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Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major changes proposed and approved by the Commission. These were (1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence 9 of the section from the same requirement. In the 1987 Constitution, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII. Luego vs CSC FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointment was described as "permanent" but the Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary." On 22 March 1984, the Civil Service
Law on Public Officers Sarmiento vs Mison Facts Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Issue: Whether or not the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments is required in appointing the head of the Bureau of Customs Held: The Court ruled in the negative. It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2 Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 3
Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and accordingly directed herein private respondent in place of petitioner's position. The private respondent was so appointed on 28 June 1984, by the new mayor; Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking his earlier permanent appointment as well as to question the Civil Service Commission's order and the private respondent's title. ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter. Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service Commission's resolution is set aside Lacson vs Romero Facts: Petitioner Lacson was on July 25, 1946, appointed by the President of the Philippines, provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. The appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointment on August 6, 1946. He took his oath of office on August 10, 1946, and thereafter performed the duties of that office. Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, on May 17, 1949, the President nominated petitioner Lacson to the post of provincial fiscal of Tarlac. On the same date, the President nominated for the position of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental respondent Romero. Both nominations were simultaneously confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on May 19, 1949.
Lacson neither accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal of Tarlac. But respondent Romero took his oath of office (the post of fiscal of Negros Oriental) in Manila on June 16, 1949, notified the Solicitor General of the fact, and thereafter proceeded to his station. Upon arrival at Dumaguete City, capital of Negros Oriental, he notified Lacson of his intention to take over the office the following day, but Lacson objected. Hence this petition ISSUE: Whether or not Lacson is entitled to the position Held : The Court ruled that: The appointment to a government post like that of provincial fiscal to be complete involves several steps. First, comes the nomination by the President. Then to make that nomination valid and permanent, the Commission on Appointments of the Legislature has to confirm said nomination. The last step is the acceptance thereof by the appointee by his assumption of office. The first two steps, nomination and confirmation, constitute a mere offer of a post. They are acts of the Executive and Legislative departments of the Government. But the last necessary step to make the appointment complete and effective rests solely with the appointee himself. He may or he may not accept the appointment or nomination. As held in the case of Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 327, "there is no Power in this country which can compel a man to accept an office." Consequently, since Lacson has declined to accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac and no one can compel him to do so, then he continues as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no vacancy in said office was created, unless Lacson had been lawfully removed as Such fiscal of Negros Oriental. Costin v. Quimbo Facts: Petitioner Estanislao Lajer was a member of themunicipal police force of Abuyog, Leyte since January 1, 1949. He was extended a promotional appointment as sergeant of police on October 15,
1958. On November 25, 1959, the outgoing municipal mayor of Abuyog accorded Lajer another promotional appointment as chief of police. This last appointment was not attested and approved as required by law. On January 14, 1960, the new municipal mayor dismissed Lajer and eight other members of the police department. On the same day, the municipal mayor extended to respondent Higinio Verra a permanent appointment as Chief of Police of Abuyog. Verra immediately took over the position. His appointment was eventually approved as permanent one. On January 19,1960, Lajer and eight other members of the police force filed an action for mandamus against the municipal mayor, municipal treasurer and the municipal council of Abuyog, contesting their separation from the service. While the petition was pending, there was again a change in the municipal administration, as a result of the 1963 elections. The newly elected municipal mayor dismissed Verra. Verra was replaced by Victoriano SIlleza, officer-in-charge when petitioner Marcial Costin was appointed as chief of police. Verra filed a case against Costin, the municipal mayor and municipal treasurer. Lajer and other eight members of police force was found to be illegally dismissed. Lajer was reinstated as chief of police. Verra filed an amended petition. The respondent judge rendered a decision in favor of the reinstatement of Verra. Issue: Whether or not the appointment of respondent Verra appointment in the position of Chief of Police was valid and consequently his removal therefrom illegal. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that when respondent Verra was appointed chief of police on January 14, 1960, Lajer had just been dismissed from office with several other members of the police force. The validity of Verra‘s appointment, therefore hinges on the legality of Lajer‘s removal. It is elementary in the law of public officers that no person, no matter how qualified and eligible he is for a certain position, may be appointed to an office which is not vacant. There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed or his appointment validly terminated.
Monsanto v. Factoran Facts: In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in view of the provision of the Local Government Code transferring the power of appointment of treasurers from the city governments to the said Ministry. In its 4th Indorsement dated March 1, 1985, the Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition in her behalf. Issue: Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the plea of the petitioner for reinstatement to her former office must be rejected. The petitioner was pardoned pending her appeal from her conviction for an offense which carried with it the penalty of disqualification from office. For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the
office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary Facts: Two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9, 1988 1 and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13, Article VII prohibits public respondents, as members of the Cabinet, along with the other public officials enumerated in the list attached to the petitions as Annex "C" in G.R. No.83815 and as Annex "B" in G.R. No. 83896 from holding any other office or employment during their tenure. In addition to seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines further seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the issuance of the extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus, as well as a temporary restraining order directing public respondents therein to cease and desist from holding, in addition to their primary positions, dual or multiple positions other than those authorized by the 1987 Constitution and from receiving any salaries, allowances, per diems and other forms of privileges and the like appurtenant to their questioned positions, and compelling public respondents to return,
reimburse or refund any and all amounts or benefits that they may have received from such positions. Specifically, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines charges that notwithstanding the aforequoted "absolute and self-executing" provision of the 1987 Constitution, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez, construing Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B, rendered on July 23, 1987 Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, declaring that Cabinet members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold other public office, including membership in the boards of government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the primary functions of their respective positions; and that on the basis of this Opinion, the President of the Philippines, on July 25, 1987 or two (2) days before Congress convened on July 27, 1987: promulgated Executive Order No. 284.Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to both DOJ Opinion No. 73 and Executive Order No. 284 as they allegedly "lumped together" Section 13, Article VII and the general provision in another article, Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB. Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No.284 was unconstitutional. Held: On the strength of the foregoing constitutional provision, the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 which, in effect, allowed Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries and other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold other positions in the government albeit subject to the limitations imposed therein. Being head of an executive department is no mean job. It is more than a full-time job, requiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are to be derived from a department head‘s ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other
government offices or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. Surely the advantages to be derived from this concentration of attention, knowledge and expertise, particularly at this stage of our national and economic development, far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be gained from a department head spreading himself too thin and taking in more than what he can handle. LABO v. COMELEC G.R. No. 86564 . August 1, 1989 FACTS: Ramon Labo asked the Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking into the question of his citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time. ISSUE: Whether or not Ramon Labo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January 1988, as mayor of Baguio City. HELD: The Court ruled that the petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code providing in material part as follows: Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English, Filipino, or any other local language or dialect.
it was not as loud as all that. A voluntary change of citizenship or a change thereof by operation of law disqualifies him to continue holding the civil service position to which he had qualified and had been appointed. An applicant for admission to examination for entrance into the civil service must be a citizen of the Philippines (section 675 of the Revised Administrative Code). That petitioner wrote another letter dated September 26. DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS No. sometime on January 9. series of 1947 had never been appealed by the petitioner to the Secretary of Education. series of 1957. 1957. Labo. 1958.00 a month from November 1. Having married Mr. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. Ng Foo alias Pio Chet Yee. The Court held that petitioner Ramon J. disauthorizing the continuance in the service of the petitioner on account of Circular No. Not being included in section 671 of the Revised Administrative Code which enumerates the officers and employees constituting the unclassified service. 1957 until the date of her reinstatement. he cannot expect to be welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as an undesirable alien.100 votes. In the school year 1957-1958 the petitioner was actually teaching in the Buhang Elementary School. He is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City. 33 But having done so. Antique. The temporary restraining order dated January 31. HELD: The Court ruled that there is no doubt that her removal as a public school teacher because of loss of Filipino citizenship is legal. The petitioner was a public school teacher and had been appointed as such teacher in the Division of Antique in 1951. for his lead over the second-placer was only about 2. once this decision becomes final and executory. And after he had qualified himself to be eligible for appointment to a civil service position and had been appointed to such position. series of 1947. teaching in a public school is in the classified service — a public function which may be performed by Filipino citizens only. God has seen fit to grant him. and ordering the respondents to reinstate the petitioner forthwith to her former position. Antonio A. That prior to the effectivity of the order of removal the petitioner wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Civil Service dated October 25. 1957. It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as such and cherish this priceless gift that. In any event. is not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. That Special Order No. rejecting it for another land that may offer him material and other attractions that he may not find in his own country. to preside over them as mayor of their city. 1957. 1957 herein. the people of that locality could not have. declaring illegal and contrary to law the removal of the petitioner from her position as school teacher in the Division of Antique on October 28. without pronouncement as to costs." To be accurate. or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. L-16924. 296. dated October 25. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia. he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a state with more allurements for him. and Circular No. 1989. and to cause to be paid her salary of P140. a Chinese citizen. Jr. the original respondents were only the Director of Public Schools and the Division Superintendent of Schools of Antique.The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City. under a public function which may be performed by Filipino citizens only. the appellee . with all the privileges appurtenant thereto. on August 10. April 29. That when this case was filed sometime on October 11. 1958 concurs with the recommendation of the Director of Public Schools for denial of the reinstatement of the petitioner to the service and that on August 26. 1957 hereto attached as. issued by the Division Superintendent of Schools of Antique and this was pursuant to the 2nd indorsement of the Director of Public Schools dated October 14. 1963 FACTS: An appeal from a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Antique. 1957 is presently a Chinese citizen. who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous majority. Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation. This may not be accomplished by election to public office. even unanimously. Such being the case. out of more than a hundred other nationalities. Yee from the teaching service. Buhang Hamtic. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen. he must continue to be such citizen. in its 4th indorsement the Commissioner of Civil Service likewise concurs in the action separating Mrs. ISSUE: Whether or not Yee is qualified as a teacher. 1955. YEE v. 1959 when the respondents Division Superintendent of Schools and the Director of Public Schools submitted their evidence in support of their motion to dismiss and which documents are hereto attached wherein it appears that the Secretary of Education in its 3rd indorsement dated March 17. 1957. That effective sometime on October 28. he must not lightly yield this precious advantage. 40. is lifted. changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution. Having been so endowed. a Chinese citizen. That the petitioner came to know for the first time of the actions taken on her letter of October 25. 296 of the Division Superintendent of Schools of Antique the ruling of the Director of Public Schools in his 2nd indorsement dated October 14. 1958 addressed to the Division Superintendent of Schools of Antique asking for reinstatement. 1957 the petitioner was removed from her teaching service by virtue of Special Order No. 40. upon the appellee's marriage on 10 August 1957 to Ng Foo alias Pio Chet Yee. A civil service eligible as a regular national teacher having passed the Junior Teachers' (Regular) Examination that was given on or about December 29. To be sure. 1958.
creating an ad hoc and independent citizens‘ committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the Philippine centennial projects. directed Laurel to submit his counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses. is no argument against the limitation of holding public offices to citizens of the Philippines. and for that reason she is no longer qualified to continue holding the civil service position to which she had qualified and had been appointed. (2) Whether or EXPOCORP is a private corporation and not a GOCC. 35. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office. Laurel filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of said office. "reconstituting the Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1988. and mariners of the United States. 3(e) and (g) of R. approved the resolution with respect to Laurel but dismissed the charge against Peña. in proper cases of. Apostol. act as the nominal complainant. It recommended the further investigation by the Ombudsman. issued its Evaluation Report. appointing officer shall. and indictment. DESIERTO G. sailors. April 12. Peña and AK President Edgardo H. Citizens of the Philippines. 1594. (4) Whether or not Laurel is not a public officer. Angeles for violation of Sec. Honorably discharged soldiers. Laurel was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators and was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.A. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be conducted before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB). ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case. Office of the Ombudsman against former NCC and EXPOCORP chair Salvador H. Second. No. No. The privilege speech was referred to the Blue Ribbon Committee for investigation. Section 681 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that — In making selection from lists of certified eligibles furnished by the Commissioner. when other qualifications are equal. LAUREL v. former EXPOCORP President Teodoro Q. 128. Laurel for violations of Section 3(e) of R." Appointed VicePresident Laurel as chair. The Saguisag Committee issued its own report. Senator Saguisag was appointed to chair the Committee. No. HELD: (1) The Court ruled that the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance. 2. President Estrada issued Administrative Order No.‖ President Ramos issued Executive Order No. Laurel moved for a reconsideration but the motion was denied. 145368.ceased to be a citizen of the Philippines. for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation… of the anti-graft law.). 223 "constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998. misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer . recommending: 1. as amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA Rules and Regulations. Ombudsman denied motion to dismiss. 2002 FACTS: President Aquino issued Administrative Order No. A corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo ‘98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created.A. No. EPIB found probable cause to indict respondents LAUREL and PEÑA before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. OIC-Director of the EPIB. in relation to Republic Act No.3019.R. in his capacity as Ombudsman.A. Its duty is to "take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress and its existence shall terminate upon the completion of all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations. The Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman. recommending the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Laurel. Blue Ribbon Committee filed its report. chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding. relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp. Senator Coseteng delivered a privilege speech denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. (3) Whether or not NCC was not a public office. 6713. and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The judgment appealed from is reversed and petition denied. Hence this present petition for certiorari. without pronouncement as to costs in both instances. the point of exhaustion of administrative remedy need not be passed upon. The preference provided for in the section quoted above was operative during the period before 4 July 1946 or before the Philippines became an independent nation. Laurel. 3019. Section 4(a) in relation to Section 11 of R. Desierto. 3019. IN VIEW OF THE CONCLUSION ARRIVED AT." It renamed the Committee as the "National Centennial Commission. prefer: First." The Committee was mandated "to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.
