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Article 2 Tanada v. Tuvera Facts: This is a case wherein the petitioner seeks the disclosure of a number of P.D.s, which they claimed had not been published as required by law, invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern. However, respondents contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. In the decision of this case, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of the decrees ordering respondent to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. Hence, this petition. Issue: W/N the P.D.s that state its date of effectivity preclude their publication in the Official Gazette, as it was “otherwise provided”. Ruling: All statutes including those of local application and private laws shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature, and part of those statutes that should be published are presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative rules and regulations, charter of a city and Central Bank circulars. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat”. Without publication, the people have no means of knowing what P.D. have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decree. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or extended. More so, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. The mere mention of the P.D. nos., title of the case, its whereabouts, and its date of effectivity cannot satisfy the publication requirement. The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. Article 3 Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez Facts: Complainant Borja-Manzano filed a case against Respondent Judge Sanchez charging him with gross ignorance of the law because he solemnized the marriage between David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao who were both bound by prior existing marriages, knowing that the marriage was bigamous and void as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated. Respondent claimed that he did not know that Manzano was legally married and all he knew was that both parties were cohabiting together for 7 years, as manifested in their joint affidavit. However, both Manzano and Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior marriages and that in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were “separated”. Issue: W/N Respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized the marriage. Ruling: Respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized the marriage. Art. 34 of the FC provides the requisites for the legal ratification of marital cohabitation; however, in the case at bar, not all of the requirements are present. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits subscribed and sworn before the respondent, Manzano and Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior marriages and that in their marriage contract, both were “separated”. Respondent judge cannot deny this knowledge. The fact that Manzano and Payao have been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time is also immaterial because legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, must less authorize the parties to contract another marriage. More so, neither can respondent Judge take refuge on their joint affidavit that they had been cohabiting for 7 years because it does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. It is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It is expected of him, as a judge, to be conversant with the law and the basic legal principles. Failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Article 4 Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr. Facts: Sometime in Dec. 1991, Complainant Lupo Atienza found Respondent Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr. sleeping in his room, and upon query with their houseboy, the latter told him that respondent was cohabiting with Yolanda de Castro, to whom complainant has two children and to whom he is living with. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Respondent denied having been married to Ongkiko although he admits having 5 children with her. He alleged that his two marriages in 1965 were celebrated without marriage license. He further claimed that when he married de Castro in L.A. in 1991, he believed in good faith that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without marriage license. He argued that Art. 40 of the FC does not apply to him because his first marriage was contracted in 1965 and it is governed by the CC, not by FC while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the FC. Issue:
W/N Art. 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the FC on Aug. 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Ruling: Art. 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the FC on Aug. 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, Art. 256 of the FC provides that the Code is given retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested rights. In the case at bar, respondent has not shown any vested rights that were impaired by the application of Art. 40. Art. 40 is a rule of procedure. The retroactive application of procedural laws are not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected because as a general rule, no vested right may attach to nor rise from procedural laws. In the present case, respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith because his failure to secure marriage license in his first and second marriage with Ongkiko. His failure to secure the same betrays his sinister motives and bad faith. Article 6 Guy v. CA Facts: Private respondents Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for letters of administration over the estate of the late Sima Wei. Private respondents alleged that they are duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate. However, petitioners alleged that Private respondents’ claim had been paid, waived and abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios’ release and waiver of claim that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities. RTC ruled that the release and waiver of claim, while signed by Remedios, did not establish that she was the duly constituted guardian of the minors. As such, no renunciation of right occurred. Hence, this petition. Issue: W/N the release and waiver of claim signed by Remedios precludes private respondents from claiming their successional rights. Ruling: The release and waiver of claim does not bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms leaving no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. In the case at bar, there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The release and waiver of claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received 300,000.00 and an educational plan for her daughters as a way of “financial assistance and full settlement of any and all claims against the estate of Rufino Guy Susim”. It did not specifically mention private respondent’s hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, hence, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights. More so, Art. 1044 of the CC provides that “xxx parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only Issue: Facts:
by judicial authorization”. Further, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. In the instant case, private respondent could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei. Articles 7 De Roy v. CA
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondent, resulting in injuries to private respondents and death of a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. RTC rendered the petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarded damages to private respondents. Petitioner appealed to the CA, but the CA affirmed the RTC decision. On the last day of the 15-day period to file an appeal, petitioner filed a motion of extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner filed their motion for reconsideration but this was also denied.
W/N CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file MFR, and their MFR. Ruling: The Court finds that CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file MFR, and their MFR. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas case wherein the 15-day period for appealing or filing MFR cannot be extended. Although there was a grace period of one-month from the promulgation of the Court’s resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, within which the rule barring extension of time to file motions is not yet strictly enforceable, petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file MFR is no longer within the coverage of the grace period as it was filed more than one year after the expiration of the grace period. Petitioners cannot also take refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a MFR within the reglementary period. Further, petitioners cannot argue that the rule in the Habaluyas case should not be applied in the present case owing to its nonpublication in the Official Gazette. There is no law requiring the publication of SC’s decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and be effective. Article 9 Silverio v. Republic Facts: On Nov. 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila alleging that he is a male transsexual who underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation, and even sex reassignment
the CA would be correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage. Van Dorn v. before it can be recognized by our courts. However. does not restrict remarriage. filed a petition for certiorari in the CA alleging that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. following the national law of Orlando. The TC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Hence. condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Phils. Months later. private respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to Lily. Ruling: Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. Subsequently. However. If she has the personality to file a petition. the divorce was ratified by mutual consent of both parties. Jr. However. Issue: W/N Petitioner has the personality to file the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. The CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. law. which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. When petitioner and Tristan got married. or on anything else. In 1982. Contending that it was a bigamous marriage. this petition. However. RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court of Dominican Republic was not recognized in the Phils. But divorces are of different types: absolute divorce. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties. they got divorced. USA and petitioner has remarried to Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada also. petitioner lived as a female and in fact engaged to be married. Article 15 Amor-Catalan v. should it choose to do so. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss but it was denied. In 2001. the parties were divorced in Nevada. which reversed the RTC decision. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which.surgery. They got married in Hongkong and established their residence in the Phils. and his sex from “male” to “female”. there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates. The petitioner’s claim that her status as the wife of Tristan for 17 years vests her with the requisite legal interest lacks merit. Then. Respondents appealed to the CA. this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter. they decided to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic through an attorney-in-fact who instituted a divorce action under its laws. it is for the legislature. Facts: Ruling: Issue: Facts: In the case at bar. Manila is conjugal property of the parties. in 1988. even though living abroad. Hence. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction. W/N petitioner has legal interest in the annulment case between Tristan and Lily. Under the law. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government. obscurity or insufficiency of the law”. Perez v. the Republic. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law. petitioner filed a motion to leave to file intervention claiming that she has an interest in the matter in litigation. not to make or to amend it. petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely”. It might be theoretically possible for this court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Phil. private respondent married Elmar Perez in the USA. Issue: W/N petitioner is entitled to the civil registry changes sought after having acquired the physical features of a female. Ruling: It is true that Art. thru the OSG. Orlando married Merope in Pangasinan. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. However. 9 of the CC mandates that “no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence.. they migrated to the US and allegedly became naturalized US citizens. Petitioner Alice Reyes is a Filipino citizen while private respondents Richard Upton is a US citizen. Private respondent however opposed the motion by filing a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA. private respondent filed a suit against petitioner stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita. which terminates the marriage and limited divorce. provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce decree. CA Private respondent Tristan Catindig and Lily Catindig got married in the Philippines twice. Hence. During their cohabitation. or to the status. From then on. the couples decided to separate from each other and upon advice of a friend. RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for being bigamous. which suspends the marriage and leaves the bond in full force. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based. Thereafter. this petition. petitioner alleged in her complaint that she and Orlando obtained American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage must be ascertained first. CA Facts: Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married Respondent Orlando in Pangasinan. will not recognize such absolute divorce. Two months after the divorce. In our system of government. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them. petitioner was never the legal wife of Tristan. the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrates its conformity to the foreign laws allowing it. However. which the TC granted. the Congress. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce . Then. Romillo. Then. it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. the Phils.
When the suit for declaration of nullity of marriage was pending. the FC allows a Filipino citizen to contract a subsequent marriage provided that the one who secured the decree of the divorce was the alien spouse and it is allowed under his national law. Petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio and respondent were married on Jan. Then. 24 and 25 of Rule 132 requires that it must either be proven as a public record of a foreign country by either official publication or copy of such official publication attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. which may be recognized in the Phils. Hence. Therefore. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. Two years after their marriage. Quita v. It must be proven as a fact. In the case at bar. On March 1998. alleging that the respondent has a prior subsisting marriage at the time when they got married.. CA Facts: W/N the divorce of respondent and his former wife was duly proven. but respondent averred that the divorce decree issued by the Australian Family Court had already dissolved his prior marriage at the time when they got married. only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces. Recio Facts: . Mere presentation of the divorce decree is insufficient. an Australian Family Court decreed a decree of divorce. such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. Geiling filed two complaints for adultery in the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that petitioner had an affair with William Chia and Jesus Chua while they were still married. Sec. respondent became an Australian citizen. Insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law in the matter of status of persons. as already demonstrated. In their application for marriage license. 15 of the CC. respondent was declared as single and Filipino. The Phil law does not allow divorce. Thus. the same being contrary to public policy and local laws. pursuant to his national law. and authenticated with the seal of his office. such decree is not enough.. But in mixed marriages. The RTC denied the motion on the ground that the property involved is located in the Phils. was married to Editha Samson. Pilapil v. Rizal and lived as husband and wife in Australia. respondent merely presented an interlocutory decree. More than 5 months after the issuance of the divorce decree. this appeal. Ruling: The divorce decree obtained by Upton is recognized in the Phils. the fact that the divorce he obtained in his country is admitted. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved by divorce obtained abroad because of Art. so that divorce has no bearing in this case. 15 of the CC. petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy. private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse. Garcia-Recio v. The TC admitted the decree as evidence. the divorce decree in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American Law. Ruling: Geiling has no legal capacity to file complaint of adultery against Pilapil. a German national. Hence.proceedings before the Nevada court wherein private respondent acknowledged that they had “no community property”. and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse. Rederick Recio. To prove it as such. Thus. Issues: 1) 2) Ruling in #1: The divorce decree between Editha and respondent was proven not by the decree itself but by failure of the petitioner to object as to its admissibility in evidence. Geiling is no longer the spouse of Pilapil. got married in Germany. The divorce decree was granted on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. But private respondent contends that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction. which is a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. there is a need to remand the case in the lower court to determine such legal capacity. the copy must be accompanied by certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Phils. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Phils. Issue: W/N the divorce decree obtained by private respondent is recognized in the Phils. He was therefore already legally capacitated to marry petitioner at that time. Ruling in #2: The divorce decree between Editha and respondent failed to fully determine w/n it enabled respondent to have the legal capacity to remarry the petitioner. However. 1994. On June 1992. However. In the case at bar. Upton is no longer the husband of Alice. It is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and. an Australian citizen in Malabon. private respondent should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to the conjugal property. respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from an Australian Family Court. stationed in the country where such copy was obtained. Issue: W/N Geiling has the legal capacity to file complaint of adultery against Pilapil. a Filipino citizen. If the record is not kept in the Phils. In the case at bar. There is no showing of w/n it was an absolute divorce or a limited divorce. thus declaring the divorce to be valid and recognized in the Phils. It is important to determine the legal capacity of the respondent at the time when he married petitioner to determine w/n their marriage should be declared null and void. aliens may obtain divorces abroad. W/N the respondent has proven to be legally capacitated to marry the petitioner. provided they are valid according to their national law. Ibay-Somera Facts: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil. a Filipino citizen and private respondent Erich Geiling.
