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LABOR CODE BOOK FOUR HEALTH, SAFETY AND SOCIAL WELFARE BENEFITS Title I MEDICAL, DENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL

SAFETY Chapter I MEDICAL AND DENTAL SERVICES

Art. 156. First-aid treatment. Every employer shall keep in his establishment such first-aid medicines and equipment as the nature and conditions of work may require, in accordance with such regulations as the Department of Labor and Employment shall prescribe. The employer shall take steps for the training of a sufficient number of employees in first-aid treatment. Art. 157. Emergency medical and dental services. It shall be the duty of every employer to furnish his employees in any locality with free medical and dental attendance and facilities consisting of: a. The services of a full-time registered nurse when the number of employees exceeds fifty (50) but not more than two hundred (200) except when the employer does not maintain hazardous workplaces, in which case, the services of a graduate first-aider shall be provided for the protection of workers, where no registered nurse is available. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall provide by appropriate regulations, the services that shall be required where the number of employees does not exceed fifty (50) and shall determine by appropriate order, hazardous workplaces for purposes of this Article; b. The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician and dentist, and an emergency clinic, when the number of employees exceeds two hundred (200) but not more than three c. The services of a full-time physician, dentist and a full-time registered nurse as well as a dental clinic and an infirmary or emergency hospital with one bed capacity for every one hundred (100) employees when the number of employees exceeds three hundred (300). In cases of hazardous workplaces, no employer shall engage the services of a physician or a dentist who cannot stay in the premises of the establishment for at least two (2) hours, in the case of those engaged on part-time basis, and not less than eight (8) hours, in the case of those employed on full-time basis. Where the undertaking is non-hazardous in nature, the physician and dentist may be engaged on retainer basis, subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may prescribe to insure immediate availability of medical and dental treatment and attendance in case of emergency. (As amended by Presidential Decree NO. 570-A, Section 26) Art. 158. When emergency hospital not required. The requirement for an emergency hospital or dental clinic shall not be applicable in case there is a hospital or dental clinic which is accessible from the employers establishment and he makes arrangement for the reservation therein of the necessary beds and dental facilities for the use of his employees.

Art. 159. Health program. The physician engaged by an employer shall, in addition to his duties under this Chapter, develop and implement a comprehensive occupational health program for the benefit of the employees of his employer. Art. 160. Qualifications of health personnel. The physicians, dentists and nurses employed by employers pursuant to this Chapter shall have the necessary training in industrial medicine and occupational safety and health. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, in consultation with industrial, medical, and occupational safety and health associations, shall establish the qualifications, criteria and conditions of employment of such health personnel. Art. 161. Assistance of employer. It shall be the duty of any employer to provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate medical and dental attendance and treatment to an injured or sick employee in case of emergency. Chapter II OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY Art. 162. Safety and health standards. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall, by appropriate orders, set and enforce mandatory occupational safety and health standards to eliminate or reduce occupationalsafety and health hazards in all workplaces and institute new, and update existing, programs to ensure safe and healthful working conditions in all places of employment. Art. 163. Research. It shall be the responsibility of the Department of Labor and Employment to conduct continuing studies and research to develop innovative methods, techniques and approaches for dealing with occupational safety and health problems; to discover latent diseases by establishing causal connections between diseases and work in environmental conditions; and to develop medical criteria which will assure insofar as practicable that no employee will suffer impairment or diminution in health, functional capacity, or life expectancy as a result of his work and working conditions. Art. 164. Training programs. The Department of Labor and Employment shall develop and implement training programs to increase the number and competence of personnel in the field of occupational safety and industrial health. Art. 165. Administration of safety and health laws. a. The Department of Labor and Employment shall be solely responsible for the administration and enforcement of occupational safety and health laws, regulations and standards in all establishments and workplaces wherever they may be located; however, chartered cities may be allowed to conduct industrial safety inspections of establishments within their respective jurisdictions where they have adequate facilities and competent personnel for the purpose as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment and subject to national standards established by the latter. b. The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, through appropriate regulations, collect reasonable fees for the inspection of steam boilers, pressure vessels and pipings and electrical installations, the test and approval for safe use of materials, equipment and other safety devices and the approval of plans for such materials, equipment and devices. The fee so collected shall be deposited in the national treasury to the credit of the occupational safety and health fund and shall be expended exclusively for the administration and enforcement of safety and other labor laws administered by the Department of

Labor and Employment. Title II EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION AND STATE INSURANCE FUND Chapter I POLICY AND DEFINITIONS Art. 166. Policy. The State shall promote and develop a tax-exempt employees compensation program whereby employees and their dependents, in the event of work-connected disability or death, may promptly secure adequate income benefit and medical related benefits. Art. 167. Definition of terms. As used in this Title, unless the context indicates otherwise: a. "Code" means the Labor Code of the Philippines instituted under Presidential Decree Numbered four hundred forty-two, as amended. b. "Commission" means the Employees Compensation Commission created under this Title. c. "SSS" means the Social Security System created under Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixtyone, as amended. d. "GSIS" means the Government Service Insurance System created under Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty-six, as amended. e. "System" means the SSS or GSIS, as the case may be. f. "Employer" means any person, natural or juridical, employing the services of the employee. g. "Employee" means any person compulsorily covered by the GSIS under Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty-six, as amended, including the members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and any person employed as casual, emergency, temporary, substitute or contractual, or any person compulsorily covered by the SSS under Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended. h. "Person" means any individual, partnership, firm, association, trust, corporation or legal representative thereof. i. "Dependent" means the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted or acknowledged natural child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one (21) years of age or over twenty-one(21) years of age provided he is incapacitated and incapable of self-support due to a physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority; the legitimate spouse living with the employee and the parents of said employee wholly dependent upon him for regular support. j. "Beneficiaries" means the dependent spouse until he/she remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants, who are the secondary beneficiaries: Provided, That the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit.

