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D A I L Y KOREAN KOREAN DAILY


I.

t
Army

SIC 9628

fin: 962s

25 JUly 1951 1951

Jw

BULLETIN BULLETIB

Military Situation
Highlights

UN activity in the vestern sector vas limited to light contact vith small enemy groups. In the central and eastern sectors, friendly patrol/ encountered stubborn resistance from enemy screening elements.

Several enemy groups of undetermined size made prObing attacks ageinst UN positions in the US IX Corps zone. All UN patrolling *laments in the IX Corps zone made light contact vith the enemy. Relief of front-line units continued. In the US X Corps zone patrolling ROK 7th Division units engaged several enemy patrols. Enemy groups, in squad to platoon strength, prObed US 2nd Division positions while artillery and mortar fire continued to fall on division positions. All other units maintained positions and patrolled.
ROE: CaPital Division units in the ROK I Corps zone continued to meet heavy resistance from an estimated enemy battalion. Enemy groups, platoon to compeny.strength, probed ROK Ilth Division dbservation posts; all attacks were repulsed. All units maintained positions and patrolled.

Naval aircraft flew a total of 250 sorties including 20 support alssions principally in the BOK I Corps zone. East coast air operations vere conducted along the coast from Kilchu to Kosong and inland from Wonsan to Tongyang. Aircraft struck enemy communications, supply dumps and troop concentrations. Surface blockade vessels scored bits on enemy communications and buildings in the Songjin area. At Wonsan, harassing fire vas delivered on gun positions troop concentrations and one factory.

Other UN aircraft flevr 672 sorties, including 401. coolant missions.

Support sorties, totalling 57, Imre largely confined to the US X Corps sone. Armed reconnaissance aircraft attacked targets in 98 areas. Night intruders

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Navy

In the IS I Corps zone, all UN units maintained and adjusted positions and Defeated. ROK let Division patrols made contact with several small enemy groups. US 24th Division positions received artillery fire, vbile US 3rd Division patrols received sporadic mortar and artillery fire.

Air

20

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No.

009

44.0. W

hit enemy installations and taciiitieI in 98 areas. Medium bombers flew 18 effective sorties. The Sariwon marshalling yards were barbed. by 12 aircraft. Other 3-29'1 struck targets with ground control radar assistanee and made photographic reconnaissance flights.

II.

General Situation Political

D103 - 159

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Radio Peking has given a slightly new twist to the propaganda sUPPort for Nsm 11's three conditions for a peaceful settlement of the Korean War. A story datelined Kaesoug reports alleged conversations betveen Chinese correspondents and American and British correspondents, in vhich the two latter groups were unanimous in their desire for peace. A, British correspondent, giving the opinion of British troops, stated that Nam Il's conditions are acceptable; anAserican officer is quoted as expressing similar convictions. Radio Peking ends on the note that the only flaw in the situation is the "American brass." Inasmuch as the broadcast was in Chinese, it was apparently designed to impress the Chinese people with the solidarity of world support for the Communist proposals. Thus US leaders would be exclusively to blame for a failure at Kaesong.

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SIC SIC

9629 9629

26 July 1951 26 1951

D DAILY A I L Y

KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIB


Highlights Highlights

I . I.

Situation Military Situation

UN forces, generally mslnt8lning maintaining poeitlons, positions, repulsed repulsed rev& several hnemy enemy UM forcca, masreUy probing attacks to patrol probing ettacka and and continued continuedto pstrol aggressively. eggresrlvely.

EEK

the ROK 2nd 2nd DIvIuIon Division sector In the rectar of of tne tns US US /X M Corps Gorp zone, tone, friendly friendly elements elemenAn attack -bet against US ngulseb an attack attrck by a reinforced reinforced enemy enmy battalion. bettaliod. A n attack repulsed an by a 24th 2bth Division Division positions posltione by by tvo t m enemy enemy platoons p18tooxm vas wse similarly e i m l l e r l y turned turned back. back. A i r Observers obrervera rsporhd ROK 6th Air reported ROK 6th Division Divlaion elements element. engsged enspgad an an enemy enemy company. c . considerable enemy comibrable emmy activity activity and and supplies suppliee in in the the Baso-KUmsong-Tungdse Haso-1CruPeong-!k@aa area. area. In the US X C Corps ROC 7th In m p zone, zone, ROK 7th Division Division patrols patrols contacted contacted several several small attacks w against US 2nd 2nd D Divisa#ll enemy eabqy groups. iproupr. Slued S-luad to to platoon plstoon strength rtrerrgth 8tf.Cls i n & U6 idSlim advances advances ver8 were reglatarad registered by by elements o of i the . sion i o n U units n i t e vere uwe repulsed. repulsed. Slight two W UN 147 rounds to artillery tw, E divisions. bivlrionm. ROK ROK 8tb 8th Division Divi8lon positions poaltlona received 14f and fire. rrd mortar m * flm.

ROK resistance from several ROK forces force6 in In the the ROK ROK I I Corps Corps zone zone met met stubborn rtubborn rerlrtance mveral of the the ROIL ROK Capital Capital Division Xvision made em-up o f up up to to company col~peqy r i a . Elements Blemnk of enemy groups of size. a a slight rllght withdrawal. wlthdraual.

1o.vr3 air sorties sortlea off off both c0tut.e 6 3 mlrceUaneou8 Naval sir coasts totalled 8 86; miscellaneous cmq! enemy Surtaw@-, targets, including inuluding installations installatiom and end troop troop concentrations, conccntntlone, were were hit. h l t . Surface craft the ua6t vest bombarded t the of the Bao Han eatu8ry estuary with with fsce creft in in tbe d h e north coast o f the unreported east blockadb blockade vessels placed unreported results, reeultr, while while in in the the e& voroelr w e d gunfire on enemy targets in taraetr i n the Chongjin, Chowin, Songjin Sollg3irr and 8ud Wonsan Woaean areas. areas.
Air

UN land-based aircraft flew y53 effective sorties, including 413 coMbat. Close support missions totalling 15 were flown in all corps zones. The medium bomber effort vas concentrated on Chinnampo and the marshalling yards at Opa-ri.
II.

leneral Situation

No significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours. al THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION De - 161 TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF SigRET THIS DOCUMENT.
No.

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Nan'

In the UB US I I Corps Corga zone, zone, RCN( ROK 1st lst DiVl8lon Division aad and Us US 3ml 3rd DIvi81on Division p~trols patrols of the ROK ROK lat lst Division Division xwcslved received e w d several beveral enemy enemy platoons. plrtoons. A patrol petrol or ensaged 200 200 rounds raundrr of o f 82 82 mm. mar. mortar mortar fire. firu.

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410

sbRra S h y ?
2; July 1951

SIC (9630 9630 SIC

/ D A I L Y
t. C .

DAILY KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N


e -

Military Situation
Highlights irighlights

Activity Activity along alone the t h e front front was u88 limited limited to ta patrols patrols and and small small probing probing attacks. attacks.
I _ -

Army rn

the ROK lst In t h e VS Iff I I Corps zone, zone, ROK 1st Division Division elements elements reported reported patrol patsol clashes, clashes, while US 3rd u:lile ,Fd Division D i Y l 8 1 0 1 I units units repulsed =pulsed a 8 small'probing small.' proEirq attack. attack. Other Other corps corps units reported no mite rsported no contact. contact.

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US US IX IX Corps Corps units u n i t 8 engaged engsged in i n minor minor patrol patrol action. action.

the X Corps zone elements elementa of of the the ROK ROK 7th 7th DiVlSiOn Division msde made a a succeseful successfUl In t h e US X 2nd Division Division reprdbing a attack probing t t a c k and end returned retUrPhd to to positions. poritioaa. Troops Troops of of the t h e US Us 2nd reOther units pulsed enemy Other units of of the the Corps Corps reported reported patrol patrol clashes. claehee. pulsed enemy probing probing attacks. attsCke
In the ROK ROK I Corps battalion-size attack Corpe zone zone an e m enemy enemybattallon-eize a t t a c k was Wae repulsed. repulsed.

Navy Navy
II

UN carrier coasts flew a total total of of 2 229 sorties. UN carrier aircraft aircrert off off both coset6 2 5 3 8 0rtIeS.
of of opportunity opportunity from *om Songjin 8ongjin to to Wonsan. Wonsan. Enemy shore batteries which returned Enemy shore b8tterle8 which returned

In t the east, planes attscked attacked targets h e wt, fargets Surface units bombarded coastal Surface unite bombarded coastal targets. targetr. fire caused the fire caueed no no damage. dmagc.

Carrier aircraft west caaat coast atkcked attacked coa8tal coastal Carrier aircraft and surface units on the west and and communications compnmicatiom targets targets with with good good results. f i S u f 6 .

Air Air

---

UN land-based land-based aircraft aircraft flew f l e w 790 790 sorties, sortieo, including l n c l u d i w 493 493 combat. combat. Medium Medium bombers flew vith unreported resulte results bombere f l e w 18 18 sorties rrortles against Bgaiaet communications communicatloaa points w i t h mrepofted
Of Of 11571 1,571 vehicles vehicle6 sighted, sighted, 394 394 were wre moving mi= south. south.

II TI

General G e ~ e r a Situation Situation l


Political Political

After endless After endleer, demands demEuida in In Communist ComrminlBt propaganda propagnndefor forthe t h e 'withdrawal vlbhdrcrual of of troops f from Kortm, Radio Radio Peiping Peiping under under a a i'yo~wPyongyang datellne dateline broerdcast broadcast foreign troope t o m Kor:a, the following following explanation explanstltm of o r Cummunist Cumanrniet agreement a@?eement with vith UN UN terms terms at a t Kaesong: Kaee~g: "In order to armistice a,greement agreement eo so as as to fulfill fulfill the "In order t o arrive rvrive at at ;In ;An eearly u l y armistice the hopes wo,ld's peace-loving peace-loving people, people, we we agree agree to to tthe proposal initial h o p e . of the vo?ld's he p roporal of your side." .ids .I' THE C C.I.A. NO OBJECTION it. THE . I . A . HAS NO && THE DECLASSIFICATION ,CIF TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OB DKB - 162 162 THIS THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. -____

a *

No. NO.

OO9 % 6

slO 9631 9631 Sm

28 28 July July 1951 1951

R E A N DA ILI KOREAN
I.

BULLETIN B ULLETIN

Valitary Situation

Atablighta
Enemy forces pressed numeroun snail probing attack along the UN line from KuMboa to the east coast and strongly reeisted friendly attempte to seize key terrain features in the east leentral sector* Battalion 8320 conoontra. tione were observed opposite friendly limagleast of the "Iron Triangle.'

ln the US IX Corm zone friendly unite repuleed several enepy probing attacks. A friendly patrol east of NUM= destroyed five enemy vehicles. Other UN patrols observed enemy groupo totalling an estinated too battaidtme opposite friendly lines east of the "Iron Triangle." Air obeervers reported
-

500 enemy dug in six miles to the rear of the above concentration.

le the east central Doctor US X Corps units repuleed several attacko by Friendly elemente vere forced to withdraq from an outpoet northveet of Yanggur but elsewhere onopy probing attacke were repulsed. Enepy forces of undetermined strength strongly resisted the advance of friendly elements attempting to seize key terrainfeatures in the arse northeast of Tanggu.
enePy gvouPs up to company dizs,..


442
21;
No.

US I Cone units reported only light contact as enemy forces continued in defensive peoturo in the weatern sector. Air observers sighted an estimated regiment videly dispereed and dugin, in the biry country northvest of the 'Iran A friendly tank vas damaged by an enemy mine field and eon.0 eiderable light artillery fire woo received during operations to recover the tank0

009

Mineral aircraft flew a total of 250 sortiee. Offensive strikes vere directed againot supp.17 and traneportation centers along rail linegi in northe east and north central Korea. Surface vessels continued patrol and bombardment pistions. Experioneed naval:gunfire control parties in the Woman ared report merkemenehip of the Britieh light cruiser Ceylon the boot they have aden.

ln the ROIC I Corps sone units reported several enemy attacks. units patrolled vigorously,

Friendly

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Norf

'gore

Mbar UN' aircraft flea a total of 007 corbieos of which 423 Imre combat ndoeiono. There pore only 29 ol000 suprort etriteo, but 273 armed romanaleoateo and 84 night intruder cortiec yere floan. Taelde medium bombers bombed A:march, Threo medium bomboro atItoked enemy troop conoontratione in foraard arena in night bombardmonto yith ground control assistance. Tao other too.plane otrikes'aero directed against highugy bridges on m1)07 rcutoo in the immediate roar of tbo enemy front.

II.

General Situation
No signifioant roporto have teen received in the poet 24 hours.

DEB - 3.63

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S7ET
30 30 July m y 1951 1951

sIc SIC 9632 96%

D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N DAILY


I.

Military Situation
Highlights

Pntrciling ?c?z=Z~U UN UH forces rorces in in the the western vestern sector aector made made scattered scattered light l i g h t contact. contact. In the central eastern sectors, UN forces repulsed repulsed a several enemy gproba probing fn the central and amtern 8ector6# tA9 e v d ellsmcy amounts of of supplies and and considerable attacks. attach. Air observers obeerverr reported r e m d large large amourrte troop activity troop rctlvlty in in the the Pyonggang, Pyon#g8ag8Haso 3aeoand andXflmsong Xbnaong areas. areas.

Army Army

Patrolling PatroUing elements clementr of or the ROK I Divieion Division in In the W US I Corps zone zone modn made Division repulwd repulsed ID an aevalpal contacts con&&cta vith small am3.l enemy enew groups. g r o w . The The US Us 25th Dlvieion several with enemy probing PrOb8 k esbdj supported OUpportad by friendly a r t i l l e r y fire# enemy attack and, artillery fire, CePtUraa captured an e m company. c m w . A platoon-strength platoon-strength probing prObing attack attack was vas reprlsed repulsed by by element8 elements enemy O f tha 3rd Division. Division. of the U8 US 3rd

'

In the the uI3 IX C m p r :nne, :+one,ROK 2nd Divi8io.u In US IX Corps Division elements elements wer.e vere attacked attacked by by 6 a Elements of the the US 24th Divleion Division received 8 a psrobprobcampmy-eise p 6 1 1 1 o Tp u p ELements company-size e enemy group upv u e division patrols ing attack nKIlp from (L a platoes-size platooa-size p group while patrols made made several several light contacts. light enemy econtacts.
ROK ROK 7th 7th Division Divirion patrols patrols in in the the Us US X X COITS C a p s zone zone r made m b contact contact 6 vith t h enemy enemy units 2nd Division eiemenk elements eng8ged engaged enemy enemy groups, unit8 of o f varied varied strength mtrength. US UB 2nd u p @ , UF 2nd DiVl6iOIt,tOBetber Divisionstogether v vith mostly m o a * of of squad r q u e d strength. etrength. Elements Elenmxb of or the I F 2nd i t h the Netherlands Betherlamdo Battalion, Battalion, attacked toward toward m and d &xed gsined hi@ high grounil ground north or of 'polrgTongmyon. myon. All other other corps corpe units units maintained mrinfsined positions poel.tions and and patrolled. patrolled.

In the the ROK ROK I I Gorp Corps eontb zone activity activity y88 vas ZiPiifed Matted to to light light patrol patrol contact. contact. A l l unit8 n o d positi0.u. All units maintained positiom.

Navy

Air sorties flommby both east ant west coast naval aircraft totalled 146; no close support missions vtre male. East coast operations, curtailed by replenishing operations, inclvded offensive sorties against enemy facilities in the Wonsan and Hungnam areas. Surface vessels bombarded communications at Wonsan, Chongjin and Songjin. "st coast aircraft struck enemy buildings, supply dumps and communications in -the Yonau, Haeju and Ongjin areas; planes also provided airspot for naval bothardment. In the Haeju vicinity, surface vessels fired on enemy troop concer rations and positions on the north bank of the Han estuary.
2:41'

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\416:)1

No. No.

OO9 09

."

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1:33BET

Air

Close Other othtr UN UB aircraft aircraft flew f l e w 850 850 sorties, d i e s , including includiDg 501 501 combat cambst missions. misrions. Close support rupport sorties rortie8 were =re flown flm in in all a l l corps corps zones, zones, principally prrincipelly in i n the the central central sector %tile mctor, vbile305 305armed srmedreconnaissance rcconrvriesencoplanes plane6hit hit targets targets in In 126 126areas. areaa. medium targets in e d i m intruders ntruck struck targets Night N i g h t infntdcrs in 163 1 6 3 areas a m a x 5 in in the the enemy's enemy's rear. rem. One m bomber bmer mission laisslon vas vas flown. flovn.
Air total of 1,867 vehicles vehicles st&ted, sighted, of of which vhich 897 897 A i r dbservers obrervera reported re-d at o t a l of Imre apwing moving south. vwe mth.

General Situation Situation 11. II. cknmrl


No significant reports have been received during the past 48 hours.

DKB -

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164
SE172

sIC SIC 9633 9633


31. lRiLy JUly 1951

31

1 . 9 5 1

D A I L Y X O R E A I BULLETIN BULLETIN DAILY KOREAN


I.

Military Situation

Eiplights
Along the UN front the enemy offered neat to moderate resistance to friendly patrols, and at several points light enemy probing attacks mere repulsed.

In the US IX Corps zone, elements of the ROK 2nd Division turned back a small-scale probing attack, vhile ROK 2nd, US 24th and. US 7th Division patrols encountered nemerous small enemy groups. The enemy continued to place 200 to 300 rounds of artillery and

mortar fire daily on US X Corps positions. Enewercups in platoon


strength mere contacted:by patrolling corps elements, while several light prdbing ettatks mere repulsed in the BOK 7th and US ard Division sectors. Advancing elements of the latter division engaged aeveral enemy companies.
ROK I Corps units dispersed several tessll enemy groups and. turned. back one platoon-size probing attack.

UN naval aircraft based off both coasts flew a total of 225 sorties against enemy installations and troon concentrations.

Surface vessels in the vest fired on miscellaneous coastal targets and continumItoMberdment of eneny positions on the north bank of the Ran estuary. In the east, blockade ships fired on enemy shore installations in the Chongjin, Songjin, and Wonsan areas.

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No. lo.

US I Corps units generally maintained or adjustedpositions. inemy groups of squad to platoon strength offered resistance to friendly patrolling elements in the ROK let, US 25th and US 3rd Division sectors, vhile several squad-size prdbing attacks were repulsed by US 3rd Division units.

THE' C.I.A. HAS HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTION 'C.I.A. THE TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OB OF TO DOCUMENT. THIS DOCUMENT.

009 0 0 9

arar

Army

SE\ET

Air
669 codbat., Enemy targets in 73 areas were attacked by 438 armed
Eamhung, Chinnampo and Kyomipo with unobserved results.

Land-based UN aircraft flew a total of 1,014 sorties, including

reconnaissance Ames. A total of 6/4. medium baraxers radar-bothed

II. General Situation


In contrast to bombastic ROK statements of a few venks ego that South Korean forces alone vould drive on to the Yalu in the event of an armistice, the ROK's Director of Public Information stated on 30 July that foreign troops should retrain in Korea for about a year. These forces would be required for defense and to train RCE forces. It vas estimated the,: the ROK would be able to defend itself et the end of 12 months.

Dica - 165

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Political

w
C72
SIC 9634

1 *spat 1951

D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN DAILY


I.

Military Situation
Highlights

friendly units repulsed several small enemy prdbing attacks in the Elsewhere along the line light patrol central and east-central sectors contacts were made with scattered enemy groups.

MEE

Enemy forces in light strength prdbed positions of US IX Corps elements northeast of KUmhwa and attacked a friendly patrol in the same area, forcing it to withdraw Other friendly patrols operating west of the Pukhan River lathe central sector Observed small enemy groups

Several enemy groups prdbed US X Corps positions east of the Pal= Fiver. Friendly patrols reported contacts vith small enemy groups at numerous points along the front in the east-control sector. friendly units establishedpatrol bases in the area of recently captummift. Thou, northeast of Tanggu.
In the eastern sector ROK I Corps units maintained positions, vith patrols reporting light contact.

Tbe Eighth Army believes that the defensive effectiveness of enemy units in contact has been considerably increased in the past month. Enemy activities have been characterized by a strong and elastic defense. Enemy forces are maintaining closer contact, considering the static nature of the ',Learnt situation, than in similar periods in the past. Buildingup of front-line units with individual replacements and relief of a battered front-line army with a fresh army are indications of the enemy's capability for continued active defense.

UN naval aircraft flew a total of 54 sorties in the Korean theater as veather restricted operations. Patrol aircraft on night heckler missions harassed enemy activities in the Eilchu, Tanchon and Songjin

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an
szeir
No.

In the western sector US / Corps units adjusted positions and patrolled with only light contact reported.

24; THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION


TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. , THIS

009_ "III S L -

' v

areas blockade amu along elow the the Korean Korean northeast nortbeaat coast. coast;. Surface craft craft continued continued blockade and and petrol patrol operations operatiom The The cruiser cruiser USS TXS Helena IIalarrs received rrrceivcd a a 105 105 mm. pm. hit hit on aain deck deck in in an an exchange exchanlge of of fire f h w with ulth enemy entuuy shore show batteries batteriea in ia the the on the the main wonran area. M. Wonsan Other UN aircraft flev 219 combat missions of a total of 555 effective sorties Attack and reconnaissance aircraft flew day and night missions over enemy forward and rear areas.

General situation Situation II. 11. oenersl

A recent Psychological Warfare Operations veekly summary states that several reports have beenreceived which indicate dissatisfaction among the Communist troops in Korea over the Soviet role in the war. The bad feeling centers =Russia's failure to provide the much propagandised material support and the lack of actual USSR troop participation even though the Chinese Communist Perces mere committed on "orders from the USSR." Ambassador MUccio reported on 31 July the tentative impeession that the ROK Ministry of Education is unprepared to eabark on an educational rehabilitation program. There is a lack of planning for the post-war period, a shortage of won funds, and a lack of suitable Korean language textbooks, while local facilities and personnel have not neen exploited to the utmost. The AMbassador foreseen a possible danger of educational rehabilitation collapse when the United Nations Command organization now taking an active interest in this phase of rehabilitation surrenders tts responsibilities to UNKRA.

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Dia - 166

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Political Politid

sIc 9535 9635 SIC

2 August A m t 1953. 1 9 5 3 .

D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N DAILY


I.

Military Situation
Highlights HighLi&ta

Ground action along'the eatire entire front front was was limited limited to to cleehetl clashes betvwn between UN patrols u14 patsole and Bnb scattered rcattered enemy enemy groups. groupa.
Army Anny

Defeneively, the US US lst lrt Cavalry csvslry and and US US 3rd 3rd Divlelone In the the US lls I I Corps Corps Defensively, the Ldvisions in zone, the ROK 7th 7th Division Division in In the t h e VS US X zone, and and the Ccrpltel DiDizone, the X COWS Corps zone, the ROK ROK Capital vision in in the t h e ROK I I Corpr zone 8 l l repulsed enemy vision Corps zone all enemy probiag prdbing attacks attacks of of platoon platoon strength the US I B 24th 24th Division Division in in the M Corps Corps zone zone launchlaunchs t r e n g t h Offensively, the the US IX ed ed a ZL limited limited Objective ob3ective attack attack and end all aU elements elements advanced aavancSd up up to to three threet miles miles without contact. contact. Patrols Patrols of of the the ROK ROK 3rd. 3rd Dlvlsion, I Corps Corga zone, zone, Division, in the the ROK ROK I forced enemy groups withdraw, but but when when the the ommy enemy group group uas was relnfomed reinforced forced groupe to vithdraw, the engegenaenfe between small fundl enemy enany units unite the patrols patrols vere were recalled. Otherwise engagements and friendly iriendly patrols petrole were were general generaL along along the the front. front. and
NaVY

Sixty air aircraft all types. Sixty air sorties wrties were were flown flown by naval rn~va3 aircmft of o f SU. t y p e s . In In the east, railroad car car vere were de8Wyed destroyed ln in the vicinity vicinity of em%, two t w o trucks truck8 and and a. a railroad of Wonsan, Wonaan, while in fn the the west, w e t , sixty sixty buildings buildings were were destroyed deEvtspyed or or damaged damaged and a da a gun gun posiposim c e tion and small Yonan. Surface tion smaU. supply 6upply dumps duorps were were strafed strafed near xmar Haeju BeJu and and Y om. 8 vessels bonibaxded bombarded trassportation transportation 3 jdoctions coast. vesaels a t i o m at at points mints along along the m e east e~dt coast. Three enemy a enemy shore shorn batteries batteries began be* 8 one o m hour hour shelling rhelling of of Hwangto Zhmngto Island, Ielend, phnlng down dovn friendly f'riendly shore shore fire-control fire-c-trol parties. parties. uN ships ships counterfired courrterflred on pinning en2my gun the engua positions. porltioas.

Other UN sire:met missions. O l h r UB sixmaf't flew i l e w 543 543 sorties, sorties, of of which vliich 166 166 were yerc combat c0-t miretons. The 12 among the the US US M /X and and X X aad and 12 close cloee support eupport sorties sorties were evenly divided among ROK ROK I I Corps COrp6 zones. zones. Medium Medium bombers bombers flew f l e w 17 1 7 effective effective sorties, eorties, of of which uhich 11 I L were wre against against the the Sariwon Sariwon marshalling mvahall% yards. yards.


Air Air

27 z7 THE THE C.I.A. C.1.A. HAS HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTION


THE DECLASSIFICATION OB TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
No.

409 003

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II. 11. General General Situation Situation

Ecoaomic Economic
food In pulwn b e 88 food prices in Pusan stood at at 2226.3 2226.3 on on 15 15 J JUne as contrarrted contrasted with with 357.'( 357.1 on on 23 June June 1950. 1950. Between Between 8 8 and and 15 15 JUne Sunc the the price price of of a a 20 20 liter liter measure measure of of rice rice rose from rose from 17,000 1'1,000 won won to to 19,000 19.,OOO won. The The price price of of u8 US greenbacks greebbacks during the the

South Korea's inflation inflation continues continucre to to mount. mount. South Korea's

The index index number nuder of of retail retall The

k dropped dropped a 8 shade, Bhade, which Which drop drop is is generally generally interpreted Interpreted as 811 a 8 measure same m week of confidence confidence in in the the UN. tw.
Political Politicsl

delegation deleetlon as Ma a fait f a l t accompli. accompli.

DKB - 16y


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A Chinese news new8 agency agency reporb reports from Kaesoq Kaesong fhat that unofiicial unofficial Cummuniet Communist soulceB sources them these hinted hinted at at a a limited limited Communist CoPPnunist offensive oftensive to to break breek the the impasse w e e at at the the peace peace talks. talks. T h e n e w agency speculate6 The news speculates that that a a succeesful successful limited limited offensive offeneive would would create create a a new new battle line which would would be be preaerrted presented to to the the W UN

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sic 9636
3 August 1951

D A I L Y
I. I.

DAILY KOREAN X O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIm

Situation Military situation

Highlight8 Highlights

positions and and continued maintain patrol UN ground ground forces forces adjusted adjurkd poultions contbued to maintain pstrol contact contact alth Vith the the enemy. enemy.

Army
US US / I Corps Corps units units maintained meinkrined or adjusted postions. poationo. Aggressive Agezressive patrols patrole f from r o m the the ROK lst, US 16t lst C CaNalry, 8 ~ 3 l r y , US US 3rd 3rd and and u8 VS 25th 25th Divirriom Divisions ang;egtd engagd numerD L p n e r ous oua enemy enemy groups group8 of of platoon platoon to to company compaay strength. rrtreagth. The T h e US 118 25th 25th Division Dlvieion ( ~bassumed sumed responsibility reeponaibillty for for the t b ~ BOK RCIK t 9th 9th Dtvision DLvielon sector. sector.

In t h e UB M Corps zone, zoni?, ROK In the US IX ROK 2nd D5vi6lOn Division exemnts elements repulaed repulsed eque8-eited squad-sized probing t h Division probing attacks attach and ancl engaged engaged tvo tvo enemy e n e q platoona. plertoons. Us US 24th and ROK RCK 6 6th patrols patrols engaged engagsd several 6e'(rem,lenemy eneuy groups -up of of up up to to company company size. size.
The X Corps smallTh8 ROK ROK 7th 7th Division, rJiVilJiOn, in in the the US x Corps zone, Zom, repulsed several eevaral wocale attsckrr and scale probing attacks and angaged engaged enew enemy groupe groups OS of squad squad to platoon platoon strength. The a phtoon-etrength platoon-strength problrg probing attack, attack, vhile !Phe ROK 8th 8th Division Dlvialon repulsed repuleed 8 division an est-ted estimated 300 m rounds of artillery fire. division positions pariticna receivel receive1 an u n d e o f artfllery No vas reported reported from No signiflcant eignif?.ca.ntactivity 8ctlvihy WLII from the the ROK I I Corps C o w zone. zona.
I

(Owing to Telecon transmission difficulties, the report on UN naval activities is not yet avaLable.)

A total of 668 effective sorties were flown by landbased UN aircraft, includinf 527 combat missions. Targets in (8 areas were attacked by 269 armed reconnaissance plame3. Medium bodbers,flying & total of 25 sorties, concentrated their efforts against the Sopo and Huillak marshalling yards and the Kyomipo supply cenrar.

TI. TI.

General General Situation Bituatlon

the past past 24 24 hours. houre. No have been been recleved recieved during during the No significant signi?icant repartil have


Navy Navy

T SF4T

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THE C.I.A. C . 1 . A . HAS NO OBJECTION OBJECTIOH THE O F TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS THIS DOCUMENT.
No.

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009

v
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CONYIDENTIAL
4 AuevAt

DAILY i:OREAN BULLETIN


Mi3ttary Situation

Highlighte

In ..:ho US I Corps 2one, ROX let Divieion patrols made several

light centects with the enemy. and US lst CavOry Division elements advenced nlightly. Units of the US 3rd Division repulsed a smell sca-A probing attadk. All other US I.Corps zone units maintsined positiene and patrolled while relief of front line units continued.
.50E 2nd Dilision patrols in the US IX Corps sone engaged several

ple630sized enemy groups while advancing slightly. An enemy force of e2nroxmately two companies forced the withdrawal of US 24th Di ii.ou .31ments. ROK 6th Division patrols engaged platoonsized grmtps, All other zone units maintained positions and patrolled.
In '!;ho US X Corps zone, Rbe 7th Division unite reauleed several

probing attacks.

poetioe,

Actty in
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ofe the the Is'? 139 CCB CU DiVision, ~ l c l n n selsmsats n t of Divfaion, bivouacked bivouacked have the *yiission mission nf of attacking Ximpo Kimpo a airfield i n the ",Be Fausong !-euaongarea; area; h e w %he i r f i e l d on in ?9 O eugult, fi7.Zp ,
1

Litijv:std positi one.


Army
All zone units meintained positions.

Artillery 611 mortar fire fell on US 2nd Division

the BOK I Corps zone was limited to patrolling and Elements of the ROK Ilth Division made a slight

UN latrols TN mcrols in in the the western sector sector encountered encountered moderate to t o heavy heavy central and end eastern eastern ~ sectore, well reeteteece. reo:!.rtLiw,, In the aeotrel C ~ O T well O ~ ddug4e y - i n enemy onemy trooles dtubbornlp ttubbornly reoieted resisted the trams tha UN UN advence. advence

ENTIAL

Document No. No Change In Class. El Declassified Class. Changed To: TS Auth.: HR 70-2 pate:

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Navel aircraft flew A total of 118 sorties. including 15 suroorl; missions. minsfonsD principally a r l n c i p a l l y In in the the US lis X X Corps Corps zone. ~ 0 n 0 East F ~ a s t coaet coast air a 3 operations, o ~p a i ~ t ~ l o r ~ a . still the a t i l l hampered hampered by by fog, fog. were were limited limited to t o offensive offenelvemissions mlseionsin iu $beliambung Hmihun~: area; and aroe; enemy enemy gun gun positions, positiOn8, communications cum*micetr~nn end troop tmop concentratione concentrationr East were struck. atruck. ? h a t coast blockade vessels ?06St?lR bombarded bmbarded rail rei!. and and highway hi@hw4, areas areas in in the the Chongjin Chongjin vicinity v i c i n i t y while, while, at a t Wonean, Wonnun, harassing hareagingand Q A destructi,~ deatiuctiy-, fire was wae placed placed on on troop troop concentrations concentrations and a d gun gun positions. Fositionn.

West coast aircraft, in addition to providing airspot, strict turgetn in the vicinities of Chinnampo, Haeju and Yonan. Surface veseels bombarded communications, troops and anti-aircraft gun positions in tht Haeju and Yonan areas.

ileee Other of combat . Other DE UN aircraft aircraft flew flew 636 638 sorties, sartieeo o fwhich wblcb306 306were were combat. f :lano support aupnort missions siraions were wore flown f l a w in i n all e l l Corps C a r p a zones. eonea), and and 154 1 P armed armed reconneAsa* recoIma.tB3e -: areas .are were also a l s o Etn.lk I'~IL.+*?aircraft attacked ettacksd targets tergets in i n 53 53 areas. arean* Enemy rear areaB total o of 21 ebfoctlm effective a sorti3 72 night n i g h t intruders. intruders, Medium bombers bombare flew a total f 21 o r t i -3 by 72 striking s t r i k i n g troop troop concentrations concentrationr end end the the Chinnampo Chinnampo supply rupply center. aenter,

TI. II.

Ambassador Mucci* reports that US Anbassador Mucci) roporte that Foreign Farsign Minister Miniater Pyun psUn stated etett.i: on rtn 1 Augnet August that I that "limited nlimfted war war cannot caanat stop etop unlimited un2lmited aggression. nggression, ShxJd Should Kof.ii. Kctfd die Korea die deserted...adieu deserted.. .adleu to t o collective c o l l e c t i v e security." socuxity.w The E o 3 Times termed Leimcsd this thle statement etstemont an an "oblique "ob1iau.e attack attack against against the the allied a l l i e d efforts efforttg to Eo comproC'XWTQmiss niee with with the the Communists." Comnunietr~"
August A parade of o f 10,000 10,000 was w&8 reportedly reportedlyheld heldin i nPusan Pusanon on1 1 A u g u ~..)rotestin t,?ratestin say aqv solution solution that that would w o u l d divide divide Korea. Kowa.

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On the other other hand, Dr. Dr. R. R. T. Oliver, OliTer, Rhee'e Rhee'e American A0erican public p u b l i c raletiow, l'dFlt~fJE1P consultant. reportedly BOK can do in con8ultant. reportedly stated etated that the the best beat the ROK i n thy t h e circuoc ~ ~ ~ ~ i a stances is Also, as stanoea la "to " t o be quiet." quiet." A l s o , Defense Defanae Miniater Minister Lee Lee characteri;Jad chaxacteri:nd X R "groundless" the report froe "graundlsrs" report that that the the ROK ROE representative representatire would would "withilrew' ' ' w i t L 3 m w ' ' drolar the Kaeaong Kaesong conference if the if the the demarcation demarcation line line was was fixed f i x e d on on the the :lith :L3th Parallel. Perallel

DEB - 169


General Situation Situation
Political

r 6 August 1951

SIC 9638

DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N
I.

BULLETIN BULLETIN

Military Situation
Highlights

UN forcep in the western and central sectors had several sharp encounters with anew groups up to battalion strength. Along the eastern sector advancing UN patrols encountered light to moderate resistance.

Activity in the US IX Corps zone was limited to light patrol contact with hostile groups up to battalion strength. Over 700 rounds of mortar and artillery fire fell on BOK 2nd Division and US 24th Division positions while patrols made minor, scattered contact with enemy groups. Other Corps units maintained positions and patrolled. In the US 3:Corps zone, ROK 7th and eth Idvision patrols engaged enemy gronps up to platoon strength.
ROK 3rd Division elements in the ROK I Corps zone made a slight advance. Other Corps units maintained positions and patrolled, making light contact.

Naval aircraft flew a total of 142 sorties, of which 14 were support missions. East coast aircraft, hampered by weather, flew offensive missions in the vicinities of Songjin, Hungnam and Wonsan, attacking enemy troop concentrations and communication facilities. Blockade vessels in the Songjin and Wonsan areas halberds& troop concentrations, supply depots and communications. In the bolbline area, naval gunfire destroyed a roadblock and dispersed troop concentrations. West coast aircreft, in offensive operations in the Sinchon, Haeju and Yonan vicinities, destroyed enemy supply dumps and harassed communications, while surface vessels boWbarded enemy troops in the Haeju area and gun positions in the Han estuary vicinity.


Navy

ROK lst Division patrols in the US I Corps zone engaged enemy groups varying from platoon to company size, while division positions received over 200 rounds of artillery and mortar fire. US 1st Cavalry Division troops forced the withdrawal of an enemy battalion and repulsed several small*scale probing attacks, while other elements advanced slightly. A total of 302 rounds of artillery end mortar fire was received. Other US I Corps zone umits maintained positions and, while patrolling, engaged enemy units of varying size.

30

No.

THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.

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Air
Zo7.,4A UN aircraft flew 576 sorties* including 271 coahat elesionG. Sup. r-ort ecte-Aes vera flown in all Corps zones and 69 reconnaissance missions uitaaeA targets in 24 areas. Night intruders hit targets in 35 wean. :t.dium,hreners fley four effective missions* striking principally at enemy
,tvuentd.flaion fac12.ities.

Gencral Situation

Wo aignificant reports Immix:en received during the past 48 hours.

iHta

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SIC 9639 BIC 9639 7 August 1952 1951 7

DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T 1 8


C. .E.

Military 8itaatlon Situation Military


HighliEhts

Action along the front was generally limited to patrol clashes between AN forces and enemy screening elements. An increased amount of enemy mortar and artillery fire was reported in the east-central sector.

In the US lst Corps zone, patrols of the US lst Cavalry tdvision engaged several enemy platoons, while other elements directed artillery fire against numerous enemy groups of squad to company strength and receivad 119 rounds of enemy mortar and artillery fire. US 3rd and US 25th Division patrols engaged enemy squad to platoon size units.

Elements of the ROK 2nd Division, in the US IrCorps zone, repulsed un attack by one enemy platoonl engaged several other enemy plateaus and received 66 rounds of mortar fire. US 24th Auld ROK 6th Dtvision patrols net resistance from enemy groups of squad to 'platoon-strength.
US X Corps units reported,increased enemy mortar and artillery fire. An estimated 160 rounds fell on ROE 7th Division positions, 420 iD the US 2nd Division sector and 76 on ROK 8th Division units. Patrols of the ROK 7th and ROK 8th Divisions, ranging up to 4,000 yards to the front, engaged tumorous enemy groups of squad to platoon strength.

No.significant activity was reported in the ROK I Corps moneuxcept in the ROK Capital Division sector, idlers 80 rounds of mortar fire fe11 en friendly positions.

Naval air sorties fran cerriers off both coasts totalled 221. Offensive operations were conducted against enemy troop concentrations Rilitary installations.


Navy

eta

Surface craft in the vest fired on enemy troop positions in the raeju and Sohae-ri areas and continued patro1 duties. ln the east, blockade ships boaberded eitht railroad and highway areas in the vicinity of Chonsjin and fired on enemy troop concentrations and gun positions near Wonsan.

31 3 THE THE
NO. No.

C.I.A. C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTIOU OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OP TO 07 THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS

009 009

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Air
land.based UN aircraft flev a total of 860 sorties, including 457 com.. Close support vas given UN troope in all corps zones. Armed reconnaissance and night intruder aircraft continued strikes against mis:ellaneous enemy targets throughout North Korea, while medium bombers hit 3elected coamunications points.

'eat missions.

11. II.

General General Sitaetion Situation


Socioloisical

A 3 August broadcast from Pyongyang describes the extensive epidemic disease control massures that have been instituted in North Korea since the 1)eginning of the year: It is claimed that over 836,000 persons verevacainated or inoculated against smallpox, cholera and typhus in this peroid. lbese measures allegedly reduced the incidence of smallpox by 23.9 percent.

DKB - 171

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= SIC 9640 g640


8 8 August 1951 1951

src

D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN DAILY


I.

I .

Military Sitiation Sitriation Military


Highlights

tor end launched silvers' counterattacks. patrol contacts occurred.

The enemy of&red determined resistance to UN forces in the western secElsewhere along the front only light

g'ong the remainder of the front,US IX, USXandRONICorps units held


posiVons and pitrolled,euking only light contacts with enemy forces. enemy vehicle traffic between Sinuiju and Pyongyang totals about 600 vaqicles daily and that traffic between Yongdok and PY0135,ang totals about 410 vehicles daily.
Tile Per East Oommasa notes that guerrilla activity in friendly rear tweet, has decreased markldly in recent weks. Unconfirmed reports of orders to tt: guerrillas to assenble southeast of Ingle nay possibly account for the Unrolled activity, although the purpose of this movement is Unknown. A more reseistic reason for ther inactivity, however, is probably the active role of tteROK troops and polies against the guerrillas.

Blockade ships along both csaste continued harassing and interdictory gunfire against various targets, including troop concentrations, limes of communication, buildinge and bridvs.

Naval air sorties totalled 236. Strikes vere made against targets in the vicinities of Kilchu, Songjir4, Pukchong, Bembung, Yonghung, Wonsan, Tongwing and Tongehon in the east, ard against targets in the vicinities of clinnempo, Pyongsan, Ullyul and the Nan esturary in the Itept.


NEx

In the US I '!orps zone, along the western sector, enemy forces offered determinee resistance to UK patrols, and counterattacked several times. The enemy placed an estimated 310 rounds of artillery and mortar fire on positions of the mi lst Cavalry Division southwest of Chorwon.

Army

xir
Land-based UN aircraft flew 63 sorties, including 304 =abet missions. Of 58 close support sorties, 47 veTe flown in support of the US I Corps, and
:re THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION
TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.

nli

NO..

009 009

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the remainder in the other corps zones. Armed reconnaissance and night intruder aircraft attacked numerous targets in enemy areas. Afedium bombers flew 19 sorties, aUacking various targets, some visually and same by radar control. AIr Observers reported sighting 790 vehicles in the enemy rear areas, of which 285 Imre moving south.

II.

General Situation
No signifIcant reports have been received daring the past 24 hours.

DI

- 172

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SIC SIC 9641 $ 4 1


9 August 9A w t 1951 1951

DAILY L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N


I:, 3.

M i l i t i f m y Situation Situation Military


Eighlights

Patrols of units,in the US I, IX and X Corps zones were in contact with enemy group* ranging from squad to comparysize. Advance elements of the US lst Cavalry Division in the US I Corne zone were forced to withdraw slightly wben attacked by enemy troops. On the other hand, US 25th Division pstrols in the same zone forced an enemy withdrawal. In the DS X Corps zone, patrols of the LG 2nd Division encountered two enemy companies and withdrew to avoid envelopment. 2namy mortar and artillery fire continued heavy across the entire front. Contacts were less numerous in the ROK I Corps zone.

Seventy-three naval air sorties were flowa including four in close support of the US II Corps. In the remaining mlssions buildings and vehicles were destroyed in the vicinity or Worsen and Ohuchonhujang in the east and in the Han Estuary in the west.
Surface vessels bombarded rail and highway targets near Chongjin and Songjin and fired on troop areas and gun positions at Wonsan and in the vicinity or the Han Estuary and Haeju.

Land-based UR aircraft flew 310 effective sorties, of 'which 79 were combat missions. Bad weather prevented further. activity and only three close support sorties were flown. Medium bombers were dispatched on only four sorties, including radar scope pbeto missons of Wonsan and Chinnappo.

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AESZ
Navy

UN defenses encountered Ugh& light to to moderate moderate reretBlQ forces force8 probing m t l n g enemy e m aefeIlsee sist~mcc. The sistance. occuxred in the the western western and The most ma8t determined determined opposition opposition ocmmed centre2 secotss where where groups g r q of of up up to to company ccapany streneth n?zvmgth mere vere engsged. engaged. central secotrs

Air

'*

C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION 33' THE C.I.A. 33 DECLASSIFICATION OF TO THE DECLILSSIFICATIOH 08 THIS DOCUMENTDOCUMENT. THIS

NO., No.

009

XI. II.

G o n u a l Situation situation General


PAlitical

Radio Melbourne reported on 6 August that tvo Brttish soldiers were kll/Ad on 5 August in Pusan and three others wounded when British military police mere called to restore order during a clash between Filipino soldiers and South Korean troops. The report adds that at least five Filipino soldiers and a Korean girl vere also wounded.
A Psychological Warfare Operations weekly report of early JUly states that friction between North Korean civilians and the Communist forces continues. The basis far the friction is, prinarily, the severe hardships placed upon the individual forth Korean as a result of Communist military operations and the lack of consideration far civilian interests. Reference is made to fighting between Chinese Communist broope and local inhabitants over food

URIC

. - 173 173

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1"

SIC SIC 9642 9642


10 Anguat 1951 10 Auguat 1951

D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N DAILY

1 4 i . h i t l y y Sitmtian i4i3.itary Situation


Bijaights

UN patrols in the western and eastern sectors encountered light to moderate resistance. In the central and east-central sectors, the enemy launched several sdnor counterattacks against UN front line units.

ROK lst Division patrols in the US I Corps zone engaged enemy group; up to compagy strength, vhile US 1st Cavalry Division patrols made similar contacts; mortar and artillery fire were received by Cavalry Divislom troops during engagements. Over 300 rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell on US 24th Division positions. All Corps units maintained positions; relief of front-line units continued. In the US IX Corps sone, ROK 2nd Division positions were attacked by an enmmy company, vhile division patrols engaged enemy groups up to platoon strength. Snell enemy groups probed US ith :Division positions; All ROK 8th Division patrols engaged several enemy platoon-sized units. Corps units maintained positions and continued to relieve front line troops.

UE 2nd Division patrols in the US I Cons zone vere forced to vithdraw 1n the face of an enemy platoon-sized attack. ROK 8th Division patrols also engaged groups up to platoon-size. Other Corps units maintained positions and patrolled.
A ROK Capital Division patrol in the ROK I Corps zone forced au eneny patrol to vithdrav, while other patrolling elements engaged an ,enemy company. ROK 3rd Division patrols engaged several enemy groups up to platoon-size. All BOK I Corps units maintained positions.

Naval aircraft from both east and vest coast carriers flew a total of 231 sorties. East coast aircraft attacked enemy gun positions, troop positions and comaunications facilities from Wonsan to Kilchu. Blockade vessels in the Chongjinvicinity boabarded rail and highway networks. In the Songjin area, naval gun fire vas delivered on troop areas, gun positions, buidges and highvay junctions.

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AER
Nov

34
\ sz17.

THE C.I.A. C.I.A. HAS HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTION THE TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OB OF TO DOCUMENT. THIS DOCUMENT.
No. No.

009 ~ 0 0 9

West coast aircraft attacked enemy buildings, troop concentrations and gun positions in the Haeju, Ongjin and Yonan areas. Surface vessels continued patrol missione and bombarded troop positions and a factory area.

Air
Otber UN aircraft flew 549 effective sorties, including 281 coMbat missions. Support sorties totalled 32. Other aircraft attacked enemy gun positions, buildings and communications facilities.

11.

US Ambassador Nhccio, commenting on the degree and intensity of feeling within the RON on the subject of the cease-fire, Observes that no new slant has agneared in speeches and messages. Muccio adds, however, that a "high emotional pitch" on the sUbject of unification may be reached at the celebration of Liberation day on 15 August.

DO - 174

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General Situation

Alr Observers reported sighting 2,485 vehicles, oflybich 1,180 mere moving south, and & total of Wenemy freighters and supply barges along the northwestern Korean coast.

Pollti& Political

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SIC 9643
11 August 1951

yri
:I.

D A I L Y KOREA'N K O R E A 3 B U L L E T I N DAILY BULLETIN

N;bituy Situation Situation Maitary

EIgnIgt!
Artivity along the front was limited primarily to patrol contacts and included several sharp encounters with enemy groups up to company strength. UN troops in the east-central sector lammehed limited objective attackn.

Army

/r. the US I Corps zone, elements of the US 3rd and 25th Divisions revulaed probing attacks by small enemy units, while elsewhere patrol contacts Tierr =serous.

Attempts by the enemy to prdbe positions of tbe ROK 2nd and US 7th Dic:aions in the US IX Corps zone were similarly unsuccessfUl.
IL the US X Corps zone prdbing attacks vere repulsed by the BOK 7th Diwlaion. Patrols of the US Prid Division encountered enemy mines. The 30K CU; Division engaged in several sharp skirmishes with enemy troops ari elenents or its 16th Regiment launched a United objective attack Which was repUsed by two enemy companies. Other elewnta of this regiment and the divtAtion reconnaissance unit mere attacked by an estimated two enemy com!?ssf.os and fOrted to withdraw. The friendly Przces then counterattacked, secure. the area and repulsed tvo enemy coanbarattacks. The Division's lett) Regiment also attacked fcrvard in its zone but vas repulsed by an
.

enew battalion.

1'1:ere vas only minor petrol activity in the ROK I Corps zone.

Naval air sorties totalled 242, of which 15 were in close support of In offensive operations ncl.th along the coast to Songjin and inland to Yangdok and Pukchong, enemy gun positions, buildings, railroad cars and vehicles were destroyed and troop concentrations attacked.

the WY I Corps.

Land-based u10 UN aSPcrW3 aircraft flew 683 sorties, which 36k were XRnb-Msed flew 683 00rt,let3~of a i which uere combat combat ndsde01.04A. #%Om , ,


Nary.

Air Air

29 close ClollG support 88&h8 ? O W corps CaXrp. areas. U a ' Po The 29 sorties were divided among all four

JT THE
No. No.

C.1.A. HAS NO OBJECTION OBJECTION THE C.I.A. TO THE DECLASSIFICATIOH DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. -

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Armed reconnaissance aircraft attacked targets in more than 50 areas. Medi bombers flew 21 effective sorties; targets included the Nvangjiu marshallil yards, Yonpo airfieldl Nyomipo supply center and tvo highway bridges.
AL B-26 some 17 miles north of Pyongyang vas attacked by enemy aircrart but vas undamaged. Royal Australian Air Force planes sighted 12 to 16 MIG 15's flying vest of the Yalu River and an undetermined number east of Sinuiju, but dia not make contact.

II. I f .

General Situation Situation General

DKB - 175

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No received furfuring the the past past 21, 24 hours.. hours" No significant a l g n t t t u n t reports report.have have 'been been received

U
SIC SIC 9644 9644

K.
I.

13 August 1951 1951 13 Ausurt

D A I L Y KOREAN E O R E A B BULLETIN BULLET18 DAILY

MUlfrry 8ituatlen Military Situation


Highlights

UN patrols continued to prcibe enemy positions along the entire front. ln the western sector UN forces engaged numerous enemy groups with artillery fire, *Ile in the central sector, several enemy platoon strength attacks were repulsed. An increasing amount of enemy artillery fire was received in the east-central sector.

In the US I Corps zone, all UN units maintained positions and patrolled, making light contact with enemy groups of up to platoon strength.

ROC 2nd Division elements in the US IX Corps sone repulsed a series of platoon-sized attacks while patrols made other minor contacts. All zone units maintained positions and patrolled. Patrolling forces of the ROC 7th Division in the US X Corps zone engaced ismY we* groups of varying size; US 2nd Division elements repuleed severia light probing attacks. Enemy groups and positions along the front were brought under artillery fire. Over 600 rounds of artillery fire fell on ROK 8th Division posttions in the east-central sector. All other corps units maintained positions. Advancing elements er the ROK 3rd Ldviaion in the ROK I Corps zone forced the enemy from high ground in the Xamjang.mi area. All corps units maintained and adjusted positions and patrolled.

Naval aircraft flew a total of 63 sorties. Although east coastair activity was curtailed by repleplehing operations, offensive missions were directed against enemy gun positions, consimications and buildings in the Xilchu and Tench= areas. Blockade ships in the Chongjin and Songjin areas bombarded rail and highwey junctions and other communication' facilities. At Wonsan naval fire was delivered on enemy shipping, troop concentrations, and suppl; and ammunition dumps.

West coast aircraft, flying offensive missions in the Chinnampo, Haeju and. Yonan areas, attacked enemy buildings and supply depots; surface vessels shelled enemy gun positions in the Yonan and Thchon-ni areas and communications at Xhmsan-ni.


AESX

Nem

3 6 THE 34;THE
No. No.

C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION C.I.A. TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS
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lf
SE

Air
Other UN aircraft flew a total of 765 aorties, including 425 combat missions. About 40 support sorties were flown in fl Corps zones, while 230 armed reconnaissance aircraft attacked targets in 80 areas. Night intruders hit targets in 92 areas, Medium bombers flew 20 eefective sorties, boMbi.ng the &trillion marshalling yards and the Haahung supply center.

Air observers sighted 800 vehicles on highways and 13 supply barges ard rata in the Ban River north of the Elmo Peninsula. According to the Far East Air Forces; observation of enemy jet aircraft in the Yalu border areas for the past two days and the possibility of incressed fighter strength at the Antung and Ta Tang Km airbases indicate that eneay mobilities for defending the YaluRiver line have been strengthened. The presence of 80 aircraft at Ta TUng Kan and 50 at Antung increases email/ air defense in being, and enables the enemy to mount a considerable nuMber of night aircraft sorties.

II. 11.

General Situation Gene.ra1 Situation

Lee Bum Suk, present ROK AMbassador in Formosa, is slated as the new defense minister of the ROX.
(Lee, ex-Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of the BOK, is., hovever, reportedly anxious to return to his diplomatic poat.)

The North Korean Government has lodged a protest with the UN concernirg the alleged use of poison gan by the "American interventionists."

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DKR- 176


Political Political
Psychological

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SIC 9645 ssc 9645

14 krguet 1951 14 August 1951


D DAILY A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N
I.

BULLETIN B U L L E T I N

Military Situation
RiePights

While UN patrols encountered only light, sporadic resistance all along the line, the enemy launched several minor probing attacks in the central and eastern sectors.

In m zone zone elements elements of of the the ROK 2nd Diviolon minor In the Iff US 31 IX C Corps BOK 2nd Division received received minor platoon-oized Other n IX Corps unite units p patrolled phtoon-oized probing probing attacks attacks for for the the second rrecond day. dsy. Other aLzed vith little vith l i t t l e contact. contact.
The ROK BOK 8th 8th Division Division in the W US X X Corps Corps zone YBS was forced forced to to Uithdrav withdraw elemeats elements a? i t a 10th 10th Regiwnt in the the face face of of a a battalion-sized battilion-8ized attack attack from fkom the the enemy. enemy. of its Regiment in The BOK ROK 7th 7th and md the ths US Iw 2nd 2nd Division Diririon also olso encountered encountered minor minor enemy enetuy probing probing attacks. attacks. The
On the east coast, the BOK Capital Division made a limited attack and maintained a patrol screen.

Naval aircraft flev a total of 227 sorties against enemy targets in North Karea. Major efforts were directed against enemy coastal installations and troop and supply positions in the Wonsan-Rungnam area. Close support missions vere flown for the US I and ROK I Corpa.

A. surface ves8el.s As UBI UN surface vessels maintain& maintained the the blockaac blockade and and fired fired on on *&eta targets in in the the Chongjin, Songjin, Tanchon and Wonran m f coast, Wonsan areas areas on on the the e east coast, a a bombardment bombardment o f tbe o~cur uemt coast coat& south sauth of Chinnampo Chinnampo alloyed allowed friendly friendly guerrilla guerrlLZa forces forces of the K Korean vest t o raakc 8 lending lauding , u s & &stray several aereral buildings. buildiagr. to make a and destroy

.UN land=based aircraft flew 725 sorties,'including 397 combat. A total of 230 armed reconnaissance flights vere flovn in the enemy's rear areas and 70 night intruder attacks vere made. While medium bombers flev only four sorties yesterday, a maxims effort of 71 aircraft vas directed against the enemy capital of Pyongyang today, with the results so far unreported.


Navy Alr

In the t15 I Corpe eo= 0 x 1tbe front, miaor activity US I Corps zone on the uerrtern western front, minor patrol patrol activity accounted accounted for for the the only oaly action. action. Elepsantr, Elements of o f both the l lst e t Coamonvealth Ccemonvealth Divlrion Division and the US US 3rd 3rd Division DiV1820n eotablished e3tablished advance advance patrol patrolbmea. and the bases.

alr

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!Sx

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. V

11. H.

General General Situation Situation

US anti-cease fire fire agitation agitation conconI S Ambassador Aubaessdor Mhccio Uuccio reports reporb that that 'while while enti-ceaae tinues tempo tinues at at about about the the sane (IIIP~ temp in in the the ROK, it i t seema eeem to t o be be "getting "getting more m e and ' Mdccio adda more dlfflcult for f o r the the government gwsrrmnent to t o stir stir up up enthusiasm." cxthuaiamm." Ehrccio adds that more difficult he he suspects suapecta "a na considerable coneiderable nuMber amber of of Koreans" Koreans" have have adopted adopted a a realistic rcslietic atattitude titude towards "de "& facto" facto" division division or of the the country. cmtxy.

Political Political

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SIC SIC 9646 9646

SE\ET

15 m August 1951 15 s t 1951

DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETII

I . I.

Military Military Situation Situation

R4hlights
UN forces continued to probe into enemy-held territory, engaging numerous enemy groups of up to company strength in sharp encounters. Some UN units made slight advances against stUbborn enemy resistance.

The T & ROK 2nd 2nd Division Division positions positions in in the the US US IX IX Corps Corps zone zone were were attacked, &;tacked, in but but the the enemy e m forces farces vere uere dispersed. dispersed. Minor M i n o r patrol clashes clashes occurred i n other unit sectors rectors of of the the zone. zone* In the In US X Corps VS C o r p zone zom, UN UNunits unitepatrolled. patrolled and and maintained maintained positions, psitione,
enemy. c I s c I I y .

;ith the the making w i n g only o w light light contacts contact0 vith

In ROK I Corps zone, zone, elnrnts elements o of the ROK ROK Capital Capital DiVl8iOn Division diecovered discovered In the BOK I Corp6 f the m psithe division attacked attacked e enemy posia r minefield a i o c f i e l d east eemt of of Sohung. Sohung. Other units of the ROK llth patrolled, and and the the latter t 1 O M . Elements Eleamntr of the the ROX l l t h and 3rd 3rd Divisions psttolltd, tions. division divirion dispersed dirperscd an an enemy e n e m y company caapany by by artillery artillery fire. ifre.
On the tbe basis barrio of Of information i & O m t % O n from * a various V M f O W sources UOUTCC6 including inClUdh5 prisoners )?OiSOn<trS of Of war, Tank Division, Tank Division, ths the Far Eart East Command crtimtes estimates that the the North Korean Korean lost 105t believed to Pyongyang, has been been f fUlly bslieved to be be located located in in the the vicinity vicinity of Pyongymg, u l l y re-equipped and re-trained sipce since itrr itshlast known appearance coMbat late 1950. MOM 8nd re-trained u t koovn appeumace inin coibnt in in late 1950. F E C W believes that with T-34 type. bsli~@ that 8 this t h i 8 division dirieion is is equipped equipped w i t h 120 1 2 0 tanks of the T-34

striking various various targets targets i in H Naval a aircraft a i r c t a t f flew ilcv a a total totsl of of 316 3 1 . 6sorties oortiea, strn and Yoagbaa-&ng Yongban-dong in the Songjin aad the vicinities of Woman, i n the Ilion, Choagdae-ri, Chongdae-ri Songjin Wonsan Iwn, em&, W Changnyon, C w o n , Ull;u1 Ullyuland andOngjin OagJinin inti;e the west. east, and Surface vessels continued to patrol off both coasts, and to bombard numerous Inland targets along both coasts.


Navy !!Ex
-

In the US r Corps zone, patrols of the ROK lst Division engaged small enemy groups, and received 38 rounds of mortar fire. Elements of the British lst Commonwealth Division conducted a reconnaissance in force, and succeeded in making and holding slight advances. Other units in the zone patrolled, emintained positions, and exchanged occasional fire with enemy groups.

38 38

Army

THE 4 0 OBJEC THE C.1.A. C.I.A. HAS HAS 1 NO OBJEO TO THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION 0 THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS
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No. NO.

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w
Air Air

W - b a a e d UN UN aircraft aircraft flew flew 11024 1 , 0 2 4 sorties, sorties, including including 641 canbet. Armed Land-based 641 combst. A n m e d reconnaisssnca targets in In numerous ~rrm#nwe mas. reconnaissance and other other aircrett aircraft s-ck struck at at vcrriow variowstargets areas. The scheduled pstOrday, yesterday, waa was made made by by 68 68 The strike 6trike on on lyomgyang, pyangVango reported as ocheduled medium medium bombers borabtre with with good good results. reeulte.
Air Air observers obaervera sighted a huge large number number o of f balf-trockrr halfAracks hauling hauling field rield guu guns of of au an estimated srthsted120 SW sim. PIP. in nor&weeteru northwesteru Korea. Of Korea. O f 300 300 vehicles sighted, alghted, 139 139 were =re moving moving south. south. Three tanka tanks vere observed some mlles miles southwest southwest of or Wonsan. Woaasn.
II. 1 1 . General General Situation SitU%ion

No significant signiiicant reports reports huve received during during the the paet 2b hours. have been been received past 24

DKB - 176

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.-

-#

I ,

w
16 August 1951

SIC 9647

DAILY KOREAN BULLETiN


Rigblighta
UN patrols continued to prehe enemy defenses encountering stObborn resistance In the extreme western and eastern sec4ors but only light resistance in the central sector.

/a the CB I Corps sone, elements of the ROIC 1st Division forced enemy units of company strength to withdraw, but later were forced back by an enemy battalion. A unit of the 1st Comonweelth Division engaged enemy units of ccupany strength and vas forced to withdraw to its former positions. A small amber at enemy troops attempting to penetrate a US 3rd Division patrol base were driven off. This division reported the discovery of a 120-pound Soviet white phosphorous boob in its sector, but the report is unaccepted by Far last Command pending the results of ordnance and chealcal warfare investigations.

In the IX IX and IC Corps sones, numerous enemy wroups were engaged but they offered only light resistance.

In the ROE I Corps zone, attacking elements of the ROE Capital Division withdrew, under intense enemy fire, to previously held positions. The ROE 3rd Division repulsed Wo enemy counterattacks, one by a unit of company strength and one of smaller scale.

Carrier-based planes flew 166 novel air sorties, imeluding close support missions for thi. OS IX and ROE I Corps. Off the east coast in the vicinity of Woman and north as tar as tiOngjin, antiaircraft positions, bridges, buildings, railroad cars and supply dumps were among the targets destroyed. Off the vest coast several buildings were destroyed in the vicinities of Nanchon, Chinne4o and Yonan.
Surface vessel* completely destroyed a previously damaged rail bridice

near Swain, hit three gun positions and a rail-highway intersection and
merle * road impassable at Wonsan, and bosbarded ten locations along the Ran River estuary near Town.


!Au

k 3 9 TYE C.I.A. C.I.A. THE

Bc73

HAS NO OBJECTION OBJECTIOU HAS NO ilp TO THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION or THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. . A'

No.

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Air
Land-based aircraft flew 733 sorties, of which 383 were coMhat. Twenty close support missions were flown in the US It_IX and X Corps sectors. Armed reconnaissance aircraft hit targets in 68 areas. Medium bombers flew only one effective sortie, a night leaflet mission. Vehicle sightings totalled 475, of which 188 were moving south.

1 1 . 11.

dansral Situation situatian General


No significant reporis bare been received during the past 24 hours.

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. 2.

SIC SIC 96148 9648

377
17 17 August A u p t 1951 1951

/ J

DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N


Military Militsty Situation Situation
Highlights

UN u10 patrols potrols encountered encountered light light to t o moderate modera& resistance reriatsnce along slol3g the the front. front. In In the metern western sector, 8cctor, UN Vmr'unit6 'units engpged engaged IeveraI several mderately-reslstiIJg moderately-resisting enemy groups, while vblle in in the the east-central ewt-cex$trel sector sector an enemy enemy campany company oiiemd offered stubbwn stubborn reriafanee. resistance.

US Corps Division troops troops resisted resisted and In the U S XX h (C o r p s zone, ZOM, ROK 2nd Divlolon and dispersed diepereed several s e r a probing probing attacks; attech; over over 160 160 rounds rouada of of artillery ertillery and and mortar mortar fire fire fell fell Corps unite maintained positlone, positions, and on &virion positions. ~ l t l o n r r . Other Other IX II Carps unit6 mintaired and fought fought on division rcattered patrol pstrol clashes. clashes. scattered

An companies to resist advanciw advancing element8 elements An enemy enemy force farce of of several r e ~ e r a companie8 l continues t o resist Other C Corps.units Oi the the ROK 7th Division Divi6ion in in the the US US X X Corp C m zone. gone. Other of ROK 7th m p s .unit8 patrolled, petrolled, Relief of front-line units md resisted re8iated light light enemy e n e m y.probing .probing attacks. Relief unite continues. continuos. and ROK Corps zone established established new new ROK Capital Capitrl Division Division units units in l a the ROK I C o r p zone pomltionr, VhUe other other division division units unit8 maintained maintained positions p i t i o n s and an8 patrolled. patrolled. positions, while ROK 3rd elements ellgnged engaged several platoon-sitcd platoon-sized enemy enemy group0 groups and and BOK 3rd Division Division element8 continued defemlra goaitions. continued to to occupy occupy defensive positions.

Naval aircraft flew a total of 203 sorties, including support missions in all Corps zones.

East coast aircraft, in offensive operations in the Songjin, Hamhung and Wonsan areas, attacked enemy gun positions, communications and shipping facilities. Blockade vessels btSbardel troop concentrations, rail and highway areas and gun emplacements.

Aircraft based off the vest 'Coast flew offensive missions in the Chinnampo and Yonan vicinities striking enemy shipping, supply lines and troop areas. Surface vessels firei on troop concentrations and gun emplacements in the Yorun pr'to. Yonan area.


Navy

ROK lst Division patrols in the US I Corps zone made contact with enemy groups from squad to company strength, while US lst Cavalry Division elements bad a day-long engagement with an enemy patrol. Other zone units maintained positions, patrolled and made minor contacts.

' '

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TO THE DECLASSIFICATION 01 THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT.


WO.

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CIQ 9

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az'r
Air

UB Isnd-bwed aircraft aircmf'tflew flow a a total t o m of o f 729 729 sorties, srx'tiea, including Including 82 support UN lawlbased support misrions missions and 282 2 & ? other other combat collbat sorties. aortiea. About About 185 1 8 5 araahd armed reconnalessncc reconnaissance airaircraft attacked attacked targets t u @ & 8 in in 73 73 rear swar areas, aress, while v h i l e 66 66 night sight inturders inturdera hit h i t targets targets craft sortie8, vith Medium bomber8 bombers flev flew nine effective effective sorties, with tvo two aircraft aircraft i n 124 324 areas. (~locu. Medium in ehm-bombing Hum-ri and uld the others athen hitting hitting troop troop concentrations. conccntrstlone. shoran-boMbing Nunu-ri
11. II.
General Situation General Situation

P o l i ticsl Political

DKB -,180 -,1& DKB

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North Korean Korean Prelnier n8 Premier Kim 11 Il Sung, Sung, i in a "Liberation Day" Day" addrese, address, etated stated that American-caused breskdrovn breakdown of or the the truce truce talks, talks, "they "they thst in i n the the event event of of an an American-earned v i l l be annihilated aMihilated ... not not only only on on land land but but also 83.80 in in the the air." vill

...

*or

SIC 9649 96L9


18 18 August 1951 1951

DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN


.

Military Military Situation Situation

41 $4
Highlipts H i g b l i g hta

THE c.1.A. C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTXOI OBJECTION TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION 08 TO DECLASSIFICATION OF

THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUb!ENT* THIS


UN defenses, encountering encountering the the moet most deterdeterW forces farces continued continued to to probe PJObc enemy defenses, mined resistance and emt-central. east-central sectors, sectors, where where enemy enemy groups groups mined resistance in i n the central c e snd up up to t o company corrl#rpr strength lrtrengkh were vex% engaged. engaged.

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Hri BavY
.
Songjin 8angjin area. 8rea.

Patrols Patrol8 of of the the us US I I Corps Carpe units unit6 made made only only minor minor contacts conteCts vith wlth the the enemy. e n . ROK two pla;taona, platoons, while while other corps ROK 1st b t Division Division engaged elagaged an an estimated catimted force f e e of tam attacks vere were units encountered unite encountered smaller smaller enemy enemy groups. group. Small-scale s n r r t - m c a l e probing attack. repulsed by repulsed by elements elementie of of the the US US 1st Ut Cavalry Cavalxy and and US US 25th 25th Divisions. Divirione.

In the US X X Cospe BOK 2nd 2nd Division Divi6ion patrols gatrob engaged engaged four enemy In /X Corps zone, zone BOK platoons and a platoon-atrength plat;on-strength pa~bing probing attack# attack. Friendly p latoo~ and repulsed repllacd s P j r i e w artillery in the WS US 7th 7th Divlaion Division fired firedon onan ane enemy squad.AARM In m quad. ROE6th 6thDivision DIVi8%On patrol wtrol clashed with an an enemy enemy. c company.

US and US X Corps Corps units, units, patrolling petroLlin,g aggressively -8siveJ.y aad making mMmg limited limitea advances, advances, encountered ROK 7th Division sector, encountered stubborn stubbarn resistance. renistsnce. In In the ROK '7th Division sector, elements dementa of of the the division division received received sporadic sporadic small m n l l arms arm6 and 8ad automatic autcgatic weapons ueapon8 fire fire from an an enemy enemy company, caagsoy, while t t w d UneUccessfUly from vhile other elartnfs elements a attempted unsuccessfully to to adadvance. US 2nd Division elements cLsllhed clashed with with MIterol several enwy enemy group. groups of of platoon platoon to comapny strength. to c~dlo~rqr strength. Elemen+% f om Elements o of one regibbnf regiment of of the the ROK ROK 8th 8th Division Division mrrde made a l u t e d advance, abence, while other e v d enemy a limited other element8 elements contacted e several enemy platooar platoons and and received moderate received moderate enemy enemy artillery a r t i l l e r y and and mortar mortar fire. fire. No Eso significant 8Qnificant action action vas WBB reported repopted in in the the ROK BOK I I Corps Corps zone. zone.

Naval Naval air sir sorties eorties totaled totaled 135, 135, the majority majority of of which which vere were apninet against enemy enemy target8 targets along along the #e east e m f coast. coast.

resoel. in i n the west Surface vessel* vest bombarded bombarded eight eight enemy enemy pooltione positions in the the Ean Ban R i v e r area. area. In River In the east, blockads blockade ahips ships bonbBlde'd bombarded six six &&road railroad rrnd and highway highway amea in the h o w n i and areas in the vicinity of C Chongjin and rhelled shelled caarmnnicationa communications paints points In in the the

Air A lr

69 attacked by 107 armed armed reconnaissance recollurri8amce aircraft. aircraft. 69 area6 areas were attacked by 107
II. 11.
Qex.B2r&l General

--baaed J N planes f l e w 542 542 sorties, eortiea, including including 2ll conitat. Targeta Land=based l UN flew 211 codbat. Targets In in
situation Situation

DKB 8 1 DNB - 1 181

100 significant; reports r e m a have h v e been received during during the the past paat 24 24 hours. houra. No significant been received

S.
20 August 1951

sc 965

DAILY ICOBEAN BULLETIN


I.

Military Situation

nab lights

Enemy groups up to battalion strength reacted strongly as UN units continued to probe enemy lines. Several enemy counterattacks vete repulsed.

In the US IX Corps zone, elements of the BOX 24 and US 7th Divisions vows end*EdbY smell eneMY groups vhich Imre, inmost cases, repulsed. Coe reement of the US 7th Division vas forced to withdraw after a short advance.

In the US X Corps saes enemy groups up to battalion size lald up the advancing ROK 7th Division. US 2nd Division units repulsed enemy probing attacks. Other Corps units reported no change.

In the US I Corps sone, the enemy launched three small prObing attacks against the US lst Cavalry Division and continued to resist the division's advance. Elements of the US 3rd. and 25th Divisions forced the withdrawal of small enemy groups, vhile making a limited advance.

In the =Isom, one enemy counterattack vas repulsed.

Due to replenishing andladimather, there veva no naval air operations.

Off the east coast, surface units successfully fired on oosnonLentIonn targets tram Chongjin to Wonsan.

ln the vest, an approathing typhocaprecluded surface operations.

Pyongyang, vith good results..

Air Air

UM land-based aircraft flew it2t sorties, including 267 combat.

Mbdiumbeibtra MN 17 sorties, mostly against railroad targets at

A total of 1,00 vehicles vas sighted, vith 1,114 moving south.

4a

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THE C.I.A. C.I.A. HAS NO NO OBJECTION THE TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF 08 TO THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS
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II. If.

Oeneral Situation aemral S1tUr;floa


Political

According to &French news agencyrepart from Norm, a UN command investigption of the Cassunist-alleged UN violation of the Naesong neutral sone has "failed to identify ....any UN command military formation" responsible for the violation. The UN communique is reported to have added, however, that the violation may have been "the work of a politically guided civilian group operating under instructions" to create a situation that mi,ghtcause the failure of the Naesong talks.
(Ite general area of Mesons has, since early 1951, been an area of RON guerrilla activity.)

DNB - 182

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t

SC 9651

7$T"
I.

D DAILY A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N

I .

Military Situation Situation Mllitary

The most moet significant significant ground ground action action occurred occurred along slow the east-central ea&-central and and eastern eclstern fronts, fronts, where where UN UIY units unit8 encountered encountered determined &termiaed resistance sesistance as a s they they along the the front front UN UIV forces forces Elsewhere along continued to prdbe probe enemy ewmy defenses. defenses. Elsevhere adjusted udjmted positions poeitions and and patrolled patrolled with with light light to t o moderate moderate contact. contact.

Liatag.t.12

2l u g u s t 1951 21 A August 1951

BULLETIN B U E L E T I B

Elements of Division, i in the 116 US IX IX Corps Corps zone, zone, advanced advanced El-& of the ROK 2nd Division, n the and r recaptured and e c a m d the the area area from f'mm which vhieh they they had had been been forced forced to to withdraw. withdraw, The The US minor while elements elements engaged engaged US 7th 7th Division Divieion repulsed repulsed a 8 m i probing attack whlle several Corps units aaintalned maintained positions positions and 6evera3 strong strong patrols. patrob. Other O w r e rC o q e Units and made made light light patrol patrol contact. contact,

. In advancing elementa elements of of the the ROK ROK 7th 7th D Division forced In the the US t S X Corps C a r p s zone, eane, dmnclxag l~lslon forced an enemy attack. au e m withdrawal wltkdraual and and then then repulsed repilred a a probing Ppdbattack. Other Other advancing advmncing elements encountered and repulsed element8 encountered determined deterrained resistance reoist~ace repulsed several several countercounterattacks. attach. Units Units of of the the ROK ROK 8th 8th Division Division 8lmil8rly similarly encountered strong strong resieresistance While units made made light tancc vhile continuing contlzmhg to to advance. advence. Other Corps C m *&ta light patrol patrol
contacts. COllt8Ct8.

30 Soviet tanks .in in the ~ Songhyon-ni vicinity, about 1 1 3 0 soviet ~ w n - vicinity, n i about nine nine miles miles northwest northst of of Xaesong. Kaesong.

In the BOK BOK Capital Capital Division Division In the the ROK RQK I I Corps Cmpe zone zone, advancing ad~ancingelements of the engaged undetermined m maker ground north of SohwsSohwaengaged an un86terabed r of of enemy enemy troops troops on on high high ground myon magon while vhile other other elements eleme&B continued coatinued to to attack attack north. north. Units Units of of the the ROK 3rd ROE 3rd .Division Division & made (L a slight alight gain. gain. Other other zone zone forcea d forces mahtalned maintained positiolls positions m and patrolled. patrolled,

In In the the east, east, ajar air operations oTerations vere were cancelled by by poor poor weather. westher. Blockade Blockade ves~els i n the the Chongjin Chongjin and and Songjin Songjin vicinities baaabsPded vessels in bombarded four four tall rail and and highhighway wag areas areas and and several several bridges. bri&es, At A t Wonsan, Woman, naval naval fire fire was vas directed on troop on troop concentrations, an an industrial induetrial area, area, and and several s m r d gun gun positions. positions. concentrations,


Navy EEz

In the Us US I Corps zone, and W US Cavalry Diri8ion Division patrols In I Corpa zone, ROK lst l e t &nd 3 lst l6f Cetralry patrols engaged many ranging to laaqy enemy ~ L ~ C P I C groups, FW, Y m a g from from squad SW to company coppsny strength; ~-43th; 170 1 1 9 0 rounds of zwunds Or artillery d i l l e r y and and mortar mortar fire fire fell f e l l on on ROK ROK lst 1st Division Division positions. Several probing prating attacks by the Several attacks were =re repulsed repulaed by the US aS 25th 25th Division. Division, Other Corpe Corps units maintained maintained positions unit. positions and and patrolled. ptrolled.

NO No.

Army a

OfY the the west west coast, c-t, veather conditions condstion+ cancelled cancelled both both air aSr and and surface surface Off veather uperatione 41, THE THEC.I.A. C.1.A. HAS H A S NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTION operations. ' TO THE DECLASSIFICATION Op DECLASSIFICATION OP
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S'ibETT

43

THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUUNT. THIS


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SE

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Air A ir

includillg 34 34 support W aircraft flew flew 761 761 effective effective sortiest sortlee including UN land-based landbased aircraft support missions mieaione, and w 326 326 other other offensive offensive sorties. eorties. Strikes S t r i b s in in 89 rear rear areas 82.888 were were made by by 201 sade 201 armed amed reconnaissance reconnaissance aircraft, aircrstt, while while 39 3 9 night night intruders intsvders hit hit dim bcelbers bombers flew flew tu0 two eorties; sorties; one one w leaflet e t miseion mission targets in te,rgete in 61 61 areas. m. Medium and made anB one one photo-radar photo-radar reconnaissance recoanaiseance were %ere made with w l t h good good results. resulte.

Qs

1 1.928were . 9 2 8 moving -vi=

Air observers total of 3,420 sightings, of of M which obfjeme reported reported a a total. 3,420 vehicle elghtbgs, ch south. SOU*.

Situation 11. II. General SitunMon

DNB - 183

NO significant No ainnificant report* report$ have hare been been received received during during tbe the past gapt 24 24 hours. hours.

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s1: SC 9652 9652

kuri

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22 August 1951 22 1951

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I.

DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N
Military Situation
l.ights wights

BULLETIN B U L L E T I N

Enemy activity activity in In the the western western sector sector was ws8 again wain limited limited to t o minor minor patrol patrol clashes. east-central and eastern sectors where UN unite units are attackclsshes. In the eaat-central ing to secure resistance is B@CUr@ commanding Campaandiag terrain, b m i n , Communist =0i8hIlC@ I S described de8Cribed as stubborn enemy regimental strength forced e t u b b m and an an e n e m y attack in I n regiaental streforced a a slight slight UN UN withvithdrawal. d r a m .

AM.

Sharp activity a c t i v i t y flared flared in in the the US US X X Corps Corpa zone zone north north of of the thelivachon Xwuchon reservoir the ROK ROK 7th 7th Division Division received received a a strong strong attack attack by an estiecrtlreservoir where where the by an mated reinforced enemy enemy regiment. regiment. Farther to esst other other attacking to the east attacking X Corps elements elements received received minor minor counterattacks counterattacks of of up up to %o company company strength. stmngtb.

The ROK I I Copra Coprs on on the the east eaet coast coast made madr! limited limited advances. The The ROK ROK llth 11th Divirrlon, hovever, was wae forced forced to t o withdrew withdrhv by by an an enemy e s q y attack, attack by w o battalions. Division, however, by ttwo battalions.
North North Koreaa Korean soldiers soldlers captured captured in in the the pest past few rev days days in in the US US X X Corps Corps zone have reported reported that that a a "general "general offensive" offeaeive" was waa to t o have have been launched zone been launched during the during t h e night night of of 21 2l August. A-t.

Ba6 weather weather restricted restricted naval naval air air activity activity to t o 25 25 sorties, a o r t i e ~ and ,and hampered hampered the the Bea blockading blockading activity activity of of UN UBI surface surface craft craf't on on the t h e west west coast. coset.
UN on UH surface surface craft craft patrolled patrolleh and and continued continued the the blockade blocon the the east esst coast. coast. haramred the the North Morth Korean Kcwean ports parte of of Songjin, Songjin, Chongjin Chongjin and and Wonsan. Worrsan. Baval gunfire harassed Naval

UN UIf land-based land-baeed aircraft alrcraft flew flew 370 3 0 cothat combat sorties eorties out out of of a a total t o t a l of a i 651. 651. While while only only four four medium medium bomber bmber missions were flora, flown, 175 iumed armed reconnaiasauce reconnaissance sorties aOUtie8 were were directed directed against against targets tatgcets behind behind the the enemy ellsmy lines. lines.
II. 11.