5 years later. Romillo. Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias. as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo under Art. In the case at bar. If the record is not kept in the Phils. the respondents prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and tat letters of administration be issued to her. the imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgresses the standards of human conduct set forth in Art 19 of the CC. 19 of the CC. Then. Tobias sought employment with RETELCO. but Hendry confronted him the next day stating that he was the number one suspect and ordered him to take one week forced leave. the copy must be accompanied by certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Phils. Fe went to USA and obtained a decree of absolute divorce. The Court had already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing . However. to leave his table drawers open and to leave the office keys. With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo. she submitted photocopies of their marriage and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California. oppressive and abusive acts of petitioners. the court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. and authenticated with the seal of his office. though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such. stationed in the country where such copy was obtained. filed a complaint of divorce and was obtained on Dec. San Luis Facts: During his lifetime. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit out of which were born 6 children. Article 19 Globe Mackay v. When Tobias returned to work after the forced leave. Issue: W/N respondent has legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration. Tobias received a notice that his employment has been terminated. provided they are valid according to their national law. Issue: W/N petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent. To prove it as such. Unaware of the denial of the motion. petitioner Hendry. Then. Sec. a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held liable. which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. which may be recognized in the Phils. Jr. the respondent has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration. Van Dorn v. and Fe could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo. He reported the anomalies to his immediate superior Eduardo Ferraren and Herbert Hendry. but Tobias was cleared. As stated in Garcia case. Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful. Escano held that “a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the CC was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction”. 1993. A right. without being asked by RETELCO. known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights. Then. to whom he has no child. but was denied. 144 of the CC. Arturo Padlan died intestate. Still in USA. USA. San Luis v. respondent submitted evidences showing that Felicisimo regularly went home to their house in Alabang and presented the decree of absolute divorce to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Ruling: Art. These standards are the ff: to act with justice. Tenchavez v. 24 and 25 of Rule 132 requires that it must either be proven as a public record of a foreign country by either official publication or copy of such official publication attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. both Filipinos. Felicisimo married Felicidad. were married in the Phils. However. petitioner Rodolfo San Luis filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the letters of administration should have been filed in Laguna and that respondent has no legal personality as she was not the legal wife of Felicisimo since the latter was still legally married to Merry Lee. Unemployed. may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. in California. Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin. Van Dorn would become applicable. wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. with whom he had a son. Ruling: Records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA. however. Ruling: The SC remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether the second marriage of the spouse during the subsistence of the first marriage was contracted before or after Fe Quita changed her citizenship. making the divorce decree recognizable in the Phils. sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. Then Virginia died. He then discovered fictitious purchases and fraudulent transactions for which the company lost several thousands of pesos. the Court ruled that mere presentation of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. However. After the relationship turned sour.. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce. and to observe honesty and good faith. an American citizen. petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a “crook” and a “swindler”. give everyone his due. When Felicisimo died. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in the said article and results to damage to another. she married for the third time a certain Wernimont. Merry Lee. CA Facts: Private respondent Restituto Tobias was an employee of Globe Mackay. Felicisimo San Luis contracted three marriages. malicious. Recio. not to communicate with the office. held that aliens may obtain divorces abroad. He was then instructed to go through a series of examinations by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies. Issue: W/N the divorce decree obtained by Quita is recognized in the Phils.. petitioners filed a complaint of estafa. There is a need to determine Fe’s citizenship in the case at bar. she got married to Felix Tupaz but also ended in divorce.Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan. In Garcia-Recio v. Fe Quita is now claiming her right over the estate of the late Arturo Padlan.
Specifically. the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondent’s business establishment where it was visible and accessible to the public. All these circumstances taken together justified the bank’s closure of Pacilan’s account for “improper mishandling”. 19 of the CC. petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent’s establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Far East Bank v. In the case at bar. San Mig Corp. a special company proprietary member of CCCI. Since. offered to sell a share for only P3. petitioner accompanied by policemen. but the CCCI kept silent. Pacilan then complained in writing that the closure of his account was unjustified.P. Cebu Country Club. but again. Worse. to amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by respondent against them. The CCCI’s Board of Directors thereafter approved the designation. CCCI issued proprietary ownership certificate to respondent. Meanwhile. Petitioner’s acts violated the law as well as public morals. Malice and bad faith is at the core of Art. insurmountable worries and sleepless nights. and transgressed the proper norms of human relations. then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. Issue: W/N malice or bad faith could be imputed to the petitioner bank for closing the account of the respondent. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration. Twice did respondent write a letter of reconsideration. As the price of a proprietary share was around the P5M range. hence. petitioner bank showed that there were also many other instances wherein the current account of Pacilan was overdrawn. No doubt. During the meetings of the Board. The law always presumes good faith and any person who seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill motive. While the policeman and the clerk in charge were talking. Hence. this petition. 2 nd and 3rd elements of abuse of rights are not attendant in the present case. The indecent haste that attended the closure of his account was patently malicious and intended to embarrass him. Petitioner Corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Ruling: . Inc. petitioner and the policemen took the motorcycle. Uypitching v. Pacilan. respondent received a letter informing him that the Board disapproved his application. There were also several instances when Pacilan issued checks deliberately using a signature different from his specimen signature on file with the bank. Facts: Respondent Pacilan opened a current account with petitioner bank. The alleged malicious acts of the bank besmirched his reputation and caused him social humiliation. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision with modification. b) which is exercised in bad faith. Further. They are clearly mistaken. approached respondent Ernesto Quiamco. action on respondent’s application for proprietary membership was deferred. Jr. Issue: W/N the petitioners are liable to respondent for damages in disapproving respondent’s application for proprietary membership with CCCI. CCCI did not reply. purchased the share of a certain Dr. W/N petitioner’s acts of enforcing its right were violative and abusive to the prejudice of respondent. Nine years later. Ruling: The elements of abuse of rights are the ff: a) existence of a legal right or duty. On appeal of the petitioners. respondent’s application was voted upon. Respondent again sent a letter inquiring whether any member of the Board objected to his application. however. petitioner even mouthed a slanderous statement. they should indemnify him. designated respondent Ricardo Elizagaque as a special non-proprietary member. Respondent asked for the original copy but the three accused never came to see him again. If the dismissal is done abusively. In another board meeting. The evidence presented by petitioner bank negates the existence of bad faith or malice on its part in closing Pacilan’s account because it was already overdrawn. which exceeded the balance of his deposit in his account. The complaint was dismissed. Consequently. respondent was neither in his Issue: establishment nor in his house. Butalid for only P3M. Petitioner Corporation blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right. Contrary to law. v. utterance of a defamatory remark. Benito Uchuan. When he did not received any reply from the bank. In 1996. Further. This was due to Pacilan’s issuance of 4 checks to different persons with an aggregate amount. petitioner bank committed an abuse thereof. respondent filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership. then president of CCCI. Respondent. and c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 19 of the CC. to the prejudice of respondent. Respondent had since then issued several postdated checks to different payees drawn against the said account.. 22. the petitioner bank’s act exposed him to criminal prosecution for violation of B. respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners. went to respondent’s establishment to recover the motorcycle. Consequently. Elizagaque Facts: Sometime in 1987. it was closed by petitioner bank on the ground that his account was “improperly mishandled”. as embodied in Art. petitioner was overheard uttering. Ruling: Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for Petitioner Corporation’s exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclosure on the mortgage in case of default. Subsequently. and filing a baseless and malicious complaint. Gabutero and Generoso. Petitioners filed MFR but it was denied.therefrom. “Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle”. wounded feelings. the facts as found by the court a quo and the appellate court do not establish that in the exercise of this right. Quiamco Facts: Davalan. Respondent then filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC for unlawful taking of the motorcycle. RTC rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff. Instead. However. Petitioner then filed a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against respondent.5M. he filed a complaint of damages against the bank alleging that he immediately deposited the following day an amount sufficient to fund the check. which was endorsed by CCCI’s two proprietary members. petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent.