k. "Injury" means any harmful change in the human organism from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. l. "Sickness" means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment. m. "Death" means loss of life resulting from injury or sickness. n. "Disability" means loss or impairment of a physical or mental function resulting from injury or sickness. o. "Compensation" means all payments made under this Title for income benefits and medical or related benefits. p. "Income benefit" means all payments made under this Title to the providers of medical care, rehabilitation services and hospital care. q. "Medical benefit" means all payments made under this Title to the providers of medical care, rehabilitation services and hospital care. r. "Related benefit" means all payments made under this Title for appliances and supplies. s. "Appliances" means crutches, artificial aids and other similar devices. t. "Supplies" means medicine and other medical, dental or surgical items. u. "Hospital" means any medical facility, government or private, authorized by law, an active member in good standing of the Philippine Hospital Association and accredited by the Commission. v. "Physician" means any doctor of medicine duly licensed to practice in the Philippines, an active member in good standing of the Philippine Medical Association and accredited by the Commission. w. "Wages" or "Salary", insofar as they refer to the computation of benefits defined in Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, for SSS and Presidential Decree No. 1146, as amended, for GSIS, respectively, except that part in excess of Three Thousand Pesos. x. "Monthly salary credit" means the wage or salary base for contributions as provided in Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, or the wages or salary. y. "Average monthly salary credit" in the case of the SSS means the result obtained by dividing the sum of the monthly salary credits in the sixty-month period immediately following the semester of death or permanent disability by sixty (60), except where the month of death or permanent disability falls within eighteen (18) calendar months from the month of coverage, in which case, it is the result obtained by dividing the sum of all monthly salary credits paid prior to the month of contingency by the total number of calendar months of coverage in the same period.

z. "Average daily salary credit" in the case of the SSS means the result obtained by dividing the sum of the six (6) highest monthly salary credits in the twelve-month period immediately preceding the semester of sickness or injury by one hundred eighty (180), except where the month of injury falls within twelve (12) calendar months from the first month of coverage, in which case it is the result obtained by dividing the sum of all monthly salary credits by thirty (30) times the number of calendar months of coverage in the period. In the case of the GSIS, the average daily salary credit shall be the actual daily salary or wage, or the monthly salary or wage divided by the actual number of working days of the month of contingency. aa. "Quarter" means a period of three (3) consecutive months ending on the last days of March, June, September and December. bb. "Semester" means a period of two consecutive quarters ending in the quarter of death, permanent disability, injury or sickness. cc. "Replacement ratio" - The sum of twenty percent and the quotient obtained by dividing three hundred by the sum of three hundred forty and the average monthly salary credit. dd. "Credited years of service" - For a member covered prior to January, 1975, nineteen hundred seventy-five minus the calendar year of coverage, plus the number of calendar years in which six or more contributions have been paid from January, 1975 up to the calendar year containing the semester prior to the contingency. For a member covered on or after January, 1975, the number of calendar years in which six or more contributions have been paid from the year of coverage up to the calendar year containing the semester prior to the contingency. ee. "Monthly income benefit" means the amount equivalent to one hundred fifteen percent of the sum of the average monthly salary credit multiplied by the replacement ratio, and one and a half percent of the average monthly salary credit for each credited year of service in excess of ten years: Provided, That the monthly income benefit shall in no case be less than two hundred fifty pesos

G.R. No. 91298 June 22, 1990 CORAZON PERIQUET, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and THE PHIL. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (Formerly Construction Development Corp. of the Phils.), respondents. Tabaquero, Albano & Associates for petitioner. The Government Corporate Counsel for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.: It is said that a woman has the privilege of changing her mind but this is usually allowed only in affairs of the heart where the rules are permissibly inconstant. In the case before us, Corazon Periquet, the herein petitioner, exercised this privilege in connection with her work, where the rules are not as fickle. The petitioner was dismissed as toll collector by the Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines, private respondent herein, for willful breach of trust and unauthorized possession of accountable toll tickets allegedly found in her purse during a surprise inspection. Claiming she had been "framed," she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and was sustained by the labor arbiter, who ordered her reinstatement within ten days "without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and with fun back wages to be computed from the date of her actual dismissal up to date of her actual reinstatement." 1 On appeal, this order was affirmed in toto by public respondent NLRC on August 29, 1980. 2 On March 11, 1989, almost nine years later, the petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the decision. The motion was granted by the executive labor arbiter in an order dated June 26, 1989, which required payment to the petitioner of the sum of P205,207.42 "by way of implementing the balance of the judgment amount" due from the private respondent. 3 Pursuant thereto, the said amount was garnished by the NLRC sheriff on July 12, 1989. 4 On September 11, 1989, however, the NLRC sustained the appeal of the CDCP and set aside the order dated June 20, 1989, the corresponding writ of execution of June 26, 1989, and the notice of garnishment. 5 In its decision, the public respondent held that the motion for execution was time-barred, having been filed beyond the five-year period prescribed by both the Rules of Court and the Labor Code. It also rejected the petitioner's claim that she had not been reinstated on time and ruled as valid the two quitclaims she had signed waiving her right to reinstatement and acknowledging settlement in full of her back wages and other benefits. The petitioner contends that this decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and asks for its reversal. We shall affirm instead. Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides: SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. A similar provision is found in Art. 224 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, viz. ART. 224. Execution of decision, orders, awards. (a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter or Med-Arbiter, or the Voluntary Arbitrator may, motu propio, or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory,