Political Political US CIS Ambassador Auibassactor Muccio Muccio reports reports that that the the news news of of the the US US Congressional COngre6SiOndl comcamlSittee's recommended recommended slash 6lmh of of 100 1cy) million dollar8 mittee's dollars from Korean Korean add aid hse has caused caused "considerable consternation" comternation" in In Korea. Korea. The The local local Korean "considerable Korean press hae has cha,racterised characterized the action ection as a8 "frightening" fY'rj.ghWning" and and "disheartening," "dirsheartening," and the a t s been the the ROK ROE dover-nt Government h has been

sUbjected strong questioning Natio9gAmelNAgnmpmfffftfil a d j e c t e d tto o strong questioning by by thethe Wtior& ~ ~ e ~ l &


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Air
General General Situation Situation

The western by the Tht western and central central portions portions of of the the front front line held heldby the US Us I I and IX C Corps the period period with with only only eporsdic sporadic patrol patrol a activity und ~ l t p swere quiet during the ctivity Enemy fire was received. received. on both sides. sides. E m e w mortar and artillery f i r e vaa

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DAILY KOREAN K O R E A E BULLETIN B U L L E T I N


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M i l i t a r y Situation Situation Military


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UN forces company to h battalion strength attacks attacks in in forces repulsed several several conpmy t t a l l o n strength Elsewhere along the east-central east-central. and and eastern eaet~rn eectors. Elsevhere elow the front, friendly the sectors. units patrolled patrolled with vith minor minor contact. contact. units

An A n enemy e m battalion battalion strength strength attack attack on on a a US u6 IX I X Corps Cory13 unit unit eight eight miles milee northeast of o f Kumhma Kumhwa vas sras repulsed repulsed after after friendly friendly elements elements withdrew Vithdrew 1,000 1,800 yards. yards. northeast Elaevhefe in i n the the zone, zone, IX IX Corps Corps units W t s maintained maintained positions poeftioxm and and patrolled. p8trolled. Elsewhere In In the east-central eaat-central Sector sector enemy enemy forces forces continued con%iruedto to show show strong strong opposition to to friendly friendly efforts effort6 to ta seize seize key key terrain terrain features ferrturea and and eliminate elhainate opposition Northwest of Yeaggu Yanggu enemy ths enemy's Cneay'B salient sslieot east east of of the the Pukhan Pukbn River. River. I?orthwt?et the enemy sttacks forced forced friendly f'riend3.y elements t o withdraw attacks to withdraw from from two two azeas, areas, although although one one of of the areas area8 was waa subsequently subsequently recovered. An the An estimated enemy battalion was enemy battalion naa engaged in r& one o m of of these these attacks attacks and snd. another another battalion-sized battalion-sized enemy encqy group group was w e s s engaged observed in the the area. area. Other US X Cmpe o advance advance on on Corps elenrents elements continued t to observed in high ground ground east east and and vest v e s t of of the the Punch Punch Bowl Bowl. area area against @a.inst moderate modmate resistance. resistanceo

BOK I attack in the the eastern eastern sector, sector, meeting meeting ROK I Corps Corps units unlbs continued to a t h c k In moderate resistance. resistance. moderate

UN mva.. naval aircraft flew as UN flew a total to-tal. of of 94 94 sorties 8ortl.e~ aa weather weather hampered bampemd flight flight operations. Carrier Carrier aircraft aircraft continued continued attacks on on communications cmmunhcatlone centers centere operations. along m t , wh-tle r a f t apttintairmd o a a t d patrol along the northerat northeast c coast, while rurfecc surface c craft maintained c coastal patrol and and blockade. blockade. A i r and off the weot suspended due due Air and surface opmxki0r.u operations off vest coast were suspended to veatber conditions weather conditions.

Other UN aircraft flew a total of 812 sorties, of which 431 were combat. Medium bombers flew 14 effective sorties including an eight-plane attack on the Sunchon railroad marshalling yard:.


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No. NO

In western sector, enemy In the western acctpf, US I I corps corps patrols probing pmbenemy defenses defenses l g h t tto o moderate A small sWl enemy enemy probing &tack In encountered l light moderate resistance. resistance. A attack in the Kumhwa Kumhwa area area was va.6 repulsed repulsed by by friendly friendly units. tulita. the

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General Situation Situation II. Generd If.

!Fruce l?egotlatioiw
Admiral. Admiral Joy's Joy's preliminary prellarlnary report report on on the breakoff of of confemnce conference negotiations, negotiations, broadcat broadcast by by Central Central Emits NeVa in in Tokyo, Tokyo, ePtpbesized emPhasized the the f3?audulent fraudulent n8ture nature of of the the Canmunist claim clalm of of an 6 1 )attack attack by by a a UN UDl aircreft. aircraft. According A c c m to fa the the report, the COmnunist Obvious obvious inability inability of of! the *he Communists Conxuuni6ta to to reach reach a a high high level level decision declsian in tn the the interval i n t e d from fpom 22 22 August Auguat to t o noon noon 23 23 August, Augut, the the nature nature of of the the damage damage -- which which ruggerted that small 8nal.i explosive charges chargee (poseibly (poaoibly &remdes) ecsttered suggested that grenades) =re were scattered oi dropied dropped from fWm an an aircraft aircraft -- and and the the statement ststernnt of of a 8 Chinese ChiaA6e soldier soldier that that or the whole incident t h e aircraft had had its ltr lights li&te on, on, strongly strongly suggest suggest that that the vhole wae staged. was staged.

--

--

A preliminary prclMnary report report from from the the 5th 5th Air Mr Force Force indicates indlcertea that that no 1 1 0 0N UI.4 planes plaaee A were in i n the the Kaesong IcBesong area area during during the the night ni@t and and that thst no no UN UN planes planes were vere off off were Force regorta reports that that c course, o m e , lost, lost, or or in i n difficulties. difficulties. However, However, the 5th Air Force an unidentified unidentified plane plane was W&B picked picked up up by by radar radar west weat oZ 02 Kaesong Kes;song at at 2130. 2 l . 3 0 . an
The T h e phraseology phrtLeeology of of the North North Korean Korean announcement announcement that the Khesong Kaeaong cease-fire talk8 talks would would be broken broken off now on" on" l left cease-flre off "from "from now e f t unclear whether whether the the break was w a a a ~ clear-cut clear-cut and and final final one, or whether N m 11 break Nam Il had had intended intended to to leave leave the way w a y open open for for resumption resumption after m e r an an effort effort to to settle settle the the problem problem of of the the the "lboWbing." "bombin&." Whatever the the answer, amwer, there seemed seePred to to be several sewerd. possibilities possibilities open Commmists, most open to to the Commnlsts, most of of them them tied tied in i n with w i t h the approaching approaching San Francisco Conference. Francisco Conference.

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DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN I C O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN


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Military mlitary SituatIon Situat!.on

Action in Action in the t h e western western sector oector was vas limited limited to t o patrol pafir01 clashes, clashes, while while to to the up t to two-battalion size size made made probing probing s attacks t h e east east several sever8l enemy enemy groups group6 of up o tvo-battalion ttack8 and counterattacks, all of which were repulsed. and counterattacks, all of which were replleed.

Army
All Corps reported numerous claehes clashes with All five five divisions divisions of of the the US US I I Corps small enemy groups d l enemy groups while conducting conducting patrols petrole and and small m a l l raids. aid de.


Navy ! E ! l Air A i r
. I I

There US M IX Corps, Corps, but but the the US US 7th There vas vaa little little change chhrrge in in the zone of tthe h e US Division repulsed in Divi8ion r e p u l e d an an enemy enemy reconnaissance reconn~iesance i n force. force.
In BOK 7th In the US X Corps C o z p zone, zone, the the ROK 7th Division Division withdrew withdrew temporarily t e m p o r a r i l y before before The 2nd attack, while while the the BOK ROK 8th 8th Divlaion Division Division repulsed a small small enemy probing attack, met stubborn.resistance stubborn resietance during during a a limited limited advance. advance. BOK ROK I I Corps Corps units unite repulsed repuleed two two small saadll probing probing attacks. attach.

.a tva-battalion twobattalion attack, -8 attack, but but counterattacked counterattacked and and regained regained the ground. ground.

east, UN UN carrier aircraft aircraft fflew only 73 73 sol%iea sorties oving owing tto weather In the east, l e w only o weather Surface operations conditione. operations were also limited. conditions. Surface
Off the weet west coast, or surface off coast, there were no no air air w surface operations. operations.

weather conditione, conditions, UI9 UN lsnd-based landbased aircraft Because of poor veather aircraft flew flev only only 132 sorties, including 1% tncluding 46 46 coMbat. conhat.

11. II.

General Situation Ooneral

Kaesong_ hvce Truce Talke Talks Izaesong

A 23 u g m t North Korearr 23 A August Korean radio braadcast broadcast accutle8 accuses the the US US of of bvillg having plunged the Korean truce conference into "finally plunged i n t o its its biggest crisis." crisla."
breaking off A revealing revealing commentary conmtentary on on Communist Coamnuniet strategy strategy in in breoff the the conconmay be seen ference mny 8een ii in a a 22 22 August article article (written (written prior prior to to the.breek-off) the. break-off) by Alan Winnington correspondent Worker." Alan Winnington, correspondent for for the the British B r i t i s h Communist Contnunlst "Daily "Daily Worker." Winnington notes that "it become becomes increa0ingl.y increasingly clear clear the the Americans Americans are are tryins trying Winnington t o maintain tensione to to pressurize prf388WiZe the the Japan Japan peace peace signatories." signatories." Be warns to maintain tensions measures w vill certainly be taken taken by by the the Koreane KOreans and and Chinese Chinese ... that "further "further maeiure8 lll c e w l n l y be tlitritlf.AcEsiffit_ilrovide a t to o guarsrrtee guarantee tho the = neutrality" u t r s l i t y i ~ of tthe h e ZO=, zone, ir if ~ t p ~ ~ ~ t ~ n c satisfactory answer esticsfactory w v e r for for an aa earlier earlier incident:. incident. TO THE DECLASSI2CITI ITT DECLASSIFICATgOI op 46 4 THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT, 3 . 6 DI[B 186 186 DKB

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25 25 August 1951 1951

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DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N


I. I.
Military Military Situation Situation

Highlights ElelignE
UN and repulaed repulsed several several determined determined UN forces forces consolidated newly-won positions and east-central and and eastern eastern enemy counterattacks. coUnterattecks. Action Action was VBB heaviest hesvieet in the east-central enemy sectors unsuccessfully to diS10dge dislodge UN UN u units from vhere the t h e enemy enemy tried tried uneucceeefully n i t s from erctore where strong defense defense positions. positions. strong

krmy
U n i t s of of the the US US I I and and IX IX Corps Corps maintained maintained positions positions and and patrolled, patrolled, Units 600 rounds The enemy enemy placed 600 m8king only only light li&tcontact contsct with vith enemy enemy forces. forcer. The making of in of mixed mixed artillery artillery and und mortar um'tar fire fire on OB UN Ul'?positions poeitions south south of of Otan 0i l l the the western aector. sector.
US US X X and and ROK ROK I I Corps Corpa elements element6 in in the the east-central east-central and and eastern eastern sectors 6e&ors successfully eucce8efully repulsed repulsed enemy enemy prObing probing attacks. sttacb3. Some Some units units made msde slight s l i g h t advances, advances, while othersmaintained vhile others maintained positions positions and snd patrolled. pstrolled.
The The Far Far East E a s t Command Cornrand now mv locates 10CSiXSthe the CCP CCF 20th 20th Army Axmy at at Wonsan Uoneanand andhas has. tentatively accepted accepted the enemy's n tentatively enemy's let lst and 3rd Armored Armored Divisions Divisions a6 as being being iin Korea, but hae not not definitely definitely located locsted them. them. Korea, but has
.NaLU


Air

Naval aircraft, flying flying 52 52 sorties, sorties, struck struck various varioue targets targets along dong the the esst coast c w t from from Tanchon Tanchon to to Wonsan. Wonsan. No sorties east s o r t i e s vere flown floun in in the t h e west. vest.

Blockade vestsels along along the the east e a s t coast coast bombarded Blockade vessels bombarded targete, targets, principally principally railroad and highway highvay facilities, f a c i l i t i e s , from from Songjin Songjin to t o Wonsan. Uonean. An enemy shore railroad and shore b s t t e r y firing firing on on UN UN vessels vessels was va8 silenced. silenced. battery
W U veesele off the the west west coast comet made made no IID enemy enemy contacts. contacts. UN vessels off

Land-baeed a i r c r a f t flew f l e w 501 501 combat combat sorties sorties in in a a total totel of of 849 849 missions. mis6ioae. Land-based UN aircraft Ib t o mnneroue aorties flown flown by armed and night night In addition to numerous sorties armed reconned~eauce reconnaissance and intruder 17 sorties, sorties, attacking the marshalling msr~hdlling intruder aircraft, medium medium bombers flew flew 17 attacking the yurds a t Sinanju SinaaJu and and a a supply eupply center center at a t Chinnampo. yards at
Air observers sighted sighted 2,200 vehicles, southward. vehicles, 970 970 of which were moving moving southward.

If. I/. General General Situation Situation


No significant the past past 24 24 hours. hours. significant rcporte reports have been been received received during the
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27 27 August August 1951 1951

DAILY D A I L Y
I.

KOREAN K O R E A N

B U L L E T I N

BULLETIN

Military Situation Highlights

the.east-central and central sectors of t the front, UIi UN forces made In the,east-central h e front, limited gains againat against heavy enemy resistance and l i m i t e d gaina ancl successfully succeesfully contained contained

several enemy counterattacks. counterattacks

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the Corps zone, all five UN divisions In t h e US I Corpe f i v e UIP d l V i 8 i O n S reported only only patrol clashes clashes with w i t h small small enemy enemy groups. groups.


Navy
Air Air
U I

was a l little heavier, as as minor minor probing probing Action in in the US IX Ur Corps zone wks i t t l e heavier, attacks of the the US attacks by by company-sized company-sized enemy enemy groups groups were were repulsed. repulsed. Elements Elements of 7th Division Division made made limited limited gains wins against against moderate maderate enemy enemy resistance. resistance.

In t h e US US 2nd 2nd Division Divisionstse las heavily heavily engaged engaged when when In the US US X X Corps Corps zone, zone, the company compsny size rlze penetrations penetrations were were made made in i n the the lines llnee of of attached attached ROK ROK tToops. troopse UN counterattacks u10 counterattscks are are in in progress. progress, In In the eastern half of the corps corps zone, zone, UN artillery a r t i l l e r y was wa8 active active against agai.net numerous numerous enemy enemy targets. targets. Action in to Action i n the the! ROK ROK I I Corps Corps zone zone was ybs limited l-ted to patrolling. patrolling.

naval aircraft aircraft flew flew a CL total t o t a l of of 249 249 sorties, eorties, striking striking enemy enemy communicommuniUN naval cation6 targets t a r g e t s along along both both the the west met and and east east coasts coasts of of North North Korea. Korea. catione

Surf8cc ships maintained maintainea blockade end patrol p a t r o l of of coastal coastsl waters vatera and md Surface blockade and bombarded boanbarded key key enemy enew installations. Installations.

Other Other UN UN aircraft aircraft flew flev a a total t o t a l of of 1,051 1,051 sorties, eorties, including including 570 570 combat combat missions. Medium Medlum bombers bombers flew flew 22 22 sorties eorties vith v i t h major major attacks attacks on on the the marmarsahlling ashlling yards at at Kunu-ri I(uw-rl and and Sinmak. Sinmak.

II. 11. General Situation Situation

Political Political
A A Korea Korea Times Time6 article article states etatee that the t h e Korean reaction t to o tthe h e breakoff breakoff in in armistice armiiticc talks taUm vas VM "one "one of of no no surprise surprise at at the the Communist Coxmnist frameup." f'rameup." The The article quoted quoted a a source source close close to t o President Preeident Rhee Rhee as as saying saying the the Korean Korean GovernGovernarticle ment "rather "rather welcomes" welcomes" the the breakoff breakoff "unofficially," "unofficially," but % e s t thing ment but that the "best THE C.I.A. C.I.A. HAS HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTION THE for the t h e government government to t o do do is I s keep keep quiet." quiet." for 411.Ak TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATIOPJ `i TO DECLASSIFICATION Or 07

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newspaper further Avther claimed that that members of o f the the ROK Assembly Asoembly likewise likewise The newspaper were not not surprised eurprieed at at the the lack lack of good good faith faith on on the the part of of the the Communists, Corrmruurlsts, and snd that that they they feel feel President Weeldent Rhee's Rhce's consistent consistant stand stand on on negotiations negotl8tions with vith the the Communists Communists "has "has been been proven proven right." right e

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28 August 1951

DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN THE C.I.A. HAS WO


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OBJECTION

I.

Military Situation

TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OW THIS DOCUMENT.

H i g h l i g hts Highlights

NO. No.

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secured In UN forces In the eastern eastern and and east-central eaet-central sectors aectcrrs advancing UX force6 secured local objectives against moderate to stUbborn enemy resistance and local objectives qpinet moderate t o atubborn enemy resistance and repulsed repulred counterattacks counterattacks by by enemy enemy groups groups up up to to regimental regimental size. eize.

Army

US US /X H Corps Corps elements element8 repulsed repulsed enemy enemy attacks attacks at at two two points point8 east east of of Friendly elements element6 continued continued the tht engagement engagement and and occupied occupied advance advance KUmhva. Friendly KUmhwa. positions. po8itlona. In the area In tho area northwest northwest of of Yanggu US US X Corps Corps units m i t e repulsed repulsed enemy enemy attacks attacks Northeast of Yanggu friendly I n platoon to to company compaay strength. strength. Northeast of Ysnggu friendly elements elements in enemy A n estimated emmy by company repulsed several acveral attacks attacks by company size oiae enemy enemy groups. An battalion forced elements of a US regiment to make a slight withdrawal battalion dentso f ' regiuen.1: t o m a k e a slight withdrawal before the before the attack attack was was contained. contsined. Units UPits of of the the ROK BOK I I Corps C o w captured captured an e m important iprpartant local local objective objective in in the the An estimated enemy n estiurated eastern esstern sector sector against agnlnst light light to to moderate aoderate resistance. rreirtance. A regiment counterattacked ragbent countersttacked in i n an en effort effort to t o recover recover this this objective objective but but was waa repulsed. npulrcd.

captured prisoners prisoners are are reported reported tto have referred referred to to Several recently captured o hsve a by Kim 11 Il Sung Sung for for the the first first part part a general general offensive offemlve personally permonally ordered by of be the greate8t greatest sssault assault hunched launched against against o f Septebher; Septeder; they they expected expected it to be MI forces. forces. UN

UN naval 47 sortice sorties with with flight flight operatione operations -red hoovered by by UIY naval aircraft flew 47 Carrier aircraft bombed bobbed key points on detcrloratiag warther conditions. conditions, Carrier deteriorating weather vest e t coast the the rail rail line lfne along along the the northeast northemt coast. coast. Other aircraft off the w craft continued patrol r a f t continued attacked secondary attukcd lrecondary targets targets in i n the tho Haeju Ea.eJu area. area. Surface c and and harassment haxnsement activity. activity. Air

combat Other Other UN aircraft aircrett flew flew a E total t o t a l of of 547 547 sorties, bartiem, of of which which 221 22l were w r e couibat Four effective medium bobber sorties were flown, with one airwith one airmissions. pis6iom. Pour effcctlve mdiurn boder sorkies were craft bombing the craft bombing the enemy enemy rear rear area area supply supply and and communication communication center center of of' Yangdok Yengdok and the other otber planes plaaee flying flying leaflet leaflet and and surveillance surveillance missions. mimei~.
II.

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Nevy

General Situation No 'significant reports have been received during the past 24 hourk.
SE

'In the western western sector Corps with light ' In the sector US I C o r p a units units patrolled With light enemy edeny were ambushed ambushed in the the Chorvon Chorwon Btca area J e e p of of a a tank-infantry tank-infantly patrol vem contact. Jeeps but but tank tank fire fire dispersed diapereed the the enemy enemy troops. troop.

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D A I L Y

DAILY KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N


Highlights

Military Situation

In area north Evachon Reservoir, the enemy mounted In the the! area north of the the Ihchon mounted several sever8l hattalion-site battalion-rize attacks attacks vhich vhich UN UtQ units u n l t s repulsed. repulsed.

ry
Action Action in in the the US US I I Corps Corps zone zone was was limited limited to to patrol patrol clashes claehes while while elements elanents of of the the US US 3rd 3rd Division bivision regrouped. regrouped. Units of Units of the the US US /X IX Corps Corpe also also reported reported only only patrol pstrol action. actlon.

An enemy An one= counterattack counterattack forced forced a a slight rllght withdrawal withdrawal of of a a ROE ROK regiment regiment which which had had seized aefzed some so= high high ground. gramd. ROE I Corps, Corps, t the ROE Capitd. Capital Division In the ROK h e ROK Division received received a a heavy heavy volume volume elements of the the ROK 11th llth Division of artillery fire. fire. Counterattacking elements Division
-.

forced a a slight sllght enemy enemy withdrawil. withdrawdl.

Owing Owing to to poor poor weather weather conditions, conditions, UN UB carrier carrier aircraft aircraft flew flev only only 33 33 missions on laissiono on the east cast coast coast and and none none on on the the west v e s t coast. coaot. East coast mt coset surface surface vessels oeseela continued continued to to bombard bombard communications CommlniCatiOM targets; trug@ts; on the on the west uest coast, coast, surface surface units upits patrolled. patrolled.

UN UIJ land-based land-based aircraft alrcrSrt flew flev 312 3 l . 2 sorties, sorties, including Including 88 88 combat. combat, Medium bombers flew flew 12 12 missions, mission6, but but the the results resulks have have not not been been reported. reported. Air with 277 A i r observers observers sighted sighted 683 683 vehicles, with r;17 moving mvlng south. eouth.

11. Oeneral Situation II. General


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Air Air

ROE 7th In the zone eone of the the US X Corps, however, however, IROK 7th Division Division troops troops repulsed repulsed . the area area several prdbing attacks pirobattachs including Including four four of of b:ttalion battalion strength strength in In the the adjacent to east, the US In the auacent zone to the e a t , ZRS north Reservoir. north of of the Hwachon Hw8chon Reoervolr. 7th Divieion Division and and an an attached attached ROK regiment regiment contained contained several several attacks atfacke from from enemy enemy groups gzwrpe up up to tc, company company strength. strength.

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DAILY KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN


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I. I.

Military Situation Military situation

Highlights
Action vas Action YBS still e t i l l heaviest heaviest in in the the east-central east-central and snd eastern emtern sectors, sectore, wbere where UN UH forces forces made made lindted limited gains gains against se;aiast moderate moderateto tostlibborn Crtubborn enemy enemy resistresistSeveral counterattackfl counterattacks by by enemy enemy groups groups of of up up t to company size ance. Several o company size were were repulsed repulsed by by friendly friendly units units while whth consolidating corusolidating positions gaeitiom on on high high ground. gmuado

X E !

In the the IR US IX IX Corps Corps zone, the ROK ROK 2nd Division Division received received 150 150 rounds rounds of In zone, the of Other units in the corps zone patrolled artillery and mortar fire. artillery end mortar flre. Other units in the corps zone petrolled and and mainmaintained po8iti01~3, positions, making light tained light contacts contacts with with enemy e n e m y forces. forces.

US X X Corps Corps zone, zone, an an estimated estimated force force of of two two enemy enemy c companies attacked In tthe h e US oz~~anla attacked s the ROK ROK 7th the 7th Division, Division, but the the attack attack vas v&8 repulsed. repulsed, The The enemy enemy placed placed approxiapproxlthe US US 2nd 2nd mately mately 110 110 rounds round8 of of artillery u r t i l l e r y fire fjze in in the the division divielon sector. sector. In In the Division engagements with with enemy enemy forces forces of of up up tto company Division sector, sector, several several engagements o company Sporadic anew enemy strength occurred, units made slight strength occurred, as as friendly friendly unlto s l i g h t advances. Sporadic mortar fire sector, Vhih while unlts units of of the the mortar fire fell f e l l in i n the the US 1st Marine Division Sector, Elements 02 of the the ROK ROE 5th 5th and and 8th 8th Divi8ioae Divisions regrouped regrouped and and division regrouped. Eleaents
patrolled. patrolled.

In the the ROK I I Corpe Corps zone, zone, attacking attacking elements elements of of the the ROK ROK Capital Capital Division Division In resistance from from an an enemy enemy compsay company along along a ridge, ridge, and, in met stlibborn stubborn resistance i n the the of au an enemy enemy ndmfleld minefield and heavy firt, fire, vithdrev withdrew several several hundred hundred yards yards face of ROK 11th ilth Division Division secured secured a ah hill after meeting meeting eastward. Elements of the ROK i l l after stubborn resistance sad and 120 120 mm. mm. mortar mortar fire fire a at the rate rate of of one stubborn enezry enew reriatance t the one round round

per minute, minute. per

The to Far Gaat East Colmnand, Command, remain8 remains one one of of The enemy easmy pattern, pettern, according according t o the Fur Unconfirmed active active defense, defense, featuring feewing strong strong and and persistent persistent counterattacks. counterattacks. Unconfirmed reports reparts state s t a t e that that enemy enemy forces forces are are regrouping; ngroupbg3 these these shifts shifts could could be be a a preprelude to the offensive vbich recently captured prisoners of war have reported lude to the offenelve which recently captuna prlaoners of war have reported According to to other other prisoners prisoners of of war, war, the the 1BE NK V VII vill begin w ill b c g h on on 1 1September. S e p W r . According I1 Corps is to move from Wonsan to relieve either the NK II or V Corps in the C o w is to mve from Wonsan to relieve either the "IS X I or V Corps in t h e eastern sector before the the next next offensive, offensive, and and the the 1oK EK VI VI Corps Corps iis now moving moving eaetern sector before s now northeast from northeast fron Haeju Eaeju across acrobs the the peninsula, peninsula, possibly possibly to to relieve relieve the the VII VfI Corps Corps The NK Corps is eastern front front ffrom at Wonsan. The HK I I Corps is also reportedly moving tto o tthe h e eastern rom the tht western w s l e r n sector. sectoro Jr1 5' THE THE C C.I.A. HAS NO NO OBJECT108 OBJECTION . I . A . HAS TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION 03 OP TO


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enemy placed placed Corps units patrolled US I Corpo patrolled and and maintained positions. porritions. The The enemy approximately 70 mortar fire approxiaQ!htely 70 rounds round8 of of artillery art;illery and and mortar fire in in the the US US lst 1st Cavalry Cavalry Division sector. Divlcrion

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sector is is indicated, Indicated, A possible increase increaee in In armor 8 3 1 1 y ) r near near the the western western sector A accepted at at Sariwon, Sar won, with the the NK NK 105th 105th Tank Tank Division Divlslon (L20 (L20Tanks) IsntrS) tentatively tentat vely accepted aith and and the the CCF CCF lst let Armored Amnored Division Divirlon tentatively tentatively acdepted acdepted in in the the Singye Singye area. area.
Navy mralvy
Naval carriers f flew approximately 117 117 sortlea, sorties, attacking attacking Naval aircraft aircraft from UN carrier8 l e w approximately numerouB targets target8 along along both both coasts. coests. Blockade Blockade vessels vessels off off both coasts cossts conconnumerous t i n u e d to to patrol pstrol and and to to bombard tinued bcabard various various targete, targets, Including including enemy enemy troop troop p i t l o a s in in the theRani:liver E8n River area. area. positions

Air -

II. Situation 1 1 . General Situation

Tao Peiping fall fail to shed any any further 'pwo 29 2 9 August A u g t s t radio radio broadcasts from from Pelphg Both braadcssts broadcasts re-eremine re-examine in in detail light light on on the the fate fate of of the the truce truce talks. talks. Both the by llalson liaison officers officers of of the the the circumstances surrounding surrounding the "investigation" "investigation" by alleged alleged 23 23 August August aerial aerial bombing bom3blng of of Kaesong Kaesong and anb attempt attempt to to place place the the onus onur the talks t s i k e on a the the UN UN Command. c m . for bmakiag breaking off the

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KastsmETru Kaeeong Truce Talks

O f 895 895 sorties flown UIU aircraft, airCrait, 528 528 were combat combet miaelona. Of flown by by land-based landbased UN missions. Ta;rgets I n 227 227 areas ere$6 amed Targets in were attacked by 366 armed reconnds8ance reconnaissance planes planes and and 56 Intruder aircraft. aircraft. Medium attacking the Medium bombers bombers flew flev 13 13 sorties, sortles, attacking the 56 night intruder wseag3ung-dong 0upply center, center, Yangdoktand Yaagdok,and enemy enengr troop troop concentrations. concentrations. Maengjung-dong supply

sc sc 9660 9660
31 31 August 1951 1951

DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN


I1 II

Military Situation Situstion Military


Highlights lantOlt

Action Action on on the the Korean Korean front front continued continued heaviest heaviest in I n the the east-central east-central sector, sector, vhere met stUbborn resistance and repulsed several where advancing adoancilrg UN u10 elements element6 mst stubborn resistsnce probing attacks. attsclre. probing

!E?x
Army

pwng attack attack on on a a friendly friendly patrol patFol base. probing

Enemy groups of undetermined atreogth strength were were engeged eneAged and and repulsed repulsed by by L n e w group patrole patrols of of the the US 25th 25th Division Divioion in in the US I IX X Corps EO=, zone, and and ROK ROK h 2nd d DiviDivision patrols patrols engaged t m e d one ollt enemy enemy platoon platoon and and dispersed dispareed an an enemy enemy squad. 8quab. In In sion the patrol forced tvo two cllemy enemy platoon6 platoons 7 t h Division Dlviaion sector, aector, an an Ethiopian pstrol the US 7th t o withdrav, Withdraw, vhile vhile the the Bthiopiaa t h k s by to Ethiopian Battalton Battalion rtpulecd repulsed eeperate separate a attacks by one enemy platoon platoon and snd one one company; campany; slight slight advance0 a d e by enemy advances uere were m made by divielon division elementeelements. ROK 6th 6th Division Division patrols patrols dispersed dispersed two tuo enemy enemy squads. squads. ROK

In the a ~ p ezone, the US US X X C Corps zone, ROK ROK 7th 7th Division Division elements elements tepulsed repulsed several several platoon platoon strength strength probing p b i n g attacks, and and friendly pstrole, patrols engsged engaged enemy e@squadstrength groups; groups; elements elements of of one one regiment regimznt made msde a a slight alight advance. advance. Platoon company strength attack6 attacks were were reprlsed repulsed by by elemnts elements of of the the Us. US 2nd 2nd DivlDiviand coageny slon. US 1st let Marine Ellarim? Division Division turWd sion. The US turned back back several smclll-ecale small-scale enemy prObing probing attacks attack8 while while division division elements element8 attacked attacked northward. northwardfire was vas placed on on two two enemy enemy companies companies by by the the ROK ROK Capital Capital Division. Division.
Navy
adjusted positions. poaitions. Artillery ROK I I Corps Carps units unite generally maintained and adJuated

In east, Task Task:Force 77 planes planes Naval air sir sorties aorties totalled totalled 142. 142. I n the east, Force 77 struck installations and tten e n enemy troop struck at eneaty enemy installations troop concentration6 concentrations alon6 along the the coaat the frontlines, lines, while while surface &ace vtseeb b d a s d e d enemy coast and and acrc88 acme the front vessel* boMbarded enemy coastal targets. West Weat coast cosst a i r c r a f t destroyed 6everal enemy ;buildings aircraft several'enemy buildings coastal targets. and attacked an enemy troop troop concentration, vhile vhile surface c craft continued to to md r a f t continued patrol.

In the the t18 US I In I Corps Carps zone, zone, patrols patrols of of the the ROK ROK 1st let Division Division engaged engaged one one enetny company and and several several enemy enemy groups group6 in in squad squad to t o platoon platoon strength. etrength. US US enemy company lst l e t Cavalry Cavalry Division Division a artillery r t i l l e r y dispersed an undetermined n nudber \ L I p b e r of of the the enemy enemy vhilc divleion patrols engaged while division engaged a reinforced reinforced enemy compsny company and and several several Division elements repulsed repulsed a a ema;ll-scale small-scale enemy enemy rlnaller groups. groups. US 3rd 3rd Division smaller

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Sit THE C.1.A. se C.I.A. HAS HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTION


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Air
Landbased Land-bseed UN UNaircraft aircraft flew flew922 922sorties, eorties, of of' which which 537 537 were were coMbat. combat. Six S i r light llght boMbers bombers attacked attacked enemy enemy troop troop concentrations concentratlone with with good good coverage. coverage. Medium targets, including the the Y Yongmi-dong Medium boMbers bombere struck struck at at several several enemy taxgets, on&ml-do~ marshalling marshalling yards, p d s , where where fires fire8 were were Observed obeerved in in the the target target area. -8.

1 1 . II.

General Situation Situation General


Political

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There is I s continued continued keen been Korean interest n the There interest i in the scand~Ls scandals currently currently being aired. aired. Rbee being Rhee reportedly reportedly has hae refused reiused to t o approve approve the tht arrest cvreet of of four four National AsseMblymen Aseemblymen implicated implicated in in the the scandals. scandale. Former Former Defense Defense Minister Minister National S i b Jung-mo Jung-mo still still refuses miuses to to return o t e s t i f y before Sihn return from Japan t to testify before the the courtcourtmartiaJ trying trying the the "Kochang "Kochang Massacre" Massacre" case. case. The The Premier Premier promised promised the National Iiatfon8l martial Assenibly, however, hmver, that that both t a f f Chug AsseMbly, both SiSihn and former Chief Chief of S Staff Chung 11-kwsn Il-kwan wruld be be recalled recalled if If cases cases were were developed develoged against against them. them. would

w
OCI O C I 1936 1936

1 September September 1951 1951 1

DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N


I, I.

Hipitshy Situation Situation Military

Highlights

Attaaldng UN Attacking UN forces forcer along along the the central sentral front front mat met heavy heavy resistance reslatancs which %hi& slowed up up the the advance. advance,
Arez

In In the US I I Corp. C o w sone cone action action was limited Umited to to patrol patrol clashes. cla8hos0

Im
Air

In the tho US X Corps C o w sone sone ROK ROK 7th 7th Division Division units unite attacking attaaklng north noi-tih of of the the In Hwactkon Reservoir were were heavily heavily engaged engaged by by two two enemy rsgimsnts regiments and were Hua*on Rerrervoir i n i t i a l l y forced f'oroed to t o wlthdraw3 i r strike aided initially withdraw; an a air aided the the units units to to mgain regain the the made limited limited gdae gains against against stubbanr stubborn cop rel o a t ground, lost ground. The US 2nd Division made ristanss, US 1st bt Marina Marine Division Division units u d t s ercountered orcountered strong strong raei@rtance d sistance. US resiotance a and also extensive minefields. ale0 axteneive mineflsldr, y'.
action. ROK I Corps Corpa units units were were involved involved only only in patrol ROK I patrol action,

UI earrier aircraft a i r c r a f t flew n attacks UN carrier flew approXinraWy approximately 125 125 mIsdon8 missions I in attacks agdnet against colnaptnlcationa targets on on the the east east and and west met coasts. coasts, communications targets
Surface r a f t continued continued to t o bombard coastal coastia targets, Surface c craft targets,

Medium bombera bombers flew n e w thirteen sorties8 sorties; twelve twelve of Of themp them, with with unreported unreported rereAir observers sighted sighted d t s , were t Sunchon. Sunchon, A i r obsemrs sults, were against the railroad railroad bridge bridge a at 3,,344 8OUth0 30344 vehicles, vehicles, 1,055 10055 of of which which were Mlving moving south.

UN land-baaed aircraft airoraft flew flew 547 $47 sorties sorties including including 254 254 combat.. conbat. UN land-based

US,25th units in IX Corpa Corps sone rspulaed repulsed an an enemy enemy pmbprobing US.25th Division Mvislon unlts i n the US M attack near near Ktmwha. Kun#tra, Farther Farther east east in in the the corps c o w sone sone elements elements of of the the advancing advancing attack US received severd several cc?unter-attacks counter-attacks US 7th 7th Division Mpiaion met mst stubborn Stubborn resistance resistance and and recsivsd which were werc which forced foraed one one UN UIl unit unit to to withdraw. Withdraw, BOK ROK 6th 6th Division Mvision elements elements whiah taking part part in in the the same a m UN UN advance advance were were able able to t o make make little l i t t l e progress prc~greaaowlng to taking owing to e m resistance.. reelstance enemy

TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF OF 3 TO


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THE C.I.A. C.I.A. H HAS NO OBJECT108 OBJECTION THE A S NO

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If, &moral Situation Situation General II


Disputes between the Disputes between the ROK ROK Anay Ai'lqg and and Air A i r Force Force regarding regarding control control and and utiliutUsation sation of of light light aircraft eirtraft are are beginning begim%ngto t o assume asmum serious serious proportions. proportionso It It is is now now rumored runurrsd that that the the Army A m y will will take take aver over light light aViation aviatlon in i n the the near near future, futuraD certainly by 1 1 Jamary, January, The states he he wilb will not not rerecrrrtaj.nly by The Air Al.r Force Force Chief Chief of Staff 8tat.0~ lease pilOts in in training, The believes leare the the pilot8 T h e US UB Army Army Attache, Attache, Seoul, Seoulo b e l i m s the (%leisof o f Staff Staff of of both both services rervicos could oouLd reaCh reach agreement agreamnt wore I t not not ' fur f ,Chiefs were it pressure from outside outdde military milltar;y. authorities. esrfhndtiea. The pressure frma The ROK Roll Air A i r Force Fome has recently rsoentlp been successfully mrocersWly ufilisod in several several anti-guerrilla been utilized in anti-guerrilla operations, operations, especisUy especially in 6oufhrest Koreao in southwest Korea.
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f'117

'

DAILY D A I L Y
.

KOREAN g O R E A l V BULLETIN BULLZTIN

t
m

OCI

1937 1937

September 1951 1951 4 Septeuiber

Military Military Situation Situation


Highlights

In sporadic In sporadic ground engagements, engagaents, UN u14 forces force6 in i n the central central and and easteaetmoderate to meeting central sectors sectors encountered encountered moderate to heavy heavy enemy enenw resistance, resistance, meets enemy groups groups of of up t o regimental regimcntel strength. some up to

Unite the-US I I Corps C o w generally generally maintained positions positione and aad patrolled. petrolled. Units of the.US In the ROK ROK l lst e t Division Division sector, sector, an an unidentified unidentifiedaircraft aircraftf lflew e w over overHrasan Masan and dramped four four yellow yellow flares flare8 1500 l5OO yards yards north north of the the UN peace peaec camp, camp, while, while, and dropped at at the same same time, tie, a a nuMber d e r of of flashlights flmhlights were vere seen aten blinking bllnk5Dg skywards sltywarde to to the northeast. Another unidentified nmtheast. Amther UidcDtified aircraft aircraft in i n the US 3rd 3rd Division Division Sector 8ector dropped a a bod bodb on drapped on the %be main main supply supply route, route, blowing a a six-foot eix-foot crater, and and then then

atrafed several vehicles, vehicles, cauaing causing only only minor damage. strafed several

X n the US IX IX Corps Corps zone, zone, numerous numrotm patrol pstrol clashes claehea occurred occurred es as UN U l V units unite In the US mmlntalned positions positlow and sad patrolled. patrolled. Two unidentified maintained unidentified aircraft and end three Yak Y a k type type aircraft r i r c r r i t strafed strafed UN UN positions positions in i n the the central central sector sector and and on on the the eastern eQe of of the thc corps corps zone. zom. eastern edge

Heavier encounters occurred occurred in in the the US U SX X Corps Corps zone, zone, with uith UN Ull forces forces Heavier encounters meeting meeting enemy cncw groups group of of up up to to regimental regimental strength. strength. The The activity was vas nrincipally principally in i n the the ROK ROK 7th 7th Division Divieion sector eector north north of of the the Hwachon Hvschon Reservoir. Rerrervoir. Other u n i t s in in the the zone, zone, while whlle engaging enemy enemy forces forces of of smaller smaller size, size, units maintained positions p 0 6 i t f O l l r and and patrolled. pstrollcd. maintained
Only Only minor minor patrol patrol activity activity occurred occurred in in the ROK ROK I I Corps C o v e zone. zone.

UN naval aircraft continued strikes against various targets along both coasts, while surface vessels bodbarded shore targets and patrolled.

Land-based flev 885 885sorties, aorties, including including 549 549 combat. combat. Armed Land-based UN UN aircraft airanetflew reconmlsancc night intruder intruder aircraft contimed to to strike strike at at numerous numeroue reconnaisance and and night aircraft continued targets in i n over 350 350 areas. areae. Medium bombera flew 27 sorties, bombers flew sorties, attacking attacking the nilrcmd bridge bridge at at Sinanju, Stnanju, the the marshalling marshalling yards ysr& at sf Chongju, ChoJlgju, and and targets targets railroad in W Wonsan In o m a n and and Chinnampo. Chinmuup. s4THJ3 TEM C. I. A. HAS C.I.A. HAS NO NO OBJECTIOl OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIBICATION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION 08 OF


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No. No.

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A Air i r obeervers observers reported sighting 2100 2100 vehicle8, vehicles, with With 892 892 moving moving south south (in the previous pcevious 24 24 hours, hours, over 3000 vehicles vehicles were were sighted, sighted, vith with 1639 ( i n the moving south). UN planes attacked attacked along along several several roads, destroyibg destroying 126 126 and damaging vehicles a d m n ig 329. 3 2 9 .
II. 11.

General G e x t e m l Situation

Political Political
President R Rhee on 2 SepteMber South Korea Kbrea can h e e on September stated atated that South can muster muster 250,000 new 250,600 new troops troop but that that "arms ''mu6 and and tiaining t h i n i n @are are needed" for for them. them.

Radio Pyongyang on on 28 28 August carried curried an an account 8ccoullt of of the the "impressive "Impre66ive Radio Pyongyang welcome" welcome" in In Pyongyang moxqgang accorded to "the "the V Vietnam i e t n a m people people's '8 delegation delegation which vhich had had coyc o Korea Korea to to comfort and inspire impire the Korean Korean people people in in their their struggle... struggle. come t to comfort and and and to to cement cement their their friendship friendahip with v i t h the the Korean Icorean people." people."

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He cautioned against against a a ncw n e w Communist Colllmunist offensive oifenaive or or a 8 limited limited offensive offensive in in connection connection with v i t h Communist Communist arguments at a t the the San San Franciico Franclaco conference. conference. His statement closed statement closed on on the the note note that that the the sooner 8ooIIcr the the ROK ROK strengthens its its forces forcer with i l l be vith additional additional troops the earlier democratic demodratic natiorrs nations v vill be able able to to attain attain their ultimate t heir u l t h t e aims. aim.

OCI OCf 1938 1938


5 5 SepteMber September 1951 1951

K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN DAILY KOREAN


I.

I .

Military Situation Situation


Riplights Hi*lights

Action Action declined declined sharply sharply along along the the entire entire frOnt &nt as acl UN Ull forces forces continued contimied to t o patrol patrol and and to to consolidate consolidate and Bnd adjust adjust their their positions positions on on high high ground. ground.

Army !E!X
UN patrols patrols in i n the the US US I I Corps Corps zone zone encountered encountered only only slight sl@t resistance rtsistanco as groups of of squad squad to to platoon platoon ae they engAged engeged and dispersed diapereed several enemy groups US 3rd Division Division repulrred repulsed etrength. Elements Elements of of the the US lst 1st Cavalry Cavalry and W strength.

several squad-sized squsd-eizcd probing probing attacks. attacka several

Corps zone, In the US IX I31 Carpa zone, small sumll enemy CI#IPY groupe groups were yore dispersed diepereed by US US 25th 25th All enemy activity ceased In in the the US US 7th 7th mB 2nd Division Dlriufon patrols. pa~rols. A l l eneny and ROX ROK 2nd BOK 6th Mvision Division patrols patrols drove drove tvo two enemy enemy Division sector. Aggressive Aggreseive ROK Division sector. pl8tOOM to t o the tbe north. platoons Numerous small Ivumel.0~~ 61miU.enemy enemy groups groups were were dispersed dispersed and end several eeveral small-scale small-scdh probing repulsed by units o of US X X.Corps, althoughenemy probing attacks attack6 were repulsed f the US .Corps, althoughsphmy BOK 7th Division a c t i v i t y vas va~ cheTacttrlzcd ~ aa light. ligbt. Elements Element8 of the fhe ROK activity characterized as reported ceased after lrieodly friendly elements elements had had secured secured a a reportad that tbat enemy enemy action action ccaeed Several h i l l against against resistance rerietance from from an an estimated estlmatad reinforced miniorcod battalion. battalion. Several hill enemy squads squade were vere dispersed Biapepeed by by elements element6 of of the thc US I E 2nd 2nd Division, Divlslon, while while enemy attach enemy units Units in in undoterminad attacks by enemy undetermined strength were were repprlsed repulsed in in the the U8 US 1st sector. lst Maslne Marine Division Division sector.

In the ROK I I Corps l i t t l e enemy enemy activity reported except except Corps zone, little activity was reported i n the ROK n e m y battalion in BOK Capital DlV$8iOn Division eoctor, sector, where where one one e enemy battalion was was driwen driven t o the north to company, engaged by by a a friendly friendly patrol,w patrol,was forced forced north and and one enemy compsny,
vlthdraw t o withdraw. to

Naval elr air eortiea sorties from carriers carriers off off both both coasts coasts totalled totalled 260, 260, vlth with strikes i n the west against coomy installations installations And three strikes in against mlsccllaneoue miscellaneous enemy three troop concentrations, conctntratiom, sad in the eacrt troop and in east against against tramportation transportation target8 targets and and seven seven troop troop areas. areas.

Surface veseels n the vessels i in the west west bombarded bombarded several seVeral enemy enemy gun gun and and troop troop poeltlorre, n the positional, while while i in the east eastblockade blockade shipe ships fired fired on on numemu8 numerous trmeportation transportation targets and shore installations. instsllations. and shore


.
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No. NOS

THE C C.I.A. HAS NO NO 0EJSCTXO)r OBJECTION . I . A . HAS

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0 0.9

Air Air

Land-bsstd UN UN aircraft aircraft flew f l t v 678 678 sorties, sortlee, including includ3ng 348 3 4 8 combat. conbat. Close Land-based Clone suppart missiODS mlselons totalling t o t s l l i n g 67 67 were were flown flown in in all all corps corps zones, moas, and sud 157 157 armed urmd support boMber reconnaissance reconrrsiaaance planes planer attacked attechsd targets tar&etr in in 78 78 areas. areas. Medium Xedfum b e e r effort effort WIWB limited limited by by poor pam weather weather conditions. conbitloam. vas

1 1 . II.

General Situation Situation General

No significant rigniflcarrt reports reporte have have been been received received during during the the past paet 24 24 hours. hours. NO

DXB 195 De-195

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?y
I,
Military Military Situation Situation
0

SEt
OCI OCI 1939 1939
Is, September September 1951 1951

6 DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN

Eglltghts 11.WN.arata
UN sectors adjueted adjusted thetheir U I V units unite in in the the east-cantral east-central and eastern aectorr, Activity positions, meeting meeting light light to t o moderate moderate resistance resistance from - 0 i ~ the the enemy. ellemyo Activity positions, the'vestern in the ve8tern sector 8ectm was veld limited limited to t o minor patrol Wtml skirmishes. skirmisheso

In Corps, UN patrole patrols encountered I n the western sector, acctor, held by the US Ifil I I Gorp, encountered Two company strength Ipobhg probing scattered resistance resistsnct from from small small enemy enemy units. UDltm. Tvo scattered camgany strength rewlsed attacks were r e p l s e d in i nthe the US Us lst Is$ Cavalry Cavalry Edvision Mvision sector rsector and 12 enemy T-34 h tanks vere e sighted the -8t westbank bankof ofthe the Win River. T-34 & S were l a t e d along thc River.


Army Armly

.,

Activity in In the the vs US IX IX Corps C o w sone tone was WIBO limited limitad to to minor minor patrol patrol contacts. contSctso Activity
A8 As element. elements of the US US X X Corps Corps adjusted adjusted positions positions in in the the east east central central mector, small rmsll scale scale enemy enemy counterattacks counterattacks were were repulsed. repulsed. sector,

In colutal eastern eastern sector, the ROIC I Corps Corps was vas engaged engaged by by small emall In the coastal ROK I units or of up t ob a t h l i o n atireagth o adjust enemy units to battalion strength aa as ROK ROK units units continued continued tto adjust positions. paeitions

Eta !E!x

flew 78 oorties sorties In in auppodt support of of ground ground units units and and in in UN naval naval aircraft f l e v 78 attacks attacks against against enemy exmay rear re- area area installations. tn8taJ.latlone. A Air i r activity in in the ea8t east . wao wms curtailed Curtailed as as Task Task Force Force 77 7 ' 7 replenished. replenished.

UN surface 6 B C e craft craif patrolled patrolled and banbarded UN boabarded enemy coaetal coastal iastallatlons installations and lines line8 of or communication commanlc8tion on on both both the the east emt and and west west coasts. coaate. and

Air A*

IJN landbased Isnd-based aircraft aircraft flew f l e v aa total t o t a l or ai 868 868 sorties. SOZ%%e60 O UN Of coMbat f the 551 551 colDbat sorties flown, ta, 3 4 were flown, 74 74 were were in close close support support or of ground ground u units, 314 were anned armed recommimance in in the the enemy's enemy's rear rear areas, areas, and and 87 87 were were counter counter air. air. Only reconnaissance m y two medium medium bomber banbcr missions mis8iona were vere flown. flovn. two
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THE HAS NO NO OBJE& OBJE THE C.I.A. C.I.A. HAS ON TO THE DECLASSIFICATION% DECLASSIFICATION _ _ THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT.
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11- General General Situation SitcuLtion II.


Political PoZitical -u3
A opinion A US Us military military observer observer in i n Korea Korea notes notea that that the the tenor tenor of ofpliblid plblic opinion expressed and public pUblic statements txptesees expresses thinly thinly velled veiled expressed in In editorials aad satisfaction aatlrfection over over the the fact fact that tbat an an armistice armistice seems meme to t o have have been been "averted." "averted." Public demonstrations dcmnatratlolu against against the the cease-fire cease-fire talks t d s s have have ceased. ceased.

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- 196 196

President President Rhee met in in a a recent recent interview interview with with newsmen newsmen is i8 reported reported to t o have have pointed to another Camaauni6t Communist offensive offensive asld and to to have have stated stated polnted t o the imminence Inndnence of amther that the the UN UN should should fight fight back back with with the the "intention "intention of of winning." winning."

. .
.

,I

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1 4
OCI O C I 1940 1940
7 September 1951 7 1951

DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN


I. I.
Military M i l i t a r y Situation Situation

Highlie EgY110.11
Enemy Encmy forces forces of of battalion bstealion to t o regiment regiment size size counterattacked counterattacked against agaiast UN troops UfI troope in in the the west west and and vest-central weet-central sectors sectora and and forced forced minor minor withdrawals. withdrawals.

US I / Corps zone, a US l 1st patrol base base came under In the US r t Cavalry Division petrol cane under constant constant attack a%tackby by enemy enemy troops t r o o p which which increased Incremed in I n strength strength from from a a company compaoy base was The patrol patrol base VLLB to to an an estimated eetimated four four battalions bsttalione supported supported by by tanks. tanks. The Division repulsed 3rd Divieion withdrawn Vithdrawn and and defensive defensive positions positions established. eatabliehed. The US 3rd several company and severel &ad two-company tw-coinpmy attacks. attaclke. Elements of a base Elements a US US 25th 25th Division patrol patrolb m e in in the the US US IX IX Corps C o w zone zone were reportedly reportedly cut cut off off by by an an estimated cstimsted enemy emmy battalion. battalion. Other division units repulsed repulsed probing pmbattacks. attacks. Tbe The identification idenlzification of of shell s h e l l fragments fragments recovered in FeCWCm2d in the the US Us 7th 7th Division sector sector as 88 coming comiw from fram Soviet Soviet 132 132 mm. m. rockets rockets has been tentatively East Command. hsrr tentatively accepted accepted by the Far F e w %st Comand. In Corps sector, elements of the ROK 7 7th In the US X Corgs sector, element6 t h Division Dlvision advanced advanced slightly, slightly, engaged engaged an 6 0 . enemy enemy company compc~nyand and established eetablished a a perimeter per5metcr defense defeaec area. arear Elsewhere in Elsewhere i n this .this corps corpfi and and in i n the the ROK ROK I I Corps Corps zone, eone, action action was VBB limited limited to to patrol petrol and and small-scale eaall-ecale probing probing attacks, attacks, all a l l of of which which were were repulsed. repulsed.

Naval naval air air sorties sorties totalled totalled 333, 333, of of which which 40 40 were close close support support missions. IUl~BlOnS. Offensive Pukchong, Barnhung, Bamhung, Wonsan Wonsan and and Offensive air air operations in in the vicinity of Pukchong, the battleline resulted resulted in i n the the destruction destructlon of a a bridge, several aereral buildings, buildings, vessels a started one gun gun position p i t i o n and and several several railroad railroad cars. care. Surface veseels w e d fires fire6 in Wonsan, damaged in a mine depot in i n the the vicinity of of Songjin SongJin and, at at Woman, u d gun gun emplacements, bombarded four @tn gun positions, positions, a a hsghvay highway emplacements, dispersed dispersed troops troops and bombarded troops, gun poeitiono, positions, and and installations inatallations in in bridgl? aaA a a highway. highway. Enemy troops, bridgp and twenty-six area6 areas along the bank of Ban River were also bombamded. twenty-eix the north north bank of the Ean also b&arcdad.
T

The 79 79 Land-baaed aircraft flew f l e w 787 787 sorties, eortiee, of of which which 467 467 were combat. combet. The Land-based aircraft support missions between the US close support missions were were divided divided between US I, I, IX, Ix, and and X Corps Corpo areas. are(LBw Medium bombers Medium b e e r a flew f l e w 29 29 effective effective sorties aorties against againat targets targets which which included included the the Yangdok Yangdok marshalling nsrshslling yards, yards, the Sinanju railroad bridge, bridge, the Wonsan Wonsan Supply supply center, snd the the Chongju Chongju and aad Bwangju Ewangji~marshalling mesehalllw yards. yarda. In 'kIEC.I.AC . I . A . HAS HRS NO NO oBJECIZEgl OBJmXO# center, and THE DECLASSIFIMXW DECLASSIFIGUION 01 &7 10 THE


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11. Central Situation Situation II. General

atastisisen k 8 0 n g Peace 1_64 T4uLe aika


A A 6 6 September Septeniber Chinese Chinese Communist Communist radio radio broadcast Brwdcaet gives gives the the text text of of Nom is is Quoted quoted General Nam General Nam Il's 11.8 latest latest communication comunication to to the the UN UN Command. Connuand. Nam as aying a8 O a y l n gthat thstthe theUN's U"6 reply reply to t o the the most most recent recent Communist Communist charges charges is $0 "absolutely unsatisfactory" and "mbsolukly uneatlsfactory" and confirms confirms "the "the inescapable inescapable responsibility responsibility of of your your side" aide" for for the the violations violations at at Kavsong. Kawaong.

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OCT 194). 1943. OCI

8 September 1951

DAILY ROBEAN BULLTIN


I.

Military Siteation

!Ugh light&
t o battalion ba"ctt.llion UN forces UB forcer repnlaed repaned several sovaral cdunterattacke cduteratbcka by enemy *r?emy groups groiqs up to size tuened clleo In i n the weeL met nnd nad west-central wo82,ccntr;;l sectors, 8 8 C t o ~ tand QW? ~ tW%ad back back a a number zlurnljsr of of light light probing probfng attacks attacks In in the the east-central east-contra1 sector. sector,

In the vest-contral sector, US IX Corps waits repulsed enemy company to battalion-sized attacks northwest of Olthwee Elemente reltevirg an advance patrol beim) under attack forced enemy elements to withdraw and seized advanced positions, permitting the mithdrawal of frieedly elements. Eest of this action, another outpost was attacked by an estimated 450 enemy.troope. Friendly eleElsements withdrew to main defensive positions after repulsing the attack. where In the sector, eneme light probing attacks were repuased.' In the east-central eector, US X Corps units repulsed a number of light probing attacke with the aid of artillery and air support. Triendly elements north of Tanggu adjusted poeitions. Other unite attacking to reduce the last enemy-held higb eround in the "punchbowl area" withdrew in the face of moderate resistance,
adjueted poaiLiono, poeitions, ROK I I Corps Corps unite w i t n in In the the eastern esetern sector mscl;or patrolled patrolled and. ~ i r d .dJueted

Carrier aircraft end surNaval aircraft flew a total of 253 sorties. face craft continued to attack the enemy-held northeast coast, ieflicting damage on importaat enemy rail centers. Other naval aircraft attacked targets along Surface creft bombarded enemy installations on the Han River the west coast. estuary'and maintained patrols off the BSreau west coast

Other UN aircraft flow a total of 716 sorties, of which 405 were combat. The Far Esat Bomber Comwand launched five effective medium bomber sorties, including attacks by three aircraft with ground control radar assistance against enemy forward troop concentration, one aircraft radar-bombing Chinnampo, and om conducttug a a leaflet leaflot drop. drop. one &craft aircraft conducting so THE THE C.I.A. C.I.A. HAS HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTIOR TO THE DECLASSIFICATION TO DECLASSIFICATION OB OP


Nam:
Air

Friendly elements engaged in a reconnaisanco in force on the US I Corps left flank, and dispereed a two-company enemy group before retureing to main . friendly positionc. An adjoining I Corps unit continued to advance in s simeler exploratory move without significant contact.

58

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II. XI.

itSlakT

General Situation Situation

EconomLc Economic. PmbassRdor Muccio has has received received a a letter l e t t e r from the the ROK ROX Minister Minister of of Finance Finance AMbasendor Muccio i n whfcb the latter latter advises Rdviees that that there there was wa6 an an increase Increase of of approximately Approximately 15.5 15a5 in which the Loans t to o UN forcee forces increased fncread billion b l l l l o n won won in In bank bank note note circulation circulatlon during during August. Augufit. Loan6 by 36.8 36,8 billion b l l l l o n won, raising raising the the outstanding outstanding balance balance to t o 291 291 billion. b i l l i o n . This inr Inflationary pressure flationary p r o e w e puihed puehed the the commodity commodity price index index during during Augurt August from from 2,682 2,682 to The Minister Minister of of Finance reporte reports that t o 1,067. 7,067. Thz, that if if the the settlement settlement of the loan loan I s d e l a p d , the the inflation I n f l a t i o n may may get gst out out of of control. control, Muaaio inauires about about the the is delayed, Muncio inouires p o s s i b i l i t y of of a a partial partial settlement settlement of of the the won won advances advancos to to UN OB forces, forcee, since since possibility harvest harvert time time normally mrmlly brings brings a A seasonal se~oonrrlupswing upming in In currency curmncy circulation circulation in i n Korea. Xorea.

DEB - 198

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SE

OCI O C I 1942 1942 10 10 September September 1951 1951

K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N DAILY KOREAN I . I.


Military Situation Situation Military
Highlights Along Along the the west-central weet-cen$ral front front attacking attacking UN UN forces forces made made limited limited gains gains units met net heavy against light light to t o moderate moderate resistance. resistance. friendly against lriendly uni& heavy resistance neiatence in the the east-central east-central sector. sector, in

AEI%

US IX H Corps Corps units units made mede lindted limited attacks and and continued continued to t o patrol patrol aggressively. crggFeealvely. Elements of of the the US US 25th 25th and and 7th 7th Divisions Divisions made -de limited limited advances advances against agaiaet Elements light tomoderate resistance l i g h t toapoderate resistancefrom fromenemy enemy groups p u p a of of up up to t o battalion battalion strength. strength. Several Several platoon platoon strength strength probing probing attacks 8ttscLs were uere repulsed reptlsed by by corps corps units. untte. Numerous contacts contacts with with small emall enemy enemy groups group were were reported reported by by friendly friendly patrols. patrols. Numerous
In heavier as In the the US X Corps COltpA zone, zone, enemy emmy resistance reeistance VOA vl~s as UN UM forces forces made made Numerous slight advances advances in in the the ROK 7th, 7th, 5th, Sth, and and 8th 8th Division Mvislon sectors. aectors. Numeroue a d 1 enemy groups resisted reslstedttrc advance of of friendly friendly patrols, patrole, while vhile several several small enemy groups the advance probing attacks attacks of of up to a p m y strength were prdbing to c company were reguleed repulsed with with the the sseietance assistance of artillery artillery and and mortar mortar fire. fire. of

ROK I f Corps Corpo unita units patrolled to the north, north, encountering encountering small small enemy enemy gfoupa resiating several several probing probing attacks attach of undetermined undetermined strength. strength. groups and resisting

Surface Surface vessels vessels in the the west vest firad fired on on 14 14 troop troop positlone positions in in the the Hsn Han ceturry area, while vhile in i n the east blockade h i p bombarded estuary area, blockade s ships bombarded eeveral several raiLrOa13 railroad and and highmy i n the highway arcareas in the vicinity vicinity of of ChongJin Chongjin and and conmnications communlcations points points and and buildingr, i n the the Songjin Songjln and and Wonsan W o m a n areas. arelps. buildings in

N a v a l air n the vest totaled t o w e d 106; 106; air air s ctivity i n the erst Naval air sortie6 sorties iinthewest activity in east vrrs was canceled owl= to %o replenishing replenishing operations, operations canceled owing


Navy LI=

In the In t h e US I I Corps zone, patrols patrols of of the the ROK lst l e t Division D i V l 8 i O n contacted contacted several several Cavalry Division pooltione positions enemy groups groups in i n squad squad to t o platoon platoon strength. 8trength. US US 1st l e t Csvslry enemy US 3rd received over over 100 100 rounds rounds of of mortar mortar and and artillery artillery fire. fire. Units of the US received Division generally generally maintained maintatned positions positions and and patrolled. patrolled, Division

.610 THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF


DOCUMENT. THIS DOCUMENT.

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U
Air

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A total of 757 sorties were flown by land.based UN aircraft, including 436 conbat, of which 73 were in close support of US / and X Corps troops. In a total of 14 missions six medium bombers bit the Buichon railroad bridge, one bolbed the Wonsan supPly center, and three.gave close support to UN ground forces.

II.

leneral Situation
No significant reports have been received during the past 48 hours.

DXS - 199

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OCI OCI 1943 1943

11 1 1September September 1951 1951

DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN


I.

r.

~ l i t a r Situation y Situation Military


.Highlights Highlight s


Laz grmor

UN forces forces in i n the the west-central sector continued t o adjust UN west-central sector to adjust position8 positions l i g h t contact contact with with enemy enemy groups groups up up to t o company company strength. strength. On O n the the and made light central and east-central east-central front, front, UN troops consolidated consolidated positions positions along along high ground and and encountered encountered light l i g h t to t o heavy resistance from groups up t o high to strength. b a t t a l i o n strength. battalion

In I n the the US T EI I Corps Corps zone, %one, ROE ROK lst 1st Division Division patrols patrols made made numerous numerous l i g h t contacts with enemy u n i t s up t o platoon strength; o t a l of light units to strength; a a ttotal of 120 120 rounds of of mortar mortar and and artillery artillery fire fire fell f e l l on on division division positions. positions. The The US US rounds 3rd Division repulsed a a small s m a l l enemy enemy probing probing attack attack with with mortar mortar fire. fire. 3rd Division repulsed All Corps Corps zone sone units u n i t s maintained maintained or or adjusted adjusted positions. positions.

In the US IX Corps Corps zone, zone, UN UN units units maintained maintained positions positions and and made made patrol contacts with with enemy envy groups groups up up to t o platoon platoon size. sise. numerous p a t r o l contacts

X Corps Corps zone repulsed repulsed a comcomBOK 7th 7th Division elements in the US X units made made patrol contact contact w with pany sized sised probing probing attack attack while other unite ith numeroua enemy groups. groups. Attacking elements elmenta encountered heavy resistance numerous enemy attacks were repulsed by some f'rom enemy battalion. battalion. Probing attack6 some US tff 2nd 2nd from an enemy Division: elements while while other other elements elements continued continued to t o attack. a t t m k . Attacking Division elements elements of of the US 1st Marine Marine Divieion Division continued continued tto advance iin the,Sohnng element8 o advance n the Sohung area, l s o continued o advance area, Elements Elements of the ROE BOK 8th Sth Divieion Division a also continued tto advance despite despite increasingly resistance. increasingly heavy heavy resistance.
.

ROK n the ROK I Corps sone ROE troops i in zone repulsed repulsed several several probing probing attack8 attacks and made ight t o moderate All division made l light to moderate patrol contact. contact. 'All division units units maintained maintained
posltion8 positions.
0

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Naval air sorties ttotalled o t a l l e d 255 and air sorties and included included 29 29 close close support support
GC) THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTIOlO OP THE DECLASSIFICATIO# DECLASSIFICATION 0% TO THE THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS
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SR,7
On the the east east coast, coast, naval naval aircraft s i r c r a f t conducted conducted offensive offanaive operaoperamissions. IdsaiOM. On tions Kilchu Hamhung tiom in i n the gilchu, Hamhung and and Komsong Komeong areas, areas, striking striking enemy engun positlone, supply centers centers and and communications o o m n i c a t i o n s facilities. facilities. Blockade positions, supply vessels in vessels In the Songjin Songjin and and Wonsan Wonsan vicinities v i o i n i t i e s bombarded bombarded gun gun positions, peltiom, Aircraft in troop concentrations, cacentrations, supply supply dumps dumps and and communications. cormnunicatione. Aircraft troop the west conducted operations operations in i n ths the Haeju, Ongjin Ongjin and and Yonan Yonan areas, areas, vessels f fired 14 h i t t i n g enemy enemy lines l i n e s of of communications. comrmmications. Surface veasela i r e d on 111 hitting enemy positions in enmy i n the the Han Han estuary estuary vicinity. vicinity,
Air

2,323 vehicle sighting, sighting, with with 858 858 vehioles vehicles Air observers obsemers reported 2,323 moving moving south. aouth.

II, 1 1 ,

A radio broadcast, broadcast, i in Engliah, again again A 10 10 SepteMber September Chinese Communist radio n English, charges UN UN insincerity insincerity in in dealing deallng with with the the Communist-alleged Communlst-alleged violations ViohtioM charges of the Kaesong of hesong neutral neutral zone. zone,. The The broadcast broadcast delcares delcares that t h a t Ilnegotiations "negoMations can proceed on on an equal equal and normal basis basis in order order to to reach...armistice reach...armistice f the United Nations t s arrogant agreement, agreement, only i if Nations forces forces changes changes Iits arrogant and and unreasonable attitude..." attitude,, o n

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General Situation General
Keesong Truce Kaesonn Truce Talks Talks

UN ZQI land-based land-based aircraft a i r c r a f t flew flew a a total total of of 814 814 sorties, sorties, including ineludiq 200 49 close close support support missions misrsione and and 424 424 other other offensive offensive strikes. strikes. Over 200 49 armed hit targets in 102 102 areas areas and 88 night night Inin, armed reconnaissance aircraft h i t target8 Medium bombers truders targets in i n 248 a 8 areas areas in i n the t h e enemy.rear. endpzy.rear. Medium truders attacked targets flew B-2910 v visually bombed the the Sariwon Sariwon flew 22 effective effective sorties; eight B-29's i s u a l l y bombed marshalling yards yards and end the the Hungnam Hungnam supply supply center. center. Two Two aircraft a i r c r a f t under ground radar concentrations, and nine nine airradar control control bombed several aeveral troop concentretlona, craft c r a f t hit hit the the Namchonjom Namchonjom marshalling marshalling yards yards and and Asand Asand cement cement factory. factory. In were damaged. damagedo 1.n air-to-air air-to-air combat, combat, five five MIC-15'8 MIG-151s were

2 2

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OCI OCI 1944 1944

12 12 SepteMber September 1951 1951

DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N


I , I.
MLLtary Situation Situation Military Highlight 8 BlEhllata
Advancing heavy Advancing UN UN forces forces it in the the east-central east-central sector encountered heavg I n other Other sectors Sectors reoistanoe from frombattalion s i z e enemy enemy units. units, UN forces in resistance battalion size adjusted adjusted positions positions and and patrolled, patroUed, meeting meeting only only enemy enemy groups. groups.

In encounIn the the US U S I I and IX IX Corps zones friendly patrols generally encounenemy groups groups up up to t o platoon platoon strength. strength. One patrol of the the US US 7th. 7th tered tered enemy Division, US day-long engagemedit engagement w with Divlsion, Us IX IX Corps, hOwever, hbwever, fought a day-long i t h an enemy company, and a com$anpsize comPany-size u unit also a patrol patrol of of the ROK ROK e n e q company, nit a l s o freed a of artillery .6th Division, US Ill IX Corps, Corps, to 6th Didaion, t o withdraw. Over 200 rounds of and mortar mortar fire fire fell fell on on division divisioh positions poaitions in i n the t h e US US I I Corpe Corpa zone. zone.

In the US X Corps zone, zone, elements elements of of the ROK 7th Division, In Division, attackattacking toward toward an objective three miles northwest of of Songhyon-ni Songhyon-ni encountered determined resistance resistance from from an an enemy enbattalion. The US 2nd Division determined battalion. repulsed repulsed small-scale small-scale probing probing attacks attacks and then then attacked t to o within 50 yards of an objective approxbately approximately t ten of Yanggu, Yanggu, against against stubborn of e n miles north of from two two enemy companies companies forced forced outpoets outposts of of the the ROX ROK resistanee, resistance. Pressure from lst Marine Divilrion Division 5th Division t o withdraw Withdraw 200 200 yards. yards. Units of the US 1st Division to advanced Changjong against resistance f from advaneed toward toward their their objective near Changjong rom Division repulsed one company two enemy enemy battalions, company strength strength battalions. The ROK 8th DSIPisfon attack, attack against positions occupied by by two enenemy then launched an 6.n attack attack, then latter forced forced a a s slight withbattalions. A counterattack eounterattack by one of the latter l i g h t vlthdraws1 the Division Divirion eventually eventunlly broke broke contact. contact, drawal and the

In the ROK h e ROR ROK I Corpa, Corps, tthe ROK 3rd 3rd Divlsion Division repulsed repulsed an an enemy enemy attack attack of undetermined strength. undetermined strength.

Naval air air sorties eortfes tOt8lled totalled 233, includixlg including 28 close close support support 1ds8iOnS missions In offensive operaoperan offenerive and LJ eortiea flown flown for f o r the US lst 1st Mhrine Marine Division. Division. I 41 sorties ttions i O M along both coasts boasts aircraft aircraft destroyed destroyed bridges, buildings, buildinge, gun gun positions, pOsitiOn8,
4;


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THE C C.I.A. HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTION THE . X.A. HAS

TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION TO THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS


No. No.

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vessels bombarded botbarded rail rail highway highway locomotlves and end railroad railroad cars. cars. Surface vesselrr locomotives areas m o m in in the the vicinity v i c i n i t y of of Chongjin Chongjin and and at a t Wonsan, Wonsen, fired f i r e d on on bridges bridges and and troop troop areas area8 near near Songjin, Songjin, and and shelled shelled ten ten Han Han River River troop troop positions. positiona.

Air Air
Land-based aircraft flew 901 effective effective s sorties of which which 570 570 were were Land-baaed o r t i e s of Most of the 79 79 close cLoss support rrupport missions were flown flown in the the U US S X X combat. Moat sorties; five five aircraft aircraft Corps area. mea. Medium bombers flew 18 effective sorties; Corps bombed the the Manchonjom Wchonjom and and Masan-ni ksan-ni marshalling yards, botbed yards, six struck the Siaanju Sinanju marshallhg marshalling yards, prde, and and one one botbed bombed Wonsan. Wonsan.

II. If,

the North Koreans are unwilling to resume peace negotiations. This unwillingness is reportedly based on the fact that Communist decisions are made by a "joint Soviet-Chinese Political Mission on the Truce Talks" from whom the Korean delegates take orders.. North Koreans are opposed to this, feeling that they should have the "deciding voice in the Korean theater."

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General, Situation General

In an In an engagement between 16 16 MIG-15's MIG-15's and and ten F-84'a F-841s i in n the the ChongChongone MIG-15 MIG-15 was wae destroyed. destroyed, An encounter between between 11 11 MIG-15rs MIG-151s jln jin area, one and an an unreported number of F-80gs at' at an unreported unreported location location r resulted of F-8008 esilted i n the loss loss of of one one F780 Ff-80 and and the t h e damaging damaging of of one one MIG-15. MIG15, in

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OCI a 1 1945 1945

13 13 SepteMber September 1951 1951

DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N


I. I.
Military Situation Situation

Hirrhllahts DighlkAR
The west-central Tho front front remained rermhtd generally generally quiet, quiet, except in the wes.t.;-centraB and east-central UN unlts units encowbored encountered enemy east-central sectors sectors where advancing U?J reaiet.ance, resistance.

In the western sector, US I Corps elements patrolled in their zone with only minor enemy contact.
US Corps units, north U S IX IX Cospe north of of Chorwon Chorion in in. the .We west-central woat-central sector, sector, met as t they advanced. met scattered scattered resistance resistance and and small s m a l l probing attacks &a h e y advanced, Other Other units d t a farther far*er east east met me% similar s k l l a r resistance reaPetanc43 as BB they theyadvanced.; advanced,


AESE

In the elements continued continued In tsle east-central Etarrt-central sector, soetor, US X Corps @lammtu

attacks to t o secure 8ecure commanding conrmnntPf~terrain. terrab, mental strength were atrenglh was wad encountered encountered and minor enemy enow probing attacks wore repulad, repulsed.

the the Enemy regi? h qresistance reebstmee in 1 x 1up to sag$-

The ROK I Corps along the east coast continued to adjust positions against scattered enemy resistanee.

Nav

Aircraft UN naval W aortfev Aircraft uncles under UN naval co,ntm% control flew 2 241 sorties in in close close nupport support of ground ground units units and and against against enemy e n m m . y rear rear area area installations. inatallatione. Naval surface sa~face craft off off the east a and west coasts coasts mintaicecl maintained the the blcpciksds blockade and and shePLed shelled craft d west e n w shore ehoro installations. installations. enemy
Air

Owing to transmission difficulties, information concerning UN ground-based air operations was incomplete. UN jet aircraft encountered

6111 6 '
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C.I.A. HAS NO NO OBJECTIOll OBJECTION THE C . I . A . HAS TO THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF


THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT.
No. No.

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four with damage to four Soviet-made Soviet-aade NIG MIG jet J e t aircraft aircraft north north of of .fyongyang Pgongyang w i t h no damage to In another another air a h encounter ezleouter east of o f the the Korean-Manchurian Korean-Manchurian either side. either side. In border town border town of of Sinuijuo Sinufju, 53 53 US I S F-86 F-86 "Sabre" T3abre" jet j o t aircraft aircraft encountered encountered 30 30 enemy MIG's, MIGrst with with no no damage damage to %oeither either side. aide.

1 1 .

General General Situation Situation

No significant significant reports reporta have have been been received received during the past pest 24 24
hours, hours.

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2 2

on" 1946

14. SepteMber September 1951 1 9 5 1 14

DAILY D AILY
I . I.
Situation Military Situation

KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLE'rIN

Highlights Highlights
UN forces forces in in the the east-central eaot-cenlral sector sector continued continued to to make make limited lhdted gains gains In the other against against resistance resistance which which varied varied from from moderate moderate to to stubborn. stubborn. In UN patrole patrols probed'enemy probed'enemy defenses defenses and and made made scattered scattered light light conconsectors, TJN tacts with i t h platoon platoon to to company-size compny-size enemy enmy grouts. grouN. tacts w

US US I I Corps Corp8 troops troops probed probed defenses defenses set set up by elements of the CCF were Contact8 were 2 6 t h Army and and by by the the CCF CCF 64th 6 4 t h Army h n y and a d 140th W t h Division. Diviaion, Contacts 26th limited and limited and involved involved only only small small groups. groups. In the US IX CorCorps sone, zone, advancing foroes forces of of the the L US 25th Divieion Division In E 25th h o enemy enemy forced an undotormined undetermined number number of of tthe enemy to to withdraw. withdraw. An An enemy company attacked elements element8 of of the the ROX ROK 2nd 2nd Division Division but but was was repulsed. company attacked Enemy Enslqy forces forces opposite opposite the US US IX IX Corps Corps consist conaist of the CCF 27th Army Army and elements of the the CCF CCF 26th 26th Army Amy and and CCF CCF 199th 1 9 9 t h Division. Division. elements of
Units of the the US US X Corps Corps continued continued to to advance advance in in their their sectors, sectors, Units of while repulsing several several platoon platoon to while repulsing t o company-strength enemy probing Eneq resistance reeietance to to these advancos attacks. Enemy advances w88 was most most stubborn in the troops facing facing the US X Corpe Corps are from ROK 8th 8 t h Division Dividon sector. sector. Enemy troops Korean lst, let, 12th, Uth, 27th 2 7 t h and and 32nd 32nd Divisions. Divisions. North Korean

ROK 15th ROK I I Corps Corps forceS, forcae, faced by the t h e North Korean 1 5 t h and 19th Divisions, division^, continued continued to.adjust to adjust positions pouitions with onIy only minor minor patrol patrol contacts. contacts.

Latest estimates of of enemy eneq strength strength place 2 210,000 1 0 , 0 0 0 troope troops in the front front Latest estimates line and 392,000 392,000 in in rear rear areas. areas. line and

Naval air air sorties sorties totalled totalled 121. L 2 1 . In sorties along In offensive offensive sorties along both both Naval coasts, coasts, naval aircraft aircraft destroyed destroyed enemy enemy installations inatallations and and communications communication6 facilities. Surfaoe vessels vessels continued conti.nud the the bombardment bombardment of of enemy enemy shore shore facilities. Surface and rail rail and and highway highway nets. nets. installations and installations


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No.

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THE

C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION OBJECTION C.1.A. TO THE DECLASSIFICATIOH 08 DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT.

, 9 0 9

Bir Air

Land-based aircraft aircraft flew flew 949 949 sorties, sortiee, of of which which 592 592 were were combat. combat. Approximately missions were were flown i in Approximately two-thirds two-third8 of of the the 70 close support mission8 n the US U S X Corps sector. sector. Seventeen effective medium bomber sorties s o r t i e e were were target bridge, but the a r g e t was a Pyongyang Pgongyang highway bridge, the flown. The principal t Wonsan airfield Wonsan d r f i e l d and and the the MUnpyong-ni Munpgong-ni marshalling marshalling yard. yard were also bombed. bombed. UN aircraft a i r c r a f t continued continued to t o encounter encounter enemy enemy MIG-15ts. MIG-15's. In I n one engagement engagement UN o s t , and n an enMIGts, one F-51 was l lost, and i in enbetween four f o u r F-51ts F-51's and three MIGfs, counter between between 35 35 F-8615 F-86'8 and and an'unreported an unreported nuMber number of of MIGIs MIG's in i n the the Chongjin area, no no losses losses have have been been reported reported on on either either side. side. Chongjin area,

1 1 . II.

Radio Radio Peiping P e i p h g on on 13 13 SepteMber September ridicules Vice-Admiral Vice-Admiral Joy's Joyts explanaexplanaThe t i o n of tion of the the 10 10 September September accidental accidental UN aJ strafing strafing of of the the neutral neutral zone. zone. The broadcast ends on the theme theme that t h a t the UI?? UN, since it denies denies the the other charges, charges, h a s no no intention intention of of ending ending its its provocative provocative acts acta in i n order to t o resume the has negotiatione, which which have have been been suspended suspended for for 22 22 days. days. negotiations,

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General Situation Situation

Propaganda ATISEN1W

2 2

W
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OCI O C I 1947

15 1951 . 1 5 september g e p t e m b r ,1951

DAILY
,I

KOREAN

BULLETIN

OW

I. I.

.
'Military Situation Military S ituation

Highlights

'

In of t the Commonwealth I n the t h e US U S I Corps zone, z o n e , , patrols p a t r o l s of h e 1st Commonwealtp Division observed observed five f i v e T-34 T-34 tanlis tanks and h r e e self-propelled self-propelled guns, @ne, while while DiVision and t three 100'enemy of Chorwon came<under eame'under US US 3rd 3rd Division Division 100 enemy in i n a village v i l l a g e west of a r t i l l e r yfire'. artillery fixe, Otherwide'only Otherwi$e only minor minor patrol p a t r o l activity a c t i v i t y occurred. occurred. The CCF 42ndend a n d and65th 6 5 t hArmies Armies replaced replaced the t h e CCF CCF 26th 26th Army Army on on the t h e US U S I Corps Corps f front. ran$
.

In Brigade, a attached to the I n the t h e US U S IX I X Corps Corps zone, zone, the t h e Turkish Brigade, ttached t o t he small enemy enemy groups. groups. A US US 25th 25th Division, forced forced a a withdrawal withdrawal of o f several s e v e r a l small tank-infantry the US engaged an an undeterundeterS 25th Division engaged t a n k - i n f a n t r y task t a s k force f o r c e of t he U 2nd Division troops troois mined number number of of enemy enemy troops t r o o p s and and withdrew. withdrew, ROK 2nd repulsed two small probing a attacks small and one company-size company-eize probing t t a c k s and received CCF 26th The entire e n t i r e CCF. 230 rounds rOunds of enemy enemy mortar mortar and artillery artillery fire. fire. The Army 67tfi Army is is now now in i n position p o s i t i o n in i n the t h e US USIX IXCorps Corpszone zonewhere wherethe t h eCCF CCF 67th A r m y replaced replaced the t h e CCF CCF 27th 27th Army. Army. Army
In I n the t h e US US X Corpi Corps zOne, zone, all a l l units u n i t s continued continued to t o attack a t t a c k against against of the t h e ROK ROK 7th 7 t h Division Division broke broke cOntact colifqct stubborn stubborn resistance. r e s i s t a n c e . Elements of and withdrew withdrew after a f t e r encountering encountering resistance r e s i s t a n d from from an an enemy enemy regiment. regiment; The entire e n t i r e US The U S 2nd 2nd Division Division made small small gains gains a against g a i n s t deterMined deternIioed U S 1st DivisiOn Division repulsed nine probing attacks a t t a c k s durift durir)g opposition. The US An enemy enemy regiment regimept offered offered t h e night n i g h t and then a t t a c k e d iin n iitseector. t s sector. An the attacied stiff stiff r resistance e s i s t a n c e to t o the t h e adVancing advancing ROK 8th 8 t h Division. Division. The North Korean 6th 6 t h and 13th 1 3 t h Division appeared on on the the US U S X Corps Corps front. front. There was was no significant s i g n i f i c a n t activity a c t i v i t y in i n the t h e ROK I Corps Corps zone zone and no no change change in i n enemy enemy identifications. identifications,


Army Ara!

