CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Political Law – Ex Officio Officials – EO 284 On 25 July 1987, Cory issued EO 284 which allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The CLU excepted this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Art 7 other than those provided in the Constitution; CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,” the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional. HELD: Sec 13, Art 7 provides: “Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.” It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof. In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

GONZALES vs. COMELEC Constitutional Law – Political Question vs Justiciable Question Facts: ? One of the issues raised in this case was the validity of the submission of certain proposed constitutional amendments at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular elections. Petitioners argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposal to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the election. It was contended that such issue cannot be properly raised before the courts because it is a political one. ISSUE: Whether or not the issue involves a political question. HELD: Pursuant to Art 15 of the ’35 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. The SC also noted that if what is placed in question or if the crux of the problem is the validity of an act then the same would be or the issue would be considered as a justiciable question NOT a political one.

Miraflor (Comelec Members) Petitioner: Gonzales Respondent : Comelec Ponente: Makasiar RELATED LAWS: Resolution No 2 (1967) Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 delegates from each representative district who shall be elected in November. 2 & 4. FACTS: This is a petition for declaratory judgment. has full authority to propose amendments. Gonzales: Sec. and validity of entire law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8 ISSUE: Whether the Congress has a right to call for ConCon and whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional. 5 and Par 1 Sec 8.IMBONG vs COMELEC September 11. implemented Res No. 2. y Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution y Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132: Congress acting as Constituent Assembly. Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving support/representing a delegate to the convention. RA 6132 Concon Act 1970. 1970 RA 6132: delegates in ConCon (Contitutional Law 1) Petitioner: Imbong Respondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair). Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2 deledates. 1970. 4. Patajo. or call for convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Res 2 and 4 Y . Furthermore. repealed RA 4919. specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional. HOLDING: The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132. Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their candicacy Sec 2: apportionment of delegates Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the election or from assuming any appointive office/position until the final adournment of the ConCon. RA 4919 implementation of Resolution No 2 Resolution 4 (1969) amended Resolution 2: ConCon shall be composed of 320 delegates approportioned among existing representative districts according to the population.

Furthermore. Macias case relied by Gonsales is not reasonable for that case granted more representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I other provinces with more population. In this case. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the Concon.Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Res 4 and is enough that the basis employed for such apportions is reasonable. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group. y Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. y Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits. it applies to all organizations . this disqualification is only temporary. and not the support of political parties.

Cory designated Bautista as the Acting Chairwoman of CHR. whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the CoA. EO 163 authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the CHR. the CoE and the COA. The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16. Bautista refused to be placed under the CoA’s review hence she filed a petition before the SC. averred that Bautista cannot take her seat w/o their confirmation. The provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutional and cannot be invoked by Mallillin. HELD: Since the position of Chairman of the CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. Art. ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista’s appointment is subject to CoA’s confirmation. without the confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint. filed with the CoA communications about Bautista’s appointment on 14 Jan 1989. The exercise of political options that finds no support in the Constitution cannot be sustained. To be more precise. The CoA. unlike the Chairmen and Members of the CSC. so also has the Constitution mandated that the President can confer no power of participation in the Commission on Appointments over other appointments exclusively reserved for her by the Constitution. Bautista should be removed. through the Exec Sec. This is untenable according to the SC. ignoring the decision in the Mison case.BAUTISTA vs. Art. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the president for it is constitutionally guaranteed that they must have a term of office. Cory. In December of the same year. Because of the fact that the president submitted to the CoA on 14 Jan 1989 the appointment of Bautista. Cory made the designation of Bautista permanent. that is.” And Sec 2(c). THERE WAS NO VACANCY TO WHICH AN APPOINTMENT COULD BE MADE ON 14 JANUARY 1989. 7. EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT MAY VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS AN APPOINTMENT THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION SOLELY BELONGS TO HER. Further. the CoA argued that the president though she has the sole prerogative to make CHR appointments may from time to time ask confirmation with the CoA. Mallillin invoked EO 163-A stating that since CoA refused Bautista’s appointment. The Constitution has blocked off certain appointments for the President to make with the participation of the Commission on Appointments. the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself. 16. appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the CoA it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the CoA. SALONGA Facts: ? On 27 Aug 1987. STILL. Appointments to the CHr is always permanent in nature. 7 of the 1987 Constitution. EO 163-A provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR should be at the pleasure of the President. . There can be no ad interim appointments in the CHR for the appointment thereto is not subject to CoA’s confirmation. On the other hand.