and the assignment of the said auxiliary judge was made with this understanding. however. for a given period. 1928. Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge is a de facto judge Held: The court ruled that the respondent is a de facto judge Briefly defined. that he now has reached that age and. that said respondent is neither a judge de jure nor de facto. he continues to hold the office of judge of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros and pretends to be duly qualified and acting judge of the said province. from a judge de jure who is in all respects legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired. concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law. Apart from any constitutional or statutory regulation on the subject there seems to be a general rule of law that an incumbent of an office will hold over after the conclusion of his term until the election and qualification of a successor. authority and duty. the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office. as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit. according to Mechem. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. therefore. A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence 13 is that provided by Mechem. and on the other hand. but. . No. Where a salary or fees is annexed. and that he has tried. the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office. scope of duties. notwithstanding this fact. previous to this date.e. That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little consequence. The petitioners further allege that in view of the many election protests and criminal cases for violation of the election law filed in the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros arising in the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros arising from the last election of June 5. and continues to try. Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989. an oath. to act as such judge and that there is reasonable ground to believe that he will take cognizance of the cases in question unless he be restrained by order of this court. continuance of the position. the Honorable Sixto de la Costa was duly designated and acted as auxiliary judge of the Province of Oriental Negros. De Facto Officers Tayko vs Capistrano Facts: The petitioners allege that the respondent judge. either fixed bylaw or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office." It also referred to the "need to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other countries. defines who public officers are. agency or instrumentality thereof. salary.O. but that. a de facto judge is one who exercises the duties of a judicial office under color of an appointment or election thereto. He differs. 128." The executive function. one to which salary. or of any subdivision. The executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. including government-owned or controlled corporations. as its Chair. to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. a public office. The characteristics of a public office.or employee of the government. created and conferred by law. nonetheless. that between the auxiliary judge and the respondent judge herein there was an understanding. The Court hold that the NCC performs executive functions. was appointed judge of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros. therefore. and the designation of the position as an office." (3) and (4) There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of industrialization and full employment is a fundamental state policy. Hence. When a judge in good faith remains in office after his title has ended. and that the respondent Honorable Nicolas Capistrano would try and hear the ordinary cases pending in the said court. to hold office during good behavior and until he should reach the age of 65 years. that the said auxiliary judge so designated would hear and take cognizance of all election protests and criminal actions then pending or to filed arising from the said last general election. The individual so invested is a public officer. Clearly. a recognized authority on the subject: a public office is the right. the respondent judge tried and is still trying to take cognizance of the election protests an criminal actions in said court. reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998. therefore. under the provisions of section 148 of the Administrative Code as amended. E. include the delegation of sovereign functions. compensation or fees are attached. i. on the one hand. The Court dismissed the petition. cited the "need to strengthen the said Committee to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government and non-government or private organizations. (2) The NCC was precisely created to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized celebration of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation form the government and non-government or private organizations and to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other countries and to carry them into effect. he is a de facto officer. notwithstanding this understanding or agreement. and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. its creation by law and not by contract. is disqualified from acting as a judge of the Court of First Instance. by which. the NCC performs sovereign functions. But it is a public office. It is. and petitioner. It is not conclusive. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position.. from a mere usurper who undertakes to act officially without any color of right. is a public officer. an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government.
on the assumption that said facts are true. can be ordered to reimburse the salaries and emoluments he has received during his incumbency to the plaintiff who has been legally declared elected by the Senate Electoral Tribunal The Court upheld the point of view of the defendant. 1947. the respondent judge must be considered a judge de facto. He was one of the candidates of the Liberal Party in the elections of November 11. and (2) because such a rule tends to curb election frauds and lessens the danger and frequency of usurpation or instrusion into the office. and that by reason of such usurpation. Kaya eto na lang ang nilagay ko. CA **Pasensya na. the Senate Electoral Tribunal on December 16. mali ‗yung nahanap kong case sa net. This is as it should be. he continously collected the salaries. emoluments and allowances which our Constitution provides for the position (article VI. In these circumstances the remedy prayed for cannot be granted. plaintiff suffered damages in the amount of P35. on the other hand. Defendant. Ito lang yung nahanap ko na importante. 1946 A de facto officer is one who is in possession of the office and is discharging its duties under color of authority. while sound and plausible cannot be invoked in the present case. defendant usurped the office of Senator of the Philippines. in the full exercise of his public judicial function. This is the policy and the rule that has been followed consistently in this jurisdiction in connection with the provisions held by persons who had been elected thereto but were later ousted as a result of an election protest. nor by any other. and from that date until December 1949. The emolument must go to the person who rendered service unless the contrary is provided. The right of the persons elected to compensation during their incumbency has always been recognized. Having been thus duly proclaimed as Senator and having assumed office as required by law. that the official acts of a de facto judge are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure judge. and as a necessary consequence he has likewise the right to collect and received the salaries and emoluments thereunto appertaining as a compensation for the salaries he has rendered. his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that will confer on him the status of a de facto officer. dating from the earliest period and repeatedly confirmed by an unbroken current of decisions. we cannot escape the conclusion that. he must be regarded as holding over in good faith. has a right to assume the office and discharge its functions notwithstanding the protest filed against his election. and by color of authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment. This is in keeping with the ordinary course of events. rendered judgment declaring plaintiff to have been duly elected to the office. Plaintiff claims that. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATAAN No. The contention of counsel for the petitioners that the auxiliary judge present in the district must be considered the regular judge seems obviously erroneous. as such. November 29. as defendant was found and by final judgment not to have been entitled to the office of Senator. and the legality of that assumption is open to the attack of the sovereign power alone. so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. Try ko ulit hanapin. 1947. and as good faith is presumed. Held: The Supreme Court declared the judgment void. contends that the rule invoked by plaintiff. 1949. L-781. he was during the time he discharged that office a mere de facto officer. emoluments and privileges attendant to that office amounting to P18. and has been proclaimed by the corresponding authority. We cannot recall of any precedent wherein the contrary rule has been upheld. cannot be questioned by any merely private suitor. it cannot be disputed that defendant is entitled to the compensation.B. If a person appointed to an office is subsequently declared ineligible therefor.: Di ko mahanap yung English translation ng case na ‗to. he should reimbursed to the plaintiff the salaries and emoluments he has received on the following grounds. (1) because the salaries and emoluments follow and are inseparable from legal title to the office and do not depend on whether the duties of the office are discharged or not. took the oath of office. excepting in the form especially provided by law.Applying the principles stated to the facts set forth in the petition before us. ―for it is now firmly established in our jurisprudence that a decision is void if promulgated after the judge who rendered it had . A judge de facto assumes the exercise of a part of the prerogative of sovereignty. who has been proclaimed. and. There is no question that the defendant acted as a de facto officer during the time he held the office of Senator. ISSUE : whether defendant. however irregular or informal. Rodriguez vs Tan Facts: Plaintiff claims that on December 30. "The rightful authority of a judge. Accordingly. but his successor has not been appointed. and thereafter he took the oath of office and immediately entered into the performance of the duties of the position. N. section 14). and discharged the duties of Senator. REGALA v. His term of office may have expired. and was proclaimed as one of those who had been elected by the Commission on Elections. that protest having been filed by plaintiff against defendant. :D Solis v.400.55 for expenses he incurred in prosecuting the protest. This is simple justice. since it runs counter to the principle and rule long observed in this jurisdiction to the effect that one who has been elected to an office. so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. parphrase galing sa book: =) Issue: Whether or not a decision is void if promulgated after the judge who rendered it had permanently ceased to be judge of the court where he sat in judgment is void. Sensya na. it is a well established principle. There is no averment in the complaint that he is linked with any irregularity vitiating his election.524.
but rather for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers. declared ―In view of the foregoing.permanently ceased to be judge of the court where he sat in judgment. Tente U. held in the suit for injunction instituted by petitioner against respondents that (a) the former had ceased to be mayor of Navotas. In his reply letter dated June 22. As revealed by the records. his certificate of candidacy as representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming elections was filed with the Commission on Elections. This judgment was. the Provincial Administrator. "that the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure. Rubillar. 1988 the petitioner Aurelio D. 1989.P.L. approved the withdrawal.. Issue: Whether or not s de facto officer has a right to emoluments while discharging the duties of office of Vice-Governor. by virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte. was not yet publicly ore generally known on 21 June 1954. Upon these facts. L-23258 . on appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals. Hence. a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte. Rizal. 1961. and (d) petitioner must pay respondent P1. HELD: The Court ruled that it is the general rule then. A de facto officer. the salaries to which respondent was entitled as Mayor from September 21. but it is far more cogently acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated. 1961 up to the time he can reassume said office. or on September 18. Justice J. Menzon v. MONROY v. in sustaining a de facto officer‘s right to emoluments while actually discharging the duties of the office of ViceGovernor. in a special session held on July 7. takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention of the public office.B. The Commission on Elections. then the vice-mayor of Navotas. The established precedent invoked in the Rodriguez case cannot therefore be applied in this case. COURT OF APPEALS No. stated that since B. Judge Leuterio should be considered as a judge de facto of said court and the promulgation of his appealed decision on said date is valid and legally effective. Reyes said: ―The main ground upon which the Court of Appeals held the contested judgment of the Court of First Instance to be valid is that ‗since the approval of Republic Act 1186. issued Resolution No. Here. the appointment of the petitioner as the temporary Vice. The present case for injunction and quo warranto involves the forfeiture of the office of municipal mayor by the incumbent occupant thereof and the claim to that office by the vice-mayor because of the operation of Sec. The same Court reaffirmed its stand upon petitioner's filing a motion to reconsider. Petilla Facts: On February 16. 1961. after his certificate of candidacy was filed on September 15. could concurrently assume the functions of both offices. But on September 21. the petitioner's right to be paid the salary attached to the Office of the Vice Governor is indubitable. i. as actual damages. July 1. Held: The Supreme Court . the Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos designated the ViceGovernor.000. The resulting hardship occasioned by the operation of this rule to the de facto officer who did actual work is recognized. 1967 FACTS: Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas. respondent Felipe del Rosario. 337 has no provision relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-Governor in case of a temporary vacancy. it is possession of title. Rubillar. the same is. not for the protection of the de facto officer principally. this petition for certiorari to review the ruling of the Court of Appeals. (b) respondent del Rosario became municipal mayor upon his having assumed office as such on September 21. There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor under color of a known appointment. not of the office. the petitioner was appointed by no less than the alter ego of the President. Jacinto T. Menzon. 1961. as it is hereby. petitioner filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of candidacy. 1989. 1989. 1961. Wherefore. Undersecretary Jacinto T. that is decisive. took his oath of office as municipal mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy in question. The petitioner took his oath of office. Jr. the Secretary of Local . Election Code. ISSUE: Whether or not a rightful incumbent may recover salary received by the de facto officer. affirmed in toto. On March 25. Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte.Governor is not necessary since the ViceGovernor who is temporarily performing the functions of the Governor. 1988.e. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan. 1961.‖ To the argument that he should be considered a de facto judge. The question of compensation involves different principles and concepts however. as to the legality of the appointment of the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte.‖ This is a misapplication of the doctrine laid down in the very case cited by the Court of Appeals. (c) petitioner must reimburse. Leopoldo E. the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Costs against petitioner. per resolution. Rizal. Quintero inquired from the Undersecretary of the Department of Local Government. finding no error in the judgment appealed from. 27 of the Rev. Jr. not having good title. even though he entered into the office in good faith and under color of title" that applies in the present case. affirmed in toto except for the award of moral damages which was eliminated.00 as moral damages. 505 where it held invalid the appointment of the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. On May 29. when on September 15. Three days later. effective 20 June 1954..
The petitioner exercised the duties attached to the Office of the ViceGovernor. 5. the NLRC reversed the Arbiter Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. it would be governed by the Labor Code. MAGLANA 113 SCRA 268 FACTS: 1.Government. when the 1987 Constitution took effect. He was acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte. 6. He was promoted to the rank of police sergeant . It was only when the controversial Resolution No. sec. 14 does not apply to him. instructed petitioner to tender his resignation pursuant to Letter of Instruction No. . petitioner filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) a complaint for illegal dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction. At the time petitioner filed his first complaint. Petitioner tendered his letter of resignation and was approved three months later. 9. 98107 YEAR: 1997 ISSUE/TOPIC: CSC. On appeal by NHC.‖ (italics supplied) Considering that NHC was a GOCC without an original charter. NHC then appealed before the Supreme Court (SC) and on January 17. His provision appointments were renewed. 1977. Since the NHC was created under the former Corporation Law. 11. the two criminal cases were dismissed. jurisdiction over corporations Petitioner Benjamin Juco worked as a project engineer of respondent National Housing Corporation (NHC).R. petitioner filed with respondent NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against private respondent NHC. However. the appointment has the color of validity. II-B. under the present Constitution. as provided for in Art. Hon. it would be highly iniquitous to now deny him the salary due him for the services he actually rendered as the acting ViceGovernor of the province of Leyte On January 6. which provides that ―The civil service embraces all branches. In the meantime. The respondents themselves acknowledged the validity of the petitioner's appointment and dealt with him as such. 1989. and the preventive suspension has been lifted. after which he took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of Local Government Regional Director Res Salvatierra. Southern Leyte. petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against NHC with the Department of Labor. including government owned andcontrolled corporations with original charters. Upon appeal to the the NLRC. 10. the SC set aside the NLRC‘s decision thereby reinstating the Labor Arbiter‘s dismissal. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GR NO: G. Upon the principle of public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based and basic considerations of justice. It was dismissed on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner Tereso Maturan was appointed as patrolman of San Francisco. He was separated from service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. the CSC dismissed the complaint. On March 25. Respondent Vice-Mayor. The dismissal was grounded on Article IX. MATURAN VS. which is the same as Art. Juan Ponce Enrile then Acting Chairman of the National Police Commission informed petitioner of the dismissal of the criminal cases. 1(1) of the 1973 Constitution. Respondent Mayor sent a letter to the Chairman of the National Police Commission requesting advice as to whether the resignation tendered by petitioner was valid. NLRC‘s dismissal reversed. Respondent Mayor Santiago Maglana suspended petitioner from office because of two pending criminal case against him. then the acting Mayor. subdivision. 3. 1989. 12. Concededly. No. Petitioner sought the reconsideration of the approval of his resignation for being null and void on the ground that LOI No. Petitioner reported for duty but Chief of Police Francisco Duterte refused to accept the former in the police force. the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter‘s dismissal. CASE TITLE: JUCO vs. On April 28. 8. the CSC dismissed the complaint. 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442). 505 was passed by the same persons who recognized him as the acting ViceGovernor that the validity of the appointment of the petitioner was made an issue and the recognition withdrawn. 14 of the President of the Philippines 7. 4. The appointments of petitioner were provisional. Sec. Upon motion to dismiss by NHC on the ground of the CSC‘s lack of jurisdiction over the dispute. it being created under the Corporation Law. and petitioner was directed to report for duty to his Chief of Police. 2. jurisdiction over GOCCS was indeed with the CSC. 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution. instrumentalities and agencies of the Government. 1985. it is governed by the Labor Code. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner‘s case is governed by the Labor Code HELD: Yes. the jurisdiction of the CSC had been limited only to GOCCs with an original charter. Labor Arbiter Caday ruled in his favor as there was evidence that the criminal case against petitioner was fabricated and therefore there was no basis – legal or factual – for his dismissal.