requiring a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to execute or enforce a final decision, order or award. ... The petitioner argues that the above rules are not absolute and cites the exception snowed in Lancita v. Magbanua, 6 where the Court held: Where judgments are for money only and wholly unpaid, and execution has been previously withheld in the interest of the judgment debtor, which is in financial difficulties, the court has no discretion to deny motions for leave to issue execution more than five years after the judgments are entered. (Application of Molnar, Belinsky, et al. v. Long Is. Amusement Corp., I N.Y.S, 2d 866) In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although there is authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias. xxx xxx xxx There has been no indication that respondents herein had ever slept on their rights to have the judgment executed by mere motions, within the reglementary period. The statute of limitation has not been devised against those who wish to act but cannot do so, for causes beyond their central. Periquet insists it was the private respondent that delayed and prevented the execution of the judgment in her favor, but that is not the way we see it. The record shows it was she who dilly-dallied. The original decision called for her reinstatement within ten days from receipt thereof following its affirmance by the NLRC on August 29, 1980, but there is no evidence that she demanded her reinstatement or that she complained when her demand was rejected. What appears is that she entered into a compromise agreement with CDCP where she waived her right to reinstatement and received from the CDCP the sum of P14,000.00 representing her back wages from the date of her dismissal to the date of the agreement. 7 Dismissing the compromise agreement, the petitioner now claims she was actually reinstated only on March 16, 1987, and so should be granted back pay for the period beginning November 28, 1978, date of her dismissal, until the date of her reinstatement. She conveniently omits to mention several significant developments that transpired during and after this period that seriously cast doubt on her candor and bona fides. After accepting the sum of P14,000.00 from the private respondent and waiving her right to reinstatement in the compromise agreement, the petitioner secured employment as kitchen dispatcher at the Tito Rey Restaurant, where she worked from October 1982 to March 1987. According to the certification issued by that business, 8 she received a monthly compensation of P1,904.00, which was higher than her salary in the CDCP. For reasons not disclosed by the record, she applied for re-employment with the CDCP and was on March 16,1987, given the position of xerox machine operator with a basic salary of P1,030.00 plus P461.33 in allowances, for a total of P1,491.33 monthly. 9 On June 27, 1988; she wrote the new management of the CDCP and asked that the rights granted her by the decision dated August 29, 1980, be recognized because the waiver she had signed was invalid. 10

On September 19, 1988, the Corporate Legal Counsel of the private respondent (now Philippine National Construction Corporation) recommended the payment to the petitioner of the sum of P9,544.00, representing the balance of her back pay for three years at P654. 00 per month (minus the P14,000.00 earlier paid). 11 On November 10, 1988, the petitioner accepted this additional amount and signed another Quitclaim and Release reading as follows: KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: THAT, I CORAZON PERIQUET, of legal age, married and resident of No. 87 Annapolis St., Quezon City, hereby acknowledged receipt of the sum of PESOS: NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR PESOS ONLY (P9,544.00) Philippine currency, representing the unpaid balance of the back wages due me under the judgment award in NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79 entitled "Corazon Periquet vs. PNCC- TOLLWAYS" and I further manifest that this payment is in full satisfaction of all my claims/demands in the aforesaid case. Likewise, I hereby manifest that I had voluntarily waived reinstatement to my former position as TOLL TELLER and in lieu thereof, I sought and am satisfied with my present position as XEROX MACHINE OPERATOR in the Central Office. Finally, I hereby certify that delay in my reinstatement, after finality of the Decision dated 10 May 1979 was due to my own fault and that PNCC is not liable thereto. I hereby RELEASE AND DISCHARGE the said corporation and its officers from money and all claims by way of unpaid wages, separation pay, differential pay, company, statutory and other benefits or otherwise as may be due me in connection with the above-entitled case. I hereby state further that I have no more claims or right of action of whatever nature, whether past, present, future or contingent against said corporation and its officers, relative to NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 10th day of November 1988 at Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. (Emphasis supplied.) 12 The petitioner was apparently satisfied with the settlement, for in the memorandum she sent the PNCC Corporate Legal Counsel on November 24, 1988, 13 she said in part: Sir, this is indeed my chance to express my gratitude to you and all others who have helped me and my family enjoy the fruits of my years of stay with PNCC by way of granting an additional amount of P9,544.00 among others ... As per your recommendation contained therein in said memo, I am now occupying the position of xerox machine operator and is (sic) presently receiving a monthly salary of P2,014.00. Reacting to her inquiry about her entitlement to longevity pay, yearly company increases and other statutory benefits, the private respondent adjusted her monthly salary from P2,014.00 to P3,588.00 monthly. Then the lull. Then the bombshell. On March 11, 1989, she filed the motion for execution that is now the subject of this petition. It is difficult to understand the attitude of the petitioner, who has blown hot and cold, as if she does not know her own mind. First she signed a waiver and then she rejected it; then she signed another waiver which she also rejected, again on the ground that she had been deceived. In her first waiver, she acknowledged full settlement of the judgment in her favor, and then in the second waiver, after accepting additional payment, she again acknowledged fun settlement of the same judgment. But now she is singing a different tune.