the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact. Certainly. respondent Isabel Singh Buenaventura. He was not informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members was required. In response. petitioners apparently ignored him. Since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. Article 22 Republic v. Art. and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. as a special non-propriety member of CCCI. A right. After respondent filed her answer. under its Articles of Incorporation. good custom or public policy. As the provisions of this article were formulated as “basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of social order xxx” the rules thereon apply equally well to the government. It bears stressing that the amendment to Section (3) of CCCI’s Amended By-Laws requiring a unanimous vote of the directors was not printed on the application form respondent filled and submitted to CCCI. of Pampanga conducted a final inspection of the project and fond it 100% completed. a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held liable. Lacap Facts: The District of Pampanga issued and duly published an “invitation to bid”. respondent and petitioner executed a contract agreement. though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such. petitioner amended his petition stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. the contract is enforceable and payment be paid. Respondent Carwin Construction. RTC held that petitioner must be required to pay the contract price. the DPWH withheld payment from respondent after the District Auditor of COA disapproved the final release of funds on the ground that the contractor’s license of respondent had expired at the time of the execution of the contract. petitioners violated the rules governing human relations. Issue: W/N private respondent is entitled to be awarded moral damages arising from the nullity of her marriage to the petitioner. he should have been treated by petitioners with courtesy and civility. the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Then. respondent sought to collect payment for the completed project. CA Facts: Petitioner Noel Buenaventura filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark wondering why his application was disapproved. After the Office of the District Engr. then the former should be compensated fro them. Ruling: It must be noted that Art. Ruling: It is proper for the petitioner to pay respondent for the projects it completed. it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the respondent. The CA affirmed the assailed decision. Thus. the CCCI Board of Directors. as the lowest bidder. Having been designated by San Mig Corp.Obviously. this petition. may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. has the right to approve or disapprove an application for proprietary membership. Therefore. At the very least they should have informed him why his application was disapproved. respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated. The TC and CA aptly held that petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving respondent’s applications. respondent undertook the works. A party who had knowledge of his/her disability and yet willfully concealed the same should predicate the award of moral damages not on the mere act of entering into the marriage. To allow petitioner to acquire the finished project at no cost would be undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of respondent. Issue: W/N it is proper for the petitioner to pay respondent for the projects it completed. As the case was elevated to the CA. But such right should not be exercised arbitrarily. CA . 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. Articles 19 and 21 of the CC provide restrictions. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated. hence. The DPWH Legal Dep’t opined that since Contractor’s License Law does not provide that a contract entered into after the license has expired is void. was awarded the contract for the concreting Sittio 5 Bahay Pare. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case. respondent did not deserve this kind of treatment. In rejecting respondent’s application for proprietary membership. When he sent a letter for reconsideration and a letter of inquiry. it recommended that payment should be made to Carwin Construction but no payment was made. Since respondent had rendered services to the full satisfaction and acceptance by petitioner. Article 21 Buenaventura v. Twice did the District Engr. The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the CC. RTC declared the marriage null and void. but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice. Therefore. The CA and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of psychological incapacity. sought opinion of the DPWH Legal Dep’t on whether the contracts of Carwin Construction were valid and effective although its contractor’s license had expired. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined Article 19 and results to damage to another. 22 of the CC embodies the maxim nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of another’s injury). This is contrary to morals. the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. However. If the private respondent was deceived. Article 27 Ledesma v. respondent filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioner before the RTC. Accordingly. made advances for the purchase of the materials and payment for labor costs. it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner.
Petitioner subsequently failed to pay respondent. but it was dismissed. appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools. 168173 and the deed of absolute sale. San Diego-Sison Facts: Petitioner Robie Frias is the owner of a house and lot. Issue: W/N the respondent CA erred in affirming the trial court’s finding that petitioner is liable for damages under Art. The petitioner’s act of trying to deprive respondent of the security of her loan by executing an affidavit of loss of the TCT and instituting a petition for the issuance of a new duplicate copy of TCT No. however. But petitioner allegedly mistook the telegram as ordering him to also send the decision back. rendered a decision stating that Delmo be not deprived of any award. the award of moral damages is in order. hence.Facts: Some students of the West Visayas College formed an organization named Student Leadership Club. The Director. Article 36 Tuanda v. Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner alleging the foregoing facts and in addition thereto averred that petitioner tried to deprive her of the security for the loan by making a false report of the loss of her owner’s copy of TCT No. however. However. entered into a memorandum of agreement over the property. Private respondents filed a petition for mandamus for recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. The petitioner received two other telegrams. In an assailed order. Then. being a public officer should have acted with circumspection and due regard to the rights of Delmo. Thus. In the case at bar. Ruling: Art. Petitioner then gave respondent TCT No. thus. Issue: W/N the legality or validity of private respondents’ designation as . Subsequently. Petitioners filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan for suspension of proceedings in the criminal case on the ground that a prejudicial question exists in a civil case pending before the RTC. TCT No. reminding petitioner of their agreement that the amount of P2M should be considered as a loan payable within 6 months. Petitioner. Inasmuch as he extended the scope of his authority by defiantly disobeying the lawful directive of his superior. Then. the petitioner received by mail the decision of the director and all the records of the case. Private respondents appealed the assailed decision to the CA where the same is currently pending resolution. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. as the first party. it was nevertheless the petitioner’s duty to enforce the decision of the Director. petitioner is liable for damages in his personal capacity. and Dra. denied the petition and enjoined Mayor Tuanda to recognize private respondents as sectoral representatives. Moral damages may be awarded in culpa contractual when the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. 168173 covers the property in the name of IMRDC. information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging petitioners with graft and corruption on the ground that the former willfully and unlawfully caused injury to the respondents by refusing to pay them their respective salaries. Ruling: It cannot be disputed that Delmo went through a painful ordeal. but it was denied. after due investigation. Delmo asked for reconsideration of the decision but petitioner denied it. executing an affidavit of loss and by filing a petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of said title. Respondent decided not to purchase the property and notified petitioner through a letter. petitioners filed an undated petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said designations. In that capacity. Delmo extended loans from the funds of the club to some of the students of the school. 168173. Thus. respondent Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of petitioners. as President of the school. Petitioner’s actuation would have deprived respondent of the security for her loan were it not for the timely filing of a petition for relief whereby the RTC set aside its previous order granting the issuance of a new title. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Petitioner received from respondent P2M in cash and P1M in a post-dated check. petitioner Ledesma. 31 of the CC provides that when the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony. Petitioner. on the day of graduation. It is clear that petitioner’s execution of the affidavit of loss became the basis of filing of the petition with the RTC for the issuance of a new duplicate copy of the TCT. While petitioner was acquitted in the false testimony and perjury case. petitioners filed an action to declare null and void the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives before the RTC. which she acquired from IMRDC by virtue of deed of sale. which is a complete disregard of Delmo’s rights. RTC granted respondent’s petition for relief of judgment and ordered the provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation of petitioner for perjury and false testimony. 168173 entitles respondent to moral damages. 27 of the CC. Thus. Thereafter. as the second party. as well as a telegram from the Director asking for the return only of the records of the case. which was brought about by the petitioner’s neglect of duty and callousness. Petitioner filed an amended answer stating that no interest could be due as there was no Issue: valid mortgage over the property as the principal obligation is vitiated with fraud and deception. Flora San Diego. W/N the respondent is entitled to moral damages. this civil action for certiorari and prohibition. Delmo was not awarded as Magna Cum Laude. The latter. moral damages are but proper. but was rendered as stale check. RTC rendered a decision declaring the designations of the respondents as representatives to be null and void ab initio. Article 31 Frias v. Sandiganbayan Facts: Private respondents Della Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as sectoral representatives. respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying the motion for suspension of proceedings filed by petitioners. petitioner made many lame excuses to deprive Delmo of the award. citation or honor from the school. Delmo. sent a letter to Delmo informing her that she was being dropped from the membership of the club and that she would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the school. The petitioner claims that the said act was against school rules and regulations. those actions are entirely distinct from the collection of some of money with damages filed by respondent against petitioner. They elected Violeta Delmo as the treasurer. Meanwhile.
