Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia Author(s): John S.
Dryzek Reviewed work(s): Source: Political Theory, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Apr., 2005), pp. 218-242 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30038413 . Accessed: 09/03/2012 19:43
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DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia
JOHN S. DRYZEK AustralianNational University
For contemporarydemocratictheorists, democracy is largely a matter of deliberation. But the recent rise of deliberativedemocracy (in practice as well as theory) coincided with ever more form in deeply dividedsocieties. This essay prominentidentitypolitics, sometimes in murderous considers howdeliberativedemocracycan process the toughest issues concerningmutuallycontradictoryassertions of identity.After considering the alternative answers provided by agonists and consociational democrats,the author makes the case for a power-sharing state with attenuated sovereigntyanda moreengaged deliberativepolitics in apublic spherethat is semidetached from the state and situated transnationally. Keywords: deliberativedemocracy; consociational democracy; agonism; identitypolitics; ethnic conflict
I. DEMOCRACY CONFRONTSIDENTITYCONFLICTS Democracyis today a near-universalvalidatingprinciplefor political systems. And accordingto contemporarydemocratic theorists,at least since the early 1990s, democracyis largely, though not exclusively, a matterof deliberation. Democratic practice too has witnessed a range of deliberative innovations. The same decade thatsaw the rise and rise of deliberativedemocracy also saw identitypolitics prominent,sometimes in murderousform. IdentitypoliAUTHOR'SNOTE:Previousversions of this article were presented to the Conferenceon Deliberative Democracyand SensitiveIssues at the UniversityOfAmsterdam,March25-26, 2003, the Social and Political TheoryProgramat Australian National University,and the Departmentof Political Science at the Universityof North Carolina. For commentsI thank TjitskeAkkerman, Bora Kanra,Ilan Kapoor,Stephen Leonard, ChristianList, GerryMackie, Claus John Forester, and Iris Young. Offe, BenjaminReilly,Mark Warren,
POLITICALTHEORY, Vol. 33 No. 2, April 2005 218-242 DOI: 10. 1177/0090591704268372 c 2005 Sage Publications
mutual acceptance of reasonableness is exactly what is lacking in divided societies. who accepts reasonableness as a norm for motivationbut not for'the content of communicative statements. they apply the reasonableness standardto the content of contributionsto debate. Gutmann and Thompson require adoption by all sides of a particular moral psychology--openness to persuasionby critical argument-that is in fact not widely held.3 Gutmann and Thompson believe thatdeliberationcan be extendedto deep moral disagreements. A mullesbians notjust as an irritant tinationalsociety is notjust a policy opposed by militantSerb nationalists. Christianfundamentalistsregardthe political presence of gays and but as a standingaffrontto who they are. as Benhabib points out.5Moreover. worse.4Again. But. including the murderous variety. Deliberative democrats influenced by Rawls might follow him in excluding the "background culture" from the purview of public reason. The assertions in question might involve nationalism (Republicans and Unionists in NorthernIreland.On a widely sharedaccount."such that arguments are made in terms the other side(s) can accept. The basic problemin all these cases is that one identity can only be validated or. Deliberationacross divided identities is hard. the political gap was often filled by assertions and denials of identity. are hardly new. combinationsof religious and ethnic conflicts (Palestinians versus Israelis)."' opposition to each otheras well as what BenjaminBarber I consider how deliberativedemocracy can process whatare arguablythe toughest kinds of political issues. But as the cold war world order fell apart.Radical Islamists cannot live in or with a McWorld.A state that was no longer a Jewish state forged in struggle would be anathemato many Israelis. the mutually contradictoryassertions of identity that define a divided society. it is a perceived attack on their core political being. "the capacity to seek fair terms of cooperation for its own sake. not just the motivation of speakers. at best an aspirationfor how opponents might one day learn to interact once their real differences are dissolved. and explicitly rejected by (say) fundamentalistChristians.because that involves suppressionof alternative
. any numberof separatistmovements). deliberationis what Bessette calls the "mildvoice of reason"2-exactly what is lacking in tough identity issues. but the precondition is commitment on all sides to reciprocity. and religious versus secular forces (Islamic fundamentalism against Western liberalism on the global stage.DEMOCRACY Dryzek / DELIBERATIVE
tics. issues generated by the backgroundculture and its "comprehensive doctrines" can be especially pressing. Religious fundamentalisms showed renewed vigor. constitutedby suppression of another. fundamentalists Islamists versus secularistsin Turkeyand Algeria.Christian versus liberalismin the United States).Thus they are vulnerable to criticism from difference democrats such as Young. in calls "McWorld.
but to mobilise these passions towards the promotion of democratic designs. and Bonnie Honig.a form of communicationstuckin neutralthat does not recognize difference. especially when it prizes the unitarypublic reason advancedby Rawls and his followers. partial in practice to well-educated white males.committedas it is to rationalistic denial of passionand the pursuitof consensus thatin practiceboth masks and serves power. fighting into critical engagement.What they want is instead "cathartic"communication that unifies the group and demands respect from others.. AGONISM The agonistic charge is that deliberative democracy is incapable of processing deepdifference. The recent history of agonism owes much to Hannah Arendt. but throughopennessto conversion as a result of a particularkind of democratic The outcome is not agreement but ratherrelationships that comattitude.8 but I focus on the work of Chantal Mouffe. seeking suppression of interchange through agreementamong well-meaning elites.
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forms. The first is agonistic.locating deliberationin engagement of discourses in the public sphere at a distance from the sovereign state.Heralternativeis agonistic pluralisminvolving "avibrantclash of democraticpolitical positions. I approachthis argumentby examining two very different responses to divided societies. enemies into adversaries. because she explicitly advocates agonism against deliberative democracy in plural societies..Mouffe arguesthatthe main task for democracy is to convert antagonism into agonism.7 I arguefor a discursive democracy that can handle deep differences. William Connolly. I arguethat a defensible discursive democracy for divided societies can develop elements of both.9 Deep difference is accompanied by passions that. I do not treat these two as "straw man"extremes between which a moderate path should be sought. Indeed."'1"Theprime task of democraticpolitics is not to eliminatethe passions. cannotbe resolved by deliberation.12 bine continuedcontestationwith deep respect for the adversary-indeed it is
. Those asserting identities for their partmay feel insulted by the very idea thatquestions going to their core be deliberated. The key involves partiallydecoupling the deliberativeand decisional moments of democracy. she believes. seeking robust exchange across identities.6More radical difference democrats and agonists see deliberation in terms of theerasureof identity."" Acceptance of the legitimacy of the positions of others comes not through being persuaded by argument. The second response is consociational. .