No.

Activity the eist-central sector where fiN 10 A c t i v i t y remained heavy in in t he e ast-central s e c t o r where elements continued to t o encounter encounter stubborn stubborn resistance r e s i s t a n c e fromi f r o enemy units elements continued were si sighted entrenched up to t o regimental.strength. regimental strength. Two enemy enemy regiments were up in i n the t h e immediate immediate r rear e a r of ofthis t h i s sector. sector.

64. THE C.I.A. +THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATIOfJ DECLASSIFICATION OF OF THIS DOCUNIENT. DOCUMENT.

0.9

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Naval air a i r sorties s o r t i e s totalled t o t a l l e d 244 244 of of which which 20 20 were were close c l o s e support support Marine Division. Division. In I n offensive a i r operatione air operations missions for f o r the t h e US US 1st 1st Marine missions near n e a r Songjin, Songjin, Hamhung, Hamhung, and and Wonsan, bridges, bridges, buildings, buildings, gun gun positions" positions" f a c i l i t i e s and and and rail r d i l equipment equipment were were destroyed. destroyed. Communications facilities n tthe he v icinity s hort i n e t a l l a t i o n s were short installations were bombarded by by surface surface vessels vessels iin vicinity of Songjin and at a t Wonsan. Wonsan. of Chongjin, Chongjin, Songjin

Air

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11.
General Situation Situation hours hours.

Other UN i r c r a f t flew o r t i e s of UN a aircraft flew 846 846 s sorties of which which 517 517were were comba9. comb0. The missions were mainly diyided 115 close close sUiiport support missions divided The approximately approximately 115 ledium bombers bombers flew flew17 17 e f f e c t i v e scfrties sqrties effec-pive between the t h e US USII and andX XCorp's. Corps. Medium tetween a g a i n s t such such targets t a r g e t s ap a3 the t h e Huichon r a i l r o a d bridge, h e Wonsan against railroad bridge, t the Wonsan aqd and report p r d a . The report Chinnampo supply centers, centers, and and the t h e Kowon Kowon marshalling marshalling yards. Chinnampo supply of sighting8 l i s t e d two n tthe h e area of air sightings listed two enemy regiments regiments entrenched entrenched iin area f four o u r miles miles southwest southwest of Nungdong. Nungdong,

s i g n i f i c a n t reports r e p o r t s have been received during t h e past No significant the past 24, 24

OCI 1948 1948


17 SepteMber 17 September 1951 1951

DAILY KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N


D A I L Y
I. I.
Military S ituation Military Situation
Highlights

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Arm
Corps. Corps.

Heavy as UN UN forces forces Heavy fighting f i g h t i n g took took place place oh on the t h e east-central east-central front f r o n t as continued to t o advance advance against a g a i n s t enemy enemy units units entrenched entrenched in i n well w e l l fortified fortified positions. positions.

In I n the t h e US U S I I Corps Corps zone, zone, action a c t i o n was wae limited limited to t o sporadic sporadic patrol patrol Armies, the 65th, small enemy enemy protdng probing attacks. attacks. Three CCF Armies, 65th, clashes and small the 47th and the t h e 64th, 64th, and elements elements of of the the 42nd 42nd are are still s t i l l along along the the I I Corps front. front.

In the US Division repulsed repulsed a a reinforced reinforced I n the US U S IX IX Corps zone, zone, t he U S 25th Division battalion b a t t a l i o n sized s i z e d attack a t t a c k as as well well as as several s e v e r a l platoon platoon sized sized probing probing attacks. attacks. The US 7th Division continued t to patrol vigorously and and reported reported one one small o p a t r o l vigorously units reported little l i t t l e action. action. The 26th and attack. Other corps units probing attack. 67th 67th Armies are are now now facing f a c i n g the t h e US U S IX IX Corps. Corps.

ROK 7th 7th Division Division continued continued to t o advance advance t h e ROK O n the t h e US U S X Corps f r o n t , the On Corpe front, Divisions are f facing the X acing t he X against heavy resistance. resistance. Five North Korean Divisions

Owing to breakdown, to a a transmission tran~ssionbr e a k d o w n , further f u r t h e r information information on on the the Army as as well well as a8 the t h e Navy Navy and and Air A i r Forde Force operations operations is i s not not available. available.

1 1 .

Situation General S ituation

Propaganda
September, Radio Radio Pyongyang Pyonuang broadcast On 15 September, broadcast a a statement statement by Pak Pak Hun foreign minister, protesting protesting the the "unilateral nunilateral ttreaty Yong, North Korean f o r e i g n minister, reaty the United S States t a t e s and its its satellites s a t e l l i t e s concluded concluded with w i t h Japan Japan at at which the
C.I.A. HAS NO NO OBJECTIOB OBJECTION 66rTHE C '$THE .I.A. HAS

DECLASSIFICATION OF TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OB THIS DOCUMENT.


No.

009

-.
San Francisco.'? The treaty treaty was described described as as an an "unlawful %.nlawf+u.l documentt1which which San Francisco." The document" represents the llmost "most dangerous dangerous rtep step taken taken by byAmerican American imperialiam imperialiam toward North Korea Korea "takes a further further expanding expanding of of its its war w a r of of aggression." aggression." axaotly the the same s m e stand stand as as the the Soviet Sovlet Government." Government.I1 The broadcast attempts exactly t0 i l l now to arouse the Koreans by commenting that Japanese Japanese imperialim imperialism w will now Japanese imperialism which Korea once once again." again." The revival of af Japanese which "challenge Korea the t h e treaty permits permite will will prove prow a a constant constant threat threat to t o Japan's Japan'e neighbors neighbors and and the document is declared declared "illegal llillegal and and null null and tmd void." void." document is

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OCI O C I 1949 1949

18 1951 18 September 1951

DAIL.Y KOREAN D A I L Y K O R E A N BULLETI B U L L E T IN. N .


I. I.
Military Situation
Highlights, Highlights

ASEX AEiY

In I n the US I I Corps zone, zone, action was limited to t o patrolling patrolling with with There There are are still three CCF armies and elements of a fourth opposing the corps. still C C F and elements of a fourth opposing the corpe,

the exception exception of of a a limited limited advance advance by by the the US U S 3rd 3rd Division. Division,

I n the the US US IX I X Corps zone, aone, several several small enemy probing In probing attacks attacks were were repulsed. order of battle b a t t l e remains remains unchanged unchanged with with two two CCF CCF armies d e s repulsed, Enemy order facing the IX IX Corps. Corps.
In ROK 7th Division Division repulsed repulsed a a cornpang. company I n the US U S X Corps zone, zone, the BOK 2nd sized attack attack and and then then counterattacked, counterattacked, making making limited limited gains. gains. The US 2nd sized BOK 5th to attack, making making minor minor gains gains against against and IXlK 5 t h Divisions continued t o attaok, strong small enemy enemy counterattacks. counterattacks. Other Other strong resistance. r e s i s t a m . There were several small North Korean divisions Korean divisions corps units units regrouped regrouped or or maintained maintained positions. positions. Five North are facing facing X X Corps Corps units. units,


Naqy
s *
61347\

NO. a68

the east-central east-central f front where advancadvancr o n t where Heavy fighting continued on the In n the the east, east, encountered well well entrenched entrenched enemy enemy groups. groups, I ing UN forces encountered UN there were were numerous patrol TJN units u n i t s made made limited gains while in the west there clashes. clashee

ROK I I Corps u n i t s made made short short gains gains against against light l i g h t resistance. resistance. ROK Corps units North Korean Korean divisions divisions are a r e facing facing the t h e ROK ROK I I Corps. Corpse

T Two w o

A total t o t a l of of 187 187 sorties sorties was flown flown from from east east coast coast carrier8 carriers aa as coastal interSurface units units also also continued continued intercommunications targets targets were were attacked. attacked. Surface dictory fire f i r e on on coastal coastal targets. targets.

There were no air a i r operations operations on on the the west coast. coast. There
t o patrol. patrol. tinued to

Surface units units coneon-

6 6TU1 WE C.I.A. c. I.A. 645


1 1

HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTIOIS HAS

TO DECLASSIFICATION QB TO TNI: TiiC DZCLASSIFICATIQ3 TNID DOCUMENT. THIS DOCUMENT. /

945-14

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Air Air

UN land baeed a i r c r a f t flew 727 727 sorties s o r t i e s including 402 combat. based aircraft 402 combat. Medium bombers bombers flew Medium flew 15 15 sorties, s o r t i e s , including including an an attack attack with with fair fair results results the marshalling yards yards at a t Hwangju. Hwangju. against the
1 1 .
General Situation
No No significant reports reports have have been been received received during during the the past past 24 2 4 hours. hours.

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SECirr

2 2

1
t7T

OCI 1950 1 9 5 0 OCI

1 9 SepteMber September 1951 1951 19


D AILY DAILY
K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN KOREAN

I . I.

Military Military Situation Situation


Highlights

Action was wa8 heaviest heaviest in in the the central central sector sector as as advancing advancing UN UN forces forces Action Enemy counterattacks counterattacks forced forced some 8ome local local withdrawals. withdrawals, met met stiff stiff resistance. resistance. Enemy

Max Arrsv
In In the the US US I I Corps Corps zone, zone, ROK ROK lst 1st and and Commonwealth Commonwealth lst 1st Divisions Divisions patrolled with little little contact. contact, Units of the t h e US 3rd Division limited patrolled with Division made made limited attacks and and then then withdrew to the the perimeter; several attacks withdrew to several small enemy counterattacks were were beaten beaten off. off. Four attacks Four CCF CCF armies armies still still face face the the I I Corps. Corps,

In I n the the US US IX IX Corps Corpe zone, sone, US US 25th Division Division units regrouped and sad repulsed one one small small probing pobing attack. attack. Other units reported little pulsed little action, action. Three CCP CCF armies aruies are are still still opposite opposite the the IX IX Corps. Corps. Three

The ROK 7th Division h e US X ROK 7th Division in in t the X Corps zone continued its attack attack against stiff against stiff enemy enemy resistance. resistance. One eneqy enemy counterattack during during the night night forced a slight slight withdrawal. withdrawal, One regiment forced a regiment of of the the US US 2nd 2nd Division Division repulsed repulsed encounterattacks, as as the the division enemy counterattacks, division resumed its attack attadk against against stiff resistance. Another regiment regiment wae w a L p forced forced to to withdraw short distance resistance. Another withdraw a short distance by battalion sized a battalion sized counterattack. counterattack. ROK 5th 5th Division units made made slight slight gains. gains. Division units The US U S let repulsed several several small small counterattacks. counterattacks. Some lst Marine Mkrine Diviaion Division repulsed ROK 8th 8 t h Division Division elements elements were were also also forced forced to to withdraw withdraw by by a a counterattack, counterattack, as thedivision resumed its its general general advance. advance. the division resumed

A total of of 155 155 sorties sorties was flown n attacks A total flown from east coast carriers carriers i in attacks against communications communications targets. targets. Fierce Fierce fires fires were were started started in in Wonsan. Wonsan. S w against Surface units continued continued interdictory interdictory miseione. missiona. face units
No air air missions missions were were flown flown in in the t h e west. west. No

UN 7 3 1 missions including including 443 combat, IN land based aircraft flew flew 731 443 combat. Medium bombers flew 19 bombers flew 1 9 missions missions against against various various targets. targets.
(i7THE 67 THEC.I.A. c. I .A, HAS HAS NO NO OBJECTION OBJECTION TO THE THE DXCLASSIFICATIO# OB TO DECLASSIFICATION OF

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Air Air

Surface units patrolled. @rolled, Surface units

1 1

THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT= THIS


No. No.

009 0 0 . 9

. .

11,

General Situation
Political Political.

visit by the the llVietnam "Vietnam peoples people's Radio Pyongyang Pyongyang has been playing up a v i s i t by delegation" to Korea, the most most recent recent publicity publicity covering covering a a c call on delegation t o North Korea, a l l on The Vietnam Vice Premier Premier Pak Pak Hun-Yong and and Hong Hong Myong-hui I@ong-hui on on 11 1 1September. September, The tfcongratulatory banner and delegation, after a f t e r presenting presenting a "congratulatory delegation, and gifts1, gifts", expressed "hearty congratulations congratulations to to the the Korean Korean appropriate sentiments by offering hearty The'ricepeople who are a r e fighting fighting heroically heroically ... against against the the common common enemy." enenly.tl Thebricein exchange for blood blood by by the the Korean Korean people... people.., were were a a less experiences experiences gained i n =change source of of profound inspiration to t o the Vietnam Vietnam people." people,

...

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i s i t tto o the r o n t on Ambassador h a t during a v AMbassador Muccio MUccio cables t that visit the f front on nto President Rhee President Rhee declared declared Korea Korea and and Japan Japan should should enter enter iinto t o establish establish friendly friendly relations. relations, The President was reported as as negotiations to declaring peace t treaty does n not necessarily declaring that t h a t the signing of of the Japanese peace r e a t y does o t necessarily establish friendly relations relations and t that relations would would come come i into being after after h a t relations n t o being d i r e c t negotiations negotiations are are completed. completed. The The President's Presidentfe remarks are a r e part pa r t of of the the direct present ROK sentiments sentiments in i n favor favor of of a a bilateral b i l a t e r a l agreement agreement which which the the Koreans Koreans hope will to the benefits benefitsof will entitle e n t i t l e them t o the of the the San San Francisco Francisco Conference. Conference. Japan, to entering i into negotiations on the the other other hand, hand, sees see8 no advantage t o entering n t o the negotiations Japan, on and and haggling haggling over over the t h e price price the the Koreans Koreans would would demand, demand.

U. 14 September, SepteMber,

,
1

OCI OCI 1951 1951

20 September 1951 2 0 September 1951

DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN


I . I.
Military Military Situation Situation
Highlights Highlights

Action was heavy Action heavy in in the the east east central central sector sector as as UN UN and and enemy enemy forces forces two 811 enemy enemy attacks, attacks, including one by two and counterattacked. counterattacked. All attacked attacked and regiments, regiment s were repulsed. repulsed


Am
Nam
No air air missions flown in in the the west. west. missions were were flown minor action action against against shore shore targets. targets.
1 1
No. l o.

In the In the US US I I Corps zone, zone, there there were were several several patrol patrol clashes, clashes, but but little little 1st Commonwealth Division sighted three three tanks tanka Division sighted other action. action. Units of the 1st The enemy enemy order order of of and took took them them under under fire fire with with undetermined undetermined results. results. The battle remains of a f fourth battle remains unchanged unchanged with three CCF armies and elements of ourth the on t h e corps corps front. little.action There was little action in in the t h e US US IX IX Corps Corps zone, zone, although although small amall

enemy attacks attacks forced withdrawals of eneqy forced withdrawals of observation observation posts posts in in the the US US 25th 25th and and probing attacks in @new probing attacks in the the corps corps ROK 6th 6th Division Division sectors. sectors. Other minor enemy There are still two CCF armies facing the zone were repulsed. sone repulaed. There stilltwo armies facing the IX IX Corps. Corps.

Division Action was heavy US X X Corps Corps zone. zone. The ROK 7th Division Action was heavy in in the the US The US US 2nd Division Division continued its advance but ran continued its advance ran into into heavy heavy resistance. The repulsed a counterattack and made made limited gains gains against against repulsed a two two regiment regiment counterattack Division elements 5th Division elements made several several short short gains gains . strong resistance. ROK 5th strong resistance. zone, one one small small In the US 1st lst Marine Division Division zone, heavy resistance. resistance. In against heavy against Division units repulsed an attack by by 8 t h Division enemy attack eneqy attack was repulsed. repulsed. ROK 8th divisions are Korean divisions are facing facing the the X X Corps. Corps. two two enemy enemy battalions. battalions, Five North Korean
"

There was only only one one squad squad sized sized clash claeh in in the the ROK ROK I I Corps Corps zone. zone. There was North Korean Korean divisions divisions are are still still on on the the corps corps front. front.

Two Two

Naval aircraft flew flew 193 193 missions misaions against against east east coast coast targets. targets. SurSurNaval aircraft face units fired fired successful succeasful interdictory interdictory missions. face units
Surface in Surface units engaged in

68 THE C.I.A. 68 THE C. I . A. HAS H A S NO NO OBJECTION OBJECT108


TO TBX THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION 0 OF TO 1 THIS DOCUMENT. Til1 S DOCUMENT

A .

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it
.
W
. ,

Air

UN land based aircraft a i r c r a f t flew flew 990 990 sorties, sorties, including 645 645 combat. combat. UN 15 attacking railroad railroad targets targets with with f fair Medium bombers flew 1 5 sorties, sorties, attacking air F-861s. Five results. There There were were two two actions actions between between MIG-151s MIG15's and and F-86'~. results. MIG1s were damaged MIG's damaged and and one one destroyed. destroyed.
1 1 .
Situation General Situation
KaesonR Cease F Fire Kaesong i r e Talks

The Communists Communists proposed proposed that that the the first first meeting meeting of of the the negotiators negotiators The ehould deal with with setting s e t t i n g up up "appropriate Ifappropriate machinery" machinerp" for f o r guaranteeing guaranteeing the the should future neutrality of of Kaesong. Kaesong.

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A 19 19 September broadcast from Peiping annotinces A annotnces Communist Communist willingwillingness faith ness to t o resume resume negotiations negotiations at a t Kaasong. Kassong. Recalling UN bad f a i t h regarding violations a at Kaesong, the the Communists Communists intimate intimate tthat hat previous alleged UN violations t Kaesong, UN admission of the UM the 10 10 September September accidental accidental strafing strafing by by UN UN aircraft a i r c r a f t of of faith enable resumption resumption of of negotianegotiathe zone showed sufficient sufficient UN good f a i t h tto o enable tions. tions.

1
SEC

OCI 1952
21 September September 1951 1951

DAILY D A I L Y
I. I.

KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N

Military Hlitary Situation


HighliRhts Highlights

Action i n the US U S I I Corps Corps zone zone was was limited United to t o patrol patrol clashes clashes with with Action in the exception exception of a a small small enemy enmy probing probing attack attack which which was repulsed repulsed by by the the US US 3rd Division. One CCF 3rd CCF army and elements elements of of three more more are a r e facing facing the the I I
Corpe. Corps.

Several small amall enemy enemy probing probing attacks attacks were were repulsed repulsed by by US U S IX IX Corps Corps Seyeral units, unita, UN stubborn resistance resistance and and made made only only UEJ tank-infantry tank-infantry task task forces met stubborn limited lFmited gains. gains. Rro Two CCF armies face face the the IX IX Corps. Corps. I n the the US US X X Corps Corps zone zone there there was was bitter b i t t e r fighting. fighting. ROK 7th 7th Division In Unite of of the the 2nd units units resumed resumed the the advance advance against against stiff stiff enemy enemy resistance. resistance. Units Division estimated enemy regiment withwithDivision after after making making tlight s l i g h t gains against an estimated drew drew to t o former former positions. positions. Elements of the ROK also unable unable ROK 5th Division were also to register any t o register any gains. gains. One regiment of of the US U S 1st 1st Marine Mhrine Division was The ROK 8 t h Division Divlsion forced to t o withdraw withdraw slightly s l i g h t l y under under an an enegy enemy attack. attack. The 8th repulsed repulsed a a company company strength strength attack. attack. Five North Korean Xoreandivisions a r e facing facing divisions are the X X Corps. Corpsg

ROK ROK I I Corps Corps units units made made slight s l i g h t gains gains against against light l i g h t enemy enemy resistance. resistance, Two North Korean Korean divisions divisions are are opposite opposite the the ROK ROK I I Corps. Corps. Two


1. 1 .

& z !

The latest l a t e s t estimates estimates of of enemy enemy strengths strengths are are as a s follows: followst The Eneq forces on on the the immediate immediate front: front: Enemy forces
CCF C C F

187,000 187,000

Korean North Korean

281,000 281,000

syr
s +1

94,000 94.000

Bitter n the east-central s UN Bitter fighting occurred i in east-central sector sector a as UN forces forces to patrol patrol continued their t h e i r slow slow advance. advance. Action elsewhere elsewhere was was limited to clashes and small small probing attacks. attacks,

69 THE C.I.A. C.I.A. 69


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0o

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Nome

VOW . i

2. 2 .

Enemy reserves capable of intervention: E n w reserves interventions


CCF CCF

241,000
J,@.OOO 140.000

North Korean

381,000 381,000

3. 3.

Trainees Trainees and and guerrillas: guerrillas8

37,000 3'7,000

The t total o t a l of of 699,000 in Korea represents represents an an increase increase of of 60,000 60,000 over over reflects e f l e c t s the acceptance of of two two additional additional previous estimates. estimates, The increase r Chinese Communist Communist armies Chinese armies in i n Korea. Koreao

UN UN carrier c a r r i e r aircraft a i r c r a f t in i n the east east flew 200 sorties s o r t i e s against against coastal coastal Surface units continued interdictory interdictory fire. fire, units continued targets. Surface targets.

There were no carrier c a r r i e r operations operations on on the the west coast. coast. ,There were no patrolled. patrolhd


.
Air
General General Situation
Political P olitical

NaW

Surface units

UN land land based aircraft a i r c r a f t flew flew 1045 1045 sorties sorties including including 606 606 combat. combat. A UN t o t a l of of 18 18 medium medium bomber bomber missions missions was was flown. flown. A A railroad r a i l r o a d bridge bridge on on the the total main line l i n e east e a s t of of Sariwon was destroyed, i r f i e l d was destroyed, and Wonsan Wonsan a airfield was bombed bombed with fair results. results,
11.

The ROK Ambassador to t o Nationalist Nationalist China, China, Lee Lee Bum Bum Suk, Suk, announced announced on on 19 September his resignation from from his post "due "due to t o certain circumstances." circumstances." Lee, in i n his h i s announcement, announcement, praised praised the Chinese Chinese Nationalists' Nationalists' anti-Communist anti-Communist efforts. efforts

According to t o unconfirmed unconfirmed speculation speculation in i n South South Korea, Korea, Lee Lee Bum Bum Suk Suk is is slated to s lated t o replace replace the present present ROK ROK Minister Minister of of Defense Defense Yi Pi Ki K i Bong. Bong.

Kaesow Truce Truce Talks Talks Kaesong

A 20 September September broadcast from from Peiping claims claim8 "new %ew light l i g h t was w a s thrown thrown on on the American violations of the Kaesong neutral tone," when four unarmed ROK Bmerican of the Kaesong zone," when four unarmed ROK soldiers, soldiere, captured in i n the the neutra2 neutral. zone, zone, were were handed handed over over to to a a UN UN liaison liaison officer. The The Communiats Communists state state that that this t h i s is i s the t h e "first "first time" tirnell a a ground ground violaviolaofficer. tion t i o n of of Kaesong was admitted by the UN. UN.
\

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OCI 1953 1953


22 September September 1951 1951 22

DAILY D A I L Y
I. I.

KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN

Military Situation
Highlights

In I n the US I Corps zone, sone, patrols of of the ROK ROIC lst 1st Division Division and and the the Unite 1st Commonwealth Cornonwealth Division Division made made light l i g h t contact contact with with enemy enemy forces. forces. Units lst of attacks, one of which which of the t h e US US 1st 1st Cavalry Cavalry Division repulsed repulsed several attacks, was in of i n reinforced reinforced battalion strength, strength, and withstood 109 rounds of 3rd Division units en0 a r t i l l e r y fire f i r e while while maintaining maintaining positions. positions. US 3rd enartillery countered land land mines mines which which damaged damaged several several tanks tanks and and vehicles vehicles, but all all countered disabled equipment e q u i p e n t was was recovered. recovered. -Enemy forces opposing opposing the the US US I I Corps Corps u units are still still the the C CCF %emy forces n i t s are C F 65th Army, and elements elements of of tthe CCF @d, 42nd, 47th, 47th, and and 64th 64th W Andes. 65th Army, h e CCF o s .


AZEI

front UN reconnaisreconnaisr o n t as advancing UN Action intensified intensified along the f sance elements, in both the the west-cehtral west-central elements, encounteringheavy encounteringheavy resistance i n both and the casualties on on enemg enemy t h e east-central east-central sectors, sectors, inflicted i n f l i c t e d substantial casualties forces ! forces.

Task forces forces from fromthe n the the US 25th Division Division i in the US US IX IX Corps Corps zone mines, antitank f fire, 132 round8 rounds i r e , and 132 met heavy resistance, resistance, encountering mines, of the Ethiopian Battalion Battalion enena r t i l l e r y and and mortar mortar fire. f i r e . Elements of of artillery east, a Farther to t o the east, gaged gaged enemy enemy forces forces in i n hand-to-hand hand-to-hand combat. combat. Farther battalion of forces, estimated estimated of the ROK 6th Division also engaged enemy forces, Other UN units n the tbe units i in to t o be two two companies, companies, in i n hand-to-hand hand-to-hand combat. combat. Other Opposing enemy enemy forces force8 corps zone zone maintained positions positions and and patrolled, patrolled, Opposing in the zone a r e the are the CCF CCF 26th 26th and and 67th 67th Armies, Andes. Corps zone, zone, the t h e ROK 7th 7th Division continued continued to t o attack, attack, I n the US X Corps In ROK 5th Division but made maih no no material material progress. progress. US 2nd Division and BOK but of t the h e US 1st lot units engaged engaged enemy enemy forces forces in i n light l i g h t contacts. contacts. Elements of units ROK eth 8th Division Division units unite Warine Division Division repulsed repulsed an Marine an enemy enemy probing probing attack. attack. ROK Korean 1st, lst, 2nd, 2nd, 6th, bth, and and 12 12 Di.% Diclosed closed in i n assembly assembly areas. areas. The North Korean visions face face the the US US X X Corps Corps units. units.
ROK patrolled, ROK I I Corps Corps units, units, faced faced by by two two North North Korean KoreanDivisions, Division8,patrolled, making light making l i g h t contact contact with with the t h e enemy forces. 117 1o THE C.I.A. C . I . A . HAS NO OBJECTION SE TO THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION GZ 07

THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT.

.A

No.

0 9 0 0 0.9

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Han

m a !

Carrier-based Carrier-baged aircraft a i r c r a f t flew flew 202 202 sorties, sortiea, attacking attacking targets t a r g e t s in in the Wbnsan i in the east, east, and Haeju t h e vicinities v i c i n i t i e s of of Songjin, Songjin, Pulehong, Pulchong, and Wonaan n the and and Chinnampo Chinnampo in i n the the west. west. Surface Surface vessels veseels continued continued the the bombardment bombardment of of communications communications facilities, gun targets both f a c i l i t i e s , warehouses, pTar8hOU8@~8, gun positions, positlops, and other t a r g e t s along both

Coast8 coasts.
patrol reported sighting sighting Soviet Soviet naval naval forces forces apapA naval p a t r o l plane reported parently parently in i n training training exercises exercises in i n the theJapan JapanSea Seaabout about90 90miles milessouth0, 8oUthof Vladiaroatoki: V'!ladbwhk, a t 1220tW, 13300~E. The forces consisted of of s a e t of east at 4220IN, 133001E. seven seven submarines, submarines, two two major major war war vessels, vessels, seven seven destroyer destroyer type type vessels, vessels, two two Catalina Catalina type t y p e aircraft, a i r c r a f t , and and one one conventional conventional fighter fighter plane. plane.

sorties, including including 625 625 combat combat UN land-based land-baeed aircraft a i r c r a f t flew 1016 sorties, 101, Armed reconnaissance missions. Close-support sorties s o r t i e s totaled totaled 101. missions. Close-support a i r c r a f t flew flew 358 358 missions missions against against targets targets in i n numeroUs numerous areas. areas. Strikes aircraft against 28 2$ targets targets were were made made by by night nlght intruder intruder aircraft. a i r c r a f t . Medium Medium bombers against flew 22 22 sorties, s o r t i e s , attacking attacking .various various targets, i r f i e l d s , at at targets, including including a airfields, medium bombers bombersshoran., ahoranEight medium Wonsan, Sondok, Sondok, Sariwon, Sariwon, and and Yonpo. Yonpo. Eight bombed Maeng jung-Dong marshalling , bombed Maengjung-Dong marshalling yarde yards.

11.

Ambassador Muccio, Rhee's 19 19Septentber September Ambassador Muccio, commenting comentixlg on on President President Rhee's h e cease-fire cease-fire should proceed f tthe h e Chineee statement t hat t that the proceed only only i if Chineee CormrmCommun i s t s leave leave Korea and the North Koreans nists Koreans disarm, disarm, considera considers these these views views as as confirming thee's "ba8ic adamant adamant dislike d i s l i k e of of any any cease-fire cease-fire settlement." settlement." confirming Rhea's "basic

attitude, Muccio suggested suggested to to t the h e ubl UN Command Command that that In view of this attitude, t h e "Korean "Korean alternate o t h e UN delegation" o the the alternate t to the delegation" be be ordered ordered tto the Kaesong Kaesong area as a s a precaution against Itany llast a s t minute against "any minute sabotagen sabotage" on on the the part part of of

Rhee Rhee.

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Aim

General General Situation Situation

Political Politdcal

srr

w
OCI CCI 1954 1954
24 24 September September 1951 1 9 5 1

DAILY D AILY
I . I.
Situation Military Situation

KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N

Highlights Highliphts

In I Corps Corps zone, divisions and and attached attached smaller zone, the four UN divisions In the the US I units maintained maintained positions making only only light light contact contact with with units positions and patrolled, making enemy forces. forces. enemy

"he five divisions in in the the US US IX I X Corps Corps zone, zone, with with the t h e smaller smaller The five UN divisions patrolled, meeting meeting enemy enemy units attached, also also maintained positions and patrolled, of up up to to platoon platoon size 8iZe only. only. forces forces of

In In the the US X Corps Corps zone, zone, the Iff US 2nd 2nd Division Division units units engaged enemy units in one area reached n i t s in forces forces in in several several sharp sharp encounters. encounters. Attacking UN u a in the face face of of deterdetera high ground objective objective but were forced to withdraw in UN counterattack counterattack was unsuccessful, and the enemy mined enemy resistance. resistance. A UN mined enemy Other UN UN divisions divisions forces followed up by by a a counterattack counterattack on on their their part. part. Other forces followed up The US 1st 1st attached smaller and attached smaller units units maintained maintained positions positions and and patrolled. patrolled. The Marine and removed removed 64 64 anti-personnel anti-personnel mines. mines. Marine Division Division located located and

UN UN units units in the the ROK ROK I I Corps Corps zone zone made made saattered scattered light light contacts contacts with with enemy enemy forces forces while while adjusting adjusting positions positions and and patrolling. patrolling,

Naval airairNaval and Marine Marine aircraft aircraft flew flew a a total total of of 232 232 sorties. sorties. Naval Naval and craft based based on on east east coast coast carriers carriers flew craft flew offensive offensive missions missions in in the the Nanam, Nanam, Hamhung and and Wonsan Wonsan areas, areas, striking striking enemy enemy communications communications and and supply Supply dumps. dumps. and Wonsan vicinities bombarded Blockade ships in in the the Changjin Changjin and Blockade ships bombarded railway railway and gun and and troop troop positions positions highway junctions, junctions, other other communications communications facilities, facilities, gun and one one small s m a l l arms arms depot, depot.


Ne_m

In the east-central east-central sector sector UN reconnaissance elements encountered In the resistance from from enemy forces up to regimental strength and and repulsed repulsed enany forces heavy resistance the front front UN UN units units repulsed repulsed Elsewhere along the several counterattacks. counterattacks. Elsewhere several several several light light probing probing attacks attacks in in scattered scattered brief brief encounters. encounters.

West coast coast drcraft, aircraft, operating in in the the Chinaamp, Chinnampo, Sariwon Sariwon and and ChqolIg Chanyong

71 TX2 -71THZ
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areas, lines and and troop troop concentraconcentraareas, struck at a t enemy shipping, shipping, communications lines rail targets west of of Chongju Chongju and and troop troop tions. Surface Surface vessels bombarded r ail t a r g e t s west tions. positions in i n the the Han IanRiver River estuary estuary vicinity. vicinity.

Air
UN land-baged i r c r a f t flew a a total t o t a l of of 884 884 sorties, sorties, inoluding including 54 54 UN land-based a aircraftilew in n the the enemy support missions and 500'Other 500 other offensive offenaive strikes. strikes. Targets i support rear aircraft; 77 night r e a r areas areas were were struck by 299 299 armed armed reconnaissance a ircraftj 7 ' 7 night Medium bombers bombers flew flew 19 19 effective effective sorties. sorties. made 149 l . 4 9 strikes. strikes. Medium intruders made facilities a t Sunchow Suichow while bile Eight aircraft a i r c r a f t shoran-bombed shoran-bombed communications communications f a c i l i t i e s at others h i t airfields a i r f i e l d s at a t Wonsan, Wonsan, Sandok Sandok and and Yonpo. Ponp. hit

IIa

A reiterates Communist willingwillingA 23 23 September September broadcast broadcast from Peiping Peiping r e i t e r a t e s Communist ness broadcast, however, text of the the broadcast, however, ness to t o resume resume negotiations negotiations at a t Kaesong. Kaesong. The text continues to will demand demand UN UN admission admission of o f the the t o suggest suggest that t h a t the the Communists Communists will violations of of the the neutral neutral zone zone before before matters matters concerning concerning alleged previous violations the cease-fire cease-fire can can be brought brought up. up.

he Meanwhile, the Communists have claimed claimed another another violation violation of of tthe neutral British Ccamunist correspondent, Burchett, claims neutral zone. zone. The B r i t i s h Communist correepndent, Burchett, claims in in a a broadcast that t h a t he he interviewed interviewed 11 1 1teen,age teen-age South South Korean Korean boys boys 23 September broadcast who who were were captured captured in i n the the neutral n e u t r d zone zone while performing an intelligence intelligence mission for f o r the mission the UN UN forces. forces.

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General Situation Situation General
Talk6 Kaesong Peace Peace Talks
2

OCI 1955

25 25 September 1951 1951

D A I L Y
I. I.

K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N DAILY KOREAN

Military Situation Highlights

in UN forces I n the east-central eaet-central sector of the front continued to to enencounter dug-in enemy units units and and repuleed repulsed several several c m n t e r heavy resistance from dug-in contact was was macle made w with orobing attacks. ?robing attacks. Elsewhere only scattered scattered contact i t h small
groups. gYxlps
0

The nine division8 lightly divisions of of the US I I and and IX IX Corps Corps malntained maintained or or s slightly u n i t s no no Patrols mado made only minor minor contacts with units adjusted their t h e i r positions. po3itions. Patrol8 larger than a CCF Army and elements of three three others others face face US I E a company. company. One CCF I Corps troops, troopn, while two two CCF CCF armies a m i o s face face the the US U S IX IX Corps. Corps.
In of the the ROK ROK 7th 7th Division Division repulsed repulsed In the US X Corps zone, elements of a probing attack of continued t to attack against against of undetermined strength, strength, and contluued o attack T E 2nd Division resistance from The US from enemy enerqy troops troops estimated e s t b a t e d to t o nuMber number 200. 200. Tho resistar.ce :giment and arul its its attached attached units units repulsed repulsed several several probing probing attacks; attacks; one one .eginent 'attacking i n its ettacking in i t s sector sector made made no progress progress against elements of of an enemy regiment. The !he US 1st Marina i f f e r e n t probing Marine Division Division repulsed repulsed eight eight d different probing regiment. attacks. Five North North Korean Xorean diviaions divisions continue continue t o furnish attacks. Five to furnish the opposition to t o this t h i s Corps. Corpe.

engaged by two two North Korean Korean divisions, divisions, Troops of the Troop t h e ROK ROK I I Corps, engaged encountered smal.1 enemy enemy groups groups while on on patrol patrol missions. miRsions. encountered small

Naval air air sorties sortiea totalled totalled 2280 228, including including 11 1 1close close support support missions misoions Naval ir a c t i v i t y along t h s east Coast air activity the coast for the tihe US U S lst 1st Marine Marine Division. Division. Offensive a for included. attacks on on anti-aircraft anti-aircraft positions, positions, bridges, bridges, vehicles, vehicles, and and a a factory. factory. included attacks Surface I n the the west, west, aircraft a i r c r a f t provided provided support support for for a a UN UN guerrilla guerrilla raid. raid. Surface In vessels vetwels fired f i r e d on on communications cornmudcations targets targets and and gun gun positions. positions,
Air

Land-based UN UN aircraft a i r c r a f t flew flew 827 827 sorties s o r t i e s of of which which 535 535 were were combat. combat. Land-based Over half half the t h e 70 70 close-support clocre-support missions missions were were flown in i n the the US US X X Corps Corps zone. Zoner Over


U I

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OCI O C I 1956 1956

26 26 September September 1951 1931

DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N


I. I.
Military ~ l i t Situation Situetloll ~ y

Ugh:LI:Ws
UN forces forces repulsed replasd a a number number of of enemy enemy probing pobfng attacks atttlckR and and made macle slight slight gains gains against against diminishing diminishing resistance rssieknce in In the the east east central central sector. 80CtoP. Elseehere Elsewhere UN ubl troops troops adjusted adjusted and and consolidated conso~dated while repulsing some Borne small small probing attacks. attaeke, probing

Four Corps maintained their pooitiorie positions and Four divisions divisione of of the US I Copper patrolled, repulsed an A attack patrolled, while the the UP 11s 3rd 3rd Division D&toiafon repulaed % t a e k by an estimated 200 enemy enemy troolm. troops. 200

The five divisions divisions of of the US US IX IX Corm The five Corps maintaSned maintained OP or adjusted positions positions while while encouetering encouptering small amall enemy enemy groups p u p s on OM patrol p a t r o l missions, mi8siom. RON platoons. ROK 6th 6th Division Did8ion patrol patrol repulsed repulsed an an attack by two t u 0 enemy enplatoons.
In Corpe zone, BOX 7th and US US 2nd In the the US X COP%one, elements elementer of the ROK Other Divisions Yanggu. Other Divisions combined combined to to take take a a strategic strategic hill h i l l top top agove Ymggu. elements of the Division made d small gains again& against light light r0rethe ROK 7th 7th Division l gain6 slatance and and consolidated consolidated new new positions. position@. sistance


&zz
Alt &E

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ROX Uth llth Divirrion Division i in RON I Corp Corps sone zone repulaed repulsed three three ma11 small The ROK n the ROE enemy probing probing attacks. attaeke.

sorties totalled228, Naval air s o r t i e s totalled 228, including including 20 2G close close support ot\pport missione Iufasiona o trammPmIm f f f i c u l t l e s , no to transmission d difficulties, for the US US 1st 1st Marine MarLne Division, Division. Owing t for the information on on naval naval operations operationa is l e available. awiilab3.e, other information

Land-based UN aircraft of w which 514 were were combat. combat, Land-beeed alrcraft flew f l e w 845 sorties eortiers of k l & 52.4 The US ZZFj X Corpe continued to to get the benefit f nearly l l the Corps continued benefit o of nearly a all the cLom close support boMbers fflew aortiee, totalled approximately approximately 60. 60, Medium bumbere l e w 12 effective sorties, which which totalled sorties and Sardok Sondok ad~f'felda. airfields. Far s o r t i e s against against targets targets which which included included Yoneee Xonp and MIG-15ts were deatmyed destroyed o.nd and five damaged damaged but but East Command claims claima that five MIC-15ts no detrdla were given. given, details were

anr

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No.

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S\\131
XI.. II..
General Cinercll Situation
EOOnomZt3 Economic

In In a a 24 2 4 September North Karean Korean broadcast, broadcast, Communist Communist farmera farmers i in n the the
Pyongyang area pledged their supPort in all-out harvest harvest e effort Pyongyang support i n an all-out f f o r t tto o farmers on the program program assured assured crush "the cruah "the American American imperialists." imperialiste." The famere their listeners lietenere that that they they would would make make their their "tax "taxpayments payments in i n kind" kind" promptIy. promptly.
(Lack of farm manpower, manpower, recent serioua serious flood conditions, (Lack of conditions, and an8 lack lack of fertilizer f e r t i l i z e r will w i l l probably probably cut cut North North Korean Korean grain grain production production this this year.) year.)

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Medium bombers flew flew 11 attacking the the town town of of Chinnmpo Chinnampo Medium bombero 11 effective effective sorties sorties attacking and photographing the town of Chongjin and the marshalling yards and photographing the tom of Chongjin and the marshalling yards at at Kilchu. Kilchu, There is a preliminary report of an engagement between 36 F-8618 and There is a prelincl.nary report of an engagement between 36 F-861s and 30 30 MIG-151s MIG-15's in i n which which one one F-86 F-86 was was damaged. damaged.

1 1 .

General Situation Situation General


been received No significant significant reports reports have have been received during during the the past past 24 2 4 hours. hours.

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sof Po

O C 3 1957 1957 ou
27 27 September September 1991 19g

DAIL! ROSSIIII

131:11,1,1111`IN

I.

Military Situation

Ilibliikla
UN units in the west-central sector repulsed a eerie, of sharp attacks from enemy elementainin increased to regimental strength. In the east-central sector UN forces made limited advauces in the face of heavy resistance from units of battalion strength and then repulsed a series de probing attacks. UN sivesaft totalling 238 &petted or engaged ovar ADO

enemy MO's.

In the westen western eeobr sector 02 of the the U8 US I I Gorp6 Corps sone, sone activity In ecCirl.ty centered around around patrol patrol action aation as as enemy en- troope tsoepe in l a eempany saapany strength strength forced foroed patrols pstrole of of RON l lst the ROK a t and and let 1st COmmonuealth Qomnonweal* Division. @ h h i l o n e to to withdraw. WiWer. Artillery Artillery ef the

US 1st let Cavalry Cavalry Divlllfon Division flred firedou on an estimated troop seen earrying 9p. estimated 50 50 e 8ow* e q llroops men aQJnrgiag B 3 A .Did;nioa eleam. recoillems t6 r6 Diviaion elea 57 57 mu, reooillese rifle r%le and ad* o 3.5 3.5 rocket reek& laundher. launaher. I meets repulsed enemy probing attack. attacks but but a a third third attaek attack ments repuleed two two platoon plgtoon sised sired enerqy resulted in hand until eaenemy troops troops rsaahed reached battalion battelion reeulted i n hand to h m d coihat eoabat uutll strength. The action action continued oootiaued to t o gain gain in in intensity lntsneity and end the the eneny m e r c y increaeinorsaoetrongth. The ed hi@ hie strength i e f lull, the After a b brief hill, the enemy resumed the strength to to a a regiment. regimeat. After attack attack but but the the UN Ull division dlvidon troops troops bold 4d.d their thezr positions positlops and and eventually eventually the the enemy drive diminfaher3 diminished*o to-a'medic mall Sane WOO rOlude of ob 400 rOunde endrive 1 1 arms am8 fire. fire, Sens enemy artillery enartillery and and mortar nm-r tii. f d h feIl toll on O(I DSH3rd 1B 3rd Division Dirieloa positions: pmitionr.
US,IX US I X Corps Carpa forces formu patrolled patrolled and and repulsed repuloed several aeweral small small probing probing attacks. attaake Elements of the RON 7th Division in the US I Corps sone resumed their attack against an enemy battalion and other troops of undetermined strength. New positions uses secured after a limited advaece, and mcpb.... ing attacks repulsed. U0 241 Divielon forces repulsed probing attacki. and maintained positions. The attached /*emit Battalion attacked, enS4Sed an enemy regiment, awl withdrew.

RON I Corps Um* were adlustiag positions.

missions for the US lot Wane Division.

Naval air sorties totalled 62, of uhich 15 were close support Few offensive missions veral,floen on the eaat coast as earTier-based planes replenished. Along the vest
\
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_ . .

-T Itliftwor'oe

coast a dumps, buildings, buildings, and and warehouse8 warehouses a railroad car, car, trucks, trucks, supply dumps, were destroyed. were deetrayed.

troops and installations, inflictSurface vessels vessels fired on enemy troops ing damage damage to ing t o gun gun positions positions on on both both the the east east and and West met coasts, coaate,

Air


General Situation

Other UN Which 661 Other UN aircraft'flew aircraft flew 1040 1040 effective effective 'sorties sorties of whhh 661 were W All four o f the the Corps areas meas shared eha~edin 10~0 suppsrb gotbato :All four of in the the 75 75 0 close support Qomb@t, HecUum bomber. bombers ~iiiekAonr'alfhough half were were flown flown in in the the US U S X Corps Gorp sone. sone. Medium lidseionsalthough half Sinanju m marshalling Targets included inaluded the Sinanju a r s h a l U W 3 flew Elew 33 33 effective effective sorties. sorties. Targets yards, pwde, Yonpo Yonpo airfield, airfield, Hamhung Hamhung supply eupply center, center, Songchon Songchoa railway railway bridge, bridel, Sinmak marshalling marshalling yards. yards. A total of 238 US IIS aircraft (F-861e, (F-86Bs,F-801e F-80'8@ and Sinmak F-84'8) sighted over over 400 400 MIGIs MIGls but but actually actually engaged engaged only o n b about about 200. 200. Total Total F-841s) sighted include one MIG destroyed, destroyed, one probably probab17 destroyed, destroyed, 14 d damaged, with claims Include mgd, w f a only o m one one US U S aircraft aircraft lost. lost.

II

No NO significant eigdffoant reports reports have have been been received received during the the past past 24 24 hours, hour&

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DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N


I. I.
Military S ituation Military Situation
Highlights

OCI OCI 1958 1958

28 28 September 1951 1951

several Fighting along along the t h e front f r o n t continued continued active. active. There were several Fighting b r i s k encounters, encounters, as as UN UN forces f o r c e s repulsed repulsed enemy enemy attacks a t t a c k s and rescued UN brisk troops that surrounded in i n the t h e west west central c e n t r a l sector. sector. t h a t had had been been temporarily temporarily surrounded


sector sector.

I n the the US U SI I Corps Corps zone, zone, all all divisions d i v i s i o n s engaged engaged enemy enemy forces. forces. A In battalion but was repulsed b a t t a l i o n penetrated penetrated US lst 1st Cavalry Division positions, positions, b u t was and the repulsed one a attack t h e positions positions restored. restored. The The US IR 3rd Division repulsed t t a c k by an estimated estimated 300 an 300 troops, troops, two two other other attacks a t t a c k s by by an an estimated estimated two two campanies, companies, sent a a relief relief column column to t o aid a i d reeonnaissance and sent reconnaissance elements elements who who had had been been mortar fire fell circled by 300 enemy enemy troops. troops. Heavy Heavy artillery a r t i l l e r y and mortar fire f e l l in i n the the corps sector. sector. corps
U S IX I X Corps Corps troops troops generally generally maintained positions positions and and patrolled. Datrolled. US

Division elements, forced t to withdraw temporarily ROK 6th Division elements, however, however, were forced o withdraw division reseby five five enemy enemy battalions. battalions. A d i v i s i o n counterattack remwhen attacked attacked by when

cured the t h e positions and forced the t h e enemy enemy to t o withdraw. withdraw.

7th I n the t h e US I T SX X Corps Corps zone, zone, ROK 7 t h Division Division troops troops maintained maintained or o r adadIn Elements of of the j u s t e d positions while repulsing repuleing several several enemy enemy thrusts. t h r u s t s . Elements the justed US hilltop position and and repulsed repulsed two two a attacks by i l l t o p position t t a c k s by U S 2nd Division maintained a h enenpr enemy forces. forces.
In I Corps zone, zone, the t h e ROK Capitol Capitol Division Division attacked attacked and and se58I n the t h e ROK I the cured t h e high ground approximately three or o r four f o u r miles forward in i n its its

s t r e n g t h in i n Korea is is now estimated estimated at at 684,000, 684,000, Combined enemy enemy ground strength Of this figure of 684,000 f t his f i g u r e of 684,000 a decrease of 15,000 from from the t h e previous p ~ e v i o u sestimate. estlmate. O troops, 271,000 are troops, a r e in i n the t h e combat zone, zone, 376,000 376,000 in i n the the rear areas areas and and the the remainder are North Korean trainees t r a i n e e s or or guerrillas. guerrillas.

ria_v
air Naval a i r sorties s o r t i e s totalled t o t a l e d 218, including 41 +l close close support support missions missione Offensive air operations were con for flown f o r the the US lst l e t Marine Division. Division. Offensive conthe s h i p s on the ducted ducted along both coasts coaets against a g a i n s t various targets. t a r g e t s . Blockade ships

s *
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--

east bombarded railway railway and and highway highway areas, areas, while while surface surface vessels vessels in in e a s t coast bombarded the west fired on troop troop positions. positions.

Air Air

Other UN UN aircraft a i r c r a f t flew flew 1,068 1,068 effective effective sorties s o r t i e s of of which whioh 695 695 were were combat, combat, including including 84 84 close close support support missions, missions, over over 60 60 in i n the t h e US E 3X X Corps Corps zone. Bone. Twenty-two Twenty-two effective effective sorties s o r t i e s ware w e e flown flown by by medium medium bombers. bombers. Targets Sinanju railroad bridge, included SinanJu bridge, Sariwon, Sarivon, Sinanju, Sunchon, Masan-ni Masan-ni and Yangdok yards, Chinnampo supply center, and and Sinmak Sinmak and and Yangdok marshalling yards, eupply center, Sariwon airfields. 62 US a aircraft i r c r a f t (F-861s, (F-8618, Sariwon airfields. There were engagements between 62 F-8418, F-80ts) F-80'~) and end 82 82 MIG's MIG'e in i n which which two two MIG's MIG's and and one one F-86 F-86 were were damaged. damaged. F-84'8,

11.

General Situation

The South South Korean Korean people people continue continue to t o remain remain generally generally silent s i l e n t on on the the The subject has been been made made sibce since President President subject of of Kaesong. Yaeeong. No major policy statement etatement has Rheels Communists and and disarmament disarmament Rhee's blast calling c a l l i n g for f o r withdrawal of of the Chinese Camnunists of of the the North North Koreans Koreans before before resuming resuming negotiations. negotiations.
Political Poli ti c e

The "skeptical "skeptical and and sulking sulking " It attitude a t t i t u d e of of the the Koreans Koreans towards towards Japan Japan has taken taken a a noticeable noticeable change change for f o r the the better. better. While numerous reservareserva= While making numerous tioqa, the t h e ROK tions, ROK government government seems seems to t o have have seen seen the the wisdom wisdom of of abandoning abandoning its its "peace treaty" stand towards towards Japan Japan and now now is is seeking seeking to t o negotiate negotiate a a simple simple treaty" stand agreement "similar llaimilar to to a a treaty t r e a t y of of friendship, friendship, commerce commerce and and navigation." navigation," agreement

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Kaesoly? Truce Truce Talks Talk6 Kaesong
2

OCI 1959 1959


29 September 1951 1951

DAIL/ D A I L Y
Military Situation I, M ilitary S ituation

KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N

gighlielts HiPhliahtrr


Arm &ax

UN There was was vicious vicious fighting f i g h t i n g in i n the the east-central e a s t - c e n t r a l sector, sector, where one IJN action was waa unit u n i t was forced forced to t o make make a a limited l i m i t e d withdrawal. withdrawal. Elsewhere, action generally limited to t o patrolling p a t r o l l i n g and and minor minor local l o c a l attacks. attacke.

In the ROK lst, 1st, U US Cavalry, and and B British I n the t h e US I Corps zone, zone, t h e ROK S 1st Cavalry, ritish lst l e t Commonwealth Commonwealth Divisions Divisions reported reported only only patrol p a t r o l action. action. The US 3rd Division, however, however, encountered encountered and and repulsed repulsed sevaral s e v e r a l platoon-size platoon-size probing attacks. The enemy unchanged, wlth with one CCF COF arMY attacka. enemy order of of battle b a t t l e remains unchanged, army and elements elements of of three three others others facing facing the the I I Corps. Corps.
In the 25th, ROK ROK 2nd, 2nd, and US 7th I n the t h e US US IX I X Corps Corps zone zone, t h e US 25th, 7 t h Divisions Divisions sustained several s e v e r a l small small probing probing attacks, attacks, which which were were repulsed. repulsed. Action Aotion in ROK 6th heavier, with with t the mounting an i n the ROK 6 t h Division sector s e c t o r was heavier, h e enemy mounting attack Two CCF CCF armies armlea still atill t h e attack a t t a c k was waa repulsed. repulsed. Two a t t a c k by by two two companies; companies; the face the IX Corps. Corps.

There There was waa vicious vicious fighting f i g h t i n g in i n the t h e US X Corps zone, where elements elements t h e ROK 8th 8 t h Division Division were were forced forced to t o withdraw 200 to of the 200 yards during hand to hand fighting. Counter-attacking UN UN forces forcee encountered encountered heavy heavy resistance. resistance. f i g h t i n g , Counter-attaeking US 2nd 2nd Division Divirlon units u n i t s repulsed repulsed more more than than a a dozen dozen small small probing probing attacks. attacks. US Five The ROK ROK 5th 5 t h and and the t h e US US 1st lrst Marine Marine Divisions Divisions reported reported light l i g h t action. action. Five The North North Korean Korean divisions d i v i s i o n s still still face faoe the t h e X Corps. Corps.

was light light action a c t i o n in i n the t h e ROK ROK I 1 Corps Corps zone zone as ab UN forces forcee made There was There limited Two North North Korean Korean divisions divisions are are on on the the ROE ROK I I Corps Corps front. front. limited gains. gains, Two

Luz Ns;ee
A A total t o t a l of of 82 82 carrier c a r r i e r aircraft a i r c r a f t sorties sorCiss were were flown flown along along the t h e east eamt and and west coasts, coasts, as as poor poor weather weather limited l i m i t e d air air operations. operationr. Successful Successhrl attacks a t t a c k s were made made on on communications communications points pointa aad and targets t a r g e t 8 of of opportunity. opportunity. $urface Surface craft c r a f t continued continued to to patrol p a t r o l and and to t o provide provide interdictory i n t e r d i c t o r y fire. fire.

76 7 6 THE THE C.I.A. C.I.A.


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AIL u
UN land-based land-based aircraft Rircreft flew flew 1002 1002 sorties, including 661 661 combat. aombat. Medium centers Kyomipo bombers flew flew 28 28 sorties, s o r t i e s , attacking supply supply and railroad centers at e t Kyomipo and Pyongynq. Pyongyang. A total t o t a l of o f 1,$82 1,382 vehicles vehicler was sighted, sighted, with 976 976 moving moving south. 80uth.

II.

General Situation
past 24 No No significant signifioant reports reports have have been been received received during during the the past 24 hours. hours.

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1.100

COPY NO.

39

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

DAILY DIGEST

Date:

JUL 3

1951

NOTE:

1.

*Army, DIA and State Dept reviews completed*


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2.
3.

This ummaary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for,the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence, It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the ;Office of Current Intelligence.

Comments repteSent the preliminary views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

Marginal letter indications are defined as follows:


"A"

items indicating SovietCopmunist intentions or oapabilities

ipportant regional developments not necessarily related to Soviet/ Communist intentions or oapabilities

"10

other information indicating trends and potential developments

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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)

"A"

"B"

editorial, managers and Party organizations of magy Soviet enterprises tblerate over-expenditures of raw materials' and natural resources, infringement of technOlogical processes, and the productive losses resulting from such abusep. The Krasnoye Sormova Worka are singled out in this connection because of the mauy locomotive and ships parts produced'that turn ant to be heavier than planned. As a result, this factory is "overexpending tens Of hundreds of tons of materials, and stocks of unfinished goods held there in excess of-norms "have still not been eliminated Pravda cautions the Works Farb Committee and the Gorki Town Party Committee to pay attention to these VIZOCODOMie and spendthrift activities, and warns that Party organizations must intensify the struggle for the strictest economy and thrift "against wastage and uneconomic conduct." (R FBIS, 28 June.51). gICUEED This is a ftrther indication of the apnarent metal Shortage in the USSR that has been reflected in this yearls scrap metal program.
.

Moscow.considers that the port of leningrad may now be closed to. foreigners. While the Soviets have not yet given a categoric answer to queries on this matter, requests for ship reservations have been.recently turned down, once for the reason that "no space was available" and again that, no foreigners would be given space on the two boats concerned from now on. FUrthermore, foreigners visiting legingrad during the past two

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USSFL:EMbasev Moscow Believes Communist Cease-Fire Terms Dictated bY ...nigELMilLsS_SEEfre:Ratha-thait.Consderato, commenting.on the terms oftheCoMmunist cease-fire proposals, Embassy Moacow believes that both the choide of Kaesong at the 38th parallel and ihe delay preceding negotiations are primarily for prestigaand propaganda considerations. 'The Embassy points out that while the delay could be designed to enable the Communist forces to improve their military situation, launching an .offensive would boomerang against their alleged peaceftl intentions. .,The Embassy further questions whether the Communist military forces could[, now expect to improve their position materially before cease-fire negotiations, except in the unlikely event that the Communists are dtermined to conClude the Korean war with a large-scale air offensive against UN rear bases and haval vessels. (C Moscow 5, 2 July 51) COMMENT:- In addition to'posaible prestige and propaganda advantages, the Communiats probably consider a delaY necessary in order to prepare their negotiating position for a conference that hap developed quite rapidly. With regard to military considerations, there is aVidence thatCommunist forces in Korea will be capable prior to mid-July of resuming the offensive if they so desire.
'

&flasteSS According to a recent Pravda

120,242,11.7_21ClosedjeFoier_resp, Embassy

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STAT
"A"

Weeks'have been refased'perMission'te take the boat trip down the Neva rgely in the tumor stage and tbe to-Peterhbf9-The situation i6 still e to Collect pertinent JurorEMbeady indi4atee that it Will cont Notanisatt-This may well. be :anOther step in cutting down Mation. the opportunity for observation in that area. (C Moscow 22009 29 June 51).

'libossadLC4qnUmabe'Ua_2.S._ZasedbNa+io_alist Problems. The . Soviet histbribal periddica4ToprosiItorii has chanted the'previously accepted theory..that since small countries could not long maintain an
existenbe independent of other predatory-capitalist powers, Tsdrist annexations' of Georgia and the Ukraine could be considered the "lesser evil", The magazine claimed that the introdnction of the higher Russian culture and economy to theseLpeoples was not "evil but good". This late twist'will undoubtedly necesSitate. further changes in the "facts" of history and significantlY the periodical also'criticised the history

National minorities in the USSEareAliertainly cognizant of the differences between-the theory. of "national equality" and "cultural autonomy" as proponnded by the Moscow ideologues And the practice of discrimination in favor of the Russian "elder brother" by the Government and Party. Pravdu of 2 July takes the Central Committee of the.Ukrainian Communist Party totask for permitting the encouragement of nationalist tendencies. A poem entitled "love Ukraine which was written seven years ago and recently republished provides gkayg4 with the point of departure for a general warning against nationalist emotions which are the most dangerous and. elusive "survivals of capitalist mores in the people7s minde%
nip

25X1A

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Soviet Paratroopo'RenortedlvSent fromfiumania to Transoau5220 Militau District. Approochnately2250 men of a Soviet parachute brigade' reportedly with complete war equipthent embarked on 28-29 May from Galati, Rumania bound for Poti end patumi. On 2 'June, 600 paratroopers and 90 female nurses were allegedlt.transported over the same route. 1COM2!Ts There is novevidence of any paratroop units in the Trenscaucausus Military District north of the IranianTurkish border, nor is there..evidence that there are- Soviet paratroops in Rumania. Closest airborne units in the USSR are believed to be north of the Black Sea in the Kiev andTaurib Military Districts. If a troop movement has actually taken place,' it is questionablel Iable to distinguish'paratroops from.regular militaAyunits. There has Men no confirmation of a report from] that paratroop equipment bad been identified on ships vmsoacting Ec-P;. and Batumi. (See 0/OI,Daily Digest, 23 Jumn 51).
I.
1

tektbook otently inns. (floscow Weeka 269 22 June

3.)..COMMENTir

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n'

51aTERF EUROPE. BUIGARIA.1


Asticqpj

iftlies--4X-Reedinesg_fRESEE2a11.9.

25X1C

f there is nb indication oi any aggressive action-in Bulgaria, despite general Imo confirmation is tension arA ramors in Sofia*, available of Soviet troop movements into Bulgaria, although the size of

25X1C

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.

TO,k:Oalftei:
the-Bulgarian army has 12100400-404.&-the,paat three months.' [the arm.* ignot .on,.a.-cwar-:foOting,morale. is poor, and the increase in the size'cifithearMay.40Yes much.bodause of the internal
. .

25X1C

25X1C

situationaa frOm external:reason/40,

tamp Although there is-to:fiii*IntliCation of immediate aggressive

intent on the part of:the PulgarigivArOyeHrecent estimates indicate that the Bulgarian Army has.attaiied aoMbet readiness. The fact that special"ists are not only being.retained.in:the army butare even being recalled to duty tends to detraotTrOM thejOageingHestimate that recent increases

25X1A

are for internal controllrapO004y:H


1113"

"B"

According to a Cteeheelovak aide -meMoire,, theliSijet pilot who inadvertently landed in Czechoslovakia wiabe?deliyerst:t6:US.authOritiee at the German border on 4 July. The4et aircraft araltelhflhiPPet'On '5-July to any German border point selected bithetS-autherities,AC Prague %, 2 Jul 51). COMMENTa The USAir Attacheageefhed-preVionily'requested permission to take'custody of the pilot,inlrastkindretUrn hhn personally to the US ZODB of Germany and'had:ASked'that aliS Air Force.tegm-be allowed to come to Prague to take deliVerypf:the,tWO
airorafte :
Bly

FINLAND. Co

the Communists and Social Demedratkmake::williprobably Such gains as be at the expense of the Agrarian ami TsiberalPartiele-of 'the center. As a result of such changes, a.coalition government *Addprobablybe formed similar to the present one but with a.aliehtj.Y:OtrOngarlabor representation., Present party strengths in,the.pietara:aa.tO4oWis-left-:0 Communists 37D Demodrats..55uCenter ....;4grarlana"56; Coalition Party 33; and Right -- Swedish Peoples PartY144,and ?rogreesivea
-.,

being.held on 24 Ally fOr:the'20Q*ati2mf,the Finnish Diet are not expected to produce any etriking/developmentee It Ifni/lost likely that the CommunistSwill gain three'pr:four'seate'in the northern provinces, where they hava done much organizationalwork during recent months. The Social Democrats are alsolikelyrtoygaina feW.seats'dve to their improved organizationaItechhiquiWamengFinnish:labor.

triAl 18/ttPTOpaganda Operation designed to Sear the US in general-and:the DS:preen:and diplomacy'in particular. He accordingly stresses the.need:fOrthejUS presS:and VOA broadcasts to !thaphasize the "worthleisnebe Ote*:4:06nfeeeionsv orevelations% etc.! obtained from Oatis after'be.hak.bonniaeld'incemimfinicado for seventy daye. Brig& oleo oeutionsagainatHOC*401Pefeivnees to Oatist good physical COndition, since; in:hiropinionOhtCoOManists have probably deliberately built up Ostia' physicaloonditioli,nfteilleving extracted the confession, (C Prague 3; 2 Jul

CZECHOSLNAKIA IlmhassrtomMerk*Oatie Tri44According to US Ambaseador Briggs inPrague tht.Gatiej

attk2Letunosiiinisor yetpota,an,,

0. F

.ctiOn', The nationwide elections

..

:J.,

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POLAND: Attaehe Field-Trips ReVeal No Unusual Military Activitz. Recent fieId-tripe by persennel,of the US Etbassy WEa'saw ArMy and Naval Attache& Offides during the latter 4:art .of Jund.revealed no unusual military 'actitity in central, southwest and northwest Poland. The Naval Attache on 22 June observed a total of about 28 small craft near Swinoujscie at the uthuth of the OderRiVer, but saw no unusual activity. Army-Attache on a trip through central and southWest The Assistant Poland 25-27 June observed Polish troops engaged in normal training, some Soviet ndlitary actitity.in the Trzebian area of southwest Poland indicating a possible build-tp, but otherwise nothing that he considered to be of an unusual nature. (S AIUSNA Warsaw 261600Z, 28 June 52; S USARMA Warsaw M4-128-51, 29 June 51).

"A"

RUMANIA:Maas Evacuations Indicate Importance of "National! Security. The US Legatien in Bucharestreports mounting evidence that.the-large scale evacuation of minority populationgroupa and "unreliables", possibly totaling 50-75,000 since 15-June extends along the whole length of RUManials frontier with Yugoslavia to a possible depth of 30 to AO miles. The."general feeling among western representatives" in Bucharest is that theMove is probably "for long-term security border control,and military considerations." purposes related to both Although concurring that these are theMajor notivatinglactors the legation states it is "at a loss to understand" why the evacuation is beingneffected (a) immediately prior to the harvest season in an important agricultural area, an& (b) with such rapidity that transportation burdened that serious accidents.havnresulted. facilities art so overAs a possible reason, the Legation suggests that the Rumanian GovernMent mayvial to complete resettlement of the evacuees before winter. The Yugoslav Government in sAmretest note delivered to the Rumanian Legation in Belgrade on 28 Jure alleges that the evacuation is principally directed against the large YUgoslav minority in the border area and constitutes *a warmongering action* to increase war psychosis and international tension. (S Bucharest 7811 27 Jume 51; S Bucharest 785, 29 June 51; ITID, 28 Juno 51). COMNENTs Although large-scale evacuation of peasants from the Important Banat agricultural area will undoubtedly necessitate emergency harvesting measures, such as use of military personnel, the Rumanian Government probably considers *nationarraecurity a more important consideration. The Rumanian Communists are undoubtedly anxious to avoid a repetition in Rumania of wholesale defections to Yugoslavia and increasing Yugoslav subversive activities, which have already occurred in Bulgaria. Previous information indicates that the evacuees are being sent into the agriculturally important Rumanian Danube plains, where the Government has complained of 4 lag in harvesting operations.
.

"13*

1UGOSLAVIA. US to Warn Tito Government Resardim glatlit. The State Department has advised Aibassador Allen in-Belgrade essential for the Yugoslav Government to be informed that it is of US concern
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regarding poesible proagoslav,aotivity in Albania. The Department mites that an'indidetion oftS concern over the discrepancy between the Yugo
slav.public position and recent Yugoslav action regarding Albanian refUgees in YugoislaVia should dissuade Tito from engaging'in -any unilateral action inAlbania. (TS SD To Belgrade 1478, 30 June 51), COMMENT: Despite previous eentraryreports,.AMbassador Allen can'find no signs.that the Tito Goteru ment is currently planning to instigate an antilioxha coup in Albania.
"B"

YUGOSLAFIL_RUMANIA4ULGARIA. Satellites Counter Yugoslav Protest of

siRmlaagaajsmEjava&Liak On 29.June Bulgaria and Rumania.delivered notes to Yugoslavia alleging numerous violations of their respective bor
dere during the past two monthee.The Rumanian note charges that Yugoslavia &Spite preVious protests, continuesto engage in "provocative and aggressive actiVity:through numerous violations of 'Rumanian territory, territorial waters, and'airspace". Bulgaria similarly accuses lUgoslavia of failing to heed'Previous Bulgarian protests and lists 18 new "provocations" by YagoslaV frontier troops and aircraft. (R FB1D, 2 Jul 51), CONMENTi The sitailtaneous Bulgarianatmanian presentation of these notes is undoubtedly a'joint maneuver to draw attention away from the Yugoslav protest Of the previoUs diy against Rumania's ruthless evacuation of Serbs from its Yugoslav border.

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IRAN. I Iran Mae-Strengthened Its MilitarYForCes in Oil Field Area/ The trffiliiTary Attache in Tehran reports lhat& as oftJuly& the total Iranian ground force at' Abadan is estimated 'Wipe 2,500. Its equipment consista of small Arne mortars& machine &tie and 11 tanks Mounting 77mm. guns. Naval strength ia placed at 500 meilivith several small vessels& whese largeet glint! are four inch. The bulk of-the Tenth Iranian Division is located at Alwaz. some 80intles away from Abadan (three hoUre distant in time). The Military.Attache belieVes the troops now in Abadan are completely adequate to preserve order. The'Iranians are--4Parently now awed by the British cruieer with ite six inch guns'off Abadan and would resist any British efforts to land military forme. Personnel from the British cruiser have already beendenied-landing permissibn. There is no doubt& according to the Military Attache& that any British effort to land would result ih Iranian military action that-would cease only when sufficient British forceswerelbrought in_to defeat Iranian unite. (S US Army Attache Tehran.; 1 Jul 51). COMMENT:- This latest US military-estiMate of Iranian deployment and.Iranian determination to resist isfully corroborated by alLeVeilable reports'. Iranle moves'to strengthen its military forces inAbadan and eleewhere arep_however& probably also aimed at preventing internal disorders:

AFGHANISTAN. PakistawSto s ort Of Diesel Oil to Af histan. On 27 Junevtlig-Coveltrunea o a an s ppe t expor o r g -Wed diesel sal to Afghanistan& presmahbly in brder to ensure maintenance of adequate stocks in Pakiatan until the Iranian oil sitation-becsoMes more clear. A. permanent stoppage of diesel oil shipments to Afghanietan dould rob:Ult.in cancellation of the contract ofMorrison-Knudsen Afghanistan& an American firm currently ehployed on large-scale development projects in that Country. CR Karachi Jt Mks 26, 29 Jun 51; O Kabul 1, 1 Jul 51). COMMENT: Afglianistan is entirely dependent upon Pakistan and the USSR fbr-ItrFetroleum supD.,

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GREECE. Kink Calls For Ne* Government OrElections. -According to press Thirgs& tang Paul intervened in the datinet crisis today and declared he would dissolve Parliamentend call new elections ifpolitical leaders Aid not fonn-a Strong ddalitiOn gOvernment: 03 lash PoeV3 Jul 513. COMMENT: The present =isle was precipitated by (1) the unwillingness of Prime Quieter Vnizeloe anci(m-Vice FattierPapandreou to support the US backed.wheat pricing program& and (2) the expressed oppOsition of Papami. dreou-4who resigned on 2 Julyfrom.the coalitionto the-eIectoral law proposed and supported-by VenizeIos and-other-leading Greek political parties.' The VS Embassy in-Athens is stressing the necessity of a stable interim government whieh muuld facilitate the adoption Of vitally necessay economic meastres without whiCh the whole rationing program in Greece might have to be abandoned with severe financial loss to Greece.
-

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Approved For Release 2002106/13 : CdA-RDP791-01146A000300070001-2

Approved For Release 2002106113 : GlA-RtIP79701146A000,34r0001-2

TOP SECRET plies. Since the of the 3,000,000 Soviets have deliVered to Afghanistan onlY 600,000 gallons of gasoline patched in /950-51 uhder the termS ofaniketotene supposed to be disthe agreement (pee COI Daily 1950Afghan-SOViet trade Bigest0:27, Jun 514-the Petroleum exports from cessation of any Pakistan,will portation system as well as seriouPly affect the Afghan transtheMorrison-Knudsen IT" INDIA. constraction company. Pretest to in Kashmir. India United Nations about Pakistani Border Violations announced todAy that Nations it has Security'Council against a series protested to the United along the cease-fire line in of violations by Pakistan Kashmir during the Minister.Nehru warned past fortnight. might flare into open that,if these violations,Zere n6t checked, Prime border violations by war. (R FBIS Ticker, 3 Jul 51). COMMENT: they both India Minor occurrence along the cease-fire and Pakistan are a relatively line in common arily treated by both sides as routine Kashmir, and they are customcoincidence that India's matters. It is present attempt to probably not aggressive tendencies call attention COMAS just one day after Br. Frank to Pakistan's Graham, UN Representative for /ndia the arrival in India of and Pakistan. "C" BURMA. Burmese C-in-C Concerned Over Militark the Burmese C-in-C, SituAIion: Lt. Gon. recently Attache in admitted,to the US Military Rangeon.that he was with the military'operations against the disappointed sed meager results of various concern oier-BUrmese insurgents. He also Communist border area which he expresinfiltration in the Sino-Burma claiis cannot:be able forces. 0 Rangoon 969, 29 June controlled with present the Burmese Foreign avail51). COMMENT: Ne Win now joins problem of CommunistMinister in acknowledging the forces moving towards increasingly serious they both still the China border, maintain the ing assistance fittion that the although from the Chineee. Communists are not receiv"C" INDONESIA. Continuing Strikes spread strikes, Diminish. GoVernment largely the result of Prestige. WideMohammedan holiday, a.general demand to continue in tion policy and its celebrate a defiance of the Covernmont's ban on strikes in ment has arbitravital attempted to counter its industries. The Governdemanding that rearnItant employers grant a One diminished prestige by in most and a half mediation proceedings month's wage bonus and by political prisoners announcing the release on 5 July. Chinese daily in of 1,000 Keng Po, a leading CPYRGH in non-Co/mast weakness, stated Djakarta, editorializing that on the coordination among cabinet ing, that they aet Government's individually Ministers is lackwonder," the /cella po, and sometimes recklessly. VeP concluted,:,"there are ever CPYRGHT more voices, The present cabinet peaking June of men than its undeniably is composed of a less capable predecessor, and lack of group coordination frequently has

Ina,

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been apparent. However, although it has received little or not support from the Indonesian press since its formation, the Governmentle majority in Parliament remains firm and there are no indications that any immediate issues will cause its fall.
.

"B"

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CHINA: Re orted Movement ot_29.9109gaiiilield Arn7 Troops into leangtung-Kwengsi Area. Two armies totaling over 30,0000 men, of the:ComMunist 2nd Field Army recently moved into the provinces of Kwengtung and Kwengsi from Iennan according to a Hong Kong press report. This movement was allegedly to aid in the cleanup of gerrrillas in these provinces and to move into positions on the Indochinese border. (U Hong Kong Reuters Ticker, 2 July 51). COMMENTs The loCation of elements of the 18th Army, 2nd Field Army has been recently confirmed in the Canton area [Reasons for this change in the long standing allotment of area respensibility-aangtung being a 4th Field Army sector-are still unknown. Other reports suggest the 19th Army end Field Army, as the second unit involved in this movement. The figure of 30,000, however, indicates only one full army. There has_ been no reliable evidence to indicate that the internal.situetion in these two provinces necessitates employment of additionalftroops, or that any further build-up is planned at the Indochinese border at this, time. The 2nd Field Army, has been charged with the responsibility of "liberatingv Indochina. Activities towards that objective are reportedly under the direction of CHIEN Keng deputy commander of the 2nd FieldArmy.
1

IrenshaisckSiture of US-Viet ECA Pact. The US Legation was informed by a Viet official on 28 June that word had just been received from the French Ministry for Associated States that the,US-Viet bilateral agreement on economic aid could not be signed without the prior approval of the High Council of the French Union. Minister Heath, while conceding that the French are,by'this move acting within legal rights as prescribed by the 8 March 1949 agreetent withjletnem observes that French authorities have been constantly and full consulted during the course of.US-Viet negotiations. He adds that the French Economic Counselor in Indochina had given written approval of the bilateral procedure, that the French did not require'High Council approval . of the pentalateral agreement on military aid, and that the High Council of the French Union is not yet in existence. On 30 June, General De Lattre made the further announeement that the French Government had now proposed certain change's in the text of the agreement.. Minister Heath finds the French action "astonishing" and is at loss to explain it, but he' urges that every effort be made to secure speedy signature of the agreement without exacerbating the feelings of eitherthe French or the Viets. (I Saigon 2346, 29 June 51; 8 Saigon 2364, 30 Aline 51; S Saigon 5, 1-July 51).

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Approved For Release 2002106/13 ECIA-RDP79T01146A000300070001-2

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IH
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CHINA..Allesed Sino -Soviet Conference.
110 top Chinese Communist leaders met with two Soviet representatives in Peiping on 4 June. CHOU En-lai reportedly demanded that the USSR vdo somethingrabout excessively heavy Chinese loases in men and materiel in the 'Korean conflict, and complained that Peiping was being distracted from its major objective of Taiwan. The Chinese are said to have been told thnt Soviet- troops are moving into Northeast Manchuria and building up illSiberia) and to have been.promited (a) Soviet aid if the mainland-were invaded and (b) training and eqpipment for Chinese troops .(for unspecified purposes). Ithe conferees agreed to attempt to /*split the solidarity of the UN and to create diversions elsewhere,s to attempt to prevent the conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty, And to improve transport and road-building.in China to facilitate -trOop movements.' COMMENT: Developments in China are often preceded, or followed, by.reports giving details of the proceedinge of alleged top-level meetings concerned with such developments. In general, it has proved difficult to distinguish the possibly valid material in such reports from plausible rumiors or embroidery of newspaper reports'. The degree of validity of the above report is unknown. 'Although Available evidence suggests that Peiping is prepared to continue with its Korean Commitment, it is possible that Peiping has been concerned Over the magnitude of its losses in Korea, as well as its inability to assault Taiwan, and that Chinese. pressure on the USSR contributed to Malik's cease-fire proposal. There have been'many reports, prior.to the alleged meeting, of the movement of Soviet troops into Manchuria and of a Soviet program of training and equipping Chinese forces in Manchuria; the latter development might explain the former. The USSR has been bound by treaty since February 1950 to come to China's-aid if the mainland is attacked. The final three alleged agreements of the conference relate to known Sino-Soviet objectives.

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Hatiallaitnn14,trateslisatattAlittping. During .June Chinese Nationalist naval patrols Intercepted four small merchant vessels -between Swatow and Foochow, Pirates-in the same general-area attacked two veisels and sank the Panamanian ship BUST. (p Far East Trader, 27 June 51 and R FBIS Daily Report, BBB 5, 27 June 51). COMMENT: As a result of such incidents many vessels destined fcr North China ports are being diverted to Whaipoa, the port for Canton. Another result may be a hastening of Chinese Communist plans to occupy offshore islands from which the Nationalists and pirates operate.

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Approved For Release 2002/06/13 : ZIA-RDP79T01146A000300070001-2

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Approved For Relene 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0003/0070001-2

Nod

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"B"

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"B"

Army report cited by FECOM, the enemy retains the capability of:increast. ing guerrilla activity in coordination with future offenses. FECPM adds that continued friendZy control measures, Iow guerrilla strength; struggle,for survival and recent decrease of control and coordination, however, May be expected to confine guerrillas to minor harassing /actions. (S FECOM Telecon 4899; 3 July 51). COMMENT: Indications ' of enemy intnetions to expand guerrilla activities alsoAlave been derived from recent guerrilla POWs as well as from rplawhe hive reported th e formation of new guerrilla units and t e re bilation of the North Korean 10th Division coimitted early this year in a deep infiltration mission against the UNgs main supply routes in
South Korea.
-

KOREA, Increased Guerrilla Activity. Far East Command reports that 'enemy guerrilla bands, quiescent for several months, have become noticeably more active during the past few weeks with over 1400 engaged between 23 June and 1 July. According to a recent 8th

CHINA. Morale Problem of Chinese Nationalist Forces. Suicide and desertion among members of the Chihese Nationalist armed forces has become a problem, according to a senior Chinese Nationalist general. The causes: (1) homesickness, heightened by the backfiring of propaganda promising an early return to the mainland; (2) physical sickness - -tuberculosis is increasing; (3) assignment to "coolie joberand (4) fear of being reported to CHIANG Ching-kuo by his Soviet style political officers. The omnipresence of these political overseers, lis shown hy four of them being plIten a-orlard a chinese Navy tanker running from Japan to Taiwan, che'tedngcsLOwattheship2s compass at all times. An "understudy" captain has been aboard this tanker, in addition to the regular captain for over four months.1 I this practice appears to be inconsistent with another naval practice of sending the regular captain to school for political indoctrination for three to four months. These political commissars of CHIANGgs were put aboard ships about three months ago over the strenuous.objections of Admiral KWEI Yung -ching Commander of the Chinese Nationalist Navy. (S ALUSNA Taipei Weeka 28, 29 June 51). COMMENT: A morale problem has always existed in the Chinese Nationalist forces. It ie generally understood that their contained position on Taiwan has brought about a further deterioration of morale. Any increase in the high 1950 average daily sick rate of 150 per thousand among only those ill enough for hospitilization would seriouslyaffect the combat potential of the Nationalist forces. While the institution of political officers serving with the armed forces is not new, they had not been accorded as much powerand corresponding fear --prior to CHIANG Ching -kuols direction. CHIANG., who is the Gimogs eldest son, Spent some 10 years-training in Russia and is reportedly attempting to emulate the Soviet methods of insuring control over potential defectees in military service, and, in the process, is arousing increasing resentment from all military elements concerned.

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in

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Approved For Release 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000400070001-2

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"Aq

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25X1

KOREA. Augmentation Of Enemy Forces in Korea. According to-Far East Command numerous recent rePorts, confirmed and unconfirmed, strongly indicate that the enemy is continuing te_provide reinforcements and replaceMents for both North KoreanHand Chinese COmmunist forces in Korea. Front line Korean Corps have been strengthened by replacements drawn from units:in the Pyongyang:and Wonsan areas. The strength of these units in turn, has been maintained by the consolidation of units assigned to rear area security missions-the reactivation of units dissipated in the defeats'orlast autumn, and.the continuance offrecruitment and training at a relatively high level. Recent 1 reporta have mentioned the activation in Manchuria of new cOrth Korean divisions and their movement into Korea. Numerous sources have referred to the arrival in Kciree of additional Chinese Communist units to replace those recently withdrawn as a consequence of combat losses. POWs have confirmed the preeence in Korea of the 140th Army. Other POWsThave reported that other units of the Fourth Field Army are in Korea in a react role. tend to confirm the movement of sipeable CCF forces aEn;i:i;13 enemy main supply route back of the northiest front in the Sibyon area. (S FECOM Telecon 4893 and 4899; 1 and 3 July 51). tOMMENT: There is ample evidence of a long range program tO bUild-up the North Korean armed forces. The extent to which the Chinese Communists have instituted a rotation of forces to replace units withdrawn remains uncertain. The influence of the ceade4ite negotiations on such long term manpower committenta-; have net as yet been reflected in available information.