The doctrine of administrative remedies does not apply where. To fill the vacancy. After conducting hearings. CLAUDIO. as deputy chief of police. the position of chief of police of Pasay City became vacant. He was charged in an administrative case resulting in his suspension by the Monetary Board and the creation of a three-man committee to investigate him. on the theory that. Sr. warranting the conclusion that the legislative intended to allow the judicial remedy even though the administrative remedy has not been exhausted. vs. "is a person next in rank entitled to promotional preference for the position of Chief of Police . the lifting of his suspension is no longer feasible. Cuaderno. Respondent court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. vice Mariano Tumaliuan.. Southern Leyte. 1969 JOVITO O. March 30. J. VILLA and ABELARDO SUBIDO. a state prosecutor in the Department of Justice. Claudio. Th fact that petitioner subsequently obtained a testimonial eligibility is of no moment. The Monetary Board. the governor or mayor shall fill them by appointment from a list of the five next ranking eligible and qualified persons BASILIO M. GR No. The court a quo agreed with the opinion of the National Police Commission that resignation submitted by the police force in compliance with the provisions of LOI No. Corpus vs. 17. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. reemployment or certification. 14. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should have exhausted all administrative remedies HELD: NO. 15.13. deceased. VILLA. had preferential right to appointment have been considered. The Deputy Executive Commissioner stated that since petitioner resigned from office. Pineda chief of police of the city." Subido defined his stand in his letter to Mayor Claudio of September 17. travelling expenses and damages. 18. G. to appoint the petitioner Basilio M. Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with claim for backsalaries. 1968. Lastly. but the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido held the appointment in abeyance until other persons who. L-17860. in Subido's opinion.. he had neither qualified in an appropriate examination for the position of policeman nor was he possessed with any civil service eligibility for any position in the government. the petitioner is legally entitled to be promoted to the said position. by the terms or implications of the statute authorizing an administrative remedy. he can be removed at any time by the appointing power. FRANCISCO A. This is a petition for mandamus to compel the respondent Jovito O. as Deputy Chief of Police of Pasay City.000 per annum effective September 1. respondent Mariano Marcos was appointed to replace petitioner. At the time he received his appointment. But even then. Such lack of civil service eligibility makes his appointment temporary and without a definite term and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power. adopted a resolution stating that petitioner is deemed resigned as of the date of his suspension. After several hearings. . as Commissioner of Civil Service. not merely reinstatement. 5185 (Decentralization Act of 1967) in its paragraphs 4 and 5 provides: In cases of vacancies in the offices of heads and assistant heads of local offices. the same having been rendered moot and academic. Subsequently. such remedy is permissive only. the committee recommended petitioner‘s reinstatement. 12-A which provides:‖ Members of the police force who have been preventively suspended shall. mayor of Pasay City. the trial court ruled that since all petitioner‘s appointment were provisional. 1962 De Leon. No. 1968. the text of which reads: Sir: This refers to the proposed appointment of Mr. L-29661 May 13. mandamus and quo warranto. FRANCISCO A. petitioner had no eligibility. 7 of Presidential Decree No. he cannot compel the Mayor to re-appoint him for the power to appoint is in essence discretionary and the appointment power enjoys sufficient discretion to select and appoint employees on the basis of their fitness to perform the duties and assume the responsibilities of the position filled. PINEDA. petitioner. as the incumbent deputy chief of police and therefore the officer next in rank. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 14 are valid. He alleged that the refusal of respondent‘s Mayor and Chief of Police to reinstate him is a violation of Par. the court dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies. As such what is required is a new appointment. however. as Mayor of Pasay City. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari. respondents. FACTS: Petitioner was holding the position of Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank.‖ 16. Claudio appointed the respondent Francisco Villa. reinstatement. before others may be considered (for) transfer. 1968. a Bar (RA 1080) and second grade eligible. as Chief of Police in the Police Department of Pasay City at P12. upon examination be entitled to immediate reinstatement and payment of the entire salary they failed to receive during the period of suspension. Upon the death of Col. One of these persons is Pineda who.R. ISSUE:Should petitioner be reinstated? HELD:Petitioner did not dispute that at the time he was appointed member of the Police Force of San Francisco. Mariano Tumaliuan on August 28.
shall be filled by promotion of the ranking officer or employee. That should there be any special reason or reasons why such officer or employee should not be promoted.) 3. The said announcement was also the subject of a news item published in the same issue of the Manila Times. in that order.ñet Paragraph 3.. by reemployment of persons separated through reduction in force. in the order of priority. third is by reinstatement and reemployment of former employees. The same procedure should also be followed if Messrs. efficiency rating. who does not possess the appropriate eligibility and who is holding on to the position of Deputy Chief of Police by virtue of a preliminary writ of injunction issued by the CFI of Rizal. seniority. has previously directed that Office to consider Mr. are hereby certified for the said position: A. that the position may be filled either by transfer. extraordinary qualifications. Under the law and Supreme Court ruling above cited. this mode of recruitment or selection cannot be observed. L-23281. D. then the same shall be filled by transfer of present employees in the government service. C. the following persons. and other supplementary criteria as may be prescribed by the Civil Service Commission. second is by transfer of employees in other agencies. and presently Deputy Chief of Police of the Pasay City Police Department. Basilio Pineda — formerly chief of police of the Pasay City Police Department. Pineda for designation as the Acting Chief of Police in place of Mr. the officer or employee next in rank who is competent and qualified to hold the position and who possesses an appropriate civil service eligibility shall be promoted thereto: Provided. Mondares — a Xerox copy of his curriculum vitae is attached. His information sheet is on file in that Office. the Honorable Supreme Court ruled: 'In other words. 1967. city or municipality where the vacancy occurs. The above-quoted provisions and Supreme Court ruling spell out categorically the priorities in the modes of filling a vacancy in the competitive service. or by certification from appropriate register of eligibles in accordance with rules promulgated in pursuance of this Act. a chief of police eligible. reinstatement. Information is requested as to the reason why the directive of this Office contained in the said communication has not been complied with. whose decision in such cases shall be final. is a person next in rank entitled to promotional preference for the position of Chief of Police. Act 2260. 1968.) 2. Transfer 1. That these five persons shall have stated beforehand that they will assume the position. Siquijor. Abelardo Tesoro — (Chief of Police eligible. Mondares and Valencia may not be considered for the said position before Messrs. and last by certification from the appropriate eligible lists. Siquijor — (Chief of Police eligible. reemployment. As a matter of fact this Office in a letter dated August 5. Interpreting this latter provision in the case of Millares vs. Mr. Section 23 of Rep. Jaime Valencia — formerly chief of police of Pasay City Police Department whose appointment was bypassed. a copy attached as Annex As of this writing. 2. Tesoro .R. If Mr. Subido. Dizon. Albino S. Conformably with these provisions and ruling. That should there be two or more persons under equal circumstances. if appointed. G. Promotion (next-in-rank) 1. the mode of filling vacancies for Chief of Police for Manila and Pasay City and the qualifications of those who may apply. B. Francisco Villa — the proposed appointee.1awphil. Certification 1. or by getting from the certified list of appropriate eligibles. or reemployment. And provided. Francisco Grape. Basilio Pineda. who is competent and qualified to hold the same. If the vacancy is not filled by promotion as provided herein. for special reason or reasons of which the affected officer or employee will be notified. Pineda should be considered for promotion before others may be considered by transfer. Reinstatement/Reemployment 1. Major Jesus Dizon — a Xerox copy of his curriculum vitae is attached. And only where.' (Emphasis by the Court). 1968. such special reason or reasons shall be stated in writing by the appointing official and the officer or employee concerned shall be informed thereof and be given an opportunity to be heard by the Commissioner of Civil Service. a Chief of Police eligible and formerly the Chief of Police of Pasay City. and reiterated in a 1st endorsement dated August 28. (paragraph 4) The ranking shall be based on such factors as class of province.as certified by the Civil Service Commission: Provided. seniority shall be given preference. to wit: first priority is by promotion of next in rank employees from within the agency. who is presently the Deputy Chief of Police of Pasay City.ñet A Xerox copy of the clippings of the Manila Times is hereto attached as Annex 'A'. also provides: Whenever a vacancy occurs in any competitive or classified position in the government or in any government-owned or controlled corporation or entity. 1968. Roland C. or certification. It is significant to note in this connection that Mr. Pineda may not be considered. the special reason or reasons therefor must be stated in writing and submitted to this Office. by reinstatement. August 10. No. however.lawphil. et al. a vacant position (be it new or created by the cessation of an incumbent in office). this Office announced in the Manila Times of September 5.
to whom the matter had earlier been referred. upon close examination of Rule VI. 23 of Republic Act 2260 in relation to Sec. 6. Premises considered. Of course. 1967). it is specifically provided (in section 17) that in case of permanent vacancy caused by death. could not be appointed Chief of Police. Act 5185) would strengthen the police service. it is readily seen that the promotional rules therein set forth find application only to the filling of positions in the police service below that of chief of police he being the one charged with the duty and responsibility of screening and recommending for promotion the deserving members of the police agency (sections 2. unencumbered by the civil service rule on the preferential right of the next-inrank and others seeking transfer. the processing of the proposed appointment of Mr. except of course.. in every case the next-in-rank or deputy chief. extra-ordinary qualifications. 1968 the Secretary of Justice. Subido contended in his own memorandum to the President of October 14. On September 30. Pertinent excerpts from the said memorandum are hereunder quoted: 3. In reply. shall be appointed by the City Mayor "subject to the civil case law. Congress is presumed to be aware of certain rules or limitations in the general civil service law which operate to restrict or curtail the discretion of the appointing power.. In the meantime. 3. In his letter to Subido on September 20." Nor did he think the mayor's reasons for bypassing Pineda to be valid. Roland C. efficiency rating. there appears to be no other statutory limitation on the City Mayor's discretion in the selection of the chief of police so long as the one chosen possesses the minimum qualifications prescribed by the Act. "provisional appointment may be made in accordance with the Civil Service Law and Rules.." Obviously. . among others. reinstatement or reemployment in order to give the City Mayor a wide latitude in the choice of key officials. this special rule which makes it indubitable that the general rules governing appointment in the civil service. hence. "In fact. which states that in case there is no civil service eligible available for the position of chief of police. there is even another provision which serves to underscore this special rule. would result in its demoralization. I am unable to see any substantial change resulting from the insertion in section 4 thereof. is governed by the Police Act of 1966. Jaime Valencia.. it was contended. Under the Police Act. of the provision that the heads of offices and their respective assistants. Basilio Pineda. in a local police agency. "the mayor shall fill such vacancy as provided in this Act" and not in accordance with the Civil Service Act and rules and regulations.. seniority. rules and regulations. are inapplicable to appointments in a police service. The Police Manual has included the civil service rule on promotion which gives the next-in-rank. 4. whose salaries are paid out of city funds. .. 4. The import of this special provision is that the filling of the positions of the office heads and assistant heads is to be governed by this special rule.. etc. considering that just a few months before the mayor had appointed ." 5. he explained: . but he cannot claim any preferential right over others in the list of eligibles based on the aforementioned rule found in the Civil Service Act. Vice versa. This was the legal situation at the time of the enactment of the Decentralization Law (RA 5185. etc. 5 and 6). Claudio for the first time disclosed his reasons for not appointing Pineda to the vacant position. quoted supra. if qualified and competent. submitted a memorandum to the President substantially to the effect that section 23 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 does not apply in the case of the chief of a police agency whose appointment. and for special reason or reasons.and Villa may be considered for appointment thereto. preference in the filling of the vacant position. supra. are not covered by any special law or provision and should therefore be appointed in accordance with the general civil service law and rules . As a native of Pasay and having been an official hereof for the past eight (8) years I am fully cognizant of the performance in office of Messrs. Francisco Villa is held in abeyance until after the persons with appointment preference have been duly considered by that Office. it was incorporated verbatim in the Police Manual. would surely be among the first to be considered by the City Mayor in the selection of the chief of police. But what is important is that the filling of positions in the police service including that of Chief of Police in accordance with the procedure outlined in paragraph 3 of Sec. Answering the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice. the appointment shall be permanent in nature and "as provided for in this (Police) Act. Siquijor and Abelardo Tesoro and they cannot boast of any improvement they have introduced to lift the sagging inefficiency of the local police organization. 4 of the Decentralization Act (Rep. this clause refers to office heads whose appointments. I refer to the last paragraph of Section 10. . by reason of his position." It is implicit in this provision that in other cases. 1968 should be complied with by that Office. What is more important and far reaching in Section 4 is the provision which categorically states that the offices of the aforementioned heads and assistant heads 'shall be filled by appointment from a list of five next ranking eligible and qualified persons as certified by the Civil Service Commissioner.. As regards the chief of police. approved on September 12. where it so expressly provided therein or incorporated in the implementing rules and regulations. unlike that of the chief of police." which shall be based on such factors as class of the city where the vacancy occurs. 1968 that section 23 of the Civil Service Act does not conflict with the provisions of the Police Act of 1966. the directive of the Office contained in the letter dated August 5. especially those covered by section 17.. [A]side from the provision (of section 11) specifically forbidding the filling of any position by permanent appointment unless the appointee has the appropriate eligibility. leaving the matter of promotion solely to the discretion of the Mayor without regard to the order of priorities contained in the Civil Service Law. The actual members of untrained and undisciplined men still persist. However.
