delivery to Alaska Lumber Co. 150751 September 20. It continues to tilt causing the captain and the crew to abandon ship. as the owner of the passenger bus engaged as a common carrier. the right side portion of the bus hit the cargo truck’s left rear. the petitioner received on board its vessel. Compostela. failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination are the matters that need to be proved. It is undisputed that the respondent and his wife were not safely transported to the destination agreed upon. in a moderate and normal speed. The negligence of petitioner Laspiñas as driver of the passenger bus is. Poblacion. G. 2004 121 SCRA 769 Facts: On July 25.R. 1990 at Puerto Princesa. While evidence may be submitted to overcome such presumption of negligence. CENTRAL SHIPPING COMPANY. Petitioner Laspiñas promptly applied the brakes and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck head-on. and the fact that the obligor. the ship tilts 10 degrees to its side. the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. vs. it must be shown that the carrier observed the required extraordinary diligence. This is because under the said contract of carriage. thus. respondent. INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA. which means that the carrier must show the utmost diligence of very cautious persons as far as human care and foresight can provide. HELD: The rules which common carriers should observe as to the safety of their passengers are set forth in the Civil Code. binding against petitioner Tiu. petitioner Tiu failed to conclusively rebut such presumption. Any injury suffered by the passengers in the course thereof is immediately attributable to the negligence of the carrier. the petitioners assumed the express obligation to transport the respondent and his wife to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all circumstances. 000. in this case the common carrier.. Palawan. . Articles 1733.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for the loss of cargo? Held: From the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy. The vessels arrived at San Jose. common carriers are responsible. unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence. Petitioner failed to show that such natural disaster or calamity was the proximate and only cause of the loss. In other words. unless they can prove that such loss. The monsoon is not the proximate cause of the sinking but is due to the improper stowage of logs. Since the D/B Lucio had no engine of its own. Antique. While petitioner contends that the happening is due to monsoons which is unforeseen or casa fortuito. In the event of loss. CA FACTS Anco Enterprises Company (ANCO). SMC’s District Sales Supervisor. Antique. storm. the clouds over the area were dark and the waves were already big. FGU INSURANCE vs. The defense of fortuitous event or natural disaster cannot be successfully made when the injury could have been avoided by human precaution. making them liable for such loss. in the afternoon of 30 September 1979. causing the logs to shift and later on the sinking the ship. at about one o’clock in the afternoon of 30 September 1979. This shows that they did not exercise extraordinary diligence. . requested ANCO’s representative to transfer the barge to a safer place beca use the vessel might not be able to withstand the big waves. or worsened by the presence of human participation. The arrastre workers unloading the cargoes of SMC on board the D/B Lucio began to complain about their difficulty in unloading the cargoes.among others -. Antique. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. contributed to. Human agency must be entirely excluded from the cause of injury or loss. earthquake. The logs were not secured by cable wires. a partnership between Ang Gui and Co To. The tugboat M/T ANCO left the barge immediately after reaching San Jose.by "flood.Respondent alleged that the loss is due to the negligence and fault of the captain. When the barge and tugboat arrived at San Jose. The D/B Lucio was towed by the M/T ANCO all the way from Mandaue City to San Jose. destruction or deterioration was brought about -. was engaged in the shipping business. destruction or deterioration of the insured goods. Antique. common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence over the goods they transport." In all other cases not specified under Article 1734 of the Civil Code. the damaging effects blamed on the event or phenomenon must not have been caused. It owned the M/T ANCO tugboat and the D/B Lucio barge which were operated as common carriers. that is. according to all the circumstances of each case. The contention of the petitioner that the loss is due to casa fortuito exempting them from liability is untenable. it could not maneuver by itself and had to be towed by a tugboat for it to move from one place to another. lightning or other natural disaster or calamity. Fernando Macabuag.