In her petition she is now disowning both acknowledgments and claiming that the earlier payments both of which she had accepted as sufficient, are insufficient. They were valid before but they are not valid now. She also claimed she was harassed and cheated by the past management of the CDCP and sought the help of the new management of the PNCC under its "dynamic leadership." But now she is denouncing the new management-for also tricking her into signing the second quitclaim. Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. As in this case. The question may be asked: Why did the petitioner sign the compromise agreement of September 16, 1980, and waive all her rights under the judgment in consideration of the cash settlement she received? It must be remembered that on that date the decision could still have been elevated on certiorari before this Court and there was still the possibility of its reversal. The petitioner obviously decided that a bird in hand was worth two on the wing and so opted for the compromise agreement. The amount she was then waiving, it is worth noting, had not yet come up to the exorbitant sum of P205,207.42 that she was later to demand after the lapse of eight years. The back pay due the petitioner need not detain us. We have held in countless cases that this should be limited to three years from the date of the illegal dismissal, during which period (but not beyond) the dismissed employee is deemed unemployed without the necessity of proof. 14 Hence, the petitioner's contention that she should be paid from 1978 to 1987 must be rejected, and even without regard to the fact (that would otherwise have been counted against her) that she was actually employed during most of that period. Finally, the petitioner's invocation of Article 223 of the Labor Code to question the failure of the private respondent to file a supersedeas bond is not well-taken. As the Solicitor General correctly points out, the bond is required only when there is an appeal from the decision with a monetary award, not an order enforcing the decision, as in the case at bar. As officers of the court, counsel are under obligation to advise their clients against making untenable and inconsistent claims like the ones raised in this petition that have only needlessly taken up the valuable time of this Court, the Solicitor General, the Government Corporate Counsel, and the respondents. Lawyers are not merely hired employees who must unquestioningly do the bidding of the client, however unreasonable this may be when tested by their own expert appreciation of the pertinent facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. Counsel must counsel. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

JEROMIE D. ESCASINAS and EVAN RIGOR SINGCO, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 178827 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, NACHURA,* BRION, and PERALTA,** JJ.

- versus -

Promulgated: SHANGRI-LAS MACTAN ISLAND RESORT and DR. March 4, 2009 JESSICA J.R. PEPITO, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Registered nurses Jeromie D. Escasinas and Evan Rigor Singco (petitioners) were engaged in 1999 and 1996, respectively, by Dr. Jessica Joyce R. Pepito (respondent doctor) to work in her clinic at respondent Shangri-las Mactan Island Resort (Shangri-la) in Cebu of which she was a retained physician. In late 2002, petitioners filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII (NLRC-RAB No. VII) a complaint[1] for regularization, underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday pay, night shift differential and 13 th month pay differential against respondents, claiming that they are regular employees of Shangri-la. The case was docketed as RAB Case No. 07-11-2089-02. Shangri-la claimed, however, that petitioners were not its employees but of respondent doctor whom it retained via Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)[2] pursuant to Article 157 of the Labor Code, as amended. Respondent doctor for her part claimed that petitioners were already working for the previous retained physicians of Shangri-la before she was retained by Shangri-la; and that she maintained petitioners services upon their request.

By Decision[3] of May 6, 2003, Labor Arbiter Ernesto F. Carreon declared petitioners to be regular employees of Shangri-la. The Arbiter thus ordered Shangri-la to grant them the wages and benefits due them as regular employees from the time their services were engaged. In finding petitioners to be regular employees of Shangri-la, the Arbiter noted that they usually perform work which is necessary and desirable to Shangrilas business; that they observe clinic hours and render services only to Shangri las guests and employees; that payment for their salaries were recommended to Shangri-las Human Resource Department (HRD); that respondent doctor was Shangri-las in-house physician, hence, also an employee; and that the MOA between Shangri-la and respondent doctor was an insidious mechanism in order to circumvent [the doctors] tenurial security and that of the employees under her. Shangri-la and respondent doctor appealed to the NLRC. Petitioners appealed too, but only with respect to the non-award to them of some of the benefits they were claiming. By Decision[4] dated March 31, 2005, the NLRC granted Shangri-las and respondent doctors appeal and dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of merit, it finding that no employer-employee relationship exists between petitioner and Shangri-la. In so deciding, the NLRC held that the Arbiter erred in interpreting Article 157 in relation to Article 280 of the Labor Code, as what is required under Article 157 is that the employer should provide the services of medical personnel to its employees, but nowhere in said article is a provision that nurses are required to be employed; that contrary to the finding of the Arbiter, even if Article 280 states that if a worker performs work usually necessary or desirable in the business of the employer, he cannot be automatically deemed a regular employee; and that the MOA amply shows that respondent doctor was in fact engaged by Shangri-la on a retainer basis, under which she could hire her own nurses and other clinic personnel. Brushing aside petitioners contention that since their application for employment was addressed to Shangri-la, it was really Shangri-la which hired them and not respondent doctor, the NLRC noted that the applications for employment were made by persons who are not parties to the case and were not shown to have been actually hired by Shangri-la. On the issue of payment of wages, the NLRC held that the fact that, for some months, payment of petitioners wages were recommended by Shangri -las

HRD did not prove that it was Shangri-la which pays their wages. It thus credited respondent doctors explanation that the recommendations for payment were based on the billings she prepared for salaries of additional nurses during Shangri-las peak months of operation, in accordance with the retainership agreement, the guests payments for medical services having been paid directly to Shanrgi -la. Petitioners thereupon brought the case to the Court of Appeals which, by Decision[5] of May 22, 2007, affirmed the NLRC Decision that no employeremployee relationship exists between Shangri-la and petitioners. The appellate court concluded that all aspects of the employment of petitioners being under the supervision and control of respondent doctor and since Shangri-la is not principally engaged in the business of providing medical or healthcare services, petitioners could not be regarded as regular employees of Shangri-la. Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been Resolution[6] of July 10, 2007, they interposed the present recourse. denied by

Petitioners insist that under Article 157 of the Labor Code, Shangri-la is required to hire a full-time registered nurse, apart from a physician, hence, their engagement should be deemed as regular employment, the provisions of the MOA notwithstanding; and that the MOA is contrary to public policy as it circumvents tenurial security and, therefore, should be struck down as being void ab initio. At most, they argue, the MOA is a mere job contract. And petitioners maintain that respondent doctor is a labor-only contractor for she has no license or business permit and no business name registration, which is contrary to the requirements under Sec. 19 and 20 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code on sub-contracting. Petitioners add that respondent doctor cannot be a legitimate independent contractor, lacking as she does in substantial capital, the clinic having been set-up and already operational when she took over as retained physician; that respondent doctor has no control over how the clinic is being run, as shown by the different orders issued by officers of Shangri-la forbidding her from receiving cash payments and several purchase orders for medicines and supplies which were coursed thru Shangri-las Purchasing Manager, circumstances indubitably showing that she is not an independent contractor but a mere agent of Shangri-la.

