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INTRODUCTION I.

Pre-1987 Constitution CASES:

Planas v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-35925 January 22, 1973 (aka Plebiscite cases) Planas vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-35925, 22 January 1973]; also Sanidad vs. Comelec [GR L-35929], Roxas vs. Comelec [GR L-35940], Monteclaro vs. Comelec [GR L-35941], Ordonez vs. National Treasurer of the Philippines [GR L-35942], Tan vs. Comelec [GR L-35948], Diokno vs. Comelec [GR L-35953], Jimenez vs. Comelec [GR L-35961], Gonzales vs. Comelec [GR L-35965], and Hidalgo vs. Comelec [GR L-35979] Second Division, Concepcion (J): 3 concur, 3 concur in separate opinions, 1 concurs as recapitulated, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 2 filed separate opinions Facts: On 16 March 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution 2, which was amended by Resolution 4 of said body, adopted on 17 June 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution 2, as amended, was implemented by RA 6132, approved on 24 August 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to said Convention was held on 10 November 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on 1 June 971. While the Convention was in session on 21 September 1972, the President issued Proclamation 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On 29 November 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, 30 November 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on 15 January 1973. Soon after, or on 7 December 1972, Charito Planas filed, with the Supreme Court, Case GR L-35925, against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress," and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for 15 January 1973, there being no freedom

of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof." Substantially identical actions were filed. Meanwhile, or on 17 December 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until 7 January 1973, when General Order 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on 15 January 1973, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of 17 December 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution." In view of the events relative to the postponement of the plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on 22 January 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President — reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections — the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases. In the afternoon of 12 January 1973, Vidal Tan, et. al. [GR L-35948] filed an "urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than 15 January 1973." It was alleged in said motion, "that the President subsequently announced the issuance of Presidential Decree 86 organizing the so-called Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted on certain public questions; and that thereafter it was later announced that 'the Assemblies will be asked if they favor or oppose — [1] The New Society; [2] Reforms instituted under Martial Law; [3] The holding of a plebiscite on the proposed new Constitution and when (the tentative new date given following the postponement of the plebiscite from the original date of January 15 are February 19 and March 5); [4] The opening of the regular session slated on January 22 in accordance with the existing Constitution despite Martial Law." Issue [1]: Whether the Court has authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential Decree 73. Held [1]: Presidential Decree 73 purports to have the force and effect of a legislation, so that the issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the authority, not only of a long list of cases in which the Court has passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the Executive, 1 but, also, of no less than that of Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly provides for the authority of the Supreme Court to review cases involving said issue.

Issue [2]: Whether the President has the authority to issue PD 73 to submit to the People the Constitution proposed by the Convention. Held [2]: As regards the authority of the President to issue Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor," it is unnecessary, for the time being, to pass upon such question, because the plebiscite ordained in said Decree has been postponed. In any event, should the plebiscite be scheduled to be held at any time later, the proper parties may then file such action as the circumstances may justify. Issue [3]: Whether martial law per se affects the validity of a submission to the people for ratification of specific proposals for amendment of the Constitution. Held [3]: The matter is one intimately and necessarily related to the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the President of the Philippines. This question has not been explicitly raised, however, in any of the cases under consideration, said cases having been filed before the issuance of such Proclamation, although the petitioners in L-35948 maintain that the issue on the referral of the Proposed Constitution to the Citizens' Assemblies may be deemed and was raised in their Supplemental Motion of January 15, 1973. At any rate, said question has not been adequately argued by the parties in any of these cases, and it would not be proper to resolve such a transcendental question without the most thorough discussion possible under the circumstances. In fairness to the petitioners in L-35948 and considering the surrounding circumstances, that instead of dismissing the case as moot and academic, said petitioners should be given a reasonable period of time within which to move in the premises. Held (totality): Recapitulating the views expressed by the Members of the Court, the result is this: (1) There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree 73. (2) On the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra and Concepcion, or 6 Members of the Court, are of the opinion that the issue has become moot and academic, whereas Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said Decree. (3) On the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the proposed Constitution or to incorporate therein the provisions contested by the petitioners in L-35948, Justice Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra opine that the issue has become moot and academic. Justice Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Concepcion have voted to uphold the authority of the Convention. (4) Justice Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971 Constitutional Convention had authority to continue in the performance of its functions despite the proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio hold the same view. (5) On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law affected the proper submission of the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar as the freedom essential therefor is concerned, Justice Fernando is of the opinion that there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated under

Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore, grant the petitions were they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra are of the opinion that that issue involves question of fact which cannot be predetermined, and that Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate freedom for the purposes contemplated. (6) On Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed: [a] Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Concepcion are of the opinion that question of validity of said Proclamation has not been properly raised before the Court, which, accordingly, should not pass upon such question. [b] Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1102 has been submitted to and should be determined by the Court, and that the "purported ratification of the Proposed Constitution based on the referendum among Citizens' Assemblies falls short of being in strict conformity with the requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution," but that such unfortunate drawback notwithstanding, "considering all other related relevant circumstances, the new Constitution is legally recognizable and should he recognized as legitimately in force." [c] Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no force and effect whatsoever. [d] Justice Antonio feels "that the Court is not competent to act" on the issue whether the Proposed Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, "in the absence of any judicially discoverable and manageable standards," since the issue "poses a question of fact." (7) On the question whether or not these cases should be dismissed, Justices Makalintal, Castro Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted in the affirmative, for the reasons set forth in their respective opinions. Justices Fernando, Teehankee and the writer similarly voted, except as regards Case No. L-35948 as to which they voted to grant to the petitioners therein a reasonable period of time within which to file appropriate pleadings should they wish to contest the legality of Presidential Proclamation 1102. Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of said period to the petitioners in said Case No. L-35948 for the purpose, but he believes, in effect, that the Court should go farther and decide on the merits everyone of the cases under consideration. Wherefore, all of the cases are dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs. Javellana vs. Exec. Sec., 50 SCRA 33 (aka Ratification cases)

Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary The Facts: Sequence of events that lead to the filing of the ―Plebiscite‖ then ―Ratification‖ Cases. The Plebiscite Case On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was

the President issued Proclamation No. On November 29. 1972.. and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof. 1971. as amended. lodged exclusively in Congress . 1972. The next day. the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 1973. 1081. the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same. when General Order No. temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No." Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite. that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling ." Said General Order No. calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. by the Constitution. On December 23. moreover. November 30. Then. be postponed until further notice. approved on August 24. "suspended in the meantime" the "order of December 17. 1972. and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1. until further orders of the Court. the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. adopted on June 17. for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. in any manner. 4 of said body. are. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution. 20. inter alia.. for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No.. 1970. 1972. directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15. and appropriating funds therefor. 2. was implemented by Republic Act No. pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held on November 10. 1969. Said Resolution No. 1972.amended by Resolution No." upon the grounds. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law." as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15. the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters. Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections. 1970. 1972. While the Convention was in session on September 21. 1973. 73. 73. 1978. from deciding the aforementioned cases. pursuant to the 1935 . press and assembly. for the time being. 1973. again. Congress was. On December 7.. the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General. there being no freedom of speech. the Court deemed it fit to refrain.. to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7." and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15. 20 was issued." On December 17. "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention. and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose. of such plebiscite. 6132.

1973. and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with. 1973. at noontime. the writer read Proclamation No. the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that. Secretary Conrado Estrella. 1973. the petitioners in Case G. 1973. preferably not later than January 15. the so-called Citizens' Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15." While the case was being heard.R. the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases. 1973. January 16. the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head. L-35948 to file "file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P. signed said Proclamation No.Constitution. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor. which was a Saturday. or on January 15.. Thereupon. 1102. No.R. the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court. at 9:30 a. certifying.m. according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice. he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No." On the same date January 15. January 16. January 13.. L-35948 riled a "supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents. the parties in G. "In the afternoon of January 12. shortly before noon." and setting the motion for hearing "on January 17. that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections." Prior thereto.M. 1973." praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible. 1102 . on the date last mentioned. Guillermo de Vega. No. upon instructions of the President. Secretary Jose Roño. on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.. from collecting. 1102. among others. as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head. their deputies." "not later than Tuesday noon.R. 1973. 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G. and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that the President had. earlier that morning. scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22.R. the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said "urgent motion" and "manifestation. the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman. subordinates and substitutes. which Congress unquestionably could do. and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task. 1973. No. the petitioners in said Case G. Tuesday. Thereupon. 1973." The next day." praying: ". 1102 which is of the following tenor: ____________________________ "BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES "PROCLAMATION NO. No. which had just been signed by the President. 
L-35948 filed an "urgent motion.

298. as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743. fifteen years of age or over. I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed. district or ward for at least six months. composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio. fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14. "Done in the City of Manila. dated January 5. "WHEREAS. "WHEREAS. do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines. "IN WITNESS WHEREOF. Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios. responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. THEREFORE. "WHEREAS. 1972. the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional Convention is subject to ratification by the Filipino people. district or ward secretary. since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution. MARCOS. the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people. nineteen hundred and seventy-three. while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution. 1973. "WHEREAS. "NOW.976. (Sgd. President of the Philippines.814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite.) FERDINAND E.869) who voted for its rejection.561) members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution. FERDINAND E. citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept by the barrio. and has thereby come into effect. I. dated December 31."ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. the following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays: Do you approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution? "WHEREAS. 86-A. MARCOS
"President of the Philippines "By the President: "ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
"Executive Secretary" _________________________________ The Ratification Case . "WHEREAS. by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution. in the year of Our Lord. the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues. fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight thousand eight hundred fourteen (14. 86. this 17th day of January. in municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No.

compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions? 3. Are petitioners entitled to relief? 5.. Castro.". The petition therein. if not strict. Makasiar. or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President. 1102 a justiciable. voted to grant the relief being sought. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No.R. question? 2. Josue Javellana filed Case G. 1102 a justiciable. hence null and void. or political and ." and that the latter "are acting without.. Fernando and Teehankee. Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution. thru his Cabinet. and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. for himself.On January 20. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people? (acquiesced . No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense. Details: 1. Concepcion. and a qualified and registered voter" and as "a class suit."permission" given by silence or passiveness. that the same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution . or political and therefore non-justiciable. as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 1973. respondents including. Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet or by not making objections. together Justices Zaldivar." The Issue: 1. filed by Josue Javellana. Barredo. Justice and Finance. Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. and "that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force? The Resolution: Summary: The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the crucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief." was amended on or about January 24. is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies".) 4. as a "Filipino citizen. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1973. After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial. six members of the court (Justices Makalintal. to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935. "that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution". thus upholding the 1973 Constitution.

or six (6) members of the Court. i. in negative. Zaldivar. after all. compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions? On the second question of validity of the ratification. said Article has been substantially complied with. hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. in the affirmative. Fernando. Antonio and Esguerra. Zaldivar. Justice Barredo qualified his vote. and. in effect. which provides only one way for ratification. if not strict. Justices Makalintal. stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the people. falls short of the requirements thereof. but. specially in the manner the votes therein were cast. and. I am constrained to hold that. question? On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal. the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV. section 1 of the 1935 Constitution. however.. or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV. the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified. in the political sense. the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with. the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will. of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications. Antonio. Teehankee and myself. or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry. or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification. which is what counts most. it may be said that in its political aspect. "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters. Castro. In view." Justices Makasiar. 3. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question." 2. in their discussion of the second question. Teehankee and myself. reported and canvassed. but. if not in the orthodox legal sense. Justice Barredo qualified his vote.therefore non-justiciable. only inferentially. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people? . Fernando. the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies. the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question. stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV. I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article. hence. Castro." Justices Makasiar. Esguerra. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial.e.

Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution. namely. Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof. and Two (2) members of the Court. Justices Zaldivar. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of martial law. Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force. Makasiar. Justices Makalintal." 91 Four (4) members of the Court." Two (2) members of the Court." 4. Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. no majority vote has been reached by the Court. is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial. (they) have no means of knowing. Justices Makalintal. Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free expression. whether the people have accepted the Constitution. Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions. with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force. namely. an therefore beyond the competence of this Court. 5. namely. Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification. namely. Are petitioners entitled to relief? On the fourth question of relief. by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines. Four (4) of its members. Justices Barredo. namely. 90 are relevant and unavoidable." 88 Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. six (6) members of the Court. and there has even been no expression. to the point of judicial certainty. Justices Barredo. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force? On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force: Four (4) members of the Court. namely. Makasiar. in the final analysis. Makasiar.On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution. . with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted. Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution. of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Castro. a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court. Barredo. Castro. namely. Four (4) members of the Court. I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law. Fernando. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution.

HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion. COMELEC. insurrection or rebellion. the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared. all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. 59 SCRA 183 Martial Law – Habeas Corpus – Power of the President to Order Arrests Enrile (then Minister of National Defense). Aquino vs. 1976 (affirming the validity of Javellana) Facts . This being the vote of the majority. Makasiar. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the President’s order. Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar. Enrile. Enrile’s answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’ declaration of Martial Law. It is so ordered. Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile.ACCORDINGLY. by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal. In the case at bar. pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them. the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. therefore.R. Castro. Fernando and Teehankee. No. Sanidad v. G. L-44640 October 12. Hence. ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law. Barredo. there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. when public safety requires it. there is a clear and imminent danger against the state. or imminent danger against the state.

" Section 2 thereof provides that"Any amendment to. call a constitutional convention or. hisson. President Ferdinand E. father and son. Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendmentto. 1033 and 1031. the interim assembly. providing for a new interimlegislative body. this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourthsof all its Members. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976National ReferendumPlebiscite. the powers of such replacement.On 2 September 1976. and Alfredo Salapantan. stating the questions to be submitted to the peoplein the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. submitthe question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election. Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a natio nalreferendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve the issues of martiallaw. to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees. Issue: W/N the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution. Gonzales. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that thepeople's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire tohave such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment. by a majority vote of all its Members. Sanidad and Pablito V. Guzman. this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votescast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the appr . which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.Pablo C. Another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed by Raul M. asserting that the power topropose amendments to. The President also issued PD 1033. the President issued another PD 1031.On 30 September 1976. a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. or revision of. amending the previous PresidentialDecree 991. They contend thatunder the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise theconstituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution.the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Sanidad. another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.On 22 September 1976. the period of its existence. or by a constitutional convention. or revision of. by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members. its replacement. was institutedby Vicente M. Article XVII of theConstitution. by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting andcanvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. commenced for Pr ohibition withPreliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the ReferendumPlebiscite on October 16. (2) The National Assembly may. or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16. to declare without force and effect PD 991.

In the Philippines. at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution wassubmitted. In times of normalcy. amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of theinterim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. In times of transition. the amending process may be initiated by theproposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members. In the referendum of 24 July 1973. the proposedquestion of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated. While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for thenation by virtue of constitutional conferment. Again. Such being the case. not of law. the interim National Assembly instituted in the TransitoryProvisions is conferred with that amending power."In the present period of transition. is one of policy.In the plebiscite of January 10-15. two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation: period of normalcy and period of transition. the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when hecould convene the interim National Assembly. were against its inclus ion since in thatreferendum of January. 1973. they wereaware of the fact that under the same. propose amendments to this Constitution. the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. who were deemedautomatically members of the interim National Assembly.oval of suchamendment or revision. it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself.In sensu striciore.When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions. The distinction. however. when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment toa Constitution. had already settled that the incumbent President is vested withthat prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. 1973 the people had already resolved against it. consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace andorder in the country. amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. approvalof the President of any proposed amendment . that power is provided for in Article XVI of the1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for theinterim National Assembly). in the referendum of 27 February 1975. Such amendments shall take effect when ratifiedin accordance with Article 16 hereof. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC. by a majority vote of allits Members. the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold theconvening of the interim National Assembly." There are. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "Theinterim National Assembly. that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking.In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. may. becausesome of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention. It is not legislating when engaged inthe amending process. TheConstitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shallinitially convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of theinterim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. upon special call by the interim Prime Minister.However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an electionvoted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. Rather. or (2) by aConstitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. therefore.

and Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency. 1981 FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A.is a misnomer. COMELEC G. NO. and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention. Resolution No. L-34150 APRIL 2. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Occeña v.R. G. the court ruled the following: . Gozales instituted a prohibiting proceedings against the validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions (Resolution No. The prerogative of the President to approveor disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. 1981 (affirming the validity of Javellana) OCCENA VS. COMELEC.R. COMELEC SAMUEL OCCENA VS. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5. The President has nothing to do withproposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. No. the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.) The petitioners contends that such resolution is against the constitutions in proposing amendments: ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional? HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit. L-56350 April 2.