as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. 3. In order for fortuitous event to be a valid defense for a common carrier. It is therefore not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated. Is this contention correct? RULING No. as all other vessels already left the wharf to seek shelter. during after the occurrence of the event). Unforeseeable . the other vessels in the port of San Jose. or if foreseeable it must be inevitable. the crew of D/B Lucio abandoned the vessel because the barge’s rope attached to the wharf was cut off by the big waves. they no longer had any means to do so as the tugboat M/T ANCO had already departed. only the M/T ANCO was left at the wharf of San Jose. This.197. were inevitable.210) cases of Pale Pilsen and Five Hundred Fifty (550) cases of Cerveza Negra. ISSUE ANCO raised the defense that the breach was caused by a fortuitous event. There must have been no contributory negligence on the part of the common carrier. ANCO could not escape liability to respondent SMC. The records clearly show the failure of petitioners’ representatives to exercise the extraordinary degree of diligence mandated by law. 2. or which though foreseen.20). the calamity which caused the loss of the cargoes was not unforeseen nor was it unavoidable. In fact. notwithstanding the fact that at that time. a circumstance which prompted SMC’s District Sales Supervisor to request that the D/B Lucio be likewise transferred. Antique. SMC’s claim against ANCO amounted to One Million Three Hundred Forty -Six Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos (P1.346. hence.790) cases of beer were discharged into the custody of the arrastre operator. The value per case of Pale Pilsen was Forty-Five Pesos and Twenty Centavos (P45.ANCO’s representative did not heed the request because he was confident that the barge could withstand the waves. but to no avail. only Ten Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety (10. events that could not be foreseen. Even if ANCO’s representatives wanted to transfer it. a natural disaster.346. While the loss of the cargoes was admittedly caused by the typhoon Sisang. the event must be: 1. ANCO failed to deliver to SMC’s consignee Twenty -Nine Thousand Two Hundred Ten (29. At around midnight.00) plus interest. It must be the proximate and the only cause of the loss. the natural disaster should have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. As a result. The D/B Lucio had no engine and could not maneuver by itself. At about ten to eleven o’clock in the evening of 01 October 1979.: . The value of a case of Cerveza Negra was Forty-Seven Pesos and Ten Centavos (P47. The common carrier must exercise due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss (before. With the waves growing bigger and bigger. In this case. thus it is exempted from liability. SMC filed a complaint for Breach of Contract of Carriage and Damages against ANCO for the amount of One Million Three Hundred Forty-Six Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos (P1. litigation expenses and Twenty-Five Percent (25%) of the total claim as attorney’s fees. Antique. are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. As held in the case of Limpangco Sons v.10).00). To be exempted from responsibility. leaving the barge to its own devices.197. As a consequence of the incident. Caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical insofar as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition. The captain of the tugboat should have had the foresight not to leave the barge alone considering the pending storm. Yangco Steamship Co. the barge run aground and was broken and the cargoes of beer in the barge were swept away. managed to transfer to another place.
The CA reversed the ruling of the trial court for the reason that said vessel was not seaworthy when it sailed to Manila. the charterer will generally be considered as owner for the voyage or service stipulated. or air — when this service is offered to the public for compensation. Charter parties are classified as contracts of demise (or bareboat) and affreightment. first in leaving the engine-less barge D/B Lucio at the mercy of the storm without the assistance of the tugboat.000. not by the law on common carriers. However. Lea Mer Industries Inc. corporations. the Court corrects the trial court's finding that petitioner became a private carrier when Vulcan chartered it. yet. if the tug unnecessarily exposed the two to such accident by any culpable act or omission of its own. firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods. . making said blatant negligence the proximate cause of the loss of the cargoes. Inc. the respondent. HELD: CA reversed. Petitioner did not know that a typhoon was coming and that it has been cleared by the Philippine Coast Guard to travel from Palawan to Manila. Petitioner is clearly a common carrier. then collected from the petitioner the amount it paid to Vulcan as reimbursement and as its exercise on the right of subrogation. it is not excused. Malayan Insurance Co.. paid Vulcan the value of the lost cargo. GR No. during the course of its voyage. The Contract in the present case was one of affreightment. water. 161745. Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in their vigilance over the goods and the . as the insurer. or both — by land. Typhoon Trining. anything short of such a complete transfer is a contract of affreightment (time or voyage charter party) or not a charter party at all. the owner of a vessel must completely and exclusively relinquish possession. the tug must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been occasioned. there was blatant negligence on the part of M/T ANCO’s crewmembers. the owner pro hac vice. Thus. The charterer mans the vessel with his own people and becomes. the vessel leased by Lea Mer. Consequently. The RTC dismissed the complaint stating that the loss was due to a fortuitous event. . The cargo was consigned to Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation and was to be shipped from Palawan to Manila.. command and navigation thereof to the charterer. The silica sand was boarded to Judy VII. in effect. as correctly pointed out by the appellate court. which are distinguished as follows: "Under the demise or bareboat charter of the vessel." The distinction is significant. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the loss of the cargo. because a demise or bareboat charter indicates a business undertaking that is private in character. To be exempt from liability because of an act of God. for the shipment of 900 metric tons of silica sand worth P565. although the immediate or proximate cause of the loss in any given instance may have been what is termed an act of God. For. and again in failing to heed the request of SMC’s representatives to have the barge transferred to a safer place. SEPTEMBER 30. the vessel sank which led to the loss of the cargo. subject to liability to others for damages caused by negligence. INC. thus. Therefore. LEA MER INDUSTRIES INC VS MALAYAN INSURANCE CO. Consequently. as shown by the fact that it was petitioner's crew that manned the tugboat M/V Ayalit and controlled the barge Judy VII. the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of private carriage are governed principally by their stipulations. 2005 FACTS: Ilian Silica Mining entered into a contract of carriage with the petitioner. To create a demise. Lea Mer refused to pay which led Malayan to institute a complaint with the RTC. because it offers to the public its business of transporting goods through its vessels. Common carriers are persons. as was done by the other vessels in the port.
LOADSTAR SHIPPING CO. MIC filed a complaint against LOADSTAR and PGAI. as in this case. however. CA Facts: On 19 November 1984. Held: Petition is dismissed: SC hold that LOADSTAR is a common carrier. As a result of the total loss of its shipment. along with its cargo. "(2) Act of the public enemy in war. whether international or civil. storm. sank off Limasawa Island. "(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods. the vessel. b) 27 boxes and crates of tilewood assemblies and the others . one consignee for a special cargo. especially where.and c) 49 bundles of mouldings R & W (3) Apitong Bolidenized. the fortuitous event must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. As required by the pertinent law. LOADSTAR submits that the vessel was a private carrier because it was not issued certificate of public convenience. Extraordinary diligence requires rendering service with the greatest skill and foresight to avoid damage and destruction to the goods entrusted for carriage and delivery." Jurisprudence defines the elements of a "fortuitous event" as follows: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence. impossible to avoid.safety of the passengers they transport. INC. On its way to Manila from the port of Nasipit. and there was only "one shipper. it should have exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before. Common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently for loss or damage to the goods that they have transported. Agusan del Norte.. This presumption can be rebutted only by proof that they observed extraordinary diligence. is not reason enough to convert the vessel from a common to a private carrier. earthquake. (b) the event that constituted the caso fortuito must have been impossible to foresee or. LOADSTAR received on board a) 705 bales of lawanit hardwood. the consignee made a claim with LOADSTAR which. it was shown that the vessel was also carrying passengers.. Moreover. if foreseeable. the bare fact that the vessel was carrying a particular type of cargo for one shipper. lightning. episodic or unscheduled. LOADSTAR denied any liability for the loss of the shipper's goods and claimed that sinking of its vessel was due to force majeure. (c) the occurrence must have been such as to render it impossible for the debtors to fulfill their obligation in a normal manner. it was not enough for the common carrier to show that there was an unforeseen or unexpected occurrence. v. which appears to be purely coincidental. or that the loss or damage was occasioned by any of the following causes: "(1) Flood. as required by the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy. and this public character is not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in question was periodic. must have been independent of human will. it did not have a regular trip or schedule nor a fixed route. It had to show that it was free from any fault — a fact it miserably failed to prove. during and after the occurrence of the fortuitous event. occasional. "(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers. "(5) Order or act of competent public authority." 14 Further. and (d) the obligor must have been free from any participation in the aggravation of the resulting injury to the creditor. or the failure of the debtors to comply with their obligations. The bills of lading failed to show any special arrangement. Issues: (1) Is the M/V "Cherokee" a private or a common carrier? (2) Did LOADSTAR observe due and/or ordinary diligence in these premises. but only a general provision to the effect that the M/V"Cherokee" was a " general cargo carrier. alleging that the sinking of the vessel was due to the fault and negligence of LOADSTAR and its employees. ignored the same. Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code the Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the following terms: . or other natural disaster or calamity. To excuse the common carrier fully of any liability. It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a certificate of public convenience.