OCCENA vs. Sola. Since then. goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. are suing as taxpayers. It could even be said that there was a need for it. COMELEC [GR 56350. It served to clear the atmosphere. there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. In declaring what the law is. It is as simple as that. Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid. as a matter of law. also Gonzales vs. The Executive Secretary. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law. and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and filed." Such a statement served a useful purpose. Gonzales. 1 dissents in separate opinion. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. 1 on official leave Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments. all doubts were resolved. 2 April 1981]. In the latter case. The latest case in point is People v. the present Constitution came into force and effect. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973. . It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority. Thereafter. a factor for instability was removed. Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. respectively. both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy. this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. National Treasurer [GR 56404] En Banc. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution. Fernando (CJ): 8 concur. the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. promulgated barely two weeks ago. at least ten cases may be cited. there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.

ISSUE: Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s. 1971." thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention. Disbursing Officer. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely. 1967 and June 17. submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No.TOLENTINO vs. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case. insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8. The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971. as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. the Court declares this decision immediately executory. 1971. The respondents Comelec. Republic Act 6132. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof. COMELEC FACTS: The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution. 1969 respectively. The petition herein is granted.". We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8. hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void. by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. Organic Resolution No. Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16. HELD: The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite." at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be. 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution. 695) are hereby declared null and void. and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention. . and the subsequent implementing resolutions. No costs .

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Facts: ? In 1973. there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election. . Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence. Further.JAVELLANA vs. a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. Majority of the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines. Further. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition. in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Javellana. HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. He argued that the president is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud.

Thus. 1986 signed by OIC Gov. 1987. 1986. Held: No. 1. february 8. 1987 and not December 1. designating Florentino Magno. de leon received memo antedated december 1. Barangay election act is not inconsistent with constitution. On february 9. 27 states that all previous constitution were suspended. 1987. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on the date when it was signed. Constitution was ratified on February 2. rizal. But provisional constitution was no longer in efffect then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its transitory provision.DE LEON vs. designated new councilmen. as new captain by authority of minister of local government and similar memo signed february 8. is within the prescribed period. memoranda has no legal effect. Petitioners now acquired security of tenure until fixed term of office for barangay officials has been fixed. 1987. Issue: Whether or not designation of successors is valid. 1987. ESGUERRA Facts: Alfredo de Leon won as barangay captain and other petitioners won as councilmen of barangay dolores. . February 8. February 8. 1987. 2. So. Benhamin Esguerra. it was the constitution in effect. taytay. Article XVIII. 3. sec.

P a b l o C . or by a constitutional co nvention. which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the . a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. asserting that the power to propose amendments to.thirds of all its Members. S a n i d a d . the powers of such replacement. by declaring the provisions of Presiden tial Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Article XVII of t h e Constitution. by a vote of two ." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to. stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum . (2) The National Assembly may.SANIDAD vs. 1033 and 1031. or revision of. its replacement. Marcos issued P D 9 9 1 c a l l i n g f o r a n a t i o n a l referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve the issues of martial law. S a n i d a d a n d P a b l i t o V. On 22 September 1976. his son. Guzman. President Ferdinand E. to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees. to declare without force and effect PD 991. Gonzales. c o m m e n c e d f o r P r o h i b i t i o n w i t h Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim Natio nal Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment. On 30 September 1976. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. the period of its existence. call a constitutional convention or. another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction. was instituted by Vicente M. the interim assembly. The President also issued PD 1033. this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members. the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. COMELEC Facts: On 2 September 1976.plebiscite on 16 October 1976. by a majority vote of all its Members. Issue: W/N the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution. the President issued another PD 1031. f a t h e r a n d s o n . or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred o n t h e i n t e r i m National Assembly under action 16. amending the previous Presidential Decree 991. Another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed by Raul M. or revision of. Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to. and Alfredo Salapantan. submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. providing for a new interim legislative body.