while the action was instituted precisely to resolve w/n the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law. should the CA uphold the RTC’s decision declaring the designation null and void charges against petitioners would no longer have a leg to stand on.sectoral representatives. Ruling: Art. Thus. and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. The trial judge granted the motion. filed a motion to defer proceedings on the ground that the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Bobis v. Petitioners cannot be accused of bad faith and partiality there being in the first place no obligation on their part to pay private respondents’ claims. for the same must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners. In the case at bench. petitioner’s wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was the petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman. Therefore. As ruled in Landicho v. It has two essential elements: a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action. As stated above. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void. Thus. which is a pending resolution. In her answer. but also that in the resolution of the issue/s raised in the aforesaid civil action. Beltran v. which was effective at the time of celebration Issue: of the second marriage. nullified or terminated. respondent cannot be permitted to us his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him. 36 of the CC) because a decision on that point is vital to the eventual judgment in the criminal case. It is a question based on fact distinct and separate from the “crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused xxx”. and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Thus. All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case. It is. Issue: W/N the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy. in the case at bar. respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without marriage license. Without having the marriage annulled. he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. Bobis Facts: Respondent Isagani contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce Javier. W/N the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is a prejudicial question. Hence. Ruling: The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. but it was denied. parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage. and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based. Petitioner. There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action and the criminal case are closely related. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case. Relova. in order to forestall the issuance of warrant of arrest. respondent contracted another marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. More importantly. Ruling: A prejudicial question is one that must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or before it may proceed (Art. not a prejudicial question. a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so . She subsequently filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against petitioner and his paramour. it must be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity. Pp Facts: Petitioner Meynardo Beltran filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. the resolution of the civil case will certainly determine if there will still be any reason to proceed with the criminal action. Hence. therefore. With regard to petitioner’s argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners’ alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents’ salaries as sectoral representatives. the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. the issue in the civil case constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners. In the case at bar. Petitioner filed MFR. It should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense. 40 of the FC. Sometime thereafter. Based on petitioner’s complaint-affidavit. this petition for review on certiorari. the resolution of the prejudicial question is a logical antecedent of the issues involved in said criminal case. information for bigamy was filed against respondent. and b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
. Inc. hence. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue/s raised in the civil case. Respecting the propriety of the dismissal by the ombudsman of the complaint due to the pendency of a prejudicial question. Ruling: If the award to the undisclosed bidder of orbital slot 153 E is. PASI President and CEO. specifically Sec. not dismissed. since the alleged offended party is Saag. the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper. or for administration. PASI. the ff. for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case. Lichauco issued a notice of offer for several orbital slots including 153 E. To give imprimatur to the ombudsman’s dismissal of petitioner’s criminal complaint due to prejudicial question would not only run counter to the provisions of Sec 6. Issue: W/N there exists a prejudicial question in the case at bar. if there be any. he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. CA Facts: Petitioner Vincent Omictin filed a complaint for two counts of estafa against private respondent George Lagos. by letter. by letter about the assignment of the orbital slots and requested the bank’s confirmation of its participation in a club loan. as such. PASI filed a complaint against Lichauco before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act. For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend criminal action. the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. the investigating officer. Phil. Lichauco Facts: DOTC Secretary Lagdameo.. Pp Private respondent Elena Librojo filed a complaint for perjury against petitioner Francisco Magestrado. The assistant city prosecutor filed information for perjury against petitioner. Subsequently. PASI thereupon undertook preparations for the launching. the proceeds of which would be applied to PASI’s interim satellite. despite repeated demands. refused to return Ruling: Facts: the two company vehicles entrusted to him when he was still the president of Saag. De Guzman. Ruling: Ultimately. Upon evaluation of the said office. through prescription under Art. the rules of Court. Inc. A month later. Private respondent was indicted with the crime of estafa. confirmed the government’s assignment of Phil orbital slots 161 E and 153 E to PASI for its AGILA satellites. 6. President and CEO of Landbank. operation and management of its satellites by.. Taken in this light. said rule directs that the proceedings may only be suspended. Phils. 89 vis-à-vis Articles 90 and 91 of the RPC. and not at the instance of the judge alone or as in this case. alleging that private respondent. filed a complaint before the RTC against Lichauco and the “unknown awardee”. Rule 111. in the civil case. which was approved by the Ombudsman. among other things.. Inc.declared can it be held void xxx. Logically. Private respondent filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the basis of a prejudicial question because of a pending petition with the SEC involving the same parties. Lapuz sent a copy of the latter to then Undersecretary Lichauco who denied the assignment of two orbital slots to PASI and only the slot 144 E is the one that can be made available to PASI. However. there would be no prohibited act speak of nor would there be basis for undue injury claimed to have been suffered by petitioner. later informed Lapuz. Phils. Moreover. Therefore. claiming that the offer was without its knowledge and that it subsequently came to learn that another company whose identity had not been disclosed had submitted a bid and won the award for orbital slot 153 E. The finding by the ombudsman of the existence of a prejudicial question is thus well-taken. applies in a suppletory character. it found the existence of a prejudicial question and recommended its dismissal. Thus. petitioner’s appointment by the former is likewise allegedly invalid. if the supposed authority of petitioner is found to be defective. the validity of the demand for the delivery of the subject vehicles rests upon the authority of the person making such a demand on the company’s behalf. Magestrado v. requisites must be present: a) the civil case involves facts intimately related to . it is as if no demand was ever made. Petitioner alleged that two civil cases pending before the RTC must be resolved first before criminal case may proceed since the issues in the civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action. and that it may be made only upon petition. v. It would sanction the extinguishment of criminal liability. Issue: W/N it is proper to suspend the criminal case for perjury filed by private respondent against petitioner pending final outcome of the two civil cases. Agila Satellite. Omictin v. Issue: W/N a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the resolution of the intracorporate controversy that was originally filed with the SEC. as laid down in Yap v. Paras. the resolution of the issues raised in the intracorporate dispute will determine the guilt or innocence of private respondent in the crime of estafa filed against him by petitioner before the RTC. or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver or to return the same or deliver the value thereof to the owner could only give rise to a civil action and does not constitute the crime of estafa. PASI argues that since the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman is silent on the matter. Petitioner filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on prejudicial question. the mere failure to return the thing received for safekeeping or on commission. obtaining loans and the like. Jr. It appears that private respondent filed SEC for the declaration of nullity of the appointments of Alex Tan and petitioner as ad interim president and ad interim operations manager stressing that Tan’s appointment was invalid because it did not have the acquiescence of the board of directors. declared valid for being within Lichauco’s scope of authority to thus free her from liability for damages.
The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exemption. and never did obtain any marriage license from any civil registry. Carmelita’s father caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract. Carino. and it was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro’s parents. However. in itself. On the said date. and c) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal. As ruled in the case of Carino v. “a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license xxx”. it was already governed by the New Civil Code. It will be remembered that the subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a “secret marriage” – a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of the contracting parties. The fact that Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is. which reversed the trial court’s decision. it authorizes the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search. upon appeal by Carmelita. declaring the marriage null and void. disagreed with the TC. the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. duress and intimidation. absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. proceed independently of each other. Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for the States. At the time the marriage was solemnized. The marriage contract states that a marriage license was issued in the name of the contracting parties. Hence. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on w/n petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss of the TCT. Issue: W/N the certification of the local civil registrar of Pasig is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued prior to the celebration of the marriage of Castro to Cardenas. according to law. or there is no necessity “that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case”. it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. Castro appealed to the CA. The certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value. this petition.those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. consequently. 29. The baby is now in the US. Carmelita refuted that she and Jaime were married civilly and in a church ceremony thereafter. According to Jaime. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry and the NSO. Ruling: The certification of the local civil registrar of Pasig is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued prior to the Petitioner Jaime Sevilla filed a complaint claiming that he was forced by Carmelita Cardenas and the latter’s father to marry Carmelita by employing machinations. therefore. The TC denied he petition on the ground that the certification was not adequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of marriage between the parties. A marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of marriage. scrutinizing the certifications by the local civil registrar . celebration of the marriage of Castro to Cardenas. which provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. The TC declared the marriage null and void on the ground that no marriage license was issued by the local civil registrar as certified by the same office. he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita. When Castro gave birth. A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that the two civil cases pending before the RTC are principally for the determination of w/n a loan was obtained by petitioner from private respondent and w/n petitioner executed a real estate mortgage. b) in the resolution of the issue/s raised in the civil action. Desiring to follow her daughter. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to the abovementioned rule. his brother adopted the baby. Ruling: The Court agrees with the CA. Issue: W/N the certifications from the local civil registrar of San Juan stating that no marriage license as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was issued are sufficient to declare the marriage as null and void. That was when she discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage. he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. As stated in Sec. the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Castro offered in evidence a certification from the civil register of Pasig certifying that the subject marriage license does not appear from the records of such office. As proof. Neither is there prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can. this petition. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years. Sevilla v. Cardenas Facts: Family Code: Article 3 Republic v. not a ground to deny her petition. It is evident that civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other. criminal case involves the determination of w/n petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support his request for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of the title. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage. Hence. The couple did not immediately lived together as husband and wife until Castro discovered she was pregnant. CA Facts: Private respondent Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony by a certain judge. a certificate of “due search and inability to find” sufficiently proved that his office did not issue the subject marriage license to the contracting parties. On the other hand. But. However. But the CA. their cohabitation lasted only for 4 months.
However. Sec. First. Petitioners point put that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. respondent judge averred that a certain Juan Arroyo had requested him to solemnize the said marriage and assured that all documents to the marriage were complete. the influx of visitors and the delivery of provisions for the occasion. Except in cases provided by law. he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of facts. since the marriage was nullity. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. To support their proposition. both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty w/n such license was issued. Damian Facts: Sometime in 1917. it is the marriage license that gives solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to real properties in the name of “Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado”. Likewise. the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan. 3 of the Rules of Court provides that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Here. they presented a certificate identity issued to Mrs. although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage. its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. During this period spanning more than half a century. the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Issue: W/N there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Rustia. According to petitioners. which preceded the issuance of marriage license is void. several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo and Josefa. Issue: W/N respondent judge is administratively liable for having solemnized a marriage license without the requisite marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. Camarines Sur. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia. Rustia. on the other hand. Camarines Sur. he refused to solemnize the marriage. In People v. the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of the subject marriage license. Article 4 Aranes v. De la Rosa v. the certificate of identity issued to Josefa as Mrs. It can also mean that the logbook just cannot be found. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. Rule 131. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook. a veterans application for pension or compensation for disability wherein Guillermo Rustia himself swore to his marriage to Josefa Delgado. Once the presumption of marriage arises. a Phil. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless. 129. Guillermo Rustia. Guillermo Rustia.” It could be easily implied that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of the marriage license due to its “loaded work”. he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. we held that a marriage. or that his testimony could not be secured. Their cohabitation for more than 50 years cannot be doubted. respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of law. Their family and friends knew them to be married and even the original petition for letters of administration filed referred to them as “spouses”. They maintain that Guillermo and Josefa were married in 1919 and from then on lived as husband and wife until the death of Josefa. He also requested that the marriage be solemnized in Nabua instead to Balatan because Orobia had difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of traveling. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook had been exerted. Occiano Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Aranes alleges that respondent Judge Salvador Occiano solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua. Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but w/n a marriage in fact took place is disputed. the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. the authority of the RTC judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the SC. he averred that he examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. more . due to the earnest pleas of the parties. which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. Presumption of facts is either conclusive or disputable. It does not appear on records that the custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing. In this case.P. Moreover. They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. passport issued to Josefa D. Ruling: A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of facts. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license. The respondents. Ruling: Under B. Moreover. This implication is confirmed by the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan that they cannot locate the logbook because the person in charge of the said logbook has already retired. In this respect. However. in his Comment. other evidence may be presented in support thereof. Lara. petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast properties” left by Orobia was not recognized. Conversely. a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as “senorita” or unmarried woman. and titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa Delgado. it must be noted that the first two certifications bear the statement that “hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.of San Juan. to which he acceded. and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein. In the case at bar. Before he started the ceremony.
