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by David Kaufmann
Thus God, the Absolute, eludes finite beings. Where they desire to name him, because they must, they betray him. But if they keep silent about him, they acquiesce in their own impotence and sin against the other, no less binding, commandment to name him.1
The critique of metaphysics is by now a venerable tradition in Western thought
and has been tied since the end of the eighteenth century to the principle of emancipation. The drive to disenchant the world -- the ongoing tendency to wrest rational control from what previously could only be seen as blind fate -has always been closely associated with the Enlightenment’s concerted attack on the institutional privileges and intellectual status accorded to revealed religion. The story is well known. Kant saved faith from Hume and philosophy from dogmatism by curtailing the speculative pretensions of the one and the reach of the other. At the same time, he submitted religion to the court of reason and thus left space for autonomy. The Left Hegelians (particularly Feuerbach and Marx) took the humanization of the world a step further by reducing metaphysics to anthropology and religion to need. The history of religion became the history of man’s alienated but authentic hope, a hope that needed to be reclaimed in the name of freedom. Nietzsche -- the apostate son of a Lutheran pastor -- launched his own, anti-Hegelian critique of metaphysics. He sought to psychologize the urge for atemporal, necessary, and universal Truth and thus to cure the nostalgia for a sovereign God and a sovereign Subject by revealing them both to be fictions of grammar and bad faith. And to this day, we find the emancipatory interest in overcoming metaphysics pursued literally by Left Hegelians and rhetorically by Nietzscheans -- by Marxists and Heideggerians, by Leftists and Deconstructionists. If there is any accuracy in this short and somewhat simplistic potted history of anti-metaphysical thought, then it is worth asking how and why it is that Theodor Adorno -- aberrant Marxist, Left Hegelian par excellence, close reader and follower of Nietzsche -- should insist on using blatantly religious tropes throughout his career. Now, it goes without saying that metaphysics -- the study of extra-sensory reality -- is not always the same as religion. But, from his first book on Kierkegaard to his final completed work, the Negative Dialectics, in which he launches a critical recovery of metaphysics itself, Adorno returns again and again to themes derived from metaphysics and theology. Assuming that Robert Hullot-Kentor is correct when he claims that "theology is always moving right under the surface of all Adorno’s writings" and that "theology penetrates every word" of them,2 I would like to look at the use to which Adorno puts a particularly Jewish notion of the name of God. I will argue that Adorno uses the Name as a model for a philosophy that understands the historical conditions that constrain it and the human needs that render it necessary. Let us begin at the end, with a quotation from the last section of Negative Dialectics. Adorno is discussing that peculiar dialectic of enlightenment that turns on itself with the result that "whoever believes in God cannot believe in God" and that "[t]he possibility represented by the divine Name is maintained by whoever does not believe." Adorno explains: Once the prohibition on graven images extended to speaking the Name; now in this form it has itself come to look suspiciously like superstition. . .This is how
so that now only the non-believer can take the positions once held by belief. the second commandment was the first move towards religious rationalization. has been revealed in history to be a false positivity. It is the human attempt. This becomes clear in a short essay on music and language. The apparent paradoxes that the dialectic of disenchantment brings forth are figured linguistically by piling up negations. The prohibition on speaking the Name maintains the integrity of the transcendent while preventing any shortcuts towards attaining it. which in turn can be maintained solely by the faithless. on the attempt to harness divine power.deeply absorbed the history of metaphysical truth has become. not to communicate meanings. in the sheer ineluctable necessity of the world as it is. This however feeds on itself just as the mythical gods liked to devour their children. the fall into immanence that monotheistic Judaism sought to escape. That would be myth. For myth is nothing other than the closed relation of immanence.3 For Adorno. the bond between Name and being is still recognized in the ban on pronouncing the name of God. The protection of God’s transcendence has come to look suspiciously like a lapse into immanence. in which the idea of the patriarchate rises to the annihilation of myth. Hope is only tied to the prohibition against calling on what is false as God. Adorno differentiates music from what he calls intentional language that is.. lie as Truth. following Weber.not as part of a magic incantation that calls godly powers down to earth but as an indication that the world could in fact be different.Adorno’s present moment -. that vainly denies history. It is not that God does not have a name. that is. Its Idea is the divine Name which has been given shape. But the hope that still lingers in the Name is not merely the residue of a double negation. a bold attempt to free man from myth: In the Jewish religion. What it has to say is simultaneously revealed and concealed.4 If myth is the belief in the unavoidability of immanence. It has positive content as well..faith has fled from theology. by avoiding the false stability of positivities. of what is. what is finite as the Infinite. that therefore the transcendent is not possible. the instrumental language of everyday communication: The language of music is quite different from the language of intentionality. In it. It contains a theological dimension. The prohibition on magic. As it leaves nothing but the merely existent behind. The disenchanted world of Judaism reconciles magic through its negation in the idea of God. only the nonbeliever can cleave to the hope of transcendence that inheres in the doctrine of the Name. doomed as ever. leaves one smack in the middle of an unchangeable world. a myth. written ten years after the collaboration with Horkheimer and a good decade before the Negative Dialectics. of the refusal of false hope that Horkheimer and Adorno posit in their Dialectic of Enlightenment. rid of efficacious magic. The Jewish religion will not endure a single word that would grant comfort to the despair of all that is mortal. to name the Name. But the quotation from Negative Dialectics indicates that the course of disenchantment has not come to a rest with the Judaic victory over myth in the doctrine of the divine Name. then Judaism frees itself from myth by making the divine Name transcendent -. At this point in history -. it flashes back into myth. The negation of mere magic has in turn been demystified. Music . It is demythologized prayer. progressive demythologization.
but it does so at the cost of unambiguous meaning.points to true language in the sense that content is apparent in it.. its self-revelation. Unlike music and language. of information. which has migrated to the languages of intentionality. He talks about the names that Adam gives.8 Truth.. I would suggest that we look briefly at the elective affinities between Adorno and Franz Rosenzweig. Note that Adorno moves from sound to sight. The absolute is. but. they display them. It is sudden and beyond dispute. from each other. returns to Genesis. but at the moment of discovery it becomes obscured. preventing them from seeing things which are perfectly visible. Truth is the self-representation of the object. leaves each one behind because each is limited. This dream of a language beyond intention derives directly from Walter Benjamin. put the absolute in a relation with others. . 9 Paradise is a paradise of simple existence.. not only from phenomena. Ideas are displayed without intention in the act of naming. Whereas Knowledge seeks possession of an object through representation.7 Benjamin contrasts Truth with the Idealist account of knowledge (Erkenntnis). then demands a mode of being which in its lack of intentionality resembles the simple existence of things. They leave everything free and absolute. where names offer the world up for show. the German-Jewish philosopher. Benjamin. It wants to subsume the particular under the universal and render it conceptual. We have discussed the value Adorno places on the ban on speaking God’s name. limited though conceptually clear. just as too powerful a light dazzles the eyes. and thus. Music finds the absolute immediately. Intentional language wants to establish a relation with the absolute. although it is not quite clear how well he .it stands alone and independent.. In order to see what he is getting at. by definition.sacrifices the conceptually clear for the immediacy of that which avoids mediation. not the name of God. Now. whose Star of Redemption Benjamin praised. of communication between people. read.paradise [is] a state in which there is as yet no need to struggle with the communicative significance of words.5 True language is thus not the language of meaning. I would like to suggest that he sees an advantage in recuperating the notion of the Name itself. The structure of truth. knowable. as the simple existence of things. not absolute. Here is Benjamin in the famously difficult introduction to his book on German tragic drama (Trauerspiel): Truth is the death of intention.6 The most important problem with intentional language is that it wants to mediate the absolute.like the language of music -. and the absolute escapes language for every specific intention. True language -. it is not articulated over time. but which is superior in its permanence. is Edenic and tied to the Adamic practice of naming: . versions of the absolute. They do not mediate the essences of things. and quoted. impervious to mediation -. Language and music are like a blinding light that unveils a presence in its inexhaustible totality in a flash. It is the revelation of the absolute: Intentional language wants to mediate the absolute.all essences exist in complete and immaculate independence. Thus it can only offer partial. . especially.