In its Comment,[7] Shangri-la questions the Special Powers of Attorneys (SPAs) appended to the petition for being inadequate. On the merits, it prays for the disallowance of the petition, contending that it raises factual issues, such as the validity of the MOA, which were never raised during the proceedings before the Arbiter, albeit passed upon by him in his Decision; that Article 157 of the Labor Code does not make it mandatory for a covered establishment to employ health personnel; that the services of nurses is not germane nor indispensable to its operations; and that respondent doctor is a legitimate individual independent contractor who has the power to hire, fire and supervise the work of the nurses under her. The resolution of the case hinges, in the main, on the correct interpretation of Art. 157 vis a vis Art. 280 and the provisions on permissible job contracting of the Labor Code, as amended. The Court holds that, contrary to petitioners postulation, Art. 157 does not require the engagement of full-time nurses as regular employees of a company employing not less than 50 workers. Thus, the Article provides:
ART. 157. Emergency medical and dental services. It shall be the duty of every employer to furnish his employees in any locality with free medical and dental attendance and facilities consisting of: (a) The services of a full-time registered nurse when the number of employees exceeds fifty (50) but not more than two hundred (200) except when the employer does not maintain hazardous workplaces, in which case the services of a graduate first-aider shall be provided for the protection of the workers, where no registered nurse is available. The Secretary of Labor shall provide by appropriate regulations the services that shall be required where the number of employees does not exceed fifty (50) and shall determine by appropriate order hazardous workplaces for purposes of this Article; The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician and dentist, and an emergency clinic, when the number of employees

(b)

exceeds two hundred (200) but not more than three hundred (300); and (c) The services of a full-time physician, dentist and full-time registered nurse as well as a dental clinic, and an infirmary or emergency hospital with one bed capacity for every one hundred (100) employees when the number of employees exceeds three hundred (300).

In cases of hazardous workplaces, no employer shall engage the services of a physician or dentist who cannot stay in the premises of the establishment for at least two (2) hours, in the case of those engaged on part-time basis, and not less than eight (8) hours in the case of those employed on full-time basis. Where the undertaking is nonhazardous in nature, the physician and dentist may be engaged on retained basis, subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe to insure immediate availability of medical and dental treatment and attendance in case of emergency. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Under the foregoing provision, Shangri-la, which employs more than 200 workers, is mandated to furnish its employees with the services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician and dentist, and an emergency clinic which means that it should provide or make available such medical and allied services to its employees, not necessarily to hire or employ a service provider. As held in Philippine Global Communications vs. De Vera:[8]
x x x while it is true that the provision requires employers to engage the services of medical practitioners in certain establishments depending on the number of their employees, nothing is there in the law which says that medical practitioners so engaged be actually hired as employees, adding that the law, as written, only requires the employer to retain, not employ, a part-time physician who needed to stay in the premises of the non-hazardous workplace for two (2) hours. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The term full-time in Art. 157 cannot be construed as referring to the type of employment of the person engaged to provide the services, for Article 157 must not be read alongside Art. 280[9] in order to vest employer-employee relationship on the employer and the person so engaged. So De Vera teaches:
x x x For, we take it that any agreement may provide that one party shall render services for and in behalf of another, no matter how necessary for the latters business, even without being hired as an employee. This set-up is precisely true in the case of an independent contractorship as well as in an agency agreement. Indeed, Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted by the appellate court, is not the yardstick for determining the existence of an employment relationship. As it is, the provision merely distinguishes between two (2) kinds of employees, i.e., regular and casual. x x x[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The phrase services of a full-time registered nurse should thus be taken to refer to the kind of services that the nurse will render in the companys premises and to its employees, not the manner of his engagement. As to whether respondent doctor can be considered a legitimate independent contractor, the pertinent sections of DOLE Department Order No. 10, series of 1997, illuminate:
Sec. 8. Job contracting. There is job contracting permissible under the Code if the following conditions are met: (1) The contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof; and (2) The contractor has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business.

Sec. 9. Labor-only contracting. (a) Any person who undertakes to supply workers to an employer shall be deemed to be engaged in labor-only contracting where such person: (1) Does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials; and (2) The workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business or operations of the employer in which workers are habitually employed. (b) Labor-only contracting as defined herein is hereby prohibited and the person acting as contractor shall be considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him. (c) For cases not falling under this Article, the Secretary of Labor shall determine through appropriate orders whether or not the contracting out of labor is permissible in the light of the circumstances of each case and after considering the operating needs of the employer and the rights of the workers involved. In such case, he may prescribe conditions and restrictions to insure the protection and welfare of the workers. (Emphasis supplied)

