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G.R. No.147812. April 6, 2005 LEONARDO R. OCAMPO, Petitioners, vs. LEONORA TIRONA, Respondents. CARPIO, J.

: This is a petition for review to annul the Decision of the Court of Appeals setting aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. The RTC affirmed the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City ordering respondent Leonora Tirona to vacate and surrender possession of the property under litigation to petitioner Leonardo R. Ocampo. The MTC also ordered Tirona to pay Ocampo rentals i n arrears, attorneys fees, and costs of suit. FACTS: Ocampo alleged that he is the owner of the subject land with an approximate area of 500 square meters, located at Alvarez Street, Pasay City. Ocampo bought the subject land from Rosauro Breton, heir of the subject lands registered owner Alipio Breton Cruz. Possession and administration of the subject land are claimed to be already in Ocampos management even though the TCT is not yet in his name. Tirona, on the other hand, is a lessee occupying a portion of the subject land. According to Ocampo, upon acquisition of ownership of the subject premises, a formal written notice was given to Tironat. In recognition of Ocampos right of ownership over the subject premises, Tirona paid some monthly rentals due, however, Ocampo received a letter from Callejo Law Office of stating among others, that, in view of the fact that the subject premises was declared under area for priority development, Tirona is invoking her right of first refusal and in connection thereto Tirona will temporarily stop paying her monthly rentals until and unless the National Housing Authority have processed the pertinent papers as regards the amount due to Ocampo by reason of the implementation of the above law. Ocampo sent a reply letter. Ocampo wrote a letter to Tirona demanding upon to pay the rentals in arrears for months and to vacate the premises. Despite receipt of said letter Tirona failed and refused and still fails and refuses to heed Ocampos demands. Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages. Tirona filed her answer asserting that Doa Lourdes Rodriguez Yaneza actually owns the subject land. The allegations in the answer state thus: One Edison A. Hindap, Sr. an assignor and General Overseer and Attorney-in-Fact of DOA LOURDES RODRIGUEZ YANEZA. That the Title of Ocampo has overlapped the Original Land Title of the Assignor. That Tirona, was recognized by the Assignor as co-owner by possession. Transfer and assign the said parcel of land in Tironas favour was made.That the property in question is not owned by Ocampo, but rather owned by the Assignor, as evidenced by Certification for Occupancy and Assignment in favor of Tirona. Tirona maintained that Ocampo is not the owner of the subject land. She stated that the certificate of title to the subject land is not even registered under Ocampos name. Tirona also alleged that she has a right of first refusal in case of sale of the land, pursuant to Presidential Decrees. The issue considered by the MTC for resolution was whether Ocampo may eject Tirona because of nonpayment of rent and because of the termination of Tironas right to possess and occupy the subject land. The MTCs Ruling The MTC ruled that Tirona does not have any reason to suspend payment of rents and that non-payment of rents rendered her occupation of the subject land illegal. As owner of the subject land, Ocampo is entitled to its use and enjoyment, as well as to recover its possession from any person unlawfully withholding it. The RTCs Ruling.

RTC relied upon by the MTC in finding for Ocampo and declaring that Tirona can be lawfully ejected from the subject premises. The Appellate Courts Ruling The appellate court considered partition of the estate of Alipio Breton as a prerequisite to Ocampos a ction. The appellate court ruled that until the partition of the estate is ordered by the Regional Trial Court in the pending partition proceedings and the share of each co-heir is determined by metes and bounds, Ocampo cannot rightfully claim that what he bought is part of the property occupied by Tirona. ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT LEONARDO R. OCAMPO HAS RIGHT TO EJECT LEONORA TIRONA, OR DEMAND PAYMENT OF RENTALS FROM HER FOR THE USE AND OCCUPANCY OF THE LOT INVOLVED IN THE PRESENT CASE. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP IS ESSENTIAL TO AN ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER. HELD: Elements to be Proved Unlawful detainer cases are summary in nature. The elements to be proved and resolved in unlawful detainer cases are the fact of lease and expiration or violation of its terms. To support their conclusion that there was an existing lease, the MTC and RTC found that:(1) Ocampo informed Tirona through a letter that he bought the subject land, upon which Tironas house stands, from the previous owner and lessor Rosauro Breton; (2) Tironas continued occupancy of the subject land signifies Tironas acceptance of Ocampos conditions of lease ; and(3) In asserting her right to possess the subject land, Tirona admitted that Ocampo is her lessor. In a letter, Tirona was referred to as "the hereinmentioned tenant of yours." In Mirasol v. Magsuci, et al., we ruled that the sale of a leased property places the vendee into the shoes of the original lessor to whom the lessee bound himself to pay. The vendee acquires the right to evict the lessee from the premises and to recover the unpaid rentals after the vendee had notified the lessee that he had bought the leased property and that the rentals on it should be paid to him, and the lessee refused to comply with the demand. Ownership as an Issue Contrary to Tironas position, the issue of ownership is not essential to an action for unlawful detainer. The fact of the lease and the expiration of its term are the only elements of the action. The defense of ownership does not change the summary nature of the action. The affected party should raise the issue of ownership in an appropriate action, because a certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. Although a wrongful possessor may at times be upheld by the courts, this is merely temporary and solely for the maintenance of public order. The question of ownership is to be settled in the proper court and in a proper action.