That which has a proper name refuses objectification. God’s name is both a particular and a category: it is his own. one cannot help addressing him: he cannot be thematized. and takes place in the constant renewal of the relationship between God and man. My use of Kantian language here is deliberate. Hence there is no theoretical concept of God. In short. marks a noticeable shift in Rosenzweig’s thinking. It is incapable of utter absorption into the category for there can be no category for it to belong to. This impossibility is historical. categorized. written a few years after The Star of Redemption. does not mention the prohibition against speaking the Name. the revelation of simple existence through names occurred mythically in Eden. that is. A proper name does not necessarily entail that a thing should be granted dignity and thus has to be viewed as unique and free. There is an obvious disparity between Adorno and Rosenzweig here.understood the book he was able to plunder so well. for Benjamin. Horkheimer and Adorno do claim that it is endemic to reason itself and thus is primordial. infinite concept. . Because there is no place that God is not. through a constant dialectic of nearness and remoteness. To be fair. After all. if one can imagine such a thing. Adorno. it is for Rosenzweig a mundane. For him. such as Baal. because he is the universal. have names. is a cipher of the Kingdom of Ends. . his concept is also his name.10 A proper name signals an absolute particularity that cannot be subsumed in a category or by a universal. it is its own category.to outflank scientific positivism on one side and proto-Fascist irrationalism on the other. too mythical. If. because a true ontology is impossible in our day. no longer everyman’s affair. it must be treated as having dignity. on the other hand. according to whether it is absent or present. God is never absent. to save modern rationality from itself and from its . the false gods of Palestine. He redeploys the theological to make an ontological point. He wants to show. wants to apply theological insights to a world and language that seem too immanent. especially as one can speak them. God always has his Name. or subsumed under the universal. who is interested in intersubjective communication. that God can be addressed.God alone has a name that is also a concept. Whatever has a name can be talked about.11 This little commentary. although it is worth remembering that in the Dialectic of Enlightenment. it is one of a kind and must be addressed intersubjectively. it is central that God has a name. refuses reduction to instrumental calculations. It is not one of many. can be talked to. daily occurrence. that transcendence does not preclude an intersubjective relation to God. I would like to bracket this argument by claiming that it was formulated with the distinct polemical purpose of that book in mind -. The ultimate proper name is the name of God: The paradox of God’s being simultaneously near and remote is essentially expressed in the fact that he has a name. Rosenzweig begins with the assumption that God is absolute. Rosenzweig provides the following brief discussion of proper names: That which has a name of its own can no longer be a thing. Rosenzweig. So their names do not confer privilege.
It therefore leaves the subject in the trammels of an immanence that cannot be transcended and leaves the subject worshipping a totality -. This abstractness is born of the lie that exchange value follows natural or quasi-natural laws. it projects their reconciliation not into the future but into an unrecoverable past. The impossibility of a true contemporary ontology can be seen in the failure of the false ones. the definite would come to itself. is thus an index of a real historical predicament. where all use value is overshadowed by exchange value. by definition.have become a basic human need. has an element that cannot be subsumed so readily. But the concept also exceeds the individual: The individual is both more and less than its general definition. Heideggerian ontology rebels. Adorno follows Marx and Lukacs in seeing that the essence of capitalism lies in the abstractness of the exchange relationship. against these modern conditions of heteronomy. but also with the excess in the concept when it is compared to his need.the recognition of difference -. not in the content of that response itself.13 In a world geared to profit and mediated by money. because while it maintains the truth of philosophical Idealism by rejecting the irrevocable divisions between inside and out. however impotently. particularly Heidegger’s. the dawning awareness that the subject is forfeiting its substantiality.16 . by the administrative rationalization of life under capitalism. But it is a wrong reaction.that is just another figure in the phantasmagoria that masks the heteronomy of modern capitalist life. In the Negative Dialectics. efficiency is the order of the day and smooth. Adorno assumes that autonomy and its concomitant -. Autonomy as a need is determined by social history.Being -. which is implicitly equated with that substantiality. But because it is only through the transumption (Aufhebung) of this contradiction. the total functional context. autonomous."12 An absolute is. a reaction to a concrete socio-historical complex. and all qualities are reduced to mere quantity. survives. essence and appearance. would be able to return substance to the subject and the object.enemies. and so through the achieved identity between the particular and its concept." although this truth lies in the fact that it is a response to a genuine need. prepares the subject to harken to the solemn declaration that Being. the interest of the individual is not only in keeping what the general concept steals from him. well-tooled organization becomes the distorted image of the public good. The particular exceeds the universal in that it is unique. that the particular. not man-made directives.15 A true ontology. A version of this need can be expressed philosophically as "the longing that Kant’s verdict on a knowledge of the Absolute should not be the end of the matter. Adorno writes: Society has grown into the total functional context that liberalism thought it was: what is is relative to what is other and is irrelevant to itself. Adorno argues that there is indeed a moment of truth in Heidegger’s "fundamental ontology. which to Adorno seems like nothing more than a rumbling mythology of Being. The fear of this. history and eternity. incapable of being lost. fact and concept. one that met its human need. all particularities are rendered equal by the universal medium of money.14 Heidegger’s ontology. It could illuminate the particular without invoking the exchange principle of conceptual thought by submitting that particular to the de-differentiation of the universal.