identities for Mouffe have to be fluid to the extent of enabling thoroughconversion in one group's attitudeto another. I explore a way to combine critical engagementand collective decision. Mouffe may be right that deliberationin the image of a philosophy seminar-dispassionate and reasoned-cannot handle deep difference. However. but not the kindof vibrantexchange of passions proposed by Mouffe. exchange is more likely to freeze identities than convert them."Mouffe (like Gutmannand Thompson) is vulnerable to questions about where exactly the required attitude should come from. at least more civilized engagementas the primary task for democracy in divided societies. then. But if individualscan listen to each others' stories. As Forester points out. the focus should be on the specific needs of the parties. being respectful of others is one thing. The first is in the content of critical interchange. The last thing thatneeds to be done is to reinforce mutually hostile identities.requiringa more challenging orderof problem solving.as opposed to the public health terms favored by the gays.But if identities themselves are highlighted. it is possible to formulatean accountof discursive democracy that is more contestatorythan this image. they might at least accept one another'sspecific needswhich can be reconciled. accepting at face value claims that preferencesand interestsare in fact basic values is quite another.for example. especially where groups asserting identity themselves feature hierarchyand repression. not on the articulationand scrutiny of general value systems. paradoxically. if not agonism.DEMOCRACY Dryzek / DELIBERATIVE
not easy to speak in termsof "outcomes. Yet.but at least consensus implies that decisions can get made. This is a kind of reciprocalrecognition."' While accepting Mouffe's identification of the need to transformantagonism into. so more robustin the face of deep difference. I differ from her on three grounds. Mouffe wants this interchange to be energized by core identities. but this requires a differentiationof the ways politics can be con-
. by debatingwhetherit is legitimateto treatthe HIV/AIDS issue in the moral terms favoredby the Christians. Foresterargues. of the main task of democracyhas no obviThird. His example concerns gay activists and fundamentalistChristiansmeeting over HIV/AIDS care in Colorado. from Mouffe involves the way deliberativeinteraction A second departure is conceptualized. otherwise passion is missing.Mouffe's interpretation ous place for collective decision making and resolutionof social problems. even when value systems and identities cannot.14If interchange is to move beyond confrontationand stalemate. it is only to point to the need for them to be open to further contestation. When agonistic pluralismdoes attendto collective decisions. She scorns consensus as a cover for power.
This channeling obstructsany kind of deliberative still less agonistic interaction across differentblocs below the elite level.proportionality. Elections have little meaning. including the deliberative dimension. to share governan between the leaders of each bloc democracy. But as Kaufman points out.But it is not hardto deduce what they ought to say about deliberativepolitics. ethnic hatreds are the product of symbolic politics in particularpolitical circumstances. criteria for consociationalism. they are learned.222
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ducted in differentsites. The political communication of ordinary people is shepherdedinto within-blocchannels where it can do little damage.'"As such. Lijphartpoints to success stories where a consociational approach has defused religious and/orethnic conflicts. as the same set of leaderswill governirrespectiveof the result. While Mouffe emphasizes the variety of sites (culture. Switzerland. ruling out much of a role for parliamentary debate. everywhere agonistic.contentiousdeliberation occurs only between the leaders of differentblocs.ANALGESIA: A very different sort of criticism of deliberative democracy's ability to process divisive issues follows from argumentsthat they should be removed from contentious democratic debate altogether. From this perspective. and even then mostly in secret (for fear of inflaming publics). workplace. for her the content of politics is undifferentiated."l6 Lijphartbelieves consociationalism is "the only workable of type democracy in deeply divided societies.) But conflict resolution is achieved at the expense of severaldimensions prized by democratictheorists. Consociation precludes any role that public deliberation construed as social learning might play in reconciliation in divided societies. South Africa in the 1994 to 1996 transitionfrom andIndia. because "segmentalautonomy"is basic.19 though that can be an uphill task in the face of
.). school. Mouffe's assertion that "a well functioning democracy calls for a vibrant for "vibrantclashes" risk clash of democraticpolitical positions" is naive. involving "grandcoalition. such as his own Netherlands.and minority veto.15 basis of claims is the for consociational Such Lijphart's disintegration.Malaysia.(Few of these cases actually meet all four of his defining apartheid. home. etc. agreement ment.""'Neither Lijphartnor his sympathizershave takenon deliberativedemocracyin these terms-illustration of the chasm between democratic theorists and students of real-world democraticdevelopment. segmental autonomy.Austria. and so can be unlearnedor transformed.
CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY III. Moreover.
20A deliberativedemocratwould hope to less vicious symthatreflection stimulatedby interactioncould contribute bolic politics. create the kind of conflict it is designed to solve. Consociationalists believe deliberativedemocracycannotdeal with divisive issues because it is too open to diverse claims and claimants. Familiarexamples of such discourses include market liberalism (dominant in global economic affairs) and sustainable development (ubiquitous in environmentalaffairs). Thus discourses feature storylines. not tied to myths of victimhood and destiny. because deliberation confined within segDebate leads ments succumbs to Sunstein's "law of group polarization. Deliberative democracy can be defended against both sides. a conception of discursive democracy in terms of a public A sphere thatis home to constellations of discourses can be broughtto bear.Segmental autonomy precludes such a politics. even if it has problems doing so when it comes to deliberation within the institutions of the state. and capabilities.DEMOCRACY Dryzek / DELIBERATIVE
persistentnegative understandingsand myths. the latterbecause they see only a politics tightly attachedto the state. In this light. contentions. involving opinions about facts and values. The content of collective decisions depends strongly(butnot exclusively) on the relative weight of competing discourses in a domain. These shared terms enable subscribersto a given discourse to recognize and convert sensory inputs into coherent accounts of situations. judgments.22 discourse can be understood as a shared way of making sense of the world embedded in language. Deliberativedemocracy can process contentious issues in a politics of engagement in thepublic sphere. For example. given their diametric opposition. the
. get their only group position's becoming others. The key is a differentiation of political sites within a society that agonists and consociationalists alike have not contemplated:the formerbecause they addressonly politics in the abstractratherthan its institutionalspecifics. On theface of it this ought to be impossible. worse. talk like-minded in with confirmed prejudices
RESPONSE A DELIBERATIVE IV TOWARD Agonists believe deliberativedemocracy cannot deal with divisive issues because it is too constraining in the kind of communication it allows. but it has to take them seriously. dispositions. In this light."21 more as individuals to the extreme. a consociational regime may actually reinforce or.by freezing cleavages. Thus any given discourse will be defined by assumptions.These accounts can then be shared in intersubjectively meaningful fashion. and be preparedto takeelements from each.