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"CH

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Approved For RtItase 2002106/13 : CIA-RDF79T01146AW6300070001-2

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SECTION 3

(WESTERN)

'tB"

Closer Relations. P. ular Distrust,of 15 Business Ham ers eve that n oc na o, renc e power CURTZn d rec ors o fer.the political, Military, iMperialism" is a seriousdanger US "ederiemic Thesathe attituda exists in nuteroes and-edonomic future=of France. circles.] French comMercial and indUstrial
FRANCE:

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near,future.
"B"

"B"
_
.

defense budget for ITALY. -Proposed 1952 Defense Budget. 'The-proposed almost $700 million. This billion lire, or META year 1952 totals 435.6 chargeable to 1952 of theapproximately $160 million atount includes the appropriation approved earlier this 5400 million supplementary defense chargeible to fiscal year 1953 from -Year as'well, as unspecified advances :Parliament is not expected to take up thie:$400 million appropriation.. 24% of the national budget, the defense budget, which represents-rolighly 26,.30 June 51) COMMENT: The proposed until autumn. (S Rome Joint Weeka is approximately the same proportion Italian defenseS budget for fiscal.1952 would in fiscal 1951. Thie comparison of the total budget as was the case effort. of the Italian defense appear to reflect unfalorably on the scope that Within the next year the Italians;will'actually However, it is believed budgetary apentire $400 million extra-MilitarY Place contracts for theoriginally,sUpposed to be Opent over a three-year. propriation, which was defense be expected to pass'another extraordinary period. The Italians can appropriation within the next year aid a half.

Swise Light Tanka. The Chief of the SWIT2ERLAIt. Swiss Urgently Seek obtain tanke.. He Troops'has Staled it is imperativethat Switzerland countries for this military said that the Swiss were dependent.upon foreign obtained, the technical and He also declared that once tanks are .item.
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_Apprehensions of a grovairki1717772'75-51iness These fears and IvCOMMENT: in non-Camnuniet circles. are widespread in-France, even signs of US diplomatic dictation appear to US-French a widespread antipathy for any a closer popular support of current Party, be the prindiparthreats toSecretary-General French Sodialist Of the Gvy Mollet, undertakings. take undue adtantage ti1771:his concern last US businese both has ekpressed the NATO arrangein Europe, under Of its opportuni es or influence distrust Of US economic While this:Freneh ment and the Sal-lumen Plan. propaganda till, there are no inflUence is griet fel' the Communists! situation in the ."great_violence":from this catione that they could induce

25X1A

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training protleMs in the use of-these tehicles.could be solted hy the .(R Bern.,'Jointleeka 26, 29 June 51) - 'COMMENT: The SWisa have Swiss. apparentlfdecided, the manufacture ofCenturion-57:77,7 for which theY hate obtained licensing rights;-is impraCtiCable at'thid-time, The appeal of the Chief of the Swiss Light Troops is probably designed to bring this problem to the attention of the West. Without the 550 tanks they need, the Swiss will not be able to defend their lowland area--a corridor from Germany into France.
"13"


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SW1ss Reaction to World Bank Bonds isSua Reflects Anxiet The Swiss press has announced the plans of the International 13ank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to float 112.-year 3.5% interest-bearieg loan on the SAiss market en 3 July.; This is the anat time that the IBRD has publicly floated a loan in Switzerland; previouely such loans have been handled privately. &Ilse bankere reportedly informed the IBRD that on its present terms the loth would fail because Swiss intestors are showing increasing reluctance to acquire ally leng-term obligatiOne, The .US Legation Bern comments, however, that the 305% rate coupled with mediuM termsland low risk factor would ensure he suecees Of the loan, (R Bern Joint Weeka No 26, 29 June 51; NY TiMes 3 July 51) -CONNENT1 The Swiss bankerslobjections to the IBRD are nU7aZilt conditioned by'their desire to get.the best terms possible. It'is,true, nevertheless; that Swiss intestore are becoming. increasingly concerned aven the prospects of inflation in Switzerland and that therefore they are hesitant to purchase fixed-return sbctrities.
Over. Inflation.
-

IIC11

SCANDINAVIK. 'Korean Peace Pnodpects Delay Decision'on Sending Troops tt The prospect of an armistice in Korea is delaying a decision by the Norwegian and Swedish Governments with respect to the UN'S request-of 22 Junta for troops. AtTthe moment neither the NorWegian nor.the Swedish Foreign Ninisters find advisable the meeting of.Scandinatian Foreign Ministers proposed by Denmark-(see OCI Daily Digest,29 June.,51), (R StockhoIM 1; 1 JulY 51; P 0s145.1289 29 June 51) COMMENT: UndionbtedlY, all three SCindinavian Governmente are pleaSed at EETTFUSpedts:of 4 eessation of hostilities in Korea. The Norwegian Foreign Minieter, nevertheiessl'indicated the sympathetic attitude of Norway to an equitable sharing of the burden in Korea. The Swedish Foreign Minister, on the other hand, is undoubtedly greatly relieved at teing able to avoid seridus consideration of SWeden's responsibilities military-wise to the UN, and another public discussion of Sweden's foreign policy,
Korea-.

no ft

2 5X1 C

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Approved For Release 2002/06/13 : COS-RDP79T01146A000300070001-2

Approved For Retse 2002/06113 : CIA-RDF79T01146ASS400070001-2

."C" 'GUATEMALA.

Government MarRegtest Vilthdraimlof US Air Misslen.,: The WAITIVtache in Guatemala hab been informed that President Arhenz is on: seriously considering reguestihg the vdthdrawal of the:USAF Mission the US id., the grounds that the MisSion mill serve no useful purpose'lf materiel.' unable.to provide the Guatemalan Air Force with.eguipment and. realm of action Seems yell mithin the The Attache comments that,'"Such concurred in by the Chief of the Air possibility and would probably be than purply professional grounds rather Force and many of.his officers oft
'

51) any'anti-US sentiment," (C Guatemala,' IR-57-51 USAIRA, A-)9'20.May Permitted the morale and egnipMent.of COMMENT: The Guatemalan'Government largely becausethe Air Force was regarlml the Air Force to deteriorate

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"B',

Council Refuses to Send Troo s to Korea. The Brazilian.National :razl does not have, at this a une, s a e. on Security ounc than those required for the defense of its moment; "military forces other recommend to the Chief The Council has decided to national.territory". of technical of Staff of the Armed Farces the study of preliminary methods "in geod collaboration and planning whiCh nil permit the implementation (U Rio de Janeiro 2, 1 July..1) time" of Brazil's obligation.% under the UN.: general Lie the appeal of Seeretary COMMENT: The Connell met to discuss Braiilian for the KoreanTwar. /be to tbe UN members for additional troops Only pnblie remains overwhelmingly, opposed to sending trodPsrnetseas. its campaign week's has the Vargas aiministratian.begun &Uri:4. the past two that it will to olereome this public attitude. It is genprally_attepted politically to take several months even te prepare the Brazilian publia As a follow-up of the favor,active participation in UN military actions. rof the Armed Monteiro,-presently Chief of Staff ESC:meeting, General Gois offieials on the Forces, is coMing to the'US to consnit with military participate in the UN action. General Practical zmys in which Brazil may Gois,1 however, has recently retarked that BratiliM efforts "should be of preferentially Utilized in the Atlantic area", and that thei!dofense East. the Weatern Hemisphere might begin in Berlin.or more to:the BRAZIL.
,

Approved For Release 2002/06/13 : CIA4RDP79T01146A000300070001-2

Approved Fcheleate 2002106/13: CIA-R0P791011464000300070001-2

Tap eiCRET

a questionable asset to Arbeni during the presidential bainpaign of recent plan to.pUrchase surpltie Spitfire :aircraft from Italy. US representations to Italy, however, prevented this trensactien, arid there are no indications that' Guatemata-viill Soon obtain aircraft.'
as

1950. A desire to rehabilitate:the:Air:Faroe maY be 'indicated by a

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Approved For Release 2002/06133 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300070001-2

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25X1

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Approved For Release 2002/06113 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300070001-2

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Approved For Re laud 2002/06113 : CIA-RDP79T01146A00W0070001-2

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT S/S

CABLES

3 Jbly 1951

SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
fRAN. Tanker Racal t Problem Under Consideration. The US Ambassador in Tehran reports that he saw Prime Minister euggested acceptance by the National Mossadeq on 2 July, and Oil Company of the receipt proposed by AIOC (Anglo-Iranian Oil ComnarAY) whicluacktobledgea the amount of oil removed, but would not prejudice the outcome of theoll dispute. eventual Mossadeq stated-that such a reservation only if given heyould accept an absolute guarantee endorsement that this will not be used by the A/pc or any other company lifting the oil as an excuse to avoid payment. 51). COMMENT: The receipt (Sp S/S Tehran problem goes considerably further 13, 2 Jbly agreement between the AICC and than Iran on acceptable wording. is not devised to remove the If t method oil frem the areas wheresborage are becoming increasingiy facilities tight, the oil industry will be forced to shut down, Whether or not AMC personnel is available. Since Mossadeq has maintained an intransigent position heretofore, it will be surprising if he does accept a new type of receipt. S Cousa Offers 2 500 US technicians to Iran to .erate Oil Indust The US Ambassador in Tehren reports . that Lee4actars Inc. of Loa has sent a letter to Iranian Angelee Prime Minister of the Iranian National Oil Mossadeq and Board offering immediately toto the Chairman contract to supply up to 2,500 negotiate a US technicians to manage and oil industry in Iran. operate the (C, S/S Tehran 10, 2 Jbly 51)0 major US oil companies have COMMENT: The a tacit understanding not to offer their services to Iran at the present time, inasmuch as the repercussions would far outweigh any advantages which might accrue to them. companies, however, Smaller have not made any such decision. of State was not informed The US Department of this move by Lep-Factors.

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Approved For Release 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300070001-2

Approved For Rekuve 2002/06/13 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0k000070001-2

SECRET

"B"

US Minister ip Ipdechina suggests ctered policy in that US Minister Heath in Saigon, obserVing that the decisive battle for Indochina has yet to be eought and that pressure for this larger battle may came to a head brthis fall, asks the State Department to review its policy toward Indochina. In this connection Heath points out (a) that the French are end will continue to be during the foreseeable future the sae effective barrier to Communist expansion in Indochina, and, therefore, (b) "it is of the greateat importance that harmonious US-French relationsbetaaintained. He asks that the Department direct him to request General De Lattre to take steps to stop anti-American reports emanating from the General's entourage, and to inform the General of our belief that it is necessary for him to issue specific instructions to certain key officials of hie staff to enter into closer relationships with designated political and economic officers of the Legation. Heath also asks authority to inform De Lattre that ECA will discuss its projects and their publicity with designated members of the Generallo staff, that there are and will be no US operations in Indochina beyond those of which the French are informed and that the officer and clerical staffs of all US missions in Indochina have been personally briefed by the Minister to insure that they ftlly understand the importance of the French oontribution to the free world being made in Indochina, and to insure that they not listen to or give encouragement to Improper criticism of French sacrifices and intentions. Subsequently, Heath reported that he gained the impression from a conversation with De Lattre that the General was in correspondence with Faris regarding changes in the status of ECA operations in Indochina. (S, S/S 2355 Saigon 29 Jun 51; S, VS 2365 Saigon, 30 Jun 51),
country..

INDOCHINA.

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L.

.
FAR EAST F A R EA,sT

%Enemv

Enemy continues to augment augment forces forces in Korea: ontiqyes to m:


antli3-Zu1Y. 51
J
____

lthe s continucontinuthe enemy enemy i is

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ing ing to to reinforce reinforce and and pravide provide replacements replacements fo; for both Worth Worth Korean Korean and and ChGese Chinese Cornmunut Communist Korean corF8 coriis have have been been strengthened by forces in Korea. Front Line line Korean Wonsanareas. areas. The replacements drawn d r a w from units unitsin in the the Pyongyang Pyongyang and Woman strength of these been Btrength theae units, in iDturn, turn,has has beenmaintained maintained by by the the consolidation consolidation of un'its units assigned assigned to torear rear area security security missions, the the reactivation reactivation of of units of ofrecruitrecruitdissipated in i n the t4e defeats of o f last autumn, autumn, and the continuance continuance of training at a relatively ment and training relatively high high level. North Korean the activation in In Manchuria of b f new mw R s r t h KO rean aivisions AM their movement into Korea, Korea.

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Numerous sources O the Numerous sources have havereferred referred tto the ararin Korea Korea of of additional additional Chi nest Communist rival in Communistunits units to to replace replace those recently withdrawn as a conseauenc conseguenc of Prisoners of recehtly withdrawn a sa 0f combat losses. Prisoners of the presence In Korea Korea Of of the the 140th 140thArmy. Army. Other Other war have confirmed the prisoners have reported that that other other units units of ofthe theFourth FourthField FieldArmArmrare Rrisoners have reported in Korea Korea i in a relief relief role, na role. [ confirm the movement jconfirm of sizeable Chinese Chinese Communist Communist forces along the main main enemy enemy supply route route forces along to the rear of the the northwest northwest front. rear of
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Gomrnent: There is i sample ample evidence evidence of a Comment: There long range program to Korean armed armed forces, which t o build build up the North Korean which all foreign foreign troops troopswere werewithdrawn. withdrawn. The, The extent might be significant if all to which the the Chinese Chinese Communists Communists have have instituted instituted a a-rotation of forces forces rotattom of to replace replace units unitswithdrawn. withdraw remains retnains uncertain. The influence inflUehceof pfthe the ceasecease-. firenegotiationf! negotiations on. on such long as fire long,term term manpower manpower commitments commitments have not as yet been reflected reflected in in available available information. Information.
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the delay preceding .negoti&tions megodations are are for reasons of of prestige prestige and and propaganda. propaganda. if the delay were designed designed to to allow allow Communist Communist if forces to forces to improve improve their their military !nilitarysituation, situation,the thelaunching launching of of an an offensive offensive would be likely to to boomerang boomerang against against their their alleged peaceful intentions. urther questions questions whether whether the the Communists Communists could could= rurther not expect to improve improvetheir their mili milittry y position position materially materially before before cease-fire cease-fire expect to negotiations, except in the unfikely un kely event negotiations, except event that that they they are are determined to conoffensive against UN UN rear clude the Korean elude Korean war war with Withaalarge-scale large-scale air offensive rear bases and and naval vessels. bases

of Kaesong Kaesong as as the the site site of ' of of negotiations and and

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In addition addition to Comment: In Comment: to possible possible prestige prestige propaganda advan@ges, advanteges, the Communists probably conqder conitider a delay Communists probably and propaganda in order orderto toprepare preparefor foraa conferencethat thathas hasdeveloped developed quite quite necessary in conference With regard i s evidence evidence that rapidly. With regard to to military military considerations, considerations, there is Communist Communist forces forces in Korea will will be capable by by mid-July mid-July of of resuming the offensive I f they offensive if they so desire.

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Communists feel feel they they enter negotiations 1. 1 . Chinese Communists negotiations with strong position:
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Army, the Chinese available to the 8th Army, Communist Field in Korea, Communist F teld Commander h General Peng Peng Teh-huai, Teh-huai, advised CCF CCF tactical General commanders on on 1 1 July July that that Chinese Chinese delegates delegatesto to the the cease-fire cease-fire negotinegotiSouth Korean avictorious victoriousarmy, army,that that Sou4I-1 Korean demands demands will be ations represent represent a ignored, and unsatisfactory, the ignored, and that, if if negotiations negotiations prove unsatisfactory, the CCF CCF will 1 on the launch their summer summer offensive, offensive. I same date, the orthe CCF the logistical logistical commands commands lofl.the CCF Third Third and and Fourth Field Field Armies informed informed General General Peng Peng of of the the movement movement of 80,000 new new "volunVolunUS Far Far East teers" fromManchuria Manchuria to to the the Korean front, East Command Command teers" from front. The US endorses the 8th Army warning that, should this report be true, no no endorses the 8th Army warning that, should this report be true, significant concessions concessions can can be be expected expected -- at at least in the political field. field. Further, thetime timegained gainedby bythe theenemy enemyduring during extended extended negotiations negotiations Further, the wouldpermit permit tthemto or would h e m t o concentrate forces equal to o r greater greater than than those those employed during the the April April offensive offensive and andto to construct construct and and repair repair forward employed during forward airfields airfields for close close air air support. support.

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'2. Chiang Chiang Kai-shek Kai-shek expresses expresses his hisviews views on on Asian. Asian,. situation:

2 July 51

cease-fire and and armistice.

Chiang Kai-shek Chiang Kai-shek observed observed privately privately to the US Charge Charge at at Taipei on 30 June June that the US . Chinese Communists in Korea badly badly needed a respite respite and and quite quite likely likely would would agree to ,toa a

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CHINA. Indications of Chinese Chinese Co Communist o r 3eDtember Indications of CHINA unist Brewrations Pre aratione f for Se tember

Operations. &F<tions.

Talk of o r *end of of preparationi preparations f or.ilend Of Amgust August 31nl'operat;ione l'Ivoperatione

Peiping, iin' n Peiplng, All land, land, sea, units have allegedly allegedly been ordered t to AU. Jea, and air u n i t s have o

,a iitiof ofreadiness readiness by by that t h a t date. data. The 68th b a r n e Division 68th b Airborne Division of 9,000 paratroopers o Antung from the Tientsin area in paratroopers llxr is repoyteqly reportedly en en route t to iits t s implementas implementation kion of of ais this directive directive. p k COMMENT: COMMENTt -This This is i e r the the latest &test in in a series serl of reports alleging Chinese Oonmplnist plans ffor o r eerded anded operation by the end of August.1951. Communist.plans operations Information Information obtained k o on n 2 2.July regarding an alleged 2 March conference of of North North Korean, Korean, Chinese Chinese Communist; Comunist, and officials conference and Soviet Soviet officials stipulated: stipulatedv.(1) (I)comPletion eomj?letlon of of border forts (presumably (presumably on the Korean Korean September.1951; of arm border) by September 1951; (2) (2) expansion of production in in Manchuria Manchuria arm production t to o Rrovlde provide for for 1,500,000 1,500,000 troop8 troopsby bySeptember September 1951; 1951(3) (3) dispateh.of dispatch of 500,000 Soviet.troops to Manchuria by the end of August 1951; and: (4) the Soviets are to complete preparations for World War,III by the.end of September 1951, if the Soviet cease-fire proposal of Julv is unsuc cessful. states that all lourtn.rield Army units located in Southeast China have been

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ordered Ai achieve a state of combat readiness not later the. 15 September 1951; that a s ar comman een ssue o the wet Minh forces in Indochina. The deadline for the air build-up in &Nangtung, Southeast'China, is also stipulated for September of this year.. The Chineee.CoMmunists s are are genera generally accorded the the potentla1 u t u r e operation8 o r , several, of accorded potential for for f future operations h in any any one, oneor,several,of the the border border regions. regions, It It is i s believed t h a t the build-up fi that in Southeastern Southeaatern has been been primarily primarily of of a a defensive defensive nature nature during during recent recent months, montha, China has 'China but this t h i s does does not not preclude precluQe the t h e possibility poseibility of & laUnching Launching an an oft-rumpred oft-rumored but assault asaault into Srho Indochina. Indochina. Indications Indications of of continuing conkinUing; preparations preparationa in i n Manchuria and and Korea Korea tend tend te t~ support support reports reportrs of of Communist Communist intentions intentions Manchuria tb conduct further military Ildllta~y adventures in in this t h i s theatre t h e a t r e if if the-pending thewpendin$ to tonduct further adventurea negotiations Prove prove unsatisfactory. unsatisfactory. negotiations
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a %Possibly ftposaibly truen 6 trUe" report report dated dated 29 Nay that an additional 120,000 troopa drawn from the 1st 2nd and 3rd Field Armies are being prepared for service in Korea. these troops which are being formed into a new army (designation anknown).,were to move to Northeast china before 31 Nay. troops can be Moved from t4e. Peipinglientsin area of northeast China to Ule Yalu River within three days by available rail lines. ( 6 July 51). COMMEFT; Numerous reportsl.ndicate that the Chinese Communists have drawn replacements for.service in Korea from regional armies in all parts of China. Other reports have mentioned the formation Of a new field army, the 6th1 from the nucleus of the North China Area Army associated With the Peiping-Tientsin Area.

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reports that President Rhee heads the group of responsible persons arousing public opinion against a cease-fire at the 38th Parallel. In reply to a Commission expression of opinion that after haVing 'so inflamed public opinion, the government will find it difficult to readjust its position on conclusion of a cease-fire, Rhee repeatedly stated "they (the Korean people) shall not accept a cease-fire." 1Khee sees the aituation clearly but assumes an extremist attitude from fear the National Assembly will be more extreme. The restraint urged by ranking US officials has been without apparent results. "after an initial disappointment, spirits will adjust themselves to the situation on eondition that there are some reasonable guarantees against renewed aggression." ( 6 July 51). COMMENT: With political rivalry in South Korea placing a premium on nationalistic statements, the Government has placed itself in a position from which extrication following a cease-fire will bring a lose of prestige0 reports that the ROK Cabinet has gone to such lengths as to consider running anti-cease-fire advertisements in US newspapers.

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2. '111Xnbassador '$&bassador Mucclo Muccio gives gives recommendations recommendations on on cease-fire cease-fire problems:


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US Ambassador commentUS Ambassador Muccio Muccioin inPusan, Pusan, commentirig onthe theproposed proposedcease-fire cease-fire talks, talks, warns hig on warns any arrangements arrangementsmade mqde should should be based that any on $he the premise preMise that that.no other settlement no other settlementof of territorial terrltbrialand andPolitical political Wilms iesues will be reached in the-foreseeable the ?oreseeable future. Zn.ordei more h order to t o make these these decisions decis$oqs morepalatable palatableto. to the the Republic of Korea .and.to.Asiatic *and.to .Asiatic public opinion, opinton, he recommend8 recommends that the Korean member be t4e given given a a proMinent.position promhent posittioh in the negotiations. negotiations.
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W i t h respect to to a a Possible.20 posSible 20 mile m i l e buffer bufferzone, zone, With Muccio cautions e creation Mucci cautions against against m the Creationof ofaathird thirdterritorial territorial entity in Korea administered by by non-Koreans, non-Korew, 'and and suggests suggests that that this this can can be be avoided avoided by by administered st Iineapproximately approximatelymidWay midway in i n the demilitarized demilitarizedzone zonewhich which designating aline
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WOCJ administration of r e a n regimes. would permit permit .adininistration. of two twohalves halves by by the the adjoining adjoining h Korean regimes. that $outh South Korean, Korean public opinion woulcl line He adds that woultlfind find any any other other dividing line acceptable than. than the Parallel. Muccio Muccio also recommends that more acceptable the 38th 38th.Parallel.. neither the the 40,000 40,000 Korean of war war Who who were Korean prisoners prisoners of were impressed impressed into the North Korean Korean refugees over to. to the KOreanarmy army nor nor the the North North.Korean refugees be turned over Northern authorities, authorities against their will. will.

3.. Reports from various various sources sourcespoint point up up possibility of of late summer summer CommuCommu. nist onmatbns:


The reports are:
(a) (4

Reports from a variety of of sources speak speak of o f impending Communist impending Communistoperations operations in in the late of this year, possibly summer of possibly dependent dependent on of Red strategy during during the the Korean Korean success of cease-fire negotiations negotiations this thismonth. month.

While thereports reports are fragmentary by While the fragmentary and, by nature, beyond beyond possibility possibility of of confirconfir their nature, mation, their general general agreement agreement in in the mation, of date date may may possibly be significant. significant. matter of

t ad i s prevalent prevalent in Les talk is in Peiping Peiping military military cir circles of preparations for operations at "the end of of August, 1951. 1951. " of August, all land sea and air forcesin in Communist Communistair forces China China have have been been ordered ordered to to put put themselves in&@tate of of readiness by by that date. date. The in,4,ptate s 68th Airborne Airborne Division, Division,9,000 9,000strong, strong, i is supposedly en Tientsin to to Antung. Antung. Supposedly en route route from Tientsin
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b ) r T l s conference of a (b) r a a n , Chinese Chinese Communist Commun st and an Russian officials o icials on on 2 2 March March North B Korean, agreed to to the the dispatch dispa@hof of 500, 500,000 Soviet troops Manchuria by the agreed 000 Soviet troops to Manchuria adding that end of of August, August, adding that Soviet SovietRussia Russia should shouldbe beready ready for for a possible

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World W War bythe theend endo ofSeptember, September,provided providedthat thatcease-fire cease-fire proproWorld a r by f posals posals in in Korea, foreseen foreseenfor forthe themonth month of of July, should should fall. fail.

(4 the (c) the recent establishment of of an entirely new n e i Soviet Army Sovietheadquartersat headquarters at at least least Army level in northern northern Manchuria. Manchuria.
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all (d) 'fourth A u r t h Field FieldArmy Army units units in in Southeast China have been ordered to reach a a state stateof of .combat combat readiness not not later laterthan than 15 15 September. September. 1

* e h ) - (e) (e) : [ the deadline Kwangtung, SoutheastChina, China,is is set for Sepfor the the air air build-up build-up ih in Kwangtung, Southeast September..

The Chinese Chinese Communists Communists are Comment: The capable of capable of operations operations in in any any one oneor or several several of of the the border border regions. regions. It is prii s believed believed that that the the build-up build-up in in Southeastern Southeastern China has been primarily defensive during recent months, but this does not preclude defensive months, but this does not preclude o f Indications of launching assaultinto intoIndochina. Indochina, Indtcations launching the oft-rumored assault continuing build-up in in Manchuria Manchuriaand andKorea Koreatend tendto tosupport support reports reports continuing build-up that failure result in failureof of the thepending pending negotiations negotiations would would result Inaanew new CommuCommunist onslaught nilst onslaught in Korea.

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NE_SECRET6.

The Effect of 'The of Kore K o r s War ar on on-Ci lian Mo ale. In a conversathe US Minister Mfnistei in.SaigOn i n Saigon a a t i o n with with ' the.US tion r ] s t a t e d that-Casualty that 'casualty lists lists and defeats were stated and news news of of Chinese defeats were being carefully uhhhe!Ld from the the public. beim parefull;y1fthlwidfrom public. Wounded Wounded have have been been kept out of the'heavily the heavily populated populated areas areas of of China China proper proper even at the the expense expense of of of denying them b e t t e r hospital hospital facilities. facilities. thembetter o probeed o Korea, t h a t %olwteersn appear that."volunteersil appear reluctant reluctant tto proceed tto Korea, and and described described the general general population population as being being completely completely opposed to t o and and disillusioned disillusioned the with the Red regime, with the'Red'regime. In In addition, addition, Y k h i this s opposition lacks any e f f e c t i v e means for a a successful successful counterrevolution. countbmwolution. Only effective-means Only the the student student and some some worker worker groups groups evince evince any-enthusiasm any enthusiaerm f o r the:current t h e current regime, regime, and for which apparently apparently is is capable capable of of enduring, endurina, in i n the t h e absence absence of of outside outside Which h interferendp, t e r f erend,e, for decades decades to t o come. come e COMMENT$ The above observations hav! been supported by a variety COMMENT:.The above observations.have beeh supported a grea great.variety of-sources,, of sources,, A A recent recent report report on on the the a r r i v a l of of Korean casualties casualties in in arrival the Shanghai etnphasized the the precautions o limit contacts Shanghai area area ehphasized precautions taken taken t to limit contacts with the the local local Populace. populace. with

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MREA. Taetical Considerations Point to 15-25 JuLyStf2agya. A significant increase'in the numbe south-bound enemy; vehieles sighted approaching the battle area has occurred Luring the past few days. the vplums of enemy vehicle traffic approaches that which 13receeded preVious enemy offenabies A sharp elimb in Vehicle sightings-indicative of reinforcement and resupP17--is a familiar step in the hostile pre-offensive pattern. purew a c t i c a l considerations suggest purely t tactical considerations suggest that the period 15-25 July is the most likely for enemy resumption ofthe.offensive. Although the enemy is capable of earlier Offensive action, present indications point to continuance of screening actions and active defense. Furthermore on unsuccessful termination of armistice negotiations prior to 25 July will enhance the probability of an offensive immediately following termination. whereas prolonged negotiations (one month), ending Unsuccessfully, may. dilctate a continued defensive attitude into middle or late August. t h e enemygs @ ybe Ithe enemyls main main effort m mAy expected in.the west and west-central sectors along the previoubly employed axis converging on Seoul with a secondary effort in the Central .sector towards ehunchon and a supporting'attack in the eastern sector.

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aNERAL. jaaratisuagg nB1t ($HEEALo W c at4 ~ ~ J t e dE e etimate igadiegliropdB_EI.iffszloaeltructKorean ProDosed Buffer Obstruct Korean
Settlement. Conmnrnfst "peaceful" sst%lement settlement iin Korea a are Communist proposals proposals-for for a "peaceful" n Korea re Qettlement. -deseation Of h hOstilities,-withdrawal of opposing force8 forces and t the ~sasation of o s t i l i t f e s , withdrawal of h e establishment befer zone of the the 38th 38th ParalleL. Parallel. of a buffer zoneof of 10 10kiilometers lometere on on either e i t h e r side of COMMENTt A An the Communists COmmuniate estimate COMMENT: n indication tthat h a t the that buffer zone might conatitute obataple i in current negolianegotia't h a t the proposed buffe constitute an obstacle n ourrent tions comentary, In this this commentary, t l o n s was contained contained in i n a 4 July July broadeaet broadcast from fromMersaw. Warsaw, In Warsaw stated Radio Warsaw s t a t e d that t h a t although although the US agreed to t o ceaee-fire cease-fire negotiatione negotiations bebeits in Korea, already there there were were indications indidations cause of i t s "hopeless "hopeless situation" i n Korea, h i s allegaallegethat talks. afrone proof of of t thie t h a t it "intends to sabotage" the the t a l k s , Cited aa.one waa the US intention t to zone, not on both both aides sides of the tion was o "create noreate a buffer zonep 38th 38th Parallel, P p a l l e l , but but only only on on the the northern northern side.". sideo"
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CHINA. Burmese Ambassadorta Ambassador'sViews Views on onSemslakttgam...0 C o m d s t China. 0Nyint Hyant.Thein, Thein, Burmese Burmese Ambassador to Communist Cornmuniet China China and and previously previously to t o Nationalist Nationaiist China, who departed departed the US US Consul Consul General General in i n Hong H ~ n Kong. g Kong. Peiping Psipilag in i n mid-June, mLd-June, has has been been interviewed interviewed by the would like" like" to to The Tie Ambassador Ambssador offered offered the the opinions opinions that that (1) (1 Peiping Peipirq "really would end Korean fighting, as finds end the the Korean a8 the the regime regime has has taken a "heavy "heavy beating" boatfig" and f inds it "increasingly to explainAhe inadequacy "increaeingly difficult" difficult" t o expLain.,the inadequacy of of Soviet S o v i e t aid, aid, but but (2) (2) Peiping Pelping is i s unlikely unlike4 to t o agree agree to t o any any terms terms not not providing providing for for withdrawal withdrawal of of UN UN forces. f o r t e s ; (3) (3) the t h e regime regiae is i s "firmly n f i A y established eatabllehed in in power," power," but but (4) ( 4 ) Peiping Peiping will will probably probably be be too too busy busy with internal i n t e r n a l reConstruction reconstruction for f o r the next few few years to to devote much energy energy to t o furthering furthering Communist Communiet aims aim in i n Southeast Southeast Asia; and and (5) (5) the t h e Indian Indian Ambassador, Ambaasador, Panikkar, Panikkar, has has become become, "mbrose "moroseand and abstracted,"ie.artly abstracted," partly as a re result of been misled" regarding.Peiping's aa c!f having h a v i n a b s e n "comnletely 'IC regarding Pefping's policy policy toward toward Tibet. COMMENT: Tibet. ,GCNWl "T The Burmese Burmese Ambassador, who who It is is predicted Korea7;73-Seen predicted Chinese intervention iin n Korea,' has been generally generally reliable. reliable. It not known known on on what evidence evidence the the first first of of the the Ambassador's Ambassordor's opinions opinions is i s based. based. However, weeks bas Homver, Peiping's Peipingqs propaganda propaganda for for the t h e past past three three vieeke hae provided strong strong evidence evidence that t h a t Peiping Psiping will will not not modify modify its i t s basic basic original original demand demand for for withdrawal withdram1 of A h s t all a l l sourtes saupces agree that t h a t the t h e Peiping Peipfng all foreign foreign forces f a r c e 8 from from Korea. Korea. Almost of all regime is regims< I s stable, stable, in i n the the sense sense that that internal i n t e r n a l opposition opposition forces forces are are not not capable capable of challenging challenging its i t s authority authority in i n any any significant significant area. area. The The Ambassador's hbaseadorts fourth fourth point point appears appear8 doubtful, doubtful, as as Peiping Peiping has ha8 demonstrated damonstrated in i n Korea Korea that t h a t it it plades places the t h e advancement advancement of o f international international Communiam Colmnunism above above its its domestic donesltic objectives. objectives. .0ther sources have reported Pahikkar's Patikkar's increasing Other sotwoes 1,ncreasing alienation alienation from from the the Peiping Peiping regime. regime.

CHINA. Ambassador to


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' t B " KOREA N o r t h Korean Korean I 1 Corps' Corps1 Rehabilitation Rehabilitation Apparently Amarenth Completed. Comleted. 11130 KOREA. North Far E h s t .Command' reports tha't $of a Far Eibt4ommand..repoortS that inthrkogation interrogation,of a lorth North Korean Korean POW POW
recently captured captured six s i x miles miles southeast mutheast of of Kaesong Kaesoag has has identified identified the the recently North North Korean Korean 8th 8th Division. Division, According According to the the prisoner, prlsoner, the North Korean Oth &h Division's Division's current current mission mission is I s to t o defend defend the the Keepong gaesong peninsula. pe&aU. The prisoner prisoner fUrther stated that the Northl _flivision_itLdefendinriesong esong River Riverwest west of of Kaesong. Kaesong,
COMMENT: This report indicates that the Barth liorean L Corps has been reintroduced on on the the front front after en reintroduced month i in Kumehon area area presumably presumably having spent more than a month n the Kumchon for for rehabilation and and reequipment. reequipment;. Press Press reports reports on on the t h e presence presence of armed armed troops troops surrounding eurrounding the the Kaesong kesong cease-fire ceaas-fire negotiation negotiation of site tend to t o support support the'POW the'P.W report. Thie change i n the the disposition site tend report. .This change in disposition the same same pattern pattern is as that that displayed displayed immediately lmmedately prior prior to to follorvs follows the the offeneive which M e h wa8 led off off hy the North Korean Korean I I the 22 22 April offensive was led Cqrpd Corps'. attack attack acroas across the the Imjin Rivar. River.

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Korean s settlement: 3. Burmese Ambassador Ambassador comments comments on Korean e : ,

The Burmese Ambassador to Communist Communist China, who left Petping Peiping in in mid-June, mid-June, has informed informed who left the US US Consul General in i n Hong Hong Kong that he believes the Peiping regime "really "really would would like" to Korea, as as the the Chinese Chinese Communists Communists have taken to end end the fighting flghting in Korea, a "heavy "heavy beating" and find it "increasingly Yncreasingly difficult" difficult" to to explain explain to to the the ChiChihownese people will, howpeople the the inadequacy inadequacy of of Soviet Soviet aid, aid, He adds that Peiping will, ever, ever, continue continue to t o insist instston on the the withdrawal withdrawal of of all foreign forces from from Korea. Korea.

IPeipiu Peiping appears genuinely desirous desirous of at this time. o f an an end end to the Korean cOnflict conflict at

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FAR EAST

Comment: I Comment:

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A North +rean Korean message to the "Commander'Commanderin-Chief, ') " signedWart01, " reporting on signedw,N&n$, '' on the 10 July July afternoon afternoon meeting meethigof ofthe thecease-fire cease-fire negotiators, stated stated that that "we l1werefused their

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propositions and and proposed ours, ours," r1 and and concluded conlcluded that the meeting "was 1rwa8 " going nicely nicely for for our side. "
: The North North Korean Comment: The Koreanmessage message prepreto presentation presentation of of the the Communist Communist demands sumably refers refers to demands summarized summarized by Peiping Beiping Radio on 10 10 July: (a) (a) "cessiktion "cessation of of hostile hostile military actions of,. every everysort... sort.. simultaneous withdrawal Communist and of... "; "; (b)@) simultaneous withdrawal ofof Communist and VIC armed forces forces to to a a distance distance of of 10 10 kilometers kilometers from the 38th wallel, Raral lel, and, at the @e same time, discussion discussionof of exchange exchange of prisoners; and and (c) (c) the withWithcfrawal ( ' i n the shortest shortest possible possible time, time, " '* of of all all fore1g4 for&!j forces, drawal from Korea, Korea, "In forces. Peiplng Peiping Radio Radio has has emphasized emphasizedthe thelast last of of these these demands demandsfor for several several

'

months. months,

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49286
39

COPY NO.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

DAILY DIGEST

STATE, DIA reviews completed. (NAVY referral transferred to DIA.)

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2.
3.

NOTE:

1.

This suMmary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the preliminary views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

Marginal letter indications are defined as follows:

items indicating SovietCommunist intentions or capabilities

IIBU

important regional developments not necessarily related to Soviet/ Communist intentions or capabilities other information indicating trends and potential developments

DC"

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Date:

JUL 1 2 1951

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TOP SECRET

SECTION 1 (SOVIET)

"B"

USSR. Purborted Preponderance of Women Specialists. A recent survey of the Soviet Presa indicates that the.institutes of.the USSR Academy of Sciences, none than a third of the scientific workers are Women. ApproS mately 380,000 women are said to be working as engineers and technicians, while over a million labor in the public health system, The same source reveals that the number of women engineers and technicians has increased by 50,000 since 1950, with many participating widely' in government adminis tration and many elected to the Supreme Soviet of the USSRl'union republics and autonomous republics, In addition, 500,000 women are said tobe deputies of the local Soviets, Iknense progress is claimed for women in the national republics, as for eXample it the Mrkmen SSR where they account for 70% of all workers employed in the public health system, In therEareloFinnish it is Teported that 90% of all medical doctors are women, that hundreds of others are engineers, agronomists, and zootechnicians, and that the great majority of elementary and riddle school teachers are women, Similarly, more than 500,000 women in the Belorussian SSR are said to'be specialists with secondary or higher education, and in the Kazakh SSR, 42.2% of all specialists with a higher education are women. COMMENT: Misreported preponderance of Soviet women specialists may be the.result of retaining large numbers of men in the Anny, thereby releas ing to women the numerous specialists' positions available in other fields.

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'A'

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EASTERN EUROPE. FINLAND, Soviet Submarine Possibly Sunk Off Helsinki,. According to information received by the US Naval Attache Helsinki fram Finnish naval sources, three Soviet destroyers and approximately seven emaller craft have been conducting =determinable operations in a 36 square mile area off Helsinki since 2 July, The Finniah sources specullte that a Soviet submarine has sunk in this area, since the operation involves flag and buoy markers, The Naval Attache notes that a 70000 ton car o vessel was sunk by a mine in approximately the same area in 1941. IELSET: No fUrther information is ava on this operation beyond that presented by the US Naval Attache in Finland, who reports that more information may be available about 14 JulY.

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B". VVNGARK. Humaarv Advises US To "Nipd Its Own Business". In a note transgTeSaing diplomatic usage, the Hungarian Government , has categorically rejected the US note of 7 July labbling it a "brazen" attempt to inter fere1n the internal affairs of the Hungarian Republic, The note declares that the open support granted by the Peoples US to Hungarian Fascists And all other, enemies of the Hungarian people, as well as the use (*the American legation in Budapest asworking a spy center, is rendering normal relations between the two countries difficult. Instead of rectifying con, ditiOns in the US where, according to the note, the most elementary rights of freed= are being flouted and a campaign of terror is being waged, the

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i COMMENT: In its 7 JulY note the US announced that it would disdontinue its cultural And inforthation activities in BUdapest. However, the US rejected the Hungaridn allegations-regarding the spying activities of its Legation staff in Budapest and labeled the Hungarian charges as a braien and futile atteript to deStroy the deep friendship and confidence of the Hungarian people that the US will not cease to concern itself with their plight.
I

mind ita /aim business."

US Government is attempting to teach the Hungarian people a lesson on baaan rights. The note aplvisma that "thn Onverment of the US better

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TOP SECRET SECTION 2 (Eastern)

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"B"

MAIAYA. New Political Party to Play Sic Alia,. The US Consul in


Kuala Lumpur estimates that an'extremely important period in Malayan political affairs is beginning. This period was heralded by the announcement in early June of a non-cormunal (i.e., no restrictions as to race or creed) political party by Dato Onn bin Jaffars a skilled politician and recognized sp oke sman of the Malay population. 0=1 s "Independence of Malaya Party" aims at self-government within ten years, the "Malayaniza.tion" of the civil service, and welcomes members from the three major racial comeunities of MalayaChinese, Indians, and Malays. There are indications that Onn cleared his proposals with the British authorities), who, the Consul speculates, nay fear lest outright ppposition to the apparently inevitable trend toward self-determination encourage extremism and the ossible complete loss of the British stake in Malaya. I I COMKENT: Dato Onn reportedly intends to resign from his present position as president of the exclusively Malay "United Malays Nationalist 'Organization." Through his chairmanship of the Federation Governmentos Rural and Industrial .Development Authority he is in a strong position to win popular support for the Independence of Malaya.. Party.

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MOn

INDOCHINA. French Proposals Delev Signing of ECA .Pact. Proposals for textbal changes in the draft US,Vietnam bilateral ECA: agreement have been transmitted to US EMbassy in Feria by the French Foreign French Economic Counselor in Indochina to Office and by the the US Legation. Although most of the dhanges proposed are of minor importance, the proposals made in Saigon differ somewhat from those made in Pariss a situation which will. delay signing of the agreement fcr Several more weeks. The Legation attaches considerable importance to an amendment proposed by the Economic Counselor which might be construed as giving the French n v?to power over the use of counterpart fundei.

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ITCH

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It 'COIMENT: The Vietnamese g orally consider that the French are cape e of any diplomatic.maneuver. the French c011eborated They recall that with Ho Chi Minh in 1946 in the forcible of nen-Communist organizations in Tonkin. Reported negotiation suppression over a period of Several feelers years hails failed to materialize.

Hints of Cease-fire in Indochina Discuseed:Consul Blancke reports fram Hanoi.that the regional Red Cross delegate has asked if the Consulate could send a code for him to Geneva. Legatidn Saigon has queried message Blancke whether he believes In this connection, the proposed code message is concerned strictly With might relate to such broader political Red Cross matters or whether it matters as prospects for negotiation The Legation would also like to know why the Red Cross does not wish to use French channels and notes that some elements of public opinion; including Bao Dai in Vietnam, fear a possible French-Viet Ranh Compromise settlement if an armistice is obtained in Korea. The leader of the opposition party in Saigon states Dai Viet 25X1 that his party is greatly concerned over a repert that the French-Vietnamese authorities are prepared to offer large concessions to Ho Chi Minh in return for actual Chinese Communist invasion. cessation of hostili.

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"C"

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"C"

Ja Ille al A Govenunent committee invetigatj.ng about midway between southeast island situated &wee, and Western Honshu) has that from 300-400 Koreans estimated are entering Japan of the illegal entrants illegally each month. Most po tical assignments, a e believed to be Communists with important most Of which is leftis COMMENT: The Korean minority c ne sas to Japan's internal security.. idant threat In addition to the approximately legal Koreanresidental 600,000 it is believed that there 400,000 illegal Korean entrants are from 200,000 to now residing in Japan.
"CP
,
.

JAPAN. leftist Koreans Enter

originating in the US, on the unification of Korea after the armistice, are provoking reaction amongst the already a sharp over-sensitiVe ROK officials. tend to support the worst fears Such stories of the ROK on the results of the armistice, 22.14.4RT: There apparently is a widespread ng among ou feeloreans tha7t-The UN may be preparing in the lurch in an overwhelming to leave them rush for "peace." There is that a future settlement apprehension may result in a withdrawal of UN time Mien ROK forces are not troops at a sufficiently strong to guarantee security against the nation's a 'better armed, although Possibly numerically smaller, North Korean force.

FAZIO reports that Semi ve on Score-of Unification4.AMbassador speculative stories, political

KOREA. ROK Officials

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Agency- is Subflended. The Japaneae (hay 12 raided thearer-critirreit-Fe; police on ordered its operations Agency throughout Japan and suspended, The police was operating for the Japanese announced that "Reng ors Communist Party. comp Rengo the only important leftist news agency been the major disseminator n apan, has of ComMunist-slanted press.. Since the Communist Party news to the leftist iS still legal in Japan, Rengo's suspension presumably is based on an ordinance directed inimical to the Otcupation." at "acts This is the latest of a series downs on the CommOnist of crack"AKAHATA" one year ago.. press which started with SCAP.Is suspension of

19,1241allsym

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SECTION 3 (ESTERS)

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"C"

New- Wage=Prica Padt 'Nearly ReadY. Negotiations for Austria? s fifth wage-price agreement are' reported o' be in the final stage, with .laat details being settled by the Economic LarectOrate (a group consisting-Of all-but two members' of the Cabinet); .:The rent question will be ixistpond until fall. Chancellor Figl has urged-the people to rethin. calm and confident, 'asserting that the Soviets will not back Communist

ASSTRIL

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Last September, the 'fourth wage-price agreement ain of Communist-led .demonatratians, strikes,. lockouts, end workers.9...ultimatUms, without direct Soviet support. Non-Communist suppert Was obtained because. the eletenth-hour agreement had left no time' to' explain' the pact to the workers. The Present negotiations, hoireter, haVe received mUch publicity. It is not expected that the Soviets will
COMMENTs

effortb tO. j.ncite riota againat the new agreement,

25X1

'

much trouble when the agreement'is announced.

back the Connunist Party,. which,by itself, will not be able to create

TOP SECRET

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awl

French,Uneffected by Iranian Oil Shutdown. refining companies claim that the Iranian shutaown will French oil have no appreci able effect on the Crude oil supply situation in France Since Itan supplies only ten petcent oflrench teciditemente. 51) COMMENT: Iraq is the sourde of almoat threeiourths of French netroleum.i*orts. Before the war the-Westetn of Fret:dela oil, but increased US coneumlition Hemiephete sUpplied Most and French restrictions on dollar_imports revereed-this situation. The-Fre/Joh have been hope ful of increasing oil imports from Latin America,howeVer because they are afraid that hostilities might cut off their Near East supply.
1

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"BP

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ITALY. tiVirDefenge Bill Pa:aide LOIset Chamber by Narroflote. The ' CTIZZer of Deputies ef the Italian Parliament approved the controvetsial civil defense bill by the Close Vote of 258 to-240. Since the Christian DaModratic Party hae-.306 defmties and cancount upOn another 12 Republican &Sled, it-ie cleat some orthe-MeMbere Of the-GOvetrmenat Voted against it. These elements 'are belieVed:to.belong mostly to a left4ring group a the Christian Demodrats who feel a more active pregram ofedenomic and social reform should be undertaken. This situation, and,the decline in Christian Democratic strength in the recent electione, convince Observers that important changeb in the Cabinet are urgent... L COMMENT: HThe narro* margin by which the ense bin haon Tiarared,by the lower houSe indidates Civil not Only that dissatisfaction axistsin the Christian Democratic Party, but that. the Christian Democrats are unlikely henceforth to obtain the support of loyaropposition patties gs easilY as they have in the past. 'The strong opposition to the bill is motivated by fear of the additional polite powers it gives-touDefenee Banister Pgcciardi and Interior Minister Scelba. It will therefore be increaSingly difficult for Premier De Gapperi to retain these two Ministers in the Cabinet.

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"B"

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strenuous efforts by the US with British and French support, the Swedish-ball-bearing manufacturer SKF, with the tacit approval of the Swedish Government, is not accepting any new orders from the USSR or its satellites for non-standard bearings -(socalled strategic bearings) tsee- CCI Daily Digest, 26 Feb 51 and .2 and is also applying the : tri-paktite forthula of size limitation Mar 51), to standard bearings. Failure of the cocom countries to abide by the restrictions kill undoubtedly result in Swedengs relaxing its controls if confronted by a Polish demand for bearings in return for vitally
needed coal.

POSSible Relaxation of Restrictions on Ball-be ore gn e, re er g r o o a repo a e French-have agreed to -ship strategic ball...bearings to Poland, implied that Sweden might be-obliged to do likewise 'then a new trade agreement is negotiated in October. / I COMMENT: Currently, AS a result of
SWCDEN.

TSF-Tiedis

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4

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"B"
_

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I

"B" SAIL Spanish' Ptetender'Denies Negotiations with France en Royal SIT6CZesion. Spanish Pretender Don Juan categoricallnenied to a.US
official in Lisbon that General Franco had aeked him to renounce his rights tothe throne of Spain in favor of his 13-year old son, Prince Juan Carlos. Labeling the story a typicalTranco "trial balloon", Don Juan.said that Francoes representatives in Lisbon "obviously woadmot have the temerity to make suah a proposal to me at they know full mell its rejection would be a foregone conclusion." The Pretender expressed the belief-that Franco is now banking heavily oh US military and economic aid to bolster his.prestige. If Franco.receives this aid, Don Juan added, he.will.continne. his "stalling tactics" and postpone indefin tel A'oractiCal consideration of:the subject of royarsdoceotion. IMOMUENTI Doh Juanes reaction wee fully anticipa e (see WI Dailytigest, 26 June 51 and 11.July 51). Any genuine attempt by Franco, te seek a rapprochement with the Spanish monarchist Oppbeition woad represent a desperate 'neve to forestall the threat to'his regime that:Ageuld-reaultfremlfailin44.0:Obtais4jubittential US'ilonamicrahl
-

De Gaaperi Links Tri-partite Trieste Declaration and Atlantic Amid shouts of "Viva Trieste" and heated questioning by members Fral parties ip theSenate, PreMier De Gapperisstated that (1) Italy cen'Only fellow the policy of the Atlantic Pact, of thidh the tri-partite declaration of March1948 about Trieste is an integral part and (2) Italy desires to solve.the Trieste problem by direct hegotiatien mdth Ytgoitlavia. He rejected prOPOCals for the denuriciation of the peace treaty in retaliatiOn fer-AMGes cutting Off-orTriestine courts from Italian judicial authority, and said that the Government Would try all possible sautions _ _ not exanding an appeatethe Hague International CoOrt. De Gasperi minimiied other bopplaintt voieed aout Trieste in the Senate. Political circles in Roimainterpretthe linking,Of Trieste and the Atlantic Pact as a morning that Italygsnontinned s4herence to the Atlantic Pact might possibly become doubtful if Trieste is not returned to May. Meanwhile, it dpriears that Christian Democratic leaders and nationalists'in Trieste pyig nrnmntinp the current-agitetion 125X1 : In defending the Government's policy tomera Pet us the Trieste ibsterfflasperi appears (1) to have reMained within the formula propoeed by the US$ UK and. France for the solution of this issue and (2) to be cencerned that gromdng lapprocheraent' between Sugoslairia and the West ine be made at the expense Of Italy. In the absence of iniminent xmr any solution of the Trieste ism:is not acceptable to the Italians, moUld strengthen neutralist and nationalistic elements end threaten the stability of the Government.'
Pact.
I

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39

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G a_

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DAILY DIGEST SUPPLEMENT

JUL 12 1951

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Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGFZICY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

25X1
12 Juiv 1951

SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"Bu IRAN. rt,-/x_s_Ex..1,,tILowiv.rankanReortedPresentedtoMalis for Ratification, Press reports from Tehran state that Prime

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25X6

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Minister a Parliament urging ratification of the Export-Import Bank Lo an. I CONMENTg Although Mossadeq has stated in the past a Iran's income from Lr oil resources should make all'foreign loans unnecessary :he has repeatedly indicated his interest in this loan in his conversations with US Ambassador Grady, If Parliament does ratify the loan, which has been available since last September (see Daily Digest 12 Jul 51), the Export-Import Bank will be placed in a difficult position, There is no assurance at present that income from the Oil will be available to service the loan. Failure to extend the loan, however, will lead to charges by Iran that the US is applying economic pressure'in support of the UK and will presumably further weaken Iranian confidence in the DS,

bill

In

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13 July 1951

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENTNO.

I/
43/4

El DECLASSMED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS


NEXT REVIEW DATE:

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.FEL'AEWLR:

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-Y-,-pgaetr

DATIV

25X1 25X1

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


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DOS review(s) completed.


DIA review(s) completed.

TOP SECRET

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SUMMARY

USSR

1. 2.

USSR maintains aloofness from Korean developments (page Soviet air display reveals new plane types (page 3).

3).

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5.

6.

Rumored return of Iranian gold from USSR is unconfirmed (page 5). US Ambassacbr regards solution of receipt problem as key to Iranian oil settlement (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE

7.

Renewed European Army talks are encouraging (page 7).

25X1A

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NEAR EAST

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USSR

25X1A 1-

USSR maintains aloofness from Korean developments:

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are trying to inject both political and territorial aspects into the armistice talks, despite Gromyko's emphasis that such topics were to be avoided.
Comment: Communist propaganda and Peiping Radio's cease-fire proposals indicate that the Communists are attempt--thg to negotiate a return to the division of Korea along the 98th Parallel in order to avoid making concessions on this point in subsequent distussions on a general settlenient. Military preparations point to a Commuhist intention to continue hostilities if they Pail to secure their objective by negotiation. There are intlications that if a cease-fire is achieved Communist demands concerning Formosa, the UN, and the Japanese peace treaty will be advanced at subsequent political discussions in addition to the already explicit demand for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea.
25X1A

2,

Soviet air display reveals new plane types:

The US Air Attache in Moscow reports getting good long-distance photographs of the new four-engined bomber featured in the 8 July air display. fle estimates the plane to be anethird larger than the TU-4, Soviet version of the B-29, with a long B-36 type fuselage, a sitigle high tail and tractor propellors.
I

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-Deputy Foreign Minister Bogomolov maintained that the Soviet Government is not involved in the Korean affair, and that an armistice was for the military commanders to'conclude. When asked his views of final settlement, togomolov confined himself to saying that the first step was an armistice and that often the first step was the most difficult to take. Ambassador kirk comments that the Chinese and North Korean Communists apparently

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25XLA

The demonstration included a total of 490 aircraft with six confirmed new types of aircraft, five probable new types and two modifications. Althnugh for the.prasent'the Soviets apparently have adopted the MIG-15 lisitheir standard jet fighter-interceptor, four new jet fighteeprototyPes were demdnstrated. Three of the four were swept-wing planes similar to and perhaps developed from types displayed in the 1949 air show.

The appearance of nine gray twin-jet aircraft and nine gray MIG-15's further suggests that some units of the Soviet Navy have received jet aircraft.

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01-3

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5. Rumored return of Iranian gold from USSR is unconfirmed:


I


NEAR EAST

the USSR has returned to Iran the 12.6 million dollars in gold that it took from the Iranian Bank during World War U. It is ziottiwn whether the USSR also returned the eight million dollars claimed

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by Iran for war-time advances, supplies.and services rendered to the Soviet Union. The us.Embassy in Moscow comments that, in view of the Iranian Government's.neectfor revenue to,replace oil royalties, such a move on the part of the USSR would be designed to stiffen the Iranian Government's attitude on the oil. issue.
Comment: There is no evidence that the USSR has actually returned or agreed to return the gold to Iran, or that there has been progress in the financial negotiations which have been taking place between Iran and the USSR. According to Ambassador Grady,an Iranian delegate to these financial talks flatly denied on 6 July recent Iranian press rumors that some agreement with the USSR had been reached.

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6.

US Ambassador regards solution of receipt problem as key to Iranian oil settlement:


The US Ambassador has stressed again the importance of solving the problem of the receipts for tanker shipments as a means of breaking the deadlock in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company dispute with Iran. To date the British have not conceded the rightof the Iranians to collect receipts on oil shipments, even with the reservation that they were signed without prejudice to the rights of the AIOC. The Ambassador states that he does not believe that the British would be sacrificing their fundamental rights under these circumstances, and that such an agreement would expedite negotiations on other matters., The Ambassador expresses the opinion that if the British are endeavoring to force the Iranians to terms by keeping them without oil revenue funds, such a policy is most dangerous.

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WESTERN EUROPE

7. Renewed European Army talks are encouraging:


The Paris European Army talks have been given new impetus by the presence of Chancellor Adenauer's chief security adviser Theodor Blank. French and German differences now appear less irreconcilable. Although the chief French representative was not authorized to offer concessions on the size of the, proposed units and the level of their integration into a European Army, he clearly left the way open for a later French concession by suggesting that this question be referred back to the governments.

Comment: Although no basic changes in the French position on Germany's defense contribution are likely before Secitember, influential officials in the Forsign atice are revealing greater determination to press on toward mutual Western agreement on this question. Bonn has shown a similar determination by sending Blank instead of his subordinates to Paris.

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However, Blank's proposal to start raising a German contribution to NATO on the basis of the report on the recent Allied-German talks at Petersberg -- while the Paris conference on a European Army pursues its "long and arduous" work -- was flatly rejected by the French representative.

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15 July- 1951
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN


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REVIEWER:

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


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DOS review(s) completed.

TOP SECRET

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SsithaMAR Y
GENERAL

I. Further concessions to Philippines on Japanese reparations rejected

Pacific Pact issue may be revived by Philippines (page 3). 3. tGerman support of Allied stand in Berlin trade crisis -Peen weaken2. 4.

by US (page 3).

ing (page 4).

Comment on British seizure of Polish tankers (page 5)

5.

South Korean Prime Minister suggests that President Truman reassure


Korean people (page 5).
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7.

Burmese Commander-111,0Mo/ andSq.cintsitstinconlift wage 0).


NEAR EAST-AFRICA

8.
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Iranian Prime Minister retains control of government despite rising


opposition (page 7).

10.

Communists linked to conspiracy to overthrow Ethiopian Government


(page 8).

FAR EAST

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GENERAL
'

1.

Further concessions to Philippines on Japanese reparations rejected


by US;

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US to accommodate Philippiall demands.

Cowen subsequently informed Dulles that after an unsatisfactory meeting with Foreign Secretary Romulo and President Quirino's advisory committee on reparations at which Dulles, views were presented, Romulo stated that Quirino was obdurate in his refusal to sign the treaty in its present form.

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Pacific Pact issue may be revived by Philippines:

An emissary of President Quirino has informed the US State Department that the Philippine Government is seriously considering again promising a Pacific Pact. The intermediary said that President Sukarno of Indonesia had reacted favorably to the idea during his recent visit to Manila and believes that Nehru could be persuaded to participate in the proposed pact. The emissary revealed that Quirino had dispatched unofficial emissaries to Indonesia, Burma and Thailand to discuss the matter and had received favorable responses.

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Mn Jahn Foster Dulles has informed Ambassador Cowen in Manila that the US has gone as far as is possible to meet the Philippine demands for revision of the Japanese :peace treaty. Pointing out that five years of occupation experience had firmly convinced the US that Japan could not pay reparations, Dulles states it was with great reluctance that the US altered its position on reparations to ease the position of the Philippine Government. He believes that that government is gravely at fault in not having informed its public of the very considerable efforts made by the

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Comment At President Quirino's invitation, representatives from most South andSoutheastAsian countries met at Baguio in the Philippines a year ago to discuss the possibility of a Pacific Pact. The only tangible results were agreements to consult with each other on matters of mutual interest and to develop closer economic and cultural relations.
India is interested in developing regional pacts in Asia, but.its whole-hearted participation will be obtained only if it is assured.a.preeminent position. .Pakistan,..while noncerned over regional .security, recently has been promoting a.Near.Eastern Moslem alliance. Indonesia,. Burma and Thailand would be receptive to a pact proposal., while Japan, when eligible, would be anxious to sign one.

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3.

German support a Allied stand in Berlin trade crisis seen weakening:


US officials in Berlin cite evidence of weakening local German support of the Allied position in the current Soviet restrictions which have resulted in a choking off of much of West Ber100 s export trade. Certain large firma and many smaller firms in West Berlin, hard hit by the restrictions, have been ignoring West German and Allied directives and complying with Soviet demands.

The French Commandant in Berlin feels that the West Berliners will not support4the Allied position and that no one has been able to indicate what the Allies. will do if West Berlin trade is stopped and Allied countermeasures, including the proposed move to hold up irnplementation of the new interzonal trade pact between East and West Germany, fall to cause the USSR to back down. He adds that the USSR could afford one or two years delay in the East German Five Year Plan if its objective to force the Allies out of Berlinls achieved.

comment The dragging out of the current Soviet restrictions appears to have succeeded in further dividing the Allies and West Berliners on this issue. Shortly after initiating the restrictions, the Soviet authorities encouraged West Berlin firms to by-pass Allied

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offices and deal directly with Soviet authorities. This is the first concrete. evidence that large numbers of firms have felt the squeeze sufficientfollow this course.

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South Korean Prime Minister suggests that President Truthan reassure Korean people:
In a conversation with Ambassador Muccio summarizing the attitude of the South Korean people, the ROK Prime Minister stated that it was not enough for the US to reiterate its exemplary past record; Korean worries stemmed from its intentions in the future. He said that the Korean people believe the US is "calling the whole thing off with victory within its grasp, " and that they are particularly worried over the concessions which will have to be made in order to obtain a cease-fire and political agreement.

of global strategy the US now plans to abandon the Republic of Korea. He feels that the situation is deteriorating and suggests that a statement of

The Prime Minister stated that his people, regardless of the past record, simply do not believe that the US continues to have Korean interests at heart, andlurthermore believe that for reasons
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4.

Comment on British seizure of Polish tankers.

The requisitioning by the UK of two Polish overnment-owned tankers nearing completion in Bstitish shipyards, under defense regulations, " was an action taken most reluctantly, and nly after vigorous US prqtests that the vessels might be used to ship ' ettoleum to Communist China. The UK feared Polish retaliation, and insisted at first that there was no satisfactory legal basis for the seizure. Two weeks ago Foreign Secretary Morrisoripromised to reconsider the matter in light of the Iranian oil crisis.

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reassurance from a high US official, preferably the President, meeting these Korean suspicions head-on, would have a salutary effect. Ambassador Muccio believes the suggestion merits consideration.

Comment Despite the plausibility of the Prime Minister's analysis of the South Korean situation, there is evidence that the gdvernment itself, through inspired demonstrations and press agitation, is largely responsible for the current feeling. There is little indication that continued remonstrances by US officials have had any appreciable effect upon President Rhee, whose actions continue to be irresponsible and unpredictable.
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01.E:=Bartnese Comrnan 1.4 r-in Chief and Socialists in conflictg


Serious friction and general deterioration within the Burmese Army are reported by the US Embassy in Rangoon. These developments

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a

are the result of mounting tension between the Burmese Commander-inChief, Ne Win, and leaders of the Socialist Party, which controls the government. The situation is rapidly, reaching a point at which Ne Win must retire (he is reported as contemplating a trip to London) or force a showdown,for power with the Socialistg large private army. With regard to future developments, the Embassy is concerned over, the fact that Ne Win this week conferred with the Chinese Communist Ambassador for over an hour.
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Comment

to Ne Win could have grave consequences, particularly at a time when Chinese Communist aid to the Burmese Communists is increasing.

Although Ne Win has been considered antiCommupist, he is completely opportunistic and might seek Communist support to maintain his position.
NEAR EAST-AFRICA

B.

Iranian Prime Minister retains control of government despite rising opposition:


The US Embassy in Tehran has received information from several sources that the Iranian Government may haveReenconsiderably weakened by developments in the past two weeks. Parliament is becoming restive as a result of its realization that the situation has worsened steadily. The cabinet is dissatisfied with the Prime Minister's habit of making decisions without consulting it. The press has also developed a more critical attitude on the handling of the oil issue. The Prime Minister, meanwhile, has announced that a group of physicians will check his physical condition. This has resulted in a spate of rumors on his resignation and a possible successor.

The USsAmbassador, while recognizing all these factors as indicative of a cerckin weakness in the present government, concludes that Prime Minister Mossadeq still has very strong popular

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A clash between the Socialists' irregular forces and Army elements loyal

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support and that no group in Iran has shown a willingness to assume responsibility for any modification of the oil nationalization which is the basis of the Prime Minister's power. The Ambassador believes that for the present Mossadeq can continue in power.

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Commilatelc d to conspiracy to overthrow Ethiopian Government:


The USSR has been definitely linked to the recently uncovered conspiracy which aimed at overthrowing the Ethippian Government and establishthg a "republic. " Total arrests as of 11 July are 43, including two interpreters at the local Russian institute and several other Ethiopian Communist sympathizers. Ethiopian -825X1A

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a

officials have linked the USSR to the mutiny in early July of sixty members of the Imperial Body Guard Cadet School. The local Communist-controlled Youth League is also involved Ramifications of the plot are still under investigation and more arrests are expected.
Comment
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The Ethioptan Government, resolutely anti-communist, may be expected to take appropriate action against any of its own subjects involved in conspiracy. It will also express itself strongly to the USSR, whose activities in Ethiopia may be sharply curtailed.
I

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the CQi' COF 12th 12th ArnIy Army from the wea,.northwest area,morthwest of of C ChorWon to displacement of of t,he homn t o

a location location 12-15 12-15 miles northpa0V-Of'Kumsong. northeas% @ I ?

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movement of forces forces may may indicate the Poaitioning of a mass of fresh troops w r , Recent reports reporte on on the the COMMENTsRecent i n preparation for'another for'another offensive. offensive in presence fn the t h e eastern eastern sector sector supports supports presence of of Go? CCF reoonns,issanee reconnaissance elements elementain the evidence evidence of t h e mssfng c d t m e nt o f CCF es in the sector of the massing and commitment of CCF fa forces the sector east of the'Hwachon the'Hwachon Reservoir. 2)3WVQir* d K 6 'July July 5 1 ) . . 116 51).
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Possibkhwlomen t of South Ko~ean&Asoners i n NorthKorean KoreaE': PossWagployment of South Korean4risoners'in Norkh J130 30 ROEpolitical U & f i c a t i o n F ' 111111catkr? Front., 1 ROX,political and indoctrinated indoctrinated in in leadera.taken lepders taken north by by the the COmmunists Commnfsts in i n June June 1950 and Abnchuria have been been returned returned to t o North North Korea* Koreao Mhnchuria have the y b h e Coanunist-sponsored ~ 0 ~ 8 % - S p O Z l S II/Democratic Party for the recently added the mmes names the Unification U d f i c a t i o n of af the the Fatherland', Fatherl8ndlI recently added to t o its its roster, rorster the ot Korean political taken north o f SdUth South Korean p o l i t i c a l leaders leaders who who were taken north as as prisoners prisoners last last summer.' The .The&mnmAsts Ommuniets w will Koreans as a f front summero i l l employ employ the South Korean8 r o n t in i n conconjunction slogans favoring peace and unification. junction with. with slo an8 favoring unification, ( 10 jelly 51).. COMMENT: The Dwcratic Demmeratic Front Front f for:the Lo and and 11 1 1 J?Qy 5 1 7 . _COMMBNT: o r t h e Unification of the Fatherland served as a usOful us&ful propaganda propaganda vehicle f or t h e North of the'Fatherland served'aaa for the North Korean Korean regime r e g h e before before the t h ewar.: waro &A eve9t the alks a re in the eve9.t the cease-fire cease-fire ttalks are successfUl successful and and foreign foreign troops troops withdraw withdraw from from Korea, aorea, the the Nott4 North Korean Korean p o l i t i c a l attacks against against the t h e RON ROK Government Government could coilld very very plausibly plausibly utilize utilize, political a s these these reports r e p m t e describe. describe. such maneuvers maneuvers as

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cent enemy e t fighter KOREA. EnePOssibE:,k_st. Recent enemy jet J fighter


te that that the the enemy enemy is is estiMate ions t o cover all cf e m capable of extending hia air defensive operations to cover all of Coni s% week week produced produced several several munistheld North Korea. Not only heti the lAst a i r engagements engagements in in the the Pyoagyeng o large-aize air Pyongyang area area hvolvhg involving moderate moderate t to large-size enemy enemy poupa, groups, but but ale0 also evidence evidence of of posdhle poisible enew enemy uae use of of lsrge large external external fuel tanks tanks w e observed. obaemed. Large k s g e silver erilver tanks tanks were o have fuel was were obeerved observed t to have been been dropped by enemy jets in their first pass at UN F-511S attacking Kam:don airf eld northeast of Pvonevan2. the EIG- 5 waa believed capable of a combat recline of more than 400 nautical miles if large tahks (apprOximately 150 gallons) were used.' The tbove sfghtlng, if Ff confirmed, confirmed, would would be d . r . r s U im h a l pupport 61um)ort aP sighting, be the the f first visual of this this POpo(The combat combat radius radius of of the the MIG-,15 MIG-15 with 33 gallon tential capability. eapabiliky. (The tential with 33 gallon_ is estimated s s t i m t e d to t o be be about about 250 250 nautical nautical miles.) miles.) external wing tanks is 17 J * 5 1 1 , . 17 July 51),

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2TQP3 3ECREMA008000170001-9
:

18 Slily 1951
COpy No. C

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7

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

11

DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: NEXT FIEVIEW DATE:

TS S C


DATE

AUTH

0-ai

nREVIEIVER:

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STATE, USAF reviews completed

Offi ce of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
,

US and UK move to effect a bilateral Itallan-hpanese peace treaty (Pa4r3).


FAR EAST
eic
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06, KP

1-taii,

2.

Enemy possibly extending jet operations (page 3).


NEAR EAST


SOUTH ASIA

4. Work on nioeline from Iran to be hastened (nage


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4)0A 3

lyn FIAM5V4

6,

Increased Soviet and Communist activity in Afghanistan (page 5).


WESTERN EUROPE

7. Sforza expected to leave Italian Foreign Ministry (page 6).-SINA

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8. West German Socialists again criticizettkapd British labor units


(page 7).
9.

Franco confirms long-awaited Spanish cabinet shakeup (page 7). -3 m

***

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GENERAL
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1.

US and UK move to effect a bilateral Italip-Japanese peace treaty:


US officials have informed Italy that its participation in the Japanese peace treaty is not deemed appropriate and that, instead, the UK and the US are prepared to use their good offices for the negotiation of a mutually satisfactory Italian-Japanese bilateral peace settlement.

Comment; The Italian Government has protested against its exclusion from the Japanese peace treaty on the grounds that this would (a) deal a serious blow to Italian prestige and (b) disastrously affect Italian public opinion. The Italian Government has sought to develop the idea that Italy has worked its way back to the family of nations especially
by its staunch support off NATO.

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2.

Enemy possibly extending jet operations

Recent Jet fighter operations support the Far East Air. Forces, estimate that the enemy is capable? extending his air defense to cover all of C mmunist-held North Korea. In a on to several air engagements in the Pyongyang area last week involving moderate to large-size enemy groups, there is evidence of possible enemy use of large external fuel tanks. Large silver tanks were reportedly observed dropping from enemy Jets in their first pass at UN F-51' s attacking Kangdong airfield northeast of Pyongyang.
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FAR EAST

from the Japanese peace settlement so that the Italian Government will not be pushed into a strong public position in conflict with that of the West. Italy was also informed that the US wishes to avoid antagonizing the Japanese public by putting Italy in the role of a victor.

Ut and the US move promptly to dispel public resentment at Italian exclusion

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The British Foreign Office suggerits that the

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comment Air,Force technical intelligence has for some time reported that the MIG-15 is believed capable of a combat radius of more than 400 nautical miles if iarge tanks (approximately 150 gallons) were used. The above sighting:Al Confirmed, would be the firSt evidence that this Potential has been reached. The combat radius of 4 MIG-15 equipped with 33 gallon external wing tanks is estimated to be about 250 nautical milea.
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4.

Work on pipeline from Iraa to be hastened:

The Iraq Petroleum Company plans to speed up work on the pipeline Currently being constructed from Voq to the Mediterranean with the completion 'date set between April and June 1952. This move is part of IPC's plans to increase oil production to meet the deficiencies resulting from the Iranian situation.


NEAR EAST

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comment: With the pipeline from the Kirkuk Ant oil field to the rettnery at Eaifa closed, Iraq can export only 7,000,000 t ons of oil per ye The completion of this new 30-inch pipeline will Increase export capacity to nearin million tons -- equivalentito twothirds of Iran's 1950 output.
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6.

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SOUTUA$IA
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and commul_it_iLwft.nmiiagiftsti an:


Embassy in Kabul reports considerable activity on the part of Soviet diplomats in Afghanistan, as well as rumors of significant/Communist activity withip the country.
The US

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Soviet Embassy and Trade Delegation personnel in Kabul are moving out of their embassy compound to take up residence in various parts of the city and are mingling to a greater degree with the local populace. Communist publications are now circulating in Kabul and Ialsilabad, and there have been rumors of Communist infiltration into the Afgfian Army. Furthermore, the Communist Iranian Tudeh party has been reportedly active in the Herat province of northwest Afghanistan.

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Sforza expected to leave Italian Foreign Ministry: Although the domestic political situation remains obscure following the Italian Cabinet's resignation, there is a growing indication that Foreign Minister Sforza will be replaced. According to well-informed Foreign Office circles, however, the final decision has not been made.
Comment: The replacement of Count Sforza, an elder statesman with little political following within Italy, has long been expected. His conduct of foreign affairs has been widely criticized, particularly by nationalistic rightist groups, on the grounds that it has been ineffective in defending Italian interests. Earlier reports have indicated that Sforza might negotiate a Trieste settlement with Yugoslavia and then be sacrificed in order to appease Italian public opinion.

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WESTERN EUROPE
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Comment: Growing internal political unrest, which stems fromassension within the ruling governmental clique and from the recent development of an anti-government liberal movement, makes Afghanistan a particularly inviting target for Soviet exploibtion. Soviet diplomats in Afghanistan, many of whom speak fluent Persian or Pushtu, are well equipped to mingle with the Afghan popdlace.

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8.

West German Socialists again criticizeittand British labor units:


The Social Democratic Party in Western Germany recently launched another bitter attack against the German Labor Service Units maintained in the US and UK zones. The Social Democrats criticize the fact that tpt members of these labor and guard units are removed from Germanyjniisdiction, and allege that there has been a tendency to transform the units into a paramilitary organization. The party further charges that the Allies have reorganized the labor units secretly and without consulting the Bundestag, and it demands iinmediate action to assure that the units do not become auxiliary troops. Government party deputies agree with the Socialists that action with respect to the labor units must not prejudge the question of German rearmament.

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conment: The US and UK together maintain about 86,000 German and other employees under contract to guard installations and provide technical assistance. Although these units are not intended as cadres for a German armed force, the USSR has protested their existence. The Social Democratic Party, which is opposing German rearmament, suspects that an attempt may be made to create armed forces "through the back door"; it therefore opposes the US-UK labor units, as well as the proposal to double the size of the Federal border police.

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Franco confirms long-awaited Spanish cabinet shakeup:

abinet o icers will be retained. They are: Minister of Labor Jose ntonio de Giron, Minister of Foreign Affairs Alberto Martin Artajo,
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General Franco has personally informed the


US Ambassador:1A 'Madrid that a general

reorganization of his government will be announced on 19 July. Only four of the present

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Minister of the Interior Blas Perez Gonzalez, aild Minister of Air Eduardo Gonzalez Gallarza. Lieutenant General Agustin Munoz Grandee is reliably mentioned as the new. Minister of the Army..

Meanwhile, press reports describe the contemplated cabinet changes as a concession to public opiniont in dernocratic countries,
Comment: This shakeup indicates a general tightening of the internal structure of the regime in order.tkobviate the criticism of inefficiency and corruption throughout the various governmental departments. Minister of Labor Giron has reportedly itold the cabinet that if Spain's economic crisis is to be understood abrbad, there must be some freedom for public criticism within Spain; otherwise, he claimed, it was logical for the US.to hesitate to assist in Spain's economic rehabilitation. Giron is generally regarded as the government member with the greatest influence over the workers within the Falangist organization.

Its4ention of Martin Artajo signifies Franco's eagerness to retain the suppori of the active Catholic elements in Spain.

Lt. General Munoz Grandes is one of Franco's ablest and most trusted generals.

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s achieved has achieved Voviet ObAectives Achieved Dur i w the & m e . The USSR b apsitit_ajecitreit_g_WAvaihwjag_thejcartenlar.. certain important objectives objectives during during the the course couree of of the the Korean war ldBr and. thus certain important was willing to advance the Malik cease-fire eaee-fire proposal, proposal, Militprily, the &kLb USSR baa to Militnrily, has been able to LI-tiarn many of the new UR weapons perfected srfectad since aince World World War War II. 11. BSccepD rIcept d nearly nearly a11 arm, including Including planes plane6 for atomic weapons, the US has umed all new arm., and and tanks, tanka, affording affording the the USSR D8SR an an opportunity opportunity for for comparison eomparieon with with its I t s own own Specifically, the the USSR uSSR has h e been able to test t e s t (a) (a) Soviet Soviet jet jet equipment. Specifically, planee, whioh although although better better in in speed speed and and maneuverability maneuverability than t b n DS U8 models, modele, planes, which Ere not the Ihe best which the Soviet@ the effectiveness effectivenessof of the the US US are Soviets bava,; have; (a) CO the anti-tank weapons weapone against agalnet the the new new secret caeoret Soviet Boviet tanks. tankc. BQpcmt~dly, ths anti-tank Reportedly, the WSR has ha8 better better bazookas baeookrra and knd napalm napalm bombs bombs than than those those used used by by the the US. US. USSR Politically and and militarily mflitarilr the the removal of of Gen. Qen. MacArthar UcA.rthr from f r o m the the lex Bkr East wae a success succeem for f o r Moscow Moecow since since it it created created US US domestic domestie discord discord tbereby thereby Rest was a contributing to US weakness. weaknese. Propagandistically, Propagandietlca,l+y, the the USSR USlsawfll able to to contributing will be able the Soviet Sooietgeace exploit the peace proposals ropoeala and and truce tructe Which whiah is l e expected expeoted to to be be forthforth1 OOMMWT: COMMFiNTr coming. 119 JUB Jul 51) 51) I 7 coming. P19 appeared to lappeared t o be bo Saviea Soviet F-"Plants" of a "$lants~ a propaganda propaganda nature. nature. The Tha above information information in in this t h i a latest latest should not not be be characterized characterized as as objectives objeotivee but rather rather results reaulte of of report should the Korean Korean war. It is obviously true t h t the that the 8oviets Soviets have been able to lenrn much of new W elnce World W a r II, 11, and learn much US weapons developments since War and tent current US 3.5@ recoillees guns againat test bhe the cuxrent 3.50 bazooka rand and recoilless against new now Soviet tank deeigns. l e equally true true that the tha Soviets S O V ~ have ~ ~ S improved jet jet airairdesigns. It is craft under under development development which which have combat.I The have not not been been seen w e n in in,combcLt.l The Soviet Soviet MIU-15 and and Type Type 15 15 jet Jet fighters fighterm used used in In Korea Korea are are best best described descrfbbd as am being being MIG-15 generally generally comparable coxparable to to the the US US 7-86 F-86 Sabre Sabre Jet. Jet. It is le coneidered likely considered likely that the Soviets Soviete have improved improved verelons o f standard rstandard US n a p a l m bombs bombe and and versions of napalm basoohe bazookas under under development, development, but but there there is is no no evidence evidence that tbat they t b y have have been been available available to to Soviet lsovlet military military forces. foreee.

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-T013-5130EST-

'APPROVED FOR RELEASE ATE: 18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010 pATE:

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hes provi.A. ba, _. SW. ti,x on, as o une $ on LUalik,e ceaee-fire proposal, he proposal resulted from consultation in'Moseow in early'June between the $qviets and a.Chinese CosKnrnilrt delegation led by &TU Sha-mhtf. sAlthough Although the the Pefpfng COMmuniat by:LIT:Phaochli. Peiping regime is tlBNdoue" t o end i n Korea, Psiping does does nOt not intend h t m d to to yield yield "anxious" tO end the'flghtlng the'fighting in-Korea:ojeiping .on iits.demands t a demnde for o the UN, t i t l e to Taban .on for admission admission t to the,UN* title-to Taiwan* and participation in.the in the Japanese Japanese peace peace treaty. treaty* a t "poUtical .t.hat "pdlitical demands are unlikely to arise the cease-fire cease-sfire negotiations." mg!&,iations.n demands'are arise !luring duringthe U'JuSy 1 1 , C C"To have re1,4',Ju4 5 5l)., COMMENT ported an an earlrJuneSino-Soviet eaplg:'June Bino-SovietcOnferince conferenceon on. ported the Korean conflict. Peiping has has frequently frsqudntly reiterated reiteratedits i t sdemands demands regarding the UN, Taiwan, and ping regarding the UN.v, Taiwan, and the japanese Japanese peace treaty, but but has has not not made mde clear olear whether whether a a Korean Korean settlesettlethe peacetreaty* ment will w l l l depend depend on on the the satisfaction satiafaction of af those those demands. demnds F - i n o ment no mention of of Peiping's PeQingga denand &emand for for the mention the withdrawal mithdtawal of of all foreign foreign forces forces fpom from Korea which which has has been been specifically specifically reaffirnted Korea teaffirmed for for several several weeks weeks as as essential to a a Ketean Korean settlement* settlemnt, and and which Upoliticaldemand" to which has has already already arisen ariaen as as o a "political demand" in the cease-fire negotiationa, negotiations. the cease-fire

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Commander T Taitijoree.77 is.increaSing antiCo-der a g o r o e 77 reports that the enemy i s increa'sing antiaircraft defenses defenses in in Northeast Northeast Korea'particularly Korea p+rticularly on on the Wonaan-Pyongaircraft Wonsan-Pyongyang and Wonsan-Pyonggang rail lines. lie further report that the increased flak is detracting from bombing accuracy. Jay 51). COMMENT: .This report adds to the observations throughout Communist el orea of the Strengthening of of eneqy enemy anti-aircraft defense.