The existence of an independent and permissible contractor relationship is generally established by considering the following determinants: whether the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the nature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the performance of a specified piece of work; the control and supervision of the work to another; the employer's power with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of the contractor's workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply the premises, tools, appliances, materials and labor; and the mode, manner and terms of payment.[11] On the other hand, existence of an employeremployee relationship is established by the presence of the following determinants: (1) the selection and engagement of the workers; (2) power of

dismissal; (3) the payment of wages by whatever means; and (4) the power to control the worker's conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration.[12] Against the above-listed determinants, the Court holds that respondent doctor is a legitimate independent contractor. That Shangri-la provides the clinic premises and medical supplies for use of its employees and guests does not necessarily prove that respondent doctor lacks substantial capital and investment. Besides, the maintenance of a clinic and provision of medical services to its employees is required under Art. 157, which are not directly related to Shangri-las principal business operation of hotels and restaurants. As to payment of wages, respondent doctor is the one who underwrites the following: salaries, SSS contributions and other benefits of the staff [13]; group life, group personal accident insurance and life/death insurance[14] for the staff with minimum benefit payable at 12 times the employees last drawn salary, as well as value added taxes and withholding taxes, sourced from her P60,000.00 monthly retainer fee and 70% share of the service charges from Shangri-las guests who avail of the clinic services. It is unlikely that respondent doctor would report petitioners as workers, pay their SSS premium as well as their wages if they were not indeed her employees.[15] With respect to the supervision and control of the nurses and clinic staff, it is not disputed that a document, Clinic Policies and Employee Manual [16] claimed to have been prepared by respondent doctor exists, to which petitioners gave their conformity[17] and in which they acknowledged their co-terminus employment status. It is thus presumed that said document, and not the employee manual being followed by Shangri-las regular workers, governs how they perform their respective tasks and responsibilities. Contrary to petitioners contention, the various office directives issued by Shangri-las officers do not imply that it is Shangri-las management and not respondent doctor who exercises control over them or that Shangri-la has control over how the doctor and the nurses perform their work. The letter[18] addressed to respondent doctor dated February 7, 2003 from a certain Tata L. Reyes giving instructions regarding the replenishment of emergency kits is, at most, administrative in nature, related as it is to safety matters; while the letter[19] dated May 17, 2004 from Shangri-las Assistant Financial Controller, Lotlot Dagat, forbidding the clinic from receiving cash payment s from the resorts guests is a

matter of financial policy in order to ensure proper sharing of the proceeds, considering that Shangri-la and respondent doctor share in the guests payments for medical services rendered. In fine, as Shangri-la does not control how the work should be performed by petitioners, it is not petitioners employer. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 22, 2007 and the Resolution dated July 10, 2007 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

ESCASINAS vs SHANGRI-LAS MACTAN ISLAND RESORT Case Digest


JEROMIE D. ESCASINAS and EVAN RIGOR SINGCO v. SHANGRI-LAS MACTAN ISLAND RESORT and DR. JESSICA J.R. PEPITO 580 SCRA 604 (2009) DIGEST FACTS: Jeromie D. Escasinas and Evan Rigor Singco were registered nurses, engaged by respondent Dr. Jessica Joyce R. Pepito to work in her clinic at respondent Shangri-Las Mactan Island Resort (Shangri-La). Escasinas and Singco filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for regularization, underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday pay, night shift differential and 13th month pay against Shangrila et al., claiming that they are regular employees of Shangri-La. Shangri-la claimed that Escasinas and Singco were not its employees but of Dr. Pepito, whom it retained via Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) pursuant to Article 157 of the Labor Code. Dr. Pepito for her part claimed that Escasinas and Singco were already working for the previous retained physicians of Shangri-la before she was retained. Escasinas and Singco, however, insist that under Article 157 of the Labor Code, Shangri-la is required to hire full-time registered nurse, hence their engagement should be deemed as regular employment. They maintain that Dr. Pepito is a labor-only contractor for she has no license or business permit and no business name registration as mandated by Sec. 19 and 20 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code. The labor arbiter declared Escasinas and Singco to be regular employees of Shangri-la. The National Labor Relations Commission, on the other hand, granted Shangri-las and Dr. Pepitos appeal and dismissed Escasinas and Singco complaint for lack of merit, finding that no employer-employee relationship exists between Shangri-la and petitioners. ISSUES: Whether or not Escasinas and Singco are regular employees of Shangri-la and Dr. Pepito HELD: The requirements for the existence of an employer-employee relationship are different from the requisites for the existence of an independent and permissible contractor relationship. The existence of an independent and permissible contractor relationship is generally established by considering the following determinants: whether the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the nature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the performance of a specified piece of work; the control and supervision of the work to another; the employer's power with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of the contractor's workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply the premises, tools, appliances, materials and labor; and the mode, manner and terms of payment. On the other hand, existence of an employer- employee relationship is established by the presence of the following determinants: (1) the selection and engagement of the workers; (2) power of dismissal; (3) the payment of wages by whatever means; and (4) the power to control the worker's conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration. Against the above-listed determinants, the Court holds that Dr. Pepito is a legitimate independent contractor. That Shangri-la provides the clinic premises and medical supplies for use of its employees and guests do not necessarily prove that respondent doctor lacks substantial capital and investment. Besides, the maintenance of a clinic and provision of medical services to its employees is required under Art. 157, which are not directly related to Shangri-las principal business operation of hotels and restaurants. As to payment of wages, Dr. Pepito is the one who underwrites the following: salaries, SSS contributions and other benefits of the staff; group life, group personal accident insurance and life/death insurance for the staff with minimum benefit payable at 12 times the employees last drawn salary, as well as value added taxes and withholding taxes, sourced from her P60,000.00 monthly retainer fee and 70% share of the service charges from Shangri-las guests who avail of the clinic services. It is unlikely that Dr. Pepito would report Escasinas and Singco as workers, pay their SSS premium as well as their wages if they were not indeed her employees.