that is. petitioner’s own witness confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa. a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. On March 1998.than adequately support the presumption of marriage. such copy must be a) accompanied by 1) 2) There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. Art. and that they eventually lived together as husband and wife. his wife obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. which is a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by divorce obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and 17 of the CC. through the OSG. When the suit for declaration of nullity of marriage was pending. we state the twin elements for the application of Par. respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from an Australian Family Court. Third. In view of the foregoing. contends that such provision of the FC is not applicable to the instant case as it only applies to a valid mixed marriage. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. There is no showing of w/n it was an absolute divorce or a limited divorce. however. 26 as follows: Ruling: Phil. an Australian citizen in Malabon. 2 of Art. should be allowed to remarry. and their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter. the twin requisites for the application of Par. On June 1992. Cipriano. Cipriano discovered that his wife has been naturalized as an American citizen. In this case. . there is a need to remand the case in the lower court to determine such legal capacity. 2 of Art. A few years later. The TC admitted the decree as evidence.. Rizal and lived as husband and wife in Australia. 2 of Art. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either 1) an official publication or 2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. Hence. Clearly. an Australian Family Court decreed a decree of divorce. Article 26 Garcia-Recio v. this appeal. a Filipino citizen. Recio Facts: Rederick Recio. 26 of the FC allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. alleging that the respondent has a prior subsisting marriage at the time when they got married. 1994. then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Par. In the case at bar. every intendment of the law leans towards legitimizing matrimony. 2 of Art. Second. It is important to determine the legal capacity of the respondent at the time when he married petitioner to determine w/n their marriage should be declared null and void. such as the alleged single or unmarried civil status of Josefa who had no hand in its preparation. Thus. foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and b) authenticated by the seal of his office. the “divorces” Filipino spouse. 26 of the FC. Facts: certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Phil. 26 of the FC. Petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio and respondent were married on Jan. 2 of Art. Then. Cipriano’s wife left for the US bringing along their son. and A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The divorce decree between Editha and respondent failed to fully determine w/n it enabled respondent to have the legal capacity to remarry the petitioner. Ruling: If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein. but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In their application for marriage license. He was therefore already legally capacitated to marry petitioner at that time. hence our court cannot grant it. Mere presentation of the divorce decree is insufficient. In 1986. Cipriano thereafter filed with the TC a petition for authority to remarry invoking Par. If the record is not kept in the Phils. respondent became an Australian citizen. thus declaring the divorce to be valid and recognized in the Phils. In this jurisdiction. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage. the baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner. the Republic.. Orbecido III In 1981. 26 are both present in this case. Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo and Josefa. These are public documents. Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros Villanueva. petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy. may be recognized in the Phils. respondent merely presented an interlocutory decree. which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. was married to Editha Samson. respondent was declared as single and Filipino. when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Republic v. after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. who are both aliens. Two years after their marriage. the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to rematty.” A divorce obtained abroad by a couple. but respondent averred that the divorce decree issued by the Australian Family Court had already dissolved his prior marriage at the time when they got married. 26 of the FC. such decree is not enough. provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. However. and that in 2000. law does not provide for absolute divorce. Issues: W/N there was a valid divorce between Editha and Rederick. Issue: W/N Cipriano is allowed to remarry under Par. It must be proven as a fact. Therefore.
They lived with Julia’s parents. knowing that the marriage was bigamous and void as the marriage contract clearly stated that both Issue: contracting parties were separated. Julia then left for the US to work as a nurse. Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license. The 5-year common-law cohabitation period. Badayog Facts: Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other. Respondent judge cannot deny this knowledge. She promised to return home after the expiration of the contract but she never did. petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. In 1986. But due to the frequent interference of Julia’s parents.Article 34 Ninal v. as manifested in their joint affidavit. it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. Leouel now argues that the failure of Julia to return home or at least communicate with him for more than 5 years now connoted that she is psychologically incapacitated to enter into a married life. a marriage of a man and a woman who had lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least 5 years before the marriage is exempt from such requisite. Article 36 Santos v. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Art. Ruling: Art. Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits subscribed and sworn before the respondent. the absence of such renders the marriage void ab initio. should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. and thereafter Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for 5 years. 34 of the FC provides that “no license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and without legal impediment to marry each other. both Manzano and Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior marriages and that in their marriage contract. neither can respondent Judge take refuge on their joint affidavit that they had been cohabiting for 7 years because it does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. However. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage. Sanchez Facts: Complainant Borja-Manzano filed a case against Respondent Judge Sanchez charging him with gross ignorance of the law because he solemnized the marriage between David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao in 1993 who were both bound by prior existing marriages. Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. Ruling: Psychologically incapacitated must be characterized by a) . however. must less authorize the parties to contract another marriage. Leouel filed a complaint with the RTC for the nullity of their marriage under Art.” Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar.1986. When Leouel underwent a training program under the AFP in the US. Ruling: The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the FC. Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. However. one year and 8 months thereafter. After 7 months. which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. Issue: W/N the second marriage of Pepito with Norma is null and void under the CC. he desperately tried to locate or get in touch with Julia but to no avail. Issue: W/N the subsequent marriage of David and Luzviminda falls under Art. It is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. both were “separated”. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. After Pepito’s death in a car accident. it was indicated that both were “separated”. W/N Julia is psychologically incapacitated. the applicable law to determine their validity is the CC. 20. Pepito has a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with Norma. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken. Even assuming that Pepito and Teodulfa had separated in fact. The fact that Manzano and Payao have been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time is also immaterial because legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie. In lieu thereof. Borja-Manzano v. 36 but it was dismissed. the fact remains that their 5-year period of cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. at the time Pepito and Norma’s marriage. she called for the first time. In this case. Respondent claimed that he did not know that Manzano was legally married and all he knew was that both parties were cohabiting together for 7 years. More so. which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage. Manzano and Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior marriages and that in their marriage contract. the couple would have quarrels. 34 of the FC. it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. 53 of the CC. only about 20 months had lapsed. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death. CA Facts: Leouel Santos and Julia Bedia were married on Sept. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his second marriage.
The ff. CA affirmed it. the defendant invited her mother. that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. After the celebration. the petition is denied. there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. the present recourse. observe love. b) juridical antecedence – it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage. c) incurability – it must be incurable or even it was otherwise. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. CA Facts: Sometime in May 1988. normal and still a virgin. They submitted themselves for medical examinations. As a result. his mother and his nephew. there is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is incapacity. According to the plaintiff. include their mutual obligations to live together. as so expressed by Art. Reynaldo was relieved on his job and since then. Issue: W/N Chi Ming Tsoi is psychologically incapacitated. the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. RTC rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. Reynaldo left her and their child and had since then abandoned them. On appeal. Hence.gravity – the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in the marriage. And that he married her. 1985. Republic v. They stayed there for 4 days but there was no sexual intercourse between them since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair. a Filipino citizen. one of the essential marital obligations under the FC is “to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of a marriage. are guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 1989. Ruling: Evidently. In the case at bar. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22. if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. and he was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances resulting to frequent quarrels between them. The factual settings in the case at bench. respect and fidelity and render help and support. this instant petition. She claims that she did not even see her husband’s private parts nor did she see hers. The defendant submitted himself in a physical examination. Roridel had been the sole breadwinner on the family. 68 of the FC. TC rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. defendant Chi Ming Tsoi married the plaintiff Gina Lao. Ruling: Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity. and that he uses an eyebrow and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. due to some psychological (not physical) illness. There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night and the same had happened on the following nights. After a year of marriage. Hence. The CA denied the appeal of petitioner. can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. that a few weeks later. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. But during this period. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married person. although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage. Roridel resigned from her job and went to live with her parents in Baguio. neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. Went they went to Baguio. The assailed decision of the CA is hereby affirmed. It appears to be more of a “difficulty”. they went and proceeded to the house of the defendant’s mother. it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so. the defendant just went to bed. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. the cure would be beyond the means of the parties involved. CA Facts: Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14. which. 1988 until March 15. Issue: W/N mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities constitutes psychological incapacity. Hence. to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain his appearance of a normal man. then turned his back and went to sleep. in no measure at all. In the present case. slept on one side thereof. She further claims that the defendant is impotent. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem. 36 of the FC: 1) 2) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriages belongs to the plaintiff. a closet “homo” as she did not show his penis. The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get along with each other. Chi Ming Tsoi v. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a) b) c) d) 3) 4) 5) Medically or clinically identified Alleged in the complaint Sufficiently proven by experts Clearly explained in the decision The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable Such illness must be grave enough to bring the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage . and the results were that she is healthy. an uncle. there is no evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his friends on whom he would squandered his money.