Again. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article 16 hereof. by a majority vote of all its Members. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. I n t i m e s o f t r a n s i t i o n amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their s o v e r e i g n w i l l t o w i t h h o l d t h e convening of the interim National Assembly.thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for . who were deemed a u t o m a t i c a l l y m e m b e r s o f t h e i n t e r i m N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y . the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members. or (2) by aConstitutional Convention called by a vote of two ." There are. upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. 1973 the people had already resolved against it. The Court in Aquino v. the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly.15. had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions. two periods contem plated in the constitutional life of the natio n: period of normalcy and period of transition. may. In times of normalcy. w e r e a g a i n s t i t s i n c l u s i o n s i n c e i n t h a t referendum of January. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially co nvene the interim National Assembly. when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution. co nsistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. they were aware of the fact that under the same. Rather. the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially co nvened was eliminated. it is exercising a peculiar power besto wed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. therefore. The President's decision to defer the co nvening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisi ons reads "The interim National Assembly. propose amendments to this Constitution. 1973. COMELEC. because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention. In the plebiscite of January 10 . In the Philippines. In sensu striciore.votes c a s t i n a p l e b i s c i t e w h i c h s h a l l b e h e l d n o t l a t e r t h a n t h r e e m o n t h s a a f t e r t h e a p p r o v a l o f s u c h amendment or revision. that body is not in the usual functio n of lawmaking. In the referendum of 2 4 J u l y 1973. However the calling of a Constitutional Co nvention m ay be submitted to the electorate in an e lection v o t e d u p o n b y a m a j o r i t y v o t e o f a l l t h e m e m b e r s o f t h e N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y." In the present period of transition. at which the ratificatio n of the 1973 Constitution was submitted. in the referendum of 27 February 1975.

Such being the case. amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. .the interim National Assembly). however. approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The distinction. The prerogative of the President to approve o r d i s a p p r o v e a p p l i e s o n l y t o t h e o r d i n a r y c a s e s o f l e g i s l a t i o n . not of law. is one of policy. While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. T h e P r e s i d e n t h a s n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

Art. which provides for the right o f the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitutio n. (3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution. the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service. the IBP. (2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. A revisio n cannot be done by initiative. Alexander Padilla. the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. No such law has been passed. T h e l i f t i n g o f t h e term limits was held to be that of a revision. Senator Roco. not to revision thereof. Issues: (1) Whether or not Sec. 2.DEFENSOR – SANTIAGO vs. No. COMELEC (G. (2) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision. 2 . Public Interest L aw Center. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. Held: S e c . T h e delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid. w i t h o u t i m p l e m e n t i n g legislation the same cannot operate. t h u s . the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic. such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on p e o p l e ’ s i n i t i a t i v e t o a m e n d t h e constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. Modernization and Action (PIRMA). and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as interveno rs . Subsequently the COMELEC issued an o rder directing the publication of the petitio n and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. and prohibiting political dynasties. is void. 1997) Facts: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right. It has been an established rule that w h a t h a s b e e n d e l e g a t e d . Sec. as it would affect o t h e r provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections. A r t X V I I o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n i s n o t s e l f e x e c u t o r y . and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for pro hibition under Rule 6 5 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments.March 19. filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials. He based this petition on Article XVII. therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention. through People’s Initiative. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative o n amendments to the Constitution is valid. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. . Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon. However. 127325 . considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago. At the hearing.R. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. c a n n o t b e d e l e g a t e d ( p o t e s t a s d e l e g a t a n o n d e l e g a r i p o t e s t ) .oppositors. president of P e o p l e ’ s I n i t i a t i v e f o r R e f o r m s . considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue. the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative.

2. and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. pursuant to Santiago v. “an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void. J. XVII on direct proposal by people Sec. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. First. the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative. The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. Moreover. 2006 (CARPIO. Constitutional Revision • Tests to determine whether amendment or revision FACTS: The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution and then filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for ratification under Sec.) Requirements for Initiative Petition • Constitutional Amendment vs. No.R. 5(b) and (c) and Sec.Second. the people must first seethe full text of the proposed amendments before they sign.. Comelec ruling ISSUES: • Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision • Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement on direct proposal by the people RULING: Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2. or attached to it. While this provision does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before – not after – signing. COMELEC G.LAMBINO vs. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition. the petition must stated the fact of such attachment. Art. This means two essential elements must be present. If so attached. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. as an initiative upon a petition. XVII. the proposal must be embodied in a petition. Art. 7 of RA 6735. Oct. COMELEC did not give it due course for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. . and (b) in particular. 25.is the governing provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The proposed changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. 2 elements of initiative 1. 174153..2.