It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. To dispose this contention. upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E.. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ." 3. At any rate. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper submission. Marcos. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to amount to a revision rather than amendments. Once ratified by the sovereign people. because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The Interim Batasang Pambansa. therefore. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions. sitting as a constituent body. That is not a requirement as . the Interim Batasang Pambansa. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments similar with the interim and regular national assembly. whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people. only a majority vote is needed. In that capacity. can propose amendments. 2.. the court held that whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic system. is of no moment.1. 15 When. met as a constituent body it acted by virtue of such impotence. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and how it may be exercised was validly obtained.

With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed. goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Gonzales. In declaring . Fernando (CJ): 8 concur. the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7. Commission on Elections [GR 56350. and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and filed. this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority. also Gonzales vs. a factor for instability was removed. Further. both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution. Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid." 21 The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973. are suing as taxpayers. as a matter of law. The Executive Secretary. the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding. National Treasurer [GR 56404] En Banc. 1 dissents in separate opinion. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution. It could even be said that there was a need for it. the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. It is as simple as that.far as a constitutional convention is concerned." Such a statement served a useful purpose. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law. Thereafter. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy. the period required by the constitution was complied as follows: "Any amendment to. Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. all doubts were resolved. or revision of. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. It served to clear the atmosphere. 1 on official leave Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments. dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification. 2 April 1981]. 22. the present Constitution came into force and effect. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. 1981. 1981. Occena vs. respectively.

Bar Association vs. promulgated barely two weeks ago. in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional. ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional.†• The unified opposition. 1986 (snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation. their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election.R. COMELEC 140 SCRA 455 January 7. . December 20. In the latter case. at least ten cases may be cited. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. 72915. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office. 1986. 1986 FACTS: Eleven petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883which calls for special national elections on February 7. rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election. Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation― did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9. No. Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. fair and honest. this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. Phil. Since then. vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President. so long as the election is clean. Comelec. G. it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. Sola. and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections? HELD: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7.what the law is. 1985 Philippine Bar Association vs. The latest case in point is People v. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana.

Territory 3. 30 SCRA 649 PVTA vs CIR G. Government a. No. as the Court did not issue any restraining order. The 1987 Constitution III. ministrant CASES: ACCFA vs. Elements of a state 1. L-32052 65 SCRA 416 July 25. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot. II. FLU. The State as a Concept A. since there is no issue more political than the election.R. functions: constituent vs. 1975 .The events that have transpired since December 3. People 2. have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election. either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions and is exempt from CA No.Petitioner: Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Respondent: Court of Industrial Relations FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services (in excess of their 8 regular hours a day) and the failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No.  Section 1: The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not be of more than eight (8) hours daily. 444 which was denied and dismissed by RTC and CA. . HELD: It is an inherent state function which makes government required to support its people and promote their general welfare. 444. 444. Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from CA No. Petitioner denies allegations for lack of a cause of action and jurisdiction. Motion for Reconsideration were also DENIED. This case explains and portrays the expanded role of government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.

proclamation No. and . He says that "The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines. is already irrelevant considering the needs of the present time. 1986.The Court held that the distinction and between constituent and ministrant functions." ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate. Aquino. The Court further held that: The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. GR 73748. President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. de facto CASES: Lawyer’s League vs. The Court affirms that the Petition as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration beDENIED. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. which the Chief Justice points out. HELD: Yes. On March 25." The distinction between constituent and ministrant functions is now considered obsolete. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. 1986. 5/22/86 FACTS: On February 25. b. types of government: de jure vs.

GR146710. On January 19. 2001 FACTS: Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30. . a crowd continued to grow at EDSA. a close friend of the President.R. On January 18. Jr.The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Arroyo. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters. 3/2/01 G. 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President. with Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. Arroyo G. pleaded ―not guilty‖. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the nation. The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed. Ilocos Sur governor Luis ―Chavit‖ Singson. In October 2000. Estrada.R. At 2:00pm. 2000. as presiding officer. stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office. which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13. Estrada vs. 146738 Estrada vs. bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Desierto March 2. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. No. alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as ―Jose Velarde‖ – a grassroots-based numbers game. Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not resign.

HELD: The Court defines a political issue as ―those questions which. whether or not petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign. the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant. are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom. Estrada again appeared on television.‖ ISSUE: 1. He also prayed for judgment ―confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office. In the former. 2001. A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace. only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. At 2:00 pm. under the Constitution. the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from ―conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. not legality of a particular measure. becoming the 14th president of the Philippines. The Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution. or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.At 6:15pm. OnJanuary 20.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.‖ The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. 2.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. overthrowing the old government entirely. it The question of whether the previous president . which he countered by filing a peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Estrada released a letter saying he had ―strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president‖. If justiciable. saying that Estrada ―constructively resigned his post‖. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA. but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President. wherein only the office of the president was affected. Noon of the same day. calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14. He added that he will not run in this election.

detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these. the petitioner. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political. the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President.(president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust. The Court added that. As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits.:FACTS: This involves petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria MacapagalArroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic. From the deliberations. J. as a non-sitting President.2001Ponente: Puno. the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right. 146710-15 March 2. A short outline of events that precipitated thecase at bar thus follows: . The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior. the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries. the Court held that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. For the president to be deemed as having resigned. and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another). It is important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. JOSEPH ESTRADA petitioner v GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO respondent G. Furthermore.R. No. there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.