Philosophy moves towards the Name -. 19 Thus not only is one not supposed to pronounce the Name. In Adorno’s version of reconciliation. truly self-reflective thought will have to make the prohibition conscious. for Adorno. that opened up interpretation but could never be comprehended by it. concept and individual are a bad fit. What the language of philosophy criticizes. its pretense to immediate truth. there is a vanishing point where the universal would be adequate to the particular and the particular would be adequate to the universal. because it is not yet the Name. as in Rosenzweig’s understanding of the Name. if epistemology means resorting to a strict dichotomy between subject and object that either deifies or eliminates mediation. based on human need. 20 I have therefore argued that Adorno mobilizes a particularly theological and particularly German-Jewish doctrine of the divine Name to describe the task of a philosophy. If we see the prohibition as a question of mere refusal. David Biale has shown that this notion of the Name and of revelation goes back to Hermann Cohen whose neo-Kantian epistemology seems to have an echo in Adorno’s account of asymptotic knowledge as well. existing identity between word and thing. The language of philosophy approaches that Name by denying it. The impossibility of achieving that ontology is historically derived and does not come from a positive prohibition.that future reconciliation between universal and particular -. even at the same time that the particular cannot be contained within the constraints of the concept. This surplus is a promise that is not yet fulfilled. but was itself the ineffable and unpronounceable name of God. Adorno is quite explicit in tying the language of philosophy as it moves asymptotically towards the ideal of a true ontology to the doctrine of the Name: The determinable flaw of all concepts makes it necessary to cite others next to it: from this flow those constellations to which solely something of the hope of the Name has passed. universal and particular. In short. the small moves towards true ontology that philosophy can make will look like . a point that Scholem (who Adorno claimed was his chief source of Judaic knowledge)18 made clear on a number of occasions.17 The individual concept is never adequate. if it is not to fall for the ideological blandishments of a false ontology based on immediacy. This objection makes sense if one sees the prohibition on pronouncing the Name as applying only to the Tetragrammaton. universalizing reason rules. Scholem made much of the Kabbalistic notion that the Torah itself not only consisted of names of God. Jews do not speak the Name because they do not want to profane it. coincide. philosophy parallels Judaism in refusing to speak the Name.The universal has a surplus that the individual needs. But this is not the only name God has. is inaccurate. One can only approximate it. Thus. by giving the lie to the ideological claim that word and thing. we could argue that the analogy between philosophy and Judaism. It will not be able to retreat from ontology completely and rest with epistemology. is almost always the ideology of a positive. Only constellations of concepts can begin to account for the particular. though riven with pathos. that urges towards and cannot achieve a true ontology. But. one cannot. philosophy does not speak the name because it is not yet adequate. will have to thematize it. but there is a utopian promise in this failure.by denying that the reconciliation has yet taken place. In the present dispensation where quantitative.