G.R. No. L-1806 February 25, 1948 ALFONSO PAGKALINAWAN and MANUEL PAGKALINAWAN, petitioners, vs. SOTERO RODAS, Judge of First Instance of Manila, JOAQUIN GARCIA, Sheriff of Manila, and MANUEL TAMBUNTING, respondents. PARAS, J.:

FACTS: In an ejectment suit between Manuel Tambunting, plaintiff, and Alfonso Pagkalinawan and Manuel Pagkalinawan, defendants, appealed from the municipal court to the Court of First Instance of Manila, the latter court, after trial, rendered a decision sentencing the defendants to vacate the house in question and to pay the plaintiff the rentals from November, 1946, at the rate of P45 a month, plus the costs. Acting upon a motion for reconsideration, filed by the defendants, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order absolving the defendants from the complaint. The Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. The defendants sought to stay the execution on the ground that they had in the meantime filed with the same court an interpleader suit against the plaintiff and one Angel de Leon Ong, praying that the latter two be ordered to litigate their conflicting claims to the rentals due from the defendants for the premises in question, it appearing that said defendants received a notice from the Attorney of Angel de Leon Ong advising the defendants to stop paying rentals to the plaintiff. The Court of First Instance of Manila acceded to the motion for stay of execution, but, at the instance of the plaintiff, it issued an order directing that execution be proceeded with. Failing to obtain a reconsideration of the latter order, the defendants instituted the present petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking from us an order directing Hon. Sotero Rodas, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and Joaquin Garcia, sheriff, to desist from carrying out the writ of execution. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a right to file interpleader in view of the claim of rentals and is free to withdraw deposits. HELD: There is merit in the petition. It is true that the decision of the respondent judge, orders the petitioners to pay the rentals directly to the respondent Manuel Tambunting and provides for their ejectment in case of default. But it appears that, in connection with the interpleader suit filed by the herein petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila, said rentals were deposited with the clerk of court, of which fact the respondent judge was informed by the petitioners in their constancia. Such deposits, in our opinion, constitute a bona fide compliance with the decision of the respondent judge, since it is undeniable that the petitioners were warned by Angel de Leon Ong not to pay rentals to the respondent Manuel Tambunting. That there is really a conflicting claim between Angel de Leon Ong and respondent Manuel Tambunting is evidenced by the fact that there are pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila civil case between Angel de Leon Ong, plaintiff, and Manuel Tambunting, defendant, for the ejectment of Tambunting from the property located at Nos. 329 to 339 Tanduay Street, Manila. Under the law, the latter have a right to file the interpleader suit in view of the claim for rentals of Angel de Leon Ong; and if the respondent Tambunting believes that he is legally entitled to said rentals, he is free to move for withdrawal of the deposits made by the petitioners. The petition is hereby granted and the respondent judge and sheriff are ordered to desist from carrying out the writ of execution