1. Arroyo discharged powers of the President. In November 20 Impeachment Trial of the petitioner was opened. 5.The Monday after the oath. the respondent as vicepresident.On October 4. Petitioner won in the May 1998 national elections as president. in December 7Impeachment Trial began.There became a built up of a call for petitioner to resign from office and his officials one byone resignedwithdrawing their support.8.WON Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as President4. 2000.WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity HELD: The petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent GloriaMacapagalArroyo as the . 1. At 12:00 noon Chief Justice Hilario Davideadministeredoath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines.2.3.WON Estrada enjoys immunity from suit5. January 19 people lined up in EDSA showing a greater call for the resignation of thepresident. Such expose ignited several reactions of rage. Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson accused the petitioner and hisfamily of receivingmillions of pesos from jueteng lords. ISSUES: There are several important issues sprouting in this case. WON the cases at bar present a justiciable controversy / political question specifically inregard thelegitimacy of the Arroyo administration2.January 20 was the day of petitioner's surrender. At 2:30 pm petitioner leftMalacanang and issueda press statement and a letter transmitting the executive power upon him. thepresident to the vicepresident becoming the acting president7.Criminal cases have been filed against the petitioner after he stepped down into presidency.6. 4.WON Estrada merely resigned as President3.

it was contended that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending the court of the defunct republic in the absence of enabling law. Valdez. doctrine of jus postliminium d. 75 Phil 113 75 PHIL 131 FACTS: Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus which prays that the respondent judge be ordered to continue the proceeding which was initiated under the regime of the socalled Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation. definition b. The question on the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration is subject to judicialreview. Douglas McArthur which had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines. ―administration‖ 4. Furthermore. political sovereignty c. Sovereignty a. effect of suspension or change in sovereignty CASES: Co Kim Chan vs. It is a legal question.de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED . . c. the Government of the Republic of the Phils. d. which is justiciable. It is based on the proclamation issued by Gen. ―government‖ vs. 1. types: legal vs.

Being a de facto government.ISSUES: Whether the government established in the said Japanese occupation is in fact a de facto government. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission were good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the US Forces. Co kim chan vs valdez tankeh Gr L5 Co kim chan vs valdez tankeh Gr L5 FACTS: a petition for mandamus was flied by herein petitioner. the respondent judge is directed to take cognizance of the civil case (3012) and continue the proceedings. HELD: In political and international law. judicial acts done under its control. All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and valid before and remained as such even after the occupied territory had come again into the power of true and original sovereign. douglasmacarthur had the effect of . all acts and proceedings of the legislative. executive and judicial department of a de facto government is valid. to the extent that they effect during the continuance and control of said government remain good. Wherefore. Seeking to continue the proceedings in civil case #3012 which the judge of CFI in manila refused to continue on the ground the proclamation issued by gen. when they are not political in nature.

those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation. usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. without an enabling law. 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that ―all laws. 2. HELD:no.MacArthur nullifies the judicial proceedings. for ―the . Civil obedience is expected even during war. ISSUE: whether or not the proclamation of gen. Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control‖ invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts.invalidating and nullifying all the judicial proceedings nd judgments of the court of the Philippines under thejapanese rule. supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Whether or not the October 23. initiated during the Japanese occupation. Municipal laws and private laws. Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case. 3. the proclamation intends only to nullify their laws. with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The court resolved three issues: 1. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation. saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation. whether legislature or judicial which has political complexion. however. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments. lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case.

A well-known rule of statutory construction is: ―A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments. It is a legal maxim that. they become his and derive their force from him. unless required by clear and unequivocal words. non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated. it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government. by being continued as required by the law of nations. 3012.‖ Another is that ―where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction. The second question. hinges on the interpretation of the phrase ―processes of any other government‖ and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation. ―law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. Summary of ratio: 1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed. even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines. the court said. according to international law. or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase ― processes of any other governments.existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society. the court must continue hearing the case pending before . excepting of a political nature. the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant. or great mischief done. such construction is to be avoided. IF. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. laws and courts of Japan. of course. the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change. ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations. and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan.‖ Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law. 3.‖ In the case of US vs Reiter. And if they were not valid. 2. until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become. DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Since the laws remain valid. as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now. Therefore. then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes.‖ Until. or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law. which would be in violation of international law.

1975. Three months passed without aword being received from him. notwithstanding the several occasions where this Court wasleft with no choice but to impose disciplinary sanction. Respondent Enrique A. this Honorable Court acting through its SecondDivision ordered the suspension of the undersigned from the practice of law for hisfailure to file appellant's brief in the above-entitled case and to submit hisexplanation thereof within ten days from receipt of the copy of the resolution of theCourt dated February 5. if not justifying. Director. 1974. 75 Phil 285 Alcantara vs. That the undersigned tried his level best to complywith his duties to this Honorable Tribunal particularly in connection with the brief forthe appellant but due to circumstances beyond his control the failure of appellant'swife to return to the undersigned the transcript of the stenographic notes of theproceedings in the trial court compounded by her assurances that appellant'srelative-lawyer in Manila will prepare the brief as shown by the affidavit . on June 2. there was the usual resolution addressed to an erring member of thebar for his inability to comply with his sworn duty. That on June 2. Ayalde received the registered letter containing copyof the resolution of this Honorable Court . In order not to prejudice appellant Venzon. denoted as a government of paramount force) through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state) Peralta vs. 4. 1975 requiring him to explain why he wasnot able to file appellant's brief and indeed he was taken by surprise when hereceived the copy of the resolution suspending him from the practice of law. Thereafter.At this stage. 1975. suspendedhim from the practice of the law. 75 Phil 749 FERNANDO. 1975. undersigneddiscovered that a certain Mrs. ***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government) through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war. will at thevery least explain their liability to do so. in informing this Court of circumstances which. to be precise on August 26. As counsel de parte for accused Rodolfo Venzon. in its resolution. That the undersigned did not receive any copy of the resolution of this Honorable Court dated February 5. . or at the veryleast.it. J:Even at this late date. this Court. That upon verification from the records of this case with the Clerk of Court. some members of the barunfortunately are still remiss in the fulfillment of their responsibilities. 1975. he failed to fileappellant's brief within the period which expired on December 22. for his failure to file thebrief and to submit the explanation required. de la Cruz belongsto such category. . theresolution of this Court likewise saw to it that a counsel de oficio be appointed onthe basis of a strict rotation. came this urgent motion from suchcounsel: "1. Director. was notable to do so. 2. 3. As aconsequence.