KOREA. KOREA p l.ftsa-trethensafenthesirINorthea_d&Forea. e w StrenathsnsJ Anti-Aircraft Defenses in Northeast Korea.

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HR70-14 HR70-14

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"A"

Czechos/ovakian Czechoslovakian Volunteers Volunteers Revorted Renorted in in Korea. Korea. ISoviet troops purporting purporting t to be'Czechoslovakian ISoviet troope o be Caechoelovalcian volunteers vo un eera have h w e been been moving moving recently r e c e n t l y with with their t h e i r supplies onpplies from from AntAntung to t o Sinuijui SinuljI.lr According approximately 20 According to t o the the same same source, eo-&cea there t h e r e are am-approximately a0 MIG type type planes planes etatloned stationed at the the Ginuiju Sinuija a airfield, idth an undleclosed undisclosed number number of of Soviet Soviet i r f i e l d s with planee concealed nearby. nearby. Civilians Civillane are a r e said eald t o have been evacuated evacuated from from planes concealed to Oh'Aryongwan and their t h e i r houses house6 requisitioned requieitioned by Soviet and Chinese Chinese Ch!Aryongwan and Communist troops. Oommanlet troope. About 300 300 Soviets S o v i e t e are a r e reported reported to to be be stationed etatloned in in the. the ChiAryongwan C h 'Aryongwan public school whence they the supposedly eupposedl conduct daily d a i 4 pistol pistol and rifle 20 Jul r i f l e practice. practice. 1 - (( Jnl 51) 51T COMMENT: OOMMERTt There There is is no no available evidence Czechoslovak volunteers volunteers in evidence indicating Indicating the the presence preeence of of Ozechoslovak in Manchuria or Xoreao It is i s possible, poasibleD however, however, that; Korea that eome some Ozechoslovak Czechoslovak n a t i o n a l s may may be attached to t o Soviet Soviet units unite reported reported recently to t o have have nationals oroeeed Into Korea. The presence of crossed the Yalu River Rivei into Korea. .The presence of of an.unknown number of in as technicianso technicians, advieorBD advisors, and and a anti-aircraft Soviet troops on duty i n Korea a8 nti-aircraft operators is i e now generally generally accepted. accepted.

APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: ,19-Feb-2010

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llBtl "B"
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K O W . memy Strength May be be Mitch Much Greater Than Now Hn addition reater lhan Now Accepted, Ac e.td0 In addition Stre th ia KOREA. units currently currently accepted accepted in i n Korea Kora' t o enemy units to'enemy pmy G mp, composeo composeaor or.5-4 ju4 the 20thChinese.Communist 20th Cbinese Cornmist rmy the urOup, i s also a l s o in in armies with a strength of of lO5-l4O,OOO 105-140;000 troops, troops, "probably" "wobably"-is re a t l east f i v e additional Koreae Korea. "Poasiblyll "Possibly" in in Korea Korea a are at least five additional Chinese Chinese Communist CoMmuniat armies, totaling 175,000, and and three three new new North.Korean North Kwean Corps Corps of of at at least least armies,-totaling.1752000, 30,oOO men, 131 2). July juiy 51)+ 51). .CONIONTi C0MMEXt"T The The Strength strength .30,000 men. ( , . of enemy en- units units currently currentlyaccepted acceptedin.Korea i n K c r totals 14.93.000, of which of 265,000 are are Chinese Chinese COIUBl@St8a A reoent race the enemy 265,000 Communists. A now supPortia support,a 5-7 5-7 day.72 division offensive prestmably l o g i s t i c a l l y could logistically could how is b s e d on that these units "probably" Pr "140.19ibly" in :is. based on consideration consideration that:these XOPW a g h t participate ..lorea might participate.
.

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.South Korea Progress in Balanc BaLancina Econoqy, ress in Econon 0 Ambassador Ambassador .Sowth o ea Maker$: Make Fro Muccfo reports that that the the N ROK has made made marked marked progress progress in i n balanting. balancing income incolns Muscle reports K has I nt h e past past t w o months, months, . and expenditures and and in i n 'Controlling contmlllng bank oredits In the two .-'and.expenditures bank credit. axpenditures of -expenditures of UN UN forces,, forces, which which far far exceed exceed the the meager meager collections collections from from t h e sale oof f imported .the,:sala imported goode, goods, have have constituted constitUted the the sole sole inflationary inflationary pressur@ pressure out that the impoverished Impoverished and and disrupted. dierupted nf ' a e SignificanCe. eignificancee Pointing Pointing out that the KQPeari'economy sconon\y cannot o absorb h e local costs of of Koreah cannot be be expected eXpected tto absorb tthe local currency currency costs wry-ing on an 8s corrective to carrying-on an extended extended wqr, War, Muccio Muccio again again ILT ur es corrective action action to Fncreaae t h eSupply supplyof of imported bnporte'd goods. goods* ( 20 July July 51). inOeise.the 20
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APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED IDATE: 17-Feb-2010 DATE: 17-Feb-2010

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KOREA. &Am CaEable of Attack41Lw1th Little or No Additional Nara Irring as the present tactical situation remains unchanged, the innodiate
pre-offensive indications which in the past have-provided an accurate basis for estimating the probable date of attack, may not be evident, according to US Eighth Army. The enemy is afforded sufficient front line intelligence,through generally close contact, to permit momentary offensive ao;tion without noticeable change in current counter-reconnaissanc, patrolling and probing activity. Recent enemy artillery activity tends to confirm deployment of artillery in forward areas reducing if not eliminating the necessity for last minute displacement and registration. No increase in deserters and stragglers is expected because of the deterreAt effect of the enemy's almost continuous outpost line. Moreover, current weather conditions can and probably havenenabled the enemy to displace troops and supplies into forward areas without detection. Ftrtheri the combat effectiweess of practically all enemy units in contact increassa the probabilitT of their offensive employment. The enemy's capability of moving hie reserve to attack positions 24 hours prior to the attack further reduces ths opportunity to obtain prior-warning of attack. Eighth Army warns that even this movement might be accomplished without detection under present weather conditions. ( 23 July 51)9

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CENTRAL DITEXLEENCE ILITELUDENCE A AGENCY WJTRAL WCY

* 1
OFFICE CURRENT INTEmNm INTELLIGENCS O F F E E OF CURHENT DAILY DIG??,ST DIGEST OF OF SIGNIFICANT SIGNIFICANT S/S S/S CABIES CABLES

23 Jly 1951 23 July. 1951


SECTION 2 (EASTERN) (EASl")

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HR70-14 HR70-14
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APPROVKD FOR RELEASE ATE% D A T B 17-Feb-2010 17-Feb-2010 'DPPROVEP

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SECTIQN ) SECTION' I I (SOVIE!!' (SOVIET)

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USSR. ....q_j_remCs_d_ol_SvetPmmet.KoreanTalks. Breaking silence on the agenda of the Korean discussions, the Soviet press on 19 July reported A TABS !! A S 8 de8 t c h baaed US opposition t to Communist conditiono, conditions. 1 despatch based on on a a Us1 o Communist Pyongyang press comentapy commentarY claimed that t the USg (I) had c categorically Pyongyang h e US:: (llpabsd ategodcally raising question of ofthe of foreign troops troops from from opposed r a i s i n g tthe h e queatiofi t h e withdrawal withdrawal of Korea; and (2) tried by-pass t the-Nalik proposaL in order to Korea; (2) had t r i e d to to by-pass h e MaUk proposal t o obI1 was tain Nam:11 was t ain a a demarcation demarcation omUch %tachto t o northig northff of of the t h e 36th'Peral1e1 9 t h P a r a l l e l .. Nam quoted,as on those those conditions conditions as a6pledgeagatent pledgeagaW new iieu military m i l i t a r y Out-. kiutquoted a s insisting i n s i s t i n g on breaks. anad ahd proposing proposing measures measures f for o r a cease-fire. cease-firee l'hase breaks These included a a deded the the r eturn o f militarizedc-zone return of militarisb&. zone, aa commission comy~iss for control thereof ald .150#00 following c cease-fire. . COMMENTg To POWE s fallowing ea~e-fire. c o 8 TO a t a cease-fire -date'there has been been no no chana change in Communist insistence that-a cease-fire date t h e r e has ih Korea be pegged t to troops. Although Moecow in o the withdrawal of foreign troops. Mbicow -his refrained ffrom direct comment on on the the negotiations, negotiations, Soviet Sadet support has refrained rom d i r e c t comment support -fOr-the detand i is indicated by by its relaying of of Pyongyang Pyongyang press comments. f o r t h e demand s indicated co~lrments, -Ohe such:comment on 24 24 July July iinsisted on the the withdrawal withdrawal of of foreign foreign troops troops One such comment on n s i s t e d on intention to refusall to t o do so.indicated so indicated US i ntention t o ncOnvert bonve~ and charged that t h a t the refusal military South Korea into i n t o its its m i l i t a r y springboard6n epringboard,'c Therefore, Therefore, the the commentary commentary cOnclUded in the interests i n t e r e s t s of of security, security, independence independence and and world world peace, peace, concluded, i nthe ."our representatives representatives iin Knesong resolutely on the the final final solution solution n Kaeeong resolute?^ iinsist n e i e t on
.
.

w. Soviet Press Comment on Korean Talks, Breaking silence on t h e agenda of t h e Korean discussions, the Soviet press on 19 July reported

ofthis of t h i s qUestioni" queetion.'f

. . " /NR

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TVF.-SEGBET--

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. an 'anincrease-intheenemesnight increase i n the eneroyfls night air operations in in Korea. Korea. air operatiens

KoflEA. Enemy NfPlht ,Ab-QpsroUsns bawsadmq. I ASOBEA. ,Et_jestreasi'..

1 9 addition to In addition to the h i t and and rAn r;wn attack: attab d l i g h t bomber3, bombep, recent air aetfvity 'the hit of the PO-2 P0-2 light -repentenemy enemy.air activity ~s included.* includad'k'number pmber of of night. night interoeptAons aircraft, pradomi-,bas intereeptiene by by enemy enemy*ircrafts, predomi,hntl,y cOnventional eonvenM,onal fighter fighter typess:and typeas 'and a a continuance continuance of.enemy af enemy night night air air nintly activity' in the the vicinity vicinity of of Wonram. Wonean, aotivity in
night training training acsivIty lsveing conausea as 60Mr. munist air air basee bases in i n Manchuria Msnchwrfo and* and .a apoupof:14,-91s of U-9ss has ha8 been been deployed deployed southsouthmunist group ward to ward t o 84010iju. Sql[qUSjua

Ba o P o an Confirms in ConIims Unrest Un~es.b, in a a North North Korea Kcmaan Province. F%wvincs. Radio Bpdio Pyongyang'on 20 uly commended a Gorp19 unit for fop mopping mopping up U p some some 80 80 a Wrcl Ward Corps unit 'oreactionarybandits' bactionary b r ~ l i k 3 who wwhohave havebeen beenConti:: oontfsr their 'desperate *desperateStruggleff strugglen their in 23 i n the the moUntain mountain area area of of Bwanghae Hwirnghae Province: Prodnee. 23 July July 51). 5 1 ) . ,COMMENT: COaaaaEWT: W t ea a nnieber.of nqx&er of Nprth l e d n g before i n i t i a l advance advance Quite North Korean Korean refugees refUgees r fleeing before the the initial oe Comasnists n Hwanghas lies of the Chineise CommuniSts sought sought refuge refuge i in Hwanghae Province Province which which lies immodiately north d of the the 38th 38th Parallel Parallelon onK~maO8 Koreeewest Smned5.ateI.y north west coast. goost, It 1% is is of of Interest to to note note tht Etadio Ppngyang h e contQmed ctivity interest that.Radio Pyongyang confirms confirms t the con4nued armed armed a activity . of O f these these anti-communiet P n t d - C O d 8 t groups. @?oupY.

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'21.'.!NlY 51).
.
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T o J A w m 5 5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE APPROVED DATE: DATE: 17-Feb-2010 17'-Feb-2010

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,

HR70-14

2S -A3u..1

.visttihrong ong:that there will "derinitelyube efL N e T Pa - truce T K &in.liorea.:. X ~ K S % Z ..s4deVtnat politics1 negotiations f011oping.the truce-would "pave'. thCwaryfOrOOMMUnist Chinags admission to the. UN, .aftpr Oich,:a"greAti WithdraWar'e the US-7th Fleet_froM.Formosan waters ,could.beLachievedA 23 Jul 53.10 ,gammA Soviet officials outside Korea have reachodin have also also etated & a t d categorically sategoricrdly that that a a truce truce will w i l l be. be reachpd in Korea... Korea. ..Such expressions. confidence obViouslyare arenot notbinding binding upon upon the the Cornwet Comtwitst Suah expresaione o fof conf'idenw obv3.oloel.y propaganda, in addition to fwaistfng insisting .negotiatorm negotiator8 in in Koreab. Kcirem Feipingos PeipPngO 8 pmpaganda, upon of a all foreign foraea forces from Korea, has upon the the TrIthdrawal withdrawal of l l foreign has implied implied that that the the queations UN and and t title to Formosa v will queetiona of o f Chiness,representation Chinese re resentation in the Ubl itle t g Fom0sa d U be brought up-in brought up in any an$ subsequent 8u sequent negotiations. negotiatiow.
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Promgenda.Explsifeation ofnjaesQng Talks. .reportS,that the Chinese CoMmunistO ars supporting withnhotographs their report8 proPaganda.that propaganda that UN UN forces foraaa tn in Korea:are Korea are suing suing for for peace.

_TOP-SUM-3 3

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having some to the ecialusiono afttr Assra resift pietares is a losaR paper ef UN repretentetives i waits item that DK fortes sew. surrenderingo ( 23 lel 500 GONMAK:g Communist propaganda can be expected tO exploit suah .fiaturee of the Keesons talks as Communist military control el the cit7 0 the passage ef U repreeentatives through. armed Communiet guarani) and thn preeence of whdte flags on UK ieeto,amt the absence of each flue from Comassiet vehicles. Newevero that Comma:Lot propaganda regarding a "thl defeat" in Korea is not beang generally'aeoepted in China0
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the enemy might laurcohnne or more strong o sttaske prior to the completion ef armistiee negotiations. The advantages ef euell local successes would be physical peopession of a desirable objective9 such ate key terrain feature of offensivy or defensive signifiesseeo and.a boost of troop morale0 he tisk ground seats of the PynaggwagAuthwa-Chorientriangle is of sufficient important. te warrant a limited attack. ( 25 Jul, g)0 Tice "Iron Triangle* with its impotent read net and forward eupply positions was utiLivid by the Cenmuniets as a base of operation.' in spring offensive00 Recent eastward displacement ef CCP forees and the "elite of trent line units ia the central eecter have provided a maw of' freak fore.a in position to undertake each alimited attack.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENS AGENCY

m 1 c E OF OF CURRENT CURRENT INTELLIGENaR OFFICE DAlSY DEEST OF SIGNIFICANT SIGNIFICANT S/S S/S CABISS CBBIZS DAILY DZEST OF
25 25

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W 1951 1951 ally


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SECTION 2,(EASTEI1N) (EASTERN) SECTION 2

XMA. 214X. jairagaLyLle

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Isga_khea
anticeasefirs oemphign.

e_l_Latne . 'Ambassador Mnccio reports that ,Secretary .Acheeongs .statement could not:have 'been better timed

with respect to local reaction.. Rhee remarked that the Seoretary4s aptech had eased everyone lnind while. the Prime Minister.cOmMentedv: very reas suring, just what Ihre.wa4ted.." The-National Assembly unanimously approved a message of gratitude6 Acheson indicated 24 Jular 51).0 that despite Comiunist demands at the Kaesong Conference .the US will not withdr,av troops. froth Korea. This assurande of security by the Secretary could provide a graceful wey for South Korean officialdom tO atop the present

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Approved For Rdse 2ale/B: SEGRETA014600230001-2

25 July 1951
25X1

Copy No. C

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN


DOCUMENT NO,

/IS
SC

CLASS. CHANGED To: 73


NEXT REVIEW DATE;

DECLASSIFIED

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. y

AUTH: HR 70DAT

2061
25X1
25X1

REVIEWER:

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Army, DOS and DIA

review(s) completed.

25X1

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/01116 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300230001-2

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Approved Fo r Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-R0P79T00975A00030023000 -2

25X1
-

SUMMARY'

GENERAL

25X1
2.

Turks restate eagerness for membership in NATO (page 3).


FAR EAST

3.

4.

5. 6.


NEAR EAST

Enemy. in Korea can attack with little or no additional warning (page 4). Chiang Kai-shek summarily dismisses naval officers for political activity (page 5).

Iraqi Government reaches agreement with petroleum company (page 5). jordanians charge link between former Grand Mufti and murderer of
Abdullah (page 6).
'

WESTERN EUROPE

25X1

B.

Spanish underground labor groups warn of Communist gains (page 7).


LATIII, AMERICA

9.

Panamanian representative instructed to -withhold papers of Chinabound vessel (page 8).


****

25X1A

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300230001-2

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Approved or Release 2004/01116 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300

25X1

25X1

25X1A

2.

Turks restate eagerness for membership in NATO:

with the UK and -France a satisfactory safeguard and wants the immediate support of all the NATO countries in the event that Turkey is attacked;

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-325X1A

The Turkish Ambassador in Moscow has made the fcillowing statements to US Ambassador Kirk:

(a) Turkey does not consider its current treaties

Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300230001-2

Approved :or Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79100975A00030023 0001-2

25X1

(b) The Anthassador, himself, is uncertain of the genuineness of British support of Turkey's application to join NATO, despite the recent British declaration; and, (c) He does not favor, an Eastern Mediterranean Pact for fear that the Arab States' insistence on joining would have disas25X6 trous repercussions vis-a-vis Israel.

25X1A

Enemy in Korea can attack with little or no additional warning:


The US Eighth Army warns that the enemy is now capable of moving his reserves into position 24 hours prior to an attack, and that even this movement may be accomplished without detection under present weather conditions. Furthermore, so long as the tactical situation remaihs almost static there may be no noticeable change in the pattern of enemy activity.

Comment: In the past, the five-day period preceeding the launching of an offensive provided numerous indications of thefl probable date of attack. As yet there is no firm indication of an intent to resume the offensive.

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FAR EAST

-425X1A

Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300230001-2

Approved or eease II,


25X1A

'Is

Il

III

IS

30001-2

4.

Chiang Kai-shek summarily dismisses naval officers for political,


aCtivity:

25X1A

control at its worst "

Comment: Chiang Kai-shek's fear of defections to the Communists or "Third Force" groups has increased the scope and power of Soviet-trained Chiang Ching-kuo's political officers. This is the first report indicating the unprecedented power of Ching-kuo vis-avis a Commander-in-Chief.

25X1A 5.

Iraqi Government reaches agreement with petroleum company: An agreement setting minimum guarantees for thelevel of oil production and Iraqi revenues has been reached between Iraq and the Iraq Petroleum Company. Under its terms, Iraqi oil revenues will reach apprOxithately 50 million pounds sterling annuallY within three years, a.sum several times greater than the current payment. The agreement, which appears to be the most favorable ever negotiated by any government, provides for renegotiation should any neighboring country obtain more favorable terins.

Comment: From the few details available it appears that the new agreement answers the chief requirements of both

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NEAR EAST
25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300230001-2

Chiang Kai-shek on 15 Iuly summarily dismissed la naval officers accused of forming a new clique. Admiral Kwei, naval Commanderin-Chief, was informed of this action by Clhiang Ching-kuo, the Generalissimo's elder son, in time to "save face" by appearing to order the dismissal himsOf. The officers included Kwei's nephew and brother-in-law. No charges have been preferred, since Chiang Chingkuo' s "political officers" would not be able to prove their. allegations. The US Naval Attache states that a long-standing feud between Admiral Kwei. and Chiang Ching-kuo is rumored to be behind this example of "tttought

"

Approved Fa r Release 2004101/16 : CIA-RDP79100975A000300 230001-2

ISX1A
25X1 25X1
1.

parties. Despite the liberal aspects of the negotiated agreement, ratification by the Irani Parliament cannot be assured. I

6.

Jordanians charge link between former Grand Mufti and murderer of


cAbdullah:

25X1A

fighting.

The Jordanian Governor of the Old City of Jerusalem is convinced that the former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem is involved in the murder of King Abdullah, but he has not been able to uneover the organization behind the act. The US Vice Consul in Arab Jerusalem reports that Abdullah's assassin was supposedly a member of the "Holy War Fighters, " a terrorist group organized by the Arab Higher Committee during the last years of the Mandate but disarmed by the Arab Legion during the Palestine

25X1

25X1A

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5X1A
Approved Fot Release 2004/01116 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300130001-2

25X1

WESTERN EUROPE

25X1A

8.

Spanish underground labor groups warn of Communist gains:


The Spanish opposition Comite Interior de Coordination, predicting a great expansion of Communist strength, warns that the Spanish people, who are losing faith in US objectives, will turn to the Communists for help against the Franco dictatorship.

In a formal protest against 'any contemplated US economic and military aid to the Franco regime, the CIC reminded the US Embassy in Madrid that Spanish workers represented by the Socialist

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-725X1A

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25X1

and Anarchist components of the CIC have "firmly decided not to cooperate" in Spain's industrial and, military, effort unless Franco.is.removed.
.

9.

Panamanian representative instructed to withhold papers of China-bound


Vessel:

25X1A

immediately or forfeit its registry.

claimed as early as 9 July that ft had instructed its representatives to hold the papers of any Panamanian flag ship bound for North Korean or Chinese Communist ports.

Comment: The Montesa's papers have been held by the US Consul General in Hamburg,. since the Panamanian representative had no authorization to do so. The Government of Panama

This is the fourth Panamanian flag vessel whose papers have been picked up on the initiative of US officials. In

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LATIN AMERICA

Comment The Spanish Communist Party is trying to capitalize on the growing sense of. frustration among the underground leftist groups. So far, all Communist offers of financial aid in exchange for .Communist party. control of a "popular front" have been rejected, because of the overwhelmingly anti-Communist sentiments of the great bulk of the workers within these groups. It is believed unlikely, therefore, that Spanish workers will.make common cause with the .Communists or resort to sabotage against the Spanish defense effort, as indicated in an earlier CIC letter to the US Embassy. The present protest, with its implied threats, is apparently calculated to induce the US to demand the liberalization of the Spanish regime. Without the cooperation of the other leftist labor groups, the CoMmunists will remain an ineffective political.force.

The Panama.Government has instructed its Consul General in Hamburg to hold the papers of the China-bound Panama flag vessel Montesa and to notify the captain to unload its cargo

-825X1A

Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300230001-2

A2859lAd For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0003002 0001-2

all four.caseS, ..Panama supported the taaction and threatened the masters of the vessels with, cancellation of Panamanian registry. unless the cargo destined for .Communist China was unloaded. In no .case, howeyer, has a Panamsnian official taken the initiatiVe in withholding the papers from such a yeesel.

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25X1A
Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300230001-2

. ,

' *'

.
rige.31) SECRET SUEN6-----nta

HR.70-14 HR70-14
I

NR

2.

APPROVED APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: 22-Mar-2010 22-Mar-201 0

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,
..
I

FAR EAST EAST FAR

'
r!Y
25 July 51
I

communists strong local attacks in Korea during Communistsmay mav launch lastrowlocal e a d u r - negotiations:,
the h e enemy may Local may launch launch one oneor or more more strong local prior to to the the completion completion of attacks prior of armistice armistice negotiations. negotiations. The The advantages of local advantages of local successes successes wodd objectives and and the improvement improvement wouldbe be the the seizure seizure of of important terrain terrain objectives of troop morale. of morale, The high ground ground south southof of the thePyonggalig-Kumhwa-Chorwon PyonggMg-Kumhwa-Chorwon is of of sufficient sufficient importance importance to warrant warrant a a limited limited attack. attack. triangle is
-3-

M1

Comment: The "Iron Comment: The "Iron Triangle, '' " with with its important road net and forward supply positions, was utilized by and positions, was utilized by the the Q h m u n i a t s as coliamunists as a a base base of ofoperations operationsin inthe thespring springoffensives. offensives. Recent Recent eastward displacement of Communistforces forces and and the the relief e'astward of Chinese Communist ofIront of fresh opfrontline line units units in in the the central central sector sectorhave have put put a a concentration concentration of attack: . troops in position to undertake such a limited attack;

3,.

Possible preparations preparations in in Peiping Peipincr for foran an international international conference: conference:
I

24 1u ly 51

jthe

move i t s offices offices from the L e foriner f o A e r US US to move its compound in Embassy compound inPeiping, Peiping, and andorders orders have have been been issued issued for for the removal of shops had previously of the the anti-American anti-American posters posters that all shops previously been beenrequired required to display. these developments developments point of some some understanding" understanding" between betwden the Peiping regime and and to the "possibility of t o preparattons preparationsfor forholding holding an an "international ''international conference" conference" in in the US, or to Peiping.

Committee of of the the the Central Committee i Chinese Chinese Communist CommunistPartv Party has has been been ordered ordered

Comment; Neither of of these these developments developments Comment Communistpropaganda propaganda has has provided provided has been confirmed by by other other sources. Communist some basis for the the speculation speculation that that the the Chinese Chfneee Communists Communists may basis for may propose a conference onvarious various Far Far Eastern problems. conference at Peiping Peiping an problems. Recent RecentChinese Chinese have provided provided no no indication of of a Communist pronouncements, pronouncements, however, have fundamental change in Peiping's hostility hostilitytoward towardthe theUS US and and fidelity kfdelity to to the the^ *
USSR. USSB.

-. . _

- 4 4-

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:kcicibajosue;

Attet'Ondless demandd in.CoMMunistprOpagandi far-tha Withdrawal of foreign troopafronflorea,'Redio Peiping under a Proligrang dateline broMdaist the following explanation-of Communist compOoMite with the UN refusal to plade the issue on,the KaasOtg'agendas orderto arrive at an early armietice agreement so as to fulfill th . initial hopes of the worldos peace-loving People, wengree to the pro; posal of 3rour-sid66" " The Communist radio in'Vienna ingenionsly explained the settle-4 tent it these termss "For the moment the 4maricans seem to have gained

faingnistatulittatialLsiabfFott#0..

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an adVantage but the Noreen and Chinese repreaentatives forced the reotenitg of the discussiOns by-postpaning this question of the withdrawal of troopso" -26-guly--5116


. :

. . .
. .

..

. .

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I

i
I

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 31-Mar-2010


___TDPSNMETLm-==--

9 9

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Approved For Release

bal

201/QOP:CSEQBELO

1300260001-9

28

July 1951
25X1

Copy No. ex--

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN


DOCUMENT No,

'


DAT

AUTH: H 78.

NO CHANGE IN CLAN. II DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO
NEXT REVIEW DATE:

REVIEWER

25X1 25X1

STATE, USAF reviews completed

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25X1

TOP SECRET
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Apprited1IThr Release 2004108103 : CIA-RDP79100975A000300260001-9

SUMMARY

GENERAL

!Yugoslav official expects Communist concessions in Korean cease-. fire negotiations (page 3). 2. Crashed MIG-15 recovered off Korean coast sage a).
1.

FAR EAST,
3.

Indonesia wants to abrogate Netherlands-Indonesian Union


(Page 4)-

4. Prince Tallal rumored to be en route, to Jordan (pSP 5)5. Egyptians continue to discuss relaxing of Suez Canal restrictions


NEAR EAST

(pne 5)-

25X1

WESTERN EUROPE

7. Question of Germany's political status may delay defense contribution

(page 6).

O.

French consider cut-back in defense program (page 7).

25X1A

25X1A

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25X1
Approved For Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300260 001-9

GENERAL
1.

25X1A

Yugoslav official expects Communist concessions in Korean ceasetire negotfations:

With regard to Soviet-Chinese Communist relations, Bebler believe$ that additional tensions will arise over whose influence should prevail in North Korea.
Comment: Communist agenda concessions regarding the question of troop withdrawal indicate a continued desire to negotiate a cease-fire. However, . Communist demands for the withdrawal of foreign troops cannot be regarded solely as propaganda. It has been a persistent Soviet aim in all areas to secure Western troop withdrawals so as to remove a stabilizing factor and facilitate the
advance of Communism.
25X1A 2.

Crashed MIG-15 recovered off Korean coast: Salvage operations conducted by UN naval forces have resulted in the of a MIG-15 airplane that crashed

25X1A

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Bebler estimates that the Communists are insisting on the withdrawal of all foreign troops largely for its propaganda appeal in the Far East, while the USSR in fact will want to keep the US Army pinned down in Korea and to this end that negotiations for a general settlement are prolonged.will make certain

recovery of all the principal parts

Approved For Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP79700975A000300260001-9

cease-fire. He believes that the Communists' desire for a cease-fire will induce them to give in as regards the 38th Parallel demarcation line and the withdrawal of foreign troops, but he is not optimistic about achieving UN observation in North Korea.

Yugoslav UN delegate Bebler remains optimistic that current negotiations in Korea will result eventually in a

A dreSieleftf o r

elease 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP79100975A0003002 0001-9

offshore west of Pyongyang..

Comment -This will afford the. US:Air-Force itafirst opportunity to conduct a technical study of.themajor-coniPonents,. accessories and equipment of the MIG-15, although several parts of an engine and tail have been examined previously. While the airplane will undoubtedly.be in poor condition as. a. result of the crash And .ex-: poSnie to salt water it is anticipated that many details heretofore unknown can nol be Idetermined,
. .

25X1A

Indonesia has requested the Netherlands to open discussions looking to a revision of the Netherlands-Indonesian agreements signed in 1949. The official designated to negotiate with the Dutch told the US Ambassador. in Djakarta that he will try to persuade the Dutch to accept a bilateral treaty in place of the present Netheriands-Indonesian Union and to obtain the elimination of certain Dutch privileget,
The Indenbsfan official also anticipates approaching the retherlands authorities on the question of Netherlands New Guineas He feels that inevitably this area must pass into hands and that the thoner this fact is recognized by the Dutch,Indonesian the sooner amicable relations
can be achieved.
agitation in Incionesia over the past six months to abrogate the Union_ and substitute a bilateral treaty negotiated by "two sovereign nations. " The Indonesians are determined to break the Union unilaterally, if the Dutch fail to agree to such an arrangement.
Indone.sianE demands for sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea have not, ceased since negotiations over the ' igsele broke down in December, 1950. Dutch-Indonesian relations

will remain strained until a,settlement of this

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-425X1A

bidonesia wants to abrogate Netherlands-Indonesian Union:

Comment: There has been increasing

Approved For Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300260001-9

FAR EAST

problem is reached.

AppaUdi Aar Release 2004/08103 : CIA-RDP79100975A000300260001 .9

NEAR EAST
25X1A 4.

prince Tallal rumored to be en route to Jordan:

Prince 'Falai has disappeared from a


sanitorium in Switzerland and may be attempting to return to Jordan, according to a report that has reached the US Minister

in Amman. It is generally feared that his arrival in Jordan at this' point would precipitate a serious internal crisis, as his name is being utilized as a rallying point for forces hostile to the British

and the late King.

25X1

25X1A 5.

Egyptians continue to discuss relaxing of Suez Canal restrictions:


The Egyptian delegate to the UN has mentioned in private conversations the desire of his country to drop the Suez Canal restrictions if it obtained adequate strategic, political and economic "compensation." The Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs has again told the US Ambassador in titiro that Egypt could relax the restrictions considerably but could not abolish them.

25X1A

Comment: One means of "compensation" that the Egyptians have suggested is the evacuation by Israel of the southern part of Palestine adjacent to the Gulf of Aqaba, where Israel has been planning to build a port. A guarantee that Israel would not use for aggressive purposes any of the oil Oat might transit the _ Suez Canal to the refinery at Haifa has also been mentioned. Neither. . of these proposals would be satisfactory to Israel. The Egyptians are searching for some face-saving formula, but to date they have only hinted at their willingness to remove the restrictions.
- 5 -

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25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300260001-9

5X1A
Approved For elease 2004108/03 : CIA-RDP79100975A00030026 001-9

25X1A'

25X1A

t Ouestion of Germanv4s-political status maV.delay defense contributtom:


to consider the problems intolved in the creation of a new political status, for Germany until after a decision was reached on'a German military contribution, according to the political Advisor to the French.Righ ComMissioner in Bonn. The French expect that
The. French Government had not expeCted

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WESTERN EUROPE

25X1A

Approved For Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300260001-9

A?task4I For Release 2004108/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300260001-9

the German contribution to Western 'defense will be determined by early fall, thus permitting a decision (on contractual relations with the Germans by the end of the year.

out, however, that it is essential to reach definitive political conclusions on Germany at the prospective meeting of US, UK and French Foreign Ministers in September and at the forthcoming NATO
Council meeting.

High Commissioner McCloyihas pointed

25X1A

8.

French consider cut-back in defense program:

French officiars are Increasingly skeptical of the fruitfulness of the current NATO hearings on sharing the defense burden and consequently believe French defense plans must be either cut back or programmed over a longer period. Any slow-down would affect production plans rather than French commitments regarding Indochina bases, or manpower. These officials claim that none of the other NATO countries is undertaking awkdditional defense effort involving any real risk to its economy, and that therefore France is assuming a disproportionately large burden.

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25X1A

Comment: The Germans are strongly opposed to concluding military agreements until they know fairly definitely what changes in their political status are proposed. Agree. ment ceuld be reached on the military question prior to the conelusion of contractual agreements given a firm Allied declaration of intentions in regard to Germany's political status. The French Government seems increasingly convinced of German good faith with respect to the European Army, and can be expepted to favor rapid agreement on political rights without, however, consenting to a restoration of complete sovereignty until the conclusion of a peace treaty.

Approved For Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300260001-9

ApX416., Release 2004108103 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300260001-9

multilateral NATO approach to rearmament planning, including detailed figures on US assistance; they have consented to continue bilateral talks with the US only because no arrangements for multilateral discussions have been made.

The French still strongly prefer a

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25X1A

Comment; Growing inflationary pressures in France, which the prospective weak coalition government is not likely to control, threaten the fairly ambitious French defense program. The last government warned the US that France would be unable to fulfill its ephimitments in Indochina and Western Europe without fuller cooperition from all the NATO countrieS. Both the US Embassy and the ECA Mission in Paris recently deplored the "serious misunderstandings" between the US and French administrations, which had already resulted in a "sharp deterioration" of the mutual confidence necessary for obtaining the desired level and effectiveness of French defense strength.

Approved For Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300260001-9

25X1A

Approved tor Reler 20T0R: 0ISECRE7TA008.8027pO


--

1-8
L.:

29 Itily 1951

Copy No.C./-

25X1

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN


DOCUMENT NO

Vt
REVIEWER

Ed

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. y
DECLASSIFIED

CLASS, CHANGED TO: TS S 5001


NEXT REVIEW DATE.

AUT./111i
DAT
.

25X1
25X1

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


25X1

State Department review completed

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003111/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300270001-8

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Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00030( 270001-8

25X1A

SUMMARY

GENERAL

I. Comment on Italian Government's position on Japanese peace treaty


(page 3).
2.

bage
3.

Increase in Costa Rican ship registry linked with Far East trade
FAR EAST

US Political Adviser warns against unequal treatment for Japanese at San Francisco (page 4). 4. Rhee may dissociate South Korea from Kaesong negotiations (page 4).

2 5X1

EASTERN EUROPE

7.

Popovic reluctant to reveal Yugoslav military strength

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25X1A

2 5X1

25X1A

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300270001-8

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25X1A

GENERAL...
1.

Comment on Italian Government's position on Japanese neace treaty.

25X1A
2.

Ifissegue in enetailiralanin rezistrv linked with Far East trade:


Ship registrations under the Costa Rican flag have increased considerably in `the past few months, according to the US Embassy in San Jose. regulations attractive to foreign 1 ship owners are given as the cause.Loose One ship has been reported en route from Bremen to pick up Middle East oil for Vladivostok. Local Costa Rican officials believe that, since Costa Rica is still at war with Germany, touching at a German port could be used as grounds for the withdrawal of registry.
Comment: Approximately 19 ships are now registered under the Costa Rican flag, about double the number registered one year ago. At least five of the larger ships have carried cargo to the

25X1A

25X1A

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The Italian Government is favorably considering the acceptance at theNS-UK-French offer to assist in the negotiation of a bilateral treaty with' aliTiap,; even though the Foreign Office has formally protested Italy's exclusion from the multilateratJapanese peace conference and is reportedly, much concerned over the effect of the exclusion on Italian public opinion. The Foreign Office reaction is probably due to the government's awareness that it must initially take a strong position on the issue, primarily in order to maintait_prestige at home.
;.

25X1

-3-

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300270001-8

Approved Fo r Release 2003/11104 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300 270001-8

25X1A

Far. East in recent months, and one of these (the tanker Aster) is currently under Soviet charter for trade between Vladivostok and Communist China. In view of _Costa Rica's traditional willingness to cooperate with the US, there is every reason to expect that it would respond to US requests for tighter control of ship registry.

FAH EAST
25X1A
3

The Political Adviser also believes that such a procedure would be inconsistent with the announced conciliatory spirit of the treaty and with recent Occupation concepts; moreover, it would run the risk of rekindling the dormant desire of some nations to perpetuate the victor-vanquished relationship. He also feels that any unequal treatment for Japan would be resented by other Asian nations, and should the US become a party to any such concept of superiority, it might Jeopardize the future of the entlie US security program in the Far East.
25X1A 4. Rhee may dissociate South Korea from Kaesong negotiations:

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As the result of a conversation with President Rhee the US Ambassador in Pusan believes it will be most difficult during the course of the Kaesong conference to keep Rhee from publicly disassociating himself from the negotiations or from indicating he is being forced to "go along."
25X1A

The US Political Adviser in Tokyo, with the concurrence of..General.Ridgwayi advises against, any procedure which would exclude the. Japanese.delegation from the opening sessions of the San Francisco peace .conference until invited to participate by . a resolution of tba viatoenations.- Repaints out that. in.the light of past experience, the Japanese will be sensitive and tense, suippeting that any real or imagined discriminatory treatment is designed to stigmatize them- as inferiors.

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP79100975A000300270001-8

US Political Adviser warns against unequal treatment for Japanese at San Franciscq:

Approved Fo r Release 2003111/04 : CIA-RDP79100975A0003 30270001-8

25X1A

Ilhee feels he cannot publicly do anything which would give the impression that he accepts the partition of Korea. Now that the Kaesong conference agenda has been agreed upon and tit possibility of an armistice exists, Rhee is infnxiated by ROK participation, which implies his approval of any agreements reached. Rhee's present instructions to the ROK representative are to attend "for the time being
only. "
25X1

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-5
25X1A
Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300270001-8

'Approved For Release 2003/11104 : CIA-R0P79100975A00030 270001-8

25X1

25X1A

7. Popovic reluctant to reveal Yugoslav military strength:

25X1A

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EASTERN EUROPE

Yugoslav officials have initially refused to answer an ECA questionnaire which would reveal the extent of Yugoslavia's military

-625X1A

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Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP791-00975A00030C 270001-8

25X1A

expenditures, -the strength of its armed forces and other military infor.

mations...Chief of .Staff ,Popovic, .in discussing the. matter with Ambassador Allen, ,promised to report the .inquiry. to Tito and.Kardelli.-but.expressed the personal opinion. that. the information requested was.notoosunensurate with the..amount of aid granted or assured.. Popovic could not understand why ECA, a civilian agency, needed. the information and felt that Yugoslav determination to use the aid in the common cause against Soviet aggression should be sufficient assurance to. the US.

25X1A

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comment; Despite its increasing reliance on Western economic and military assistance, Yugoslavia has been reluctant to join any Western-sponsored economic or military orgaeization. For internal political reasons the regime probably considers it expedient to maintain an independent posttion and to continue its program of developing an independent Socialist state.

25X1A

Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP79700975A000300270001-8

In view of the extreine Yugoslav sensitiveness regarding military information, Ambassador Allen suggests that the US should exercise patience and make the questionnaire as mild as possible in the beginning.

25X1

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Approved For Release 2003111/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000300270001-8

HR70-14

TsoP SECRET SUEll.d,


OP SECRE
SUEDE
,

NR

Urpt "Bit

6 taesong &esong negotiations.Aere negotiations them has has been a gradual n traffic traffic a.the been.a gradual &orreasa &crease i in volume Qn a l l North Korean conmumications n&mrks, While the ncstworb are

ItOREA. Traffio decline decline nated rwtecj IQ I North w KOREA. Traffic on Nbrth Korean Korean network& networks.' Since Since the the b bStinning

. . . . Comment: This gradual dedline decline may be explained explained by the deerease? n ccmaw Gement: This gradual maybe hvrthe decrease i in bat o m n during B during t h corresponding e corresponding periodo,During During this this period pariod of bat oFiarns the period. of dedecreased t r a f f i c thoro creased traffic there has has been been no no relaxation relaxation of of %ranaaisaion transmission security security which which might haw originated o r i g i n a t g d normally nowally in in a a belief t h a t the end of was might-have belief'that the end of %he the conflict conflict was On the the contrary, contrary, a a high has been i n sight.' sight. On in high dogree degree of of socvrity securtty effectiveness effecttveness has been n addition addition to $0 these securiy p r e a a d i m , cryptographic aryptographic systems systems maintainedo I maintained. In these security precautions have on a l l notworks h i s period. period. have beon been changed changed on all networks except except the the police police during during tthis

volums-pn all North Korean communications networks, lhile the networks are @ti-, the the average average number number of-messages-passed of messages assed ciPAly daily h&S active, has dropped &sipped approximately approximately 30 cente (SUEDE (SUEDE KC/IXBdis 28 Ju1 Jul 51) 30 per per cent. KC/TIB,S, 28

&)

I
I

The abovo factors, factars, while while inconclUsive, inconclusive, indicate, indiaate frm communications The above fram a a communications that (a) (a) the t h e Communists ConmnurLaCs are are in e t a t s o f madiness standpoint that standpoint in a a state of readiness for for any emsemer@nay (b) this readiness may may peint $oink to to a a CommUnist Communist belief onflict gency and and (b) thiereadiness belief that that the the c conflict w l l l not not terminate tnrplinate with the truce hwcs talksO will with the talks.

aw

. _

NR NR

-flep-sBefep-LJUEDE--

31 ity i751
.1)D

m
55

APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE.20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-2010 ATE: IDPPROVED

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. .
-.

HR70-14 HR70-14
*

Dud SECRET SUED:bel


SECTION 2 (EASTERN) (EASTERN) SECTION 2

/NR

PPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 18-Mar-2010 C)ATE: 18-Mar-2010 IPPROVED


.

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North Koreans .augmenting front line l i n e artillery: artillgry: Mountain MQuntain artillery &illary North Koreans augmenting front and equiped in Man& u r i a h a m reached the North Korean trqined Zing trained and equiped in Manchuria have reached the North Korean 1 T Corps, Corps, units (possib7y of battalion strength) according to to a a recent recent intercept. intercept. These according These units (possibly of battalion strength)
IcOTIpIA, KOREA.
2 2

TOP SECRET SUEDE


I.

. .. .

T6.4" SECRET SUED13,/


have been beon attached attached to t o each each of of the t h e divisions divisionssubordinate subordinateto t othat t h a tCorps Corpsds.. dehave 837, ployed defensively defensive1 on on the the UN U N forces' forces' northwest n o r t h s t flank. flank. (SUEDE played (SUEBB TIK TIK 837,
29 Jul. JUl 5 51; Jn1.51) 1 ; . TIW . M2641 2h[, 31 31 Jul 51)
r .

. .

' Comment: indicated that t h a t each each of of the the front front line line COMmentt. Previous'interc^epts Previous intercepts indicated NorthCorpswas was to t obe be augmented augmentedby by pack pack artillery a r t i l l e r y unitS units whose whose addiaddiNorth7RUnig Corps t i o n a l ffire i r e power o tthe h e enemy'e capabilitional. power and and mobilitywould mobility would add add tto enemy's offeneive offensive capabiltBased on on the the ties, particUlarly particularly in i n the the eastern eastern sector's sector's rugged rugged terrain. terrain. Based ties, latest reported reported locations, .1Julydestined latest locations: the the unlfs units which which left left SlSaiju Sinuijuon onI alyidestined for the the II, 1 1 , III, 1 1 1 , and and V n the r e not o for V Corps Corps i in the eastern eastern sector, sector, a are not expected expected tto affect the timing timing of of hostile hostile offensive offensive operations, operations, if i f such such are are planned. planned. The affeCt the The addition of of new new units units and and equipment equipment is i s in I nline line with with thegradual the gradual buil&w of of addition build...up North forces which has been going on on in i n Manchuria Manchuria and and Korea Korea With with Soviet Soviet North Korean Kerean forces which has been going assistance since the the near near collapse collapse of of these these units units after after the the Inchon Inchon landing. landing. assistance since

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1 August 1951

CIA No. 49291

39

DAILY DIGEST

This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the preliminary views of the Office of Current Intelligence. Marginal letter indications are defined as follows:

DOS AND DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File

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"A" - items indicating Soviet-Communist intentions or capabilities "B" - important regional developments not necessarily related to Soviet/Communist intentions "C" - other information indicating trends and potential developments

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECTION 1 (SOV/ET)

*BP WAO;

:OiUtoerietion ofinremertg. Sattiarch.Alexandros of Antioch arrived in MoscoW-on 20 july avowedly to discumscompensation for confiscated chmrch 'Icroperty. The Soviet Union is apparently aeeking to delay any decision mn CoMpensation in order to influence the Patriarch. Meanwhile it is

gistathsbauUstitaLomatax-iiatialtsaa

taking propaganda advantage of his visits am= played up his approval


of-the SteckhoIM Appeal, and the US Ebbassy.in Moseowoonsiders that mont WO will be made of his peace pact support in propaganda to the Near East. (C Monody 150, 27 July 51),
CommentS The UM:Rye stepped-up efforts to utilize the Near East OrthodoXChuroh as a means of spreading Soviet influence and power in that area hate been noted for over a year, but the USSR has apparently not yet suebeeded.in achieving control of any group. Mbst Orthodox Near East coMmunities appear to oppose Communism and view Soviet activities,with suspicion, with the possible exception of the Patriarch of Antioch. Act6rd4ng to seyeral seurces, however, he actuAly travelled to Mbscow to aeek compen. satioMfer the loss of revenue. The Archbishop of Istanbul, firmly anti.CoMmuniat-abd believed to be a top figure in the Near East Orthodoxbier.; arehy, recently assured US officials that Antioch would not sstray from the fold."

"B"


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memoreting Navy Nay, Major General.Korniyenko recalled what he termed the rich revolutiOnarY tradition of the Russian Nov. According to him, from the very beginning of the October revolution.Rtssian sailors were counted among its Shock detachments.

Thal-staatkaRalitglabit.PEL.9.229katigne

In a lecture comp-

'

General Rorniyenko also ahlicathat no other navy in the world has made such great contributions to the development of science and oulture. He cited as exaMples the 85 expeditions undertaken in the Pacific alone fring the last half the eighteenth century, and asserted that bore than 30,000 kilometers of Arctic and Pacific cosatline, islands 'and archipeligees, a "considerable" part of the American continent's coast, and many areas of ASia Africa ost the Antarctic continents were discovered,. ,surveyed and described by Russiai navigators.. (R FBIS, 30 July 51)e
Comments. The recent appointment of Vice Admiral. Ruznetsov as Naval Ministerp'slong with the new emphasis on the real and imagined contributions ,pf the Rusdian Navy, indicates the increasing importance the USSR now .*btaches to the navy.

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."410

The Embassy.in Moscow . by.the Quaker delegation cetsiders that thflordial treatment received seriousness to their visit. ftom the UK showa that the Soviets attached some non-official delegation has Such attention to a Western, non-Communist, Second-hand reports been unprecedented since the immediate postwar years,. Indicate that the Quakers were impressed by Soviet reasonableness in dimcuseing the toseibiiities ofreconciling East.:West difficulties.- The Quakers blamed-the West for intransigence at Paris and felt.that advantage should now be taken of the present change in Soviet tactics, as exemplified by the Dew publication gm and by Mtlikgs talk with the Quakers, to disk. cuss current tensions with.the USSR,
er d

"BR

EASTERN-EUROPE 'BULGARIA', 'Industrialization fails to reach opal. In its report.:ofiAhe.sectind.Onetterof.1954.the.Bulgarien.State.Planning Campmission claims a considerable increase in industrial production, but admits that implementation of the overall plan failed by 2.4 per cent. The commission specifically criticizes the following organizations for their failure to readh plan gots in the fields listeds (a) the Ministry of Industry.-- steel, metal processing and agricultural madhinery;'(b) the electric power and metal processing; Ministry of Electrification (c) the Minietry of Supplies -- food and Chemical industries; and (d) the Central Cooperative Union -- food industry, With respect to certain compmodities BUlgarian industry failed to reach its goals by significant amounts, e.g., electric power (7.2 per cent), electric bulbs (20,2 per centl household utensils and china (13.8 per cent), shoes (33.2 per cent), cheese (11.9 percent) and meat (3.9 per cent). (R FBIS0 30 July 51).
. '

Commead In order to meet the industrial goals set by the Five Tear Plan, .Bulgarta needs considerable outside assistance in procuring machinery which the USSR is'either unable or unwilling to and skilled personnel The chiefs of the ministriees listed above and the Chief of the Thrnish. industrial division of the Central Cooperative Union have been sufficiently criticited by the regime during the past two'years to justify their purge. It is probable, however, that they continue to remain in office as perennial scapegoats for failures that the USSR cannot or will not remedy.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Prothresj Accordinito.a 284uly dcamunique of the.Czechoslovak State Plexutuag Office', the increased goals of thetive4ear Plan have been fulfilbd for the first half of 1951.. Industry as a whole exceeded its targets by

"EP

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The embasey comments that the visit was successful from the Soviet viewpoint and that the gremlin incidentally gained .good advice on how to Make ita propaganda more convincing to the West,. The enhassy noted that the QUakers, Convinced as they are that good cannot result from force, will not see the relationibetween any current change in Soviet attitude and UN military success in Korea. (C Moscow 158, 28 July 51),

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1:3 per cent, and its volume of production rose by 12.5 per cent coMpared with the corresponding period of 1950. The various sectors of industry over-ftlfilled the plan during this period at followsi heavy industry, 100.7 Per cent; light industry, 102.6 per cent; food industry 1003 per cent. The heavy engineering industrYs despite a reported rise in the volume of prodUction over 1950, did not fUlfill its pIan, Shortages Of raw materials, especially non,ferrous metals and rolled steel, as well as poor management, were cited as corps tributing causes. In conparisOn with the first half of 1950$ coal production increased 5.5 per dent, The production of lignite arid coke surpassed the planned iluotae, but that Of hard coal did not. The production plan for electricity also was not
'

Despite the impressive figures representing general ful of engineering productioni hard coal production and electricitY output to meet planned goals means that Czechoslovakia is not meeting the increased Soviet demands for heavy industrial products, The State Planning Office's admission that a shortage of non-ferroun metals exists does not jibe with the eulogisticamments about Soviet aid, but does correspond to known Czech efforts to obtain these very materials clandestinely from the West. Some of the failures can be attributed to increasing labor discontent, increased absenteeiam and aporadic paseive economic sabotage.
fillment$ :the

RUMANIA.


Comments

The communique reports that the volume of Czechoslovak foreign trade during the period was 30.1 per cent greater than in the first half of 1950. The Soviet Orbit's share of this trade rose to 56.8 per cent of the total, ae against 52 per dent in 1950. The communique eulogized the aid of the SoViet Union in providing Czechoslovakia with grain, industrial raw materials, machinery, and food, (R MS, 30 July 51).

failure

GaVernMent Wade u'.l2,...I.,_fSs'_frsat,tpu"tl-fieatel'ieznrua.

fulfilled.

The

attestOf "an iMportant number of spies and.provocateurs..employed by the Yugoslav Security Police" in the interest of the American espionage service" has been- announced by the Rumanian Government. The accused were allegedly instructed to propagate chauvinism among the ranks of the SerMan population in the Banat region on the Yugoslav borderi to agitate for the union Of the Rumanian Banat with Yugoslavia, and to penetrate the ranks of Yugoslav einigres in Rumania. Rumania ftrther charges that many of the accused.have relatives in the Banat whom they were sent in to incite. (B PHIS, 30 JulY 51)0

Comment,s This is the first group of alleged Yugoslav agents slated for public trial in Rumania during the past year. Undoubtedly resulting

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from'strong Western reaction to Rumania's eviction.ofthousands.of,Banat residertir (see 0/01 Daily Digests, 25 and 27 June, 17 July 51)0he announeement of the arrests sets the stage for the usual Communist props, genie campaign to justify police state measurds.
"Bo

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Comment: This report points up the frequent disparity in Yugoslav stateMents.. In.his Titograd speech on 13 July Tito declared that the border situation was becoming worse, and more recently Yugoslav leaders expressed some concern that Molotov's Warsaw speech might be the prelude to Satellite aggression against YUgoslavia. There is-no evidence that border incidents have become more frequent or serious, and available lAtelligence appears to support Mtola's statement.

4
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YUGOSLAVIAI-Intellicence Chief exrects no Satellite attack in .!Mmediate fUture. :IUgOsIavia-does.not expedfl.Soviet.Satellite.attackin the_ !mediate lfttre, accOtding to Admiral Manola, the Yugoslav Deputy Chief of Staff and reportedly also the Chief of Intelligence. In a conversation with the US Military Attache on 24 July, Mamie stated that border incidents remained oh a small scale and the only indication of danger was an uncon firmed report of.a pontoon bridge installed over the Danube on, the RumanianBulgarian border. The US Military Attache reports that Yugoslav military activities are completely normal; it is his impreasion that Yugoslav leaders are basically unconcerned over the possibility of a general war.

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

"C".

SYRIA. Cabinet resigns: Prime Minister Kalid al-Azm and his cabinet have tendered their resignations to thetPresident of Syria. One of the first ministers to resign was a "Hawrani man," indicating, in the view of the US Minister, a deliherate move by Hawrani.and the army to bring about the fall of the Cabinet.; Although Azm might be asked to form another government, Maruf Dawalibi has been mentioned hy many as a.likely successor. Any government headed by Dawalihi would include some Populists Who would permit Parliament to continue with its work. (1 FBID Brazzaville, 30 Jul 51; C Damascus 55, 30 Jul 51). Comment: This report indicates that Colonel Shishakli, the Chief of Staff, continues to be the real power in Syria. Akrim Hawrani, leader of the Arab Socialist Party-and a recent critic of the government, is his close friend. Although a coalition government containing some members ofthe Populist Party - currently in opposition - might be able to progress with the business of government, Mere Dawalibi, who has stated that Syria should ally with the USSR rather than with the US, would as prime minister foster antiAlestern sentiment n Syria.

"B"

Commission to attempt to obtain oil direct from Iran: The project manager for Morrisorktudson AfghanistanJa US construction firm) has been told by the Acting Prime Minister of Afghanistan that a commission headed by the Afghan Minister of Mines Will proceed shortly to Iran to attempt to arrange for oil shipments directly from Iran to Afghanistan. MorrisonKnudsen Afghanistan has been asked to investigate the feasibility of sending Afghan tank trucks to the Iranian border if the Iranians are able to deliver oil products there. Such an arrangement would eliminate present transshipment through Pakistani territory. (C Kabulal, 27 Jul 51).
Comment: Sihce Iranle oil storage facilities are full and its export outlets by sea are closed, Iran probably will welcome the Afghan suggestion. However, difficulties likely to be encountered in diverting Iranian oil carriers from their present internal distribution duties may-prevent effective implementation of any agreement reached by the two countries.

AFGHANISTAN.

..

"B"

BURMA. Situa.tion in dentral Nina deterioratingi A US Embaesy officer who recently spent a week in Mandalay reports that the town is virtually surrounded by Communist insurgents and that attacks on communication facilities have increased in number and intensity. Although there is much speculation that the well-armed insurgents are being suppliethfrom China; the Communists are also receiving arms through sales from government forces. There are no indications that the government is taking steps to halt the deterioration of law and order in the area, and the army apparently is unable to do more than defend the towns,,leaving the initiative in the hands of the Communists. (3 Rangoon 115, 27 Jul 51).

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Comment: The situation in central Burma has obviously taken a turn for the worse. Little improvement can be expected so long as friction between C-in-C Ne Win and the Socialists continues and the reportedly alarming deterioration of morale is unchecked. The Communists can look forward to increasing Chinese encouragement and suPport.
193"

HURMA/CHINA. Communist-KUT forces clash in Yunnan: Chinese Communist and Nationalist units have been engaged in heavy but indecisive fighting in southwest Yunnan, according to a spokesman of the Burmese War Office, One highly reliable report mentioned the disarming of a battalion of Chinese Communist troops in Mangshih after the defection of 200 of its members to the KO forces. (S Rangoon 115, 27 Jul 51).
Comment: This report appears to be overly optimistic regarding EMT successes. Reliable evidence indicates that the KMT forces have suffered severe defeats at the hands of the Chinese Communists and have retreated into Burma.

.,"B"

INDOCHINA. French considering repatriation of Chinese Nationalist internees in Indochina: The French Foreign Office appears to have receded from its former opposition to the repatriation to Formosa of Chinese Nationalist troops interned in Indochina, according to the Chinese Nationalist Minister in Paris. .Although emphasizing that General De lattre and the next French cabinet must approve any such decision, a Foreign Office official hinted that it might be possible to repatriate a few groups and then await Chinese Communist reaction. (C Paris 652, 30 Jul 51).
Comment: The Chinese Nationalist Government has been attempting periodically during the past two years to obtain permission for the internees to leave Indochina for Formosa. The French, however, have firmly refused all requests, fearing that the proposed action might provide the Chinese,Comr munists with a pretext for intervening in Indochina.

This is the second report during the past week that the French position in this matter has been relaxed.
"B"

Vietnam to draft 60,000: The Vietnam Government supplemented its recently assumed authority to conscript doctors by issuing a decree' calling up a contingent of 60,000 ntentra two-month military instruction period. US Minister Heath describes the Vietnam.Governmentle series of mobilization measures beginning 15 July as "the key to De Lattre's policy" since the joint French-Vietnamese declaration of "total war" against the Viet Minh on 19 April. Heath does not believe there will be any great difficulty in drafting 60,000 men. (S Saigon 258, 30 Jul 51).

Comment: The fact that the mobilization measures represent "De Lattre's polidy," and will be executed by Vietnamese who have distinguished themselves by their loyalty to De Lattre rather then by their devotion to the cause of

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Vietnamese independence, will tend to limit the effectiveness of the mobilization policy. Previous French refusal to turn over,4,000 rifles to the hard-pressed Vietnamese regional security forces in North Vietnam contrasts with their apparent ability to arm 60,000 Vietnamese under the Francophile central government of Tran Van Huu.

French general and Vietnamese official slain. Thai Lap Thanh, Governor of South Vietnam, and General Charles Chanson, Commander of French Forces in South Vietnam, were killed by the grenade of a Viet Minh terrorist' in the province of Sadao, west of Saigon. (R Press TiCker Paris, 31 Jul 51).
Comment: This incident is a striking exception to the generally declining trend of terrorism in South Vietnam! a high ranking French officer has been killed hy It is the first time that a terrorist. Governer Thai Lap Thanh was, despite his title, a relatively uninfluential figure in the Vietnam administration.
"T"

Comment: Although it i8 true that the Indonesian Charge d'Affaires in Peiping issued visas to the Chinese, the Chinese Embassy in Djakarta made no effort to inform the Indonesian Foreign Office of the pending arriVal of additional staff members until three days before their ship docked. Even then the Embassy failed to provide names and positions. Indonesia, therefore, considers that the Chinese Government hao deliberately ignored diplomatic procedures, and to date has refused to reconsider its decision refusing entry to the 16 Chinese.
-

Comment: It is not clear what unions participated in the congress. A loose federation of the four Indonesian oil unions - the Oil Workers Committee 'for Joint Action - has been non-SOBSI, although one of the participating unions was a SOBSI affiliate and another was pro-SOBSI. It is probable that these two latter unions and possibly a third, having been unsuccessful in forcing the Committesvto join putsI; have formed their own'organization and have established connections with the Communist federation.

INDONESIA. Oil workers' trade unions decide to affiliate with SOBS'. A congreas of oil trade unions decided on 27 July to affiliate with Communistdominated SOBSI0 Indonesia's largest trade union federation, (R FBID Ticker Djakarta, 29 JUl 51).

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7

INDONESIA/CHINA. Communist China claims Indonesia violated international ractice: A Peiping release by the New China News Agency on 25 July states that doneeials refuaal to admit 16 new staff members of the Chinese Embassy in Djakarta is contrary to international practice. The release claims that all sixteen had obtained entryvisas from the Indonesian Embassy in China. The Chinese Government has expreseed deep regret over the affair and is taking up the matter with the Indonesian Government. (U Hong Kong 388, 28 Jul 51).

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"C"

Hong Kong shipowner seeks reinstatement of Panamanian re,istry: The Hong Kong firm of Wallem & Co., Ltd., owner of the vessel Marion 00317 gross tons), has cabled its Calcutta agents that "we undertake never to trade with Chinese ports again during the present emergency." These assurances were given in order to regain Panamanian registry, cancelled after the vessel loaded cargo in Calcutta for Communist Chiha. In View of the owner'e aseurances, the US Consul General in Calcutta has no objection to restoretion of the vesiells Panamanian registry. (C Calcutta 86, 27 Jul 51).
CHINA.
.

Comment: Wellem & Co., Ltd., has a long record of dealing with the Chinese Communists. The company's assurances that the vessel will not again call at Chinese ports are probably designed merely to achieve restoration of the ship's papers, so that it may clear Calcutta. If the policy of the Panamanian government continues to hamper Wallem's dealings with Communist China, the company can transfer the vessel to other registry.
"A"

25X1C

25X1A

25X1C

Chinese Communists concerned over losses in Korea: the statement of Gen. Yeh Chien-ying; Chairman of the Kwangtung provincial government and Secretary of the CCP's South China Sub-Bureau, that China should "take advantage of the (Kaesong) Peace negotiations to preserve the core of the Axially," tnd that a continuation of the Korean conflict would have "catastrophie effects on the Chinese Communist forces.

25X1A

Comment: It is ironic that this same Gen. Yeh, severel months ago, publicly stated that it was international Communist strategy to employ the manpower resources of Asian 'liberation' movements to force the Western powers to engage in costly attritional warfare which the latter could not long afford. Chinese Communist casualties ih Korea are estimated to approach 600,000. Although intensiVe recruiting has restored Chinese Communist field forces to their pre-Korea numerical level of approximately 2,000,000, the Chinese have lost a significant proportion - possibly as high as 25 percent of their best-trained and best-indoctrinated troops.

Chiang Ching-kuo gains control of Nationalist press and propaganda: Chiang Ching-kuo, the Generalissimo's eldcr son, -reportedly became dissatisfied with the efforts of Nationalist press and propaganda spokesman, Tao Hsishing during the current anti-American campaign.

25X1A

He charged that Tao failed to carry out the Generalissimo's wishes and that his subordinates did not denounce the Americans strongly enough. Tao offered his resignation, and it was accepted promptly. Chiang Ching-kuo's immediate subordinate in the political bureau was appointed to replace him.

Comment: This is anotherindication of Chiang Ching-kuo's antiAmerican attitude and his growing strength within the Nationalist government.

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"B"

Chinese Nationalists react to US memoranda on aid controls. Chiang Kai-shek was "considerably upset" by the Department of State memoranda requesting effective supervision.and control of US aid. The memoranda, after some delay, were sent to the cabinet by Chiang on 27 July. Meanwhile, on 25 July the cabinet learned of the US memoranda and held a secret meeting at which Chiang Ching -kuo, the Generalissimo's elder son,opposed the US recommendations. Foreign Minister George Yeh, heretofore considered pro-US, stated, "the, US is forcing the Nationalists to the edge of surrender." This stand obviously was taken in an attempt to regain the Generalissimo!s favor, since the Foreign Minister has been blamed for the.exclusion of the.Nationalists from the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty.

Among those favoring the US suggestions are Premier Chen Cheng and the Governor of Formosa, K. C. Wu. Chang Chun, a former premier and close associate,of 'the Generalissimo, was entrusted with the job of making him realize the consequences of losing US aid. Chang Chun will also attempt to convince the Generalissimo that the anti-American campaign begun over the the exclusion of the Nationalists from the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty should not be overdone and might result in the replacing of the present US Embassy staff by others less sympathetic.
1 I

25X1A

25X1A

Comment: Despite the realization that American aid is essential to their existence, the Chinese Nationaliats apparently are determined to advance their contention that US controls would be an infringement of the sovereignty of a free nation.

If the US remains firm, the Nationalists will be forced to yield to the controls requested. They will, nevertheless, make every effort to free themselves of US supervision.

25X1C

"B"

Non-Communists In the Peinaisillusionedil:


I members of non -Commmnist

25X1C

25X1A

,parties invited to join the "coalition" government set up by the Chinese Communist Party (qcP) in the.fall of 1949 are "very disillusioned with their lot." lhese persons feel that no non-Communist is informed of major decisions before they becoze public, that none occupies an important office, and that they have little authority in the posts they do hold. Further, non-Communist officials receive less real pay than their Communist colleagues and are subject to more severe punishment for malfeasance. Finally, nonCommunist officials must unconditionally obey their Communist superiors, cannot express themselves as nan the Communists, and are regarded by the Communists as inferior beings. The consensus is that non -CoMmunist officials "have become slaves" and that their parties "are only puppets" of the CCP.

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"C".

general been confirmed hy all sources and Comment: This account has in puppet parties and their members. is a good summary of the status of the has ordered all Chinese New blow at US missions. The Peiping regime (to) sever xelations" Christian churches and organizations "immediately supported by US funds, and has with American missions and other missions their activities in China." further ordered "all such missions (to) cease of all US missionaries The decree of 27 July provides for the departure reflme or are accused of crimes other than those who are still useful to the (1/ FBID Peiping, 30 Jul 51 ). against the regime.
frank campaign to eliminate US Comment: This step in Peiping's groups into puppets influence from China and to transform Chinese religious It has long been apparent to most of the regime.has been anticipated. Missionaries missionaries that they Wad no future in Communist China. natianals now imprisoned in comprise the majority Of the 25 to 30 US Communist China, and other arrests are expected.

"C"

present level: A Communists plan to continue aid to Indochina,at Republic of Vietnam decision to withhold Overt support from the Democratic reportedly made (DRV), but to continue the "secret infiltration" policy was nay representatives in at a 28 to 30 June meeting of Chinese, Soviet and (a) at this conference include: Canton. Other plans allegedly reached in the border area, the use, if necessary, of Chinese troops concentrated to be infiltrated by the two regiments at one time, up to a maximum of doubling, if necessary, "old method" - i.e., use of DRV uniforms; (b) the with the DRV forces; of the number of Chinese and Soviet advisors on duty China of 1.000 tons each and (e) the designation by the Soviet Union and of supplies permonth to the DRV ther transmitted e For critical security reasons this report is not to United States, withbeyond the borders of the within the United States, or out the express permission of the releasing office).

25X1A 25X1A

have been reported frequently -Comment: Conferences of this nature of the decisions allegedly taken has since November, but no confirmation to enlarge their present aii been received. The Communist potential points is generally conprogram by impleMenting any or all of the above complete road and rail contacts :ceded. Recently intensified efforts.to increased in the near future. with Indochina indicates that such aid may be with USSRIs role in Korean war. A "C" KOREA. Communist troops dissatisfied reveals that several mid-June psychological warfare summary from Korea among Communist which indicate dissatisfaction reports have been reoeived SoViet troops over the Soviet role in Korea. This discontent centers on support for COmmunist failuteAO -Li)._ send much-propagandized material sent to Korea on offensives, and (b) support Chinese Communist troops, (S Psychological Warfare Operations, Soviet orders, with Russian troops.

13-19 Jun 51).


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Comment: While the evidence is inconclusive, any awakening among Communist troops to the actual Soviet position in Korea would be significant.

South Korea wants foreign troops to stay a years The BOK pirector of Public Information announced'on 30 July that South Korea will require foreign troops for defense and, to train ROK forces. He estimates that it will be a year before the South Koreans will be in aTosition to defend themselves. (iR FBID Ticker Reuters, 30 Jul 51).
Comment: This expression of need for external military assistance stands out in sharp contrast to recent bombastic statements of several ranking South Korean officials, including President Rhee. The general tenor of those remarks was that the South Koreans could gcron to the Yalu alone if , necessary.

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SECTION 3

(NESTERS)

"A"

WESTERN EUROPE. Western European Communists coordinate efforta towardslabor agitation. ND members of the Italian Communist PartyDirectorate are expected to meet with French Communist leaders in Paris during Menet to.coordinate a large-scale program for a peace propaganda campaign and labor agitation in both countries in September,

Comment: Such plans would be consistent with known Communist intentions to exploit rising living, costs in order to sabotage the Western-defense effort. Should the Communists stress labor's economic grievances, as they did With considerable success in France last spring, they would have a good chance of totching off a sorioup wave of strikes.
In the past two years) however, Communist efforts to foment port strikes inWestern Europe for ideological reanons have generally failed, 'and the current intensity of shipping activity in France and the Benelux yountries further reduces the Communists' appeal to the dockers. Despite considerable unemployment in Italian ports, the Communists have also been unable to win significant support for politically motivated strikes.

"AN

FRANCE-ITALY. Prominent Communists visit USSR and Satellites. Jacques buclos, Acting Secretary General of the French Communist Party (PCF), is reported to be on "vacation", possibly in the USSR visiting Maurice Therez. During his absence, Francois Billoux, PCF politburo member, will direct Communist activities. The Secretary General of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), Pahairo Togliatti, is also reported to be planning an early trip to the USSR. Other prominent Italian Communists have recently.left Italy for Central Europe Trith Prague as a possible destination.

25X1A

French and Italian Communist port workers reportedZy met recentlY in Marseille to plan strikes and sabotage for the entire Mediterranean baein at an unspecified time. Communist seamen and dockere are also reported to have met in Amhterdam on 3 July to schedule-a "big offensive" for early-fall in ail Northern European ports.
1

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

CommAt Inasmuch as an official Cominform meeting is reportedly scheduled for the near future, both Duclos and Togliatti mgy have been asked to present official.reports on Communist activities.- Duclos' absence from recent sessions of the National Assembly previously led to the assumption that he had gone to the USSR.

"B"

SWITZERLAND. Eiport controls to be effected largely through "gentlemah's agreement". The -Smiss Government's position on export controls, which Wall

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be communicated to the 1 August meeting of the Coordinating Committee's control group, is as follows: (1) The government will put into effect early in August measures agreed upon recently in Bern by the US and the Swiss, such measures to be retroactive to 25 June. (2) The government cannot compel cancellation of old Azontracts, but in practice many companies will cancel or delay execution.

(S Bern 163, 30 JulY 51)

Comment: The government's admission that it cannot in general bring pressure to bear oh Swiss industry is in line with the laissez-faire policy .dominating the Swiss economy. Gentleman's agreements mill not prevent many Swiss industrialiets from acting in accordance with their own interests, even if the East is benefitted thereby,

"C" SPAM UK rajects Madrid note on US-Spanish defense talks.

The British F3Fagn Office has officially rejected- the Spanish note of 21 July which complained about UK-"meddling with SpaniSh Sovereignty" in the matter of US-Spanish mutual defense talks. The Spanish Atbassador in London accepted the British Foreign Secretary's oral rejection which was couched in "mild terms" in preference to a more caustic written answer drafted by the Foreign Office, (S London 593, 30 Atli 51)

ComMent: The Spanish note reflects the Madrid governmentis bitterness at UK Objections to a spenish-US agreement upon which Franco is pinning his hopee for surviVel. The controlled Spanish press has redently adopted a ptern attitude toward critics of US-Spanish defense talks, and asserts that it is a-sign of weakness to appease such "tools of the Kremlin" as the Sacialiet governments of Europe. The newspapers present Spain's willingness to cooperate-in Western defense as a recognition of its responsibilities for pretecting Civilization and peace and they label the British and French governments as unreliable mercenaries.

"B"
.
.

DENMARK-SWEDEN. Suggest Hague Court ruling on Soviet claketd territorial waters. The Danish and Swedish ambassadors at Moscow submitted notes to the Soviet Foreign Offide on 18 July suggesting that Denmark, Sweden, and the USSR agree to submit to the International Court at The Hague the question of whether the Soviet Union is entitled by

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(3), The government cannot make a commitment in situations where Eastern and Western buyers are competing, but Swiss industry has a gentleman's Agreement to give priority to Western orders.

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international law to exercise jurisdiction over territorial waters extending 12 nautical miles off its Baltic Sea coasts. (U Copenhagen FDIS-Danish radio, 28 July 51)
Comment: Since 1946 Russian patrol boats have seized a number of Swedish and Danish fishing vessels for allegedly violating the 12-mile demarcation of territorial waters. On 31 August 1950, the USSR rejected a joint Swedish-Danish protest and reiterated its contention that the delineation of territorial waters is the sole right of the littoral state. The Danes and Swedes have been unwilling to adopt any retaliatory measures, and in fact have advised their fishermen to remain safely distant from Soviet shores with the result that actual seizures have been much fewer this year. But they (particularly the Swedes) do not wish silently to acquiesce in the Soviet claim, which they therefore continue to-reject largely for the record.
."B"

Present countermeasures naW include Western refusal to approve the interzenal trade agreement, and a partial embargo on goods to east Germany. ,Mere stringent measuree have not been adopted because of French reluctance to provoke Soviet retaliation. A limited airlift with commercial planes has already begun to move the bilge backlog of Berlin exports bottled up by the Soviet refusal to let them move overland through east Germany. (S Frankfurt Unnumbered, 29 July 51, S Paris 612, 28 July 51)
Comment:

exports to sp6477giclusion of the interzonal trade agreement, which is not-only valuable in itself, but 'serves as a Cover for illegal trede. Failing in this purpose, the Soviets nevertheless observed that the restrictions could .play hob withWest Berlin's economy, a desirable result in the SoViet view. The Kremlin might mull be_willing to dontinue the restrictione

for some time, for though they would result in depriving the Soviet zone of same valuable West German goods, the damage inflicted upon the West Berlin economy Would be proportionately much greater. If, however, the West is able to Move West Berlin exports by commercial or military airlift, the Soviet restrictions would be stripped of their economic effect.

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GERMANY. Soviet Motive for Berlin trade restrictions. may have shifted. US officials in Berlin believe that the USSR, having imposed restrictions on Berlin exports for such limited objectiVes as speeding the conclusion of an interzonal trade agreement, say now 112.8 these restrictions for broader economic and political purposes. The officials foresee' a tenacious Soviet campaign to retain and develop these reetrictions (centering around ,the demand for certificates of Origin). The officials estimate that the USSR could withstand the present and proposed Allied economic counter Measures for another two months', and even longer, if Soviet Objectives were, on the whole, being served.

The USSR may have imposed the restrictions:on BerlinTs

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1141 PREVIOUS EOIPIONS.

OFFICk

26

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(40)

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1 August 1951

CIA No. 49291-A Copy No.

DAILY DIGEST

This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current not represent a complete coverage of all Intelligence. It does current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the preliminary views of the Office of Current Intelligence. Marginal letter indications are defined as follows:

- items indicating Soviet-Communist intentions or capabilities important regional developments not necessarily related to Soviet/Communist intentions "C" - other information indicating trends and potential developments
"B"

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Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECTION 1

(SOVIET)

"A"

USSR. Soviet "peaceful coexistence" policy considered likely. The US riiiMsy in London suggests the possibility that the USSR milL now seek

to re-enter a period of "peaceful coexietence during which it will attempt to increase its own strength while calcUlating that the West May be weakened by unpreparedness, complacency, or edonomic cilia's. :As reasons for shell a Kremlin choice, the embassy points to the USSR's provocation ofWestern rearmament, some other serious failures of Soviet policy over the past three Years, and the apparent Soviet unreadiness to challenge the West in a fullscale war.
Recalling the precedent of Soviet policies in the 1920's and 19301s, the embassy characterizes the coexistence policy as a middle road between a "genuine general retreat" and an imminent showdown with the West. The USSR may even, for the time being, refrain from further local aggressions 'oh the part of the Satellites, since the riek of thereby precipitating a general conflict may be greater than the USSR careth to incur. The embassy sPeculates that the "cautious" nature of Soviet policy has been upset in the Far East by the "revolutionary fervor" of the Chinese Communists but that the USSR can be more conciliatory in Europe because the Satellites are more malleable. In the embassy's opinion, a renewed attempt to achieve an Austrian Treaty Should be used to test the new Soviet protestations of a desire to cooperate. (S 5/8 London 562, 27 Jul 51)
Commerit: The only evidence of a Possible change in Soviet foreign policies, aside from a professed willingness to settle the Korean War, lies in the trade arid cultural fielde, but activities in these fields haVe not so far involved ariy real concessions on the Part .of the Soviet Government. They have coincided with a rather sharp shift in the propaganda line, apParentIy designed to persuade susceptible non-Communist governments that a costly Western alliance against the Soviet Union is no longer necessary.

"B" EOM: King unwillinito break off Anglo-Egyptian negotiatiohe. Ihe


,

Dritish Ambassador is to be informed,on King Farouk's orders, that. Salaheddin, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, had not been authorized to state that the Ahglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 would be denounced unless .there were tangible evidence.of progress in the negotiations by mid-August. The Egyptian Prime Minister has been informed of the King's opinion and is expected to respect it. The Royal Press Counselor is not disturbed by the possibility of Salaheddin's resignation from the Cabinet, which already has two vacancies, because he.feels that Salaheddin's following is overrated. (TS S/S Cairo 119, 28 July 51)
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Egypt's poor showing in the Palestine campaigns convinced Farouk of the necessity for AngloEgyptian defense cooperation. He has previously warned government officials against breaking off negotiations with the British. Specifically, he has informed Salaheddin that he would never be forgiven should he resign over this issue. present strength of Salaheddin's political following, Regardless of the should he resign from the government he would become the focal point for those forces opposed to continuing ties with the British.
SECTION 3
HD"

Comment:

(WESTIMN)

Comment: In June of this year Gruber hoped for agreement on the Austrian treaty at a Big Four meeting, and therefore regarded the deputies' sessions as unnecessary. (See OCI Daily Digest, 5 June 51,) Now, with no prospect of a Big Four meeting, Gruber has changed his attitude toward the efforts of the deputies.

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2

that the continuity of treaty efforts should not be interrupted altogether. Gruber does not feel that there is any present urgency for a meeting of the deputies, although he indicates that another attempt at a treaty could loom more important in the autumn, depending on developments of the next few weeks. Gruber considers that there is a general contact through the Council of Foreign utility in preserving fourpower Ministers or the deputies. (S S/S Vienna 362, 27 July 51)

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Gruber looks with favor upon reopening of treaty talks. Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber has welcomed US suggestion that negotiations be resumed on the Austrian treaty, asthe he considers it important

AUSTRIA.

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-TOP-SECilET SUEDE SUEDE

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m SUEDE? -TOP-SECRETSUEDe

....Cianmagnt;The Thearrival arrival, a of these. )vell as as these as, as,yell similar artillery, units of the other fhree Three frontline frontline Norm North s i m i l a rmountain, mountain artillery units for for each. each of ,Ko.rean Corps ..indicated,by. other intercepts, w will add.to tothe the emmyts enemVs offenKoreap corps, indicated,by other Intercepts, i l l add terrain.o oft the eastern. sector, sector. qiya capabilities,_particularly particularly in..the.,rugged La the rugged terrala f h @ emtern Aive capabilities, While the movement movement of ofthese these.artillery.units While the artillery unite alone alone is. is not expected sxpecbd to affect, affect the timing. t i m i n g of opmat.i&s, the the addition addition al o fnew new Units Units and, and equipof-y any offensive. .offensiveoperatifins, ment is i spart partof of the the gradual gradualbuild-up builddup of d North Korean forces forces with Soviet a@asststance over a period of several months.. sistance over a pericid, of several months.,

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2 August 1951 CIA No. 49292


Copy No.

iS

DAILY DIGEST

DIA, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECT/ON 1 (SOVIET)

USSR. Pravda prints article by British Foreign Secretary: As a result of a challenge last month by Herbert Morrison, Pravda printed in full end without alteration an article by the Foreign Secretary which highlighted the internal freedoms of domestic British life and briefly exThe article plained the Ulfle policy and aims in international relations.

was accompanied by a Soviet rebuttal that contradicted Morrison point by point. By agreement the rebuttal was published in full in Britain, appeering in more than twenty morning newspapers. (u NY Times, 1 Aug 51).
Comment: Pravda's unprecedented action may well be part of Moscowls new propaganda line and tactics apparently designed to soften Western anti-Soviet unity. At the same time, however, the publication of propaganda material criticizing the West has not diminished in amount or intensity. There hae still been no mention in Soviet media of President Truman's message of friendship from the American to the Russian people sent about a month ago.

The Soviet cruisers Two Soviet cruisers depart from Baltic area: Chapayev ami'Eheleznyakov were last reported in the Skagerrak early on 17 July after leavinglhe Baltic Sea. Although no further contact has been established, the Ships are believed enroute to the Northern area or possibly the Far East via the Northern Sea route. (S Navy D/D 143, 20 Jul 51).