G.R. No. 70145 November 13, 1986 MARCELO A. MESINA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, in his capacity as Judge of Regional Trial Court Manila (Branch VIII), JOSE GO, and ALBERT UY, respondents. PARAS, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Marcelo A. Mesina against the trial court in Civil Case. Said case (an Interpleader) was filed by Associated Bank against Jose Go and Marcelo A. Mesina regarding their conflicting claims over Associated Bank Cashier's Check. FACTS: Respondent Jose Go, purchased from Associated Bank Cashier's Check No. for P800,000.00. Unfortunately, Jose Go left said check on the top of the desk of the bank manager when he left the bank. The bank manager entrusted the check for safekeeping to a bank official, a certain Albert Uy, who had then a visitor in the person of Alexander Lim. Uy had to answer a phone call on a nearby telephone after which he proceeded to the men's room. When he returned to his desk, his visitor Lim was already gone. When Jose Go inquired for his cashier's check from Albert Uy, the check was not in his folder and nowhere to be found. The latter advised Jose Go to go to the bank to accomplish a "STOP PAYMENT" order, which suggestion Jose Go immediately followed. He also executed an affidavit of loss. Albert Uy went to the police to report the loss of the check, pointing to the person of Alexander Lim as the one who could shed light on it. The records of the police show that Associated Bank received the lost check for clearing coming from Prudential Bank, Escolta Branch. The check was immediately dishonored by Associated Bank by sending it back to Prudential Bank, with the words "Payment Stopped" stamped on it. However, the same was again returned to Associated Bank and for the second time it was dishonored. Several days later, respondent Associated Bank received a letter, rom a certain Atty. Lorenzo Navarro demanding payment on the cashier's check in question, which was being held by his client. He however refused to reveal the name of his client and threatened to sue, if payment is not made. Respondent bank, in its letter, replied saying the check belonged to Jose Go who lost it in the bank and is laying claim to it. Police sent a letter to the Manager of the Prudential Bank requesting assistance in Identifying the person who tried to encash the check but said bank refused saying that it had to protect its client's interest and the Identity could only be revealed with the client's conformity. Unsure of what to do on the matter, respondent Associated Bank filed an action for Interpleader naming as respondent, Jose Go and one John Doe, Atty. Navarro's then unnamed client. On even date, respondent bank received summons and copy of the complaint for damages of a certain Marcelo A. Mesina from the Regional Trial Court. Respondent bank moved to amend its complaint, having been notified for the first time of the name of Atty. Navarro's client and substituted Marcelo A. Mesina for John Doe. Simultaneously, respondent bank, thru representative Albert Uy, informed Cpl. Gimao of the Western Police District that the lost check of Jose Go is in the possession of Marcelo Mesina, herein petitioner. When Cpl. Gimao went to Marcelo Mesina to ask how he came to possess the check, he said it was paid to him by Alexander Lim in a "certain transaction" but refused to elucidate further. An information for theft was instituted against Alexander Lim and the corresponding warrant for his arrest was issued which up to the date of the filing of this instant petition remains unserved because of Alexander Lim's successful evation thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the IAC went beyond the scope of its certiorari jurisdiction by making findings of facts in advance of trial. HELD: In his third assignment of error, petitioner assails the then respondent IAC in upholding the trial court's order declaring petitioner in default when there was no proper order for him to plead in the interpleader case. Again, such

contention is untenable. The trial court issued an order, compelling petitioner and respondent Jose Go to file their Answers setting forth their respective claims. Subsequently, a Pre-Trial Conference was set with notice to parties to submit position papers. Petitioner argues in his memorandum that this order requiring petitioner to file his answer was issued without jurisdiction alleging that since he is presumably a holder in due course and for value, how can he be compelled to litigate against Jose Go who is not even a party to the check? Such argument is trite and ridiculous if we have to consider that neither his name or Jose Go's name appears on the check. Following such line of argument, petitioner is not a party to the check either and therefore has no valid claim to the Check. Furthermore, the Order of the trial court requiring the parties to file their answers is to all intents and purposes an order to interplead, substantially and essentially and therefore in compliance with the provisions of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. What else is the purpose of a law suit but to litigate? The records of the case show that respondent bank had to resort to details in support of its action for Interpleader. Before it resorted to Interpleader, respondent bank took a precautionary and necessary measures to bring out the truth. On the other hand, petitioner concealed the circumstances known to him and now that private respondent bank brought these circumstances out in court (which eventually rendered its decision in the light of these facts), petitioner charges it with "gratuitous excursions into these non-issues." Respondent IAC cannot rule on whether respondent RTC committed an abuse of discretion or not, without being apprised of the facts and reasons why respondent Associated Bank instituted the Interpleader case. Both parties were given an opportunity to present their sides. Petitioner chose to withhold substantial facts. Respondents were not forbidden to present their side-this is the purpose of the Comment of respondent to the petition. IAC decided the question by considering both the facts submitted by petitioner and those given by respondents. IAC did not act therefore beyond the scope of the remedy sought in the petition.