testimony. How can this discursive approach be applied to divided societies? To begin. meet the agonist's critique. The engagement of discourses andits provisionaloutcomes aredemocraticto the degree they are under dispersedinfluence of competent actors.there are few differences between Catholics and Protestantsin NorthernIreland. However.24 The last of these threecriteriais crucial when it comes to identity politics gone bad. Discourses must be amenableto reflection. societies deeply divided in identity are often not divided at all in culture. as opposed to manipulation by propagandists.the psychopathology of the criminalmind. communication is required to be first. if only at the margins. as Moore points out. and the circumstances of povertythatlead individuals to a life of crime. It is. Croats. rationalcalculation of the costs andbenefits of criminal acts by perpetrators. taking identities seriously means allowing different communicative forms thatcan accompany particularidentities.This treatmentof identity in terms of culture extends even to Benhabib's defense of universalist deliberative democracy against cultural
. and it retains some connection (however loose) to collective decision.Once we move beyond ritualisticopenings. and jokes.224
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content of criminaljustice policy varies with the weight of discourses stressing. making reconciliation at least conceivable (though not easy). However. noncoercive. and third. andthe world's most secular Muslim community in former Yugoslavia. this recognition often helps little when it comes to deeply divided societies. including rhetoric. A harrowingstory of (say) rape and murderin a Bosnian village can be told in terms of guilt of one ethnic group and violated innocence of another-fuel for revenge. performance. then. capable of inducing reflection.25 Culturally. this is Young's connection. gossip.But the storycan also be told in termsof violation of basic principles of humanitythat apply to all ethnicities. and between Serbs. But the engagement of discourses can accommodate many kinds of communication beyond reasoned argument.The possibility of contestation and engagement means discourses have to be treated as less totalizing and constraining than some followers of Michel Foucault claim. and corporateadvertisers. because. then. Some recenttreatmentsof deliberativedemocracydo. capable of linking the particularexperience of an individual or group with some more general point or principle.The requisite communication is deliberation not agonism because it is oriented to persuasion ratherthan conversion.spin doctors. three tests mustbe appliedto secure the intersubjectiveunderstandingprized by deliberativedemocrats. respectively.a mistaketo treatidentity conflicts as merely a matterof multiculturalism. second.23 Agonists see deliberation as deadening and biased in the kind of communication it allows.
"27 even as she "pleads for recand that faciliof the radical polyvocality of all cultures"28 hybridity ognition tates deliberationboth within and across groups. Notably.DEMOCRACY Dryzek / DELIBERATIVE
She accepts that "culturehas become a ubiquitoussynonym for relativism.35 Experiments with n-person prisoner's dilemmas show that even a period of irrele-
.Avoidance of head-on confrontationmeans the other side is less easily accused of a hidden agenda to capturethe state. engagement across genes. But such argumentscould resonateonly within theirown ethnic group.Even the materialadvantageof (say) patriarchsin a culturalgroup can be arguedin termsof stabilityand continuity.26 an identity. education) rather than general values. fueled by existential resentments?31 Engagement is less likely to end in hostility if the focus is on specific needs (e..33 sion in termsof more generalprinciples. identity markerand differentiator. not courses. and the issue looked less intractable. Deliberative rituals and indirect communication(as opposed to confrontation) also have roles to play in reconstructingrelationships.34 A deeper problem in emphasizing needs is thatsome needs can be manipulated to justify hostility. advocates of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia arguedthatit was necessary to ensurethebasic need of security. A focus on needs is likely to contributeto conflict resolution only in the context of an engaged dialogue across difference.g."30 how can reflective But not culture. and one's own side cannot so easily claim alone to represent "the people" or safeguardthe polity.32 needs she advocates will Deveaux worries thatthe emphasis on particular be rejected by deliberativedemocrats because of its inconsistency with uniBut particularneeds are often amenable to expresversalist public reason. Demagogues can manipulateneeds-talkin a destructive direction.just as they can manipulateany otherkind of talk. a reframing of the issue in terms of the education needs of young women and the characterof educationas a basic humanright gained ground.Foresterdemonstrates the importance of (say) small talk between erstwhile opponents over a sharedmeal with no explicit connection to the issue at hand.at least for theirown side. security. Beginning in 2002. discourses move beyond the vain hopes of agonists when identities are only asserted dogmatically and so relativistically. And public reason itself can be plural. It is in this sense that nations are the productof disin Benedict Anderson's terms "imaginedcommunities.where headscarvesworn by young Islamic women were long a symbolic markerthat excluded them from secularTurkishuniversities. but not when communication is segmented within groups.29 Identities are bound up with discourses. An example comes from Turkey.
sovereignty has had an all-or-nothingcharacter. but the idea of one identity per state persisted.courts. beginning by pointing to the desirabilityof loosening the connection between the deliberation and decision moments of democracy in a divided society. Later.ethnicity. almost sole. decision overwhelms deliberation-especially when decision is tied to sovereign authority. Such loosening resists one strong currentin deliberative democratic theory. and may exacerbate them. it is leviathan under construction that creates murder and misery. ratherthan curbing them. The very worst repression of competing identities has often come from actors' strugglingto secure their hold over the state.Westphaliaestablished the norm in internalaffairs and the principle that the religion of the of noninterference is the prince religion of the state. Mainly. which sees the properhome for deliberation in the institutions of the sovereign state.committees. identity that mattered. measurestakento stop AfricanAmericans from voting in the American South. The game becomes one of ensuring that the state is defined to ensure that one's favoredidentitywill win key votes. and administrative tribunals. Contra Hobbes.To see why a degree of separationis desirable.
AND THE STATE IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES V DEMOCRACY I turnnow from the "what"to the "where"of deliberation. and class. though by itself such talk ior.religion was the main.At the time in Europe.episodes ranging from expulsion and forced conversion of Jews in fifteenth-centurySpain to the Armenian genocide in Turkeyto ethniccleansing in formerYugoslaviain the 1990s can all be attributed to state-building These elites pursue"pathologicalhomogenizaelites. and exclusion of those with a criminal record).226
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vant discussion can increase the incidence of subsequentcooperative behavSo even cheap talk can help moderateconflict. such as legislatures.g.
.36 is insufficientto produce the requisite engagement across discourses. This definition can involve drawing physical boundariesor manipulatingthe electoral system or gerrymandering or using suffragerestrictions(e. ranging over propertyqualifications. public inquiries. Electoral democracy does not solve matters.. Identityissues could become intractablein the context of the politics of the state:the game is all or nothing. and the state's hold over society.Since the peace of Westphalia in 1648.literacy tests. identity came also to involve nationality.37 tion" to secure a mass identity to accompany and bolster the incipient state. consider what happens when deliberation and decision are joined in the context of divisive identity. As Rae demonstrates.
parliamentary ular group). and so moderatetheirpositions.