At the recent plenary session Party limits ignore link with masses: of the Central Committee of the Byelorussian Communist Party, the Minsk Provincial Party Committee was "justly" criticized for ite lack of initiative and its inability to organize farmers and machine tractor station workers for the purpose of raising the province's agricultural output. Party units were once again warned to develop the "creative initiative" of the masses ahd to make the widest possible use of every laborsaving device. The meeting was reminded that a party worker whose link with the masses is "feeble" cannot successfully discharge the tasks en, trusted to him. As an example of this, the speaker cited the case of the Magnitogorsk Town Party Committee, which weakened its link with the primary party organizations by frequently ignoring the valuable initiative derived from below. While the party organization at the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Works was reported to have achieved excellent results in implementing the State Plan, the Town Party Committee was criticized for insvSficiently atudying and applying the "considerable" experience amassed by this organization. (R FBIS, 31 Jul 51),

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This is another example of the constant struggle of the Comment: Soviet Communist Party to increase agricultural production by attempting to overcome the apparently permanent sluggiehness of the disinterested agricultural worker.

EASTERN EUROPE, FINIAND, Formation of new cabinet postponed until The Finnish Government has confirmed reports that the forma, Septembers tion of a new Cabinet will not take place until after the Diet reconvenes in September. All parties except the Communists supported the decision to delay the Cabinet reshuffle, which has become necessary because of changes in party strength in the Diet ressilting from the national elee(R,Heleinki 61, 29 Jul 51). tione of 2 and 3 July.

The Diet recessed on 31 July. Postponement of the forma, Comment: tion of the new Cabinet was probably due in large part to the incumbent government's desire to complete ite study of new inflation control mea sures. This delay will also permit more time for inter-party discussions concerning the composition of the new Cabinet and the best means for continuing to keep the Communists out of the Cabinet.

PO/A311. 'Indictment of former Army officers lays emphasis on national deviations The indictment of nine former senior Polish Army officers on trial in Warsaw emphasizes their alleged efforts to create a "Titoist Fascist regimen in Poland and to a lesser extent their criminal, saversive and esnonage activities for the US and UK, The indictment accuses former Polish Communist Party Secretary Gomulka and ex-Minister of National Defense General Spychalski of protecting these officers. It also associates the defendants with other Polish national elements, in, eluding former Socialists, the Mikolajczyk Peasant Party and the wartime partisans who have been brought to trial in recent years.
,

The US Embassy in Moscow reports that the Soviet press has given the indictment a build-up comparable to that accorded the Rajk trial in Hungary in 1949. The embassy points out that the trial may be intended to underline Molotov's recent warning against national deviation. (R Warsaw 510, 30 Jul 51; C Moscow 176, 31 Jul 51),

Comment; Although the majority of the defendants were arrested or disappeared during 1949 and 1950 when the Polish Army underwent extensive purging ef politically suspect officers, this is the first public trial of Polish Army officers. It is the first time since the fall of 1949, when Polandls leading deviatiOnists Gomulka and Spychalski were publicly denounced for Titoism and demoted, that national deviation has been attafled with such vehemence. The extent of play given the problem of

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national deviation auggests again, as did Molotov's recent epeech, the strong Soviet preoccupation with this weakness on its strategic European periphery.

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

NEAR EAST. Concern expressed over increase in Comumnist actiVity: The Falronztly. General of the Arab League is "alarmed" over the vigor and violence of Communist propaganda, especially in Egypt, within the last month. He noted that all the propaganda was direeted agaihat the US and wondered if Ahshington.were aware that the Communists Pare shooting the works" in the Near East.

Comments Isolated fragmente of information indicate that Communist efforts in tho Near East are being stepped up: (a) that a Communist demonstration, involving 50 peopllial preliminary to a larger one scheduled for 3 August, ms held in Baghdad on 30 July; (3) plans are being made for alliddle East Peace Congress to meet at an undetermined time and place; (c) a sizeable delegation of students from Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq are on their way to the World Youth Festival in-Berlin; (d) it is suspected that the ComMunist press in Egypt is subsidized by the Soviet Legation. In addition, events in the Near East, such as the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis and the assassination of Abdullah, offer the Communists ideal focal points for propaganda.

The YugoslavMinister in Cairo also expressed concern to the US Ambassador about the trend of Communist propaganda within the past month. He believesthat "a lot of money is changing hands." (S Cairo 135, 31 Oiay 51; C Cairo 136, 31 Jay 51).

25X1C

Shifts occur in Greek Cabinet: Falb:ringthe dissolution of on 28 July-and the schedulingef national elections for 9 September, the King appointed four non-partisan ministers to the key electoral posts of Justice, Interior, National Defense and Governor General of Northern Greece. There has been some shifting Of-less important ministries: among Prime MiniSter Venezelos' Liberals, but economic posts remain in the same hands. (U Athens 552, 31 July 51).
GREECE.

Prrir&nent

Comment:

It is believed that the appointment of nonpartisan men

to kenroral posts will Provide sufficient assurance of


Perpetuation of Venezelost government should do a viding much needed continuity in economic policy.

great

impartiality.

deal toward pro-

JUDAS: US Minister o tithistic about future of Jordan: The new Jordanian Prime M nister has impressed the US M n s er.in AmMan.with his serene and statesman-like attitude toward his country's future problems. The US representative feels that if hostile or ambitious neighbors can be deterred from interfering, Jordan will remain a friend of the West and an
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element of political and military stability in the Near East.. The Prime Minister has told him that he fears that the MUftits men, in conjundtion with the Communists, 'might capitalize on economib distress induced by the current drought to create disorders which his Arab neighbors would utilize to intervene in Jordan. The Prime Minister stated that he would not perpetuate Abdullahts plan for a Greater Syria and dismissed the idea of a union with Iraq. He promised that his government would enforce strict observance of the armistice agreement with Israel but mould not continue Abdullehts policy of seeking bilateral settlement with Israel.

51).

Comment: Tawfiq Abul Huda has been prime minister twice previously and is widely respected as an astute politician. He is known to be a close friend.of the British Minister, whose guidance will be sought and generally followed on major problems. His government is expected to be short-lived, an previously scheduled general elections will be held on 29 August. MIth the convening of Parliament, which will contain a large number of Palestinian Arabs, a more volatile political situation will exist. Abdullah had trouble with the Arab Palestinians and there is ne available replacement for his firm hand. The situation will be touchy' but if the present calm can be maintained until after the elections, the anticipated internal confusion may not materialize.
-

Government remains firm in denying entry to Chinese EMbassy P771171a: 'Despite a blast from the Peiping radio charging a violation of international law (see O(3I Daily Digest, 31 July 51),-the Indonesian Government continues to stand firM in denying entry'to 16 Additional staff members of the Chinese Communist Etbassy in Djakarta. The Secretary General of the Foreign Office delivered a strong statement to the prees charging that this is the third occasion the Chinese EMbassy has acted without prior authority and has violated diplethatic courtesy.. Two leading Djakarta newspapers editorially backed the government's stand, reviewing the unsatisfactory aspects ef Indonesian-Chinese diplomatic re(C Djakarta 148, 28 July 51). lAtions.
INDONESIA.
Camment: The Indonesian Governmentts stand on the matter continues to be based more upon what it considers a diplomatic insult than upon its concern over Chinese Communist activities. However, the episode has highlighted Communist Chinats diplomatie procedures and may result in a sterner attitude on the part of Indonesia toward the Chinese EMbaseva activities.

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The US Minister suggests that-UKUS high level policy talks be held to ascertain British views on continued financing of the Legion, the possibility of a major expenditure for militarY base sion, and the extension of bilateral economic aid. (C Amman 51,

night Arab expan31 JUly

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INDONESIA. Criticism of cabinet continues: Grave criticism-of the current coalition cabinet was voiced by leaders of two of-the government's supporting parties during the past week. Tadjuddin floor, parliamentary leader of the Greater Indonesian Party, stated that his party would withdraw its representatives from the cabinet unless there is noticeable improvement by the end of August. Engel, leader of the Democratic Faction, declared that the cabinet should be replaced by experts under the leadership of a "strong man" --pteferably Vice President Hatta. A cabinet spokesman subsequently told the press that in order to strengthen the government, all important decisions will henceforth be referred to "consultation party councils" before they are implemented. Pedoman, the independent Socialist daily, commented that this procedure may help if prime consideration is given to the government's basic ills, but that if attention continues to be focused chiefly upon the various parties" relative positions in the cabinet, there is little hope for improvement. (C Djakarta 148, 28 July 51). Comment: The current cabinet is largely composed of men lacking in ability and experience. Although the government has a solid majority in parliament which would permit it to take decisive action, it has taken no effective steps toward the achievement of law and order, increased production, or the control of Communist activity. Should the cabinet fall, a "strong man" government, although technically unconstitutional) might be arranged.

MALAYA. Lack of success in suppressing Malaya's rebels reported: During a recent tour of northern Malaya, the US Consul in Penang was told by prominent British administrative and security officials that no end to the emergency is in sight so long as the Communist-led terrorists retain hope of eventual aid from outside Malaya. The officials are hopeful, however, that efforts to cut off the rebels' food supply and an increase in the home guard will decrease their numbers. It is not expected that the now neutral mass of Malayan Chinese will turn against the terrorists until it is quite clear that the West is winning the world power struggle. (C Penang unnumbered 31 July 51),
Comment: Lack of success by the British in their campaign to destroy the 4,000 to 5,000 insurgents has been interpreted by US officials in Malaya as the reason for the intended resignation of Lt. General Sir Harold Briggs, Director of Operations. The General, who devised the "Briggs Plan" to exterminate the rebels, was put in charge of its execution. If the plan had been proceeding successfully, he might have been expected to continue in command.

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BURMA. Increased smuggling to China reported: The US Embassy in Rangoon has been reliably informed that the smuggling of tires, auto parts, gasoline and oil from Burma to China is increasing. The Burmese Foreign Office, when approached on the matter, assured the embassy that additional measures for the restriction of smuggling and the enforcement of the Burmese Government's policy of non-reexport of scarce commodities were being considered. (S Rangoon 127, 31 July 51). Comment: This information provides further evidence of Chinese interest in exploiting Burmese sources of supply. The general disorder that prevails in Burma, as well as widespread corruption among officials and indifference to the smuggling problem, will prevent the establishment of an effective control system in the near future.

Comment: Although it seems unlikely that Ne Win would fight to retain his job, the Socialists are at a loss to name a generally acceptable replacement and probably will allow him to continue in office.

Burmese reconsidering Japanese treaty: The Burmese Foreign Minister told US Ambassador Key that his government is reconsidering its rejection of the Japanese Peace Treaty, and that a final decision will be reached in the next two or three days. (S Rangoon 132, 31 July 51).

Burmese labor organization loins WFTU: The World Federation of Trade Unions has accepted the application for membership, effective 1 July, of the Burma Trade Union Congress, the labor instrument/of the pro-Communist Burma Workers and Peasants Party. (S Rangoon 115, 27 July 51).

2X1C
1
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CHINA. Organizational overhaul of the Chinese Communist Party urged: A / Liu Shao-ch'il the CCP's

:25k1A
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organizational overhaul" of the Party "to remedy the general decline in quality" of Party membership. The overhaul was o dered to begin owl and is to be completed by the end of 1953.

Retention of Ne Win as C-in-C predicted: The US Military Attache in Rangoon believee that neither Defense Minister U Win nor the Socialist Party can force C-in-C Ne Win to relinquish his post. The MA thinks that Ne Win, upon his return from vacation, will be more amenable to governmental policies than heretofore. (S MA Rangoon SO, 27 July 51).

in April "urgedan

y 51

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Comment: This report is unconfirmed but is supported by the Nay Day 1951 statement of P'eng Chen, Secretary of the Peiping Committee of the CCP, which promised a "systematic and complete reorganization of the Party." Liu Shaoch'i would be the logical man to announce and supervise such an effort. The.CCP has expanded almost 600 per cent in six years; its 5.8 million members are of uneven quality, and a continuing purge is to be expected.

Continued "reign of terror" reported in Shanghai: A British national who left Shanghai:on 26 July reports that the city's "reign of terror has

not abatedtand that

Comment: With the possible exception of the execution figures, this report is probably true.

Polish vessel to carry Ceylonese rubber to Communist China, The Polish merchant ship Kilinpki is expected to call it Colombo in midAugust to load up to 3,000 tons of rubber for Communist China. Credit facilities to finance the major part of this shipment have already been arranged. The Ceylonese prime minister indicates that nothing can be done to prevent the rubber shipments. (C Colombo 58, 30 July 51 ).

Comment: There had been reports that the Communists would have dif ficulty arranging for shipping space because of the inability of Polish vessels to get needed bunker fuel. Apparently, however, the Poles have arranged for the necessary bunkers. The statements of Ceylonese officials suggest unconcern about rubber shipments to Communist China, desfite earlier expressions of a desire to cooperate with the US in this matter.

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(b)
(c)

(a)

An estimated 200 to 300 people were being executed daily up to the date of source's departure; Both Chinese and foreigners are "thoroughly intimidated," fearing arrest at the "slightest misstep";

Nearly all British residents now wish to leave the city; and

(d)

Nothing has been heard from three Americans imprisoned in Shanghai, while a fourth,jalmus Kanady, is seriously ill and will be reincarcerated if he recovers. (C Shanghai 415, 31 July 51).

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The USSR and Stalin omitted from Chinese Army Day s1oganss The 18 slogans approved by Peiping for public use on Chinese Communist Army Day (1 August) make no mention of either the USSR or Comrade Stalin. In contrast, the 35 slogans for Army Day in 1950 included one exhorting "support" for the USSR and one wishing long life to Stalin. (R FBID, 29 July 1950-51). Comment: The omissions from the slogans, plus Chinese Communist studies published on the CCP's 30th anniversary (1 July), have been cited as evidence of "serious trouble" between Moscow and Peiping. Neither the slogans nor the documents support such a conclusion. On the contrary, the document--analyzed at length in the OCI Bi -Weekly Survey of International Communism, 10 July 51 - -strongly indicate that the earlier divergence (1920-35) between Mao Tse-tung and the Kremlin has been repaired over the past 15 years. There have been inconclusive indications, in the past two weeks, that Moscow and Peiping, contemplating the adoption of a superficialiy conciliatory line toward the West, may be encouraging speculation that all is not well with the Sino -Soviet alliance.

25X1A

25X1C Korean cease-fire proposal explained: view of a Chinese Communist official that the Korean cease-fire propose resulted from Peiping's realization of Communist inability to win the war without air support and Chinese inability to provide pilots for Soviet supplied planes. The Peiping regime reportedly was unwilling te subject itself to an "endless drain" ii Ko while Moscow was unwillin to provide the requisite Soviet pilots.
Comment: It is not known whether this report is based on information or speculation. The pilots of jet planes encountering UN aircraft in.Korea have not been positively identified but have been reported to be Soviet. However, ComMunist air operations in Korea to date have been primarily defensive, not of a nature or scope appropriate to an effort to expel.UN forces from Korea. It is possible, and has been reported by many sourbes that Soviet unwillingness to provide either the materiel or the personnel for an offensive operation was a major factor in motivating the cease-fire proposal.

KOREA. Communists hint at local offensives during negotiations: The Communist delegation at the Kaesong Conference meeting of 28 July-stated that due regard must be given to military realities which the present battle-front situation does not reflect. The Communists added that battle lines are constantly changing and could change even during the present negotiations. (S Outgoing State Circular 92, 31 July 51).

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Comment: A 31 Jnly PANA report from Eaesong claims that COmmunist newsmen hinted obliquely that their side might have to use force to break the stalemate, in view of the adamant UN stand. General Peng Teh-huai allegedly advised the UN.in a 1 August broadcast to accept the Communist terms or be exposed to "a fatal danger." has been'obvious'for some time that the Communists have the capability of launching at least local offensives. It must be recalled, however, that Communist propaganda was very threatening immediately prior to the Communist agreement to.drop from the Eaesong agenda the issue of foreign troop withdrawal.

It

Comment: Abolition of the decade-long control over price, collection, and rationing of cereals has been a major objective of the Liberal Party, which is wedded to a concept of "free economy." Agitation toward this end commenced during early 1950, when world food supplies appeared ample to assure Japan of its needs. However, under present conditions - -sharply rising world food prices, tightening of world grain supplies, and the shipping shortage, combined with inflationary conditions in Japan --the wisdom of food decontrol is highly questionable. The dangers inherent in an inequitable distribution of inadequate rice supplies have been amply demonsUsted in Japan's history and would be intensified with the present, less-regimented population.

Comment: The Socialists had already refused to participate on grounds of policy; the.People's Democratic Party, although previously supporting the government on foreign policies, reportedly refused to 'participate unless the draft treaty could be debated at a Diet session prior to the conference-something which Yoshida feared would have unfortunate consequences abroad. Failure of the opposition partius to participate will force the Liberal Party to accept the full brunt of expected political attacks bated on the treaty, and may create scepticism among some of the signatory nations.

Plan for non-partisan peace delegation fails: The Japanese Government's plan to send a.non-partiSan Japanese delegation to.the peace conference has failed, according to the Jiji news agency. Prime Ninister Yoshida announced that the delegation will be comPosed of state ministerflnd others whose appointment does not.require Diet approval; therefore, an extraordinary session of the Diet will not be called. ..(R FBID Ticker, 1 Aug 51).

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JAPAN. Government plans to decontrol staple foods: The Japanese Government has received "fundamental agreement" from SCAP to decontrol staple foods (rice, wheat, barley), effective in April 1952, according to the Japanese news agency "Eyodo." (12 FHB, 31 July 51).

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Dollar clause abolished in sterling area trade agreements A new sterling area-Japan trade agreement, MIN being drafted as the.result of a recent conference between representatives of Japan and the UK, reportedly abolishes the clause which provided for settlement of adverse trade balances in dollars. (a FBID, 31 July 51).
Comment: Removal of the threat of a dollar drain very likely will increase JapanIs trade with the sterling area. Japan has been reluctant to place too greet emphasis on sterling trade, however, fearing the accumulation of sterling balances which could not be used in making dollar purchases. Japan also recognizes that the sterling area is unable to supply Japan's needs for foodstuffs, coking coal, cotton, and iron ore, and is therefore hesitant in diverting exports from the dollar to the sterling area.

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SECTION 3

(WESTERN)

.September-nrail meeting:

GERMANY. Embassy Moscow believes USSR is showing restraint in Berlin: US Embassy Moscow, commenting on the Berlin trade impasse, considers that the USSR is anxious to avoid showing itself in an openly provocative attitude at a time when "the peaceful coexistence repertoire is playing in other theaters of operation". The Embassy bases this judgment on the cautious Soviet approach to the Bei-lin issue, the sporadic willingness to negotiate with the Allies, and the lack of Soviet propaganda emphasis on the situation. The Embassy feels, however, that the Kremlin hopes to profit fram even softpedalled tactics in Berlin, as long as the West refraiS from taking stringent action. Embassy officials endorse the plan for a liMited Allied airlift, including military planes, as a practical means of easing the present West Berlin export backlog and demonstrating to the Politburo the mass and flexibility of Allied air-power.

The State Department meanwhile recommends a considerable extension of the present partial embargo of West German shipments to East Germany. Although conceding that French objections might preclude the complete termination by the Allies of interzonal trade, the Department urges that at least shipments of all essential and strategic goods to East Germany should be halted, in an attempt to damage the East German economy and force Soviet,capitulation. (S Moscow 167, 30 July 51; S State to Frankfurt 807, 31 July 51)

Government bans second Communist front organization: Op 29 July the West German Government banned the central council of the Communist front

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lidesvread opposition in NATO to US position on possible Further discussion in the NATO Deputiest meetings of the proposal to hold a Council meeting at Ottawa on 15 September-has led to sharp disagreement between the US and most of the other NATO members. Many members believe the presence of the Defense Ministers is eesential for a decision on Greek and Turkish membership in NATO. lhe UK, with Dutch, Norwegian and Danish support, insists that a decision on the Middle East command structure be reached concurrently. The French are in general agreement with the US in opposing these vieme and desiring definitive action on basic questions such as the proposed European Defense Forces and agreements on Germany, The French join the Norwegians and the Dutch, however, in preferring to abandon the proposal for a September meeting. The majority of the members oppose any serious consideratiOn of the German question or of additional steps for financing the defense effort, and favor giving primary attention to the non-military aspects of NATO problems aside from the admission of Greece and Turkey. (S London 138-139, 31 JulY 51)

WESTERN EUROPE.

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Victims of Nazi Persecution (VI% under Article 9 of the Basic Law which prohibits associations directed against the constitutional order. The ban stems chiefly from the VVN's continued support of the Communist anti remilitarization plebiscite in defiance of the government's 26 April. prohibition of the plebiscite. The local organizations of the VVN are not affected by the ban of the central council, but the federal govern:ment has requested the state governments to take appropriate prohibitive action if the local VVN groups continue to follow the policy of the central council. (R Bonn 75, 31 July 51)
Comment: The VVN was formed in early 1947 on a non-party basis, but as it became more and more Communist penetrated and controlled, it:was discredited and lost much of its influence in West Germany. Tho government's ban of the VVN follows similar action against the Communist youth organization on 26 June.

'

New maps are being made with Soviet symbols: HICOG Frankfurt has learned that the East German Government has been conducting a field check of the basic German maps of the zone, and is providing them with the Russian conventional signs and symbols. To execute this program, a central surveying office (VVB Vermessung) was established in January 1951. (C Frankfurt Desp. 3904, 12 June 51)
Comment: Probably the Soviet occupation authorities have ordered the making of these maps, In other Satellites, the USSR itself has completely usurped the mapping functions.

FRANCE. Fears of-German militarism rekindledt All elements of the Paris pWsiThave reacted violently to former German General Ramcke's speech calling for a free German hand in military matters and the release of war criminals. Most commentators consider Ramckets proposal to rearm Germany only upon satisfaction of these demands a threat of a renewed, unregenerate Hitlerism. They are particularly disturbed because the Bonn government permits such rabble-rousing and has failed to take a stand on the warcriminal question. There is unanimity of opinion that both the reintegration of Germany into Europe and the SchuMan Plan are endangered unless German good-will is forcefully demonstrated. (U Paris 681, 31 July 51) Comment: Ramoke was recently released from a French war prison. His remarks upon his return to Germany have been a source of embarrassment to the government, as in the earlier case of a former German general returned
froth Belgium.

Incidents of thip kind are apt to have an ill effect upon the French attitude torard German rearmament. The French originally accepted the idea

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of a German defense contribution reluctantly, but have recently had their suspicions lulled by the sincere approach of the German delegation to the European Army Conference. The French are determined to forestall the recreation of the German General Staff, which would inevitably follow the development of an independent German national army such as Ramcke favors, and aay hint that responsible Germans have such a goal will reverse the progress so far made toward Franco-German cooperation.

US Consul McBride thinks that Juin would consider the Sultan's removal a great-personal victory. Because of the Sultan's outspoken pro-US stand, however, his deposition would be considered a defeat for US prestige throughout the Moslem world. (S Rabat 5, 31
July 51)

Comment: The bitter relations been alleviated since the crisis of between Juin and-the Sultan have not February 1951. Although a rightist oriented French Government conceivably could approve'Juin's scheme, such a government is more likely to relieve Juin energies to his SHAPE command, and to assign so that he 'can devote his full to Morocco another strong military commander in an attempt to make peace with the Sultan.

There is an increasing realization among French officia/s in Paris that the dangers inherent in antagonizing the Moslem world outweigh the dubious advantages of ousting the Sultan. Mhile Juin has ample force to suppress au disorders that might follow his removal of the Sultan, such. 'disorders would provide the Communists with an opportunity to exploit the situation.

FRENCH MOROCCO. Juin again reported to be planning deposition of Sultan: According to a nationalist source,-Resident General Juin again is attempting to obtain official support for the deposition of the Sultan. This step supposedly will be taken clandestinely and immediately in order to eliminate the possibility of foreign opposition, particularly from the US. Juin is said to be convinced that the outcry from the Moslem states would be ineffectual and belated.

AUSTRIA. Soviet paper attacks US High Commissioner: After weeks of charging that the new US military camp at Salzburg constitutes a fortification, and in reaction te US,High Commissioner Donnelly's acausations of Soviet stalling on the Austrian treaty, the Soviet official paper Oesterreichische Zeitung took the unprecedented step of attacking Donnelly personally in a long editorial on 29 July. The paper called issue "hypocritical", "calumniation of Donnelly's remarks on the treaty the Soviet Union", and "babble designed to deceive public opinion". The article used maay arguments to show that the US is converting Austria of raw materials", and concluded that into a "military bridgehead and source the facts clearly demonstrated "who is the real culprit" in denying Austria a treaty. (U,Vienna 374, 30 Jai. 51)

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Comment: The incident illustrates the usual sensitivity of the USSR to charges that it is responsible for blocking the treaty.

UNITED KINGDOM. Britain sharply protests Nehru's Charges against British generals. Indian Prime Minister Nehru has rejecteda formal British request to withdraw his recent insinuation that retired Britieh Generals Auchinleck and Gracey have been advising Pakistan and operations directed against India. in the preparation of military plans The UK protest in NewDelhi followed an investigation by British officials who reportedly obtained a satisfactory account of the rocent activities of both officers. In indirect response to Nehruls rejection, Prime Minister Attlee subsequently stated in Parlia ment that he greatly regretted Nehru's lending the weight of his authority to such unfounded allegations. (S New Delhi 417, 30 July 511 U FBIS London radio, 1 Aug 51) Britain since 19h7 has striven to maintain an attitude of completritTartiality in all military matters

Comment:

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NORWAY. Shortage of militarypersonnel may delay MDAP deliveries; The US Ambassador and the Chief of the Military (MAAG), Norway, have recommended postponing Assistance Advisory Group of MDAP material until the Norwegian Defense delivery of the major nortions Ministry has made plans to procure sufficient regular personnel to maintain and utilize US equipment adequately. In the interests of good relations -with NorWay, however, the Ambassador feels that the MDAP Committee be informed before such action is taken. of the Norwegian Cabinet shoUld Also, he believes that if the Cabinet is apprised of the full significance of the recommendation and is shown the need for substantial increases in regular personnel (which has repeatedly been pointed out to the Defense Minister), the government may take the necessary corrective measures. (S London DEPTO 132, 30 July 51) Comment: The factor of adequate regular nersonnel,is the heart of the problem of building up and improving the Norwegian military forces. The historic Norwegian military concept of a small percentage of regulars causes both a mobilizablo force with only officials to react sensitively to proposals Norwegian military and civilian that the regular military establishment be geared to standards determined by other NATO countries. Procurement of personnel, moreover, is made difficult by an extremely low pay scale for regular officerS and NCOs and by a very tight labor market in Norway. The Defense Minister has taken a soMewhat negative attitude toward MAAG and NATO efforts to have Norway begin expansion of its regular force- no change is likely unless officials outside the Defense Ministry are mL.de aware of MAAG appraisals that Norway currently is incapable of utilizing MDAP equipment and has no adequate plan for fulfilling ite Medium Term Defense Plan contribution. (see OCI DailyDigest, 17 July 51)

affecting India and Pakistan

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in order to avoid arousing antagonisms which the Commonwealth ties of the two countries, might place added strain on and which might doom any hope of eventually developing their defensive capabilities in line with Britain's over-all strategy in South Asia. The present incident, occurring at a time of serious tension between the two Asian countries, justified official action on the highest level. No evidence has been received that Auchinleck and Gracey have recently been consulted by the Pakistani high command, although both were employed by Pakistan before retirement, and both have recently been accessible to the Pakistanis for advice.

25X1A

Comment: Political conditions that a revo ution has been scheduled in Ecuador remain unstable, and reports have been received on the average of one a month for the past seven months. revolutionary groups are led by Carlos The two currently most important Guevara Moreno and Minister of Defense Manuel Diaz -Granados, either of whom would set up a dictatorship should he come to power. Two recent events suggest that chances for the initiation of a coup by either are slightly better now than they have been for some time. On 24 July group Guevara Moreno (who had been in prison for over a year for leading a revolution in July 1950) was released on bail. He is therefore again able to assume personal leadership of his revolutionary group, which has remained organized and active during his confinement, On 16 July Minister of Defense Diaz -Granados presented his resignation "for reasons of ill health". Upon President Plaza's request, he agreed to withdraw the resignation, but took a 30-day "sick" leave in Guayaquil. It is probable that in this period Diaz -Granados is attempting to increase his following in Guayaquil, the region in which Guevara's strength is colleen trated (see OCI Daily Digests, 18 and 31 July 51).
:

Formation of leftist anti-administration The Popular Party of Vicente Lombardo campaign coalition Federation of People's Parties of Mexico (FPPM) Toledano will join the in the support of General Miguel Henriquez Guzman as presidential candidate, according to a Mexican news service transmission. The FPFM however, is reported to be ficially silent" on the pact which it "will "ofconclude" with the Popular Party, (R FBIS, Mexico City, 31 July 51)
rel-o-Red:

MEXICO.

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ECUADOR. Revolutionary plots against the Ecuadoran government:: Carlos Guevara Moreno stated on the night of 26 July that Minister of Defense Manuel Diaz -Granados is making preparations for overthrowing the government, probably within the coming week. He further, stated that he would permit Diaz -Granados to stage the coup, but he, Guevara would then lead his followers in a counter-movement own 25X10 Guevara will initiate action between 7 and 10 counterrevolution. -Granados -led

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Comment: This unverified report mgy represent an attempt to discredit the Henriquez movement by associating it with pro-Communist and Communist element's in-Mexico led by Lombardo Toledano, wealthy business associate 'of former leftist Nevertheless, Henriquez (a President Lazaro Cardenas) relies on militant agrarian and labor elements for support. In the present presidential campaign, as an independent anti-administration candidate with, well-organized local supporters and some army backing, he represents a significant political influence. It is favor Henriquet above other candidatesl, quite possible that Lombardo would though it seems doubtful that Henriquez would benefit at this time from Lombardo's support.

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CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT


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ATTENTION: This form will be placed top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence or classified Top Secret within the C on Agency A and will remain attached to the document until such time a9 it Li downgraded, destroyed, transmitted outside 01 CIA. Access to Top Secret matter Or is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Toy Secre Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material and indicate period of custody in the left-hane will sign this /Orin columns provided, Each individual who indicate the date o/ handling in the right-hand columns. sees the Top Secret document will sign and

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NOTICi OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Sec et mate MI it shalt be completed in the appropriate spaoes below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Contro /or record.
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a ..,

US COITIORp.

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140/

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2 August 1951

CIA No. 49292-A


Copy No.

S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT


TO THE DAILY DIGEST

This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE.

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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I.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

NEPAL.- Chinese Communists desire to open embassy in Nepal: The Nepalese Ambassador to India has expressed his governmentls concern over the Chinese Communist& detire to open an embassy. in Katmandu. The Nepalese Government is faced with two choicest -to display no.interest in the opening of an embaasy and consequently expose itself to A Possible Chinese revival of the debatable question of Nepalese sovereignty; or to agree to establishment an embassy, thereby obtaining Chinese recognitien of Nepal's independent of status but at tho same time enabling the Chinese to-make the embassy a center for subversive activities. (S S/S New Delhi 395, 28 Jul 51)
ComMont: Regardless of the action taken, Nepal probably will be unable to prevent the infiltration of Communist elements from Tibet and India. Both the nature of the terrain and the absence of firm government control outside the capital make it difficult to detect and limit the activities of undesirables, some of whom are already operating in Nepal.
INDIA. India rejects proposed Burmese-Indonesian mediation: The Burmese Ambassador to Pakistan on 25 July revealed to the US Ambassador his govern-. mantis pian to prepose that the Prime Ministers of Burma and Indonesia jointly visit Ne* Delhi and Karachi to offer their good offices toward easing the tension between India and Pakistan. Two days later, however, the Burmese envoy stated that although the Pakistanis and Indonesians were favorably disposed toward the project, it had been rejected by Nehru. (S S/S Karachi 109, 31 Jul 51)

Commentt Burma's concern' over tension between India and Pakistan was evidet7;a-last week by the visit of the Burmese Foreign Minister to New Delhi to inquire if his government could help solve the impasse on Kashmir.

India's rejection of the mediation offer undoubtedly derives partly from a fear of losing face through mediation by two nations it looks upon as "satellites." More importantly, however, India's refusal reflects a confidence in it& ability to maintain independently its-present pawer position vis-a-vis Pakistan and the United Nations, as well as a belief that its current actions will not lead to oPen warfare with Pakistan.

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1

Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP79101146A000300310001-5

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EST01146A0150600310001-5

3 August 1951

CIA No. 49293-A 9 Copy No.

.S/S.C.ABLE SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGEST

This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE.

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECTION 2 (EASTMIN)
EGYPT.

1.

These admisaions by the Foreign Minieter do not encourage Regardless of what action may be taken before the Egyptian Parliament adjourns in-midAngust, some state ment About the treaty will have to be made inHthe speeckfrom the throne at the opening of the next parliamentary session. Public ariticism of the treaty, which has been fostered by the government, could force denunciation of the treaty.

optimr3cgr tho future of the negotiations.

2.

PANAMA. Promulgation of decree on shipping delayed. Efforts to broaden the ZFICTig on/shipping.under.the.Panama flag so as to prohibit all calls in Com, munist China or North Korea were reportedly well received by PreSident Arose mane, but have apparently caused delay in its promulgation. Ambassador Wiley reports that oppositioh to broadening the decree is partly based on the arguMent that the ships affected would change to Honduran or Liberian regie try, thus depriving Panama of revenue. (0 Panama City 71, 31_Jul 51; C S/S State to Panama City 57, 31 Jul 51).

Comment: On 29 July, a PanaMa decree penalizing ships under its flag which carry strategic.materials to Communist China or North Korean porte was app-roved by the President and Cabinet, and the signature of President Ares:6 mena was expected on 30 July. If the decree should be broadened to forbid all calls at these ports, it would somewhat curtail smuggling of contraband goods, would eliminate disputes as to the Abfinition of contraband, and

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ZoMmenti
SECTION 3 (NESTERN)

Foreign Minister exploiting British treaty issue for domestic pur, The internal policy of the Nerd Oovernment has been a failure, ac. cording to the Egyptian Foreign Minister. It has carried out none of its pnrposes and much corruption and inefficiency still exist. He admitted that in order to divert attention from domestic failures, the Waffled been oter7exPloiting its differences with the UK. GiVen the atate Of Egyptian public opinion, which he admits the Ward has created, the Foreign Minister feels he can follow none but the present policy regarding-British evacuation of the Sudan and the Suez Canal Zone. Therefore, before the end of the parliamentary session he Must make a statement that there is no us6 continu ing the negotiations. The Foreign Minister also stated that whether or not the negotiations were continued, he felt that the opposition should be in cluded in the government. Nb other members of the government share this opinion. The British Ambassador feels that when the above remarks were made, the Foreign Minister had no knowledge of the Mingle message that the negotia tions should not be broken off. (TS S/S Cairo 134: 31 Jul 51).
poses,:

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would hinder the acquisition of shipping by the Chinese Communists. While ships affected by the more comprehensive decree might well transfer to some other Western flag, Honduran registry would be relatively unattractive since a Honduran government order iii January 3.90. prohibited Honduran vessels from entering ports of Communist China.

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2

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HR70-14
r.
3
I

EAST FAR EAST

cA5

I. 1. Chinese Communist Communist attitude toward Kaesong discussions:

eY5-

as of midJuly Peiping held the following opinions rediscussions in inKaesong: Kaesong: garding the current current discussions

(a) The are (a) The Chinese Chinese Communists Communists a r e so anxious will grant grant"many "many concessions"; concessions"; to secure secure a a cease-fire cease-firethat thatthey theywill


rnnirnanf. n)*I

(c) terms are so severe UN terms severe as t o be (c) Even Even if UN as to contfnue the the completely completely unacceptable unacceptableto toPefping, Peiping, the the latter latter will will attempt attempt to continue discussions until September, when when "marked "marked changes in U international changes in the international are expected. expected. situation" are
I

(b) The regime will will attempt attempt to to disdis(b) The Peiping Peiping regime cover, during during the the Kaesong Kaesong talks, some means means whereby whereby the talks, some the regime may may the UN UN and and enter the and participate participate in the Japanese peace treaty; and

and that Peiping in its itspropaganda propaganda has haslong long demanded representation in the UN and participation in the Japanese peace peace treaty. alleged that that the theUSSR USSR plans to initiate c loba.1 rew have recently alleged tillties in in September, September, but this assertion has not been supported tilities I
1

mat the Lommunist negotiators at Kaesong have made made certain concessions, CXmmunist nePtiatOrS Kaesong have

1 It is is public public knowledge knowledgzJ

2.

Possilge CCF reinforcements total 350, 000:

A study indicates that in addition to the Chinese Communist units which have been identified and accepted in

Korea, additional units may have arrived whose estimated total strength would be 350,000. This would give the enemy an estimated maximum possible strength of 907, 000 for an offensive.

-3 3 --

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.--

.
I

_TAAP_SECRET-SUEDw--

comment: s consid rsbly in comment: This total total i is considtably excess of of the 770,000 774 000 maximum, 1.1. pril, maximum,estimated estimatedin inKorea Koreaas.'& as.' of pril, that that inincluded units subsequently identified identified elsewhere as cluded as of of that thatdate.. date. The total force would be equivalent u l l strength divisions. div.isions. This number of of force would equivalent to 90 ffull whichit it has has heretofore heretofore been been estimated estimated that divisions exceeds the maximum maximum which Korea. the enemy is is logistically logistically capable capable of of maintaining m a i n t a i n i n g in inKorea.

'According to a a3 3 August August estimate estimate According to however, available available indications indicationspoint point to continueac ac ve however, to aa continue in Korea until such time a as s the mist forces amense ooy uommunist forces in Korea until such time thepresent presentqrmisarmistice parleys collapse collapse or or appear appear no no longer longer profitable to the enemy. enemy.

1
NR

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HR70-14 HR70-14

_TAR/P_SECRETSUEDie

5 P6A-151

ni3
NR

n sive Dreparations noted in in Korea during during past Dast 24 24 hours: hours: 4. m Offensive preparations noted

E ] =

Indications that the Communists may Indications may resume the offensive on the UN UN western western flank have noted in o u r s , / ] been noted in the the past 24 h hours, Enemy Enemy forces forces areahave have suddenly suddenly tightened t ghtened their their counter-reconnaLsance counter-reconna ssance screen. in this area They may may also have have moved movedarmor armor into into the the Otan Otanarea area 25 25 miles miles northeyjt northeast of Kaesong, observershave have sighted sighted tank tank traCks t r e k s and not,d notvd Kaesong, where where aerial aerial observers filling in in ofnntPtaikk. of-antt~dltehm. the filling

recent displacement ofenemy enemyunits unitsin inthis thissector sector whichwould would not Indilndi! a recnt displacement of which anenemy enemytntention tntention to to mount mount an early early general general offensive. offensive. &ate tate an

Comment! Thesehostile hostiledevelopments developments in the ullanagut These areaof of the theKaesong Kaesong conference conference may be designed designed only general area only to to exert exert the negotiations, negotiations, but could could be pressure 6n bn the pressure bepreparations preparationsto to seize seize strategic strategic parSdrrns for the launching launching of offensive, poSitions of a general offensive.

11 N F

-5 5-

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HR70-14

7 443 5-1 7 t4w 5 1

bi

w
+w-mBmTer-830alre-SXCTION 1 1 (80VIll') (SMIZT) SECTION

'4110

1.

N.y. Bovlet bae88~dorto to Peiping Peivige enroute enroute to to Moscow& ~oacowa I . 'V. Roshchin, Boehchin, Soviet Am Ambassador 3 Ambassador to People's Republic Republic, left by by plane plane on 3Soviet Ambaeeador t o the Chinese Chineee Peoplelo , left August forfMoscow, according according to Radio Peiping. to Radio Pelping. Auguet o r Hoecow, -

Mg. m.

-~1
.

As as is Roshchin's visit Comment: b e far ae ir known, this is is B ~ e h c h l n ~first e v i e i b to Moecow . view of current negotiations negotiations since he returned retarned to to Peiping Peiping in in March March 1950. 1950. In view In Impending conference on the Japanese peace treaty, iC is in Korea and the impending treaty, it Moreover, likely l i k e l y that that his hi8 return return is is for f o r consultation:on coneultatlon on these these questions. queatlons. Moreover, Boehchlnla in Moscow thie time time lende to the recent recent Roshohin's presence presence in Moscow at this lends sfgnlflcance significance.to high,level Soviet diplomate diplomats from return and continued contfnued stay there of of high-level Afghanistan, A f g h w l m t a n , Pakistan Pakistan and and India. India.

NR

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11'010-8201111--

w ,41.0
TE5F-BECHET-TOP SECF@T

7.

CHINA. Pre arations for further o erations in Korea reported:


Chinese Communist mical units assigned to Aorea were ordered to reaCh their stations by 10 August, and that the "4th wing" of the Chinese Communist Air Force was ordered to reach its Manchurian base hy 4 August.
Comment: This information has not been confirmed. A "4th wing" of the CCAF has not been identified in Manchuria or elsewhere. that Communist forces have been ordered to be in a state of readiness hy early Septebber.

8. 8.

AlCorrounonsSorinleca_l_g_talksaleed: Communist intentions i n Korean t a l k s allenedt h e following decisions were t a inese Lmomleges that that t the were made made a at a top-level top-lovel Chinese munist conference conference on on 25 25 Zuly: July:
(a) (a)

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(b) (b) (c) (c)

r i p -

to agreement" iin the Kaesong Kaesong t o avoid reaching any "definite " d e f M t e agreement" n the talks, but hut

t o mke necessary concessions conceaaions to t o prevent prevent a a "premature llpremature to make necessary breakdown" of of the the Kaesong Kaesong talks; and meanwhile
t o continue continue "military 'hLUtary a c t i v i t i e s " in to activities" in Korea, Korea, preparing preparing
t o launch launch a large-scale offensive n Korea n early to a large-scale offensive i in Korea i in early September. September.

(d) (d)

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' U
11-701-3-3ECRET----

11.1
reported

I. to -level conferemes conferences axe are continually : A l . ;k g ~ i n *oceedjnns , of tols-level !

i t is the the Communist Communiot i n t e n t i o n to t o prolong prolong the the it intention offensive. Kaesong talks Communist forces are prepared for a major major new new offensive. Kaesong talk8 until un

limportant important developmnts, possibly even Soviet initiation of global hostilities, opmsnts, possibly even Soviet i n i t i a t i o n of global 6 o s t i l i t i e s , are are expected expected !L !t in unconfirmed. I t a early e a r l y September; September: such such reports remain kemairl unconfirmed,

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8 August 1951
CIA No. 49296 Copy No.

sesz

DAILY DIGEST

This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

State Department review completed


DIA

and PACOM review(s) completed.

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECTION 1 (901/IET)
Propaganda reflects increased Soviet interest in East-West trade: An Irvestia article and a Mbscow home service broadcast attacked the proposed US bill for cutting off add to countries Shipping strategic materThe bill was ials to the Soviet bloc as "dangerous to East-West peaee." branded a weapon in the hands of US imperialitts, directed toward-preparation of a new war," and constituting open pressure by the US monopolists on their Western European vassals." The broadcast added a plug for the World Peace Congress resolution calling for an international economic conference in Moscow before the end of the year.
USSR.

Comment: Soviet phraseology attemptrto conceal the Kremlinle con, cern over economic bans against the Soviet bloc while placing emphasis on the so-called encroachment on Western Europels sovereignty.

2.

Second quarter results of 1951 State Plan: Results of the Staie Economic Plan for the second quarter of 1951 were published in the Soviet press on 4 August. Compared with the same period last year, gross value of output rose 16 percent, and productivity of labor increased ten perdent. The spring crop sowing plan was described as having been overfulfilled,, with the total 1951 sown area augmented by six million hectares over that of 1950. The wheat area was expanded by more than four million It is claimed that in state and hectares, and cotton by almost 400,000. cooperative trade, the population of the country sold 14 percent more at comparable prices than in the second quarter of 1950. Iblkhos market sales are also said to have risen in the second quarter of 1951 compared with the same period in 1950.
Yield Comment: Embassy Moscow observed that in format, timing and content, second quarter results parallel their first quarter predecessors and are similarly devoid of practically all meaningful" data. The Em. bassy feels, however, that the trade data may have smile iignificance in that the 14 percent increase in state and cooperative sales appears to be the lowest gain on record in the postwar period (1948 data lacking). The gain of 16 percent in gross industrial output may have been caused by reconversion, but the Embassy eve that it is impossible to know whether the second quarter increase is doe to rising military or civilian production.

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4.

30th Annizene,aocli_ans Penile's Republic:

A. celebration

The fact that two such prominent officials as Tarasov and Tunkin were sent to attend the Mongolian festivities reflects the desire of the Soviet Government to lend an aura of prestige to one of ite lesser known, but strategically located Satellites.

5.

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EASTERN EUROPE. 'CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Foreign Office protests Sudeten reiieionist activity in West Germany The Czechoslovak Government has protested to US Embassy Prague against the alleged toleration of "hostile" ex-SUdeten activities in the US zone of Germany. The note reviews previous exchanges on the same subject dating back to 1947 which stress that US occupation authorities have condoned the formation of "independent organizations, whose principal purpose is political activ ity directed against the Czechoslovak Republic." The note refers to a revival of "Bitlerite, Pen-Germen aggressive nationalism", DB support of "German chauvinist militarism". and US promotion of "revisionist activities."
I

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Commentt

commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Mongolian revolution was held in Ulan Bator on 9 July. In addition to the Soviet Ambassador Y. K. Prikhodov, the USSR was represented by an official delegation headed by M. P. Tarasov, (Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Chairman of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet). The group also included G. I. Tunkin, head of the first Far Eastern Section of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Tsyrempilon, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR. Other goternmental delegations at the festivities included those from Communist China, Korth Korea, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish Republic, the Bulgarian People's Republic, and the People's Republic of Albania.

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Comment: Nearly two million Sudeten Germane have been expelled from Czechoslovakia since the end of World War II. These transferred Sudetens have held numerous meetings in West Germany during which revisionist aspirations were expressed. Such expressions of irredentism have greatly assisted the Czeohoslovak Communist regime in capitalizing on popular fear of West German rearmament and have provided it with an issue around which to rally otherwise divergent Czechoslovak elements. US Ambassador Briggs in Prague suggested in May 1951 that in order to reduce the effectiveness of such propaganda, the US Righ Commissioner in Germany officially dieclaim US support of Sudeten aspirations,

6.

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Comment: Austria will be the only Western country to retain a Consulate in Bratislava, a useful observation post on the Danube.

7.

ALBANIA, Catholic Church nationalized: The Presidium of the Albanian Government recently issued a decree which, in effect, nationalized the Albanian Catholic Church. Under the terms of the measure the Catholic Church in Albania no longer hal any ties with the Vatican The Albanian Catholic Church henceforth will submit to the Canonic code of Rome only insofar as the codeos provisions do not contradict the laws of the Albanian Peopleos Republic. A/banian Catholic clergy will be trained according to the dictates of the Government. Relations with the Church abroad will be conducted through official channels. In commenting on the na.. tionalization decree, the Tirana press stated that at last the Albanian Catholic clergy has thrown off the yoke of the Vatican "which hag religion in the service of American imperialism."

Italy to close consulate in Bratielava: The Italian Minister to Czechoslovakia has notified US Embassy Prague that effective 15 August the Italian Consulate-General in Bratislava wi/1 be closed. This step is the direct result of a "determined buttwauccessful effort" by Czechoslovak border officials to force the Italian Consul-General to open his diplomatic pouch. Czechoslovakia will 10 required to close its Consulate in Milan, Italy,

8.

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Persecution of religious elements in Albania started with the advent of Communist power in 1946. The head of the Albanian Catholic Church, Archbishop Prennushi was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment in 1948 and was reported to have died in prison in February 1949. The latest measure against the Albanian Catholics, who total approximately 100,000, formalizes the break with the Vatican.

Comment:

YUGOSLAVIA. Embassy Belgraft_favorp Ingoelav nationals: Embassy Belgrade lifting US visa restrictions on considers that the US program of
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assistance to Yugoslavia could be much iMprOved a program of technical if it were combined with training of Yugoelave in the US. goats that a clause be added The Embassy sugto the current temporary visits to the US by the subjects aid bill which would permit aid programs. of nations participating in In this manner Yugoslav nationals could be admitted without weakening existing visa regulations against states. nationals of Cominform The Embassy feels nese to expose its citizens that the US should encourage Yugoslav willing to Western life recent requests f or on-the-job as evidenced by the regime es Embassy points out that there training and scholars:hips in the US. The i 8 very little selected by the regime likelihood that any trainee would be empathetic to the Comdnform anti-Cominform screeni cees in Yugoslavia is extremely since the severe.

25)0

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A would mateilally program of technical training for Yugoslav nationals and politically assistance programs. enhance the US economic and military Because present US legielation trance of all Communists, restricts the en, those Yugoslav nationals most sent for such training likely to be are not eligible for visas.

__Comments

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1. INDONESIA. Bandits and Approximately 200 men Islamic fanatics attack Djakarta port area: fanatics and leftist described by an Indonesian official as nIslamic banditsn attacked on 5 August. Tandjong Priok, the port of The attackers decorated with both earried red flags and Djakarta, Islamdc emblems and wore red headbands pose of the the hammer attack is believed to and sickle. The purequipment. Four have been the ts were killed and procurement of arms and fled eastward. fly captured; the remainder

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2.

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Cabinet adopts five point proposal on Japanese Indonesian Government peace treaty: The Japanese peace treaty has adopted a five-point proposal regatding the expression of support which includes a demand for for Soviet reparations and an the treaty. Indonesia will not and Communist Chinese San Francisco decide whether to send participation in a delegation to on 13 August. until it sees the final text of the draft treaty now expected
Comment: Indonesia has displayed Japanese treaty, and the current relatively little seriously. proposal probably need interest in the The government not be taken had previously reparations would not indicated that its demand very be large and that included in the treaty for even if majority. negotiations, Indonesia Communist China were not would go along with the

INDOCHINA. Vietnam nam Surete in HanoiGovernment bans exit of men of received on 3 August military eget National Security The Vietan official Service in Saigon aged 20 to 45 would directive from the that'henceforth Consulate confirmed be issued exit visas. A check no Vietnamese males that this to Vietnamese directive will result with the Surete by the who have received in the denial of persons grants under the visas legislation. On 5 August Smith-Mundt Catholic diocese of exchange of two Vietnamese Buiehu seminarians from the were stopped bound for the US. I from boarding an Air France plane

Comment: The proximity of this attack Indonesials serious to the capital city Islam which seeks to security emphasizes In addition to the set up a problem. Moslem fanatical Darul numerous armed state by force of arme, there ate been exploited gangs operating in West also Java, some of which by the Communists. The identity Tandjong Priok is undoubtedly have not yet known. of the band which attaaked

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5

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Comment: This is the latest in a series of steps by the French Viethamese authorities designed to step up the military effort Viet Minh) and stems directly from against the Bao Bails dedree of 15 July providing for the "mobilization of all national resources." This step, however, threatens to be far more explosive politically than any heretofore taken. The absolute authority of the French High Commissariat for Indochina and the French-sanctioned Vietnam Government has, in the past, been tempered by the opportunity which has been accorded Vietnamese to express their political views at least to the unrepresentative and unpopular extent of refusing to cooperate with an government or of leaving the country-altogether. Compulsory military service under a government which is widely regarded by the Vietnamese as French-dominated, go abroad, particularly and denial of the right to for educational purposes, will cause intense ill feeling. This will be particularly true in the case of projeeted travel to the US, whose educational opportunities are regarded by many Vietnamese as the key to release from subordination to the French. This attitude toward the US is held in virtually all political circles of non-Communist Vietnam? and it is extremely doubtful that the Vietnam Government have curtailed contacts between would strong pressure from the French its nationals and the US except under authorities. On numerous occasions French have manifiested their the alarm at signs of closer US-Vietnam and have taken steps to thwart relations such a trend.

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5.

truce with Viet Vietnamese circlesirM,risreacted Minh alarms Vietnamese: Official


"with some emotion" to the hint dropped by Minister for Associated States Letourneau that negotiations to end "civil war" in Vietnammight follow the the Korean truce talks, according to a French Press Agency (AFP) broadcast from Saigon. French political circles in Saigon were quoted by the AFP as stating that the Letourneau hint, given in an interview with a Dutch correspondent should be regarded as " ust a periodical solnding-out attempt which should not be taken seriously."

Ezia2h_hint_at

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Comment: Although there is probably the French Government to negotiate with no serious intent on the part of Ho Chi Minh and although such TOP SECRET

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intent has been denied by De Lattre, the recollection of French-Viet Minh negotiations in 1946 is still fresh in the minds of the Vietnamese, and even the remotest hint that the French may "sell them out" to the Viet Minh creates painful uncertainty in Vietnam.

6.

CHINA. Soviet and Chinese Communist influence in Inner Mongolia assessed:


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(a)

the Ministers of the Inner Mongolian regime were all Moscowtrained Mongols who spoke excellent Russian; however, the Vice-Ministers were all Chinese, and it was the Chinese who exercised "actual control" over the area; there was no official Soviet representative in Wangyehmiao, nor were any Soviet troops or railway guards observed; however,

(b)


(c)
(d)
(0)

the study of Russian was compulsory in the area (for officials?), and many young Russians had been imported as teachers;

the Mongols wished to establish better rail connections with the USSR hy extending the railway from Aershan to Manchuli or Hailer, but the Chinese Communists would not permit work to be begun on the proposed line; and

(f)

the border with Outer Mongolia was "tightly closed," with no travel except for occasional official delegations from Ulan Bator (the capital of Outer Mongolia).
I

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Comment: The Inner Nbngolian Autonomous Region, a creation of the Peiping regime, adjoins Outer Mongolia and Communist China2s Northeast, occupying a large slice of the area formerly known as Mhnchuria. Little information has come out of the area; I There has long been speculation as to whether the Peiping regime would prove willing and able to prevent Outer Mongolian (and hence Soviet) annexation of Inner Mongolia

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!

las ol 1949, the Peiping regime retained the superior position in the area. However, in the past two years there have been fragmentary reports of increased Soviet and Outer Mongolian activity in Inner Mongolia, and it is possible that the USSR has been steadily increasing its influence in the region.

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7.

Communist advance into Tibet reported:


(a)

The Indian press reports that

Chinese Communist forces are now only 150 miles east of Lhasa and have been identified near the Indian border;

(b)

Chinese Communist officials who have arrived at principal Tibetan trading centers are "virtually in control" of administrative machinery; and the Dalai Lama and Chang Ching -wu (Communist military governor of Tibet) are about to enter Lhasa.
I
1

(c)

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8.

Political:labor camps proposed for Central-South China: Labor camps for political prisoners will soon be in operation!throughout the CentralSouth China administrative region as a result of plans drawn up at a recent regional conference on "reform through labor," according to a 27 July communist newspaper in Hong Kong. The system, which will be decentralizedet first with prisoners working on local projects, will lay the groundwork for the later use of prisoners on large-scale engineering projects. The US Consul general in Hong Kong remarks that the establishment of a system creating a continuous demand for this type of labor would provide an additional motive for an unendin2 series of ',arraigns to arrest counterrevolutionaries.
I

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Comment: Indications of Chinese Cammutist intent to implement a labor program of this sort have been observed in an increasing number of reports alluding to a decrease in the number of death sentences and a concurrent increase in commutations of sentences to servitude for varying periods. This is among the first observations of intent to employ prisoners in South China; other.reports concerned shipments of corvees northwards. The present development has long been expected.

Comment: Chinese Commanist forces and officials are known to be moving into Tibet, but the extent of their advance is not clear. The Dalai Lama's apparent decision to accept Peiping's termswhich leave him with no sig-. nificant authority- -will facilitate the Commmnist advance. The Peiping regime is expected to be in effective control of Tibet by the end of 1952.

9.

US objects to Chinese Nationalist conscription plans: The reported Chinese Nationalist intention to begin the conscription of 15,000 men on 10 August is diametrically opposed to the recommendations of the US Military Aid and Advisory Group (MAAG) and was announced without prior consultation with officials of that organization. General Chase, head of MAAG,

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told Chinese officials on several occasions that he opposed any increase in the armed forces at this time. The ECA mission to Formosa has continuously stressed that the island's gravely strained economy cannot bear this burden. As a compromise, US officials hope for a deferment or only a oartial imnipmnwtation of this conscription.
I

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10.

KOREA.

Communists take action against disease threat:

Comment: This incident points up the neceasity for establishing effective US political, economic, and military control over the programs supported by US aid. Chinese Nationalist preoccupation with sovereign rights wakes the solution of this particular problem difficult. Considerations of "faxen further complicate the problah, since the conscription program has already received the Generalissimo's signature and nation-wide publicity.

cholera and-typhus in one province alone since January, 1951. These disease prevention. measures reportedly are credited with reducing the incidence of smallpox hi 23.9 per cent.
I

broadcast relates that...over 1136,00lo persons.have teen vaccinated or inoculated against smallpox,

A 3 August Pyongyang

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During the past winter the high incidence of eruptive typhus and hemorraghic smallpox among Communist troops and civilians was a matter of considerable toncern to North Korean authorities.

Comment:

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SECTION 3

(WESTERN)

1.

2.

FRANCE. French fear aviation gasoline shortage is imminent: A severe aviation gas shortage is expected in France by Oetbber if the Abadan refinery shutdown continues.- The French are trying to borrow from SHAPE enough gas to tide them over, but they fear that they will not be successful after the freight airlift from-Berlin is started. They believe that the new Soviet blockade of Berlin's exports is timed to take the greatest possible advantage of the growing Western European shortage of aviation gas resulting from the Iranian dispute,
I

GERMANY. West German press expresses concern about Camnunist influence iiirarnst Oerman youfhs In reporting therm-tinier WiTrt75uth Festival now going on in East Berlin, many West German newspapers warn that the Communist youth rally should be viewed by the West as a "significant warning signal", and express grave concern lest the Communists win German youth to their cause while West Germany does very little to arouse enthusiasm among its,o7In youth for Western democratic ideals. Several newspapers publish the remark of a well-known news camnentator that the influence the 25X1 Communist regime is exerting on youth is "more damaging to German reun fi cation than the entire People's Police", 25X6
I

25X1

3.

Comment: The Abadan shutdown has deprived Western Europe of 31 per cent of its processed petroleum imports, Iran supplied only a slight portion of total French petroleum imports, but a relatively high proportion of this ISMB aviation gasoline, and current stocks cannot be entirely replenished from domestic plants. There is no direct evidence of a connection between Soviet-inspired economic trouble in Berlin and developnents in the Iranian oil dispute,

Further progress is made on export controls: Recent meetings of Western Powers participating in East-West trade-Eaarols have, in the opinion of the US delegation, led to "significant further progress toward parallel action" among all countries represented. More than 60 per cent of the critical items on vhich the US had previously been unable to obtain agreement for a strict embargo (US List IA) have now been accepted, bringing to 90 per cent the total number of items so far agreed to for embargo (US List I). In addition, "advantageous"-proposals for handling quantitative controls and exceptions have been adopted, and further progress is likely

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to be made by obtaining at least partial control over the remaining US List IA items.
The US delegates were impressed, however, with the "very firm position", particularly of the UK and France, against a further extension of the embargo on basic industrial exports. These countries showed "grate condern" with their domestic political problems and rejected what they probably viewed as a US effart to impose its will for complete acceptance of List IA.
Comment: Substantial further progresp toward a general embargo on US Liet Trafelis is not indicated. Furthermore, the other participating countries have accepted less than 40 per cent of the 250 items on US Lists II and ITS, which were proposed for quantitative restrictione.only although in practice the US denies them totally to the Soviet Orbit,

The Western European countries are increasingly apprehensive over inflationary pressures, which some leaders are determined to coMbat in part .by encouraging imports. These countries insist that they can obtain urgently needed Eastern products, such as coal, only by offering some critical items in exchange. Furthermore, the Western EuropeanCountries are increasingly sensitive to US leadership and resentful of exceptions approved for individual nations. 25X1

5.

BELGIUM. Decline in export trade anticipated: BelgiumLuxembourg had a favorable balance of trade in June for the first time in 1951, due to a fall in the value 6f imports and a rise in the export level to a postwar high.

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25X1
Although the Belgian press welcomes thefavorable balance of trade, it does not consider it a good sign. It believes the drop in imports foreshadows a decline in exports, and a general slackening of over-all-economic activity. The embassy comments that although no details are available on the sectors affected by the drop in imports, it seems that the decline occurred primarily in imports of textile materials and vegetable prodicte. Imports of mineral articularly coal, shawed an increase. roducts

25Xi
Comment: Belgiam-Luxembourg has had a slight yearly balance of trade deficit. As usual, both before and since World:War II, some decline in overall economic activity probably will be evident during the summer. Activity in the secondary industries, such as textiles, has fallen off considerably since the first of the year because of the lack of world demand. No improve-

6.

Reavy Vote points up Salazarss nation-wide prestige: The Supreme Court today handed down the official returns on the 22 July general elections, which confirmed the choice of General Francisco Craveiro Lopes as the eighth President of the Portuguese Republic. Although the number of abstentions and voided ballots was not published, the unopposed official candidate is estimated to have polled 80 per cent of the total national vote, 25X1
'FOtITUGAL.

25X1

7.

Comment: The real victor in the elections was Premier Salazar. Previotm succegginf the polls had been generally attributed to the vote-getting appeal of the late President Carmona. The 80 per cent vote polled by the regire which, according to a pro-government newspaper, surprised even-the most optimistic observers, indicates that Salazar's party still enjoys a broad base of popular support. With his personal control of the party established beyond dispute, it is believed that Salazar may decide to deal severely mdth corrupt office-holders whose scandalous activities, widely publicized by the opposition during the presidential campaign, are said to have caused him considerable embarrassment. Lopes, who will take office on 9 August, visited Washington in 1943. Reportedly favorably disposed toward the US, he recently saiA that the strengthening of relations with the US will continue to be a basic aim of Portugal's foreign policy,

UNITED KINGDOM. US-UK disagreement over Far East policy seen as probable after Korean armistice: US Embassy London predicts that British differences with the US over Far East policy, nomr held in check in order to preserve a united front in Korea, will probably revive if a Korean armistice is achieved,-..The embassy indicates that the British see an armistice as the first phase in "step-by-step" negotiations leading eventually to a general
.

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ment is likely-Untildefenee orders are under wsy and inventories-are depleted. In view of.the continued high value of mineral importS, no decline in the steel and metallurgical industries is foreseen at present.

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settlement in the Far East, and expect the Chinese Communiets to demand admission to the UN as a prerequisite to an over-all Korean settlement. The eebassy estimates that the present government would find great difficulty.in trying to dodge such a demand in the face of UK public opinion on the issue. On the Formosa issue the embassy reports an increasing conviction of many senior military and civil officials, including Foreign Secretary Morrison, that the island would possess high strategic utility to a hoptile power, but estimates that the cabinet nevertheless might be led to over-rule Foreign Office support of Formosaus continued neutralization should it appear expedient to promote a general Far East settlement. Regarding the future of Korea once the embassy estimates that Britain might a cease-fire had been negotiated, for,a time resist pressure for a total withdrawal of UN forces, but probably would eventually prove willing to accept some face-saving solution. This would relieve the UK of unWelcome responsibi/ities in Korea and though it to eventual political absorption by:the might leave South Korea vulnerable North Korean Communist regime, Foreign Office circles repar such a development as in any event probable.
I

25X1

8.

British still push adoption of their .28 calibre rifIet The British Army will conduct on 10 August a demonstration of the .20 clalibre rifle lit the British Sehool of Infantry. US ArmyAttache London notes a determined'effort to "sell" the new rifle to all interested parties, including other NATO members. Be believes the demonstration has a definite political aspect, as the invitations for American personnel were handled through the NATO Council of Deputies and the political Midir; nf the embassy rather than by his office. I
Comment: UK Defonse Minister Shinmell, on his return to London from the smail arms standardization talks inWashington, reported that "for the present" he had failed to get the new British rifle and annunition adopted as standard NATO equipment, that the whole standardization matter had been referred to the supreme NATO military organization, and that he hoped a report could be drafted in time for the October Council meeting. the British Government Meanwhile, has decided not to request at this time US of any machine tools for production financing of .28 calibre weapons or ammunition.

25X1

9.

UK and German coal shortage keeps Denmark dependent upon Polish in acprihagen estimate that ECA efforts to reduce Mash dependence upon Polish coal hy financing coal imports from the US will have little effects unless Denmark can substantially increase its present imports of coal from the UK and Western Germany. The UK, for example, has

DENMARK.

crCUS oflicials

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25X1

million exported committed only 1.1 million tons for 1951 as against 2.9 from Britain and Germany, the in 1950. Failing a marked rise in imports quantity from would be a vaitly increased only alternative to Polish coal the US. /
of the UK and West Germany Comment: Since the present coal situation Denmark unlikely without special makes-ariittrease in their shipments to that Poland will be able to exert considerpressure from. the US, it appears strategic goods as payment for coal when able pressure on Denmark to export Reduced UK coal deliveries in October, the current trade agreement expires have also diminished Norway's bargaining position with Poland.

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UNCLASSIFIED when bAl*WOCOMAERtilkflISAYIREOYMESAFT:SeTgArAll91011/401ftitediflakel


fled

or declassi-

when fMed in form a detached from controlled document.

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IDATE

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This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agenby or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, Or transtnifted outside o/ CIA. Access to Top Secret matter ts limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those Individuals whose official ductei relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this /Ornt and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document Will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
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NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When.this form ts detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate space below and ransmitted to Central Top Secret Contro for record. .


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(Signature)
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u"
PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

' 26
9.73

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MO)

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25X1

TO THE DAILY DIGEST

This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence.

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Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE.

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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if

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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)

1.

TRIESTE. State Department consideriqg postponement of Trieste elections: The Department of State is exploring the possibility of postponing the Trieste elections, as Premier De Gasperi has requested, on the understanding that the Italian Government will seriously try to reach agreement with Yugoslavia on the settlement of the Trieste problem. If this plan is implemented, the Allied Military Government will issue a carefully timed statement that the

elections have been deferred in order to facilitate a mutually satisfactory Trieste settlement in connection with the larger problem of the revision of the Italian Peade Treaty. Before seeking the concurrence of the UK and France for such a step, the Department has requested the comments of US ambassadors in Belgrade and Rome and the US political adviser in Trieste. 25X1

2.

JAPAN. Japan desires peace treaty provision for repatriation: Japan, con, cerned over the unrepatriated Japanese for whom the Soviet Union or Communist China have failed to account, desires the inclusion of a provision in Article 26 of the peace treaty for the return of prisoners of war and civilian detainees, according to a letter from Premier Yoshida to Ambassador Dulles. The Japanese are apprehensive that, without such a clause, if either Communist nation proposed a bilateral treaty identical with the present treaty Japan might be obligated to accept the proposal unconditionally. If the inclusion of such a repatriation provision proves impractical, Yoshida suggests a proto col joined in by the Allied Powers which would specify that the treaty does not prohibit repatriation provisions in subsequent bilateral treaties*

25X1

Comments Article 26 provides that for a period of three years after the peace treaty Japan will not make a bilateral peace treaty with any state which grants the latter greater advantages than those offered the signatories of the San Francisco treaty.
c

3.

Yoshida very likeli feels that a small concession of this nature from the Allied Powers, on a Matter as close to Japanese hearts as the subject of repatriation, will strengthen public support for the peace treaty in Japan,

Japanese promise to establish-overseas agency on Formosa after pease The US Political Advisor POLAD in Tokyo received categorical assurance on 4 August that the Japanese Government will open an overseas agency at Taipei after the peace treaty is signed.
treaty is consummated::

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25X1

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POIAD states that to time would bind Japan pnblicly to discourage India and ists from joining Nationalist China at others who have severed this us in signing opposed to the Japanese ties with the Nationalthe treaty. Since the British Chinese Government taking are adamantly Nationalists, any overt action in favor of the Japanese in this the US representative the warns that respect US-UK China further pressure on wouthoav ore to policyd displgy the disunity of
r

25X1

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2 Approved For Release 2007103107 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300350001-1

*too

HR70-14 HR70-14

I
-TOP-aftittil-calfa-

JgterceDt euaaests Oonununist mmredunit unit orerations omrations A A garbled garbled North North 11. suggests Communist armored 1 1 , AgsgA. HQBE;B. ;ntervut Korean message of of 6 6 August states etatee that that due due to to a a "(decrease?) "(dearease?) in in attacks Korean message attacks by

enemy bombers because of of rainy rainy weather...we weather.e,we shall s h a l l begin begin (operations?) (operations?) with., With.., . enemy boebers because tank (unit?) about about 20 20 August...." AUgl18taoe.ll (SUEDE,rjm6, North #orean mulitargo 436, North Korean Military.,, tank.(unit?) (SLMMR4 6 Aug 51)0 6A u ~ 511,

whtle this this measage olearly state state that nits COmmen.t;s Uhile message does does not not olearly that armored armored U unite Comments are,being di@OU86ed, it it is is nevertheless nevertheless true true that t h t oeasehss are,being discussed, ceaseless and and in-bensive intensive UN air action actlon has has been been a a major factor factor in i n preventing orea air preventing Gommurrist communist forces forces in K Korea e o d e d that that during from employing armor m o r in in the the 1951 1951 offensives. offensives. It It may may be be r recalled during from employing a similar period period in in 1950, 1950, North North Korean Korean forces emceedad in oomidera similar forces succeeded in deploying deploying a considerable armored armored force foroe around around the the Pusan Pusan perimeter* perimeter, able

NR NR

-T0P-siztET-etran5

13 w 51 13 A Aug 51

FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED FOR DATE: 18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010 ,DATE:

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HR70-14

v
T01"--SSORkT

NR

12. 12.

the adamant &mnt stand stand Comment: While While the as condoning condoning partition p a r t i t i o n of of negotiations negotiations as a t the the Kaesong negotiations negotiatioas of of General General at a t least preserves the semblance semblance of of UN UN at
13. 13 *

Unification sentiment sentiment continues continues in in the the ROE: ROKr Ambassador Ambassador Muccio, commentUnification Muccio, commenting h g on on the t h e demonstrations demnstrations within within the the ROK ROK against"the against the cease-fire cease-fire without without unification, no basic basic Change change in i n the the line l i n e of of action a c t i o b'advocated advocated in in speeches speeches unification, notes notes no delivered a at While the the Ambaseador'.obserVes Ambaesador observes that ddlivered t frequent frequent meetings. meetings. While that meetings meetings are generally amall small in i n size s i z e and and not not indicative indicative of of a a "strong t8etrongorganizational or anizational are generally effort," effort," he he believes belleves that the the celebration celebration of "Liberation 18Uberation Day" Day" (15 $15 August) August) wiU be aqiLoited to t o "produce llproduce a a high high emotional emotional pitch" pitch" on on :the the theme 0 . f will be.exploited theme of unification. M ication.

Imultak: Comment: While While it it is i s believed belleved that that President Preeident Rhee Rhee and and his h i s follawers followers will ndU. limit U t their t h e i r disapproval disapproval of of the t h e cease-fire cease-fire negoitations negoitations to t o such such meetings meetings and and speedhes speeches as as have have been bean described, described, the the possibility p o s s i b i l i t y always always exists exists that t h a t Rhee Rhee will withdraw Will withdraw his his military military representative representative from from the the Kaesong Kaesong meeting, meeting, thus thus prejudicing prejudicing the UN UN pOSition. poleition.

14.

w*

a of a discussion disc= of the the enemy's 'aemyDs artored armred potential p o t e n t i a l in in Korea, Korea, concludes concludes that that while while recent tank .recent tank sightings sightings do do not not indicate iridicate an an intention intention to t o employ employ armor armor extenextensiVely, number of of recent reports reports suggest suggest an an increased increased armored armored potential potential eivoly, a number (above (above the the 150 150 tanks currently currentlg accepted) accepted) for for future future offensive offensive operations. operations. Reports by FEC0M FECOM are a r e those those concerning concerning the the movement movement of of Chinese Chinese Reports referred referred to t o by e p o r t s received reports received COmmunist Cammunist armored units units into i n t o Korea Korea from from Manchuria. Manchuria. Other r


j
6 6
I

KOREA.. ROK representative instructed instructed tto remain a at Kaesong KOaEA. BOK cease-fire aease-fire repressntative o remain t Kaeaona; negotiations: Ambassador the contents contents of of a a 3.AugUst 3 August letter letter negotiations: Ambassador Muncio.reports Muccio r e p a r t s the by General General Ridgeway Ridgeway from from General General Falk, P a o ROK ROK cease-fire cease-fire representative, representative, received by received Paik notes notes his h i s instructions instructions from from President President Rhee.to Rhee t o be be present present at at i n which which Paik in all a l l meetings. meetings. General Paik makes it clear clear in in h i s letter, l e t t e r , however, General Faik makes it his homever, that attendance attendance is is against against his his personal personal convictions convictions and and that that his his presence preeence does does not signify signify the the ROK Gover 9s approval h e negotiations. not Governmen.'s approval of of any any outcome outcome of of tthenegotiations.

of the the RDK in viewing viewing the the cease-fire cease-fire of ROK in Korea is i s recognized, recognized, the the presence presence Korea Paik, representing representing the the Korean Korean Army, Army, Paik, unanimity of of action. unanimity action.

22gualataramaxasatascussed:. The US Eastern Command, C at. armored potential discussed: TheFar US Far Eastern Command,, in in

13 Aug Aug 51 5 1

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bb

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Top

RET

nentioned muvemenk movement of of-armored into the the combat combat areaarea-i n July have mentioned armred units into particularly i in sector. particulaFu n the western sector.

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HR70-14 /1-1R70-14

SECTION .1 (SOVIET) SECTION1 (SOVTET)


NR NR

30 30

APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE 20-Mar-201 0 ATE: 20-Mar-2010 11;)PPROVED


Tenhtive Indentification of Soviet fiEhter re&nente In the &nchurlaKorea area8 Prellmhry of radio-telephone radio-telephone traffics traffie intercepted Korea area& Preliminary analysie analysis of intercepted during during b e period period 19 19 Nay-16 May-16 July July suggests suggeets that that two t w o reglmente o v i e t 9th i r Arqy the regiments of of a a S Soviet 9th A Air ArMY
-T-OP-GEGRET-SME-

TOP SECRET SUEDE

14 Aug 51

-DD

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4 A

T6-1) SECRET SUEDEr-0


-20P-SEORN-811108-

fighter fighter division ,-risim have have been been operating operating in in the the Manchuria-Korea Mmchuria-Korea border border area. area.
Three. airCraft aalleign ',ensign series series representing representing three three fighter fighter regiment6 regiments Three airdraft believed to the Maritime Maritime Military Military District District to be located in i n the southern part of the disappeared fram f'rm 9th 9th Air A i r Army Army communioatione oommunioationa after after mid-May. mid4ky. On On 19 19 Msy, one disappeared May, one of in tra4fic passed on the the Sovietoperated Soviet-operated groundgroundQf the series reappeared i nt r a f f i c passed oontrolled intercept interoept network network centered oentered at at Antung. Antung. Since 11 11 Zuly July the second secroad controlled of groundof these ensign aalleignseries seriee has has been been heard he& in i n volume volume en m the t h e same 881118 ground("ensign seriee been heard eerie6 has hae not not been heard controlled controlled intercept intercept network. network. The third ctallsign slnoeo (SUEDE, T U f i U U T I s 906, 906, 9 9 Aug Aug 51). 5 1 ) . since.. (SUEDE,UAFSA-242EAUTTS
comment: This suggests that that organised organized units units of of the the This information strongly suggeete FOgrmenGg Soviet Air Bir Force Form are a r e now now stationed stationed in the Manchuria-Xorea Soviet Manchuria-Korea border border area, area, poeeibly possiblY for coMbat far oambat purposes. purpoaecr. The type of s not of aircraft i is not lmowl, known, although although met most fighter fighter aircraft operating operating in in the the area area ate are jets jete or or long-range long-range conventional-engined, conventional-engined, penetration fighters. fighters.

Previou8 indicated direat participation in in the the Previous information information has indicated direot Soviet Soviet participation expaneion of enemy enemy air a h operations operations since since Chinese Chinese entry enLry into into the the Korean Korean war. war. expansion of 811 pilots p i l o t s and and ground ground operators operator8 heard on the ground-controlled All groUnd-controlled iatercept intercept netnetwork have have been Russian, and and communications cornmunitations prOOedWe8 work been Russian, procedures have have shown shown 9th 9th Air Air Amy Army characteristics. Chinese characterietios, Chinese Cannnuniet o * kllied' Communist flight report8 reports have referred referred t to "allied" airoraft, se as distinguished distinguished from from "Chinese "Chinese " n aircraft, aircraf't, and and havoL have and "Soviet "Soviet " aircraft, named Russian flight-&mders, Russian flight-leaders.

.NR

40,P-SEGRET-SIMMI-' 2

'2

14 A Aug 51 34. u g 51

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Ttzad, SECRET SUEDir


-TOP-SEGEST-StIEDE-

SECTION 2 (ELSTERN)

NR

8. 80


KOREA. X a

* ~ iof i of eN e t h Koreanmilitary m i u t a r y messages indicates i d i o a t e a ta aZ w note ;Mike North Korean new note of urgency urgency In oombat oombat preparations preparations on on the the eastern eastern ftont. front, Priaerily in t h North Primarily concerned concerned d with North Korean IX, If, III I11 and srtld V Corpe,logistical Corpa logistical activity, the messages Korean activity,.the messages detail detail the sendsendh $ of t o these corps ing of 789 789 horses horses.to corps and and receipt receipt by by the the I1 II,Corpo of of mountain mountain
artillery artillery battalions. battalions. (SUEDE, TIK-909, TIL-909, 13 Aug 51). (SUEDE, 13 Bug 51).
Comments Mountain much ta to increase the -8 Mountain artillery a r t i l l e r y and horses will do muoh mobility o f . these theae three three corps. corpse The eastern mobility of eastern seatar, sector, in in which which these these corpe corps are are ourrently to the currently engaged, is is very very mountainous mountainous and and well well suited suited.to the use use of of suah sudh

Eteent b North Korean mtlitsry mi4tary mespages pecent r a brem messaims reflect refleo

urzepc7: e a t

A 113 3 AAugust ugust

equipment, equipat.
G

--TOP-SEGRET-613EDR-

14 Aug 51

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9. 9.

1A.,43 SECRET SUEDi.s.


--TOP-SEGRET-19iTEDE--

SM. g-ste &?w.

-the Kaesorvr Conferenoer i d activity at the A recent analysis Communist radio radio aotivity activity in in Kaeeong Kaesong reveal8 reveale.the existence @f of a n a l y d e of Oommuniet the Qtlstenee three communioatlon communication U~-Kaeeong-Fyongyang, links--Kaesongyongyang, KaesongPeiping, Kaesong-hiping, and and SoksanSoksanPyongyang, The The.amsIysis concludes with with the the observation, observation, "It "It fe is intereating interesting &ongying, analyaie conuludee - o ang link to traffic volume deareaeed decreased somewhat someWhat on on the the Kae Kae t o note that t r a f f i o volume with activation o of the Kaeeong-Peiping Kaesong-Peiping link." (SUEDE .(SWE 11 Aug 51), w i t h the aotlvation f the link,n

Comments While this this decrease decrease could crould be interpreted a8 the coneon' &te as eupporting supporting the tention that Conmatxist Communist decieions decisions on on the the oease-flre oease-fire negotiations negotiations are are made made in in PeIPing, there is is no 110 firm firm evidence ePidenae that that this this is is true, h e , Peiping, there


--26P-8-EGRET-WIADIC-

14 Aug 51

TOP SECRET SUEDE

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ThiA, SECRET SUEDhe


FAR EAST

C calR7CT-14 I MR70-14

Tentative identification of Soviet Soviet fighter fighter redments regiments in 1. Tentative identiifcation of i.n the Manchuria-Korean area:
I

Armed Forces Security Security Armed Agency 9 Aug 4w 51 51 SUEDE

Preliminary analysis analysis of of radio-telephone radio-telephone 19 May May to 16 16 traffic during during the period from from19 July suggests that two regiments of a Soviet July two a Soviet 9th Air Air Army Army fighter division have been operating in the Manchuria-Korea Manchuria-Korea border border area. area.

Previous information information has has indicated indicated direct direct Soviet participation Soviet participation in the expansion expansion of of enemy enemyair air operations operations since Chinese Kore.an war. Allpilots pilotsand andground ground operators operatorshe'ard hebrd on on the entry into the Korean war. All ground-controlled intercept network network have been and communications ground-controlled intercept been Russian, Russian, and procedures have have shown shown 9th procedures 9th Air Air Army Army characteristics. characteristics. Chinese Co;mnunist Cop:munist reports have have referred referred to to "Allied" "ARiedtt and a s distinguished distinguished flight reports and 9oviet1f "Soviet"aircraft, aircraft, as ffChinesevf aircraft,and andhave havenamed named Russian flight-leaders. from "Chinese" aircraft, flight-leaders.

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-3-

Three Three aircraft aircraft callsign series series representing 'three fighter regiments believed to be located in the southern part of 'three regiment8 believed located southern part of the Maritime Military District from 9th 9th Air A i r Army Army communications communications District disappeared disappeared from gter On19 19May, May, one oneof of the the series seriesreappeared reappeared in i n traffic traffic passed passed Ytermid-May. mid-May. On Soviet-operated ground-controlled ground-controlled intercept network on the Soviet-operated network centered at at ntung. Since' 11 11 Jnly July the the second secondof of these these calisign callsign series series has has been been heard in Antung.Since The third volume on on the the same ground-controlled ground-controlled intercept third callvolume intercept network. network. The sign series series has has not not reappeared. reappeared.