With respect to the supervision and control of the nurses and clinic staff, it is not disputed that a document, Clinic Policies and Employee Manual claimed to have been prepared by Dr. Pepito exists, to which Escasinas and Singco gave their conformity and in which they acknowledged their co-terminus employment status. It is thus presumed that said document, and not the employee manual being followed by Shangri-las regular workers, governs how they perform their respective tasks and responsibilities. Contrary to Escasinas and Singco contention, the various office directives issued by Shangri-las officers do not imply that it is Shangri-las management and not Dr. Pepito who exercises control over them or that Shangri-la has control over how the doctor and the nurses perform their work. In fine, as Shangri-la does not control how the work should be performed by Escasinas and Singco, it is not Escasinas and Singcos employer

OCEAN BUILDERS CONSTRUCTION CORP., and/or DENNIS HAO, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 150898 Present: CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated:

- versus -

SPOUSES ANTONIO and ANICIA CUBACUB, Respondents.

April 13, 2011 x-------------------------------------------------- x DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Bladimir Cubacub (Bladimir) was employed as maintenance man by petitioner company Ocean Builders Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan City. On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. He was thus advised by petitioner Dennis Hao (Hao), the companys general manager, to rest for three days which he did at the companys barracks where he lives free of charge. Three days later or on April 12, 1995, Bladimir went about his usual chores of manning the gate of the company premises and even cleaned the company vehicles. Later in the afternoon, however, he asked a co-worker, Ignacio Silangga (Silangga), to accompany him to his house in Capas, Tarlac so he could rest. Informed by Silangga of Bladimirs intention, Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga to instead bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital. Along with co-workers Narding and Tito Vergado, Silangga thus brought Bladimir to the Caybiga Community Hospital (Caybiga Hospital), a primary-care hospital around one kilometer away from the office of the company.

The hospital did not allow Bladimir to leave the hospital. He was then confined, with Narding keeping watch over him. The next day, April 13, 1995, a doctor of the hospital informed Narding that they needed to talk to Bladimirs parents, hence, on Silanggas request, their co-workers June Matias and Joel Edrene fetched Bladimirs parents from Tarlac. At about 8 oclock in the evening of the same day, April 13, 1995, Bladimirs parents-respondent spouses Cubacub, with their friend Dr. Hermes Frias (Dr. Frias), arrived at the Caybiga Hospital and transferred Bladimir to the Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) where he was placed in the intensive care unit and died the following day, April 14, 1995. The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimirs immediate cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause as pneumonia. On the other hand, the death certificate issued by Dr. Frias recorded the causes of death as cardiac arrest, multiple organ system failure, septicemia and chicken pox. Bladimirs parents-herein respondents later filed on August 17, 1995 before the Tarlac Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Capas a complaint for damages against petitioners, alleging that Hao was guilty of negligence which resulted in the deterioration of Bladimirs condition leading to his death. By Decision of April 14, 1997,[1] Branch 66 of the Tarlac RTC at Capas dismissed the complaint, holding that Hao was not negligent. It ruled that Hao was not under any obligation to bring Bladimir to better tertiary hospitals, and assuming that Bladimir died of chicken pox aggravated by pneumonia or some other complications due to lack of adequate facilities at the hospital, the same cannot be attributed to Hao. On respondents appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of June 22, 2001, reversed the trial courts decision, holding that by Haos failure to bring Bladimir to a better-equipped hospital, he violated Article 161 of the Labor Code. It went on to state that Hao should have foreseen that Bladimir, an adult, could suffer complications from chicken pox and, had he been brought to hospitals like St. Lukes, Capitol Medical Center, Philippine General Hospital and th e like, Bladimir could have been saved.

Thus the appellate court disposed:


WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66 in Civil Case No. 349 dated April 14, 1997 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered holding the defendants solidarily liable to plaintiffs-appellants for the following: 1. P50,000.00 for the life of Bladimir Cubacub; 2. P584,630.00 for loss of Bladimirs earning capacity; 3. P4,834.60 as reimbursement of expenses incurred at Quezon City General Hospital as evidenced by Exhibits E to E -14 inclusive; 4. P18,107.75 as reimbursement of expenses for the 5-day wake covered by Exhibits F to F-17; 5. P30,000.00 as funeral expenses at Prudential Funeral Homes covered by Exhibit I; 6. P6,700.00 for acquisition of memorial lot at Sto. Rosario Memorial Park covered by Exhibit J; 7. P50,000.00 as moral damages; 8. P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; 9. P15,000.00 as attorneys fees and 10. Cost of suit. SO ORDERED.[2]

The motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution [3] of November 26, 2001, hence this petition. Petitioners maintain that Hao exercised the diligence more than what the law requires, hence, they are not liable for damages. The petition is meritorious.

At the onset, the Court notes that the present case is one for damages based on torts, the employer-employee relationship being merely incidental. To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements must be present, viz: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation. The assailed decision of the appellate court held that it was the duty of petitioners to provide adequate medical assistance to the employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, failing which a breach is committed. Art. 161 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 161. Assistance of employer. It shall be the duty of any employer to provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate medical and dental attendance and treatment to an injured or sick employee in case of emergency. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Implementing Rules of the Code do not enlighten what the phrase adequate and immediate medical attendance means in relation to an emergency. It would thus appear that the determination of what it means is left to the employer, except when a full-time registered nurse or physician are available on-site as required, also under the Labor Code, specifically Art. 157 which provides: Article 157. Emergency Medical and Dental Services. It shall be the duty of every employer to furnish his employees in any locality with free medical and dental attendance and facilitiesconsisting of: (a) The services of a full-time registered nurse when the number of employees exceeds fifty (50) but not more than two hundred (200) except when the employer does not maintain hazardous workplaces, in which case, the services of a graduate first-aider shall be provided for the protection of workers, where no registered nurse is available. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall provide by appropriate regulations, the services that shall be required where the number of employees does not exceed fifty (50) and shall determine by appropriate order, hazardous workplaces for purposes of this Article; The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician and dentist, and an emergency clinic, when the