. Leaders of ethnic parties have an incentive to seek second. which used the Australian-modelAV before it foolishly changed to first-past-the-postvoting in 1975. third. though it promotes moderationbetterprecisely because it has a majormajoritarian. If there are not enough voters with moderateattitudes. and single voting such as the alternativevote (AV). The deadly numbers game is transferredto the meta level.everyone will try to claim that being categorized divisions.42 moderate attitudes can be promoted. These theorists are more compelling on the liberal aspects of such a state-the specification of rights for individualsand groups. under AV memberscannot be elected threshold.legal recognitionand promotionof minority quotas for a particlanguages.instability and violence can still result. and group representation(e.38though they err by treatingidentity differences as mere cultural differences.Reilly shows with reference to the use of AV in Fiji that if the engineering is not done precisely right. If thereis advantagein groupscount and how much representation as an oppressed minority.40 Reilly shows that "centripetal"politics can be induced by systems of preferential vote (SV).41 Only in 1998. after"a core group of moderatesemerges from both sides of the communaldivide"does STV work This finding begs the question of exactly how better in Northern Ireland. in keeping with Horowitz's claim that. raising A betterapproachto electoral democracyin divided societies is the "electoral engineering" proposed by Horowitz and given flesh by Reilly. Parallel problems have arisen with the use of SV in Sri Lanka.Dryzek / DELIBERATIVEDEMOCRACY
Multicultural liberals have addressed what a multi-identity state might look like. They are less compelling when it comes to the democraticaspects. and fourthpreferencesof voters from the other side of the ethnic divide. supplementary transferablevote (STV).Proposalsfor group representationare fraughtwith difficulty when it comes to specifying which they have.. Apparentlytechnical aspects of the AV system specified as partof the 1997 Fijianelectoralreformturnedout to favor ethnic Indian parties.43 ity with the supportonly of a hardlineminority.Precision electoral engineering is difficult in the chargedsettingof a divided society. Perhaps AV would work better than STV in Northern Ireland.39Such a state might involve devolution of authorityto regions dominatedby minoritycultures.preferentialvoting will fail to assist reconciliation-as shown by elections in NorthernIrelandin 1973 and 1982 conducted under STV. especially once different sides realize thatrules arenot neutraland so try to influence their content.g. Reilly's clearestpositive example is Papua New Guinea.However. whose success led to an indigenist coup in 2000. so status. So unlike under STV.
might deliberative democrats respond to the challenge posed by a deadly numbersgame? At one level they could pin theirhopes on the civilizing force of deliberation to defuse conflict (and so provide one essential preconditionfor preferentialvoting to work). Consociationalism is therefore vulnerableto Horowitz'spessimism concerning any kind of institutionaldesign (including centripetal electoral systems) in divided societies: "So many forces favor the pursuit and exacerbation of conflict . How else. Przeworski argues that the stability of an electoral democracyrests on losers' acceptingdefeat in the expectation thatthey might be able to win in a subsequentelection. Some kind of preferentialvoting is clearly best for divided societies. they can all too easily be overwhelmed by demagogues.228
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Despite these difficulties. then.
IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE VI. Horowitz's and Reilly's analyses are a step beyond Schumpeterianminimalist accounts of the establishment of stable electoral democracy. .the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein still prosper at the expense of.44Horowitz and Reilly show exactly why such acceptancemay be facilitated by voting systems that draw the sting from defeat by inducing victors to moderation. Perhapsthereare nected tightlyto stateauthority. that anything less than a coherent package is unlikely to provide sufficient counterweight to these forces. and the paramilitarieson both sides have laid down (most of) their arms.LOCATING DELIBERATION A moreradicaldiscursivedemocraticresponse would ask why democracy and deliberationmust be joined to head counting and sovereign authority.the more moderate"Official"Unionists and Social Democratic LabourParty--even at a time when compromise is in the NorthernIrishairas never before. respectively. but in a politics of mass vota few representatives ing tightly connected to definitionof the sovereign state. because there is so much more to politics than elections. Consociationaliststake a step in this direction on the head-countingdimension. who might be so civilized. Thus in Northern Ireland. But now the familiar scale problem arises: deliberation. But they do not escape the difficulties associated with construction of sovereign authorityby constitutional settlement. or because they fear the consequences of the breakdownof ordermore than those of defeat. My point is simply that electoral engineering is not enough. and yet only partialmeasuresthatare doomed to fall shortof the
. at least of the face-to-face variety concan only ever be for the few. because they suppress voting's connection to collective decision..
Individuals can shift from partisanshipto moderation to apathy and vice versa. where reflection can take effect only in the choices of individuals under the gaze of both opponents and those with a shared identity.Locating deliberationin the engagement of discourses in the public sphere avoids this problem because reflection is a diffuse process. But he or she can most easily admit that in a different setting. with different participants. The desirability of locating deliberationin the engagement of discourses in the public sphere in divided societies can draw on Mackie's observation that people are rarely seen to change their minds in deliberativeforums.and it is normalto see substantialopinion shifts therein. takingeffect over time. Democratic deliberationin a public sphereat some distancefrom (but not completely unconnected with) the sovereign statecan make a major contributionhere. at anothertime and place. deliberation-inducedreflection can eventually lead an individual to change his or her mind.Nothing as dramaticas the kind of conversion Mouffe seeks is required.""45 Though Horowitzrecognizes no limits to the reachof this conclusion.Dryzek / DELIBERATIVEDEMOCRACY
coherentpackage standa real chance of adoptionmost of the time.and so cannot easily change. where face and credibility associated with having staked out a position are no longer decisive.47 deliberativeopinion polls exemplify this category.
.49 tentious issues can be revisited provides a way for those who have changed their minds to both save face (by not admitting it for the present) and contributeto conflict resolution (by accepting a changed position later).and may even come to adoptdifferentattitudes.under "hot"deliberation. degree of activation of concern on particularissues can change. Actually such changing of minds is common in what Fung classifies as "cold" deliberative settings-where participantsare not partiCitizens' juries and sans.participantshave more strongly formed views going into deliberation. With time. Contemplation of the informal communicativerealm might soften his conclusion.it is hardfor him or herto admitit. his pessimism actuallyrefers only to constructionof the formalinstitutionsof the sovereign state.48 In contrast. for then credibilityis lost. As Mackie points out.This situationis less fraught than that in hot deliberation.tied to collective decision and involving partisans. This consideration supports A guaranteethatconDeveaux's specification of a "revisability" principle.46 Even if an individual is persuaded. and the forum is either unofficial or advisory. Most conceptions of deliberativedemocracy requirereflection and the possibility that minds can be changed in the forum itself This is unlikely if one's position is tied to one's identity. Deliberation tied to sovereign authorityin divided societies is about as "hot"a setting as one can imagine.
most importantlyby establishing the very idea of environmentaljustice as a public concern. but thatis not necessarily right. But from the point of view of promotingdialogue in divided societies. planning cells. most lack any such direct connection from recommendationto collective decision. In societies more deeply divided. Togetherthey successfully changed the content of public discourse on environmentalaffairs. the network form of organizationcan help establish dispersed control over the content and relative weight of discourses.INSTITUTIONAL SPECIFICS The public sphere is sometimes conceptualized as an institution-free zone. Two sorts of institutionslocated in the public spherecan play roles in facilitating discursive engagement:networks and discursivedesigns. Sponsors can include governments.nongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs). On the other hand.some involve partisans. facilitating negotiation across difference.each is a "micro"moment in the "macro"life of the public sphere.For example. Any such exercise is not in itself a public sphere. Some debatea specific issue ordecision. In relativelywellbehaved political systems. given the informal apartheidof American cities. the development of networks across divisions could be a greaterchallenge. deliberative polls. policy dialogues.More formalarethe institutionsFung calls "recipesfor public spheres. There are many such discursive designs available. so Fung's terminology is a bit misleading. this absence of directpolicy connection may be positive because it provides a space for exploratoryinterchange across difference.in some cases from groups otherwise quite hostile to each other.Rather. and foundations. and theirsponsorsoften strivefor such impact.Some are small scale. even in the United States these networks developed across groups who otherwise lived in quite separateworlds. in 2001 a deliberativepoll was conductedon the issue of relationsbetween the indigenous and nonindigenous peoples of
. given thatsuch societies are divided into blocs with dense within-bloc communication but little across-bloc communication. academics. and participatoryproblem-solving exercises. A few have a direct link to policy making.They involve individualsfrom very differentrace and class backgrounds. Networks are at the "informal"end of the institutional continuum.""' He has in mind designed forums such as citizens' juries. Theircritics deride the general lack of direct influence on policy content. Some involve lay citizens picked at random. Schlosberg analyses environmental justice networks in the United States in these terms.230
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VII. whose contributionsI now discuss.50These networks arose from a series of local actions and have no centralized leadership. some try to engage larger numbers of interlinked deliberators (such as the exercises sponsoredby the AmericaSpeaks Foundation). othershave a broaderremit.