Comment: This Comment: This information information strongly sugggsts suggests now stationed in the the ManManthat' organbed organiXedunits units of ofthe the Soviet Soviet-Air Air Force Force are are now churia-Korea border border area, area, possibly for comb& combatpurposes. purposes. The The type typeof ofairairchuria-Korea possibly for craft is althoughmost mostfighter fighteraircraft aircraft operating operating in in the the area area a are craft is not not known, known, although re jets penetration fighters. jets or o r long-range long-range conventional-engine conventional-engine penetration

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P4

---r&P---SEGRET SUEDhoi SUEDk


jet r reconnaissance aircraft 2. US 2. US jet e vintercepted intercepted at at40.000 40.000 treet feet in darkness:

ZIIII

Night interceptions interceptions of of an anRB-46 RB-45aircraft aircraft by by a a Night total of seven enemy Jets at altitudes of 35, 000 total o f wven enemy jets altihudea of 55,000 to 40,000 feet have have recently recently been been reported reported over to 40,000 feet over Korean theater. theater. the Korean

Comment: These Comment: These interceptions interceptions clearly clearly demondemonstrate the a very difficult strate the Communists' Communists' ability ability to accomplish accomplish a difficult mission requiring excellent equipment, of coordinaexcelIent equipment, highly trained personnel and a high degree of tion. tion,
These operations operations described described would would require require an an These aircraft with aircralt with a aminimum minimum combat combat radius radius of of approximately approximately 350 nautical miles miles over the the RB-45, RB-45, which whichis is the the reconnaisreconnaisconeiderable speed advantage advantage over and a considerable sance version of could of the B-45. These Theseattacks attacks couldnot nothave have been been accomplished accomplished with the MIG-15 or or the Type-15 with the 33-gallon with 33-gallon wing wing tanks currently currentlyknown known to be in use.
NR NR

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Four aircraft maintained Four enemy enemy aircraft maintained formation formation for a period of o f 25 25 to 30 SO minutes while pursuing the BB-45, kB-45, which which was was executing executing evasive maneuverer.' maneuvers.. At the same time, time, single were occurring, At the single interceptions were evasive including a firing pass 000 feet RB-45 was at at 40, 000 paes from from1, 1,000 feet above above while while the RB-45 40,000 including byan anaircraft aircraft that that later later altered altered feet, and and a a collision collision course course interception interception by course and pulled abreast abreast of RB-45. While pursued, the RB-45 emcourse and pulled of the RB-45. While being being pursued, RB-45 employed 100 100 percent percent power, power, giving ployed giving a a ground ground speed of approximately 470 knots.

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CIA No.49305 Copy No.

33

DAILY DIGEST

OSD REVIEW COMPLETE

DIA and PACOM review(s) completed.

State Department review completed


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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)

1.

USSR. EMbassm Moscow comments on US-USSR exnharges EMbassy Moscow believes that the VOA campaign publicizing the US resolution of friendship for the

Russian people was the decisive factor whiehlorced the sudden and perhaps defensive shift in policy resulting in the publication of the US messages and the Soviet rebuttal. Recent Enbassy monitoring indicates that a significant segment of VOA broadcasts has reached the Russian audience. Embassy officials note that the Kremlin had a convenient opportunity to lend official stature to many component phases of the "peaceful co-existence" campaign but chose instead the points on a FiVe Power Peace Pact and on "discrimination." The Five Power Pact contains, in a single package, these basic essentials of cur-

The EMbassy concludes that the USSR reply was not meant to lead toward any chanke in the existing relations tetween the two governments.


(a)
(b) (c)

rent Soviet' policys

Recogmition of the CPR,

strain on free world unity in the Far East,

weakening of the UN,

(d). reestablishment of big power diplomacy, and


(e)

cheoking of impetus towerd strengthening of the free world defenses.

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2.

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Airfield in Sovzone of Germany to receliVe TU-4es (B-29 tyne)s Two current reports indicate that Briesen Airfield located in the Sovzone of Gernams 25X1 will receive a second taxi track an4 44 concrete parking stands in addition to the planned 8,200-foot concrete runway 260 feet in width. Each parking stand is to be circular and 118 feet in diameter. ITU-4 aircraft are to be stationed at this field and that parking stands are to be constructed for
1

this purl:3619e.

Field Comments One of the above reports was substantiated with a master .construction plan Of the new runway including parking stands. The latter were drawn on the plan on 20 July 1951. The 118-foot diameter circular parking stand is adequate for parking and accommodating TU-4 aircraft. This is the first time that parking stands have been included in construction of:any airfield in the Soviet Zone' of Germany. It is also the first time that Soviet officers have mentioned plans for stationing TU.14 aircraft at one of the newly constructed airfields.
1

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Comments TU-Als are not new stationed in the Soviet Zone of Germany. 'This spring, type 27 twinjet bombers bedaMe the first bomber aircraft with increased offensive capabilities to arrive in the Zone.

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EASTERN EUROPE. amingzAism. New technique adopted to perfect Communist
political trialss The-Russians are rePorted to have developed a new teChnique to assure a perfect performanceja-political trials. The new technique, allegedly used at:the Oatis trial, consists of conducting four or five dress rehearsals, complete with a hand-picked audience, during which all mistakes in the dialegue are corrected. If the accused attempts to interject unauthorized statements; the audience is instructed to burst inte laughter. These rehearsals take place until the script is perfected.'

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Comments Many theories have been advanced for the lethargy of the defendants at Communist trials, although few facts are definitely known. The monotonoui lack of spontaneity exhibited by the accused and prosecutor alike in the Oatis trial could stem from such preparation. Extreme physical ex hanstion, the application of drugs, and the promise of improved physical cos& ditions may also contribute to the lethargic manner of the defendant.

4,

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HUNGARY. Soviet troop departure reporteds The US Air Attache in Budapest transmits-the-report. that Russian 25X1 troops in Hungary are to begin or hive already begun a slow withdrawal to Russia and the Rumanian-side Of the border. This move is to be effected by mid-October'in advance of a possible Hungarian strike against Yugoslavia. The USSR would then aid the Hungarian invasion of Yugoslavia with "volunteers."

Comments No evidence is available of any unusual movement 9f the two Soviet divisions in Hungary; The Hungarian Army which has been apanded from 65,000 to 100,000 since 1950 is generally' considered less prepared for any aggressive action thin are the Bulgarian or Rtmanian armies. Moreover, until the Austrian Peace Treat, is signed, the USSR has a valid reason, provided by the Hungarian Peace Treaty, for maintaining armed forces in Hungary.

Hungary procuring copper through Zurich firmz Metallimpex Budapest has arranged to procure 3,000 tons of electrolytic 99% copper bars through Herman Az, a Zurich firm. The Hungarian importer has stated that he prefers to have the shipment routed through Antwerp or Durazzo (Albania) rather than via Rumania. The US Legation Vienna has suggested that an investigation by the Swiss Government.is in order. The Legation points out that recent information


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indicates that the Satellites regard Antwerp as the tort thremph whtnh clandestine trade can be diverted most easily.
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Comments There have been numerous reports of Hungarian efforts to procure critical raw materials'through interthediaries. The copper would probably be obtained from Rhodesia, Chile,. or Mexico. Shipment of goods through Antwerp or Durazzo, from whence they:would be taken to Trieste for transPortation by rail to Hungary, is quicker and cheaper than shipment through
Rumania..

6.

POLAND. Prosecutor exceptionally violent in trial summation of Army officerss US Embassy Warsaw reports that the prosecutorgs summation of the evidence in the trial of nine former senior Polish Army Officers was extra-, ordinarily violent, even for such Communist denunciations. The defendants were referred to as "foul subversionistspw "mercenary.degenerates," and "the scum of the Polish nation." Their objective was described as plotting "to pave the way for the Anglo -SaXon air pirates to destroy Polish towns, murder its women, aged, and children as they are now 'doing in Korea." The prosecutor dealared that their prinoipal aim was "to brealf the bonds linking Poland with the Soviet area."

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Comments The trial has consittently emphasized national deviationism as being the root 6f the evils in Which the defendants were engaged. Despite the smear tactics whioh the prosecutor used in his summation, it is unlikely that he was able to eraseithe respect which the Polish public bolds for these leaders of the wartime underground.

70

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YUGOSLAVIA, Tito Government not internally endangered. US Ambassador Allen reports that although the unpopularity of Yugoslav Communist regime remains undiminished, the available evidence points to its continued stability. There seems to be a sympathetic popular understanding of the government's military and foreign policies, as well as an unconscious dissociation of certain respected members of the regime, such as Tito, Xerdelj and possibly Pijade, Atli the lower officials responsible for executing the regime's policies; The AMbaseador-concurs in the opinion of the US Military Attache that:the Yugoslav army would fight loyally, and if its organization were disrupted, would resort to localized guerrilla tactics. Allen concludes that the widespread popular discontent is caused by the demand for continued popular sacrifices after the country's past tribulations.

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Comment: The ihrewd appea/ of the Tito regime to the strong nationalism Of the Yugoslav people afforded it internal stability even during the crucial , period of.the 1950 drought. All available intelligence indicates that the Yugoslav Government, although beset with numerous internal difficulties, can effectively cope with them.

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

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3.


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INDONESIA. Darul Islam possibly involved in Djakarta port ments from prisoners arrested in connection with the attack on the

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Djakarta port of Tandjong Priok (see Daily Digest, $ Aug) indicate that a Moslem religioue leader, Kijahi, was the key figure behind the incident. Also seized at the time of the arresta were hathmer and sickle insignia and emblem 'of the Darel Iglpm nnri 11%n thiitary arm, the Indonesian Moslem Army.
Comment: The Darul Islam is a fanatical Moslem organization entrenched in West Java, which seeks to establish a Mohammedan state by force. Although Darul Islam follozers include certain "Communisttinged" groups (which could-explain the presence of hammer and sickle insignia at Tandjong Priok), the organization is not known to have cooperated in the past with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).
. ,

Undoubtedly the PKI hopes to exploit Darul Islam strength in West Java. Whether the Tandjong Priok attack represents evidence of PKIDarul Islam cooperation, however, has yet to be proved.

4.

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THAILAND. Military leaders continue to vie for powert Hostility between Police Director:Phao and General Sarit:(commander Of the Bangkok army garrison) is continuing: The latter is obtaining increasing support from various army elements but is not yet ready to make a bid for power. Phao, on the other hand, apparently prefers to temporize until the elections of March 1952, at which time he hopes to gain control of Parliament and be in a position to dominate Sarit without resort forte. The position ofithe air force in the struggle is unclear.

.It is significant to note, however, that in June the Consultative Council of Political Parties--the PKI-sponsOred national front organizetion--set up a branch in Bandung in West Java. Appointed as general chairman of the branch was a member of the Indonesian Islamic League, an orgardzation which has always been eympathetic to the Darul Islam and which has now joined the government's opposition. The branch secretary of the League is a member of the PKI.

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5.

Cbmment: If at any time between now and the elections Phao believes he is.losing ground in his rivalry with Sarit, he might well attempt a coup d'etat.

CHINA. Chinese Communists strengthen police controls: The Chinese Com. nunist press reveals that the Peiping regime has strengthened its already extensive'police controls over the Chinese populace by

(a) promulgating new, regulations further restricting entry and exit of overseas Chinese and travel to and from

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14 Aug 51

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Hong Kong andliacao;


(b). giving the Ministry of Public Seduriti new powers to control radio appliances and Supplies (with the partial intention and result of reducing the effectiveness of the Voice of America); and (c) 'establishing a central school charged with the training of County and municipal public security, and jUdicial cadres.
.

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6.

Peipig press claims Communist forces "well pre:pared" to continuewarr ThaPeiping PeOpIelA.Daily, organ of the Chinese Communist Party, asserted in an 11 AugUst.editorial that the Chinese and North Korean "people" are not "afraid of continuing our just war of resistance to aggression." and are "fully confident and well preparedtto continue.

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Cetment: On 5 Atigust, Generaljleng Teh-haai, commanding Chinese Communist forces in:Korea, asserted that the CNIs superiority in weapons "vilkchange,"..and that Chinese forees had%libegun the Astablishment of a peoples artillery and large-scale air forces" with which they would "win greater victories," 5he 11 August.assertion that ComMunist forces are now "well prepared" to continue hostilities implies, or at least threatens, that the artillery arid air Arms are ready for action. HUN field intelligence confirme a considerable build-up in COmmunist Artillery and air strength in the past several months. However, the 11:August editorial iSlargely devoted to asserting thateemmunist China genuinely desires a Korean armistice on the basis of the 38th Parallel.

Comment: The Peiping regime dims,at the total domination of its Subjects in all aspects of their lives. An enormous increase in security organization:SI regulations and operations is to:be expected.

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8.

KOREA. A

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rumored: A 12 August ointment of new ROK Defense Minister rumor Nationalist news source in Korea reports a dispatch from a Chinese China, is slated to Nationalist that 1ee Bum Suk, present ROK Ambassador Government. The item notes, in thellOK for the post of Defense Minister reluctande to accept any Cabinet office however, that Lee has expressed diplomatic post. and desire to return to his
I

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\

Comment :

in the ROK, was considered a strong man President Rhee will replace the present indicate that friend of is no evidence to competent official and personal Minister of Defense Yi Ki Bong, a Rhee, with Lea.

of Defense in the Lee; an ex.-Prime Minister and Minister earlY days of the Itepublic. There

9.

limitations are if aerial reconnaissanCe er to UN fo ces FECOM notes da tore& and Coitunist .air capabilities in and the US Far impoied in ceas-f ire agreement: Eastern. Command US Far. Manchuria have been reevaluated by the based on the possibility that hostiliThis new estimate, Eastern Air Force. of the Kaesong talks, notes a ties may cease in the near future as a result Korea should an agreement be reached such considerable danger to the UN forces in over North Korea . In MOW a opinion, reconnaissance limiting UN aerialallow the reoecupation of North Korean- airfields by Commuin limitations might threat to UN aerial nist aircraft, thereby posing a serious the event of renewed hostilities.
'

superiorit/

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IO.
, '

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\

of gas by UN forces: An 11 August radio North Koreans protest use ,Korean note to the UN prothe text of a .North The broadcast iniCoream.teleased "American interventionists:" testing against the use of poison gas by two "bombs" on the city of Yonan broadcast cites the 6 August dropping of August bombing of a North K.orean troav (southwest of Kaesong) and the 7 .".1 atrocities inetallation as usVidenee of these "deliberate
I

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Consent: Korth Korea has previously accused the,114 of 'employing chenical and biological warfare. These accusationa are-probably for Soviet.Crbit internal consumption in order to atrengthen the "hate America" feeling*

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SECTION 3
1.

(MES1ERI)

FRANCE.. Near pro=US French Government is Vinod iwithout Embassy Paris finds that the Socialists: US replacements of Moch and and Mayer in the Defense Petsphe by Bidault and Finance posts, Cabinet shifts of partidular respectively, are the French rearmament and relations withinterest to the US in connection with France's NATO.
.

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affairs

.Bidaalt will have full authrity, ordinate rapidlyFrench policy on North according to press reports to coprespective Contribution. Atlantic defense, including Mile he reportedly Germany's will Minister Schuman in this task, "cooperate" mith Foreign the latter ment of the will be concentrating French position in the Far on deVelopas well as on application East, Indochina, and the of the Mediterranean, coal-steel pool plan, 'The embassy believes that, whatever Bidault's Schaman may turn Out to official relation to be, "it is More than training and interest in probable that Bidault with his desire to be more adtiVe foreign and his long in that field and ill-concealed will exert an influence strictiv domestie asoeits of national beyond the defense", 1

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d'ointherit:

Vice-Premiers mill hold 'preGovernmentfare ardently pro-American supporterS of NATO. Although of b.:mediate Moch had come to...fever Socialist aims to defense a sacrifice coolneas to US leadership requirements, he:reflected and.Was Socialist generally considered The departure of Petsehe, a difficait however, and his replacement with Mayer, negotiator. narrower political supportl-close who has business quarrels with the Socialists, connections, and a record of mill weaken their present of the government, conditional support

amineEtTgrtions in the new Pleven And Strong

Both Bidault and Mayer, who as

2. AUSTRIA.

\
,

:Government plans to deny Minister of the Interior residence pertits to 1FTU emple- lie: Helmer informed US High,Commiss Donnelly on 9 AUgust that the World Federation oner declared illegal in Austria, of Trade Unions had been The minister expiration of two-month teMporary residence stated further that after the .(other than permits, all V/FTU employees SoViet nationals who may permits) would be denied remain for permission to reside in seven menths on temporary however, remains Austria. The US 'skeptical that the Austrian legation, government will be able to
117517Ffih
.

While the past syMpathies of Pleven, Bidault, could be and Mayer for De Gaulle expected-to help soften the the diffieult opposition of the General's Months ahead, the Gsullists' party in position whenever the strategy is middle-of-the-road regime can be to joirLthe opdiscredited.

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take effective action against the WFTU, and expects that achieved other than to Make little can be it clear that the VIFTU Austriartcapital by grace .of contintes in the the Soviet the wishes of the Austrian occvnation authoritils and against people.

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ITALY.

Premier was to press the Soviet Minister than 63,000 Union for the retttn of more Italian'prisoners still held in the Government has evidence that USSR. Although the Italian Italian prisoners are Soviet concentration still held-in sane 56 campe, probably as slave labor, replied to previous Italian the Soviet Union has inquiries with the statement prisoners remain in the USSR. that ho Italian
-Ite Italipilstatiptics on war prisoners elicited by th&UN were preewnabiy commission investigating the wir in the Soviet Union. status of.Priseners of .Premier De Gasperi timed doindide with: (1) his his announcement to recently inaugurated campaign to strength of Italian Communists,by diminish the (2) Italy's propaganda and restrictive intensified drive for revision means; and of the Italian admission.ihto the UN. Dn seVeral pease'treaty and ifi atteMpts'to occasions former debunk Communist claims that Foreign Minister Sforsa, to Italians, has pointed the SeViet Union is to the retention of friendly the USSR. Sforza has also Italian prisonere of war by dwelt on the admission to the UN. Soviet veto of Italy.'s proposed Govermteht apprehensive aver possible loss of US aheese aneolive oit: market for Italian' The Italian Foreign Office amendment to the Defense Act, has protested the Anderson suspending oils, cheese', or limiting US imports df fats, etc. fromWestern European countries which export materials to Eastern Europe., strategic The Foreign Office points hit two typical Italian out that it would products olive oil and to conflict with US policy cheese, and would appear favoring the economic recovery of countries within
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bOinthent:

return Italian war prisoners: DW-Msperi'has announced that one of his first acts as Foreign in tha nevicabinet

De Gasperi trges USSR to

intervention.and by the absence Strong support of the WFTU Element in the by the Soviet Allied Commission and consequent the Austrians have led US hesitanay bn the part of observers to believe that move Slowly in declaring the Austrian officials WFTU a "menace to public will register aS required by safety", if it should Austrian law, or an illegal should not. The MOVO to deny residence perMits to secret society, if it probably be regarded, therefore, WFTU pereonnel should as merely part of the general campaign which the Austrian harassing Government is apparently willing to undertake.
'

Comment; Although by the US legation effective action againstencouraged to take all possible the WFTU, the in its measures by the Austrian Government has been liMited possibility of Soviet of clear legal justification.

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the framexmrk of ER4.1S.,-13mbassY-Rohe bel*Od..".thejtalian protest:is more than-justified"'-sihaelit,:woul&be.,,most 4iffichlt to explain tb the cheese and oii:prodhOO'PO....P9*,faCed'Ilidth

half of their reePective:exPert:Marketa. assists up defense-preductiona


I

the loss of One-third:and oher

25X1

to all countries Ori.the other hand; since these two products had a total,yalua ef $1jJ. MilliOn for this:peried, the loss of the US market:lor:Italian Cheese end olive 61r:exporters would have a dignificant effect on Italy"s foreigh exchange.poeitiOn.

the same period, thei*rd'OplYA:per cent ahd5 Per:bent reePactiva.347 of total Italiamekports

While Italian exports Of cheeSeahdOliVe oil for the first four mopths of 195IMere approxiMately-33'per ta the US Cent and 61 per cent reapectiyely of total Italialt*Perts of thSse doMmodities for:

Comment,:

5.

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Commentt The:commentaier'is-editor ot the Small: Liberal Party"s hows paper, -which had 6.relatiVely low.eirculationO Nevertheless, the views expressed represehtl4e_opihionof that large 'segment eftheHphblic composed principally of,bubinesie men,,.which ihaiSts-that Switzerlan4 keep open its normal chdrInels of trade with all countries,:
.

bWiTZERLAND. Reaesertibn of neUtralist poSitionsfirlEastgibat'trade: A commentator on the Bern radio denies that the recehtJZ-Swiss:conVersations on export Oohtrole involved apy agreement-en:the:Part of the Swiss, and asserta that Switzerland is unwilling triliecoms:,inyolved mith either the East Or the Xest in any kind of enbargo faVor :one side to the detrimentof the other wohld,rhe declares,:hean "giviheup the neutrality mhich is writteriAlito our cohstitutien and interhationaI agreements". He further comments that Switzerland mbuld be taking sides and,forsaking its neutrality if it adopted the US suggestion that it prohibit pXport to the USSR of goada:manufptured et home from rew materials obtained fram the West.
.

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UNITED KINGDOM. Serious decline in steel produotion foreseen: ECA London reports that a critical reduction in British steel output is expected in 1951. This will be due primarily to an estimated lag of one million tons in ingot capacity which has resulted from: (a) drying up of German scrap exports,

(b) inability to purchase adequate iron ore supplies in world markets,

The British contend that the US has been getting most of the available German scrap exports.and is the most favored purchaser of continental Steel. 'Although the.British'Oevernment has started a blast furnace expandion program, and hes begun to develop iron ore resources in parts of Africa, UK domestic production is unlikely to exdeed 16 million ingot tons in 1951 and 1952.
GodMent: A steel shortage now'appears as an added serious factor in the difs deteriorating economic situation. The latest production estimate now anticipated is 147.2 million tons less than peat long-range estimates for this period. The Government is hard-pressed to'fulfill defense cammitments for the reariament program, whieh by increasing cOnsumption is largely responsible for the steel shortage.


(c) a shipping shortage, and (d) inadequate blast furnace capacity.

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8.

BRITISN'GUIANA. Significant gains made by CoMmuniet-oriented party: The Communist-oriented People's Progressive Party (PPP) has gained-wide support in British Guiana in the year-and-a-half since its formation, and all evidenop indicates that it will meet with continuing success in ite current Campaign for recruiting additional members. Formed early in 1950 hy Dr. and Mrs. Cheddi Jagan, a couple with kneWn Pro-SoVidt, anti4S sympathies, it is the only political party which has ever commanded a significant following in the colony. Membership in Marohcas announced by Mrs. Jagan during the party's first congress stood at 3,0607-a figure which was probably not grossly exaggerated and *doh assumes significance with the realizatixv: that the membership fee, although small, ill not easily raised by the average
'

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The remarkable strides which the party has made in 18 months are explained by the fact-that it is the first group ever to hold out any hope to British Guiana's poorly paid, inadequately housed workers for improving their miserable standard of living,
Guianese.

The party has cleverly used tactics which attract tbe widest possible support fram lower-income groups. Byplaying-up the poor conditions which most of the Colony's peoples under actually do work and live, PEP leaders have created considerable unrest and have rather successfully presented party as tbe rallying point for those the dition, the party has sought to align dissatiefied With their lot. In aditself with some Of the organized labor unions* Its connections with the Guiana IndustrialWorkers' now seem to be firmly established, and Union it is probable that the Jagans at least nartially were responsible for the workers' union from the non-Communist recent separation of the bauxite Man Power Citizens' Association*

25X1.

1 If PPP influence continues to increase (and there is every indication that it will), Com-. munist capabilities for hindering Canada and the US through atrike the flow of British Guiana bauxite to and.sabotage activitiea will'increase respondingly (9% of US requiroments corcome from British Guiana).

sign on the British Guiana scene in December 1950 of a second was the formation political partythe National Democratic Party ,organized by hon-Communist leaders and also designed toappeal 'income groups, As yet, however, to lowerit has not had great success, in members, and has given no promise recruiting of beeoming an effective opponent PPP. of the
9.

One slightlyhopeful

4.9.221,_Ngfj.

refine The US Consul reports -sow emending A 20 wage increase. The company's per cent counter-offer was refused by the renudiated their, bargaining_committee workers, who which had accepted the offer." The Netherlands Government mediator is negotiating. The refinery operating at reduced capacity on is-now an emergency basis.
:
I

'Strike re Orted in Aruba oil thatWv:re ry wor ars s ruc on

The Lego Oil and Transport Company, Ztd, Oil OMIT-jersey) operates the world's second largest of Aruba (Standard haa a normal output of oil refinery which approximately 490,000 barrels daily, satisfaction has been present right along in both Aruba and Labor disit apparently is nowcoming Curacao, and to a head as a reSult of the national petroleum situation which general interhas led ths workers to believe are in aistronger bargaining that they position*

Comment:

25X1

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The main grievance of labor has been the wage differential and general preferential position given to certain foreign nationalities. During WorldMar II this wage policy operated against the Chinese employees of the tanker fleet and produced a long strike which seriously hampered the importation of crude petroleum from Venezuela. The present cause of dissatisfaetion 12 possibly a sharp rise in the cost of living -which has not been offset by a proportionate upward adjUstment of tagots cost of living bonus to its employees. Lego has exercised rather close supervision of organized labor in its plant. It wisely has encouraged establishment of the Lago Employee Council (employee advisory committee) to .confer with management on labor problems while simultaneously using it as a device to combat the rise of labor unions. Of the numerous sporadic efforts at unionization, one formal Union has managed to risethe ArUba Labor Union. It has been used primarily' to further the political aspirations ot its president, Henry Eman, The union apparently has attracted enough dissatisfied workers to its ranks and has gained sufficient 'strength to declare this strike in an effort to force company recognition.

10.

SWEDEN. Government grants asylud to Polish nutineers: The Swedish govern:76=as granted political refuge to the 12 polish naval.mutineers who southern Swedish port of Ystad on 2 August,
I

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The Swedes were able to escape a conflict between their Comment: humanitarian implges and-their pride in strictly observing international law because there is ne extradition treaty between Poland and Sweden, and the Swedish law of 1913 specifically exemptedrmutiny as a crime requiring extradition. In the case of such a conflict, the goVernment would undoubtedly make a great effort to find some legal loophole or overriding political reason to maintain its humanitarian record,

11,

ARGENTINA. Peronista Party urges denunciation.of opposition: The Peronista Party has urged all medbers to tell police of any "attempts to promote sabotage" and has advised them that the time has coMe "to wipe out the swine made daring by oUr tolerance". The statement followed the arrest of 80 raillkey engineers and a number of Radicals and Socialists, All of Wham were accused of plotting a campaign of terrorilm and sabotage to spread disorder on the eve of the 11 November elections.
I

25X1

Cednenti Peron has denounced all non-Peronistas as traitors. The constant call for action against the opposition and foreign interests could resUlt in violence, as election activities are intensified. On occasion official newspapers have published names and addesss of anti-Peron elements,

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arid often Peron hae advised workers to keep a supply of baling wire "to hang the opposition".

12.

Cannon: As the 1952 elections approach, the administration Will probahly become increasingly hesitant to admit international obligations which might be regarded as adverse.to'national Sovereignty and welfare. The Mexican public does not appear Convinced, at present, that the Eastlest struggle involves an hmnediate threat to Mexico. Unless a new crisis arises, therefore, it is possible that domestic political'considerations will serve to inhibit'expressions of agreement With, or support of, various US international aims.

13.

25X1

PANAMA. President's new legal advisor: President Arosemena has appointed RTFrilo J. Alfaro as his legal counselor. Alfaro accepted the office without Salary which may indicate-a deSire to remain aloof from the present Weak administratiOn. Clearly, though, he plans to'play an important political role. i
1

Comment: Ricardo J. Alfaro has been prominent in Panamanian governments throughout Panama's history. His first position was that of Under Secretary Of Foreign Relations in 1905, two ysars after the establishmmnt of the Republic. Throughout his career he has maintained a reputation for financial honesty.

In recent years, he has been obdurate and ultra-nationalistic in negotiations with the US Embassy. in Panama on,issues of bilateral interest, but has been cooperative withmembers of US delegations at internatienal conferences, especially when problems of international laW were under dipcussion. The Embassy reports that he is currently exerting his influence in favor of strong measures, which are advocated by the US, to ban Panama flag vessels from visiting Chinese Communist or North Korean ports.

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MEXICO. Administration seeks te'avOid publiciiing Military cooperation with OS: In response to a US auggestion'that an exchange of notes might serve to revalidate the US-Mexico reciprocal agreement fer the transit of military aircraft, a Mexican Foreign Office spokesman has indicated that it would be well not to question the validity of the agreement and to assume that it has not expired. In a strictly confidential oral reply, the spokesman stated that the exchange of notes would have to be ratified by the Senate, and--although ratificatiOn would be, likely-tpolitical opposition might be encountered which would lead to undeeirable public debate,; The proximity of the coming presidential electiona was giVen as a factor which "might also complicate matters". The US Embassy comments that these remarks "would seem to confirm the present.well-known policy of the Mexidan government to avoid any action which might:in anyway be interpreted as a military commitment". 25X1

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140)

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14 August 1951

CIA No. 49305-A


Copy No.

25X1

SUPPLEMENT
TO THE DAILY DIGEST

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Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE.

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence-

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SECRET

SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

10

Government accepts latest draft of Japanese peace.treatv: President Quirino, with the concurrence of his special 15man.advisory committee, has agreed to accept the language of the latest draft of the Japanese peace treaty.
I 1

MILIPPINES.

25X1

2.

Meanwhile, Minister Heath in Saigon argues against offering the Associated States observer status, stating that such a halfmeasure would cast more doubt on the independence of the Associated States than would their nonattendance at the lonference.

signatories of Japanese treatv: The UK Foreign Office is opposed to,inviting the Associated States to the San Francisco treaty- conference as Dobservers," feeling that this would stir up the question ofChinese Nationalist observer status. The Foreign Office plans to delay its reply to a formal request from CaMbodia that it be invited to sign at San Francisco pending Indiats response to UK attempts to persuade India to sigh the treaty. Apparently. the Foreign Office believes that India will delay its reply, thereby blocking an invita tion to the Associated States,

INACCHIN West weighs choice be-Mien India and Indoehinese states as

25X1

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HR70-14

V'
TOP SECIZER

NR


Communist. Air Force.

7..

..

German FOWs al e e to flyjets in Man4wriat about 300 German prisoners-of-war have been sent from Kommomolsk to Mukden and Changchun to pilot jet aircraft for the Chinese
Comment: ComIlentr

Although G e m P ~ Ehavei5fi.nI Uerman POWs have often peen reported amohg,Soviet advisorytechnical personnel in Shanghai, it is doubtful that the USSR would entrust jet aircraft to them.

r
L

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6 6

15 1 5 Aug 51 51

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-Ter-RIEORET

NR NR

3.116,

KOREA.

North KrOeans to use civilian in POW returns:

North Korean Authorities are othering refugees and ordinary citizens together in tear area camps. These people riaportedlylill be designated pr4soners cf war and used in eny'exchanke of *isoners growing Out of the Khesong
cease-fire- talks.

Commenbi

The great disparity between the large number of prieeners

of warlactbythe UN.forces and the Small nuMber held Wthe Communist


forces may have induced thelbrth Koreans to resort to such a stbterfuget however, this activityis Unconfirmed.

I
TOPSEGRET7
.

NR NR

15 Aug 51

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w
,

1 .

Teil-SEGRET--

4.

AOK unification activities may be eMbarrassing North Korea: AMbassador. Ikea Peale that.the strange.failure.of the North Korean propaganda mechanism to seise upon MK anti-oease-fire and unification aetivities may be due to eMbarrassment. He Observes that unification sentiment in North Korea is equally as strong as in the ROK, and that the volume of ROE activity has probably had the*effect of "stealing the.thunder from the North Koreans." Koreanso" North

UM.

5.

It has has previously k v i o w l y been observed that that despite despite the the intensity intensity with With pomments It 22mmants been Observed w w c h the the ROK g0vemxmn-t m a pushing uniflaatlon line, n whiCh ROK government wae pushing the the.unification line,me&nge meetingsheld had i in support of of this thia stand stand were were not not large large and and seemed seemed to to be be disorganized. disorgani5ed. support
NI


10P-SECRET%kPmXEY

AOK unification activities lagging: AMbassador Muccio reports that anti-cease-fire and pro-unification activity,while still at a high pitch, is "certainly not increasing...." Mucci() observes that the subject "has taken on the aspects of an old story" to many Korean and that the government is meeting increasing difficulty in arousing enthusiasm. He observes, In addition, that a "considerable nuMber" of Koreans herve become more realistic and are oreoared "to accept de facto division...."

2 2

15 Aug 51 51 1 5 Aug

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HR70-14 HR70-14
*
L

'

11013-633RET-BUIE111

NR

&rth Jsme= uoabat &orm reaeive additi o n dweaconos. weaponas A 1 August 10. um. Xorth Korean dombatlorusreceive additional Auguat ULJiiA. meesqe f r o m the the North Narth Korean Korean artillery artillery commander oanrmander at.Front a t Front Line Lirie Headquarters Headquartere message from to the the artillenrystaff artillery staff at a t Supreme Supreme Headquarters i n Py t h e roreto Headquarters in Pyongyang reports reports the

21and and30 303111,15 J e of lO&O 3 aati-aircraft ceipt, between 21 of 104480(maohine (machine guns?), 1 163 anti-aircraft 11 2 2 4 ~ artdllery 1 rifles 1 122-imm artillery (howitzers (howitzers ?) ?) and and 194 194 anti-tank'rifles. anti-tank'rifles. (SUEDE 040 1 1 Aug A u ~ 51)e 040 51).

-rt

11.

Gas ahortaae shortwe olaaupa Dl a m e s Communis ta t i o n at a t Ka esopg;: An Bn'8 Auguat Gas Communist deleaation Keesonal 8 August message from from the the'hesong Conference Group Group to to Pyongyang Pyongyttng deplores deplores the the fact fact that that message Kaesong Conference worktlis is in poor condition "due o the lack gasoUne." ca one wore "oommunioat4ona in poor condition 0due to t the lack of of gasoline...0. (SUEDE, 34, 34, 8 8 Aug Bug 51). 5 1 ) .
.

; : = =

Gasolipe shortages have-been fiaulty t o C munlet qommen701 Gasoline Shortages have-been a a oonetant constant U difficulty to Communist S;Ommen$s foroee in mare than than 66 bionthe, mOnthe. forcesin Korea Korea for for more
/NR

-Terii-3-9213T-s-tazs16, Avg 51.

i n Come& Convaents It It is is believed believed that that this this report report probably probably refers refers to to xlflee rifles inThe stead of of machine maohina guns, gunrs, and and anti-aircraft anti-aireraft machine machine guns guna inetead instead of of rifles. rifles. The stead preeenoe of of 31 31 m e d i u m artillery (222-mm howitzers) presence medium artillery pieoee pieces (122-mm howitzers) in in the the forward forward are-areas-if confirmed-6i oonfirmed- dll ffrs power ofof the three NortlhICorean if willconsiderably considerablyincrease increasethe the fire power the three NorWKorean oork under undw Front Front Line Line Headquarters. Headquartere, corpe

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b-1)
5_S

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HR70-14

v
-TOP-SECRET
SECTION 1 1 (SOVIET) SECTION (SOVIET)

1 .

USSR. U rn.

Kremlin takes fill full credit.for KOreags liberation Kremlin credit for Korea*e, Uberation from A.om Japanese; Jaoaneee a to.the.6th.Annivereary.of Korea's liberaliberaA Moscow broadcast broadeast deiroted devoted to .the 6th .Annfvereazg of Korea18 t$onp extolled of tions, extolled the the Soviet Soviet UnionQrr Union'e udecislve' *decisive role role in in the defeat of

.hi
-

'

Japan the subsequent arbrequent liberation liberation of of Korea. Kmea. Stereotyped charges charge0 Japan and the traced US violations uviolatlons of obligation8 obligations f'rm from tha the moment moment of of Korea's Korea's llbliberation" the Xarean Korean people." people.N 'The orationn to,the t o the "armed intervention intarvention std.:net againet the The broadoaet broadcast r reiterated e i t e r a t e d that the "entire "entire peace peace oamp, camp, headed headed by by the the SorSoviet l e t Union, Union9 58 is on on t the h e side side of ofAhe the Korean Xorean people people who are a m confident oonfident of t h e i r abilities abilitlar and and their their might, their might,
pravda alio pUblished a TASS dispateh from Korea which expressed the Korean.people's "feeling of deep gratitude and love for the Soviet Union and its armed forces which liberated Kores,from Japen.". This marked thevfirst occasion in a long, time that urese_published heavy North Korean =aim+ for the USSR.

Comments Comntents Moscow again avoided avoided comment comment on the current situation Moscow again situation in Korea, a characteristie Soviet.propaganda i n Korea, charaoterietie dr df Soviet propaganda since s h o e the the beginning beginning of the Korean Korean h hoetilities. of o s t i l i t i e s . However, However, exasperation e x m p r a t i o n with firmwith the Vpr UR firmnee6 at at ESesong Kaesong was waa suggested suggested in in the the North North KoreantZonmiunist Korean*~Caanmuniet etabness statemeats selected seleoted for for pdblication.in publfeation I n the the Moscow Mosoow press. press, ments

NR NR

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16 Aug,51

[~PPROVED-FOR RELEASE APPROVED-FOR RELEASE [DATE: .DATE: 09-Dec-2009

1 I

4b

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EIL1 -

5.

5.

CHINA.

Ti"irit Japant

authorities in Canton in late July, it was revealedAhab.thi.peiplJag regime 8UthOr


(a) (a)


(b) (b)

Columnists allegedly to resume Korean confiiet;i4ttadklormosa and

at a moting,Oalledhe CoMmunist

will Eaesong talks talks for for a aY "ft* w i l l prolong the Raesong e w monthan'inorder to reorganize reorpdqe their their forces; forces;
together ferces leaven; together with with the the ussa, USSR, will will attack:4apan;**14:119$ attack Japan "wh

and and

(c) (c)

will larill "liberate UberatellFormosa, Formosa, although althoughCommnhiat Conmuaiet losses lcrses are are expected expected t r 3 eaUal e a h l those:of thoee.of the t he HlahJlland Oamaian anainst tO mainland campaign againet the the Natiohaliets Nationalists.

,COments Comment t cided late 'July July ta to prolong prolong the the Kaeeolig Kaesong t talks for/amPriWer .4N, therecided in late a b 'for a QLO after offensive iin Korea and and to to a attack FOimoSa.and/or Japan after to t o returns r e 8 w t the h e offensive n Korea and/Or Asia, ..Althougha top7leVelftiscussion arad/or certain certain countries countries of o f SoUtheast Southeast Asia. ~1uthough a top-level di8CUSeiOn

the:ghilie*COMunists

16 Aug 51

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10

U
101"emecl.tET

ur

of such have taken taken place a at the time time stated, stated, it it r remains doubtful such topics topics may have t the e w i n s doubtful
0 es not no co e k MMm ormosa and and Japan operations operations does colrPait tih8 sts t o the alleged Formosa

aao eaege

-I

at is still no no reliable reliable evidence evidence of of a a Slno-Soviet Sino-4oviet a t any definite time. time. There is to Formosa or Japan, Japan, or or t to invade Southeast 4outheast Asia, Asia, in intent t o assault either Formosa o Invade the next next seVeral the several weeks.. weeks.

N F

7. Agym. h Korean beration.Da f : a o ans mention mentio- ninht ni t f 7. KOREA. NO North Korean " "Liberation D a y t t slogans : oOf f perticular erest in-thelong slogans'recently.issued the G T Iiin n~ te res ~ t in the long liat<of u s t , d slogans r e c e n t b ism%%y the
North Korean radio to commemorate 15 August 1945, Korea's liberation day, are those exhorting various branches of the armed forces to strive "to annihilate and clean up the enemy under any combat conditiona." "Night formations" of the "Air Force of the Republic" are instructed to "refine "]Khgineers" are your Martial arta and yeurselves with advanced air arts.'" instructed to perfect themselves in the laying of "river.croseing bridges," and "tankmen" are ordered to "drive your tanks into the heart of the enemy positions...."
~

Comment: While for morale While slogans slogans are a r e frequently frequently employed employed for morale purposes, ppoees, it by the the North North Korean Korean a air force is menit is l e interesting interesting that that night night :flying S b i n g by i r force tioned: tioned. The The incidence incidence of of night night attacks attacks on i r c r a f t over North Korea has has on UN UN s aircraft risen week at rlsen from from nil nil four four months months ago ago to t o several several encounters encounters per week a t present. present,

I
16 Aug Aug 51 51 16

NF

-Tet"MtliE-T-

7 7

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17.Aupst 1951

c* No. 49308
Copy No.

?5

DAILY DIGEST

State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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SEOTION 1 (SOVIET)

1.

2.

POLAND. possibility of further 'flaps against US following US/S closing: US Embassy Warsaw believes that further Polish Government action against the possible as a follow-up to the closing of the usIs office. The Embassy feels that, while the Polish Government's note proteeting the closing:of the

Polish Research and Information Service office in New York May have been deSigned primarily for propaganda use, it may also te used as the basis yor (1) the expulsion of the Embassy information officer, or (2) the proseCution of USIS Polish personnel. The Embassy points out that tbs Polish note spew cifically states that "only diplomatic immunity.has protected the responsible ones from the merited legal consequences" of1IISIS: allegedly,-criminal activities. (S Warsaw 151, 15 Aug 51).
Comments LIS EMbasey Warsaw originally believed that there would be.no specifid steps taken against US personnel working for the USIS office. Except for the language of the latest Polish note there are no indications of poseible future steps against US personnel of USIS.
:

3,

DS Military Commander Trieste evaluates PugoelaV etabilitv: The US Military Commander in Trieste believes that the Yugoslav Army will remain loyal while it is organited and carefully watched. If the Yugoslav forces were confronted by overwhelming military power, they would retreat to already prepared defenses in the mountains, since the Ytgoslave ere probably counting on guerrilla tactics rather than front line action in the event of an invasion. The source considers it likely that popular resentment toward the Tito regime, Cominformist and royalist sympathies, and historic Serb-Croat differences would weaken the Tito regime in the event that it became involved ia hostilities. (CGTRUST TRIESTE 8, 15 Aug. 51)

ructoSLAVIA.

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1

Comment: The upward revision of norms will substantially redude ths already low standard of living of the Czechoslovak Worker and add to his discontent with decreased rations and increased regimentation:

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EASTERN EUROPE. CZECHOSLOVAKIA. 1h:ward revision of norme planned to "To raise the productivity of labor and to lower proincrease production: duction costs." is the aim of the norm revision for 1952,,according to a statement by Czechoslovak Minister of,Reavy Industry Kliment. He descHbed the curient wage systed as disjointed, and stated thet, if the average wage rates are being exceeded by 80 to 100 percent in virtuallY all heavy industriAlenterprises, the present norms must be "soft." Wages, ha added, late been allowed to rise, but productivity has lagged far behind. Kliment emphasized that the upward revision of the norms must be accomplished/by the adoption &IP Soviet Stakhanovite techniques, the operation of more than one machine at a time by the worker, and by he introduction of two or three work shifts where necessary. (PRID, 13 Aug 51).

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official! that, The Yugoslav Government has recently told SS the arrival of modern eas its military capabilities were increased by if mountains the quipment, it would. become lees necessary to retreat into Yugoslavia, factors are present in attacked. Although the foregoing divisive following a Cominform attack on the: a resnrgence of national patriotism country would.tend to counteract them.
Comment:
4.

Unions-will meet in INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM: World Federation of Trade of Trade Unions The Executive Committee of the World Federation Berlin: general WPTU condecided at their July meeting in Vinnna to hold the next in Berlin in mid-November,
Communist meetings Comment: East Berlin is as far, west as international and it is easily can still be held without running'into visa difficulties, add to other accessible from Soviet orbit ports. The WPTU conference Would World Peace Council meeting evidence, ouch as major youth meetings and the of inter's, is being built up into a center held there this year, that Berlin national Communist activities.

25X1C

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

1.

GREECE.

Papagos' initial speech rouses little enthusiam*

Marshal PePagoat
.

EMI-electoral speech, delivered on 11 August, influenced few wile were

not already persuaded. Dispassionate in both content and delivery, the speech disappointed those who hoped for a fighting statement or an emotionally inspiring declaration. Commenting that Papagos could have come closer to the public mood with a "throw the rascals out" speech, the Embassy reports that the Marshal is apparently sincere and firm in his determination to avoid mud-slinging and recrimination. (C Athens 787, 14 Aug 51).
Comment: Papagos opponents have not been inhibited by the Marshal's restraint. Neither the King, who is currently the C-in-C of the Armed Farces, nor the Liberal Prize Minister has hesitated to take adVantage of his position to weaken Papagos. Despite the Marshal's determination to conduct a fair campaign, he may eventually be persuaded to adopt the tactics of his opponents.

2.

INDIA. Food ration raised: The food ration, which was cut to 9 ounces during India"s critical period of shortages, has been restored te its . original amount of 12 ounces per day in over half the Indian states, according to a Food Ministry statement on 8 August. The other states have been advised to restore:the 12 ounce ration as soon as stocks become available. .(R FBID Far East, 10 Aug 51),

Comment: The moderate success of India's long struggle to obtain food grains seems to have brought at least temporary relief.

25X1C
3.

25X1C

25X1A

BURMA. Chinese Nationalist forces in Burma disintegratir General Li Mi's Chinese Nationalist forces, which were recently defeated by the Chinese Communists in Yunnan and driven beak into Burma, are now looting Burmese villages. many Nationalists have deserted and that the morale of those remaining is

25X1C

very low. ME.M.11

The Burmese have just dispatched 600 additional troops to Kengtung State to control the Nationalists. Two battalions were committed,to the TOP SECRET
3

Comment: Other reports have been received that Li Bi's army is disintegrating. Their.looting activities, however, may cauee Burma again to raise on an international level the question of the Nationalists' violation of Burmese territory.

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same area several weeks ago. The diversion of these forces will further weaken the government's efforts to contain the Burmese Communist insurrection.

25X1C
4.

Sino-Burmese CoMmunist activity reported: reports that, according to a Burmese who attended a conference at Paoshan (Yunnan) in July: (a) Naw Seng, the Burmese army rehegade, is in Khnming and his followers are being Mu:Lined near Paoshan; (b) there are an estimated 2)500 Chinese Communist troops at Paoshan;


TOF SECRET

(c) Than Tun', the Bur-mese Communist leader, is highly regarded by the Chinese and is in radio contact with Peoshan and Kunming;
.

(d) at the Paoshan conference it. was decided to station Chine5e-Com1u15t troops along the Sitio-Burma border.
i

25X1A

Comment: Many sources are reporting increasing coordination of Chinese and Burmese Communist activities along the Sino-Burma border.

5. INDONESIA. Indonesian Government undertakes forceful anti-Communist action: MilitaryPolice in the past few days have arrested several hundred people
including some high officials of the Ministry of Labor, Communist Farty chieftains atd leaders of several Communist uniona. The police also searched the offices of the Communist Party and:the Communist labor unions and the homes of several Parliament members. (1/ FBID Ticker Djakarta, 16 Aug 51).
Comment: Serious incidents of apparently coordinated violence-through out Indonesia from 4 to 6 August -- including an attack on 'the Djkarta port area by 200 to 300 men wearing COmmunist insignia have alarmed the Indonesian Government sufficiently to force it to take strong action for,the first time against the Communists.
-

'

These developments, in addition to reported Communist plans for nationwide demonstrations on 17 August, led the cabinet to order drastic action "within the bounds of cocisting laws and regulations" against ."anti-national movements."

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"Conservative" Indonesians have stated, howeVer, that unless sufficiently serious ineidents continue) it is doubtful that the government will persist in its forceful policy and that the Communists will be permitted to develop their strength unopposed.
6.

CHINA. Peiping denounces Japanese peace treaty conference: Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-iai, in an official statement of 15 August, made the following points regarding the Japanese peace treaty:-

ally unacceptablee

(a) Peiping regards the US-UR draft treaty as "basic-

(e) Peiping believes that a peace conference should be attended by all states that engaged in armed conflict with Japan during World War II, and Peiping is prepared to "exchange views" on a "joint(Japanese),peace treaty" with all Such states.
(R FBID Flimsy, Peiping, 15 Aug 51).

Comment:

7.

Disaffection reportedly widespeadiamong Chinese Communist military: A Chinese source reports widespread:dissatisfaction among the Chinese Communist military with.the Peiping regime's Korean venture and with C-in-C.Chu Teh's "lowered prestige." Another source corroborates the latter point and adds that an estimated 70 per cent of the Communist

conceivably could become a source of embarrassment to both Peiping and the USSR, especially if the USSR should choose to sign the draft treaty. However Chou's last point suggests that Moscow and Peiping may be contemplating the calling of a separate peace treaty conference.

was public knowledge that 1177551 had accepted its invitation to attend the San Francisco conference. Chou's statement

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states;
-

(b) the treaty is "in reality...for preparing a new. war " is'hostile" to Communist China and a "Menace" to other Asilin

(c) Peiping continues to endorse proposals regarding the peace treaty; completely the USSR's

(d) Peiping, unless invited to participate in the preparation and signing of a Japanese peace treaty, will consider the treaty "illegal" and "null and voide and

This statement was issued after it

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military have "nationalist" sentiments as opposed to the 30 per cent who are "internationalists." (C Hong Kong 661, 15 Aug 51).
Comment: It ii unclear whether the sources are speaking of the Peiping regime's top military leaders, or of the officer class as a whole, or of the armed forces as a whOle. Frequent reports of disaffection among the leaders have never.been confirmed. While there 113 fragmentary evidence that Chu Teh has lost some part of his former power, his prestige as one of the top four or five in the Peiping hierarchy remains unimpaired.

8.

Chinese Nationalist agents receive favorable treatment hy British: The US Consulate General in Hong Kong was reliably informed that a branch office of the Chinese Nationalist guerrilla liaison office was recently raided, While the main office remained untouched and is still functioning. Several persons arrested in the raid were allowed to depart to Formosa after necessary arrangements were made with the British Consul in Formosa and fines paid. The American Consul General notes that this is the first evidence that the Chinese Nationalist Government is in a position to negotiate with the British in these matters, and that all Chinese Nationalists agents in Hong Kong will have considerably improved freedom of action if they can depend on being returned to Formosa when arrested. Independent anti-Chinese Communists, mho ere receiving increased :attention from the Hong Kong GovernMent are in a. much les favorable position, since they can expect only jail or deportation to the mainland if apprehended. (S Hong Kong 595, 13 Aug 5)3.
Comment: This report, if true, represents a change in.the British position and indicates a softening of their attitude toward the Chinese Nationalists. It assures the Nationalists of more control over the guerrillas operating in China, and consequently weakens the "Third Force" Movement.

9.

Chinese Nationalists accept Proposal for supervision of US aid: The Chinese Nationalists, in response to the US memoranda requesting


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Although it is doubtless true that the military has not been thoroughly indoctrinated with the tenets of "proletarian internationalism," the political commissioner apparatus is an effective instrument of Stalinist control and there is no evidence of the functioning of a significant anti-Stalinist group at any level in the armed forces.

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effective supervision and control of VS aid, 'in Taipei that they have appointed a special Premier to deal with reduction of the budget expenditures. The Chinese GoVernment states the advice of US representatives on Formosa.

have adviee&Ahe-US Charge committee headed by the deficit and control of it will be gratefulto have
(9 Taipei 212 13 Aug 51)o

22mmat: A report of 10 August stated that the cabinet was divided on whether or not to accept the UR memoranda. Furthermore, at that time Premier Chlen Cheng admitted privately that the Nationaliata had no plan to propose, but desired practical suggestions from the US.:
10.
KOREA. Rhee seeks amendnent to ROK constitution: President Rhee, in a "Liberation Day" speech, discussed the subject of two constitUtional amendments that he urges the National Assembly to adopt. These amendments provide for the election of the president by direct poPular vote And the.setting up of a,bi-cameral legislature. Rhee further declared that he, personally; had no interest in these amendments and that his sole cOndern "ie o secure democracy for the sake of the fUttre of the Republic." (R FBID 15 Aug 51).
Comment: These constitutional amendments were suggested prior to the June electionp in 1950. While President Rhee has always tacitly favored them, this is the first known occasion on which he hae made a public statement urging their adoption. Although hip potivations in bringing.the matter Up now are still obscure, it is likeli that this move is a further step in the Presidentls campaign to-asoure hie:as cendancy over the National Assembly,

26X1A
1

11.

Conment: Mile certain types Of German rockets are known to have a burning period that would extend up to 750 yards, an additional pos., .sibility exists that the observed missile might have been a largecaliber air-borne artillery tracer shell. This is the first reported instance of a Communist airborne attack employing anything larger than machine gune and snall caliber cannons.

Communist Air Force night interceptor uses "rocket ,,Cohmunist aircraft over North Korea made four attacks oh UN airdraft during the nights of 11 and 13 August--two by jet-type and two by high-performance conventional-type aircraft. Of particular interept is the 12'August deternined night attack on a US reconnaissance bomber north-of Pyongyang. The enemy aircraft, identified as a twin-jet "believed to be a Type-8,"-fired a rocket which nissed the US plane andipurned out 1,000 yards away. Neither aircraft was danaged in this encounter. .(a Ax 2686 FEAF, 14 Aug 51; S AX 2685. FEAF 14 Aug 51; S AX 2660,FEAF,H13_Aug 51; S AX 2700 FEAF,'14 Aug 51).H


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SECTION 3

(WESTERN)

1.

2.

FRANCE. Assembly Committee resolution on Japanese Peace Treaty Worriet naraila Minister: A Foreign Office official has revealed.that-Foweign Minister Schuman is somewhat upset over the Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee's adopticai of a Gaullist-sponsored resolution decrying the government's stand on the Japanese. Peace Treaty. The resolution4as especially critical of France's omission from the group of "inviting powers" for negotiation of the_Treaty, and of the failUro to.invite the Indechinese states. Schuman plans to present the Foreign Office position.to.this committee in an off-thetrecord talk next week.

Government concern over Gaullist efforts to make political caPital of the Japanese Peace Treaty has induced the Foreign Office again to request that the Associated States of Indochina be invited to the peace treaty conference. (C Paris 996, 13 Aug 51)
.

policrigilded-by.the widespread popular suspicion that the US tends to

3.

ignore French Wishes. In the present instance, there is considerable sentiment within the Cabinet itself that France should have been given a major role in the handling of the Japanese Treaty.

Deputy Permanent RepresentativeThuicis Lacoste has expressed the "personal vise that France would.be strongly tempted to vote for admission of the Chinese'Cemmunists to the UN if they held out the prospect-of A "Kaesong in Indochina". He inquired whether the US would modify its position on


Cc:aliment:

GERMANY; West Germans are indignant over Allied economic moves: The West Uermans, sensing the approach of virtual independence in their internal affair*, react sharply these days to any restraints or direction fromthe Western Ocoupation Powers. Indignation bee been intense overAhe decisions of the RUhr Authority on German coal export quotas and the insistence of the Allies upon the full payment of German occupation costs. The Germans . appreciate that the Ruhr Authority will soon be superseded by the Schuman Plan; meanwhile, they resent its decisions having tbe effect ef curbing lest Germany's robust industry. .Finance Minister Schaeffer Ma demanded a GerMan-Allied treaty on defense costs, deplaring-that the occupatien-dosts must not be set unilaterally by the Allies. Newspapers report that the coalition parties and the opposition Social Democrats are united in a common front against the Allies.on both issues. The press speaks.of "high political tension" in Bonn,-and foresees not only a crisis in German-Allied relations, butSlso'in German internal politics and economics.

GaUllist efforts to embarrass the government in its foreign

French backing hinted. for Chinese GomMunist UN bid: .French, UN

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,

Admitting the Chinese in the event of a Korean armistide. 15 Aug 51) H


;

(S NY:233,

Cement: While the French have been extremely desirousOf obtaining some TOFF1-7 non-intervention guarantee for Indochina, this is the first intimation that France would consider bargaining with commpnishina DU its admiseion to the UN. This "personal view" may be a feeler, but there is little likelihood that France would act against US wishes on this point.
4.

Comment: If M. Saillant approaches Vienna by air and Aveids read transit of the Western zonbs, tail or Allied occupation authorities cannot prevent hie return. The Amstrian Government is not:likely to Undertake additional provocative measures on ite own initiative without support. This means that strOng Allied any action would have to be taken by mho hate not,,however, indiCated the French, an intention of,preventing Austria. hie return tO
.

5.

NETHERLANDS. HRetision of Dutch-Indonesian agreements: ferabasti A:special :Indonesian Ambassador is on his way to the Netherlands for talks With Dutch Government the on replacement of the Union Statute by national treaty. Other agreements an ordinary interon Dutch-Indonesian cooperation, mad& at'the December 1949 round table conference, will also have to be studied, according to the Ambassador. CR FB1S.6Hilversum, 14 Aug 51) Comment: Defense .and internal economic problems have lately over shadoiiiMESideration of the Dutch-Indonesian relationahip by the Dutch GovernMent and iiress. The Union Statute, soVereign be head Of the Dutch-Indonesian which prOvidee that the Netherlands Union, is essentialZy d natter of preStige for the Dutch and has:never been implemented. Abro&tion of the Statute, either because the Dutch accede to Indonesian-threats lateral action Or because the seek to prevent additional'Ioss of unieconomic interests under other Dutch Of their portions of the 1949 agreethents; probably fUrther weaken the Dutch would Government.
.

AUSTRIA. EkcluSion fram Austria of 1FTU Secretary-General oonSidered: INT'ariaien at ths Austrian capital indicates that Louis Saillant, SeCretary General now in prance, may return !FTU by air to his Vienna poet abeut 20 August, The US Legation,opposes harassment effectiVe action pretenting'SaiIlantieretnrn as sudh but suggests that wouldleerionply embarrass 1FTU activities in Vienna. Austrian_authorities have previously asserted that the MFTU le considered an illegal organization and-that reisidence permits for its employees will be denied. However, expuleion of-1FTU personnel has been believed impopsible so long as the Sotiet occupation authorities provide protection. (S Vienna 597, 14sAug 51)

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9

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6.

ITALY: Italian Communists speed sabotage program: Twojneibers of the COERUhist Party's central committee recently briefed.the:directing:grOup of the Milan federation on the party's program for inprOving:itS.nabotege petential. This'potentiai in the.metallurgical-mama4e4)06-4Etty::"4-:-. described as "already well organized"'and ib,ekpeated,WbeUtilized. "toward the end:of the yearn.: It was stated that the Italiah:Cemntnists had trained 27 expert saboteurs,and hoped in line with the organization of sabotage to have 50 by the end ofthe year and their operations "for the past eight squads on en interhational_level months" in WesternEurope, Yugoslavia, Greece, Africa, Asia and America. They also.had:fleeeded,, Was said, in planting at least one agent it "in every militarfleadquarters".

25X1A


The UK remains

It wee-emphasized that ComMuniet party members poseeSsinOwar Material" mnst hide or destroy:it, hot only for security reasons, but also-because: at the suitable Moment, "the most modern equipment" Will be 'evailable'. Mith referenee to the Milan municipal 25X1A election, it was asserted tha.tthe:eitteme left was the real victor because the election result's showed:demiliiiiiiidarity between the Conmninjs.q sind the
pro-Communist Sodialietev.i
_

-Cement There have been no other reports that internationally ized sabotage squads have been operating organ., in apy of the arepOntiened co,c7 cept Yugoslavia. It is known that considerable nnmbers Of Eoviet-Satellite-agents have been penetrating Yugoslavia ih acontinuous strean,:but there haVe been no reports of,sabotage, Although the Italian, nilitartautnorities maintain they, have: weeded Communists out of top7leVel positions, it Trobable that the Comunists have succeeded IniMainteining 'where they have accese to important agents in'pests: information. '

7.

UNITED KINGDOM. -British foreeee favorable grain contraet_With 'USSR* british delegation w ic ie curren Th0 y nego a ng qr a-coarse gr contract With SoViet, representatiVes feels confident thetTthe USSRYwill 4Sree to supply bY mid-1952 all of the 4000,000,:tehs,requeptect.bY the UK. (nmoo tons' were nearly delivered during the paet discussions are being carried year4H Theugh'the, on by commodity level representatives) is believed that the Soviet delegation it has the requisite a binding agreement at London. authority to sign The British hope thatHa bilateral.:agreement Will be practically completed when the Econonic_Comniesion'for.EUrope((ECE) neeting on East-Neat trade convenes at Geneva on 20 August.S-giondon853, 13 Aug 51; NY Times) 15 Aug 51) : ..H ----,...r .:,.,,.

...

dollar area because of Briteints critical dollar-ehortate.;' If the-Ourrent.negotiations are completed before the FOB EastWeet:trede talks begin, the Ws opposition to a total economic blookade'f the poviet
'

convinced that substantial and qSnoalrain must be obtained,from quantities of timber Eastern Europeen_couptrieSthan from:the rather

Comment"

'

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10

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Union will then be quite clear. (A timber contract was signed Mat me:1thbetween the UK and the USSR.) The speed with which the grain negotiations are ComMencing contrasts sharply wd.th.the SoViet delayint.tactica-in fonner Years and suggests that the USSR aldo feels..it advantageous to secure the commerdial contract. Ifan agreement is reached before the Geneva: meeting, the USSR can use it for propaganda for closer economic relations with Western European countries.

.8.

The SecretaryNorway that hid center., satiens with the Swedibh Prime Minister indicate thatJleuttality sentiment is currently stronger in Sweden than ever before. (S StoCkholm 171; 14 Aug 51)

SWEDEN. .Trp e'Liereeirte-neutrality firily entilenched: MTEWM.. of t6 UN has informed the US Ambassador to

ComMent: This assertion of the continuing alliaR;(7"-Mreign policy is supportedby other firmness of Sweden's "no evidence. Stronger.confidence in this Policy is probably due in part to Sweden's suceess inHebtaining vitally-needed radar equipment from the US (see OCI Daily Digest, 24 Mgy 51), which has largely removed-such doubts as the Swedish GoVerthnent may have inwardly harbored that its non-adherence tO NATO was isolating Sweden from the West and adversely affecting ita defense capabilities. At the same time, Sweden has been evincing an increased willingness to cooperate With thelffest in such matters as the limitation of strategic exports to the SeViet Orbit and the informal communication of military information to NATOnations, provided that Sweden's "freedom of action" is not Lnpaired by any legal treaty obligations.
'

9.

ARGENTINA. Meat exports to Britain temporarily Suspended: On 15 August the government ordered that.meat shipments to Britain be suspended for 10 doge, or until the critical supply situation in Argentina is relieved.' Shortly before the suspension order, it werned cattle producers'that if they,did 'not ship their cattle to market, "they would regret it". (trig). Prensa.(NY); 16 Aug.51)

Comment: A moderate meat shortage has been created in Buenos Aires by the cattlemehis refusal to 'accept prices offered by the government'a packing plants. .The order suepending exports is probably designed to..assure a plentiful sUpply of meat for the thousands of workers which the government will bring into Buenos Aires to attend the 22 August peronista_ political rally. At this meeting, sponsored by the government-dominated Confederation of Labor Unione, Peron is expected to accept the workers' "demand" for his re-election.
.

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11

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17 Aug

51'

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ferkINCI.ASSIFIED when

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FORM
8.73

06

00000000

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Approved For RelArie 2001/09/06 ,:ncja-ERIDMT01146A001400420001-3

IVY bCEET

17 August 1951

CIA No. 49308


Copy No.

S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT


TO THE DAILY DIGEST

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Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE.

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCy

This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligenc e.

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SECRET

SECTION 1 (SOVIET)

1.

USSR not expected to demand reparations pt JAA.ano&veaca conferences The Department of State does mot, share .Thilippine concern that Soviet maneuvers at San Francisco will revolve around the reparations issue. The Department points out that Sviet proposalsi:which Gromyko has indicated will be renewed at San Francisco, so far have been wholly geared to winning favor in Japan: In particular there have been no suggestions li prior Soviet notes that Japan should pay reparations, The Department further observes that since India also opposes reparations, efforts of Indonesia and Burma to form a common front with India in this respect have not succeeded. (C, S/S State to Manila 5600 15 Aug 51).
Comment: The USSR may be hesitant to raise the reparations question because Soviet postwar removals from Manchuria have presumably created a delicate issue between the USSR and Communist China

Img.

2,

INDOCHINA US.Minister in Saigon urges.Presence of Indochinese states at San Francisco conference: In view of the Soviet decision to take part in the Japanese peace treaty conference, Minister Heath believes that the:issue of the Associated Statest participation has been intensified, and that fail, ure to invite them is "less than ever defensible." Heath believes that in addition to wedge-driving on larger issues, the Russians may defend the legitimacy of the Ho Chi Minh government, recall Vicbyls and Bao Dal's war,. time collaboration with the Japanese, and challenge the Western nations to pubmit the Vietnam problem to elections or international investigation. Moreover, the Russians may bid for French support of their overall position at'the conference, by dangling before the French the prospectS of a guaranitee for the Tonkin frontier, Heath believes that under these circumstances to withhold an invitation to the Associated States would take on the charadter of appeasement, and that by a forthright defense of our own position we may even enhance the solidarity of the Western and Western-oriented Asian nations. ( S, S/S Saigon 383, 15 Aug 51).


SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

'

SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
3.

PANAMA, Newly appointed US Ambassador in Panama suggests further delay on shipping decree: On 14 August, Ambassador Wiley informed Panama's Foreign Minister that, if the Panama Administration should want legislative authority in Order to iamb astrong decree banning ships from ca;ing at .Communist China,

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postponement of action on the decree until the National Assembly convenes on 1 October would not be an excessive delay. The AMbassador believes that the decree as now drafted might actUally serve as a blueprint for the. evasion of controls and might offer new life to unethical and illicit trade. In answer to the Foreign Minister's expression of concern over the possi bility that a postponement of promulgation would cause palicity adverse to Panama in the US press, the Ambassador replied that the US press would closely analyse the text of any published decree and that to promulgate an inadequate decree also might have unfavorable repercussionn. (Sp S/S Panama 137, 14 Aug 51).

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HR70-14 HR70-14
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13.

KOREA.

New Chinese Conmiunist arny group may be enroute to Korea: recant reports.suggest.nstrOnglym the movement of the Chineae Gommuniat 5th Army Group, 4th Field Arnr, from south C h i n a to =le it not clear clear whether t h i s composite compoeite force, made up up China to Korea, Korea. 'While it ie is not whether this force, made from other other 4th 4th Field Fleld Army A m y units, units, will w i l l be used used as 88 an an integral integral unit unit or or for f o r rerefrom placement purposes, purpoaee, it it is i a noteworthy noteworthy that that the the 140th,Division, W t h Division, Chinese Chinese CommhCoarmuplacement niat 47th 47th Army. Arm. 15th 15th Arm Grour,. ia I s now now accented in '&rea 8 a a combat combat unit. unit. niat Army Group accepted in Korea 8 as
1

,,'

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ffrOP-SECRET-

20 Aug 51

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CD

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.'.
While as as yet Introduction into Comment: While yet an an unconfirmed unconfirmed movement, movement, the the.introduction into Comntt Korea of an an additional fresh Chinese Conmnnist COrmunist troops troops would would add conconadditional 105,000 freeh However, the siderably eiderably to t o the the Communist tkmnuntet offensive offeneive potential. potential, Hawever, the problem problem of of supplying the Comrmnisfs' Communists' losuppJying these these new divisions would further complicate the @ . 8 u C 8 l position. POSitiOn. gistical

' 1 4 .

'munist armored unit'reoorled Chinese Coitmwd e t armored unit reported jm,Ktrea4. I n Korea1 Com 1 tio:ChinaseComnst:garmored vthicle two Chinese C o d s t %m!ored vehicle divisions" dAviei6&" mni with a total or *wu "so T T-35 armed vehicbs'f vehicles" moved moved from fromthe witn t o t a l of -35 -e!d the Harbin Harbin area area to t o Korea Korea for employment followinR "the "the breakdown a~cs." T I for employment:following breakdown of of the the cease-fire cease-fire ttalks."
I
I

.
~

units. unita

a d d i t w A o has r has been,movedinto nto Korea. Korea. Curr ently accepted o dst additranirmor been.moved Currently accepted C Communist armored strength in however, i,s ip only l 148 T-34 tanks,-reflecting tanks, reflecting the armred etrength i n Korea, however, . 4 8 T-34 Tank Division Division and and independent independent armored armored equipment of the North Korean 105th Tank

Comment: Comment :

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20 Aug 51

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9. 9.

eveal move move of of North North Korean Korean VI VX Corps: O m - 8 Several Several recent reoenti 11B4A. Intercepts m-e-r reveal intrroepte reveal reveal that that the the North North Korean Corps, garrieoning wesQ ooarat intercepts Korean VI VI.Corps, garrisoning the the west coast irouth of Oi Pyongyangp P g o q y q , an8 two of t e eubordhate dlvislone have have disdisSouth and possibly pOssibly two of I its subordinate divisions plaaed eastward. (STEDE, (SUIDE, TIK-9&, Aug 5 1 , CINGFE Sl&8=344). Placed eastward. 1IZ-940,18 18 Aug 51, MOPE:SP-344).
The final final destination destination and and the the reason reason for for this this move are not not yet yet OommenVt 'The move are llrhed. However, Hwever, the the VI eomndtfed clear4 established. VI Cmpe, Corps, well well traimd trained an8 and not not yet yet committed to aombat, miasrion in ia to combat, has his been been performing performing an an iateznal internal en8 and coastal coastal eeourl.by security mission Hwanghae province, pnminoe, south csouth of o f Pyongyang, Pgowgang, and and thie this m o m may mey foreshadow foreshadow its its Hwanghae mOve

mu,

appearanae aa a a comdbat acnnbat unit appearance as unit in in the the vestern western acuter,, Sector,

-Tor-eigena-sunt
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21 Aug 51

93
55

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21 August 1951

CIA No. 49310 Copy No.

DAILY DIGEST

State

ept., USAF reviews completed

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This suthmary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.

USSR. EMbassy reports curbs on foreign air travel Within USSR: EMbassy Moscow considers it possible that a largtiaitlift into Siberia and the Far East may be the cause of added travel testrictions which have been im posed on members of its military staff.

Comment: Restrictions on the moveMents of,the Eabassy staff within the USSR are-of long standing and are part Of.the Soviet internal security pattern. However, recent added restrictions on air travel could be due to an airlift tO the Far East in view uf the US5R2s commitments to aid Com munist China,

2.

NEWS resumee Softer tonelin Moscowls.dUaluropagandas The most notable articles in the thirdAssue of-NeWs2 the Soviet Englishlanguage journal supposedly dedicated to the impretement of East-4est relations, denied any change.whatsoever inSoviet foreign policy, urged USUSSR trade expansion, andsditorialized on the principle of noninterference in:the internal affSirs of other countries. Another article denied that the USSR failed to demobilize after the war and asserted that the present strength of the Soviet armed forces is approximately the same as in 1939.
Field comments %bag:ay Moscow noted that, apart fram familiar in sinuations that US policy is detrimental to the interests sf many countries and to Htitain in particular, the News editorial seemed to imply that harsh judgments of each other's economic and political systems should not pre vent two sides from working out trade and political arrangementso The emphasis on Soviet-American trade reveals the Ktemlinos hopes for reioval of US controls. (R Eabassy Moscow 2912 17 Aug 51).

Comments The pinch of trade reprisals against iron curtain coun tries probably accounts for the softer line employed in the articleLplead ing for Eastjest trade. However, there is no dearth of the "hate,America" and "warscare" themes in the propaganda output of other Soviet media.


TOP SECRET

The trend was first observed a month ago and.travel eastward is hardest hit. Other directions affected:inaude Odessa. The official Soviet excuse for placing_curbs on air travel.is the need to give priority to the movement of freight, the consequent diversion_of aircraft for haul ing cargo and the_resulting shortage of passenger, space. (S Moscow Weeka 33 17 Aug 51).

21 Aug 51

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3.

Russians claim'US annulment of trade naCt causes discords The Soviet Union's hote.of 19 August .on.the_US.dedision:to-cancel the 1937 trade pest makes the'point that the US.waS-the one t0 request renewal of the agreement in 1942 for an indefinite period. The note also states that American renunciation contradicts the, alleged desire for improvement of Soviet-American relations which vas .expressed by the US in the TrumanShvernik.exchange, (11 New York Times, 20 Aug 51)0
Camnents The Soviet protestucoming_almOst two months after the US notified the USSR of ite actiontiwas'Probably' delayed until the Soviet Government had deeided on the. form Of its reply to President Truman's message and ..the Congressional resolution.

USAF
25X1

5.

Moscow visits of Soviet officials from Pakistan may be related to expansion of Soviet activities2 The Karachi press reported that M. M. Volkov; Second Secretary in charge of Cultural Affairs of the Soviet EMbassy left on 12 Zu1y for a temporary visit to Moscow. Voikov was described as a specialist in South Abian affairs and one of the most active members of the EMbassy. US EMbassy Karachi noted that the USSR Ambassador to Pakistan, A. G. Stetsenko, and Trade Counselor Brobjes, who left on TOP SECRET
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17 May and 14 June respectively-2' are still absent and. are presumably in Moscow. (1 Karachi' 1843, 13 July 51).
Comments Observers in South Asia haVe.recently noted the strides made by theCoMmuniete'in reversing..the traditiOnal trade routes in the area in favor of cloSer-ties with the_Sotiet-bloo, In view'of the apparent success of thie4olioy2.the presence in:Macaw of the Soviet Ambassador to Kaiachi together with Soviet Officials in charge of economic and cultural affairs suggests further, efforts to extend Soviet influence along these lines.

Kremlin barter, for_return_of.ohildren-claimed as Soviet citizens: The Soviet.Governmentlas.offered to:alliowlSotiet Uitizen" Maria Pyrz to leave the Soviet Union if some children.reviously claimed es Soviet citizens will be "permitted" to leave the US.
Field comment: Maria Pyrz is a US' citizen who desired to leave the Soviet UniOn.butwas refused.permission.by the Soviet Government. In 1948 the Kremlin made a similar offer to exchange certain persons of US citizenship-for those Same children claimed by the Soviet Union. The present barter-offer is-believed to be'inspired not by huManitarian con-. siderations but by a desire to.build up-the current propaganda' charge that it is the'US which impedeti freedoM.oriovement of persons.' ( C Moscow 242, 10 Aug 51; C SD to Moscow 1-40 17 Aug 51).

25X1C
7

EASTERN EUROPE. POLAND. Re- 'rted- lanS tor marked expansion of Polish Merchant Marines.' hmprimary'ob jectiva oftheria ish Merchant 'Marine is.to-eXioand its present 270,000-ton 'fleet to 600,000. To achieve this ged12-Poland must'resort to the purchaSe of shipping-fron auteide.the extended fleet of ships is expected to nearly double..the 12 ships. currently plying the China trade routes.

25X1A

1Soviet control of the Polish Merchant Marine was initiated during discussions betWeen the USSR and-Toland in OctOber, 1949, ultimately resulting In a reorganized Polish Merchant. Marine. Since these discussions former nersonnei have been ornAlully plaoed by new officers andMen. 1
'


5X1C
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re -

Comments Other sources have reported the reorganization of the Polish MerChant Marine at the beginning of 1951 as well as increasing Soviet control over most of its activities.

21 Aug 51

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S.

RUMANIA. Swiss4lumanian trade agreement signed; The Rumanian press bss announeed.the'conclusien'of.a.one.year.trade.agreement with Switzerland. According to the Bucharest announcement, Switzerland Will export machine 'tools, miscellaneous installations and machinery, electrical equipment, instruments, dyes, and'pharmaceutical products. in return-for Rumanian cereals, fodder plants, lumber,, chemicals and fuel. oil.

Comment; Trade and financial.negetiatiOns'begun im November 1950 between the SWiss and Rumanians_were terminated, reportedly because of Rumanian intransigeance over Swiss clahns for:Coipehsation for nationalized property. A Swiss delegation returned; to Bucharest in April.
.
.

Conclusion-of a trade agreement undoubtedly indicates that arrangements acceptable to'both sides.on.controtereial issues have been made, including,-in addition-te nationalized property Olaims, some adjustment of the Rumanian.Governeent assertion. that.funda.deposited in Swiss banks by . former Foreign Minister.Cretzianu. were official rather than private funds. The US Legation in Bucharest had previOnsly been informed by the Swiss Charge in BuCharest that Switzerland did-not:contemplate including in its export items-fletritegio_war material^ but Would consider meeting Rumanian demands for Swiss equipment for two power stations.
-

The US Legation in Bucharestunderstands, bat has been unable to confirm, that an agreenent was simultaneously concluded whereby Rumania agreed to. payeent of about 20 percent of the claims of Swiss citizens for property'nationalited by'the Rumanian Government. (U Bucharest 67, 10 Aug 51; C Bucharest SO, 13.Aug 513.

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21 Aug 51
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sECTION 2 (EASTERN)

.IRAN.

25X1C

25X1A

Kashani, 1has indireet contacts with the Soviet bbbassy. He is representea as haying told the embassy that, tith the government facing cial crisis, now is a tipropitious" an imninent finantime to show Soviet goad will by Iranian gold it has held since its occupation of Iran during World returning the reports state that he is interested War II.. Other in the abolition of the monarchy anachronism and the establishment of as a useless a Prderation of Islanic iet influences. republics under Sor-

Cabinet reportedly developinc Mrah Tashani, a top religious leader in Iran, is reportedly invelved in paign to undermine the present Prime a tamMinister.

Internal opposition to the present Iranian

25X1X

11

25X1A

Comments

the USSR have been rumored before.

While he has continued to support the present Prime Minister tional Front Party he belongs, Kashani to whose Nahas recently been particularly vocal urging a united Islam, and these in speeches may have given rise to the port. above refThe opposition of various Iranian elements hostile to the present meni is.not yot sufficiently governstrong to bring about the fall ister. of the Prime Min2.

111g, First Indian-made aircraft under oes trial fli hts: midi-Tairor .a.basic. rainer
sucoessful trial flights in mid=August.
pr o. ceo by

Comment/ There is no evidence that Lebanon is actuallymediating India and Pakistan: between India has refused previous offers offices. Pakistan, however, of mediation or good has been seeking the support against India, and the Lebanese of other countries Minister is probably doing that he the situation. can to ease

INDONESIA.

"Cf Mrte

gnmedi.atjng in Icashfl1frdjpUth, Karachi.is mediating.between lhe Lebaneae Minister to Pakistan.and.India in.an attempt Kashmir problem, according to to settle the a broadcast from Cairo on 19 August. Ticker Beirut, 19 Aug 51). (U FBID

PAKISTAN


influence.
-

an opportunist. &mulls efforts to secure the return Presumably, 114 of Iranisul gold would imply of a government the institution more amenable to Soviet

Kaehani is a rabble-rouser and

Contacts between Kashani and

The first Indiandustan Aircraft, Ltd., made (S NOW Delhi,

Weeka 33, 17 Aug 51).

Overseas Chinese usightseeing group bound for tour of Communist ge-sca e org ze oe ega on o ese in .nes o TOP SECRET

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5

21 Aug .5.1

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TOP SECRET currentIy-en route to Canton. The visit China eince the Communist Victory is Indonesian-born who *ere selected from grouP numbers 64-Chineee, 33 of them approxately four-months and the ,all parts of Indenebia. The tour will 1St and Peiping, thence to Thrieri, delegates will proceed froth Canton to Hahkaw Tsinan, and Hangchow, presumably Mukden, and Harbin, and finally to Tientsin, return'to Indonesia to act as apostles they will get a ted carpet tour and'will 51). of the new China. /(l Hong Kong 668, 16 Aug Chineee in Indonesia has increased Comment: Anti-Communist sentiment'among Fro-Nationaltst riewspapera are quite surprisingly during the ast six months. been unsuccessful in achieving vocal, and in several cities the Communists have control of the local Chinese associations, into army: The Celebes guerrillas force rejects scheduled incorporation Kahar.Muzakar has ordered hie DefenseMinistry.has:confirmeitheHreport.that By doing so he can:4,000 guerrillaS back to the jungle in the Sodth Celebes. into the Republican A;my: The celled theittagaddt incorporation, en 17 August, with Commander, in announcing failure of settlement Fest Indonesian Territorial that "there have obtained proof the guerrillas stated that the armed forces issue in'an the exploit are Still ceraim elements which desire to 18 Aug 51; R a certain purpose." CR FBID Ticker Djakarta, effort to FRIO Ticker Makassar? 17 Aug 51). in March that the ComComment; government's efforts to restore in-

25X1 C

muniats had ternal security in the South Celebes,


further
.

guerrilla

beensuccesitfainThdirrin

L----___IrepOrted
f:

25X1C

5X1 C
gn.
.

for Indochina invasion: ainese Communists re orted re ari MvisCor are Aroops.of.the_Chinese.Comnunis collecting food -: of southern Yunnanwhere whey are 5 assembling September. Indochina during and telling local inhabitants that they-will:attack
(S SOPD 381, Bangkok C-6,'17 Aug 51).
:

Comments portel 25X1X .port at


'

not be discounted.

resumed hip duties as Supreme Cormander Ne Win returns: Lt. 'General He Win month's leave. (S Rangoon 59? 18 of Burmats.armed.forces on 14 August after a TOP SECRET
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25X1C

has been reThe presence of the 39th Division in the Fohai area also appears to suPThe above information Itndt.the Chinese Communists are planning opera and Thailand which would be ations against Li Mils Dationailst fordes in.Burma With Ho Chi Minh. launched from Yunnan.and northern Indochina in cooperation to undertake overt operations are prepared If the Chinese Communists, however, their attempting to sweep through anYwhere in Southeast Asia, the possibility of to limited objectives ahould the entire area instead of restricting themselves

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Aug 51

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Aug 51).
Cammentt

regarding% lints imminent remotal frOm office. ilt is likely, however, that Defense Minister.11 Win and the Socialists have reduced the general's inhuence and naw exercise a greater degree of control over the armed forces than they did previously.