Claudio concludes that his appointment as chief of police is in order. particularly. rules and regulations. without need of further discussion. "subject to civil service law. subject to civil service law. providing for such procedure of priorities. Section 17 of the Police Act of 1966 expressly provides that "In case of vacancy caused by death. Pineda can qualify as Deputy Chief of Police in the Mayor's estimation (and thus under Sec. to determine the scope and meaning of the provisions of Section 23 which deal with the "Recruitment and Selection of Employees. Subido admitted in his reply that Memorandum Circular No. Pineda filed the present action. Division Superintendents of Schools." Subido merely issued a certification." "overlooked the Millares case and relied solely on the provision of Sec. and evidently did not consider as applicable the provisions on preferences of Section 23 of the Civil Service Act nor the ruling in Millares v. The City Assessor. he shall automatically assume the office of Chief of Police in case a temporary vacancy occurs in said office). the incumbent Deputy Chief of Police." but averred that later. R. specifically. that Subido should be held in estoppel on the basis of his approval of the very appointment of Pineda as deputy chief of police of Pasay City.A. because he is one of those mentioned in the certified list of eligibles." throw us right back to the basic Civil Service Act. the governor or mayor shall fill them by appointing from a list of the five next ranking eligible and qualified persons as certified by the Civil Service Commissioner: Provided. On the other hand. dated January 12. as interpreted in Millares. dated September 5. City Treasurers. shall. subject to civil service law. be appointed by the City Mayor: Provided. containing the names of "five ranking qualified and eligible persons" including Pineda. under section 23 of the Civil Service Act. after having become convinced that the Millares ruling was applicable to the filling of vacancies of heads and assistant heads of local offices under the Decentralization Law. It behooves us. and that only if for some "special reasons" he cannot be promoted may others be considered for transfer. City Chief of Police and City Chief of Fire Department and other heads of offices entirely paid out of city funds and their respective assistants or deputies shall. Fiscals. Subido 1 now invoked by him. Pineda is not qualified to be chief of Police?" Respondents Claudio and Villa point out. That this section shall not apply to Judges. — The Provincial Assessor. City Health Officers and City Engineers. Rep. As no solution to the impasse was in sight." The validity of Villa's appointment. as required by the Police Act of 1966. rules and regulations. 1968. 1968. who . rules and regulations. contending that. extraordinary qualifications and other supplementary criteria as may be prescribed by the Civil Service Commission. 17 of the Police Act. The ranking shall be based on such factors as class of province. a competitive position. That this section shall not apply to Judges. 4. which was the procedure in force as of the date the appointment of Villa was received in his office. Auditors. S. in relation to Section 4 of the Decentralization Act. Principals. the mayor shall fill such vacancy as provided for in this Act. where no list of those with "preferential rights" and no inquiry as to the mayor's reasons for not appointing the police officer next-in-rank in the Pasay City police department was made. on the other hand. "in that order". be appointed by the City Mayor" and that the mayor "shall fill them by appointment from a list of the five next ranking eligible and qualified persons as certified by the Civil Service Commissioner. could be here and now sustained. it is the duty of the mayor to promote him as the ranking employee. under which he issued "priorities. As Villa is one of these certified. That these five persons shall have stated beforehand that they will assume the position if appointed. Supervisors. City Agriculturist. Provincial Treasurers. however. resignation. (R. 5185. however. 21. including the chiefs of police. petitioner Pineda. retirement. 1968. be appointed by the Provincial Governor: Provided. how can Mayor Claudio now claim in all sincerity that Mr. 1968. Auditors. City Superintendents of Schools. which states that a chief of police may be appointed "from the list of eligibles certified by the Civil Service Commissioner"." obviously referring to Section 8 thereof will states that "appointment to a local police agency shall be made by a mayor from the list of eligibles certified by the Civil Service Commission.Pineda deputy chief of police. Act 5185. 5185) The pertinent provisions thereof to the effect that the heads of offices entirely paid out of city funds. he issued Memorandum Circular No." The contending parties have thus thrust upon this Court the basic issue of the proper application and scope of Section 23 of the Civil Service Act in relation to the provisions of the Decentralization Act of 1967 and the Police Act of 1966. Provincial Health Officers and District Engineers. Fiscals. seniority.A. Supervisors. Section 4 thereof. which provides: Appointment of Heads. Claudio's position is that what controls is not section 23 of the Civil Service Act but section 8 of the Police Act of 1966. 1. Principals. The petitioner states the issues as follows: (1) Is it mandatory and ministerial upon the Mayor of Pasay City to promote to the vacant position of Chief of Police. were it not for the subsequent enactment in 1967 of the Decentralization Act. Assistant Heads of Local Offices and Their Subordinates. efficiency rating. and their assistants or deputies. Provincial Agriculturist and other heads of offices entirely paid out of provincial funds and their respective assistants shall. and that advising the mayor that "the filling of the vacancy for Deputy Chief of Police is governed by Section 4. city or municipality where the vacancy occurs. S. xxx xxx xxx In case of vacancies in the offices of heads and assistant heads of local offices. reemployment or certification. suspension or removal in a local police agency. "If Mr.
But that statement was not necessary. or by getting from the certified list of appropriate eligibles. otherwise the vacancy may be filled by transfer. repugnant to the Constitution.. it is the local executive. as well as of the Police Act and the Decentralization Law. 23. in that order. What it does purport to say is that as far as practicable the person next in rank should be promoted. knowledgeability. 3 this Court. we hold that it is neither mandatory nor ministerial for the mayor of Pasay City to promote to the vacant position of chief of police the incumbent deputy chief of police Pineda." emphasizing the urgency of the resolution of the legal issues presented. — Opportunity for government employment shall be open to all qualified citizens and positive efforts shall be exerted to attract the best qualified to enter the service." The first two paragraphs of Section 23 of the Civil Service Act (the third paragraph we have already reproduced above. administration. although an "outsider" and not the next-in-rank. read together with Section 1 of Article XII of the Philippine Constitution which directs that "[A]ppointments in the Civil Service . "submits the matter to the judicious consideration of this Honorable Court. reinstatement. To construe section 23 the way the petitioner urges it should be. is it mandatory that respondent Mayor appoint Petitioner to the position? The respondent Subido. and operation of local police agencies" 2 and that of the Civil Service Act "to attract the best qualified to enter the service. or by Section 4 of the Decentralization Act and the third paragraph of Section 23 of the Civil Service Law? (2) If the appointment of the Chief of Police of Pasay City is subject to the provisions of section 4 of the Decentralization Act. this mode of recruitment or selection cannot be observed. who is competent and qualified to hold the same. Recruitment and Selection of Employees. made the following statement: In other words. Section 23 thereof does not require that vacancies must be filled by promotion. provided the appointee is certified to be qualified and eligible — which is the basic requirement of the Civil Service Act. albeit by passive prescription. and is directly answerable to the people who elected him. that the position may be filled either by transfer." For it is not enough that an aspirant is qualified and eligible or that he is next in rank or line for promotion. to the position of deputy chief of police was valid. a vacant position (be it new or created by the cessation of an incumbent in office) shall be filed by promotion of the ranking officer or employee. would be to unduly interfere with the power and prerogatives of the local executive as reinforced by the Decentralization Act at the same time that it would frustrate the policy of the Police Act "to achieve and attain a higher degree of efficiency in the organization. to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations.is the competent and qualified next-in-rank employee with the appropriate civil service eligibility? (2) Is respondent Mayor's appointment of respondent Villa to the said classified position of Chief of Police null and void. for special reason or reasons of which the affected officer or employee will be notified. that the local executive be local the choice of men of his confidence. in that order. The Civil Service Act does not peremptorily require the mayor to promote the officer next in rank. Villa would be the first appointment under the Decentralization Act and any decision thereon would guide the future action of the Civil Service Commission and other offices concerned in the application of said law. 23. "considering that the questioned appointment of respondent Francisco A. in the language of the decision . who in his best estimation are possessed of the requisite reputation. transfer. in the same manner that the appointment of Pineda. (Emphasis supplied) The granting of equal opportunity for government employment to all qualified citizens and the exertion of positive efforts to attract the best qualified to enter the service may be implemented effectively only through the judicious exercise of the best judgment and discretion of the appointing authority. Resolving the issue squarely presented. These first two paragraphs set the guide norm that: SEC.. That would be to construe the provision not merely as a legislative prescription of qualifications but as a legislative appointment. is valid. integrity. or reemployment. True it is that in Millares. thus: (1) Is the appointment of the Chief of Police of Pasay City to be regulated by Section 8 of the Police Act of 1966. shall be made only according to merit and fitness. although an "outsider" and not the nextin-rank employee. in order for public administration to be dynamic and responsive to the needs of the times. energy and judgment. in his Answer. Nowhere is this more true than in the sensitive area of police administration. and that the appointment to said position of the respondent Villa. And only where. Employees shall be selected on the basis of their fitness to perform the duties and assume the responsibilities of the positions whether in the competitive or classified or in the non-competitive or unclassified service." provide the key for the proper application and interpretation of the "next-in-rank" rule enunciated in the third paragraph of said Sec. he is not next-in-rank employee and he has not passed the Civil Service examination for Chief of Police? The respondents Claudio and Villa formulate the issues. more than anyone else. as the appointing power sees fit. supra). reinstatement. who has been certified as qualified and eligible. considering that he is an outsider. considering that. referring to section 23 of the Civil Service Act. who is primarily responsible for efficient governmental administration in the locality and the effective maintenance of peace and order therein. reemployment or certification. It is just as necessary. reemployment or certification. After all. provided they are qualified and eligible.
But where the vacancy is filled not by promotion but by transfer. reinstatement or reemployment. projects the pitfalls of such a theory which would in some cases permit unauthorized interference by the Commissioner of Civil Service with the appointing authority's free exercise of his judgment and prerogative of free choice. 4 and we now rule that the principle of seniority and the next-in-rank rule embodied in section 23. or reemployed in." There was therefore no occasion for the application of section 23 to that case. "whereas the first denotes a scalar ascent of a senior officer or employee to another position. with its corollary requirement to set forth the "special reason or reasons" in case the officer next in rank is not appointed to the vacant position. This is not to say that seniority and rank are of no consequence. the question is squarely presented. For due process recognizes the free exercise by the executive of his prerogatives under the Constitution and the laws but rules out arbitrariness and oppression. There is no legal fiat that those next in rank for promotion are more fit and meritorious for appointment than those moved by transfer from another unit or department. Our Constitution recognized this and hence provided that appointments be made according to merit and fitness. the meaning emerges that in each class . Among those qualified and eligible. reemployment or certification (not necessarily in that order. to be determined only as far as practicable by competitive examination. and so it is reasonable to require the appointing power to give his "special reason or reasons" for preferring his appointee to the officer next-in-rank. level or salary.. Bocar. as we have already said) he is under no duty whatsoever to explain his action. applies only to cases of promotion. the position which he formerly held. To the appointee. nor subject the appointing authority's reasons for his choice to final review and decision by the Civil Service Commissioner. "no evidence was presented that there were ranking employees in the office of the City Mayor affected by the appointment of appellee to the position involved herein. to paraphrase the Court's ruling in Morrero v. the appointing authority must give the "special reason or reasons" for by passing the nextin-rank. or by appropriate certification. and requires that when the vacancy is filled by promotion. our system of qualification through periodic appropriate examinations. for the law does not so require him. it may be said that he has never been rated before and so he can be said neither to be below nor above the ranking employee in the hierarchy. 6 such as where the qualifications. proper remedy through judicial review would be available. Subido's action of questioning respondent Claudio's sincerity in not appointing petitioner to the vacant position of chief of police when he had appointed him (Pineda) as deputy chief of police just a few months before. The Civil Service Act does direct. As this Court correctly observed in Millares. would be to invalidly substitute the judgment of the Commissioner of Civil Service for that of the appointing authority. The only way to determine such fitness would be to hold a competitive examination among all applicants every time a vacancy occurs. merit. where there is unequivocally demonstrated an arbitrary and improvident exercise of the power of the appointing authority. those who have previously resigned to avoid investigation of involvement in irregularities in office should certainly not be allowed to invoke "preference" when they subsequently seek reinstatement or reemployment. When a person who is a junior jumps over his senior. reinstatement or reemployment. as will constitute a denial of due process of law.. just as those applying for transfer cannot claim preference over those seeking reinstatement. As for the person chosen by certification. higher either in rank or salary. it cannot be doubted that some next-in-rank officers or employees have risen to their seniority slots through mere passivity. 7 We do not of course lose sight of the fact that Section 4 of the Decentralization Act of 1967 does provide that In cases of vacancies in the offices of heads and assistant heads of local offices. But such official cannot claim any preferential right to appointment to the vacancy over others equally certified to be qualified and eligible for appointment by transfer. Of course. which would be completely disruptive of the public service. Hence." 5 The same reasoning applies when the person chosen to fill the vacancy is merely being reinstated to. and that those applying for transfer should have "preference" to those seeking reinstatement. reinstatement. the person next-in-rank is not really bypassed because the person appointed is one who holds a position of equivalent rank as the vacant position. It may be added that there is no valid or cogent reason to consider it mandatory and ministerial that the filling of vacancies be by promotion. Here. the appointing authority is granted the discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he deems most fit for appointment. and certification. And as a matter of policy. etc. Reading this provision in the light of the Civil Service Act. More. transfer. experience and competence of an official next in rank for promotion are widely disparate over those of the actual appointee. For it is obvious that in this case such person is the senior of the one who at the moment is next in rank. in the present case. in distinguishing promotion from transfer. the ranking is disturbed and the person next in rank is actually bypassed. in that order. where the appointing power chooses to fill the vacancy not by promotion but by transfer. . as we construe it. Hence.. in whom the prerogative of free choice resides. if qualified and eligible. From the perspective of practical experience. the new position is hardly a higher one.itself. The reason for this distinction is simple. To so hold as the petitioner and the respondent Commissioner contend. the governor or mayor shall fill them by appointment from a list of the five next ranking eligible and qualified persons as certified by the Civil Service Commission. and the latter in turn to those who are duly certified eligibles. the second refers to a lateral movement from one position to another of equivalent rank. that as far as practicable the next in rank should be among the first considered for the vacancy.