In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition. or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction. like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-andbalances. the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. and unelected individuals. applies to “any amendment to. the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed. a change reducing the voting age from 18years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision. applies only to “amendments to this Constitution. . or sentence of text of the proposed changes in the signature sheet. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution. while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. On so vital an issue as amending the nation’s fundamental law. Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision.” This distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. The initiative violates Section 2. as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution.” In contrast. That’s why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be” directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition” . referring to the third mode. Does the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution? Yes. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The third mode is through a people’s initiative. For example. and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution. Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article. Section 1 of Article XVII. there’s not a single word. faceless. referring to the first and second modes. Section 2 of Article XVII. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. phrase. On the other hand. this Constitution. involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress. In contrast. a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system. Amendment vs. An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception.meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution. is beyond doubt a revision. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the UnicameralParliamentary system of government. Revision Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. not a mere amendment. Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. amendment broadly refers to a change that adds. This omission is fatal. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. reduces. or revision of.

which do not have fixed &identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings. However. a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. or several provisions of a constitution. the Lambino Group’s proposed changes overhaul two articles . A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of government & the system of check and balances Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests. Also. but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. the Lambino Group’s initiative is a revision &Not merely an amendment. each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case. a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision. depending on how it affects other provisions. and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. Quantitatively. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions. constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. constitutions allow people’s initiatives. Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus. Tests to determine whether amendment or revision In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution. courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. the carefully crafted system of checksand-balances. to undertake only amendments & not revisions. Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. the substitution of the word “republican” with “monarchic” or “theocratic” in Section 1. Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles.Similarly. Thus. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. On the other hand. Qualitatively. as well as how it affects the structure of government. the proposed changes alter .Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive -affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not a revision. For example. Thus. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment.

Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government. as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-andbalances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. or vocation out of such endeavor. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. The same substantive changes. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution. The SC. A shift from the present BicameralPresidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. substantive changes are called revisions because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language. are called amendments because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an occupation. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. profession. A change in the structure of government is a revision A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution. from presidential to parliamentary.substantially the basic plan of government. . not of substance. when proposed through an initiative. The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and revision is only one of procedure. ruled that the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated. Likewise. however.

According to Justice Bellosillo. . therefore. and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel. GSIS 267 SCRA 402 February 1997 En Banc FACTS: Pursuant to the privatization program of the government. privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. One day after the filing of the petition in October 1995. The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark. In September 1996. the Court issued a TRO enjoining the respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Renong Berhad. petitioner matched the former¶s bid prize also with Php 44. the Supreme Court En Banc accepted the instant case. ISSUE: Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10. Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners.MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and. at the same time. The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners. but the GSIS refused to accept both the bid match and the manager¶s check. as mandated by the provision in question. Section 10. a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. too. ponente of the case at bar. In his dissenting opinion. GSIS chose to award during bidding in September 1995 the 51% outstanding shares of the respondent Manila Hotel Corp. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified. making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution COURT RULING: The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad. second paragraph. a Malaysian firm.00 per share followed by a manager¶s check worth Php 33 million as Bid Security. for the amount of Php 44. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC.00 per share against herein petitioner which is a Filipino corporation who offered Php 41. (MHC) to the Renong Berhad. second paragraph. not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights.58 per share.

Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates." "opportunities. the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing. he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. Article II of the 1987 Constitution. What is recognized in Section 26.PAMATONG vs. the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies. Moreover. it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights . Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II. Certainly. by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Words and phrases such as "equal access. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution. Broadly written. Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office? RULING: No. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. and he has a platform of government." and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. i.e. COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26.. Obviously. he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries.

(3) able to read and write. Thus.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination. The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines. . the equal access clause is not violated. The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. In the case at bar. and orderly. Under the Constitution (Article VII. there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. however. the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion.may be sourced. the greater the number of candidates. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process. Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap. objective. (2) registered voter. Towards this end. Inevitably. Section 2). who was only a high school dropout. to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a onenote joke. and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.

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