petitioner filed a suit for the annulment of her marriage with the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity. Hernandez v. then disappear again. After the downfall of the Marcoses. Due to that. Marcos Facts: Petitioner Brenda and respondent Wilson got married twice. The TC found Wilson to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards Brenda and their children. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake. She and her children left their house. not for declaring a marriage void. The TC dismissed the case. he devoted most of his time drinking with his friends. CA: gravity. In 1992. he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. CA Facts: Petitoner Lucita was working as a teacher in PCU whereas respondent was her student. other than her self-serving declaration. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychologically condition. They eventually got married. suddenly reappear for a few months. They became sweethearts when respondent was no longer her student. Expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity. should be given great respect by our courts The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State conclusion of psychological incapacity on his. In the instant case. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused. then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. the totality of his acts does not lead to a Republic v. Marcos v. he would hit and beat her. At best. petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them. went to their house to look for her missing son. In Santos v. Hence. 1994. 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children Interpretations given by the National Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines while not controlling or decisive. Hence. In a case study conducted by a social worker. The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. It must be shown that the acts of the respondent are manifestations of a disordered personality. the CA reversed the RTC’s decision. if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. During their marriage. respondent failed to perform his obligations to support his family and contribute to the management of the household. The CA affirmed the trial court. in which he had an illegitimate son with one of them. Ruling: The acts alleged by the petitioner do not constitute psychological incapacity. Issue: W/N the acts alleged by the petitioner constitute psychological incapacity. No evidence was presented to show that respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. she was so angry and she lambasted him. Issue: W/N a personal medical or psychological examination is required before it could be declared that the respondent is psychologically incapacitated. he would leave their house. On appeal. Mario continued his studies for two more years. which make him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation. they would often quarrel and as a consequence. he beats Lucita often. respondent was suffering from psychological defect. For indeed. the root cause may be “medically or clinically identified”. He turned violent. During the times he was with his family. It was not sufficiently provided that respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature. He would disappear for months. CA. which in fact. inflicting physical harm on her where she suffered contusions. Nevertheless. Thus. deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. In fact. they were already living separately. the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity. Although the respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment. psychological capacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity xxx and that this psychological condition must be present at the time the marriage was celebrated. in order that it existed at the inception of the marriage. for several times. Ruling: Personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. he left the military service and then engaged in different business ventures that did not prosper. juridical antecedence and incurability. if any. and not merely physical. Because of these. He also infected her with STD. 7) 8) The marriage of Roridel to Reynaldo subsists and remains. this appeal. this appeal. When she. when she saw him in their house.6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68-71 of the FC as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220. Dagdag Facts: Respondent Erlinda Matias married Avelino Dagdag in 1975. he got mad and ran after them with a samurai and even beat the driver. and not merely due to his youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome. Sometime in Oct. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. Brenda submitted herself to a psychologist while Wilson did not. Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. A week after the wedding. He had been cohabiting with other women. he would inflict . with her two sisters and a driver. The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
this appeal. let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract. a seaman. to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. Hence. It started in1988 when petitioner noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to perform his marital covenant. which reversed the RTC’s decision. RTC declared the marriage to be null and void ab initio. 36 of the FC. he chased petitioner with a shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. On Oct. Ruling: Subsequent to Santos and Molina. The prosecutor filed a motion to set aside the judgment.physical injuries on her. Diana filed a motion to dismiss the second petition on the ground that the second petition failed to cause an action. extremely low intelligence. 2 (d) provides: a petition under Art. When cautioned to stop. the CA dismissed the petition and denied the MFR. The RTC granted the petition without waiting for the manifestation of the prosecutor to intervene in the case. and like circumstances. Barcelona v. He was cruel and violent. Pesca v. Ca. cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime. Initially. and that she escaped from jail. Petitioner sued respondent before the RTC for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychologically incapacity. 1993. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline no. She presented her sister-in-law as a witness. Ruling: In Republic v. Pesca Facts: Petitioner Lorna and respondent Zosimo first met sometime in 1975 while on-borad an inter-island vessel. slap and kick her. 36 of the FC shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration. he later filed a motion to withdraw petition. a perusal of the allegations in the petition shows that Diana has violated Tadeo’s rights. petitioner assaulted respondent about half an hour in the presence of the children. That was when she and the children left the conjugal home. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. the Ca affirmed the RTC’s ruling. Upon Diana’s MFR. Sec. The TC held that contrary to Diana’s claim. respondent Tadeo Bengzon filed a petition for annulment of marriage against petitioner Diana Barcelona. immaturity. the TC issued an order denying the motion. as are indicative of the psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. petitioner has utterly failed. 36 of the FC. In July 1995. He was a habitual drinker. further. which the TC granted. has been explained by the court in Santos and reiterated in Molina. this petition. Erlinda failed to comply with the evidentiary requirements. Erlinda filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. . The TC issued an order deferring resolution of the motion until the parties ventilate their arguments in a hearing. And respondent Tadeo’s second Issue: W/N emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. they got married. thus giving rise to a cause of action. as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible. they did not live together as petitioner was still a student and respondent. if any. Psychological incapacity under Art. the Court laid down guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. this petition. In fact. CA Facts: In March 1995. as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Art. The Solicitor General also filed MFR. At one time. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes the party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants xxx. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. respondent would beat. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity. a habitual alcoholic and a fugitive from justice. Issue: W/N the second petition failed to cause an action. Finally. the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. What the new rules require the petition to allege are the physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity. so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. At all events. After a whirlwind courtship. the Court adopted a new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Respondent appealed to the CA. Sometime in 1994. invoked by her. On appeal. both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence. Ruling: The term “psychological incapacity”. the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged the investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the TC’s decision was prematurely rendered. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility. In the case at bar. or at least minimize his drinking. On appeal. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations. 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Both were denied by the RTC. likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities. 36 of the FC on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity. had to leave the country barely a month after the marriage. She was battered black and blue. The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that “expert opinion need not be alleged” in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Tadeo filed a new petition for annulment of marriage against Diana. Issue: W/N the TC and CA correctly declared the marriage as null and void under Art. Hence. His true color of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could stay together. Hence. and she suffered contusions and abrasions. however.
and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages. in 1993. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage. Ruling: The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon. sexual infidelity. petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Hence. Sharon did not stop her illicit affair with the Jordanian national. They lived together continuously until the latter part of 1991 when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes. which defies easy analysis and definition. a Japanese national. in fact. In this case. could not have given a valid assumption thereof. In short. Issue: W/N the totality of evidences presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. TC declared the marriage null and void. while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise to futurity and commitment. Since then. CA Facts: Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted a marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Petitioner presented Dr. A month later. it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the AFP. Likewise. Natividad Dayan who testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of the petitioner and found him to be ‘fine’ while Sharon was suffering from anti-social personality disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity. the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Art. Sharon turned out to be irresponsible and immature wife and mother. petitioner and Ancajas satisfied all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage. appealed. Moreover. the financial support only lasted for two months and efforts to contact him . Finally. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage are indications antisocial personality disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of a marriage. petitioner left the conjugal dwelling stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. 55 of the FC: physical violence. drug addiction. Respondent Republic. Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions. Sharon returned to the petitioner bringing along her children with the Jordanian. Sharon was confined in a hospital for treatment by a clinical psychiatrist but despite such. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. Thereafter. through the OSG. Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the FC. Issue: W/N the declaration of nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.petition complies with this requirement. Villareyes confirmed that Tenebro was indeed her husband. Neither could her emotional immaturity and responsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. moral pressure. the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. immaturity or sexual promiscuity. petitioner filed a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. In a handwritten letter. petition is denied. Then. At best. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes. CA Facts: Petitioner David Dedel met respondent Sharon Corpuz-Dedel while he was working in the advertising business of his father. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory. and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner. In this case. Petitioner avers that during the marriage. later affirmed in church rites. not merely due to her youth. Tenebro v. What is. and in which produced 4 children. Republic v. Hamano Facts: In 1988. The mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is penalized under the RPC. The RTC rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. It appears that respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. petitioner contracted yet another marriage with Nilda Villegas. a lieutenant in the PSC and later a Jordanian national. respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming. disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration. the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation. abandonment and the like. The two were married civilly and such was ratified by a church wedding. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. habitual alcoholism. Hence. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Sharon abandoned him petitioner to join the Jordanian in Jordan with their two children. this petition. When the said Jordanian left the country. but he never did. Lolita married Toshio. the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Toshio returned to Japan with the promise he would be back by Christmas. Dedel v. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void. the CA affirmed the decision of the TC. Although the judicial declaration of a nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned. Thereafter. she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. Ruling: The declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned. not for declaring a marriage void. or knowing them. civil interdiction. On appeal. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Both were over 18 years of age and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before a judge in the presence of at least 2 witnesses.
They asserted respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. and she spent lavishly on unnecessary items. Issue: W/N the norms laid down by the SC in Santos and Molina cases applicable to marriages where one of the parties to the marriage and alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is a foreigner.. and affirmed by the CA. the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified. alleged in the complaint. the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a mixed marriage. that petitioner was normal while they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. not physical illness. As stated in the Molina case. First. 6) she presented herself as a person of greater means. which was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal with modification. respondent presented a psychiatrist. as a rule. This could have been done through expert witness. told lies and invented personalities. For indeed. who stated. The TC favorably acted upon her petition. there was no need for an actual medical examination. 36 where Lolita alleged that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. it would greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. The norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality. it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person. and c) incurability. Although. . Village Hotel Pavillon. 36 alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. b) juridical antecedence. It reached the point of paranoia. In those cases. Antonio v. In support of his petition. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden to proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. 3) she misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist and told some of her friends that she is a psychology graduate. sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the TC’s decision. respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. thus alter her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. The TC declared the marriage null and void giving credence to petitioner’s evidences. Village Hotel Pavillon.through letters proved futile. Ruling: The Court finds no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. They concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. which decision was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican. petitioner elevated the case to the SC. As manifestations of such. While the two witnesses did not personally examine respondent. her occupation. As held in Molina. Issue: W/N the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Art.” We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina. Apart from his own testimony. educational attainment and other events or things. petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself. The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician shall physically examine the alleged psychologically incapacitated spouse in order that his psychological incapacity may be “medically or clinically identified”. Thus. Petitioner duly alerted the CA of these rulings. who testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant. Shortly before the TC rendered its decision. led him to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. Ruling: Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity “is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of the awareness of duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. income. but still. the CA reversed the RTC’s judgment holding that the totality of evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity as declared in Molina case. which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. 36 of the FC as laid down in the Molina case. Lolita also learned from friends that Toshio visited the Phils. the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties. Hence. and certifications from Blackgold and the Phil. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories. Second. petitioner presented a psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist. Reyes Facts: Petitioner Leonio Antonio filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent Marie Ivonne Reyes declared null and void under Art. 4) she claimed to be a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold and postulated that a luncheon show was held in her honor at the Phil. This Lolita did not do. The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated in Santos: psychological incapacity must be characterized by a) gravity. In opposing the petition. b) alleged in the complaint. the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. He also presented two expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In the case at bar. this instant petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on Art. The Court cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior. and 7) she exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him. It is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological. c) sufficiently proven by experts. the totality of evidence presented concerned need not be resorted. In addition. 2) she fabricated story that her brother-in-law attempted to rape and kill her. the Court had already held in Marcos v. but never bothered to visit her and their child. The CA further stated that the case at bar cannot be equated with Santos and Molina cases. Marcos that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. the people around her. 5) she invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez. to wit: 1) she concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son. which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. and d) clearly explained in the decision. based on the tests they conducted.