loss of the thing due. 168 SCRA 125 (1988) -. must certify five qualified and eligible persons for each area. of the Civil Service Act. Consequently." 8 although he erroneously assigned priority thereto in that order. therefore.In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC. She was however granted pardon by Marcos. reemployment or certification — not necessarily in that order — and that it is only in cases of promotion." Therefore by clear implication. five ranking. cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. It is not retrospective. Salvacion Monsanto vs Deputy Exec Sec Fulgencio Factoran Pardon Does not Extinguish Civil Liabilities & It is Prospective FACTS: Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for her to be reinstated to her former position since it was still vacant.ISSUE: W/N employees of NASECO. Monsanto avers that by reason of the pardon. NASECO as a government corporation byvirtue of its being a subsidiary of the NIDC. HELD: A pardon looks to the future. (b) transfer list. The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retro¬active effect. She was charged for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents.the Commissioner must certify. the Commissioner whenever practicable and possible. the officer next in rank must. 1985. five such persons for promotion. among them NASECO. vs. Thus. where he announced that his office would certify not more than five eligibles and qualified persons in each list as follows: "(a) promotion list. third paragraph. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS). and so on.The civil service does not include Government owned or controlledcorporations (GOCC) which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.THE COURT OF APPEALS.F: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. BAYLON. of 1968. reinstatement. ―Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings. which is wholly owned by the Phil. amnesty or commutation of sentence. She claims she was illegally dismissed. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC. NLRC ruled orderingher reinstatement. as far as practicable and as the appointing authority sees fit in his best judgment and estimation. It makes no amends for the past. Also. and agencies of the Government. Petitioner‘s civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code. instrumentalities. . PLACIDO AGUSTIN. she should no longer be compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought about by her acts.‖ This would explain why petitioner. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. i. On the other hand. the 1987 Consti starkly differs from the 1973 consti where NHC v Juco wasbased. v. the terms andconditions of employment of its em¬ployees are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing v Juco. and no satisfaction for it can be required. civil liability arising from crime is governed by the RPC.e. the petition for mandamus is denied. the performance of which may be compelled by mandamus. where an employee other than the ranking one is appointed. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon. merger of the rights of creditor and debtor. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence. a GOCC without original charter. REUBEN ZAMORA. be promoted. As there is no question that the respondent Villa has been certified to be qualified and eligible. 1968. She was found guilty and was sentenced to jail. as provided in Section 23.HELD: NO. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1973 Constibut prior to the ruling in NHC v Juco. She was also requesting for back pays. is the appointing power under duty to give "special reason or reasons" for his action to the Civil Service Commissioner. that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered. dated September 5. compensation and novation. (c) reinstatement/reemployment list. SERGIO ARANETA. namely: payment. whereas we have above ruled that there is no such order of priority amongst the four said areas. VIRGILIO DE ALDAY. ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post. this court recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms andconditions of employment in GOCC's. It provides that the "civil service embraces all branches. otherwise the vacancy may be filled either by transfer. are governed by the Civil Service Law. hold that in the event of there occurring a vacancy. whenever there are available. and (d) list of appropriate eligibles. that is to cases that arose before its promulga¬tion of Jan 17. RAMON MODESTO. ACCORDINGLY.com. subdivisions. S. We. the respondent Claudio owes the petitioner no duty to extend to him a promotional appointment. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. NLRC. petitioner. DIONISION T. remission of the debt. And this has been properly implemented by the respondent Commissioner in his last Memorandum Circular No.. it is well within the ambit of the power of the respondent Claudio to appoint him chief of police of Pasay City. National Service Corp. JUANITO MADURA. though pardoned. without pronouncement as to costs. qualified and eligible persons. For more case digests and lawschool notes visit lizajamarga. the civil service doesnot include GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law. The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President and Factoran denied Monsanto‘s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA). VIRGILIO MAGPAYO. 21. five such persons for transfer.including government owned or controlled corporation with origi¬nal charter.
P.O. This being the case. that is those created by an act of Congress of by special law. that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor . 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter. 1161. BRANCH 98. Issue: Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike. the NHC being a govt owned and/ or controlled corp. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands. RTC. Petitioner TUPAS is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC. HELD: The civil service now covers only govt owned or controlled corporations w/ original or legislative charters.A. no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code. XIII. which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues. Nos. Garcia v. that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages.00. For more case digests and law school notes visit lizajamarga. QUEZON CITY. the trial court rendered its decision acquitting Garcia of the offense charged. that the strikers refused to return to work. Garcia was summarily dismissed from the service on the ground of dishonesty in accordance with the decision of the then Ministry of Public Works. and that the strike be declared illegal. granted executive clemency to Garcia. In an indorsement dated 7 April 1980. and agencies of the Government. 173 SCRA 33 F: Respondent NHC is a corporation organized in 1959 under the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations. and payment of the children's allowance of P30. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches. Deputy Presidential Executive Assistant Joaquin T. Chairman. Sec. NLRC. Held: The 1987 Constitution. TUPAS filed a petition for certification elec¬tion with DOLE. Venus. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work. night differential pay and holiday pay. and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. telecom lines. 1800. including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. No. conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries. November 24. including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. No. by authority of the President.1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. xxx There is. et al. w/o an original charter. Transportation and Communications in Administrative Case 975 for the loss of several telegraph poles which were located at the SariayaLucena City and Mauban-Sampaloc. O. NHA. subdivisions. its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v.R. 1 of E. CEZAR C. the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building. On 23 January 1980. 1987. 1989 Facts: On June 11. On 26 August 1981. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions.R. in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights. without including the right to strike. which ordered the strikers to return to work. and peaceful concerted activities. Quezon. No. instrumentalities.HON. payment of accrued overtime pay. G. G. On 1 April 1975. Garcia's request to be reinstated was denied by the Bureau of Telecommunications. therefore. Garcia thereafter filed with the Commission on Audit (COA) a claim for payment of back salaries effective 1 April 1975. a criminal case for qualified theft was filed against Garcia with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Quezon. Consequently. Garcia pleaded to the President of the Philippines for executive clemency. respondents. and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. acting on the favorable indorsements of the then Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service Commission. 1987.Management Council. the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS. Its shares of stock have been 100% owned by the Government from its incorpora¬tion. . and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. having been created under R. Based on the same facts obtaining in the administrative action. 31]. collective bargaining and negotiations.. Garcia sought reinstatement to his former position in view of his acquittal in the criminal case. Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) VS. 85279 July 28. Jr. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize. IX(B). 69870 & 70295.2(l) see also Sec.com. the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners. allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS. Hence. per Resolution No. Garcia did not appeal from the decision. Sec. the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only. PERALEJO. provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization. alleging that on June 9. the date of his dismissal from . Commission on Audit. It was denied. Facts: Vicente Garcia was a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City.
This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating Garcia from the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement." holding that the Supreme Court is the proper forum to take cognizance of the appeal on certiorari from the decision of the COA. as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged. i. bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service Commission. Aggrieved. to be exercised by some department or functionary of a government.e. it is worthy to note that the dismissal of Garcia was not the result of any criminal conviction that carried with it forfeiture of the right to hold public office. Moreover. 7. Sec." From among the different acts of executive clemency spelled out above. the trial court commended Garcia for his concern and dedication as a public servant. it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty. Hence. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and not forgetfulness . has the power of control. This is meant to afford relief to Garcia who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. Further. XII-(D). in proper cases. This signifies that Garcia need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment. However. after conviction by final judgment. citing Art. and remit fines and forfeitures. The bestowal of executive clemency on Garcia in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service. Garcia's innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive clemency to him. Held: Yes. the President may grant reprieves. The President's control has been defined to mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to the judgment of the former for the latter. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge. Every civilized country recognizes. Time and again the Supreme Court has unfolded the effects of a pardon upon the individual to whom it is granted. But. In Monsanto v. Factoran. he was later acquitted by the trial court of the charge of qualified theft based on the very same acts for which he was dismissed. thereby restoring to him his clean name. as its head. it does not operate for all purposes. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. Our Constitution reposes in the President the power and the exclusive prerogative to extend executive clemency under the following circumstances. the Court has firmly established the general rule that while a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense. The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt. and pardons. the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act. IX-[A]. Garcia's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. of the 1987 Constitution). Garcia filed the petition for review on certiorari. commutations. the clemency granted to Garcia in the instant case partakes of the nature of an executive pardon.. Garcia appealed the COA decision of 23 July 1985 to the Office of the President. The clemency nullified the dismissal of Garcia and relieved him from . stated otherwise. Issue: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency. and has therefore provided for. denied the appeal "due to legal and constitutional constraint. the date of his dismissal. Garcia was found administratively liable for dishonesty and consequently dismissed from the service. integrity and fair dealing. In Decision 362 embodied in its 3rd Indorsement dated 23 July 1985. Sec. Herein. by authority of the President. the right to back wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. to give justice to Garcia. COA denied the claim stating that the executive clemency was silent on the payment of back wages and that he had not rendered service during the period of his claim. a country would be most imperfect and deficient in its political morality and in that attribute of Deity whose judgments are always tempered with money. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment. to 12 March 1984.the service. he is not entitled to back wages. The acquittal of Garcia by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that Garcia did not commit the offense imputed to him. Unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence. he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency. "Except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided in this Constitution. 2. which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. To rule otherwise would defeat the very intention of the executive clemency. When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense. Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores to him all his civil rights. Without such a power of clemency. par. Verily. it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent. It appears that Garcia was recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do not show whether Garcia's reinstatement was to the same position of Supervising Lineman.. On 21 April 1986. but is the direct consequence of an administrative decision of a branch of the Executive Department over which the President. the pardoning power to be exercised as an act of grace and humanity. if the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual. Garcia again filed a claim to recover his back salaries for the period from 1 April 1975. Factoran. Jr. of the 1973 Constitution (now Art. There is no doubt that Garcia's case falls within the situations aforementioned to entitle him to back wages. when he was reinstated. 2." In pardoning Garcia and ordering his reinstatement. the Chief Executive exercised his power of control and set aside the decision of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. This was denied by the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 12 October 1982 on the ground that the executive clemency granted to him did not provide for the payment of back salaries and that he has not been reinstated in the service.
Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. the evidence and conceded facts in finding that in the trespass on plaintiff's land defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. or any private individual. as a matter of practical administrative procedure. is in charge of irrigation projects and systems. Isaias Fernando. and against her express objection unlawfully took possession of portions of the three parcels of land and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels of land on to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff. which pursuant to the Constitution. American Tobacco Company et al vs Director of Patents Due Process ATC et al filed before the Philippine Patent Office concerning the use of trade mark and trade name. As . who directly or indirectly obstructs. and without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff. ISSUE: Whether or not the hearing done by hearing officers are within due process. this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. ministerial. If he exceed the power conferred on him by law. ISSUE: Whether or not this is a suit against the state? RULING:No. he is thus entitled to back wages. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition and usefulness. therefore. which also served as basis for the administrative charge. Any public officer or emplyee. Separate Opinions CONCEPCION. HELD: The SC ruled that the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law. authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear ―inter partes‖ proceedings. in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint. and the official responsible for the construction of irrigation system in the Philippines. without obtaining first a right of way. ATC et al challenged the validity of Rule 168 of the ―Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases‖ as amended. Said Rule likewise provides that ―all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing. hence. and cancellation of registration of a trademark or trade name pending at the Patent Office. ART. to compel the Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of petitioners. the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts.administrative liability. Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases. and may be sued as any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortuous act. administrative quasi-judicial. must be appropriated by law. 32. In the eye of the law. is "in charge" and for which he is "responsible" as Director of the Bureau of Public Works — are established and operated with public funds. According to said pleading the defendant is "Isaias Fernando. the system or canal is. the present petition for mandamus. as Director of the Bureau of Public Works. Garcia should not be considered to have left his office for all legal purposes. trade name or servicemark. defeats. according to the same pleading. but as an officer of the Government. Irrespective of the manner in which the construction may have been undertaken by the Bureau of Public Works. After having been declared innocent of the crime of qualified theft. Director.. including back wages. It is a general rule that an officer-executive. Bureau of Public Works. the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than that appellee Isaias Fernando is a party in this case. or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions." Moreover. and not personally. ISAIAS FERNANDO. his acts then are wholly without authority. not in his personal capacity. in lieu of the hearing officers. he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office. We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation projects and system reffered to in the complaint — of which the defendant. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. without authority obtained first from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. CARMEN FESTEJO vs. so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrued to him by virtue of the office held. interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark. That the defendant as Director of the Bureau of Public Works. The separation of the Garcia from the service being null and void. it is alleged: 4. dissenting: To my mind.‖ These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name. violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: (6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law. Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefore. FACTS: The defendant. a property of the Government. alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the law the Director must personally hear and decide inter partes case. he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law. Said objections were overruled by the Director of Patents. J.