The results of the poll had no immediate or direct impact on public policy. security be tempted by sectarianextremism. Hutu hate radio prior to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Television coverage took the proceedings into a broader public sphere. the source of interethnicconflict.)The fact that sectarian demagogues can flourish therein is exactly why consociationalists seek to silence the public sphere.
AND ITS REMEDIES VIII. Snyder and Ballentine believe that such communicative extremism is a especially if problem in societies emergingfrom authoritarianism. most notoriously. while recognizing that such efforts may hinder homegrown groups.so not entirely a public spherephenomenon. particular caution of tradition lack against a They any professionaljournalism.and Soros in promotingbenign group life in the postcommunist world. (The latter was controlled by Hutu extremists associated with the government.recommendingboth stateregulation of speech (as in Malaysia since 1969) and NGO intervention to restrict hate speech and promote professional journalism in integrative media.53 Polarizationcan be exacerbatedby segmented media such as right-wing talkradio in the United States and. Deliberating groups were made up of oversampled Aborigines selected in consultation with indigenouscommunitiesandrandomlyselected nonindigenous others. Public spheres can be segmented.56 role played by Ford. but the poll itself constitutedone moment in a long process of reconciliation across a deep divide. Calling the state to the rescue of bad civil society is problematicif the state itself is the instrumentof one group in a divided society. or if it is engaged in a
."55 advocate and Chambers in the United States. Chambersand Kopsteinalso guardedly endorse intervention to shape group life through (for example) subsidies to They approveof the relatively benign organizations that provide services.52and prone to Sunstein's "law of group polarization"if individualscommunicate only with like-mindedothers.DEMOCRACY 231 / DELIBERATIVE Dryzek
Australia. greaterincome Kopstein groups insecure individuals to fewer mean which would social and justice. The problem of what Chambersand Kopstein (2001) call "badcivil sociFocusing on racist hate ety" is not confined to postauthoritarian societies.BAD CIVILSOCIETY Recognition of the centralityof engagementacross discourses in the public spheredoes not mean thatthe state shouldbe conceptualizedas the source only of problems for divided societies. andthe public sphereonly as a benign source of solutions.54 they liberalfree-for-all in political communication. the EurasiaFoundation.
Some groups in divided societies have already succeeded in making such links. and much of the Serb diaspora was in the 1990s vocal in supporting nationalism and excusing ethniccleansing. the Zapatistas in Chiapas have develnetworkof sympathizers. and subsidies conditionalon accurateand balancedcoverage. the Ogoni people in Nigeria sought help from NGOs based mainly in developed countries. sponsorshipof nonpartisanmedia. Snyderand Ballentinerecommendtransnationalinterventionto curb the contribution of partisanjournalism to hostility in divided societies. corporations. In Mexico. The opening of channels to a neighboringstateof sharedethnicityby a minorityis also dangerousand has historicallyprovided a justification for invasion of the Sudetenlandby Nazi Germany.
THEPUBLIC SPHERE TRANSNATIONALLY IX. But government with incentives to only a power-sharingstate (or a majoritarian to deliberationacross diviis in a to contribute to position appeal minorities) sion in the public sphere. The Irish Republican Army long depended on financial supportfrom Irish Americans.232
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homogenization projectto bolster its own support. press codes. This caveat aside. more negative forms of transnationallinkage are possible too. NGOs and foundations can play similar parts. especially by nationalists reaching out to a diaspora. Forexample. LOCATING Engagement across division can be further promoted by transnational aspects of deliberationin the public sphere. in responseto governmentalrepression and environmental destructionassociated with oil production.of Croatia by Serbia. And there might even be a role for political theorists when it comes to exposing the false necessities pushed by sectariangroups. These NGOs in turn pressured their own governments and corporations such as Shell which operate in Nigeria. They point to the success in Cambodiaof a UN media program. strengthening of transnational sources of political authoritywould be conducive to the weakening
.This sort of outreachcomes oped an Internet-based with an obligation to behave according to emerging transnationalnorms of civility. So only outreach beyond shared national identity has a civilizing force.The state need not be the exclusive source of solutions here. and other states.5 Appropriate measures might include professional journalism education. A consociational state is not much betterif it seeks to suppress engagement in the public sphere. NGOs. Of course. Channels of political influence bodies such as the European can be extended to and from intergovernmental international transnational Union.of Cyprus by Turkey.
Dryzek / DELIBERATIVEDEMOCRACY
of the connection between engagement in the public sphere and the deadly contest for sovereign authority. NATO interventionin Kosovo in 1999 behindwhich a state helped reinforce the idea thatsovereigntyis not a barrier of sovereigntyandtranssections of its people. the results they register when it comes to the weight of competing groups and of their extremists and moderates depend crucially on the design of the electoral system. for whom a centralized state has always brought misery because it has only ever been experienced as the instrumentof one segment. Such weakening is also consistent with the increasingconditionalityof sovereignty in the internationalsystem.It is betterundersuch circumstances to think of engagement across discourses ("discourse" itself terms. The first reason is that "subjectless communication"is too amorphouswhen the identity of subjects themselves is the key issue and public opinion is deeply plural. completely tions are highly problematictransmissionmechanisms. require
X.which can also be secured through responsiveness of public policy to the relative weight of discourses in the public sphere.In any society. which does not have to involve the direct
. This influence is centralto Habermas's model of deliberative democracy. Elections are not the only source of democraticlegitimacy. This sequence is insufficient for divided societies for two reasons. whose plans nationalization conflict to be centralizedandthenresolved in a fully sovereign state. The conditionality can terrorize of authority will not please consociationalists. In divided societies.producingpublic opinion whose influence can then be turned into communicativepower throughelections. competitive elections are largely strategic and symbolically manipulatedexercises." Habermasendorses diffuse "subjectless communication"in the public sphere. Any associated weakening of the sovereign state might be especially attractiveto those on the receiving end of oppression in countries like Sudan and Rwanda. a deadly numbersgame at the meta level can resultonce all sides recognize the importanceof electoral engineering. And as discussed earlier. then into administrativepower through legislation. PUBLIC SPHERE INFLUENCEON THE STATE:LOOSE CONNECTIONS connections) as the Emphasizing the public sphere (and its transnational focus for discursive engagement does not have to mean banning public sphere influence over state actions.because for Habermasdiscourse is being defined in non-Habermasian The second reason is that elecunconstrained communication).