Issue: W/N the “leaving-of-the-house” attitude of respondent. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals were sufficiently convinced that the respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted. Norma admitted that her marital woes started only after the birth if their firstborn and when Eulogio lost his job. Issue: alcoholism. an expert witness would have strengthened Norma’s claim of Eulogio’s alleged psychological incapacity. but was denied. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Phils. The parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the petitioner left his wife. the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by a) gravity. the manifestations of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity are his immaturity. including parenting. Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Art. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties of the marriage. Likewise. From the totality of the evidence. 221 and 225. 36 of the FC. habitual . should be given great respect by our courts. Seventh. In this case. Subsequently. In Marcos v. 36. constitutional laziness. however. Petitioner appealed to the CA. filed an appeal with the CA. Indeed. no other evidence was presented to show that Eulogio was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations outlined in Articles 68 to 71. 220. Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina. and preference to spend Republic v.Third. not physical. CA (Molina) the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. The RTC correctly ruled. unbearable jealousy. psychiatric or psychological examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love. Further. there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. W/N Eulogio is psychologically incapacitated Ruling: In Santos v. much less its psychic meaning. this present petition fro review of certiorari. It should refer to “no less than mental. Cuison-Melgar Facts: Norma and Eulogio were married and begot five children. thus she filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. which affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court. Such psychological incapacity. and abandonment of his family since Dec. According to Norma. must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial. we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Art. the abandonment and lack of support. while not controlling or decisive. and the CA erred in reversing the trial court. CA. the sexual infidelity. 1985.. maltreatment. Marcos. she did not disclose the fact of her natural child’s parentage. a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond. Petitioner filed the instant MFR. There can be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no showing that the “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. which affirmed the decision of the RTC. the Court laid down in Republic v. there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. Clearly in this case. 36 of the FC and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. The CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the Catholic Church annulled the marriage of the parties. Sixth. 68 to 71 of the FC. Hence. In fact. thru the OSG. they indicated a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction or at least abide by the truth. evidence other than Norma’s lone testimony should have been adduced. the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks. we are sufficiently convinced that the petitioner has established the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity. Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. b) juridical antecedence. RTC rendered its decision nullifying the marriage of Norma and Eulogio Petitioner. Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris Facts: In Feb. 2001. the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition for declaration of nullity of Amy Perez’s marriage with Brix Ferraris on the ground that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Art. While an actual medical. More disturbingly. Norma failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married. and c) incurability. The Court resolves to deny petitioner’s MFR. Norma filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations. All told. trust and respect. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage. Petitioner’s MFR was denied for lack of merit. Eulogio was suffering from a psychological defect that I fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. In order that the allegation of psychological incapacity may not be considered a mere fabrication. Hence. As noted by the TC. It supports the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable. petition is granted.
the “leaving-of-the-house” attitude whenever they quarreled. Petitioner filed a special civil action in the CA. During their . Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. such as. Petitioner filed a motion to dimiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. Hence. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner. Parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.” Art. which is in his possession.” Carino v. It added that private respondent has no property. the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained. unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. More so. Issue: W/N a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. quite apart from being plainly self-serving. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Ruling: There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former’s previous marriage with Emerlina dela Paz was still subsisting is bigamous. the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses. he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. Hence. respondent alleged that petitioner has been unemployed. the custody and support of the common children. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder called “schizoid” and why is he the “dependent and avoidant type”. the petition for the declaration of its nullity is. Respondent filed a petition before the RTC for the declaration of nullity of their marriage and for declaration of sole and exclusive ownership over all properties. superfluous and unnecessary. and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and delivery of the latter’s presumptive legitimes. but unknown to her. In such cases. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. In the case at bar. Ruling: The term “psychological incapacity” to be ground for the nullity of marriage under Art. testimonial or documentary. this petition. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. If in the affirmative.more time with his band mates than his family. When a marriage is declared void ab initio. 1976. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. petitioner’s evidence showed that respondent’s alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated. Carino Facts: Article 40 Domingo v. in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which is legally unassailable. The word “solely” is meant to qualify “final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. The CA ruled against the petitioner. Petitioner likewise failed to prove that respondent’s supposed psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage. marriage. The TC did not accept such contention and denied his motion to dismiss. it is void from the beginning. the abandonment and lack of support. However. the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for the “liquidation. whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage. We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder. distribution. 36 of the FC. the sexual infidelity. Their problems began when petitioner started doubting respondent’s fidelity. which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate. to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. She came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina sued them for bigamy. Inputs on the supposed problematic history of respondent’s parents also came from petitioner. the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks. and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family. The marriage being void ab initio. Dr. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. partition and distribution of the parties of the spouses. in case of an action for liquidation. and has been disposing some of her properties without her knowledge or consent. one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage. grave. Undoubtedly. As such. and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes. which married is valid and still existing. are rooted on some debilitating psychological condition. The doctor’s statement that one suffering from such mixed personality disorder lacks specificity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Also. It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. CA Facts: Private respondent Delia Soledad Domingo and petitioner Roberto Domingo got married on Nov. therefore. 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. permanent and incurable psychological malady. partition. evidence needs must be adduced. Dr. Dayan’s information that respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself. he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. has been cohabiting with another woman.
On appeal to the CA. In 1988. Art. therefore. subject to certain exceptions. to his legal heirs. Issue: W/N the applicable property regime would be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property. respondent obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents. intestate succession. property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. To bolster her collection for sum of money. to whom he had two offsprings. but she claimed that she has no knowledge of such marriage. respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. it could not be said that the contributed money. his children with petitioner Susan Nicdao. Nolasco Facts: Respondent Gregorio Nolasco was a seaman. Hence. The marriage between petitioner and the deceased. respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. though void. On cross-examination. respondent. adulterous relationships. respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet had given birth to his son. Ruling: Under the CC. Under Art. but only arrived after 9 months. Respondent claimed that he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home. the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property. the first marriage. who spent for his medical and burial expenses. the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent. to whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation. and eventually got married. this instant petition. onehalf of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime. and the absence thereof. he contracted two marriages. there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage. void ab initio.” Under Art. and he first met Janet Monica Parker. the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. relationships in a state of concubine. The disputed P146. was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. namely. the second marriage would also be void. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet. 148 is therefore in order. and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement. Respondent filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146. the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent. they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased. 148 of the FC (bigamous marriages. for purposes of remarriage. as it applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage. 40 of FC. not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them. considering that the two marriages are void ab initio. Thus.” Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Janet lived with respondent on his ship for six months until they returned to respondent’s hometown.000 while respondent received a total of P21. while working overseas. By intestate succession. and the second was with respondent Susan Yee Carino. incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Considering that the marriage of respondent and the deceased is a bigamous marriage. TC ruled in favor of respondent. having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased). A marriage license. and that she had left Antique. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. As to the property regime of petitioner and the deceased. the application of Art. but rather. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to Janet were all returned to him. Then. It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition. 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto. a British subject. After the marriage celebration. Respondent admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of. in a bar in England.During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago Carino. be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the FC on “property regime of unions without marriage. Hence. like the absence of marriage license. entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. the first was with petitioner Susan Nicdao Carino. the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. Article 41 Republic v.000. a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage. under the foregoing article. In contrast to Art. Hence. He insisted that his wife refused to give him such information even after they were married. He passed away under the care of Susan Yee. however. there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriage exempt from the license requirement. having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license. In the case at bar. but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons. relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons. Accordingly. “only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money. Art. Thereafter. which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 1969. and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of. He further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. Petitioner was able to collect a total of P146. even if the deceased alone as a government employee earned the disputed “death benefits”. Conformably. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner and the deceased void. otherwise. and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by. but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith.000 are clearly renumerations. that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio. multiple alliances of the same man). And. the marriage of respondent and the deceased. Santiago became ill and bedridden. before a party can enter into a second marriage. Unless respondent presents proof to the contrary. wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them. He also testified that he did not report . 147 of the FC governs. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case. renders the marriage void ab initio. property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio. 148. is likewise.000 collectively denominated as “death benefits”. is undoubtedly void ab initio.
On the other hand. Ruling: Issue: Alan Alegro and Lea Julaton were married in Jan. In sum. respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to get help of the police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. Sued for bigamy. Pp In July 1975. TC declared that Janet is presumptively dead. Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent’s bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts. to look for her there. Issue: W/N Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead. he would look for Lea in the malls. respondent. The respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. In this case. he went to Manila and went to the house of Janeth in Navotas. but the Republic appealed to the CA. Then. that his spouse Lea was already dead. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search fro his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a “well-founded belief” that she is dead. which affirmed the TC’s decision. instead of seeking help of local authorities or of the British Embassy. he secured another seaman’s contract and went to London. Starting 1999. the respondent failed to present a witness other than Brgy. CA Facts: Facts: The spouse present is burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The OSG appealed to the CA affirming the decision of the TC. Lea was nowhere to be found. if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Art. Also. Alan further testified that after his work. and thereafter married her. Manuel v. On Feb. Tina became curious and made inquiries from the NSO where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. When he arrived in San Jose. Captain Magat. under unspecified circumstances. the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief. In the case at bar. 1996. More so. The TC declared Lea as presumptively dead. 391 of the CC. 2) 3) 4) W/N respondent acted on a well-founded belief of the death of his wife. this petition. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters. failed to make inquiries from his parentsin-law regarding Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. he went to the house of one of Lea’s friends. authorities. but when he arrived home later. that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead. he went to the house of Lea’s parents to look for Lea. on his free-time as a taxi driver. a vast city of many millions of inhabitants. Lea was still in the house. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC. it would be better for her to go back to her parents. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person. when informed by Nelson Abaenza that Janet had left for Manila. he reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station and NBI. and did not return home since then. Eduardo started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. the respondent admitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law. Alan narrated that when he reported for work the following day. Hence. Eduardo Manuel was married to Rubylus Gana. this petition. 41 of the FC: 1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years. and that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. Lea arrived home late in the evening and he berated her for being always out of their house. and to his friends’ houses as well. that the present spouse wishes to remarry. he sought the help of Brgy. 2001. Republic v. he met private complainant Tina Gandalera sometime in Jan. left and did not return. when he retuned to Samar. the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet’s whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. his fatherin-law told him that Lea had just been there but that she left without notice. the court rendered judgment finding . or two consecutive years. but it was only an afterthought. 1995. before he filed his petition in the RTC. which respondent claims were all returned to him. Antique after learning Janet’s departure. 1995. The Court also views respondent’s claim that Janet declined to give any information as to her personal background even after she had married respondent too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. Eduardo took all his clothes.the matter of Janet’s disappearance to the Phil. Sometime in Jan. Janeth Bautista. Ruling: There are four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Art. The circumstances of Janet’s departure and respondent’s subsequent behavior makes it difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet were dead a well-founded one. Eduardo avers that he married Tina believing in good faith that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years. he again looked for his wife. Captain Magat. Hence. After the trial. Respondent did not explain the delay of 9 months when he allegedly asked leave from his captain. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search. The respondent did not report and seek the help of the local authorities and the NBI to locate Lea. considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. It could have enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea’s whereabouts considering that Lea’s father was the owner of Radio DYMS.