the suspension of respondent Enrique A. The reason is understandable for in theaffidavit of his wife. . de la Cruz. madeclear that he is withdrawing his appeal. Ayalde. . Ayalde" to whom was attributed the receipt of the copy of theresolution of this Court of February 5. Misa 77 Phil. JJ. that she has a classroom teacher by that name Mrs. in a spirit of leniency. regarding his appeal and thatshe was unable to bring back with her the aforesaid transcript. Laurel vs. is disposed to lift the suspension not because he had been penalizedenough.J. 77 Phil 856 Laurel vs. De la Cruz said registered letter thereafter. While itwill appear that there is no satisfactory explanation. 1975. 5. had Mrs. Ayalde forgot oroverlooked to turn over to Mrs. Alcantara of the Bureau of Prisons.His prayer to be appointed as counsel de oficio is denied for the reason that in accordance with the express wishes of appellant Rodolfo Venzon.What immediately attracts attention is that instead of including an affidavit fromthat "certain Mrs. de la Cruz is hereby lifted. . are on official leave. 1975. had heard from his wife. JJ. .Antonio and Concepcion Jr. his parole was already recommended. That theundersigned does not know personally any person by the name of 'Mrs. the Principal Teacher of Dadiangas North Elementary School." 1It is his prayer that his suspension be lifted and that he be appointed as counsel deoficio for appellant.Makalintal.dated February 5. Such withdrawal of appeal then is likewise ordered in thisresolution. C. the wife of appellant.. Aquino and Martin. Misa.especially registered ones. Then he could have avoided the predicament he is in right now. Barredo. but also because appellant Venzon. she was informed by her husband that "he was able to save thelife of one of the Officers of the Bureau of Prisons in a recent riot that happened andby reason of his good behavior. If that were reallyso. which she left withhim. which confirmed the fact that the transcriptof stenographic notes was taken by her from respondent for the purpose of enlistingthe aid of a Manila lawyer. there was instead a sworn statementby Teresa Venzon. That it is of judicial notice that the month of March is a very busymonth for Public School Teachers and with all probability Mrs.. . however. Dela Cruz at her Office in the school but not finding her there. 856 . . respondent could have filed the formal pleading withdrawing from the case ascounsel. according to her affidavit. a relative of her husband. Mrs. . Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the records of respondentEnrique A. That it is very probable that the letter carrier. upon learning that the undersignedwas out of town that day of March 11. tothe effect that he was notified of the appointment of his counsel de oficio.Felisa B. 6. 1975. Ayalde' andhad never authorized any person carrying that name to receive mail for him. 7. his appeal isconsidered withdrawn.General Santos City. She then.. assured respondent that the preparationof the brief could very well be entrusted to such Manila lawyer. the undersigned. decided to deliver the letter to Mrs. three months having elapsed. de la Cruz. in hisown handwriting at the bottom of an indorsement from the Senior ExecutiveAssistant and Acting Assistant Director Julio M. this Court. concur." 2WHEREFORE. Ayalde receiveit instead..

RULING: The Supreme Court acquitted him. Sovereignty per se wasn’t suspended. discovered that certain documents. 256 of the Penal Code. The day following the convening of the Senate. it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. No transfer of sovereignty was made. Also. of the said Code had been automatically abrogated. During the Japanese occupation. The editorial in question was alleged to have violated Art. the newspaper La Nacion. there is no suspended allegiance. published an article regarding what happened. punishing insults to Ministers of the Crown. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign. Guerrero. HELD: The accused was found guilty. Thus. upon the advent of American sovereignty. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines. Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of government. Perfecto 43 Phil 887 FACTS: The Secretary of the Philippine Senate. hence. Gregorio Perfecto. Moreover. Regarding the change of government. the accused adhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. edited by Mr. Perfecto was prosecuted for writing an editorial against the Philippine Senate. ISSUE: Whether Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is still in force. which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies. there is no such change since the sovereign – the Filipino people – is still the same. What happened was a mere change of name of government. had disappeared from his office. People vs. it is presumed that the Philippine government still had the power. rather. it is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced. The gulf which separates this article from this spirit which inspires all penal . Perfecto. holding that the particular article. sovereignty cannot be suspended.FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. Fernando M. 43 Phil 887 People vs. being political in nature. he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic. Furthermore.