beaten.22 To think the absolute. Adorno remarked that "[t]his is not the time for political works of art.25 Adorno is often his most insightful when he is most extreme. emancipatory intent. on metaphysics at the time of its disappearance. to approach the absolute. not as mere ornament. beleaguered. measured by the subsuming cover concept. it is his return to theology and metaphysics when these have been so well . that is. critical philosophy must now draw on aesthetics because this is the closest it can come to the unredeemed truth of ontological need.. and distorted -to aesthetics. the knowledge of the absolute. The micrological appreciation of the nuance. not possible as a deductive context of judgments about beings. In the process. rather. I have indicated that according to this logic. but not yet fulfilled promises of reason. art and aesthetic perception will be the only places that the solid ground of resistance that used to be mapped by ontology and politics can be approached. and explodes its identity."24 In an administered world given over to profit and exchange. it is because ontology has fled -."23 gets its demonstration in his recuperation of the Name. Nor can it be thought of on the model of an absolute Otherness. seems to be helplessly isolated. While his historical paradoxes -. will have to ally itself to metaphysics and draw the tropes of theology into its orbit. And so. according to its own concept. In an essay on Brecht and Sartre." because it sees the particular as if it were contained under a determinate universal while knowing that this is a necessary fiction if the particular is to be intelligible at all. for the micrological view shatters the shells of what. for to reason from the particular is by definition inductive. it plays a game of "as if. of the place where the particular differs from the universal. Nor can thought of the absolute flee from reason to some immediate apperception.interest me and Adorno’s sometimes complicated theory of the truth needs further elaboration. that it is not completely subject to an alien law..aesthetics and will be allied to metaphysics. if it is to have critical. which in fear despises thought. 21 This faculty reasons from the individual to the universal. the delusion that it is only a specimen (emphasis added). Because it has a form. modern thought. Adorno’s nicely Hegelian dictum that "[w]hat has been cast aside but not absorbed theoretically will often yield its truth content only later. cannot entail deduction. Adorno (whose definition of metaphysics here owes everything to reflective judgment): Metaphysics is. The smallest intramundane traits would be relevant to the Absolute. it looks like it should be intelligible. requires what Kant called the faculty of reflective judgment. For Adorno. a cipher of freedom. it must learn to discriminate the "smallest intramundane traits. To put it more simply: if politics has fled to art. Adorno’s crack that in psychoanalysis nothing is true except the exaggerations (as well as betraying a keen understanding of the way meaning is derived in the analytic process) is a deadly accurate self-description. where its absoluteness appears. And so it is that for the brief space that remains in this essay. if only as a cipher." those tiny marks of irrevocable difference that show that it cannot be subsumed completely by the cover concept. Rather. I want to return to Adorno ’s bizarre insistence on a theology without belief. For the individual (work of art) cannot be subsumed under a law because it gives itself its own law. But that form.that only when theology has been banished from critical philosophy can its undigested truths shine out -. seems to escape intelligibility in the end. politics has migrated into the autonomous work of art.
Again. To banish "metaphysics" in the name of progress might be to regress to a mythological worship of what has merely come to exist. trans. Adorno. p. 1986)." Quasi Una Fantasia. much to be debated in the exaggerations of Adorno’s thought: his now-outdated reliance on theories of monopoly capital. according to its critique.B. Adorno indicates that our thinking might well want to avail itself of the truths of theology and metaphysics as long as we can see just how false they are. (2) Theodor W. trans. I cannot help remembering that Habermas addresses the practice of philosophy as a discipline. of course. I remain impressed with his guts. It wants to disrupt the triumph of radical evil. Negative Dialectics. but if it is redeployed to a place. where. pp. "Sacred Fragment: Schoenberg’s Moses und Aron. "Metaphysics" tout court is no more the enemy of liberation than a blind faith in historical progress is its guarantee. To put it in Adorno’s own words: "Progress is not a conclusive category. in an era of equivalence and ineluctable mediation. (5) Quasi Una Fantasia. and his language theory.established as the conservative enemies of liberation that I want to end with. not to triumph in itself. p. (4) Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. Adorno. 23. p. Nevertheless. This is a notoriously bad translation of a notoriously difficult book. xi. The name of God is a potent idea. trans. 226. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: Univ. I have modified this translation. 1992). 2-3. Ashton (NY: Continuum. Adorno. Adorno shows that the name of God is a model for and an index of an ontology. with his adamant refusal to give up one iota of experience to the rigorism of a post-Kantian philosophy. it legitimately belongs. trans." 26 The secret could well be that metaphysics lurking in its old haunts might pose a danger to autonomy but that any all-encompassing prohibition on metaphysics is always on the verge of becoming myth. and throughout this paper I have altered Ashton’s version to conform more closely with the German original. This being the case. Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso. There is. that is. While I understand Habermas’s scruples about the limits of philosophy. E. just how they are false.27 Footnotes (1) Theodor W. . John Cumming (NY: Continuum. of a metaphysical experience of the absolute. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Adorno’s attempt to redeem the undigested and therefore emancipatory semantic potential of Jewish theology and speculative metaphysics serves as an interesting warning against a superstitious fear of an unmastered intellectual past and a fetishizing confidence in the supersession of old ideas. his often monochromatic account of the course of rationalization. not if it is just secularized to a pretty little metaphor. 1973) 401-2. not the practice of thought itself. 1989). (3) Theodor W. Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic. of Minnesota Press.