” Article 42 SSS v. respondent is rightfully the dependent spousebeneficiary of Bailon. The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by Art. 42 of the FC does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage. Under the CC. Under the FC. CA affirmed the TC’s decision. the CFI granted the petition. Since the second marriage has been contracted because of presumption that the former spouse is dead. Bailon. If the absentee spouse reappears. as a consequence. de Bailon Facts: Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz contracted a marriage. he did so in good faith and without criminal intent. he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. 390 of the CC. Ruling: The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the FC. which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. which judicial declaration was not even a requirement then for purposes of remarriage. this instant petition. He also posited that the TC should have taken into account Art. She claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime: the first with Alice. Ruling: The phrase “or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings” was incorporated in the RPC in consonance with the civil law. It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married Tina in 1996. Jarque Vda. who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon. as he had not heard of her for more than 20 years since 1975. in accordance with law. the second with her mother Elisa. 1992. Under Art 2. Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years when Bailon sought the declaration of her presumptive death. More than 15 years later. and by fiction of law. no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. 349 of the RPC. such absentee’s mere reappearance. Respondent filed an additional claim for death benefits. Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998. W/N respondent is the rightful spouse-beneficiary of the deceased. Hence. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Art. Under Art. Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque. 83 of the CC. Eduardo appealed to the CA insisting that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married Tina.000 by SSS. paid for Bailon’s medical and funeral expenses. hence. CA Facts: Orlando and Lilia got married sometime in April 1988. will not terminate such marriage. and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity. died. he was of the well-founded belief that his first wife was already dead. a subsequent marriage being voidable. Bailon filed before the CFI a petition to declare Alice presumptively dead. In the present case. Sec. Orlando filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into . In the case at bar. and all the documents submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are spurious. The SSS however maintained the denial of her claim. Issue: W/N Eduardo was in good faith when he married Tina. this petition. together with her siblings. Respondent’s MFR having been denied. Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits by letter to the SSS. On Nov. Article 45 Villanueva v. Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead. the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gana in 1975. which was also granted by the SSS. either by affidavit or by court action. The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. 12 of the Constitution.Eduardo guilty of bigamy. but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage. hence. a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. he or she must still be regarded as legally as absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law. such presumption continues in spite of the spouse’s physical reappearance. even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage. 41 of the FC.” In the case at bar. the marriage is presumed to subsist. failed to discharge his burden. Issue: Respondent thus filed a petition against the SSS before the SSC for the restoration of her entitlement to monthly pension. By resolution. SSS recommended the cancellation of payment of death pension benefits to respondent. the SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void and therefore she was just a “common-law-wife”. the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy. all whom are still alive. and one Elisa Jayona contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. the “State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits and was granted P12. By order. the applicable law to determine their validity is the CC. which reversed and set aside SSC’s decision and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits due her. in relation to Art. Cecilia Bailon-Yap. which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years. The SSC and SSS separately filed their MFR. and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married Tina and. as found by CFI. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith. she filed a petition for review before the CA. as no step was taken to nullify. It bears noting that the marriage under any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid “unless declared null and void by competent court. and the third with respondent. it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage. she. The petitioner. but both were denied. who was a member of the SSS since 1960 and a retiree thereof effective July 1994. however.
following Art. which was denied by the CA. threats. but had their conjugal partnership property dissolved judicially. insanity. Ong William and Lucita were married. eye. used insulting language against her. such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision. William would also beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of the belt. the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Although he knew where Marietta is residing. filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of the wife. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct. William. and he would slap her and kick her. Rodolfo married Teresita Rodil in civil rights. 55. which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. Lack of cohabitation. that he never cohabited with her after the marriage. Cavite that is now used as a residence of Marietta and their children. Bildner Facts: Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. not a ground to annul a marriage. intending to remarry. The TC and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18. What benefit would Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents’ and siblings’ financial interests at the expense of her marriage? What is more probable is that there truly exists a ground for legal separation. 1 of the FC alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence. intimidation or undue influence xxx. Article 55 Ong v. the validity of the marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. Hence. One of the properties adjudicated in her favor was a resort named Munting Paraiso in Carmona. “gago”. stomach. that Lucita was willing to destroy his reputation by filing the legal separtion case just so her parents and her siblings could control the properties he worked hard for. Article 48 Ancheta v. W/N the abandonment of Lucita is also a ground for legal separation Ruling: William posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in order for her side of te family to gain control of the conjugal properties. Issue: W/N the TC and public prosecutor erred when they admitted the adduced evidence of the respondent ex-parte as it is in defiance to Art. par. who are now all of the age of majority. and that he later learned that Lilia’s child died during delivery. Otherwise. 48 of the FC. Rodolfo. The abandonment referred to by the FC is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. Lilia moved for the dismissal of the complaint. arguing that Orlando freely and voluntarily married her. a decree of legal separation should not be granted. intimidation and grossly abusive conduct. The last of these quarrels was Lucita was hit on her head.marrying Lilia. Marietta then filed a petition with the CA for the annulment of the order of the RTC. that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage. Ruling: The record show that for the petitioner’s failure to file an answer to the complaint. a cause so strong that Lucita had to seek redress from the courts. “where she may be served with summons. For many years. 55. Ancheta Facts: Spouses Rodolfo and Marietta separated-in-fact. Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation under Art. with physical violence being inflicted upon her. although he admits the last quarrel he had with Lucita. which states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. RTC rendered its decision decreeing legal separation. The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with Lilia of any of those grounds. Ruling: The letters admitted to be written by Orlando contained expressions of love and concern for his wife. After the grant of the petition. and arms. who was already pregnant. she and William quarreled almost everyday. The public prosecution condoned the acts of the TC when he interposed no objection to the motion of the respondent. for his part. Article 68 Ilusorio v. William appealed to the CA. Sec. which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. William hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house. Rodolfo had the respondent wife declared in default and was allowed to adduce evidence ex-parte. the validity of the marriage must be upheld. Issue: W/N lack of cohabitation is a ground per se for annulment. is per se. The TC forthwith received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor. denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife. and hardly the rantings of a man under duress. bang her head against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage. and begot three children. Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family. On March 1996. 4 of the FC. he alleged in his petition that Marietta is residing in Las Pinas. the TC granted the motion of the respondent herein to declare her in default. who is about 68 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at million pesos. William would shout invectives at her like “putang ina mo”. Lucita claimed that soon after three years of marriage. 48 of the FC. the present petition. when she bent down because of pain. 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court. or whipped the children wit the buckle of his belt. The actuations of the TC and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Art. such as lack of parental consent. Metro Manila.” For failure to file an answer. “tanga”. par. which provides that there must be no Issue: Facts: defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. Potenciano was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio City Country . Wiilaim filed MFR. fraud. pull her hair. left cheek.
That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice. He made it clear to the CA that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. kit also emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. De Batocael Facts: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of a parcel of land. 87 of the FC. Two of their children alleged that during this time. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons. Luzviminda. Article 87 Arcaba v. Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium. the CA observed that he was of sound and alert mind.” Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for declaration of nullity of the deed. and that the latter did not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper. we will deprive him of his right to privacy. He made it clear that he did not object to seeing them. USA. On the other hand. the latter’s cousin. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. As a consequence. It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married. A few months after his death. they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. this petition. between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. Potenciano may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. though he provided her family with food and lodging. Hence. The CA also observed that Potenciano did not request the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. and this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. and absent of any true restraint on his liberty. not merely nominal or moral. Issue: W/N the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. Respondents.Club. Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potencaiano. especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. As to Potenciano’s mental state. Issue: W/N Erlinda may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband Potenciano to live with her in conjugal bliss. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. Erlinda filed with the RTC a petition for guardianship over person and property of Potenciano due to latter’s advanced age. frail health. In Bitangcor v. Vda. The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. According to Leticia. At the very least. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse. Francisco executed a “deed of donation inter vivos” in which he ceded a portion of the subject property to Cirila in consideration of “the faithful services Cirila had rendered over the past 10 years. direct or indirect. claimed that the latter had told her that Cirila was his mistress. Having no children to take care of him after his retirement. Ruling: The donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. and dwelling together. Cohabitation. The fact that Potenciano is about 86 years old or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation. Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights. they are merely meretricious. upon Potenciano’s arrival from the US. She alleged that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prevented Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City. Ruling: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement and detention. of course. having answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court. only Cirila was left to take care of Francisco. Otherwise. Being of sound mind. Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. he stayed with Erlinda for about 5 months in Antipolo City. who are the decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession. we have no reason to reverse the findings of the CA. In 1942. In 1972. their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft. After due hearing. When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights. alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inter vivos is void under Art. poor eyesight and impaired judgment. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective. Potenciano’s health deteriorated. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together. Cirila said she was a mere helper who could enter the master’s bedroom only when the old man asked her to and that Francisco in any case was too old for her. an anti-depressant drug prescribed by his doctor in NY. the term “cohabitation” or “living together as husband and wife” means not only residing under one roof. After attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City. which states that every donation or gratuitous advantage. After Zosima’s death. . 87 of the FC. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition. Erlinda and Potenciano contracted a marriage and lived together for a period of 30 years. as well as the store inside. The CA missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor but the right of a wife to visit a husband. 87 of the FC. To justify the grant of the petition. recovery of possession and damages. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. means. in which the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the property to Francisco. Makati. With that declaration. In 1997. but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda but dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. then a widow. but also having repeated sexual intercourse. he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices as to his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice. to take care of his house. do not constitute such kind of cohabitation. he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercised of his right. Francisco asked his niece Leticia. except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. Tan. while Erlinda Tabancura. The CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. more than sexual intercourse. and petitioner Cirila Arcaba. another niece of Francisco. even if often repeated.
___________________________________________________ “The King’s Good Servant. gave him therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same room. the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee. their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient. in an answer to a civil case filed by Francisco’s lesses. At the very least. and the death certificate of Francisco. but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife. Aside from those. but Francisco’s common-law spouse. a sanitary permit to operate as a real estate lessor with a health certificate. the following evidences preponderantly prove that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage wherein Cirlia signed such documents using the surname “Comille”: 1) 2) 3) an application for a business permit to operate as a real estate lessor. they referred to Cirila as “the common-law spouse of Francisco.In the case at bar. But God’s First” TAU MU – Scroll No. after all. It is difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time. Human reason would thus lead to the conclusion that she was Francisco’s common-law spouse. entitled to a regular cash wage under the law. More so. 490 . She was.” Finally.
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