No. Mr. L-18463FACTS:In the case of People vs. but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo. Perfecto violated Article 256 of the Penal Code.is in force.. 887) the accused was charged with having published anarticle reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members in violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code. 3010 for partition. 43 Phil.R. but as to this point. under which the information was presented. 114 SCRA 77 MACARIOLA VS. and that under the information and the facts. Perfecto ([1922]. or insult. Three members of the court believe thatarticle 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and isinconsistent with democratic principles of government.‖ISSUES:Whether or not Mr. thedefendant was neither guilty of a violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code nor of the Libel Law.legislation of American origin. In thecourse of the main opinion in the Perfecto case is found this significant sentence: ―Act No. Punishment for contempt of nonjudicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles. People vs PerfectoG. ASUNCION 114 SCRA 77 FACTS: 1. it is not necessary to make a pronouncement. 292 of thePhilippine Commission. 2.HELD: The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in theinformation do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. may also have affected Article 256.On the subject of whether or not Article 256 of the Penal Code. Macariola. with three members of the court holding thatArticle 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over thePhilippines and with six members holding that the Libel Law had the effect of repealing so much of Article256 as relates to written defamation. Perfecto was acquitted by unanimous vote. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due. the Treason and Sedition Law. . Asuncion. Macariola vs. is as wide as that which separates a monarchy from a democratic republic like that of the Unite States. which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks. Judge Elias Asuncion was the presiding Judge in Civil Case No. Inthis Court. abuse. Among the parties thereto was Bernardita R.

respondent’s order date October 23. The Supreme Court held that for the prohibition to operate. the decision in Civil Case No. ISSUE: Is the actuation of Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of property in a Civil Case previously handled by him an act unbecoming of a Judge? HELD: Article 1491 . Bernardita Macariola thus charged Judge Asuncion of the CFI of Leyte. a portion of lot 1184-E. 1963 and the amended order dated November 11. when respondent Judge purchased on March 6. par. par. 1491. 1963 approving the October 16. 1963 decision. In the case at bar. respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6. Macariola alleged that Asuncion violated . 5 of the New Civil Code and Article 14 of the Code of Commerce. On March 6. 3010. Furthermore.. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. 1963 was already final because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period hence. 1965. was acquired by purchase by respondent Macariola and his wife. Moreover at the time of the sale on March 6. among others. 1963. 1863 respondent Judge rendered a decision.‖ 7. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31. On June 8. . now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals ―with acts unbecoming of a judge. 1963 a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which he approved in an Order dated October 23. later amended on November 11. 4. 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5. 6. 3010. 3010 which he rendered on June 8. 1963. the sale or assignment must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.3. 3010 but from Dr. which became final for lack of an appeal. 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. On October 16. 1965. one of the properties subject to partition under Civil Case No. Art. 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8. the lot in question was no longer subject of litigation. 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E. had long been final for there was no appeal from said orders. who were major stockholders of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.

Judge Elias B. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign. Asuncion Case Digest Macariola v. are automatically abrogated.Consequently. Macariola v. the political laws of the former sovereign . May 31. 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. Article 1491 of the New Civil Code. unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. Among the parties thereto was complainant Bernardita R. Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8. there was no violation of paragraph 5. a project of partition was submitted to him which he later approved in an Order dated October 23. and not during the pendency of the litigation. One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. 1863 for lack of an appeal. 1963. On July 31. Art. This lot according to the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. 114 SCRA 77. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion. 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is a change of sovereignty . Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines. Macariola. Makasiar Facts: When the decision in Civil Case No. 1982 (En Banc). Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. J. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition. Asuncion. wherein Judge .

After the investigation. 1968 docketed as Civil Case No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge" alleging that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491 par. Art. Sec. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to operate. 3019. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce. 1970." But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an "act unbecoming of a judge. Sec.Asuncion was the president. she recommended on her decision dated March 27. Issue: Does Judge Asuncion. pars. Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9. On November 2. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. 5 of the New Civil Code. 3010 and his engagement in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act unbecoming of a judge"? Ruling: No. report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals. 1971 that Judge Asuncion be exonerated. 3 par. Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion. the sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. 14. SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par.A. now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil Case No. H of R. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on March .

Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. No. There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce. 3010 but from Dr. 133-J 114 SCRA 77 May 31. 1965. Furthermore. 3019 because the business of the corporation in which respondent participated had obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office.A. Art.6. SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later on from the US to the Republic of the Philippines. H. Article 14 of Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent Judge Asuncion. Section 3 of R. whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign. 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period. are automatically abrogated. Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its incorporation realizing that their interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. the lot in question was no longer subject to litigation. 1982 . Hence. the in Civil Case No. the political laws of the former sovereign. 3010 which he rendered on June 8.M. unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. Macariola vs Asuncion A. 3010. consequently.

pars. Section 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. A certain Judge Nepomuceno however dismissed such complaints. owned and managed by Judge Asuncion. 2012 for lack of an appeal. the case at bar. Elias B. H of RA No. 5 of the New Civil Code. Among the parties thereto was petitioner Macariola. Hence. Inc.Petitioner: Bernardita R. Sec. in his capacity as Judge of Court of First Instance (CFI) Leyte FACTS: Respondent judge rendered a final decision in Civil Case No. 3019. par. This lot was adjudicated t the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five (5) lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of the lot to respondent Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria. A project of partition was submitted to him. Macariola then filed an instant complaint in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion charging him with "Acts Unbecoming of a Judge" invoking Art 1491. The fifth lot. which he later approved. was sold to a Dr. Mecariola Respondent: Hon. Spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries. 3 par. . Asuncion. Lot 1184-E.1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce.

Vilas brought an action to recover the sum of money owed to him by the city.ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Asuncion's act does not violate the above-mentioned provisions. Respondent judge purchased the said lot after the decision rendered was already final because no party filed for an appeal within the reglementary period which makes the lot in question no longer the subject to litigation. Vilas vs. rather from a Dr. Petition is hereby DENIED. Issue . Furthermore. Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from plaintiffs. The City of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris and its contention now is founded on the theory that by virtue of the Act No. HELD: The Court held that respondent Judge Asuncion's acts did not constitute an "Act Unbecoming of a Judge" but he was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities for next time. Arcadio Galapon. Article 1491. After the incorporation. 42 Phil 953 Facts Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. par. 183. City of Manila. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. petitioner Vilas is the creditorof the City. 183 its liability has been extinguished.