the President of the Philippines issued Memorandum Order No. excluding his years of service as judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City for which he has already been given retirement gratuity and pension. The Assistant Manager for Finance of the MMDA referred the Position Paper to the Regional Office of the CSC-NCR. In this petition for review on certiorari petitioner assails the decision of 19 August 1999 of the Court of Appeals  in CA-G. In short.‖ American Tobacco Co. and he thereafter assumed office. Director IV Nelson Acebedo of the CSC-NCR handed down an opinion that the payment of petitioner‘s separation pay must be in accordance with Civil Service Resolution No. SP No. Section 11 thereof reads: Section 11. No. series of 1996.R.A. 372 approving the Rules and Regulations Implementing R. No. there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. 2000] ANTONIO P.‖ In view of some doubt or confusion as to the extent of his separation benefits. and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record. Congress enacted R. Pursuant thereto. On 2 December 1993. pertinent portions of which read: [T]he payment of separation/[retirement] benefits cannot be subject to the prohibition against the [sic] double compensation in cases when officers [G. said employees may opt to receive the benefits thereunder. is not an additional or double compensation. No. It is.A. 92063. vs.A. petitioner was appointed Judge of the MeTC of Quezon City. as amended.. On 7 October 1996. No.long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. 7924 should be limited to the number of years of his service in the Metropolitan Manila .A. and five years thereafter he has been regularly receiving a monthly pension. however. That. which reorganized the MMA and renamed it as Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA). there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. inter alia. 139792. now known as METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. 910. He was appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation Center of the MMA. On 30 August 1996. . THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. and of being transferred to another office or position. petitioner re-entered the government service. 7924. 7924. On 16 May 1996. which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them. The national government shall provide such amounts as may be necessary to pay the benefits accruing to displaced employees at the rate of one and one-fourth (1¼) month‘s salary for every year of service: Provided. required that to ―give the substance of a hearing. should be credited in the computation of his separation benefits under R. No. and received his retirement gratuity under the law for his entire years in the government service. 7924. all officials and employees of the interim MMA shall continue to exercise their duties and functions and receive their salaries and allowances until they shall have been given notice of change of duties and functions. On 1 April 1992. 910. Transitory Provisions. petitioner optionally retired from the Judiciary under R. After the militarybacked EDSA revolt. and THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.  as amended. Director of Patents Authority (MMA) only. 16. – To prevent disruption in the delivery of basic urban services pending the full implementation of the MMDA‘s organizational structure and staffing pattern. vs.R. including those years in the Judiciary. if qualified for retirement under existing retirement laws. METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY. No. 7924. which. His appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The undisputed facts are as follows: On 18 January 1983. the MMDA issued Resolution No. November 22. No.A. petitioner was reappointed to the same position.A.. On 1 March 1995. the MMDA issued a Memorandum to petitioner informing him that in view of his ―voluntary option to be separated from the service‖ his services would automatically cease effective at the close of office hours on 15 September 1996. respondents. 48301. The civil service laws. all the years of his government service. No. petitioner. SANTOS.A. petitioner submitted a Position Paper wherein he asserted that since the retirement gratuity he received under R. authorized the payment of separation benefits to the officials and employees of the former MMA who would be separated as a result of the implementation of R. rules and regulations pertinent to the displacement of personnel affected by this Act shall be strictly enforced. and that he would be entitled to ―separation benefits equivalent to one and onefourth (1¼) monthly salary for every year of service as provided under Section 11 of the MMDA Law. which held that petitioner‘s separation pay under Section 11 of R.
Now. 7924 – for the same services he rendered as MeTC Judge. is nevertheless applicable owing to its ―commonsense consideration. ‗would run roughshod over the well-settled rule that in the absence of an express legal exception. at the rate of one and one-fourth salary for every year of service pursuant to MMDA Memorandum dated 30 August 1996. 245 SCRA 179. affirming Borromeo. Otadoy. We affirm the assailed judgment.A. Suffice it to state that upon his retirement from his office as a Judge.and employees who were previously granted said benefits are rehired or reemployed in another government Agency or Office. Justice J. it would be proper and logical that said separation/retirement benefits should nevertheless be deducted from the retirement/[separation] pay to be received by the employee concerned. for reasons of equity however.B. On 19 August 1999. Equity dictates that he should no longer be allowed to receive further gratuity for said years of service in the guise of separation pay. there is no need for separated employees to refund the separation/retirement benefits they received when subsequently reemployed in another government agency or office. 98-1422 denying petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration. Accordingly.L. manifestly govern the case at bar. He can only exercise one of two options in the computation of his separation pay under R. in this instance. after he retired from the MeTC and get the full separation pay for his entire years in the government. Civil Service Commission..‖ Said ruling reads: ―The ‗common-sense consideration‘ stated by Mr. Petitioner already received and is continually receiving gratuity for his years of service as a Metropolitan Trial Court Judge. the Court finds it equitable to deny his claim for payment of separation pay at the rate of one and one-fourth (1¼) month‘s salary for every year of his service in government. 910. another chapter of petitioner‘s government service which has come to a close by the reorganization of the MMA into the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. His motion for reconsideration having been denied. the CSC promulgated Resolution No. which ruling. Section 11 of Republic Act No. which should be construed to preclude a government employee from receiving double gratuity for the same years of service. the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision.A. No. petitioner has already closed a chapter of his government service.A. strictly speaking. .A. The Court. or (2) to retain the gratuity pay he received for his services as MeTC Judge but an equivalent amount shall be deducted from the separation benefits due from the former MMA for his entire government service. his years of service in the Judiciary should be excluded and that his separation pay should be solely confined to his services in the MMA. the CSC promulgated Resolution No. No. 7924. as amended. Mathay‖ (37 SCRA 776). vs.‘ It is. if not actually in point. petitioner elevated the opinion of Director Acebedo to the CSC. 780. … This being so. On 9 June 1998. Mathay. that claims for double retirement or pension such as petitioner‘s. Reyes for the Court in Espejo.  it held that petitioner cannot be paid retirement benefits twice – one under R. It held that the CSC was ―correct in dismissing petitioner‘s appeal from the opinion of Director Acebedo. On 21 October 1997. Citing Chaves v. merely is implementing the ruling in ―Chavez. viz. that is. now challenged in this case. 910.‘ (p. or not [to] refund his separation/retirement pay but suffer a deduction of his retirement/separation gratuity for the total amount representing his previous separation/retirement pay received. as aforestated. 7924 which awards separation pay to those government employees who were displaced by the reorganization of the MMA into the MMDA. It is but in accordance with the rule consistently enunciated by the Court as in Anciano v. the employee concerned has the option either to refund his separation/retirement benefits and claim his gross retirement/separation pay without any deduction corresponding to his separation pay received. petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to set aside these Resolutions.A. No. that if a retiree is being credited with his years of service under his first retirement in computing his gratuity under his second retirement. Service Insurance System v. 97-4266 affirming the opinion of Director Acebedo and dismissing petitioner‘s appeal. 7924. however. The State has already shown its gratitude for his services when he was paid retirement benefits under Republic Act No. Sr. Nevertheless. that is 9 years and 2 months with the MeTC plus two (2) years and eight (8) months for his services as Director III in the defunct MMA. No. about ‗double pension. These options are (1) to refund the gratuity he received under R. Thus. Rewards [are] given to an employee who has given up the best years of his life to the service of his country (Gov‘t. underscoring supplied) The case at bench is not. Moreover. in limiting the computation of petitioner‘s separation pay to the number of years of his service at the MMA. pension and gratuity laws should be so construed as to preclude any person from receiving double pension. as amended. For that is what retirement benefits are for. We agree with the Court of Appeals and the Civil Service Commission that for the purpose of computing or determining petitioner‘s separation pay under Section 11 of R. and another under R. 188). while an employee who was paid separation/retirement benefits is not required to refund the same once reemployed in the government service. 901 [sic]. inclusive of the number of years he served as Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila [sic]. about the interpretation of a gratuity law. it is but just that the retirement gratuity received by him under his first retirement should also be charged to his account. the state again wishes to show its gratitude to petitioner by awarding him separation pay for his services as a director of the Metro Manila Authority (MMA).‖ It ratiocinated as follows: There is no specific rule of law which applies to petitioner‘s case.
the last paragraph of Section 11 of R.A.In the first place. That. Kapunan.. 48301 is AFFIRMED. No. 203 SCRA 195 FACTS: Petitioner. petitioner was fully paid of his retirement gratuity under R. or indirect compensation. No. the retirement benefits which petitioner had received or has been receiving under R. his services as MeTC Judge. 807. CSC. after the approval of his optional retirement on 1 April 1992. i. The court ruled that petitioner could not legally and validly appoint his brother Benjamin Laurel to said position because of the prohibition on nepotism under Section 49 of P. No. Mendoza. the petition in this case is DENIED for want of merit. the duly elected Governor of the Province of Batangas. i. as amended. SP No. the power to abolish is subject to the condition that it be exercised in good faith.  However. finding no reversible error in the judgment appealed from.A.A. He could continue receiving the same even if after his retirement he had been receiving salary from the defunct MMA as Director III thereof. Since it allows the grant of separation pay to employees who were to be displaced thereby the separation pay can be based only on the length of service in the MMA. His specious and tenuous distinction between appointment and designation is nothing more than either a ploy ingeniously conceived to circumvent the rigid rule . The rule is settled that Congress may abolish public offices. 910. hence. Petitioner‘s contention that the designation of his brother is not covered by the prohibition cannot be accepted for by legal contemplation. a non-career service position which belongs to the personal and confidential staff of an elective official. unless specifically authorized by law… ... and De Leon. would be to countenance double compensation for exactly the same services. However. The exemption in the said section covering confidential positions cannot be considered since the said position is not primarily confidential for it belongs to the career service. if qualified for retirement under existing retirement laws.A. 7924 on the grant of separation pay at the rate of ―one and one-fourth (1¼) months of salary for every year of service‖ cannot by any stretch of logic or imagination be interpreted to refer to the total length of service of an MMA employee in the government. do not constitute double compensation. Second.A.R. or indirect compensation.. and five years thereafter he has been receiving a monthly pension. it would be in violation of the first paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution. Jr. Upon the vacancy of the position of Provincial Administrator of Batangas. Such a power is a consequent prerogative of its power to create public offices. 910. which pertinently reads: Provided. Section 11 of R. Panganiban. Buena. such as that of petitioner. and the decision of 19 August 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Quisumbing. Third. This is but just because said retirement benefits are rewards for his services as MeTC Judge. said employee may opt to receive the benefits thereunder. No.  More important.e. since by adding his years of service in the MMA to his previous years of service in the Government he could have retired under the third paragraph of Section 11. while his salary was his compensation for his services as Director III of the MMA. Costs against petitioner. because what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.D. Puno. Laurel V vs. SO ORDERED. the separation pay must relate only to the employment thus affected. concur. They are related within the third degree of consanguinity and the case does not fall within any of the exemptions provided therein. which proscribes additional. double. petitioner himself must have realized that Section 11 does not allow the tacking in of his previous government service. Melo. Such would run counter to the policy of this Court against double compensation for exactly the same services. the prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include designation. GonzagaReyes. double. ISSUE: Does nepotism apply to designation? RULING: Yes. The petitioner cannot take refuge under the second paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution. or indirect compensation. No.A. 7924 does not specifically authorize payment of additional compensation for years of government service outside of the MMA.e. to include such service in the government outside the MMA. No. as amended. No. 868. 910. This provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another government position to which another compensation is attached. No. double. If he were convinced that it does he could have instead applied for retirement benefits. as amended. 7924 notwithstanding the fact that he had received or has been receiving the retirement benefits under R. Then. as Senior Executive Assistant in the Office of the Governor.D. which provides: Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional. The displacement amounted to an abolition of the office or position of the displaced employees. petitioner designated his brother as Acting Provincial Administrator. he issued Benjamin Laurel a promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer which is a position which the Civil Service Commission classifies as "primarily confidential" pursuant to P.  Indeed. JJ. Benjamin Laurel. Ynares-Santiago. WHEREFORE. Bellosillo. Vitug. appointed his brother. to credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation pay under R. Said provision reads: No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional. Pardo.  The separation partook of the nature of a disturbance of compensation.
but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal procedures in order . Mr. the unseen but obvious hand of respondent Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or recommending authority in the appointment of his two sons.The Commission denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or bated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case "what we need now is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the ‗outstanding‘ civil servants. The Court was unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive. Dacoycoy was charged with habitual drunkenness. . Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT. it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office. with the provision that such positions shall be under Mr. who recommended the appointment of Rito. ISSUES 1. or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. respectively. his son Ped stated in his position description form that his father was ―his next higher supervisor‖. promulgated its resolution finding no substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. utility workers.To our mind.Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. However. He authorized Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. No.Respondent Pedro O. and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. hence a designation of a person to fill it up because it is vacant. Daclag's authority to recommend the appointment of first level positions such as watchmen. as driver and utility worker. it was respondent Dacoycoy who certified that ―funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy‖ and even rated his performance as ―very satisfactory‖.The Commission then filed an appeal via ceriorari before the Supreme Court. Dacoycoy. it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. It was Mr. .Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction to set aside the Civil Service Commission‘s resolutions. April 29. career service positions may be filled up only by appointment. Rito and Ped Dacoycoy. . c) chief of the bureau or office. and d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. YES. the Commission conducted a formal investigation. DECS Regional Office VIII. drivers. Dioko. Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. Palo. WON respondent is guilty of nepotism 2.Respondent is the Vocational School Administrator. Mr. Daclag‘s immediate supervision. Atty. and. The Court of Appeals then reversed and set aside the decision of the Civil Service Commission. for it precisely accomplishes the same purpose. Section 49 of P. The basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one. Director III. Jaime Daclag. Mr. ruling that respondent did not appoint or recommend his two sons Rito and Ped. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V DACOYCOY PARDO. and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. WON the Commission is the "party adversely affected by the decision" of the Court of Appeals who may file an appeal therefrom HELD1. is necessarily included in the term appointment. To constitute a violation of the law. and thereafter. and casuals and emergency laborers for short durations of three to six months was recommended by respondent Dacoycoy and approved by DECS Regional Director Eladio C. If not within the exceptions. was not guilty of nepotism.on nepotism or a last-ditch maneuver to cushion the impact of its violation. Leyte.Under the definition of nepotism (Section 59 of Executive Order 292). Clearly. Unquestionably. Accordingly. 1999 FACTS . Both positions are career positions. . Victorino B. he is guilty of nepotism. He did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: a) appointing authority. security guards.the last two mentioned situations.D. ." It likewise declared null and void the Civil Service Commission‘s resolution dismissing him from the service. 807 does not suggest that designation should be differentiated from appointment. as it is he who performs the prohibited act. Then Mr. Tirol II. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent‘s two sons and placed them under respondent‘s immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. misconduct and nepotism before the Civil Service Commission. hence. Northern Samar. The Court of Appeals further held that it is "the person who recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned. . the Commission found respondent guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons. On the other hand. Daclag also appointed Ped Dacoycoy as casual utility worker. . b) recommending authority. appointed Rito Dacoycoy driver of the school. Reading the section with Section 25 of said decree. The circumvention of the ban on nepotism is quite obvious. Allen. However. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level employees under his immediate supervision. who was the school administrator. either permanent or temporary.