Inc. shipped 62. Respondent filed an answer which admitted that it undertook to transport the shipment. inspected it and found the same clean. loosening the covers and cargo ingress.201. Issues: 1. based in South Korea. After due hearing. Respondent Chemoil Lighterage Corporation is also a domestic corporation engaged in the transport of goods. Whether or not the Notice of Claim was filed within the required period. in Manila. On 24 January 1991. Petitioner requested the GIT Insurance Adjusters. On 15 July 1991. 2786 dated 11 May 1991 was attached and formed part of MRN-30721. the representative of PGP. we find that the M/V "Cherokee" was not seaworthy when it embarked on its voyage on 19 November 1984. by land. water. Marine Endorsement No.16. or air for compensation.Whether or not the damage to the cargo was due to the fault or negligence of the respondent. the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision reversing the trial court. provided that the indications .. which shall transport the same to Del Pan Bridge in Pasig River and haul it by land to PGP’s storage tanks in Calamba.724. Upon inspection by PGP. The consignee was Plastic Group Phils.03. the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of plaintiff. which provides that. Laguna. it must be adequately equipped for the voyage and manned with a sufficient number of competent officers and crew. Br.06 metric tons of the liquid chemical DIOCTYL PHTHALATE (DOP) on board MT “TACHIBANA” which was valued at US$90. June 29. and fit for loading.70 metric tons of DOP valued at US$634. No. Petitioner paid PGP the full and final payment for the loss and issued a Subrogation Receipt. Samkyung Chemical Company. and reduced the premium accordingly. PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORPORATION VS. Inc. “Within twenty-four hours following the receipt of the merchandise a claim may be made against the carrier on account of damage or average found upon opening the packages.89 to the Philippines. MRN-30721 dated 06 February 1991.667. corporations. The failure of a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel involved in a contract of carriage is a clear breach of its duty.422.Art. Common carriers are persons. 136888. PGP paid the respondent the as full payment for the latter’s services. an action for damages was instituted by the petitioner-insurer against respondent-carrier before the RTC. amending the latter’s insured value to P24. dry. On appeal. As carrier. Adjustment Standard Corporation. PGP insured the cargo with Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation against all risks. 1732. Held: Article 366 of the Code of Commerce has profound application in the case at bar. The insurance was under Marine Policies No. thus accepted the cargo without any protest or notice. PGP then sent a letter where it formally made an insurance claim for the loss it sustained. The vessel was not even sufficiently manned at the time. A petition for review on certiorar[ was filed by the petitioner with this Court. no fault and negligence can be attributed against respondent as it exercised extraordinary diligence in handling the cargo. 2. 2005 Facts: Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of non-life insurance. firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both. Inspection of cargo tanks showed manhole covers of ballast tanks’ ceilings loosely secured and that the rubber gaskets of the manhole covers of the ballast tanks re-acted to the chemical causing shrinkage thus. but alleged that before the DOP was loaded into its barge.R. Ltd. Meanwhile. "For a vessel to be seaworthy. City of Manila. the sample s taken from the shipment showed discoloration demonstrating that it was damaged. The ocean tanker MT “TACHIBANA” unloaded the cargo to the tanker barge. On to the second assigned error.57 and another 436. CHEMOIL LIGHTERAGE HITE GOLD CORPORATION G. offering their services to the public. (GIT).. to conduct a Quantity and Condition Survey of the shipment which issued a report stating that DOP samples taken were discolored.