For example. As Habermasputs it in a moment of expansiveness beyond his stress on elections.Such decay would underminethe legitimacy of the state itself.60Between these two extremes one can think of state and public sphere as being loosely connected."'61 environmentalismand feminism in the late twentieth century can be interpreted in these terms. a groupthatdefines by the idea of ecological modernization. some electoral systems are betterthan others counting of heads.But as this example makes clear. there is a danger the public sphere may decay into inconsequentiality.62 one side in a divided society has the capacity once included to connect to the core interestof the state in securing internal order. These two movements provided a new vocabularyincluding. during. Individualsversed in these discourses eventually occupied influential positions in government. Discursive engagementin the public spherecan influence state action in many informal ways. the termenvironment. Preferential voting has the merits of promoting communication across divides involving voters and leaders. because then the deadly contest for sovereign authorityresumes. as is clear from the historical success of consociational settlements in Europe. Otherunresolved questions include the characterof the leadersincluded(radicalsor moderates)and incentives for different sorts of behavioronce included. inclusion of group leadershipbegs some largerquestions about adversarypolitics versus consensual politics in the institutionsof government. though sometimes this has proved to be a bad bargainif the movement has received mostly symbolic rewards.andhow this affects social learningacross difference in the public sphere. It influences the premises of judgment and decision making in the political system Much of the success of without intending to conquer the system itself. "Communicative power is exercised in the manner of a siege. These ways include changingthe terms of discourse in ways thateventually come to pervade the understandings of governmental actors. Movement impact from the public sphere by means of changes in the terms of discourse can occur before.59 when it comes to promotingdiscursiveengagement in a divided society.234
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However. the link from public sphere to state ought not be too tight. In
.for example. the alignment of environmentalismwith the core economic priorityhas recently been facilitated in NorthernEurope In these terms.which did not exist priorto the 1960s. or at least its leadership does. Electoral or otherwise. But if influence is absent entirely. and after any such inclusion. Genuine inclusion as opposed to symbolic inclusion is facilitatedto the degree a movementcan establish a link between its defining interest and a core function in the state's system of priorities. Social movements have at times achieved more formal integrationinto policy making. or semidetached.
When Nelson Mandela emerged from prison he could have espoused a rhetoricof victimhood and revenge."even though not one of his four defining features truly applies). Canadais at its best.
XI. in the 1960s. POSITIVEEXAMPLES No polity that I know of exemplifies the sort of discursive democratic engagement in a semidetached public sphere that I am endorsing here.as in the Meech Lake accordsof 1987. But elements can be discerned in some systems. Failure is generally followed by a period of inaction at the constitutional level. it is easy to identify rapidchange in the terms of discourse thatcreatedivisions ratherthanheal them. as indicated by the rethinkingof identity on all sides but especially on the part of formerly dominant whites in South Africa in the 1990s. Changes in the terms of discourse can be broughtabout by the power of rhetoric. because individuals on the various sides can then get back to engaging one anotherin the public sphere where struggle over sovereignty is not at stake. Because King appealedto the emotional commitmentof white Americansto symbols such as the Declaration of Independenceand the Constitution. andrhetoricianssuch as King and Mandeladid of course accompanyrhetoric with argument. as well as episodes where Quebec looks as though it might secede and then draws back. frustration. and eventually the rhetoricforced redefinitionof the ways in which dominant liberal discourse was understood.which can also reach from the public sphereinto the state.But morebenign shifts are possible. Hutuand Tutsiidentities hardlyexisted in Rwandabefore Belgian colonial rule.63Canada featuresoccasional attemptsto rewritethe constitutionto accommodatethe competingaspirationsof Francophonesand Anglophones. Attempts to rewrite the constitutionnormally end in deadlock. In these periods of inaction. which failed to attainratification because of opposition from Anglophones and indigenous peoples. Such was the achievement of Dr. Martin LutherKing Jr.Dryzek / DELIBERATIVEDEMOCRACY
divided societies. Political leadership can get back to the modus vivendi that makes Canadasuch a generally suc-
. with telling effect on the state structure. Consider Canada(classified by Lijphartas "semiconsociational. instead.Arguments honed in the public sphere may be noticed and heeded by state actors.he could not easily be dismissed.This sort of influence is what Habermas(following Arendt) means by "communicativepower"(thoughHabermasacceptsonly argument and rejects rhetoric).and failure--even if elites manage to bargaina resolution.Forexample. he developed a rhetoricof reconciliation that looked forward ratherthan backward.
This compromise entailed some reform to traditionalpractices. Perpetrators and victims of apartheid-era political crimes told their stories." Engagement and reflection were promoted by Archbishop Desmond Tutu's 1995-98 Truth and Reconciliation Commission-which operated at arm's length from the coercive authority of the sovereign state (and withstood legal challenges PresidentF W.236
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cessful society. which threatened the authorityof traditionalleaders. which was reflected in legislation. The peace is disturbed only by political philosophers who believe a constitutional solution is required. that was acceptableto both women's groups and traditionalleaders.though the implementationof its recommendationsin public policy were haphazard." These consultations produced a compromise. and efforts to rethink identity in the media. but this avoidance of challenge to the "sovereignty"of traditionalleaders may have facilitated deliberative resolution. educational institutions. A second positive examplecan be found in South Africa's transitionin the mid-1990s. Deep division in South Africa did not end with the departure In 1996. There was no suppression of engagement across racial and ethnic lines as required by consociationalism's "segmental autonomy. and there and were some very public episodes of reconciliation between perpetrators survivors. Though claimed by Lijphartfor consociationalism. Deveaux discusses a series of consultations initiated by the South Africa Law Commission to resolve this conflict. Deveaux does not addressthe issue. a liberalconstitutionwas adoptedthat specified equal rightsfor men and women. of apartheid. de Clerk and the AfricanNational from bothformerapartheid was a deliberative institution whose terms of The commission Congress).So althoughtherewas a (rare)tight connection between deliberative forum and legislative outcome.so its influence on the state may have fallen shortof the optimumin the terms I have developed. while retaining the nonliberal bridewealth payment practice. and avoided confronting the authority of traditional leaders. thatdesignation applies mainly in terms of the grand coalition that oversaw transition. this was possible because the "sovereignty"issue was not confronted. clashing with the institution of customary marriage in some African communities. reference were themselves the product of broad public debate (though the commission was established under the new constitution).
. South Africa also featured mixed-race discussion groups. It could offer amnesty and recommendreparations. This is exactly what is not required-as should be clear from the lessons of what happens when it is tried. and elsewhere in the public sphere.