From such ―adverse decision‖. If this point is not stressed by the Court. appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an administrative case is extended to the party adversely affected by the decision. demotion in rank or salary or transfer. or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days‘ salary." ." Decision Petition granted.D." 2. 805 (should be 807) which contemplates: "Appeals. or even imposing a penalty upon him. Justice Puno would go further by allowing even a private complainant – and by implication. here respondent Dacoycoy. so this Court ruled in the above-cited cases. The issues in Debulgado are whether a promotional appointment is covered by the prohibition against nepotism or the prohibition applies only to original appointments to the civil service. to implead the Civil Service Commission as public respondent as the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service. Precisely. a complainant office.Although I completely agree with the result and likewise with the wisdom in which the issues relating to nepotism are threshed out in the majority opinion. The remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges against him. . Debulgado never even impliedly limited the coverage of the ban on nepotism to only the appointing or recommending authority for appointing a relative. as an aggrieved party.The Court of Appeals‘ reliance on Debulgado vs. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent. transfer. YES. we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges. I do not agree with the majority opinion stating that the Civil Service Commission may appeal a judgment of exoneration in an administrative case involving nepotism.Said provision must be read together with Section 39 paragraph (a) of P. interposed the present appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.Based on the above provision of law.There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service Commission adverse to him. removal or dismissal from office. we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that "the phrase ‗party adversely affected by the decision‘ refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension. By this ruling. there is no occasion for appeal. the person or the respondent . . . there is no occasion for appeal. through its Office for Legal Affairs. Consequently. demotion in rank or salary. Civil Service Commission.The phrase "party adversely affected by the decision" refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension. transfer. . . 807.Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof. it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. in Debulgado. SEPARATE OPINION MELO [dissent and concur] .The Court of Appeals exonerated respondent Dacoycoy of the charge of nepotism. to support its ruling is misplaced. .D. Suan. which seriously prejudices the civil service system. shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision."The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more that thirty days. where allowable. On appeal to the Court of Appeals. the present decision might be misconstrued as a watering down of the settled doctrine. and whether the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in recalling and disapproving the promotional appointment given to petitioner after the Commission had earlier approved that appointment.A cursory reading of P. that is. Hence. the court required the petitioner therein.Subsequently. And Mr. This totally contravenes our well-settled ruling in several cases. provides: . the Civil Service Commission. Under existing laws and jurisprudence this is not allowed." . and the Court had neither authority nor inclination to dilute that important public policy by introducing a qualification here or a distinction there. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges. The Court of Appeals' decision is reversed and the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are revived and affirmed. who was merely a witness for the government." In other words. Nor the complainant George P. otherwise known as ―The Philippine Civil Service Law‖ shows that said law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges. the Court emphasized that Section 59 "means exactly what it says in plain and ordinary language: x x x The public policy embodied in Section 59 is clearly fundamental in importance. removal or dismissal from office. to appeal a decision exonerating or absolving a civil service employee of charges against. who was declared not guilty of the charge. as in the case. the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. He was the respondent official meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service.to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law. the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling. removal or dismissal from office" and not included are "cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more then thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary" or "when the respondent is exonerated of the charges." . demotion in rank or salary.It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of law.
Any ambiguity. an employee may be hounded into spending up to his last resources and losing his self-respect and honor by successive appeals. against civil service employees would. I wish to stress that I speak here of the ordinary employees. This notwithstanding.Premises considered and with the above observations. an appeal involving a judgment or final order of the Court of Appeals exonerating a government employee in an administrative case. should it find any. especially when the definite intention of the existing law was to disallow the State to appeal from judgments of exoneration.To allow appeals from decisions. to my mind. The decision of the disciplining authority is even final and not appealable to the Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days‘ salary. Any attempt by the Court to transgress this most basic principle in the separation of powers between these two branches of government would to my mind. 807. result in the abhorrent act of judicial legislation. the person of the respondent employee who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days.A judgment of exoneration by the Court of Appeals. Only Congress has authority to remedy inadequacies in the wisdom of a law. appeals from awards. which is merely statutory may not be invoked. may indeed prove to be truly adverse to the government agency concerned and eventually to the State as a whole. paragraph (a) of Presidential Decree No. the matter may still be elevated to the Court of Appeals or even this Court? Where else will all this end. constitutes a proceeding which partakes of a criminal nature. 1-95 ordained that. 1995. This is especially so when there had been lapses in the interpretation and/or application of the law as in the present case. be they exonerative or otherwise. exclusively belongs to Legislature. Their simple status notwithstanding. the respondent government employee is initially exonerated or given a light penalty. removal or dismissal from office. appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals may be filed via a verified petition for review on certiorari with this Court (where pure questions of law. The decision of the disciplining authority is even final and not appealable to the Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not .Effective June 1. insisting that the employee is guilty or that he deserves a heavier penalty? And. are threatened with complaints. judgments or final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency (which includes the Civil Service Commission) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals. more often than not. . be stocking the stakes too much against our civil servants. if for instance. therefore. as in the case of a judgment of exoneration by the Civil Service Commission or the now defunct Merit System Protection Board. Many. much less exercised. that is. No appeal may. . removal or dismissal from office. they are not easily cowed and intimidated. . transfer of station. must be resolved in favor of the respondent in the administrative case. Appeal in cases allowed by law must be filed within fifteen days from receipt of the decision. or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary. but then we shall be content in concluding that we decided in favor of the many. and the complainant may appeal. demotion in rank or salary or transfer.Moreover.employee who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days.What will happen. it is recognized in our jurisdiction that an administrative case which could result in the revocation of license. It should be noted in this regard that the greater bulk of our government workers are ordinary people. that the good of the majority prevailed. if they refuse to do the bidding of some unscrupulous superiors or politicians.It is my submission that the prerogative to now determine whether this practice of disallowing appeals in cases of exoneration should still continue or not. or similar sanctions like dismissal from office. . The Court cannot and should not arrogate this policy-making power of Congress unto itself. though. in particular.Appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an administrative case is extended to the party adversely affected by the decision. be taken under Rule 45. It is elementary that a special law such as Presidential Decree No. . we held that the party favored by such law who fails to interpose any objection to an appeal may be deemed to have waived this right. I can. when the law does not provide any. working under supervision and. not even in the guise of the exercise of its expanded power of judicial review under the 1987 Constitution. Revised Administrative Circular No. I vote to grant the petition as stated in the dispositive thereof. . until and unless Congress exercises its prerogative to amend such law. the right to appeal. the latter failed to invoke the foregoing general rule. or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary. falls within the ambit of the provisions of Section 39. Being such. or demotion. 807 takes precedence over general rules of procedure such as Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. therefore. distinctly set forth therein. Fortunately for petitioner but not so for respondent. if not in the physical and financial exhaustion of the respondent civil servant? Again. this Court is bound by it and has no other recourse except to apply the same. demotion in rank or salary or transfer. The big shots in government who commit wrongs may somehow hereby benefit. Although in general. The term "party adversely affected" should not be construed as to include the State in administrative charges involving nepotism. be they exonerative or otherwise. exposed to political pressure and the influence of peddlers of power. PUNO [concur] . if the Civil Service Commission thereafter metes out a penalty not to the liking of the complainant. Verily. Again. In a similar case. should there be any. understand why the law and our jurisprudence disallow appeal by the complainant from decisions in administrative cases. just as penal laws are strictly construed strictly against the State. provisions of law pertaining thereto must perforce be construed strictly against the State. may be duly raised). .
His charged with the offense of nepotism for the appointment of two sons as driver and utility worker under his immediate control and supervision. or head of local government or chiefs of agencies. therefore. They excluded from its compass the party complainant whose charge is dismissed. however. . Hence. 807 (Civil Service Law) which states: ―Sec. The doctrine is principally based on a constricted interpretation of Section 39 of P. Mendez and Magpale do not give any policy reasons why the dismissal of a charge of nepotism cannot be appealed. I make the submission that is time to strike down the doctrine disallowing appeals to the Civil Service Commission when the decision exonerates a government official or employee from an administrative charge. (2) fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days salary. especially judicial review. transfer. No. . erroneous decisions allowing nepotism cannot be given immunity from review. when the respondent government official or employee is exonerated. These decisions involve minor offenses. the case at bar involves the right of a party adversely affected to resort to judicial review. They merely resort to doubtful inferences in justifying the bar to appeals. . A contrary rule will diminish the value of the right to complain. This case does not involve the appellate .‖ A taxpayer has a right to good government and good government cannot result from appointments determined by bloodlines. the doctrine barring appeal cannot be justified by the provision limiting the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission to review decisions involving: (1) suspension for more than thirty (30) days. Such an approach goes against the rule that ―preclusions of judicial review of administrative action .In truth. or regional directors or upon sworn written complaint of any other persons. Statutory preclusion of appeals is the exception rather than the rule. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges. private respondent is the Vocational Administrator of the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. Mendez and Magpale precisely barred all appeals despite lack of an explicit. even a decision acquitting a government official from a major offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed. The Civil Service Law itself recognizes that there are offenses which can be the subject of a complaint by any private citizen. the decision is deemed final as the party complainant is precluded from appealing. In the case at bar. x x x‖ . Section 38 also recognizes that ―administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the head of the department or office of equivalent rank. the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges filed against him. is: who has the standing to prevent the violation of this law and protect public interest? I submit that a taxpayer has the standing to bring suit to void nepotic acts for he has an interest that ―appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness x x x. hence. Again. removal or dismissal from office. for as stressed by Mr.According to Paredes. The objective should be to eliminate nepotic acts. positive provision in the Civil Service Law. removal or dismissal from office.exceeding thirty days salary. and (4) transfer. as in this case. . .It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of law. if a private citizen has the right to file an administrative complaint. To allow their multiple level appeal will doubtless overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative system and defeat the expectation of fast and efficient action from these administrative agencies. For what the law declares as "final" are decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension for not more than 30 days or fine in an amount not exceeding 30 days salary. the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service Law. It is thus non sequitur to contend that since some decisions exonerating public officials from minor offenses can not be appealed.I find it difficult to agree with the above interpretation which is not only too narrow but is subversive of the essence of our civil service law. the phrase ―party adversely affected by the decision‖ refers alone to the respondent government official or employee against whom the administrative case is filed. Thus. there is no occasion for appeal.The phrase ‗party adversely affected by the decision‘ refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension. is not a petty offense. They are numerous for they are the usual offenses committed by government officials and employees. Hence." Yet the cases of Paredes. unless the law clearly precludes his right of appeal for indubitable policy reasons.Moreover. And it is a stubborn evil. Section 37 of the law allows any private citizen to file a complaint against a government official or employee directly with the Commission. if not corruption.Similarly. Appeal in cases allowed by law must be filed within fifteen days from receipt of the decision.By inference or implication. But there is a clear policy reasons for declaring these decisions final. demotion in rank or salary. 39. where allowable.‖ The general rule is that one who has a right to be heard has standing to seek review of any ruling adverse to him. Mendez and Magpale. The critical question. . in government service. ergo. shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed. "tolerance of judicial review has been more and more the rule against the claim of administrative finality.With humility. Justice Douglas. there is nothing in this provision indicating legislative intent to bar appeal from decisions exonerating a government official or employee from nepotism.D. (3) demotion in rank or salary. The cases of Paredes. . It is beyond argument that nepotism is prohibited by our civil service law for it breeds inefficiency. Its deleterious effect on government cannot be over-emphasized. which petition shall be decided within fifteen days. . is not lightly to be inferred. (a) Appeals. Nepotism. he must also have the right to appeal a dismissal of his complaint. . .