1986). Jacobson and Evelyn M.. p. To date. p. trans. "Revelation and Tradition as Religious Categories. Capital. (17) Negative Dialectics. 61. (12) Negative Dialectics. 37. 1970). pp. 4. 29-30. 53.. 1976). (14) Negative Dialectics. The Origin of German Tragic Drama. Rolf Tiedemann. 1965). p. p. Hallo (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. ed. Scholem. our critique of the inequality within equality aims at equality too." (Karl Marx. trans. I:135). Adorno. 3 vols. The Letters of Walter Benjamin. (7) Walter Benjamin. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Its realization alone would transcend exchange. pp. pp." The Messianic Idea in Judaism (NY: Schocken.. of Chicago Press. (11) Nahum Glatzer. 194. 151. p. p." On the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism (NY: Schocken. pp. p. pp. we want to realize the ideal of free and just exchange. (16) Negative Dialectics.. It is important to supplement this quotation with another from Adorno: "When we criticize the exchange principle as the identifying principle of thought.. 173-4. see also his famous letter to Martin Buber in Gershom Scholem and Theodor W. ed. this ideal is only a pretext. "The Name of God and the Linguistic Theory of the Kabbalah. 77-80. 36. Adorno eds. XX:I 482-3. Ben Fowkes (London: New Left Books. John Osborne (London: New Left Books. (18) Theodor W." Gesammelte Schriften. "Gruss an Gershom G. 65. 188-9. (8) Benjamin. (13) Here is Marx: "The various proportions in which different kinds of labor are reduced to simple labor as their unit of measurement are established by a social process that goes on behind the backs of the producers. trans. 1971).. (10) Franz Rosenzweig. 91-3. (20) David Biale. The Star of Redemption. 1960). an exchange of things that are equal and yet unequal. Franz Rosenzweig (NY: Schocken. 39-43. 20 vols. Gershom Scholem: Kabbalah and Counter-History (Cambridge: . p. Manfred R.(6) Quasi Una Fantasia. "The Meaning of the Torah in Jewish Mysticism. 147)." Diogenes 79-80 (1972-3). 292-4. (15) Negative Dialectics. William W. 79-81. Jacobson (Chicago: Univ. Once critical theory has shown it up for what it is. 281. 180-3. p. these proportions therefore appear to the producers to have been handed down by tradition." ( Negative Dialectics. (19) See (in order of their original composition). trans. 1994).. pp. 1977). pp. (9) Benjamin.
He therefore has no headstone to honor his memory. 1989). 1991-2). (21) Cf. Adorno. This paper. he was cremated. (26) Theodor W. is for him: Thomas David Kaufmann.. A final note of pathos as well: my father died on October 6. 407-8. 1979). History. such as it is. who read closely and suggested well. 1994.N. Adorno. Gray Smith (Chicago: Chicago Univ. 2 vols. Aesthetics. Minima Moralia. 96-7. Being the quintessential German Jew that he was. (25) Theodor W. 92-3. (22) Negative Dialectics. 79-80. 1974). ed. Adorno." Benjamin: Philosophy. Proverbs I:6. 1922-1994.Harvard Univ. (27) My thanks are due to Sharon Squassoni and Nancy Weiss Hanrahan. p. (24) Theodor W. (23) Negative Dialectics. E." Notes to Literature. 49. . II: pp. 44-5. 101. trans. trans. "Progress.F. Press. and his ashes scattered on the hillside behind his house. p. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (NY: Columbia Univ. a year before I wrote this. p. pp. 144. Press. pp. Jephcott (London: New Left Books. 110-11. Negative Dialectics. Press. "Commitment. pp.
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