to Ms. Having examined the entire records of the case. The respondent. or damage to. we cannot find a shred of evidence that will precisely and ultimately point to the conclusion that the notice of claim was timely relayed or filed. the petitioner contends that the notice of contamination was given by PGP employee. DIAZ vs CA Petitioner Agapita Diaz operated a common carrier. 1996. nine passengers of the taxi died including Sherly Moneño. however. The shipper or consignee must allege and prove the fulfillment of the condition. Abastillas. . and We are unable to find any proof of compliance with the required period. no right of action against the carrier can accrue in favor of the former. The Court of Appeals made the same finding.. the goods. We have examined the evidence. As to the first issue. Abastillas. Petitioner’s contention proceeds from a false presupposition that the notice of claim was timely filed. The requirement that a notice of claim should be filed within the period stated by Article 366 of the Code of Commerce is not an empty or worthless proviso. the clear import being that prompt examination of the goods must be made to ascertain damage if this is not immediately apparent. or after the transportation charges have been paid.of the damage or average giving rise to the claim cannot be ascertained from the exterior of said packages. within the required period. The aforementioned requirement is a reasonable condition precedent. claims that the supposed notice given by PGP over the telephone was denied by Ms. it does not constitute a limitation of action. so that the carrier will be enabled to verify all such claims at the time of delivery or within twenty-four hours thereafter. there is no evidence to confirm that the notice of claim was filed within the period provided for under Article 366 of the Code of Commerce. However. If it fails to do so. The object sought to be attained by the requirement of the submission of claims in pursuance of this article is to compel the consignee of goods entrusted to a carrier to make prompt demand for settlement of alleged damages suffered by the goods while in transport. Considering that we have resolved the first issue in the negative. or otherwise within twenty-four hours from receipt of the goods. and if necessary fix responsibility and secure evidence as to the nature and extent of the alleged damages to the goods while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the parties. which is fatal to the accrual of the right of action against the carrier. no claim whatsoever shall be admitted against the carrier with regard to the condition in which the goods transported were delivered. petitioner's taxi. it must be pointed out that compliance with the period for filing notice is an essential part of the requirement. driven by one Arman Retes.e. Nothing in the trial court’s decision stated that the notice of claim was relayed or filed with the respondent-carrier immediately or within a period of twenty-four hours from the time the goods were received. was moving at an excessive speed when it rammed into the rear portion of a Hino cargo truck owned by private respondent Teodoro Lantoria and driven by private respondent Rogelio Francisco. at the time of the delivery of the cargo. it is therefore unnecessary to make a resolution on the second issue. a Tamaraw FX taxi plying the route of Cagayan de Oro City to any point in Region 10. The Court of Appeals declared:that a telephone call made to defendant-company could constitute substantial compliance with the requirement of notice.” After the periods mentioned have elapsed. immediately if the damage is apparent. On July 20. As a result. in which case said claim shall only be admitted at the time o f the receipt of the packages. and therefore. The filing of a claim with the carrier within the time limitation therefore actually constitutes a condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against a carrier for loss of. i. We do not believe so. As discussed at length above.
13 The trial court denied this. Arman Retes. 1996. Registry receipt number 04364 10 showed that notice had been sent to petitioner's counsel. 1998 for petitioner and her counsel's failure to appear 9 despite due notice. and 2)whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable for breach of contract. 8 The pre-trial conference was initially set on July 11.000 as moral damages. On motion. P50. 7 petitioner filed a third-party complaint against private respondents Teodorio Lantoria and Rogelio Francisco. 16 The motion for reconsideration was denied.000 as exemplary damages and P20. The issues raised by petitioner are: 1)whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision denying petitioner's motion for leave to present evidence on her defense and third-party complaint. the heirs of Sherly Moneño 4 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City. Cipriano Lupeba. petitioner filed a motion for leave to present evidence on her defense and third-party complaint. 1998 but was reset to July 30. prompting the court to allow private respondents to present evidence ex parte. Branch 10. 17 Hence. this recourse. 2001 decision. 1999. The petition lacks merit. 15 On appeal. aDECHI More than seven months after the conclusion 12 of private respondents' ex parte presentation of evidence. Rule 18 of the Rules of Court states that: .000 for her death. 11 On scheduled date. petitioner and her counsel again failed to appear. the trial court rendered a decision holding petitioner and Arman Retes jointly and severally liable to pay private respondent heirs of Sherly Moneño P50.On August 13.000 as attorney's fees. Section 3. 14 On October 29. 5 an action for breach of contract of carriage and damages 6 against petitioner and her driver. Atty. P20. First. the trial court's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in the assailed May 30.