At the time. But unresponsivenessandrepressionon the partof the state played into the hands of the IrishRepublicanArmy.DEMOCRACY Dryzek / DELIBERATIVE
XII. THREEKINDS OF FAILURE To further strengthen the case for emphasizing the engagement of discourses in a semidetached public sphere in divided societies. paramilitaries.whose leadership was upper-middleclass.community groups. The first consists of too tight a connection between public sphereand sovereign authority. Northern Irelandat the commencement of the Troubles in the late 1960s may illustrate this condition. and welfare across the communal divide. These boardsdeal with some of the most divisive andcontentious issues in day-to-day life in NorthernIrelandbut stay away from the sovereignty question. Community groups. A second. Indeed. kind of failing exists when a public sphere confronts a completely unresponsive state. As such they are elements of a semidetached public sphere.The tighterthis connection. Heroic attempts have been made by activists to develop networks concerned with issues such as health care.On the Unionist side.and the social movement gave way to paramilitaryaction and terror. The Troubles began as a civil rights movement on the Catholic side. the province had been governed for decades by the Ulster Unionist Party. employment. working-class activists denied access by the traditionalunionist elite organizedin paramilitaryfashion. the organizationsactive in this debate have close links to the political leadershipnegotiating with British and Irish governments over how government in NorthernIrelandshall be organized. the greateris the likelihood of a NorthernIrelandsince deadly contest over the content of sovereignauthority. but such networksremainprecarious in the face of sectarianpublic spheresjoined to each other mainly in the institutionsin sovereignty contest. Perhapsthe most successful antisectarian of NorthernIrelandtoday areCommunityPolice Boardswith representatives both communities. NorthernIreland is a highly politicized society. However. bars. so there is plenty of public debatein the media.The struggle stoppedbeing about civil rights and startedbeing about sovereignty. the 1990s illustrates this difficulty. very different. this kind of polity comes close to failing to be a deliberativedemocracyby definition(unless collective outcomes sensitive to public opinion can be produced in nonstateor transstate locations).
. There is great difficulty in maintaininga public sphere at any distance from the sovereignty contest. clubs.and politicians are tightly connected. consider three kinds of failure in these terms. and so forth.
States with consociational aspects for their part can sometimes preserve political stability in real-world divided societies.decades of a noncontentious partypolitics and consensus governmenteventually provided fertile ground for the rise of right-wing populism in the form of Jorg Haider's Freedom Partyin the late 1990s. particularly system dominatedby traditional on the Muslim side. YugoslaviaunderTito suppressed any kind of contestatorypolitics. CONCLUSION Agonism may featureplenty in the way of authentic democraticcommunication. but they undermine the ability of groups to live together throughdeliberativeand democratic social learning. But even a consociational state that is completely unresponsiveto events in the public sphere may be vulnerable. Again this failureis one of deliberativedemocracyalmost by definition. partly for fear of ethnic nationalist mobilization. but one factorwas the complete lack of responsivenessof a elites to emerging social forces. but my aim has not been merely to stake out a moderate position. Warlordscould then harness these forces.exacerbating a sectarianpolitics that is both irresponsibleand violent. direct rule from London began to amelioratethis aspect. a state thatis completely obtuse in the face of movement activism may play into the hands of warlordswho preferviolence to the traditionalsocial movementrepertoire.
XIII. there were no substantialpolitical forces to standin the way of powerfulfigures from the old regime reinventing themselves as murderousethnic nationalists. if (as I have argued)deliberativedemocracy depends crucially on the engagementof discoursesin the public sphere. While the story of the breakdownof Yugoslaviais complex. for there is validity in aspects of both these "extremes. Of course."and I have tried to show that these aspects can be redeemed and developed in a discursive democracy in divided societies that emphasizes engagement in the public sphere only loosely connected to the state. A thirdkind of failure exists when there is no autonomous public sphere worthspeakingof. but is hardto apply to any divided society in the real world. Manypositions may exist in the largeterritorybetween these two models.238
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In divided societies. NorthernIrelandwas alreadya sectarianstate-though beginning in the early 1970s. Contributionsto its development could come from the following:
.In the case of Austria. Many factors conspired to drive Lebanon's consociational system into civil war in the 1970s. But theremay also be a threatto political stability. be it within the state or the public sphere. In a very differentsetting.
Social Research 66 9. The Claims of Culture:Equalityand Diversityin the Global Era (Princeton. Mouffe. Identity/Difference:Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca."Dealing with Deep ValueDifferences. "Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?"755-56. 4. Ilan Kapoor. 10.DEMOCRACY Dryzek / DELIBERATIVE
* deliberativeinstitutions at a distance from sovereign authority. 463-93.ed. 1994). at 50-52.MA: HarvardUniversity Press. "MutualRespect as a Device of Exclusion. 1996). Ibid."in Democracy and Institutions: TheLife Work ofArend Lijphart. Lawrence Susskind (Thousand Oaks. MarkusM.2000). at 92-93. 16. 16-51. 16. 15. Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford. Crepaz. "ThreeLimitationsof DeliberativeDemocracy:IdentityPolitics. Democracyand Disagreement(Cambridge. Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism. The Democratic Paradox (London:Verso. NJ: Princeton University Press. CA: Sage. NY: Cornell UniversityPress. andDavid
.. * deliberativeforums in the public sphere thatfocus on particularneeds ratherthan general values. Political Theoryand the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca. Young identifies herself with agonism (pp. * issue-specific networks. and Bonnie Honig. Simon. Barber. and Chantal Mouffe. 1995).
1. 13. 108-12. 2.Jihad vs. 11. 5. 16. Koelble. L. 1999). at 470-72. The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government(Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 7. 2002). JohnForester. Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism."Alternatives27 (2002): 459-87."Varietiesof Nonmajoritarian Democracy. * the conditionality of sovereignty. Political Science Series 72 (Vienna: Institutefor Advanced Studies. Seyla Benhabib. William H. Iris Marion Young. Bad in Deliberative Politics. McWorld:How Globalism and TribalismAre Reshaping the World(New York: Ballantine. 12. 6. Arend Lijphart. Chantal Mouffe. 2000). Joseph M. ed. at472-73. Bessette. "DeliberativeDemocracy or Agonistic Pluralism?" (1999): 745-58. Amy Gutmannand Dennis Thompson. She does push deliberativedemocracyin an agonistic direction. and * the transnationalizationof political influence. 755. William E."in TheConsensusBuildingHandbook. Connolly. Mouffe. 1993). 1991). Mouffe.ThomasA. and Indeterminacy. Stanley Fish. butthe reasonablenessmotivational normwould set her apartfrom many agonists. 14. ed. Faith."in Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement. 1999). Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism.NY: Cornell University Press. 49-51 ). 88-102. Stephen Macedo (New York:Oxford University Press. "Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?The Relevance of the Habermas-MouffeDebate for ThirdWorldPolitics. 3. ChantalMouffe. 49-57. 2000). * a power-sharingstate that does not reach too far into the public sphere. Benjamin R." 8. * centripetalelectoral systems. UK: Oxford University Press.
"Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (2002): 175-95. Inclusion and Democracy. Ibid. See the guidelines proposedby Meindert Fennema and Marcel Maussen. Contestations (Oxford. ArendLijphart. James Bohman. and David Wilsford (Ann Arbor:Universityof Michigan Press. 2002). Dawes. "Majoritarian Institutions:TheLife Work ofArendLijphart. 2001). 28. 2001). "TheLaw of GroupPolarization. 32. Ibid.publicly assertable. "Beyondthe CulturalArgumentfor Liberal Nationalism. HeatherRae. 1995). 31. 3.The Deliberative Practitioner (Cambridge. Benedict Anderson. State Identitiesand the Homogenisation ofPeoples (Cambridge.240
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Wilsford (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press."Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54 (1988): 811-19. 1977). 36-38.MA: MIT Press. NY: Cor18. StuartKaufman.ModernHatreds:TheSymbolicPolitics of Ethnic War(Ithaca. AndrewReynolds (New York:St. "ExplainingDiscussion-InducedCooperationin Social Dilemmas. As lamentedby Connolly. "A DeliberativeApproach. Benhabib. Public Deliberation: Pluralism. 24. 225-46. 17. andJohnS. at 781. 21.."
. 1. Political Legitimacy."Political Theory29 (2001): 651-69. Sunstein. Martin's. Political 29. and SelfDeterminationin MulticulturalSocieties (Boulder.7779. Dryzek. Critics."CriticalReview of InternationalSocial and Political Philosophy 2 (1999): 26-47. 25. "LegitimacyandEconomy in DeliberativeDemocracy. John Forester. 1999). 36. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. 30. Deliberative Democracy. 39. "Dealing with Extremistsin Political Discussion: FrontNational and 'FrontRepublican' in France. Koelble. Margaret Moore. John S. Cass R.UK: Cambridge UniversityPress. chap. 68. Crepaz. Imagined Communities:Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso. 155-96.The Claims of Culture. Dryzek. 1996). 1994). 38. "ADeliberativeApproachto Conflicts of Culture. 83-85. 26. See also Arend Lijphart. MA: MIT Press. van de Kragt.Will Kymlicka. 35. ed."788. 37. 1983).2000). Alphons J. Deveaux.. See also Monique Deveaux. Andrew Reynolds.and Robyn M. CO: Westview. C. 222. nell University Press.Deliberative Democracyand Beyond. Moore.UK: OxfordUniversityPress. "Beyond the CulturalArgument." Theory 31 (2003): 780-807. and does it stand up to public challenge?" 25. proposes a complementaryset of standards:to ask if an interventionis "respectful. 2000)." Journalof Political Philosophy 8 (2000): 379-400."in Democracy and 20.ed. MarkusM. Orbell."in Election '94 SouthAfrica:AnAnalysis of the Results.Identity/Difference. Complexity. Inclusion and Democracy. 19. 27. L. Campaignand FutureProspects. Valadez.ThomasA. and Democracy (Cambridge. 34. Dryzek. 33. For example. 2000). CT: Yale University Press. or Power-Sharing Government. Dryzek."Prospectsfor Power Sharingin the New South Africa. at 169-70. 22. UK: OxfordUniversity Press. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals. at 228. 23. See also Jorge M.MulticulturalCitizenship(Oxford.Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven. Young. John M. Young. 11553.
253-84.67 percentof votes. "Nationalismand the Marketplaceof Ideas. Boston. 24. Simone Chambersand Jeffrey Kopstein. 1995). 42. all but the top two candidates(based on firstpreferences)are eliminated. "ConstitutionalDesign: An Oxymoron?"in Designing Democratic Institutions(Nomos XLII). 2002). 46." 52. their surplus votes are then redistributed. 43. "Recipes for Public Spheres. "Legitimacy and Economy. Reilly. and second choices of votes for all the other candidatesare reallocatedto determine the winner. STV combines preferentialvoting with proportional representation stituencies. Claire Jean Kim. Sunstein. Donald Horowitz."Political Studies 48 (2000): 51-65. 49. A Democratic SouthAfrica? ConstitutionalEngineering in a Divided Society (Berkeley: University of California Press. 2001)."Political Theory29 (2001): 837-65. 136-37. Adam Przeworski. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Europeand Latin America (Cambridge. GerryMackie." 60. Donald Horowitz. Environmental ference for Environmentalism(Oxford." 54. CT: Yale University Press. 48. 57. and Benjamin Reilly. 45. AV uses single-memberconstituencies.ed. Fung. Habermas. MA: MIT Press. 1991). 1999)."International Security 21 (1996): 5-40. 51. Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: Universityof California Press."792. Snyder and Ballentine. 53. UK: CambridgeUniversity Press. Bitter Fruit: The Politics of Black-KoreanConflict in New YorkCity (New Haven.
. 189. Ibid."38-39. 47.Candidatesachieving a "quota"are declaredelected. in multimembercon41. GrahamSmith and CorinneWales.a quota could be 16. again requiringvoters to rankall candidates. "Nationalismand the Marketplaceof Ideas. Deveaux. at 262. 855..Candidatesare eliminated beginning with those with the fewest first preferences. 61. UnderSV. "Recipes for Public Spheres. Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineeringfor Conflict Management(Cambridge. Ibid. Democracy in Divided Societies. If no candidate receives a majorityof first preferences. The ballot requires voters to rankall candidates. Dryzek."BadCivil Society. 486. 1985). "A Deliberative Approach. Ian Shapiroand StephenMacedo (New York:New YorkUniversity Press. 2000). 1996). the votes for eliminated candidates being reallocated accordingto the next preference on the ballot. Between Facts and Norms: Contributionsto a Discourse Theoryof Law and Democracy (Cambridge. "Citizens'JuriesandDeliberativeDemocracy. voters identify only their first and second preferences for candidates in a single-member constituency.Dryzek / DELIBERATIVEDEMOCRACY
40. Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine. "Does Democratic DeliberationChange Minds?"(paperpresentedat the annualmeeting of the American Political Science Association. "The Law of Group Polarization. UK: CambridgeUniversityPress. 44. Justice and the New Pluralism: The Challenge ofDif50. 2000). Donald Horowitz. The Voiceof the People: Public Opinion and Democracy (New Haven. 55. and James Fishkin. UK: Oxford UniversityPress. 1991).If there are (say) six seats perconstituency."Journal of Political Philosophy 11 (2003): 338-67. 59. 56. along with the second preferencesof candidateseliminated on the basis of their low numberof first preferences. Archon Fung. JtirgenHabermas.Between Facts and Norms. 58. CT: Yale University Press. David Schlosberg.
ResearchSchool of Social Sciences. John S. Dryzekis professor in the Social and Political TheoryProgram. 2003). Recent books include Deliberative Democracy and Beyond (OxfordUniversityPress. United Kingdom.
John S. 2002)."795-800. Cambridge University Press. 63. OxfordUniversityPress. and Green States and Social Movements (coauthored. with HansKristianHernes. David Downes.Germany. 64. Lijphart. Green States and Social Movements: Environmentalismin the United States. AustralianNational University.
.Democracy in Plural Societies. Post-CommunistDemocratization (coauthored. "A DeliberativeApproach. 2003). Dryzek. UK: Oxford University Press. 2000). Christian Hunold.242
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62.and Norway (Oxford. Deveaux. and David Schlosberg.