In certiorari cases alleging grave abuse of discretion. For still another. No. I submit that the nature of the issue in the case at bar and its impact on the effectiveness of government give the Civil Service Commission the standing to pursue this appeal. But even without Suan.D.. the Court of Appeals ordered that the Civil Service Commission should also be impleaded as party respondent. or (f) Upon Sworn. As Justice Brandeis opined. an evil that should be extirpated wherever found. 292 (otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of 1987) as well as the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. The question therefore is whether or not this Court is precluded from reviewing the decision of the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. It is thus the party better equipped to argue the diverse dimensions of the issue. (d) Chief of Agency. I find no legal basis to support the contention of the majority that the Commission has that legal personality. reversed and nullified the Commission‘s finding that the respondent employee is guilty as charged? . (c) Head of Local Government Unit. under the Constitution. thus: "Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the following officials and employees: (a) Secretary of department. our given task is to determine how much is too much of an abuse. I submit that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this review. it is also of de minimis importance that the petition of thus Court was filed by the Civil Service Commission. it is equipped with the power and function to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal. the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of Court.Section 34.jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. For one. in effect. The issue in the case at bar is basically a legal one. The records will reveal that Suan. Corollarily. discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law. For another.e. i. separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct. (e) Regional Director. 292. 807 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Law). And the issue has broad implications on the merit and fitness philosophy of our civil service system. This distorted rule contravenes our distaste against nepotism." . Indeed. Executive Order No. The facts show that it was the Civil Service Commission that at the first instance found Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism. Putting up borders of nonreviewability weakens the judiciary‘s checking power. (b) Head of Office of Equivalent rank. including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and the agencies attached to it. the proper interpretation of who can be convicted of nepotism. Indeed." . can never be the intent of our legislators who crafted our Civil Service Law. it is the Civil Service Commission that has oversight of our civil service system. wrote to the Civil Service Commission urging it to make the appeal ostensibly for lack of means." The question is not our lack of jurisdiction but the prudential exercise of power. which decision.There are other disturbing implication if we do not junk the doctrine of non-reviewability of decisions exonerating government officials from charges of nepotism.Does the Civil Service Commission have the legal personality to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeals exonerating an employee charged in an administrative case. Again.. we disallow review of their exoneration. 292 provides the answer as to who may appear before the Commission. the original complainant. "supremacy of law demands that there shall be an opportunity to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied and whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly. . ROMERO [dissent] . Administrative agencies have always conceded that the final interpretation of laws belongs to regular courts. a practice whose continuance can fatally erode faith in government. Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. and undoubtedly. for while we allow further review of their conviction. . the doctrine unduly favors officials charged with nepotism. Written complaint of Any other Person. As Dacoycoy only impleaded Suan as respondent.The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the government. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Commission as it cleared Dacoycoy from the charge of nepotism. regardless of the errors. this Court has the authoritative say on how to interpret laws. . the jurisdiction of this Court has even been expanded "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. This is in consonance with its authority to pass upon the removal. perpetuating a nepotic act. It is also the most affected.e. for it has the duty not to stand still when nepotic practices threaten the principle of meritrocacy in our government. 3.To my mind. i. Article IX (B) of our Constitution. .I join the majority opinion. It was Dacoycoy who appealed the decision of the Civil Service Commission to our regular court. whether or not it has the power to review a decision exonerating a government official from a charge of nepotism. shielding abusive administrative actions and decisions from judicial oversight will ultimately erode the rule of law.After an exhaustive and careful scrutiny of P. It is thus clear that the Civil Service Commission has been constituted as a disciplining authority. It seems to me self evident that this type of injury to public interest can best be vindicated by the Commission and not by a private person. Under Sec. more exactly. completely cutting off access to judicial review goes against the spirit of the 1987 Constitution expanding the jurisdiction of this Court.
the government is an "aggrieved party" in administrative proceedings before the Commission. but merely acknowledged that Gimenez had received the sum of 55M from Tabuena on three occasions. By filing this case. 807 or the Civil Service Law. thru this Office (Office of the President). he would not be criminally liable. SANDIGANBAYAN [121 SCRA 389 (1983)] Facts: ? In a Presidential Memorandum (the Marcos Memorandum) dated Jan. an aggrieved party is either the one who initiated the complaint before the Commission or the respondent. By analogy. Neither is it an agency against whom an administrative charge is filed. now to the Court of Appeals. in a sense.1985…‖ Tabuena withdrew the sum of 55M on three separate occasions (25M. therefore. expressly or impliedly. . ―to pay immediately the Philippine National Construction Corporation. has no legal standing to file the instant petition. a nominal party is not the aggrieved party. 55M in cash. there was no receipt from the PNCC recognizing payment of debt.. Nowhere can be found. orders or rulings of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court. ? Tabuena was only issued a receipt after the third delivery and it did not mention anything about the purpose of the receipt or the money being used to pay PNCC. the Commission in the performance of its quasi-judicial functions is just like a judge who should "detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review.The respondent. President Marcos allegedly commanded petitioner Tabuena. 1986.Having established that the Civil Service Commission is not a party. ? Sandiganbayan rejected Tabuena‘s claim of good faith and found him guilty of malversation by negligence. head of office of equivalent rank. 7. the Civil Service Commission is considered a nominal party when its decision is brought before the Court of Appeals. As with appellate processes. on the other hand. Based on the foregoing. such is only a procedural formality. that Tabuena acted in good faith. PNCC said themselves that they didn‘t receive the P55M. Its inclusion as a party is based primarily on the fact that the decision. ? It is without dispute that Tabuena did not follow the normal procedures in withdrawal and delivery of the money (no disbursement slips and paid in cold cash). but merely civilly liable)? Held: Tabuena is merely civilly liable. order or ruling it issued is being contested or assailed and secondarily. Furthermore. as partial payment of MIAA‘s obligations to PNCC and that he believed that MIAA indeed had those liabilities to PNCC.I dissent from the ponencia‘s conclusion that the Commission may appeal a judgement of exoneration in an administrative case involving nepotism in light of the foregoing disquisition. 25M. chief of agency. regional director or any other person or party." . the question as to who is an ―aggrieved party‖ has long been settled in a litany of cases. was guilty of malversation (or if because of the justifying circumstance of following the orders of his superior. the person subject of the complaint. The Commission. in his capacity as General Manager of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA). the complaint can either be the Secretary of department. Issue: WON Tabuena. No. CASE DIGEST ON TABUENA v. the sum P55M in cash as partial payment of MIAA‘s account with said company mentioned in a Memorandum of (Trade and Industry) Minister Robert Ongpin to this Office dated Jan. On the point raised by Tabuena that he cannot be charged with intentional malversation . in Section 34 of Rule XIV of Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E. in following the orders of his superior. No. in good faith.Consequently. Logically and by necessary implication. decisions. it nevertheless is not the "aggrieved party" contemplated under P. the Commission as one of the parties. then indubitably. Marcos‘s private secretary. The very fact that he was merely following the orders of his superior is a justifying circumstance. As provided by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 1-95. In fact. Ratio: 1. In short.While admittedly. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The raison d‘etre for such doctrine is that a judge is not an active combatant in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and for the appellate court to decide the issues without his active participation.O. there is no other conclusion but that the Civil Service Commission is not a party to an administrative proceeding brought before it. An aggrieved party in an administrative case is the government employee against whom an administrative complaint is filed. The Civil Service Commission is definitely not a government employee. The express mention of one person. While it may be argued that. much less an aggrieved party. ? Tabuena claimed that he was only complying with the direct order of Marcos (plus the Marcos memorandum which contained same order) to immediately forward to the office of the President. either as complainant or respondent in an administrative case. .D. ? Prosecution: there were no standing obligations in favor of the PNCC at the time of disbursement of 55M. By inference. it has no legal personality to elevate the case to the appellate authority. is any subordinate officer or employee. head of a local government unit. 292. hence this case. 5M – with Adolfo Peralta) and delivered them to Gimenez. on certiorari by the aggrieved party. 6. petitioner in a way ceased to be judicial and has become adversarial instead. for purposes of enforcement. . thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. it cannot considered either a complaint or a respondent. The phrase ‗any other party‘ has been understood to be a complainant other than the head of department or office of equivalent rank or head of local government or chiefs of agencies or regional directors.
Melo. the Court itself raises the contention that the case involves a violation of the accused‘s right to due process in the sense that it was obvious that the Sandiganbayan was overzealous in its attempt to convict parties involved – as seen in the volume of questions asked. The same felony is still there and conviction thereof is proper. Tabuena entitled to the justifying circumstance of ―any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose‖ because he is only acting in good faith. facts show that the debt was only 34. Romero. So even if the order was illegal and Tabuena was not aware of the illegality. Bellosillo and Torres. nisi mens sit rea – a crime is not commited if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent (malversation cases: US v. as president of the Philippines. the act must. denying Tabuena and parties involves the requirement of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Note that this defense was not raised by Tabuena. Thus. Catolico. 9. 8. Puno. through this office (office of the president) the sum of 55M. 5. it is clear that he did and would not profit from such and that he did not have anything to do with the creation of the memorandum.‖ Sandiganbayan was obviously biased. 7. Sandiganbayan is not precedent for the proposition that any public official who blindly follows orders of their superior. indubitably the head of governmental agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. Decision: Tabuena and Peralta acquitted. Mendoza) ? Six dissented (Padilla. ―Respect for the Constitution is more important that securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights of the accused. Furthermore.5M so order of Marcos had excess of 20. non- . On the defense of good faith: it is a valid defense against malversation because it would negate criminal intent. According to Davide. To constitute a crime. faithfully and efficiently carrying out orders from the highest official in the land. The Court.and be convicted by malversation by negligence. he is found to be excused from such because the Marcos Memorandum enjoined his IMMEDIATE COMPLIANCE. escaping the harsher penalties) (see page 362). he would not be liable because there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith. the wording of the memorandum expressed a certain urgency to its execution—Obedienta est legis essential (act swiftly without question). this case is not authoritative on Art. 11(6). found that Tabuena had no other choice but to actually follow the order stated in the Marcos Memorandum.) Implication of pro hac vice: Tabuena v. he would still be civilly liable (but he‘s not criminally liable anymore. Jr. by his own admission. On the other hand. 4. Main Ratio: Furthermore. Davide. based on the evidence presented. the order of Sandiganbayan was found void. Romero. there was nothing in the Marcos Memorandum that may invite suspicion – there was no question about the lawfulness of the order contained in such a memorandum. 3. To quote Justice Cruz. dissenting: Davide disagrees with majority that all the requisites of the sixth justifying circumstance in art 11 of the RPC were present The sixth circumstance of the said article implies 3 things: a) that the order was issued by a superior. Pro hac vice (meaning they join the majority opinion but they reserve their right to change their vote should a similar case with the same facts arise. b) such order must be for some lawful purpose and. Moreover. 6. while this allows for the negation of criminal intent. non-issuance of a receipt in 1st 2 deliveries. did not follow standard operating procedures (no vouchers. dissenting: He also believes that not all requisites were present to warrant a justifying circumstance as Tabuena. c) means used by subordinate to carry out said order must be lawful. except in certain crimes…be accompanied by criminal intent or such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences as is equivalent to criminal intent The maxim actus non facit reum. Voting: ? Four concurred (Narvasa. Vitug. Tabuena had reason to believe that the 55M was indeed part of a due and demandable debt. There is no showing that Tabuena had anything to do with the creation of the Marcos Memorandum – that even if the real purpose behind the memorandum was to get 55M from public funds. and the manner the same were posed (cross examinations characteristic of confrontation. Davide.5M – said order then had no factual or legal basis and unlawful. The order/memorandum came from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the president himself. Marcos exercised supervision and control over governmental agencies (good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of malversation). no approval by Commission on Audit. as Tabuena acted in good faith. While even Tabuena admitted that procedures were ignored and that the disbursement was unusual. in effect allowing for the presumption that such order was regularly issued and patently legal. the Court ruled that the dolo and culpa of the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. because. US v. probing and insinuation). paying immediately the PNCC. As a consequence of such violation of due process. Marcos is undeniably the superior of Tabuena. 2. Kapunan. Tabuena followed the memorandum to the letter. Tabuena had reasonable ground to believe that the President was entitled to receive the money because as Chief Executive. a portion of a bigger liability to PNCC (existence of such debts determined from testimonies). Tabuena case is a case concerning obedience in good faith of a duly executed order. Elvina). Panganiban) ? Justice Hermosisima took no part as he was a signatory to the SB decision ? Regalaso.
delivery to office of Gimenez [not office in Malacanang]. To allow this defense to hold in the Tabuena case sets a dangerous precedent in the country because it would deprive the Courts the moral authority to convict any subordinate because he or she was ―merely following the orders of the his or her superior (allowing the same doctrine to be invoked in similar criminal cases before the SC and even in the inferior courts who have no choice but to follow the doctrines set by the SC). . Puno. Panganiban. He also adds that if there was not enough time. dissenting: He concentrates on the case involving a mistake in fact. dissenting: He is of the same view as Romero. possible. which is more than enough time to comply with procedure. Tabuena‘s rank does not excuse him from ignoring such. citing the Ah CHong case among others. a stranger to contract between PNCC and MIAA). Tabuena should have asked for more time or at least communicated such problems to the president. The tribunal said that the true test did not lie with the existence of an order but whether a moral choice was in fact. It was also clear from the facts that it took one month for Tabuena to comply with order (starting from the time Marcos called him up by phone – to which the memorandum containing the same orders followed a week later). Moreover. Davide and Puno but also raises some points: the defense of obedience to a superior‘s order is already obsolete. to acquit the petitioners imply that people believe that the president is always right. and discussing article 3 in some detail -saying that mistake in fact should not excuse the accused from incurring liability.issuance of receipt by PNCC. as determined by the Tribunal in Nuremberg. that he or she can do no wrong – that the president is above and beyond the law. done with haste and with a total disregard of appropriate auditing requirements was not based on normal procedure. The entire process. in its judgment against Nazi war criminals who put up the defense that they were merely following orders.
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