(b)

number of employees exceeds two hundred (200) but not more than three hundred (300); and (c) The services of a full-time physician, dentist and a full-time registered nurse as well as a dental clinic and an infirmary or emergency hospital with one bed capacity for every one hundred (100) employees when the number of employees exceeds three hundred (300). (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the present case, there is no allegation that the company premises are hazardous. Neither is there any allegation on the number of employees the company has. If Haos testimony[4] would be believed, the company had only seven regular employees and 20 contractual employees still short of the minimum 50 workers that an establishment must have for it to be required to have a full-time registered nurse. The Court can thus only determine whether the actions taken by petitioners when Bladimir became ill amounted to the necessary assistance to ensure adequate and immediate medical . . . attendance to Bladimir as required under Art. 161 of the Labor Code. As found by the trial court and borne by the records, petitioner Haos advice for Bladimir to, as he did, take a 3-day rest and to later have him brought to the nearest hospital constituted adequate and immediate medical attendance that he is mandated, under Art. 161, to provide to a sick employee in an emergency. Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to have a medical background. He may not be thus expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with better facilities than the Caybiga Hospital, contrary to appellate courts ruling. AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the death of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would not have occurred.[5] An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and

that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.[6] Verily, the issue in this case is essentially factual in nature. The dissent, apart from adopting the appellate courts findings, finds that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker and Hao was negligent in not bringing that coworker to the nearest physician, or isolating him as well. This finding is not, however, borne by the records. Nowhere in the appellate courts or even the trial courts decision is there any such definite finding that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker. At best, the only allusion to another employee being afflicted with chicken pox was when Hao testified that he knew it to heal within three days as was the case of another worker, without reference, however, as to when it happened.[7] On the issue of which of the two death certificates is more credible, the dissent, noting that Dr. Frias attended to Bladimir during his last illness, holds that the certificate which he issued citing chicken pox as antecedent cause deserves more credence. There appears, however, to be no conflict in the two death certificates on the immediate cause of Bladimirs death since both cite cardio-respiratory arrest due to complications from pneumonia per QCGH, septicemia and chicken pox per Dr. Frias. In fact, Dr. Frias admitted that the causes of death in both certificates were the same.[8] Be that as it may, Dr. Frias could not be considered as Bladimirs attending physician, he having merely ordered Bladimirs transfer to the QCGH after seeing him at theCaybiga Hospital. He thereafter left Bladimir to the care of doctors at QCGH, returning to Capas, Tarlac at 4 oclock the following morning or eight hours after seeing Bladimir. As he himself testified upon cross-examination, he did not personally attend to Bladimir anymore once the latter was brought to the ICU at QCGH.[9] It bears emphasis that a duly-registered death certificate is considered a public document and the entries therein are presumed correct, unless the party who contests its accuracy can produce positive evidence establishing otherwise. [10] The QCGH death certificate was received by the City Civil Registrar on April 17, 1995. Not only was the certificate shown by positive evidence to be inaccurate. Its credibility, more than that issued by Dr. Frias, becomes more

pronounced as note is taken of the fact that he was not around at the time of death. IN FINE, petitioner company and its co-petitioner manager Dennis Hao are not guilty of negligence. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the complaint is hereby DISMISSED. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

Ocean Builders vs. Sps. Cubacub


Ocean Builders Construction Corporation vs. Spouses Cubacub G.R. No. 150898, April 13, 2011 Digest Facts: Bladimir Cubacub was employed as maintenance man by petitioner company Ocean Builders Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan City. On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. He was thus advised by petitioner Dennis Hao, the companys general manager, to rest for three days which he did at the companys barracks where he lives free of charge. Later in the afternoon, however, he asked a co-worker, Ignacio Silangga, to accompany him to his house in Capas, Tarlac so he could rest. Informed by Silangga of Bladimirs intention, Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga to instead bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital.

Bladimir was brought to the Caybiga Community Hospital, a primary-care hospital around one kilometer away from the office of the company. At about 8 oclock in the evening of the same day, April 13, 1995, Bladimirs parents -respondent spouses Cubacub, arrived at the Caybiga Hospital and transferred Bladimir to the Quezon City General Hospital where he was placed in the intencive care unit and died the following day.

The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimirs immediate cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause as pneumonia.

Bladimirs parents-herein respondents later filed on August 17, 1995 before the Tarlac Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages against petitioners, alleging that Hao was guilty of negligence which resulted in the deterioration of Bladimirs condition leading to his death.

Issue: Whether the manager was guilty of negligence for not bringing his employee, who later died, to a better hospital, and hence liable for torts based on Article 161 of the Labor Code. Held: No, the manager, Hao, was not guilty of negligence for not bringing his employee, who later died, to a better hospital. ART. 161. Assistance of employer. It shall be the duty of any employer to provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate medical and dental attendance and treatment to an injured or sick employee in case of emergency. Haos advice for Bladimir to, as he did, take a 3-day rest and to later have him brought to the nearest hospital constituted adequate and immediate medical attendance that he is mandated, under Art. 161, to provide to a sick em ployee in an emergency.

Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to have a medical background. He may not be thus expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with better facilities than the Caybiga Hospital.

At all events, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the death of Bladimir. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.

Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper authority shall be held liable under the law of Karma.