Petitioner was represented by Atty. failed to establish sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of negligence. with a due regard for all the circumstances. it is presumed that the common carrier is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Consequently. and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents. A similar failure on the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. Sec. The findings of the trial court. showed that the accident which led to the death of Sherly Moneño was caused by the reckless speed and gross negligence . as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The non-appearance of the party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefore or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement.Effect of failure to appear. aEcHCD Further. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence. as common carrier." 19 In a contract of carriage. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 18 read: Sec. The counsel served with such notice is charged with the duty of notifying the party represented by him. Cipriano Lupeba to whom the notice was sent. 5. 18 It was incumbent on the latter to advise petitioner accordingly. 4. 20 In the case at bar. Second. petitioner. unless otherwise ordered by the court. using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. "a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. it was no error for the trial court to allow private respondents to present their evidence ex parte when petitioner and her counsel failed to appear for the scheduled pre-trial conference. The dismissal shall be with prejudice. or on the party who has no counsel. — It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. there is even no need for the court to make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier.Appearance of Parties. — The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for the dismissal of the action. In fact. His failure to do so constituted negligence which bound petitioner.The notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel. to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution.
(Philippines) Inc. In the event of loss. a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence. To overcome the presumption of negligence. It must do more than merely show that some other party could be responsible for the damage. unless they observed extraordinary diligence. G. R Transport Corporation vs. and caused physical injuries to respondent.R. G. Regional Container Lines (RCL) of Singapore and Shipping Agency vs. or deterioration of the insured goods. and was. No. Common carrier. 168151. The Netherlands Insurance Co. and there need not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable. No. liability. negligent in transporting the passengers of the bus safely to Gapan. Common carrier. liability. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. In all other cases not specified under Article 1734 of the Civil Code. lightning.of petitioner's driver who demonstrated no regard for the safety of his passengers. Article 1759 of the Civil Code explicitly states that the common carrier is liable for the death or injury to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of its employees. Nueva Ecija on January 27. 2009. . “flood. even if petitioner was able to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver. according to all the circumstances of each case. Hence. 21 It was thus correct to hold petitioner guilty of breach of the contract of carriage. through its bus driver. When the goods shipped are either lost or arrived in damaged condition. unless they can prove that such loss. since the bus bumped a tree and a house. 1995. or deterioration was brought about by. storm. September 15. 162104. Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence over the goods they transport. Eduardo Pante. therefore. Common carrier. A common carrier is presumed to have been negligent if it fails to prove that it exercised extraordinary vigilance over the goods it transported. earthquake. it is still liable to respondent for the physical injuries he sustained due to the vehicular accident.. CEIHcT WHEREFORE. failed to observe extraordinary diligence. 2009. the common carrier must establish by adequate proof that it exercised extraordinary diligence over the goods. and that such liability does not cease upon proof that the common carrier exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. presumption of negligence. among others. September 4. destruction. Petitioner. this petition is hereby DISMISSED. destruction. or other natural disaster or calamity”. common carriers are responsible.R.
While approaching Sumasap Bridge at the said speed. Misamis Occidental. RCL and EDSA Shipping failed to prove that they did exercise that degree of diligence required by law over the goods they transported. It is settled in maritime law jurisprudence that cargoes while being unloaded generally remain under the custody of the carrier.00 for partial permanent deformity. to the Court of Appeals. (2)P840. The jeep was driven by Felario Montefalcon at around 40 kilometers per hour. blowing its horn to signal its intention to overtake the jeep. however. and driven by Nicostrato Digal) coming from behind. William Sevilla. Thereafter as the jeep was left behind. Castano filed a case for damages against Rosita Bacarro. and (3) P2. such that both vehicles ran side by side for a distance of around 20 meters. to jointly and severally pay Castano the sum of (1) P973. alias Chinggim. affirmed that of . does not disprove that the condenser fan – which caused the fluctuation of the temperature in the refrigerated container – was not damaged while the cargo was being unloaded from the ship. ICTSI. 16 SCRA 641) Bacarro vs. G. et. gave way by swerving to the right. as recorded in the temperature chart. Appeal was taken by Bacarro. Castano boarded a jeep as a paying passenger at Oroquieta bound for Jimenez. The carrier is liable when its personnel allowed a passenger to drive the vehicle causing it to collide with another vehicle resulting to the injuries suffered by the other passengers. without changing its speed.al. with 12 passengers in all. Gerundio B. which. Castano (HR L-34597. 2009. occurred after the cargo had been discharged from the vessel and was already under the custody of the arrastre operator. The jeep. 5 November 1982) First Division. Defendants alleged that the jeepney was sideswiped by the overtaking cargo truck. the CFI of Misamis Oriental ordered Bacarro. It was then filled to capacity. with costs against Bacarro.In the present case. a cargo truck (owned by Te Tiong.10 for medical treatment and hospitalization. (MRR vs. This evidence. Ballesteros. et. Regional Container Lines (RCL) of Singapore and Shipping Agency vs. its driver was unable to return it to its former lane and instead it obliquely or diagonally ran down an inclined terrain towards the right until it fell into a ditch pinning down and crushing Castano’s right leg in the process. Relova (J): 4 concur..R. 1 on leave Facts: In the afternoon of 1 April 1960. After trial. RCL and EDSA Shipping failed to dispute this. The Netherlands Insurance Co. on 30 September 1971. and Felario Montefalcon. There is is sufficient evidence showing that the fluctuation of the temperature in the refrigerated container van.20 for loss of salary during treatment.000. et. al. (Philippines) Inc. 168151.al. September 4. No.