This action ends all speculations for the time being at least,

Zo:mmentt In the matte:, of the Japanese peace treaty, Burmese fears of in,curring.Chinese.Communist have tot been completely.allayed and will continue.to affect a decision as to whether or not to attend the conference.


TOP,SECRET

Burma may attend San Ftandieco:conferences The US Eftbassy inRangoon reports..thatthe.BUrmese.Government.may:reverseltself and accePt the invitation, te the Japanesdpeace conference in view of the SoViet Union's,decision to attend. The Burmathe Might feel that the Soviet Union's presence weuld permit Burmese attendanoe by removing the poseibility of antagonizing Communiet China. .The embassy points out, however, that such action would not necessarily signify a. willingness to sign the treaty. (S Rangoon 199, 18 Aug 51),

9.,

THAILAND.

25X1A

25X1A

General Phao commences tour, The Director General Of the Thai rolice, ugust'to tour. Entope and the US. RFBID Taipei, 15 Aug 51).

Mae has for some time intended to visit the King in Switzerland, He undoubtedly hopes to win Royal faVor and thereby considerably enhance his prestige in preparation for becoming, some day, Thailand's Premier and de facto ruler.

Ceranieritt

but CM-gilt coup ettempt delayed his departure.

10.

INDOCHINA. Vietnam official:says press concern re Japanese treaty is government-. inspired: The nress shief mit the .North Vietnaminformation Service toldaUS.. vice-consul that the Central Government bas-ordered his service to ftake enough noise" to keep the Japanese treaty issue before the public. The source said that as a result many Vietnamese ire npw interested in whether Vietnam will be in vited to the treaty conference., but that a greater number take the view that if' Vietnath's participation is vetoed on the ground that Vietnam lacks independence, the French maybe pressurod_into granting further concessions. The source stated that:people in North Vietnam are far more worried about mobilization and earning a living than &bout the treaty issue. (S Hanoi 105, 20 Aug 51).

Of a,governt: mental attempt to distract public attention from domestic issues by magnifying international relations.

Cbmmentt Mir: report tends to confirm earlier evidence that the alleged concernofthe Vietnamese with the treaty issue consists largely

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U. CHINA.

Appointment indicates growing importance of China's aviation industry: An indication of the growing importance of China's aviation industry is the recent appointment of a veteran Chinese Communist military leader.as director of the Aviation Industry Bureau under the Ministry of Heavy Industry. The new director is Ho Chang Jung, concurrently Vice Minister of Heavy Industry. The former director, according to the same Peiping broadcast which announced HO's appointment, was demoted to deputy director. (U Hong Kong 703, 17 Aug 51).

12.

25X1X

Violence declining in "suppression of counterrevolutionaties" campaign: The US Consul General in Hong Kong notes that, of 923 alleged "counter revolutionaties" reported in the Communist press as sentenced during 3 to 9 August, only 19 were reported as executed. This evidence of the declining 25X1X violence of the suppression campaign is supportedl
p

adivce given Mayor Ch'en Yi by the Shanghai Unamber of Uommerce to the effect that the "execution with fanfare" policy was "seriously affecting" popular morale. The U4 Consul General concludes that, although other recent arrivals from Shanghai have not noticed a decline in executions, the weight of evidence indicates that this is so. (S Hong Kong 694, 17 Aug 51).
Comment: Communist and other sources indicate that the percentage of those executed has declined considerably in recent weeks. Neverthe less, the campaign continues withcnrtdiscernible decrease in scope, and its purpose is precisely that of "seriously affecting" popular morale, i.e., convincing the Chinese people that present or future opposition to the regime is hopeless. The Communists aim to make their subjects totally subservient, and are clearly prepared to kill several million Chinese to that end.

13..

Chinese Communist agents for Southeast Asia to be trained: An Over seas Chinese Institute opened on 20 August at Nan Fang University in, Canton and is accepting "politically pure" overseas Chinese students between the ages of 18 and 30. Entrance standards are low, and the students are to be maintained by the State. The US Consul General in Hong Kong comments that the Institute is likely to emphasize political rather than academic training and may become an important source of cadres for aubversive work among the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. (S Hong Kong 694, 17 Aug 51).
TOP SECRET

5X1C

Comment: The first mention of the Aviation Industry Bureau in Communist broadcasts was in June 1951. It is improbable that the Chinese have facilities for more than assembly arid minor repair of aircraft. An early I I claimed that such facilities were set up recently at 19aiyuan in North China.

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Comment:.. Undoubtedly a major objective of the new Institute is training of young persons for the both overt and covert assignmeuts east Asia. in South-

14.

Comment: The Daily Digett of 14 August reported strengthening the regime's police earlier regulations controls. Every aspect Of Peiping's subjects will the lives of be affected by these burgeoning security measures.
15.

KOREA. .Weather may explain The US Far Eastern Command, inactivity in North Korean airfield conStructions last few weeks in airfield commenting on the sharp decline during the construction that the weather "has been activity in North particularly inappropriate for Korea, observes of airfields. FECOM cautions, however, that construction" extensive UN air action against Communist airfields, coupled with the Communist ability to launch effective' counter-air sorties from Manchurian bases alone, may be responsible cessation of airfield for the construction activity in North Korea. Telecon 5062, 20 Aug 51). (S CINCFE

16.

25X A

25X1C North Koreans re orted to have received 'et aircraft craft from the USSR: 1 tanks and naval the following to have supplied information: The Northkorean air force jets, in early received 60 NIG August, concurrent with the return pilots from Soviet training; of 165 North Korean 270 tanks were received with the intention of prior to mid-August equipping a tank corps; the North Korean navy division for each North Korean requested a transf Soviet Union. of "ships" from the


25X1C

Peiping issues new security regulations: Communist China's of Public Security has Ministry. issued additional regulations amusement places and printing controlling hotels, and engraving shops. mitted near military organizations of any kind, and Hotels are not perguest registers daily. must submit their forms for any governmentPrinting firma must have permission to print official agency or to make official effort to prevent the seals--obviously an forging of official Aug 51). documents. (S Hong Kong 694, 17

25X1A Comment: Although the amount of is unconfirmed, it is known equipment received that the USSI is continuing and pilots trained heavy weapons in small to supply needed in the USSR to utilize amounts and is training personnel such equipment. It is considered in Manchuria or North Korean request for doubtful that any naval craft would be granted by the USSR.
17.
1

25X1A

Communistssgain claim Korean General Nam Il on 19 UN violation of Kaesong's neutrality: North August lodged a formal complaint alleging

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violation of the Kaesong neutral area by never 30 armed'men of your siden. who ambushed a Chinese Communist patrol. An immediate investigation of the incident by the UN military command "failed to identify the armed bands as belonging to any UN command military.formation." However, the UN communique concerning the investigation raised the nposeibility....that the shooting was the work of a politically guided civilian group operating under instructions to crente an atmosphere of tension which would tend to support the breaking off of the current military armistice conference.n AFF Tokyo, 20 Aug 51; R FBID, NCNA Peiping, 20 Aug 51).
Comment: Kaesong and the surrounding countryside has been an arta of operations for antiCommunist and ROK guerillas since late in 1950. There is no evidence available indicating that this incident was instigated by the ROK.

18.

JAPAN. Opposition parties agree to participate in treaty conference: The opposition parties have agreed to participate in the Japanese peace treaty conference; according to Reuters. The Democrats will have one member,as

a delegate, one as an alternate, and two on a 12man Diet mission that will accompany the delegation. The Socialist party will be represented by two members on the Diet mission. (1 FBID, Reuters Tokyo, 18 Aug 51):
Comment: Decision of the opposition to participate will strengthen the delegation in the eyes of the Participating Allied nations, should make the treaty more acceptable to the Japanese public, and should weaken political attacks on the government. By not participating in the main delegation: however, the Socialists apparently are preserving their opportunity to oppose the government on this issue after the signing.


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MOTION 3

(WESTERN)

1.

GERMANY. Coal trains to West Berlin are stopped by East Germans: The East German-controlled Roichsbahn suddenly refused to permit the movement of extra coal trains to Berlin on 17 August, stating that the rail paths were needed to move the harvest, and that Berlin has enough coal. These trains had been carrying over 15:000 tons of coal a week from the Ruhr (C to West Berlin., by agreement between the East and West Germans. Berlin 267, 18 Aug 51)

25X6 2.


TOP SECRET
11

Comment: This move may be a Soviet retaliation to the West's action in bringing legal east-west German trade to a halt on 3 August. The retaliation was probably deferred until the Berlin Youth Fostival was nearly over. In January of this year, the East Germans closed the Mittel land canal lock, through which Ruhr coal had previously moved, and since that time coal shipments to Berlin have boon difficult. West Berlin's coal stockpile is sufficient for about three months.

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3.

AUSTRIA. Union of Independents purges press. The press service of the Union of Independents (VDU) announced on 14 August that the bi -weekly paper, Der Angriff (The Attack), is no longer, associated with the VDU. The publisher and editor of the paper has been expelled from party ranks for disloyalty. Der Angriff will be replaced by a new publication, Die Arbeiterfront (Workers' Front). (R FBIS -Graz radio, 14 Aug 51)

4.

Minister of Interior foresees period Of internal calm: Minister of the Interior Helmer has informed High Commissioner Donnelly that., in his personal view, no now world crisis need be anticipated prior.to next June. Be regards the internal situation in Austria as similarly stabilized and believes the government competent to meet any Communist disturbances. The Minister, however, expects Communist efforts to create unity fronts in the September trade union electiohs, and warns that futther economdc deterioration would contribute to Communist success. He has no evidence of increased Soviet military activities, but reports that the Soviets are bringing quantities of road building equipment into Austria. (S Vienna 8774, 16 Aug 51)
Comment: Minister Helmer did not disclose the source of his general optimism and, on the whole, his capacities as a world-prognosticator may be discounted. Allied observers- -particularly.on,tho occasion of the communist riots in Vienna last-fall - -have not fully shared Helmer's belief that his police force is a match for any Communist challenget his sanguine attitude should perhaps, be considered in conjunction with Foreign Minister Gruber's pressure for reiumption of Austrian treaty talks. Heimerls Socialists have previously charged that blanm for the current economic crisis - -the meat shortage - -rests upon the Ministry of Agriculture, headed by People'S Party Minister Kraus.

5.

NETHERLANDS. Anti-US feeling in the Netherlands is growing: The US Ambassador to The Hague states that confidential and informal reports from unofficial US observers reveal a growing feeling of resentment toward the US on ihe part of the Dutch, who allege that US political

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Comment: Austria's burgeoning "fourth party", which has long had press troubles 'with the occupation authorities because of its allegedly neo -Nazi and openly anti-Soviet editorial policies, appears to have acquired internal press troubles. The establishment of a working class publication is significant of recent efforts of the VDU to retain and enlarge its following among labor, after the recent presidential elections demonstrated the existence of such a following. The VDU aspires to develop a b.road, supra-party base, and seems willing, therefore, to sacrifice a militant approach.

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and economic poliey'is becoming "increasingly dictatorial and arbitrary


as respects Europe. ft

25X1C

25X1A

fa high -ranking Dutch Government official in the Ninistry of the Interior declares his intention of cooperating fully with the US in international &grit:Monts aimed at the USSR, despite the possible opposition of his government. he implied that several Cabinet members fear that US actions might become "so aggressive as to provoke war," an attitude characterized by the souice as ufAlliig for Communist propaganda." (C Hague 180, 17 Aug 51; 17 Aug 51)

Comment: -Although there is evidence of a growing anti-US feeling in the Netherlands, it can hardly be considered as stemming entirely from Communist propaganda. The Dutch, faced with a worsening economic situation, have given a bad press to the Kem Amendment and the recently-announced ECA Productivity Program. The Netherlands undoubtedly fears that the loss of its voice in world affairs would force the country to abide by the decisions of the big powers.
'

The ever-present Dutch resentment against,the US role in achieving Indonesian independence is currently accentuated by the Indonesian detondo foi revision of the Dutch-Indonesian agreements and the transfer of Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia. Dutch cooperation in US policies probably will be harder to achieve in the future, and the current anti-US attitude may jeopardize implementation of the Dutch defense program.

6.

UNITED KINGDOM. -Britain sceptical of proposed Palestine Commission conference: file Foreign Office has displayed "chill scepticism" toward the proposed meeting of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) in Paris on 10 September,. and has in effect instructed British representatives in Middle East capitals to make only general replies to queries regarding the meeting. The Foreign Office considers the invitation to the meeting ill-timed, and emphasizes the need for a preparatory "educative process" in the Diddle East. The Foreign Office indicates concern that the UK, though not a member of the Commission, failed to receive advance notice of the impending invitatiOn; and it also questions the practicability of a number of the proposals to be suggested at the conference. (C London 936, 17 Aug 51)

Comment: The proposed meeting of the PCC is intended to bring togather representatives of Israel and the Arab States in an endeavor to promote the solution of st least some of the problems currently vexing their relations. The impatience displayed by the Foreign Office reflects


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the deep concern currently felt in the UK over what is regarded as a general weakening in the entire British position in the Middle East over the past six months, and suggests that the Foreign Office is for the moment not disposed to be conciliatory on any Middle Eastern questions.

7.

B.

Death of Chibas probably will not bring serious political roperCUBA. cussiona: The death of Senator Eduardo Chibas y Rivas, leader of the "Ortodoxo" party, and 1952 presidential aspirant, probably will not bring serious repercussions to the political situation in Cuba. Chlbas shot himself on 5 August after a weekly broadcast in which he called on the people to aWaken to what he called corruption in the government. ..Bad Chibas lived, he probably would have had little chance to secure the presidency due largely to his proven instability. Once considered the leading presidential aspirant and "the man to beat", .Clibas derived his strength, at least in part, from the fact that the government had not yet decided on a candidate. Recently his position began to deteriorate as certain segments of his party began working in harmony with Communist leaders. More recently Chiba& prestige suffered considerably as a result of his failure to prove charges of graft against Minister of Education Sanchez Arango and several other government
officials.

Chiba& ooncentrated campaign to discredit the gOvernment and Oreate distrust of .all its acts did have some effect on the general public. However, it appeared that public reaction was redounding more in favor of ax-president Batista, another presidential aspirant, than to Chibas Many Cubans who applauded Chibas for berating the government himself. rather than for any qualities he may have had as a statesman. apparently were giving their support to other candidates as election time approached.
While some Orthodoxos will now return to the government group, the opposition leader Batista will probably derive the most benefit from the passing of Chibas. TOP SECRET Approved ForfUlease 2002/05/20: 6A4RDP79T01146A000300440001-1 21 Aug 51 14

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This is the first report that such instructions have boon Comment: issued to any Latin American Communist Party. Colombian Communists would probably be capable of performing the assigned task.

25X1A

COLOMBIA. Communists collecting detailed personal information on Colombian diplomatic and consular representatives: In accordance with instructions from the Cominform, Colombian Communist leaders are collecting information orrthe diplomatic and consular representatives of Colombia in the US, UK, and France. The information desired included detailed knowledge of the subject's debts, vices, and weaknesses.

\ill

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declassi-

UNCLASSIFIED when
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ed from TOP NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this /orm is detac, and transmitted to Central Top Secret Contro tor record.
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140)

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2.1 August.1951..

a-

CIA No, 49310-A

S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT


'10 THE DAILY DIGEST

This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of 'Current Intelligence. Comments represent the -immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE.

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

1.

EGYPT. Foreign Minister again insiste denunciation of treaty with Britain is inainents ..The.Egyptian Foreign Minister has again informed the US AMbassador in Cairo.that he thinks he will formally announce Egyptian abrogation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty before the end of the Egyptian Parliament's present session. (TS, S/S Cairo 2169.113 Aug 51; U News Ticker, 19 Aug 51),

usla

Syrian Prime Minister issues statements favorable to the West: The ne4 Syrian Prime Minister has issued statements to the local press which reveal a favorable attitude toward the West. He is quoted as saying: "Arabs cannot face the dangers of this perplexed world alone. Neutrality is imaginary when we are weak.... I do not advocate alignment with the Western bloc for love of this bloc, but to repel the dangers threatening my country."

The Prime Minister, however% also has cautioned that there is a great " difference between his beliefs and government policy formulated by the (Cs, S/S Damascus 94, 16 Aug 51). Cabinet.
The.forthright and realistic statements attributed to the comment; Prime Minister are in sharp contrast to the neutralism and open antiWesternism so commonly voiced in Syria. The Army and its Chief of Staff are the real rulers of Syria; there is no evidence that they have assumed a proWestern attitude.

2 5X1 C

2 5X 1 A

mg. ;nternal opposition to the mreeent Iranian Cabinet reportedlY developings Mullah Kashani, a top religious leader in Iran, is reportedly

,involved in a Campaign to undermine the present Prime Minister. Kashani, 'has indirect contacts with the Soviet Enbassy. He is represented as having told the ethbassy that, with the government facing an imminent financial crisis, now is a "propitious" time to show Soviet good will by returning the Iranian gold it has held since its occupation of Iran during World Wgr II. Other reports state that he is interested in the abolition of the monarchy as a useless anachronism and the establishment of a federation of Islamic republics under Soviet influences,


Comments

The Igyptian Foreign Minister, according to his various stateComment: ments, apparently cannot decide on a date for the treaty's denunciation. A few days ago he told the US Anbassador that he intended to delay abrogation until probably October. le Egyptian press is quoted on 19 August to the effect that the Foreign Minister would not denounce the treaty during the present session of parliament whichwill be concluded within a few days.

Kashani is a rabble-rouser and an opportunist. TOP SECRET

Presumably,

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Kashanils efforts to secure the return of Iranian gold would imply the institution of a government more amenable to Soviet influence. Contacts between Eashani and the USSR have been rumored before.

While he has continued to support the present Prime Minister to whose National Front Party he belongs, Kashani has recently been particularly vocal in urging a united Islam, and these speeches may have given rise tO the above report, The opposition of various Iranian elements hostile to the present government is not yet sufficiently Strong to bring about the fall of the Prime Minister.

25X1A
40

IRAN.

National Front Deputies reportedly urge continuation of oil talks: Three National Front Deputies have agreed to urge Prime Minister Mossadeq not to break off the current IranianBritish oil discussions,
I

25X1A

Comment: The three men mentioned have all been ardent supporters of oil nationalization. If this report is correct -- and it may well be2 since an increasing nuthber of Iranians apparently now favpr coming to some sort of agreehent with the UK in the oil dispute -- it would seem to indicate that the move toward settlement of the oil question had penetrated the Prime Minister's own party,

5.

PAKISTAN, Government accepts invitation to Japanese Peace Conference: Pakistan's acceptance of an invitation to the Sah Francisco Conference has "gone forward," according to Sir Zaftullah Khan the Foreign Minister, Sir Zatrullah hopes to head the delegation if conditions in Pakistan permit him to leave the country. (00 S/S Karachi 173, 17 Aug 51),

6,

Britain now willing to invite Indochinese states to Japanese The UK Government has instructed its High Commissioner in India to inform the GOI that, having "duly noted the views of the Indian Government," the UK nevertheless finds it desirable to invite the Associated States to the San Francisco conference. (C, S/S State to London 10420 18 Aug 51).
treaty conference.:

INDOCHINA.

Comments The altered position of the UK, which has previously been reluctant to invite the Associated States in view.of India's unfavorable attitude* virtually assures the attendance of the Associated States at the conference.

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7,

CHINA:

25X1X

Pe

Is Forei

Office

e:

.;nese peace

treaty:
,

on 16 AugUst that he had been celled to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to receive a copy of Premier Chou Entlai's 15 August statement on the Japanese peace treat'. The ministry's spokesman emphasized to the charge the importance of the conclud ing paragraphs of Chouge statement. (S, S/8 The Hague 189, 17 Aug 51).

Chouts speech suggests the possibility that, after the San Francisco conference, Moscow and Peiping will.call A separate conference of the Soviet bloc and those nations that do not sign the USUK draft treaty at San Frandisco,

8; =maw,

putch are dissatisfied with the present Japanese peace treatr draft: The Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister is soiewhat doubtful whether his country will sign the present draft of the Japanese treaty especially if the Indonesians refUse to sign it. He hopes that some revision will be posSible at the San Francisco conference, despite the US and UK statements that the draft is "final." Certain modifications of Article 14 (reparations) would make the treaty acceptable to the Dutch. .00 S/S The Hague 187,
Cotments The Dutch fear that the reparations clause as it now stands will result in the Netherlands being responsible for the claims of its citizens who suffered from the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, Other reports indicate that, even though the Dutch demandi for revision are not act ed'upon, the Netherlands may sign the treaty with reservations,

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Comment: The last three Paragraphs of the Chou statement declare that, if Communist China does not-participate in the "preparation, drafting and signing" of a Japanese peace treaty, Peiping will consider the treaty "illegal" and "null and void," These paragraphs also express agreement with the Soviet position that a peace conference should include all the states Whose armed forces were in conflict with Japan in World War and affirm that Peiping is prepared to "exchange views" on a Japanese peace treaty with all such states,
.

II,

SECTION 3 (WESTERN)

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22 August 1951

CIA No. 49311


Copy No.

DAILY DIGEST

Sta e Dept. declassification & release instructions on file

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)

1.

US Lend-Lease goods 'still 'sold in USSR: Embasay Moscow nOtes that US lend-lease goods are still being sold to the Soviet public, at mitmessed by an Embassy officer who recentlyeai a Ruisian purchasing 300 rubles worth of radio tubee, tnciuding Xany of DS manufaCture. The Russian upon inquiring of the salesgirl for Glavelectrosvyazhyt (chief administration.for eleotrical and communicitions-eqUipment sales) whether he would be able to 'continue bUying US tubes, was told that up to now the supply of US tubes was adequate. (C Moscow 301, 20 Aug 51)... USSR.
:

2.

25X1A

Interior New pOstal 'security Measures re orted in Lithuania: has r6Minister General Bartasiunas cently issued new security' measures requiring all postal shipments. letters, parcels and telegrams ciroulating withtn Lithuania to carry the sender's name and address. Letters and parcels destined abroad must reportedly be presented for inspection at Special postal sections of the Gorkoim (Town Committees) or Raikoms (Regional Committees) before mailing. SPreading rumors and gossip by mail is said to be punishable just as if circulated by word of mouth. Minor Offenses are to be hnadled by 100 to 1000 ruble finaa issued by local NVD organs. The V710 is authorized to hand over the more serious cises to the State ?toss,cuter.

Comment: Further cOrroboration iS subMittefly-the Embassy which, itselicFiTaaly Purchased an RCA 6F6 tube tannfaatured in 1944 for the US Army and Navy. The newly evineed SoViet interest in expanded trade with the West may partially reflect fears of future shortages of such essential electrical appliances and radio tubes as appear to be still easily obtainable from abroad.

25X1C

5X1X

regnlationsave It is possible that additional Se Comment: been IET7317ed in the Lithuanian SSR as a rwault of Mote that took: in 111no on 4 June 1951. -(See place . ug 0/dI Dai y Miges
jlcurity

3..

EMbassy Moscow convinced of post-war fall Prom grace of Zhukov and Kuznetsov: Embassy Moscow believes that the post-war faiI715Fai grace of General Zhukov and Viceairal KnznetsoV was 'clearly demonstrated hy the publicity denied to them in recent "Vweril but accorded te suoh titans as Konev, Rokossovsky and Vasilevsky: The Ehbassy recalls that Kuznetsov, as-full admiral, was apparently tried by a oourt of honor in 1948, downgraded three ranks, and aceording to some reports deprived.of his freedom. Similarly ZhukoV although not downgraded, was

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1

22 Aug 51.

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'

given peripheral assignments at Odesed and Sverdlovsk, was eclipsed by other marshals, and received shabby treatment in films depicting the fall of Berlin. According to-the Ebbassy, local repOrts picture Yumashev as ailing in recent years, although he_was seen at the 1951 May Day and other functiens. The Embassy doubte :that he was transferred in order to assume "higher duties." (S Moscow257, 13 Aug 51).
Comment: Marshal Zhukov recently re-emerged into prominence at the Polish liberation anniversary, and it is suppeoted that he is slated coven important military post. In July,XUsnetsov was reappointed Minister of the Navy.
.

4.

..

The Commissioner pointe to Communist gains,in that the bulk of the youth obeyed Communist directions entirely, foreign participants were probably impressed, and the Feetival:as a whole provided the Communists with a wealth of propaganda material,

MoCloy is convinced, however, that the FeStital tOok an unexpeoted turn of importance to the 77est when at least 600000 of ite delegates defied.Communist regulations to visit lest Berlin: Many of these youthr made full use of facilities prepared for their reception, pieked up propaganda literature, and participated in group discusiions, often voioing anti7Communist sentiiente. MoCley gained the impression that the proportion of the East German youth won over to Communism is not as large as had been feared.
The Festival provided no reliable evidence on the attitude of Russian or Satellite youth since they had no opportUnity to join the Mass visits to West Berlin. (S Frankfert 1566, 19 Aug 51, Sect. 1 of 2; S Frankfort 1566, 19 Aug 51, Seot. 2 of 2),
Comment: The mass visits of youth:: to the Meet sectors pf Berlin -in many cases induoed merely by curiOeity -- are not deemed a reliable index of the true extent of youth support of the East German regime.


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2

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. High ComMissioner MoCloy reperts'en ComMunist World Youth Festival: ln a preliMinary analysis of the recently coneluded World Youth Festival ii Beilin, US High COMmisitioner MoCloy observes that the Communist's were undoubtedly successfel in gathering a very large number Of youth and Marshalling them in Smoothly run mass meetings and parades. He feels, hOwever, that East German participants, knowingly or unknowingly, had engaged in anti-Communist activities on a mass scale during the festival, and that the potential for a resistance movement among them has been clearly demonstrated:

22 Aug 51

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25X1C.
5.

EASTERN EUROPE.

ALBANIA.

Focid nppl .

ithrove i

Th food situation in

25)6C

ved during ile.y and June

It is iePorted that:teat bread in great quantities is replacing the meager'ration-of"corn breed Which had been

enforced for some time. 1111111111.,--25X1A


Comment:.
-

Although the report of "great quantitiesT'mak be exaggerated, the food situation probably has improved. In the spring of 1951, the Albanian Government reduced the oenpulsOry deliVery quotas of agricultural products hy 25% and the USSR sent-5000 tons of wheat to alleviate a deoline in food production. Previously; the food supply was reported to have dropized as a result oflhe-drought, the lack of incentive in the oolleotive farm system and the government's requisitioning of grain.

6,

Comment: The current trial, with ite forced publio attendance proballTri-Intended to terrorize the populace into submission.

7.

HUNGARY. Renewed efforts being made tO overocime-eoonoido difficulties: A recent article in the Hungarian Communist Party daily dealt with the ourrent important taski faeing-the Communists: (1) having the grain threshed and delivered; (2) guarantieing the success of the production competition; (3) Inc:reading the number of agricultural .cooperatives.
Cajolery, threats, awards and iipriSonthefttthave all been used to get the harvest in; howeter, there are reports tilatTsons grain deliveries are lagging. The'latest step in the move to laerease production by the recruitment of 160,000 new workers is a decree forcing thetaged and maimed into Various types of presCribed lailors. 'An intensive oaMpaign to recruit 5,000 new miners is evidence of serious shorteoMings in Hungarian coal production. In addition, press reports presage a reduction in the number of rail passenger schedules aimed it economizing 15,000 tons of coal yearly. (6 MA 2619 Blpst, 15 Aug 51; R MA 2624, Blpst, 17 Aug 51; FBIS), Comment: Periedio drives to alleviatahe deteriCrating Hungarian economic situation have failed to achieve more than momenterrsumess.


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3

Trial of "spies" revealsinternal difficulties; A trial of seventeen vterrorist kulaks" accused of espionage and spreading false information has begun in Tirana-before anHaudience of 2,000. The'aecused are charged with collaborating-with American, Yugoslav and Greek agents, killing Communist Party offieials and attempting to recrUit agents locally for their diversionary activities. .(UIPBID, 20 Aug 51).

22 Aug 51

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The measures used increased control, Produetion competitions, higher norms -do not correot the basic troubles which include obsolete machinery; lack Of raw materials, a'dearth of skilled teohniclans, and the absence of labor incentives.

8.

.YUGOSLAVIA.

Yugoslavia refusee to attend Bin Franciec Conference, Assistant Yoreign Minister Vilfan has infornumITS Ambaseador Allen that the Yugoslav Governmenthas depided.not to attend the SenloranOisco Japanese Treaty Conference because of the remoteness of Yugoslav M.06= stantiVe interest.in-Japanese affairs. Vilfan explained.that, although his government recegnized the-deciaiatiOn'ef war an Japan made.bY ihe Yugoslav London Government, Yugoelavia would find-it embarrassingto take a position on a nuMber of qUestioniwhioh will probably arise at. the Conference. (C Belgrade 219, 20 Aug 61).
Comment: Yugoslavia had previcUsly indioated that it would deolineITT7.7131tation. By refusing toattend, the Yugoslav Government can aVeid taking a stand on Chinese Communist participation in the treaty, a:question that w111 probabiy'be raised by the.Soviet Union. It oan also evade the aWkwardness ot signing a lenient Japaneee treaty at a time When it is opPosing all suggestions to revise the more punitive Italian Peaoy Treaty.


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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

1.

IRAN. Senate approves Export-Import Bank loan: The Iranian Senate has approved by a wide majority the Export-IMport Bank loan previously passed by the Lower House and the Senate Committee. (U Tehran 707, 19 Aug 51).

In addition, the US Army Attache in Karachi reports that the' Pakistani Army in the Lahore area is defensively disposed and that it displays calm and confidence despite the fact that India's total armored forces are drawn up about 30 miles away. (S Karachi Weeka 7, 18 Aug 51; USARMA Karachi DWH 112, 17 Aug 51).
'

Comment: This information further substantiates the belief that Pakistan will not initiate armed warfare with India.

3.

NEPAL. Organized pro-Communist student activities appear for the first time: The Gpvernment.of Nepal refused passports to members of the Nepal Students' Federation who wished to attend the Communist-sponsored East Berlin Youth Festival, according to a 12 August press report. A Karachi radio broadcast of 15 August stated that students in Katmandu, the capital of Nepal, demonstrated on 14 August for the establishment of diplomatic relations with China. ( s New Delhi Weeka 33, 18 Aug 51; R FBID Far East, 17 Aug 51).
Comment: These are the first reports Of organized pro-Communist student activities in Nepal.

2.

PAKISTAN. War hysteria is lacking: The US Embassy in Karachi states that the Pakistani people will be ',very angry" if India proceeds with its declared intention of supporting the election of a Constituent Assembly in Kashmir, but that Pakistani public opinion will accept whatever action is taken by the government to prevent the election. The embassy believes this action will take the form of an appeal to the Commonwealth countries, to the UN Security Council, and possibly to a special session of the UN General Assembly to halt the elections.

Comment: The loan, approved by the US in early 1951, had not previously been ratified by the Iranian Parliament. If the loan is made available, Iran will be able to continue with its badly needed economic.development program which is currently stalled for lack of funds. However, concern has been felt that implementation of the loan at this time would be interpreted as pressure on Greet Britain in favor of Iran; Conversely, failure to implement the loan would appear to Iran as undue pressure in support of Great, Britain.

'

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5

22 Aug 51

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4.

INDONESIA, ommunist arrests will cont nue: A cabinet member told US Ambassador Cochran that,recent:widespread arrests were based upon definite information that subversive elements, including Communists, turbances on 17 August and planned disHe said that arrests would had plans for further action from 21-24 August. continue until :wirer:of the known were in custody. instigators
Pringgodigdo, Chief of President Sukarno'a staff, that Sukarno himself had been intimated to chiefly responsible for the decision Cochran strong action against subversive to tnke elements. Pringgodigdo bility which the President said the responsihas taken weighs heavily that Cochran seize every upon him. opportunity to support and encourage He suggested Djakarta 278, 18 Aug 51). Sukarno. (C

5.

INDOCHINA. French mints osition in Indochina little im rovedni The US Army Attache in Saigon believed io be 'ter standing French tactical estimates that, notwithsuccesses in Tonkin, the overall position of French Union forces strategic is very little improved obtained last fall. over that which He believes that-various the infliction of a four to favorable factors, including one casualty rate offset by improved Viet Minh on the Viet Minh, are nearly organization, arid logistics. recruitment, troop disposition

The process of reinforcing French forces and training and non-commissioned native commissioned officers has been slow, an attrition rate of,ten and the attache believes that to one would have to be French Union forces to seize maintained in order for and retain the initiative defeat of the enemy. and insure the (S USARIAA Saigon, MC 206, 18 Aug 51). Comment: This is an unusually pessimistic estimate, particularly view of official French claims in that the Viet Minh has been and decimated in battles badZy defeated during the past few months. French Union forces, although roughly equal in numbers to the Viet Minh, are better armed. those of They possess control of Indochina, air and sea are far better supported undisputed logiatically access to a greater reservar of fit manpower than the eneMy. and have barring Chinese Communist intervention, Thus, the Viet Minh would appear a four to one attrition rate on to promise steady improvement Military position. of the French


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6

Comment: It is of some significance that Sukarno ponsible for the government's was personnally resdecision. The cabinet opinion that decisions is of such diverse are nearly impossible. be increasingli Sukarno's leadership will required should inter-party rivalry in ihe cabinet continue,

22 Aug 51

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6.

Chinese Consul predicts ChinaVietnam diplomatic exchange: The ChineseConsul General in Saigon announced before a meeting of Chinese community leaders that the exchange of diplomatic representativeS between Vietnam and Nationalist China is "just around the corner." (S Saigon Weeka 33, 20 Aug 51).

_Comment: The French authorities have discouraged the establishment of diplomatic relations between Nationalist China and Vietnam in accord with their continuing'policy of nonprovocation with respedt to the Chinese Communists,

7.

Comnent: During the year ending 30 June 1951, Panamanianregistered shipping engaged in trade with Communist China increased threefold. In many cases the vessels have been registered under the names of dummy companies, with Chinese Communist interests suspected as being the bene ficial owners. The projedted transfer of vessels to other registry indicates that, in the absence of parallel action by other countries, Panama's decree will not effectively discourage merchant shipping from the China trade.

8.

Chungking claims suppression of 154.000 "bandits": Chungking radio claims that "banditsuppression" troops, in the first six months of 1951, "put oUt of action" more than 154,000 anti,-Communist guerrillas-in the Southwest region (Szechuan, Sikang, Yunnan, Kweichow). FBID, 20 Aug 51).
'

Comment: In June 1950 Peiping admitted the presence of 400,000 "bandits" in the Southwest region alone. In November 1950, Peiping radio asserted that "remnant bandits" had been wiped out in the Southwest.: Communist figures on "banditsuppression" are unreliable even for Communist figures, as many or most of the guerrillas listed as "put out of action" are simplY- dispersed, thereafter to resunp activity and to appear in subsequent lists of those "suppressed." AJS Army G-2 estimated in July 1951 that about 75,000 antiCommunist guerrillas were still active in the Southwest.


TOP SECRET
7

CHINA. Hong Kong shipowners withdraw vessels from Panamanian registry: The Panamanian Consulate General in Hong Kong has made public a decree approved by the Panamanian cabinet (but awaiting presidential signature) which forbids Panamanianflag ships from calling at Communist ports and also prohibits the carrying of strategic cargo to Hong Kong and Macao. Shipping firms in the colony are now applying to the Panamanian Consulate General for revocation of their shipping registry. It is reported that shipowners are planning to switch to British, Portuguese or Indonesian registry. (U Central News Hong Kong, 21 Aug 51).

22 Aug 51

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25X1X
9.

TOP SECRET

25X1A 25X1A

25X1X Soviet "airborne division" allegedly in Tientsin: inl'eiping alleges that the Soviet "68th airborne division" s been in Tientsin since April 1951, engaged in training Chinese troop's inthe area. The Soviet Communist division is said to comprise six battalions with paratroop of 120 officers and 2,304 men, (da received),
Comment: No Soviet 68th rifle or aLrborne division, army or army corps has been identified. Travelers from Tientsin in the past few have not reported the presence months of Soviet military units --other than technical personnel- -in the advisoryTientsin area. While the above be dismissed, its validity is report cannot questionable.

10.

11.

KOREA. Communist plans for a sixth phase offensive to a recently captured Chinese reportedj According' 140th Division, 47th Army, his Communist soldier from the newly arrived company political officer stated that his
.TOP SECRET

Comment: General Mao mas trained in Russia and returned to China in 1937 to become one of Chiang Kai-shek's most trusted lieutenants. In 1943 he was appointed head of the CAF office in Washington charge of purchase functions for to take knowledge that he has long been the Nationalist Air Force. It is Common Commander and a trusted favorite a rival of Chou Chih-jou, Nationalist Air of Chiang. phether the dismissal made for the reasons stated in was the presidential a political mandate, or whether it was move, is not clear. It is, however, as a token of good that it was made faith to the US as a-result of possible the acceptance by Nationalist China of the 20 July memoranda.

-rankin Nationalist air re esentative in the Formosa: A Taipei US recalled to press report of 21 August revealed the immediate recall to Formosa of Nationalist suspension and Ghinats top-ranking air representative in the US, Air.Lt. Gen. Nho Pang-chu. A later report the same day announced the dismissal of executive assistant to Nho. ,The two and recall'of Colonel Hsiang Weih7suan, men were accused by the presidential mandate of "dereliction duties and disobedience offenses were listed as: of of orders," Nhots (a) failure to.account for funds used for the purchase of military equipment for the Air Force; (b) dereliction of impeding the fighting power duties of the Air Force; (c) espousal of.the "disloyal" staff cause of members; (d) refusal undermining the government's prestige to hand oVer public funds; and (e) by spreading rumors'. speculates that neither of .the The report men will return to Formosa, mean certain punishment, as but rather will use their knowledge it would the prestige of Nationalist China to undermine in the.US in the capacity of political refugees. (U PANA, Taipei, 21 Aug 51).

22 Aug 51

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.division was holding the line in order to permit troops in the rear areas to prepare for a sixth phase offensive. The up Far East Command concludes, reasoning from the fact that similar statements by'political officers have preceded previous offensives, that an enemy offensive will be launched if current ceasefire negotiations fail. CINCFE-Telecon 5066, 21 Aug 51); Comment: The us lar.East Command still estimates that Communist forces in Korea have'the capability of sustaining a major offensive for a two. week period.


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22 Aug 51

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/SECTION 3

(1ESTERN)

1.

GERMANY. Prospects for ratification of Schuman Plan deteriorating: Recent deVelopments indicate that prospects for a prompt ratification of the Schuman

Plan by the West German ParliaMent (lower house) are deteriorating. Key delegates of the two minor parties of the government coalition have expressed the view that ratification mould be impossible under the present circumstance; and that half of their factions might refuse to support the Plan mhen the' Parliament reconvenes in September. Although HICOG officials believe these ,claims to be exaggerated, they acknowledge that GerMan anger oVer the recent Ruhr Authority and Saar issues is certain to delay ratifidation of the Plan and-strengthen the hand of the forces opposing ratification, (C Bonn un numbered, 15 Aug 51; C Bonn 118, 17 Aug 51)

2.

Pleven GOvernment proposes token aid for Churchschools and sets dates: The first meeting of the new Pleven government has resulted in action on the wage and school questions, which embittered the recent Cabinet crisis, and the dates for fall elections. The government's decision to raise the minimum wage, however, is far from satisfying even the non Communist unions. Aid to churchschools took the form mainly of an agree ment to Seek Parliamentary approval of an increase of $2500 in credits for secondary school scholarships. The main controversy, aver aid to church primary schools, was to be resumed 21 August in the Assembly, with the Government taking no initiative. Cantonal elections for renemml of half the membership in each of the general councils of the 90 departments are scheduled for 7 and 14 October, while special elections to fill 12 vacancies in the Council of the Republic (upper house of Parliament) will be held on 30 September. (R Paris 1077, 18 Aug 51)

FRANCE.

Zation

Comteht: This Government may find a general solution of the wageprice and churchschool problems virtually impossible of attainment since the Cabinet is deprived of the Socialists' participation in its deliberations and yet must bargain for their support in the Assembly. Meanwhile the anticipation of fall elections has Stiffened considerably the positions of both the Socialists and the proCatholic Popular Republicans on the churchschool Issue, the former fearing lossea to the Communists, and the latter to the Gaullists. Although the cantonal elections will turn largely

Comment: On 12 July, prior to its recess, the lower house passed the law ratifying the Schuman Plan in the first of three readings necessary to secure final ratification, Although the three Government parties at that tithe presented a solid front in supporting the Plan, the debate indicated that aRy adverse developments, particularly in the Ruhr Authority and Saar issues, might considerably increase the Chancellor's difficulties in securing approval at the time of the final reading of the bill.

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10

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upon local questions, they will afford some measure of popular reaction to political developments
since the June' elections.

3.

Coitment: In general, restrictive business practices are in keeping with time-honored procedures prevailing in Austria and recent US complaints Of the "medievar organization of Austrian business have caused resentment. US and Soviet opposition merely delays and does not annul the objectionable law. It would appear unlikely, therefore, that the Austrian government will offei a measure mere acceptable to the American viewpoint.

Werld,Council for Peace surveys Vienna as conference site: zeneral secretariat of the World Council The for Peace has requested the Austrian Committee of Fighters for Peace for a survey of the feaSibility of,convoking a.convention in Vienna in October. The US Legation is concerned that the meeting may coincide with Communist agitation within the ranks of labor -anticipated in Austria this fall. (C Vienna 631, 16 Aug 51)

13ukr

pommentp The advantageous position of the Austrian capital (and Berlin) as aicenter of internationcomm,Jistfront org nations is becoming increasingly evident. Th.Wellgial=2Peace, fart sand,' WOrld FeAgration 442,emocraticand
.


'Nome

AUSTRIA. US opposes Austrian anti-cartel law: US High Commiesioner Donnelly refused to give his consent at the Allied COuncil meeting of 17 August to the new Austrian cartel control the law reversed.the position enunciated the law. The US objection to previous meek in the Executive CoMmittee of the.Allied Commission and is of non-interference in internal Austrian a departure from the US policy legislation. US Commiseioner Donnelly asserted that the law was contrary to the interests of consumers and to us conceptions of sound business practices. He particularly objected to exemptions accorded to large sectors of the business community, and to registration provisions which, he alleged, mould merely formalize the existence of cartels. Despite US and Soviet agreement in opposing the-law) Commissioner Donnelly pointed out that the Seviet occupation itself was responaible for numerous Austrian monopolies; the Communist press in turn alleged that US opposition was only "ostensible" since cartels are a consequence of the Marshallization of Austria. .(U Vienna 668, 20 Aug 51)

tempt to establish Austrian_headquarIttS_AiLallaw_the. edergionmaraiWFTU into Vienna... In the absence ve travel controls, the US Legation is considering the possible usefulness of Wide publicity as a countermeasure. Propaganda would stress that, in view of the Austrian attitude, agencies of international,commnnismoould remain in Vienna only with Soviet protection. The migration Of zilch agencies to Vienna, Soviet intentions to terminate in the therefore, reflects unfavorably upon foreseeable future its Anstrian occupation.
!

Cr

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5.

25X1C

25X1C ITALY. Role of Communistpara-Military organization modified. Elagt paramilitary organization (apparato)

The Com-

25X1A

no longer considers insurrection feasible in case o war, but is prepared to undertake sabotage and guerrilla warfare. The' COmmunist Party shifted its policy in accordance With Soviet directives issued after Tito's defection, and abandoned the aim of obtaining power through armed revolt. Having "disinterested itself" from the apparato which nnmbers about 50,000, the Party seeks to undermine the Italian state in divert way so as to facilitate the "liberation" of Italy by the Soviet armies when the time COMBS' The Communist Party.never organized sabotage schools or courses ih the theory of guerrilla warfare., While 'the percentage of Communists among the enlisted men of the armed forces is the same as among the country'S population, there has been practically nopenetration amon the officers and NCOls and none at All among the carabinieri and police.

Comment: The increased efficiency of the Italian:armed forces and police makes armed revolt less attractive. However, there haveTbeen,no other indications that the Communists have desisted frem.consolidating their apparato, whose strength US observers still estimate at 75,000. The alleged non.Lexistence of Communist sabotage schools conflicts with reports that the party has recently been training w4)1ert.aaboteurs (see 00I Daily Digest, 17 Ang 51). While Communist penetration Among the armed forces is probably not significant, considerable infiltration has been reported among the pelice, particularly in rural areas and north Italian industrial centers.

6.

UNITED KINGDOM. Latest public opinion poll shows decline ih Labor Party su ort: According to the Gallup Poll taken in July, popular support for e Conservatives increased for the first time since February, While that for the Labor Party correspondingly dropped. The respective percentages: far those who had made up their minds are:


February
Jime

July 39 49

Labor Conservative

37i 51*

41
48

The apparent reversal of trend is considered surprising for it was widely believed that the Labor Party would continue to make inrOads in the Censervative Party lead throughout the summer. (R London, Joint Weeka No 33, 17 Aug 51)
-

Commeht: An increased meat ration, the Festival of Britain, and warm weather which held in abeyance the effects of a coal shortage were considered' all favorable factors for sustained Labor Party popularity at least during the summer months. Tkmmver, it may be that rising prices and a belief that

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12

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the government is not protecting'British interests abroad has overshadowed these factors in the public mind.
GOV$1rnment adopts anti-strike measurekr TheNetherlands ARTIPAI les1 Indies Government is taking the following action as a result of the recent Dago refinery strike: (a) Dismissal of the Dovernor of Aruba for his failure to talcs police action when so ordered;

7.

(b) DePortation of twelve Surinam and British Guiana agitators suspected of Communist leanings; (c) Strictest application of police measures; and (d) Introduetion of new legislation limiting the legality of strikes.

Tbe action is due, in part, to the complaint of the Lago Oil and Transport Company to the Governor that'nrotection has been'inadeqUate and that the (C Curacao 7, number of threats to American personnel must be stopped. 20 Aug 51)

Comment: 'The employees of the Lego Oil and Transport Company (Standard Oil of New4ersey) returned to work on 18 August after A strike lasting a week. Operations at the refinery had been reduced to 65 per cent capacity. Thedispute was Settled with the aid of a government mediator and the emPloyeed obtained a 16 per cent general wage increase. No serious disorders, antagonisM; Or afiti-US attitude were manifested and there was no evidence of Communist activity. The government's action will do much toward lessening future strike threats,
-

racial


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22 Aug 51
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1JNCLASSIFIED when litipirdgethreffEReSsettpdottogagp:*Astagetrerpoiti*Aegtbodosgoeice or declassiA firtd when filled in form is detached from controlled document.
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NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detect ed from Top Sec et material it shall be completed ffi the appropriate spaces below and t ansmitird to Central Top Secret Contra for record.
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PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

nee Ler

FORM
0773

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( 40)

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23 August 1951
CIA No. 49311-A 3a Copy No.

S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT


TO THE DAILY DIGEST

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Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE.

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. le does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

Approved For Release 2001109/06 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300450001-0

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

1.

Burmese attitude toward Japanese peace treaty still unresolved: A. high bfficial of the Burmese.Foreign Office informed tis Ebbassy Rangoon that a Cabinet decision will probably be required to determine whether or not Burma will attend the Japanese Peace Conference. Since many cabinet officers are out of town, a delay of several days is anticipated. The em bassy suspects that the Soviet Union's decision to attend may have radically altered Burmese thinking in favor of.joining the conference. The EMbassy also feels that the Cabinet's final decision is likely to be influenced by the Government of Indonesia. (S, 8/8 Rangoon 201, 18 Aug 51),
Comment: US AMbassador Cochran reported from Djakarta on 21 August that the Indonesian Foreign Minister was attempting to gain governmental and parlia mentary approval for participation in the conference, ard that a final decision in favor of attending was imminent.

BURMA.

2.

INDOCHINA. Vietnam Mgr demand reparations from Japan: The Vietnamese Govern ment's note to the US Legation pleading Vietnam's case for attendance at the Sanhe:lois= conference indicates a desire for some measure of reparations. Previous discussions with the Vietnamese had given US officials the impression that Vietnam did not intend to make an issue of reparations. The Vietnamese note suggested that reparations in the form of trade privileges or Japaneee teohnicians would be favorably considered. (S, 8/8 Saigon 420, 19 Aug 51),
:wont: The French have vigorously championed Vietnam's right to at tend the conference, while indicating that no request for reparations would be made on behalf of Vietnam, Vietnamese insistence on reparations, par ticsularly in the forms suggested above, could be expected to conflict with Frenoh reluctance to tolerate the reentrk of Japanese goods and influence into Itdoohina,

3.

allagrall.

Romulo has told the-US &ham in Manila that President Quirino hae decided

to send him to Washington as AMbaseador and, accordingly, would not include his name among the approved Liberal Party list of senatorial candidates. (C, 8/8 Manila 719, 18 Aug 51).

Ommepts Rumors that Romulo would run for the Senate hod been inter preted to indicate that Quirino was preparing the wey for him to become an eventual candidate for the presidency. Although he is a popular figure in the Philippines, Romulo at present lacks the close political connections necessary to ensure his election to the highest office.


pomulo to be Ambassador to US:
SECRET

Seoretary of Foreign Affairs

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SECRET

4,

JAPAN. Strong criticism of peace treaty appears in press for the first time: A columnist in the YUkan Yomiuri on 16 August strongly'criticized..the cheerful and festive attitude of the Japanese 'Government and peoPle toward the peace treaty. Contrasting thia with the deep resentment held by the Japanese following the Treaties og Shimonoseki and Portemouth, the article etated that this is a time for the Japanese to be in mourning and in deep grief.. The US. Political Adviser comments that this is the most critical statement;yet to appear in a large daily newspaper,and, while not typ ical of the prevailing sentiment, it undoubtedly represents the unexpressed sentiments of some Japanese and might be indicative of a future thought trend.. (8, 8/s ToXyo 351, 18 Aug 51).
Comment. It is considered probable that a reaction against the treaty, centering areund the territorial clauses, will set in following the treaty's signing. The Socialist Party, which has continued to maintain its opposition to the treaty, is undoubtedly banking on this prospect to die:Credit the government and enhance its own political future,

5:

British official'raises question of Japan-China treaty: In the course of a conversation about the Japanese peace treaty, a British Embassy officer in Washington asked Ambassador Dulles whether the US interpreted the US-UK uhderstanding about China as preventing the signature of a peace treaty. between Japan and any Chinese government until after the coming into force of the main Treaty of Peace. In reply, Dulles pointed out that the principle involved was that there should be no Allied coercion upon Japan to adopt a course regarding China which might prejudice Japan's best interests for the future. He added that it would be normal that the.Japanese Government would quickly seek a peace with the Nationalist Government, but that such a peace should not assume that the Nationalist Government, would bin4 pal:1A anl'ailChinese, flIfin (S, S/S State to Taipei 7631, 17 Aug 51). The British Cabinet originally rejected the compromise formula, which deleted all references to China in the treaty, on the grounds that the participation of Nationalist China through a separate bilateral treaty was made possible at Japan's discretion. In view of this attitude, the UK would be very unlikely to approve a policy which would encourage Japan to conclude a.quick, though limited, treaty with the Formosan government,
Comment:


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2

22 Aug 51

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0

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23 August 1951

CIA No. 49312

DAILY DIGEST

State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM: yive Power Peace Pact campaign to be clitaxed 1)3 signature drive in USSR' The Soviet prase reports that the Soviet Peace Committee will held a plenary meeting on 28 August to "discuss conducting a signature campaigd in the USSR for the World Peace Council apPeal for a-Five Power Peace'Pact and plans for an All-Uhion Conference of Peace Partisans.". (R Moscow 310, 21 Aug 51). A Moscow AP diepatch dated 21 August etateli that a mammoth campaign for auch signatures:was already going on throughout the Soviet Union.
Comment: Thb delayed entry of the US8R into the signature campaign initiated last February by the World Peace Council, follows .the same procedure Moscow used in the 1950 Stockholm appeal to ban the atomic bomb. The USSR may wish to conclude ite eignature campaign so that the final figures can be announced in time for a meeting of the World Peace Council reportedly.scheduled for October in Vienna or Helsinki.

25X1X
2.

EASTERN EUROPE: eiger of Satellite airlines under Soviet direction reported. he state-owned airline companies of Eastern Europe were incorporated on 20-July lnto,the Soviet CiVil Air Fleet (Aeroflot). lids decision was reportedly taken at a conference in Moscow about 15 July. Control of themerged Satellite airlines has been asiumed by Soviet General Zigarev, representing Marshal ronkoV Chief of Aeroflot.

25X1A

av.

25X1A

Comment: There is no other information available On the alleged merger. Such an amalgamation would be a logical development, since it would partially rectify the operational and maintenance difficulties which have beset the Satellite-airlines, The eliminatien of duplicate routes and the establishment of central repair facilities would considerably mitigate chronic shortages of planes, spate parte and trained personnel. The Soviet Union already actively participates in the joint-stock companies which control the Hungarian and Rumanian civil airlines.
3.

ROLAND: Maes movement of political unreliablee reported under way: US Emb 'Warsaw reports that following the end of the trial of ex-Army officers a mass movement of politically unreliable elements apparentlY began from the Warsaw area. Among the groups affected are: officers of the Polish armed forces who were members of the wartime underground resistance; relatives of political prisoners, and businessmen who have been deprived of their enterprises. Moat of the unreliables are being relocated in other parts of Poland. Thel officers in the armed forces who were in the wartime Polish underground, however, are being moved to undetermined areas outside of

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Poland.

The first contingent consisting of 130 fliers was deported in mid-August. (C Warsaw. 165, 17 Aug 51).
Comment: The US Embassy noted in June that it was receiving numerous reports of dissidents being evicted from Warsaw and other Polish cities. Similar reports have been received in recent months from all the Eastern European Satellites.

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

1.

JORDAN. Economic crisis materializing: Jordan is rapidly approaching a serious economic crisis caused by the 60 per cent failure of its wheat prop and intensified by the gradual disappearance of the windfall capital brought in by the wealthier Palestine refugees. Government officials fear that starvation conditions will lead to disorders on which the Communists, whose activities have become more apparent, can capitalize. They assume that the US can grant Jordan a loan to carry it through the winter. /he US Minister in AmMan recommends consideration of all possible soirees of relief in anticitation of a formal request. (R Amman 62, 20 Aug 51).
Commsnt: The Prime Minister previously msntioned his concern over the economic situation which he feared might lead to internaLdisturbances that would encourage Joidan's Arab neighbors to intervene. (See Daily. Dig est 2 Aug 51)4

2.

SYRIA. US help sought to Justify pro-Westernism to Arabs: The Syrian Foreign Minieter has informed the US Minister in Damascus that the new government is :disposed to seek a broader understanding with the West and acknowledges the need for Western help in solving Near Eastern problems. Past experiences make the Arabs suspicious, however; and the US will be held to a strict account. Therefore, in the Foreign Minister's view, the US must help Syria to produce tangible results to justify cooperation with the West. ;(C Damascus 101, 20 Aug 51).
Comment: The Prime Minister has expressed similar pro-Western sentiments to the local press. UN action on-the 20 AuguSt report filed by General Riley, the Chief of Staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation, setting forth Israeli non-compliance with the UN resolution concerning the SyrianIsraeli border dispute, could produce sOme tangible results for the Syrians.

3.

Comment: Continued wagon shortages could result in the loss to the US of 20 per cent of its anticipated 1951 manganese imports from India4 The Indian railways are probably unable to handle manganese shipments beeause of the necessity of distributing imported food supplies. .If railway capabilities are further curtailed by strikes, one of which is still pending, exports of manganese to the US will be even more drastically reduced.

INDIA. Shortage of rail facilities impedes manganese exPorts to US: %The 'Shortage of rail facilities in India is seriously impeding normal exports of Manganese to the US. Shipments'during the first seven months of 1951 were 60,000 tons below expectations. (S New Delhi 569, 10 Aug 51)0

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4.

Government refuses to Permit establishment of Indo -Afghan air A proposed air service between India and Afghanistan has been blocked by the Pakistani GovernMent for the reason that the route would be over a "prohibited area." (ii FBID, Far East, 20 Aug 51). Comment: The Himalayan Air Lines, an Indian company, has been attempting to establish a Delhi-Karachi-Quetta-Kandahar-Kabul air route. not surprising, cobsidering It is the existing tensions between Pakistan its two neighbors, that permission for and such a route has been denied.
servicei

PAKISTAN.

Comment: The cabinet appeared willing to participate until the sudden outbreak of criticism in response to the Soviet decision to attend the conference. Such criticism,sa reflected chiefly in Masjumi Party,news papers, contends that if Indonesia attends the conference it will become involved in conflicts between Russia and the US which would endanger the government's "independent" foreign policy. Since the government's position, however, has included official'. support of Communist Chinese add Soviet participation, it ie likely that Indonesia will send a delegation to San Francisco.

6.

BURMA. Communists mount heavy attack in central Burma: Five hundred Communists who raided Pyinnana ib central Burma on 21 August were beaten off after a four hour battle with government forces, according to Reuters report. (U Reuters, 21 a Aug 51).
Comment': Despite the pronounced movement of Burmese Communist forces northeastward towards the China border, they have retained considerable strength in their former stronghold around the Pyinmana-Yamethin central Burma, where the government's axis in position has deteriorated steadily. during the paet few months.

7.

Official predicts Burmese refusal to attend conference: A high official of the Burmese Foreign Office predicted that the Burmese Government would notjoin the Japanese peace conference despite the USSR's decision to attend. He stated that since Burma did not intend to sign

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5. 'INDONESIA. Cabinet hesitant on Japanese treaty decision: Foreign Minister Subardjo told US Ambassador Cochran that the Indonesian Cabinet has postponed its decision on participation in the Japanese peace treaty conference until 24 August. He said party leaders feel some uneasiness over the fisheries and trade issues. Subardjo himself and is doing his utmost to insure Indonesian is anxious to visit the US ence. participation in the confer(S Djakarta 296, 22 Aug 51).

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the treaty there was no point in sending a delegation to San Francisco. The source also stated that the Asian countries might negotiate a separate treaty with Japan. (S Rangoon 208, 21 Aug 51).

8.

PHILIPPINES. Huks and army reported preparing for anniversary day of 26 August.: With the approach of 26 August, anniversary day of the Philippine revolt against Spanish rule, the Huks are increasingly active and.the armed.forces have been placed on a special alert. (It AFP Manila, 22 Aug 51).
Comment: relative lack harassment by holidays have by noteworthy


would concede in Korea for

The increase in Huk activity has not been significant. Their of activity is due in part, at least, to their continued the armed forces. Special alerts of the security forces on become routine, although such occasions have not been marked outbreaks in recent months.

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9.

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CHINA. Peiping reporte Japanese Peace Treaty:

rtici ation in

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eip,ng wou e wi ing o ma e concess ons regar ng a er zone in Korea in exchange for assurances of "militart'security" and participation in the' Japanese peace treaty. Source states that Peiping's present policy in Korea is "to avoid further 'losses...and await Soviet moves," and that Peiping "Will not allow the talks to break down" des ite the "coin letel unease table" nature of UN terms.
Comment: It is plausible that Peiping would be willing to trade a few miles in Korea for an invitation to the San Francisco conference. Several sources have reported that Peiping intends to prolong the Kaesong talks, even if UN terms remain unacceptable, until Conmunist forces in Korea, with Soviet assistance, are prepared to launch a new major offensive. It is doubtful that had access to top-level Sino -Soviet decisions, and the of this report has not been established.
.

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Soviet "South China Liaison Office" reported. the establishment in late 1950 of a Soviet "South ChMITA-111M.ceninaiaisat in Canton. This office is said to channel to Moscow Chinese requests for Soviet aid and to control some 1500 Soviet advisory-technical personnel in .South.China. the USSR has established this liaison office for the purpose of "tightening its control" over military, political and economic matters in South China, alleges that Chinese Communist authorities in the area vidll not in the future need to refer important matters to Pei ing but are to a.peal to the liaison office for "adVide."

10.

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2p(1C

,Commentr reported much the same information some months ago... t ip reasonable to assume that the. Soviet adVisory-technical 'program in china; which employs at least. 10,000 and perhaps 20,000 Soviet nationals, has a branch office in South China; The estimate of 1,500 in.the South China.area is plausible and is supported by fragmentary reports from many points. While the Soviet advisory-technical program throughout China doubtless contributes substantially to the ex., tension of Seviet control over Peiping's military-Tolitical-economic appaTatus, it is imProbable that Chinese Communist regional authorities accept Soviet didtation in major matters without reference to Peiping.
11.

25X1C 25X1C
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The Indians are.eaid to have proposed, inter alia, that .(a). the USSR and Communist China not attempt to promote'Communism in India, (b) India be granted certain Commercial rights, and (c) Peiping come to India's defense if the latter ia attacked. The Chinese are said to have demanded that the Indian Government (a) recognize the:Communist Party of India as a legitimate political party, .(b) SUpperty.internetienally,ailprogressive proposals' of the USSR and Pei in and c influence
projects'.

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Comment: The headquarters of the rePorting office evaluates this report as "doubtfUln and notee that its details are inconsistent. Available evidence indicates strongly that it is a fabrication. In February 1951, it was rumored that Peiping and,New Delhi were discussing possible conclusion of a treaty of friendship and alliance; these rUmors were denied by New Delhi. There was then and is now no reliable evidence that such discussiona have been under;:j..11 taken.

Indian representative allegedly ne otiating secret treaty with Pei inR: a personal representative of Prime s er ehru was in Peiping in July

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12.

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Chia

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Kaiehek orders 20 per cent budget cut:

on 1 Aug Generalisaimo Chiang Kei-ehek requested'the cabinet to prepare a new budget showing a general reduction of 20 per Cent. 'He s ecified that no items were to be aingled out for reduction.fl

25X1A

' Cotment:

of the budget deficit: It was reported on 2 August that the cabinet suggested a budget cut of 25 per cent. However, since only six per cent of expenditures are for administration, it is doubtful that this item can be cut much, particu larly.as secret aervice activities are reported to be on the increase.

NatiogalT-Goyernment of the 20.July 4 memoranda recommending a reduction

The Generalissimo's order is a result of the aCceptande by the

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13.

Chiang Kai-shake's elder son heads 'secret Service coordinating agency: Chiang Ching.7-kuo; the%Generalissimols elder- son who hedds-the Political
:

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Department of the Ministry of National Defense, has been named head of a newly organized "Materials Group." This organization, composed of five units totaling 'approximately 200 employees, was established by the Generalissimo during early August and is attached to his office. Its duties are to coordinate the work Of all secret service agencies.

14.

KOREA. South Korean drought will cut rice crops While central Korea has suffered from torrential rains during the past few weeks, rice-rich south,western Korea has receiyed an average rainfall of only One inch since early July. A prelitinary survey of the drought-affected area reveals that the rice crop in this.normally fertile region may be cut as mach as 30 per cent below previous estimates. (K FBID Flimsy, Central Neve Taegu, 22 Aug 51).
Comment: The cumulative effectof the lack of farm labor and animals, the small fertilizer Application this year, and the drought may cause even more serious troubleS for the South Korean economy than had been previously
expected'.

16.

Congressional recemmendation for aid slash shakes Korea: Ambassador Muccio reporta.that the ps Foreign Affaits Committee's recommendationnfor a 100 million dollar cut in aid to Korea haa caused "considerable consternation" there. ROK Prime Minister Chang was subjected td severe questioning by the National Assembly on the issue, and local newspapers have termed the action as "frightening" and "disheartening." (U Pusan 172, 22 Aug 51).

Comment: The ROK has received similar shocks before; they have had the salutary effect of shaking ROlccomplacency over the prospect of an indefinite continuance Of large-scalellS aid.

JAPAN. SocialiSt factions unite in anti-leftist move: The right and center factions of the Socialist Party haveagreed to unite in an effort to end control by the party's left-wing faction. At a conference held on 20 August,

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.ComMent: The Organization of the Materials Group is probably an answer to the redommendation ny the American Military Advisory Group that the political Department be deactivated because it constituted a major obstacle to the group's program. The east along of operating the Political Department was reported to have exceeded the cost of maintaining four army divisions. It appears., however, that rather than eliminating the Tblitical Department 'the generalissimo may simply have changed its name.

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the two factions decided on a basic policy of anti-CoMmunism paign to rally as many Socialists and a camas possible to the movement. Kyodo Tokyo, 20 Aug 51). (R FBID
Comment: The numerically superior leftwing of the party has so far been able to resist right-wing efforts to modify the three-point platform (opposition to a separate treaty, opposition to US bases, and neutrality). Criticism of the party's unrealistic stand has increased since the Japanese delegation at the meeting abstained on a resolution to .recent international Socialist this latest effort to force the party oppose Communism. The success of toward a more pro-US policy,- may be dependent upon 'Soviet tactics at the peace treaty conference.


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SECTION 3

(WESTERN)

1.

WESTERN EUROPE. Divergent British and French approaches are apparent in The US observer at the Economic Commission'for Eaet -West trade talks: Europe (ECE) meeting on East-West trade which opened this week in Geneva, is "impressed with the sharp differences" between the position of the UK and that of the other Western European delegations.
The UK hopes mainly that this meeting, if it achieves anything, wil1 . generate pressure on the Soviets to come to early terms with the UK in the bilateral negotiations previously initiated. The UK is principally desirous of obtaining up to one million tons of coarse grain, but is not prepared to present a list of goods in exchange.

France intends to comply fully with Chairman Myrdal's suggestions for an exchange of information on both grain requirements and counter-deliveries. The French list of goods available for export to Eastern Europe covers a rather wide range, principally construction equipment, Machinery such as small tractors and textile machines, textiles, and cargo ships of unspecified tonnage. France is determined "to go to all reasonable lengths" in this meeting in order both to obtain.more background information on possibilities of trade with the USSR and to make it impossible for the Soviets to blame France should the meeting fail. The Danes plan to pursue about the same tactics as the French, and have met a negative response in approaching the British for a pooling of purchases and deliveries.
The US observer considers that Western European collaboration is ."clearly desirable" should this meeting have results, since no nation except the UK would otherwise avoid the "excessive danger of Soviet blackmail." (S Geneva 164, 21 Aug 51) Comment: In recent bilateral negotiations the Soviet Orbit has been doingThsonard bargaining, with decreasing success, to obtainWestern

'

strategic materials in exchange for needed commodities.

The Western European nations, faced with a decline in their living standards, are eager to obtain cheap Eastern European it materials and In addition) both France and the UK are intensifying their foodstuffs. search for non-dollar industrial markets in view of the declining opportunities to develop sales to the dollar area.


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2.

AUSTRIA. Government adopts emergency measures in current meat crisisi Elicormc Control Board on 20 August decided to retain prevailing price

The

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ceilings for meat products and to improve the supply situation by increasing imports.. Augmented deliveries from YugOslaVia and Denmark are expected to mitigate the shortages; a ministerial committee will examine the problem of increased foreign exchange allocations tO pay for the foreign supplies. Beginning 24 August, two meatless days a week will be enforced and penal measures will be applied incases of infractions, Spokesmen for the meat industry continue to shift responsibility elsewhere, blaming price ceilings, exeessive Austrian exports, and inadequate supplies of foreign and domestic meat for the crisis. i(11 FBIS-Ravag and Red4filite-Red0 20 Aug 51) Comment: Having previously enjoyed a highly favorable supply situation, AUstrirri-Tiow faced with the problem of almost total unavailability of meat products. Although post-war recovery of the Austrian livestock industry showed signs of levelling Off last year, doMestic production approaching pre-war levels and increasing imports lend Substance to the allegation that the sudden shortage is largely attributable to farmer resistance to price ceilings. It is unlikely that the Government mill soon tolerate any upward adjustments in meat prices.

ECA proposes emergency assistance in Austro-Polish coal dispute: EPA Washington has advised the US Legation in Vienna that the US is prepared to Ship an additional 1002000 tons of AmeriCan coal on an emergency basis, should trade negotiations with the Poles for coal be broken off. If Austrian transportation facilities can handle the'emergency shipment, US coal transported to Austria during the months of August and Septemiber will, under the proposed plan, total some 500,000 tons. Should agreement with Poland ultimately be reached, the additional coal will be stockpiled. (S EDAM Control 7423, 17 Aug 51)
Comment: Austro-Polish trade negotiations have been stymied for some iieeks-Wei-Folish demands for embargoed ball bearings in return for Polish coal essential to.Austrian industry and public utilitieS (see OCI Daily Digest, 8 Aug 51), A suspicion that the magnitude of Polish-demands may have been exaggerated by Austrian negotiators has proved unfounded, and the original estimate that the Poles are requesting some $600,000 worth of embargo-type goods is now believed accurate, inasmuch as the proposed oneyear trade agreement will provide Austria with a ndllion metric tons ef Polish coal at the rate of 80,000 tons per month, it is apparent that the emergency shipment of US coal will be a temporary solution.

CORRECTION: In a recent report on Soviet purchases of almonds ip southern Italy (see Daily Digest, 20 Aug 51, Western Section, Item #7, pp. 12, 13) it was stated that US EMbassy Rome was disturbed not only by the politiCal leverage which these purchases might give Italian Communists in the local

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elections, but also by the possibility that the purchased products would be used for the cultivation of bacilli and hence for bacteriological war fare. However, sweet almonds, which have a number of pharmaceutical ap plications, are not used in any recognized bacteriological media. It is possible that almonds might bp used in small quantities to enhance the growth of certain bacteria. These cultures, however, need not necessarily be intended for bacteriological warfare.

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,UNCLASSIFIED when lapisn-698cfrefficterietast t2d1,41/09/19P CfAtleZDFF9t0+1116A0EIODEPIgseat4 or declassifiMd when filled in form is detached from controlled document.
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Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE.

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Curl. ,at Intelligence.

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SECTION 2 (EASTERI)

1.

PHILIPPINES. US.EMbassy in Manila forecasts Huk military disintegration: MeTalitary disintegration of the Huke as early ad November appears likely if present pressures are centinued, according to the US EMbassy in Manila.Unless a weig aad victorious event in November,w promised by their leaders, is sufficiently successful to ensure eventual victory, the Huk rank and file mill cease its struggle. The embassy- adds that there is reason to belieVe that the Chinese Com-

=mists are quietlyorganizing a stronger, more disciplined and moreclan-

21 Aug 50.

Comiment: HUk leadership has long been recognized as Commmmist but the s1174171FI of the movement has been solidly babed on agrarian discontent. With the armed forces providing the countryside witha certain.degree of security and with.a mild improvement in eoonomic.prospects, support from this quarter becomesdifficult to maintain.
.

The prediction of a "big event" inNovember is obscure but may derive from a Hi& belief that tho elections at that time will inevitably be as corrupt as those two years previously and that a resulting popular revu1.sion toward the goverment will enable the Huks to bid for power.
There have been several recent reportsdndicating increasing Chinese participation in the Philippine Communist movement and increasing dependence by Huk leaders upon. Chinese Communists.

2.

AUSTRALIA.

Gpvernment questions wisdom of sTareasien of all discussion at Sal Francisconle Depailiga^of ERIeihal*Affiirs cplesTionS thrlasirafilltk of-EPosing completely rigid procedures for the San Francisco
conference in advance and in isolation from the actual. conference atmosphere. It feels that a firm stand is possible without the suppreseion of all discussion, a move whieh might alienate. some Asian support. (S S/S Canberra 64, 21 Aug 51).

Comment:. The US has indicated that a full exchange of views on the treatyrg-Tas is contemplated, but thatino major revisions will be made. This expression of concern undoubtedly stems from a Tear that possible US attempts to frustrate.SoViet obstructionisMat the conference mightlend credence to.Soviet claims that the treaty is a white mants "dictate."

SECRET

destine forcerith which eventually to supplant the links.

.(S S/S Manila 737,

23 Aug 51

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High level S o"advisers" v i e t lfadvlseren disauss the arrivalof of Korean Korean 19. Bigh_leVsl Soviet discuss the arrival 1 9 . Imam. KCREAhSSR. " ournali ournali tos t s A 28 28 June June message from Sukharev, message from Sukharev, a Soviet adviser t to o the North North orean a a rforce, rforcs, whioh wag to t o be be passed to to Ra~uvaev, orean which was Razuvaev, chief chief adviser at Supreme Supreme


4-G4LEBORETMDZ7 7

i?----F Headquarters, states: "A group of Korean jourm%liats (has arrived?).

Headquarters, states: "A group of Korean journalists (has arrived?). (send?) (send?) 2 2 trucks." (SUEDE, 5 1 ) . (SUEDE, AFSA-23A4/704/KC/TIB-13, AFSA-23A4/704/EC/TIB,13', 23 23 Aug Aug 51).

Urgently

Cammenti Comment; Razuvaev Razwaev is i s also also the new Soviet Ambaasador AMbassador to North Korea. W hllexesaage is ofno no particularimportance importanoe as aa it it stands, stands, it While-1777essage is of particular it may may be be speculated that that the t h e term term "journalist" lljournalistll is a cover name for Korean8 speculated a cover Koreans who who have reoeived some form form of of specialized specialized training training either either i n Mancthuria n the received some in Manchuria or or i in the USSR. USSR. In connection recent recent covert covert reports have alleged tthe h e return In this this connection return of a number of Korean pilots who have received aircraft training in the U S % . Korean pilots USSR.

20.

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8. 80

CHINA

Chinese Communists r7logrtedlv prenaring_for"cgmina" world wars Ithe Peiping regiMe issued "circular orders" to all Party and government organizations'"to prepare for a coming world war."
Comments Reports for -8 Reports have have been been reoeived reoitvbd periodically periodically f a r more than two two years, the outbreak of t the years, especially especially during during the the first few few months monthe after Che he Korean regime was p preparing Korean conflict c o n f l i c t in In June June 1950, 1950, that t h a t the Peiping Peipingreglrns r 6 p y i n g for definite datej.all such reports reports haPa haSe been been global hostilities h o s t i l i t i e s at a t some some d e f i n i t e date; all suoh invalidated by events. invalidated eventso It It is is true true that that Peiping Pelping is I s preparing preparing for for an an WIWIeventual global conflict, CoMmunists, like like all all S Stalinists, ere tual c o n f l i c t , as a8 the Chinese Communiata, t a l i n i s t e , We o o m i t t e d to t o the t h e view view that that a a "final "final conflict" c o n f l i c t n is i s inevitable. inevitable, Moreover, Moreover, committed Pefpiqg has ha8 been been preparing preparing since e i n c r its It8 intervention Intervention i n Korea f o r a poeeible Peiping in for possible expandon However, expansionof of the the Korean Korean conflict. confl ict. However, ittAs q?estionable questionable that ltris t h a t Peiping Peiping wouldmula-' widely d d e l y circulate a i r a a l a t e its i t s knowledge knowledge or o r expectation bxpeotation of o f an an imminent imminent world world war. War.

9.
1


(a)

2121agifiresup,munistiaramizAtime_AnglAinsbalastsuLantwenta_ars....allogfals
I

preparing" f for new ofThe Chinese Chinese Communists Communiata are "feverishly Mfeverlehlypreparing" o r a new fensive in feneive i n Korea, in i n the t h e event event of of a a failure failure of of the t h e Kaesong Kae8ong talks, talks, and "about '@about one million million new and one new troops troops are are pouring pourlag into i n t o the t h e battlebattle-

front* j front";
f dlj fail;
1 I

(b) Two at in l late July (b) Two Soviet Sovfet infantry infantry divisions dlvieions arrived a t Mukden In ate J u l y and rumored to t o be be held held for f o r action aotion in in Korea Korea if i f the t h e Kassong Kassong talka talks are rumored
*IJA:-,.;'

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-TOP-SEeRgr-regiMents of t the 18th D DiviTwo Soviet anti-eircrattlisttllery a n t i - a i r c r a f t :alrbfllery regiments h e 18th idsion arrived and will oion arrived in i n Dairen D a l r s n at a t -Oa the end end of ofJuly' July'and dll be be tranS-' trans'to Mukden; ferred t o Antung and Mukden; The CCM inManchuria Manchuria has has been been building building up up for f o r action acitlon in i n Korea Korea CUP in for Japan "in "in the the event event of of a aW thitd war"; f Japan P d world w ar"~ and f o r 'invasion invasion oof and Poeng Teh-huai has been replaced replaaed as ad Chinese Communist Peeng Communist aommanding commanding officer in offioer In Korea bv,Nieh by Bieh Juna-oheh. Junp.ohen*

(a)

(d)
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Dinatents
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The The assertion assertion edmost ' that t h a t one one million new new troops troops are w e "pouring" mpouningn into &rea Korea i is r a moat certainly osrtainu false. f a l s e . There is l a no no confirmation of the arrival a r r i v a l of Soviet t Soviet divisions divisions a at Mukden and no new Soviet groUnd Dairen. ground unite unite are are known to to have arrived at Dairen. an an imminent imminent Sino-Soviet operation against against Japan Japan are era o f available evidence.. eviderroe. Pyongyang not supported by the bulk of Pyongyang radio radio Menle&identified Teh-huai as August; lllieh Nieh Jung-ahen Jung-chen f i e d Pleng P'eng Teh-huai a8 in i n command aommend in i n Korea on 23 Augusfj is i a believed believed to t o be be in in Peiping. Peiping.

24 Aug 51 24 Pug 51

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HR70-14 HR70-14

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21. 2 1 .

mnchuria-based rle t a on photo reconnaissance mission8 Several MIG-150s and YAK-1718, TAK-171s, both both j jet fighter aircraft, were echeduled scheduled to to c carry MIGI150s et f ighter a i r c r a f t , were arry reconnaissance mission mission from Uaoyang Liaoyang iin south Manchuria Manchuria on out a photo reconnaissance n south 22 August. August. According t o aU S . A i r Forca analysis, analyais, this this is i s the &a first first in:into US.AirForce 22 to photO reconnaissance reconnaissance mission6 missions i in Manchuria. tercepted reference t o photo n Manchuria. (SUEDE, 51) (SUEDE, Air Force Force Roundup Roundup 182, 22 Aug 51).
Commentg T This h i s message message implies, implies, and and provides provides the the first first evidence evidende Comment8 source, t that aircraft in Manchuria 8re are equipped equipped with with cameras. cameras. from any source, hat a ircraft i n Manchuria Communist a aircraft been noted noted i in Kbrea t to be engaged Communiat i r c r a f t have occasionally been n Korea o be in i n what appeared to t o be reconnaissance reconnaiasance missions. missions.
c

lisacharecoasscont Seveial

23.

NR

KOREA, KOREA, Nutihjor_n_Lgors1111)edagi_ing_r_graj2ea'sm'awtoes N9rth Korean I cor^8 mas be withdrawinn t o renrougg Recent North Korean messages indicate indicate t h a t the from the the Korean that the Mg: NK I I Corps Corps may may be be withdrawing withdrming from front f r o n t to t o regroup. regroup, Artillery Artillery units units of of t h e NK 8th Division displaced the NK 8th Division have have displaced aboUt 40 miles northwest northwest of of the last l a s t reported reported location of t the h e division about 40 in i n the t h e Kaesong Kaesong area. areao Another Another message indioates that t h a t elements of t h e 47th 47th message indicates elements of.the Division, also a160 part part of of the the I I Corps, Corps, may may likewise likewise be modng north, Thi8 Division, moving north. This l a t t e r message message further further indicates indicates that t h a t the the NK NK 17th 17th Mechanized Mechanized Division Division is is latter now now subordinate subordinate to t o the fihe I'CoiTs.-. X Corps,-. (SUEDE, (SUEDE, THK g TIK 974, 974, W W 286 286 H H 150, 150, U, 24 h Aug
51). 51)0

Having recently recently detached detached the t h e NK NK 19th 19th Division Division to;partaiparc Commentt ~ m e n $ S Having t i c i p a t e in i n the the movement movement of of the the NK NK VI V I Corps Corps to to the t h e eastern eastern sector, sector, the the ticipate NK NK I I Corpe Corps may nay have have withdrawn withdrawn to t o regroup regroup and and to t o integrate Integrate the t h e 17th 17th MechanMechanized ized Division. Mvision, The The addition addition of of the t h e 17th 17th Mechanized Division which Mechanized Division which has been out out of of the t h e combat combat zone zone since since the t h e abortive abortive May M e ; y offensive offensive will w i l l signifisignifibeen oantly increase increase the t h e potential p o t e n t i a l of of t h e NK I Carps and may indicate indicate that t h a t it it cantly the NK I Corps and has has been been assigned assigned a a combat combat mission. misoion, Total Total North North Korean Korean tank tank strength strength has has

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27 27 Aug Aug 51 51

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been estimated estimated at a t 150 150 tanks, tanks, of of which which 120 120 are a r e accepted of t he been accepted a5 as part part of the A n estimated estimated 40 40 to to 105th Division located located in i n the tho Pyongyang Pyongyang area. apeao An 105th Tank Tank Division 25 tanks tanks are are believed believed to t o be be in in forward forward areas areas in i n the the western western sector, sector, 25 possibly associatod With k i t h the the 17th 1 7 t h Mechanized Machanized Division. Division. possibly associated
24. 2 4 .

12,Mv-adjeleattrAeLLINzarjae_e2LILt2Zaegauga E luxuries sent Kaeso 8 In'the I n the late late r o k : off), gotiation8 had afternoon of 23 August (after negotiations had been been b broken off), General General Nam 112 I1, chief ohief Communist Communist. delegate delegate to ta the the Kaesong Kaesong talks, t a l k s , instriacted irnstrkcted tthe he Nam fe, Chief "