All prayed for the State to bring suit against Monte de Piedad. Concept of ―Act of State‖ C. As a result.000 of the relief fund in Four (4)4 installments. . various petitions were filed. Spain paid $400.Whether or not the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability of the City of Manila to itscreditor? Held No. The court held that only the governmental functions that are not compatible with the present sovereignty are suspended. including the heirs of those entitled to the allotments. the Philippine Government directed its treasurer to give $80. 35 Phil 728 Government v.000 into the treasury of the Philippine Islands for the relief of those damaged by an earthquake. and for it to pay with interest. Monte de Piedad. Doctrine of the state as parenspatriae CASES: Gov’t vs. B. Thus the new city is entitled to all property and property rights of the predecessor corporation including its liabilities. Monte De Piedad Digest Facts: 1. an institution under the control of the church. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal corporation organized under the former sovereign. The new City of Manila is in a legal sense the successor of the old city. Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the old city it is still liable to the creditors of the old City of Manila. 2. Upon the petition of Monte de Piedad.

1916 Petitioner: Government of the Philippine Islands.3. No. These principles are based upon public policy. as a sovereign. The Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it was exercising its sovereign functions or powers and was merely seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands was ceded to the United States. Finally. 9959 35 PH 728. Government of the Philippine Islands vs Monte de Piedad G. Issue: Whether the government is the proper authority to the cause of action YES. represented by Executive Treasurer Respondent: El Monte de Piedad Y Caja de Ajorras de Manila . then Spain would not exercise its civil capacities. as a trustee towards the funds could maintain the action since there has been no change of sovereignty. The state. The Philippine government. 751-753 December 13.R. The Defendant appealed since all its funds have been exhausted already on various jewelry loans. is the parens patriae of the people. if said loan was for ecclesiastical pious work.

000 aid as received by the National Treasury as relief of the victims of the earthquake. this appeal. Respondent refuse to provide the money. which was in turn invested as jewelries. the Department of Finance called upon the same bank to return the $80. The government is the sole protector of the rights of the people thus. . by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests. 1863. The government has the right to "take back" the money intended fro people. for the benefit of those persons and their heirs. the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for a recovery of the $80. equivalent to the same amount. The government used the money as such but $80. where no other person is entrusted with it. The Spanish dominions provided $400. On account of various petitions of the persons. it holds an inherent supreme power to enforce laws which promote public interest. a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took place.000 was left untouched and was thus invested to Monte de Piedad bank. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file a reimbursement of the money of the people deposited in respondent bank. In June 1983. The Monte de Piedad declined to comply with this order on the ground that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement because the Philippine government is not the affected party.000 together with interest.FACTS: On June 3. HELD: The Court held that the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint/reimbursement against respondent bank in accordance to the Doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government has the right to enforce all charities of public nature.000 deposited from before. hence.

‖ . to act as trustee during his daughter’s minority.Appellate court decision was affirmed. deceased. The Court ordered that respondent bank return the amount to the rightful heirs with interest in gold or coin in Philippine peso. July 25. Cabanas vs. Petition was thereby GRANTED. Ruling: With the provisions Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code as basis. the right to act as trustee citing the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code and the consideration of the child’s welfare. and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives. is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. Millian Pilapil. Pilapil. defendant-appellant (58 SCRA 94. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos. as the beneficiary and authorized his brother. the decision is affirmed with costs against the defendant-appellant. Issue: Whether the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy from the deceased. Francisco Pilapil. He claims the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy. belongs to the child in ownership. plaintiff-appellee vs. 58 SCRA 94 MELCHORA CABANAS. left an insurance having his child. Melchora Cabanas." And Article 321 states that "The property which the child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry. Francisco Pilapil. or by any lucrative title. or in his absence the mother. FRANCISCO PILAPIL. The defendant appealed for the case. the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. The lower court decided to give the mother of the child. 1974) Facts: Florentino Pilapil. Article 320 states that ―the father.

not the uncle. insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law. whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature.00. the decision arrived at stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. however. Proc. Sp. ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of ―parens patriae‖ to the terms of the insurance policy? . In order." There is a constitutional provision vitalizing this concept that "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5. Millian Pilapil. it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle." If. the proceeds shall be administered by his brother Francisco. is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State. and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties.000. to protect the rights of the minor. The appealed decision is supported by another rational consideration. Meanwhile. still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did. No. as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae. The trust. the mother of the child Melchora Cabañas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself to be the child’s trustee. Francisco took charge of Florentino’s benefits for the child. Florentino died when the child was only ten years old hence. the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings.With the added condition that the child stays with the mother. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened." Cabanas v Pilapil Digest Facts: 1. as the Constitution so wisely dictates. is pro tanto null and void. It is reinforced by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary. He likewise indicated that if he dies while the child is still a minor. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and contended that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries. without any evidence of lack of maternal care.

Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries. It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary. is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit. it could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother. It is a mother asserting priority. and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best interest of that person. It may happen. The child was only ten years of age when Florentino died and Francisco then took charge of Florentino’s benefits for the child. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. The uncle here should not be the trustee. family relations may press their respective claims. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae. as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae. it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shows more care towards the child than an uncle.YES. the mother of the child Melchora Cabañas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money to be placed in favor of her and for her to be the child’s trustee and the child’s benefits. On the other hand. Cabanas v Pilapil Digest Political Law – Parens Patriae – Strengthening the Family Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will be his beneficiary. cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea. . the proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by his brother Francisco Pilapil. Such is not the case at all.

. The uncle here should not be the trustee. and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best interest of that person. it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care towards the child than the uncle will.ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of ―parens patriae‖ to the terms of the insurance policy? HELD: The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the parent (mother) is observed.