1. according to all the circumstances of each case. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Jeepney driver failed to exercise extraordinary diligence. 3. is immaterial. from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy. Hence. Common carrier vested with public interest. Whether the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the driver of the truck. as alleged. the vehicles were getting nearer the bridge and as the road was getting narrower the truck would be too close to the jeep and would eventually sideswipe it. Article 1763 The jeepney driver failed to exercise extraordinary diligence. foresight and utmost diligence of a very cautious person. with a due regard for all the circumstances. instead of running side by side with the cargo truck. the appeal by certiorari. are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them. Article 1733 NCC Article 1733 provides that “Common carriers.the trial court. when the diligence required pursuant to Article 1763 of the Civil Code is only that of a good father of a family. et. He should have foreseen that at the speed he was running.” 4. the rights and obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws. Contributory negligence of Montefalcon Herein. there would have been no contact and accident. human care. using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. Article 1766 NCC Article 1766 provides that “In all matters not regulated by this Code. al. foresight and utmost diligence of a very cautious person .. 1755 and 1766 of the Civil Code which require the exercise of extraordinary diligence on the part of Montefalcon. 2. with costs. the Court of Appeals correctly applied Articles 1733. Had Montefalcon slackened the speed of the jeep at the time the truck was overtaking it. Presumption of fault . he should have slackened his jeep when he swerved it to the right to give way to the truck because the two vehicles could not cross the bridge at the same time. driver Montefalcon did not slacken his speed but instead continued to run the jeep at about 40 kilometers per hour even at the time the overtaking cargo truck was running side by side for about 20 meters and at which time he even shouted to the driver of the truck. required utmost diligence of very cautious persons.” 6.” 5. As there was a contract of carriage between Castano and Bacarro. human care. Article 1755 NCC Article 1755 provides that “A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. Otherwise stated.
e. This caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. concentric. But. Montefalcon contributed to the occurrence of the mishap. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering injury. When he was about to alight from the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim. that is to say. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit. or does not reach his destination safely. he is not liable for the acts of the latter. if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured. Herein. Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). figuratively speaking. the sideswiping of the jeepney by the cargo truck. i. has caused damage to another. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm. 7. Cangco vs. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood. HELD: Yes. and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. was something which could have been avoided considering the narrowness of Sumasap Bridge which was not wide enough to admit two vehicles. ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages. These two fields. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act . Sideswiping of jeepney foreseeable. the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. Culpa Contractual On January 20. It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of watermelons. he arose from his seat even though the train was not at full stop. not fortuitous event The accident was not due to a fortuitous event. MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to stop. the carrier and driver are presumed to be at fault. He was an employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for free. Under the new Civil Code. if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the servant. whatever done within the scope of his employment or not. Manila Railroad. 1915. but by mere negligence or inattention. He was dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.The hazards of modern transportation demand extraordinary diligence. The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which. Once a passenger in the course of travel is injured. The alleged fortuitous event in the case. instead of being required to exercise mere ordinary diligence a common carrier is exhorted to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide “using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. without willful intent.” (Article 1755). A common carrier is vested with public interest.
Vinculum Juris: (def) It means “an obligation of law”. . or the right of the obligee to enforce a civil matter in a court of law. its essential characteristics are identical. Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or in itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation.which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
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