The pensive man . . . He sees that eagle float For which the intricate Alps are a single nest. Wallace everything Gaston I. INTRODUCTION Stevens, round ‘Connoisseur a caress. The Poetics ofSpace of Chaos’



(i) setting the scene. It has gradually become clear since their ‘discovery’ late in the last century that the Saiva traditions centered in Kasmir did not become extinct after the Islamic conquest of northern India.’ That they are today of more than historical interest may be seen in their connections with other sorts of Hindu (usually tantric) stfdhunti in north India, especially in the so-called Natha traditions; in their still significant relationship with south Indian agamic Saivism; but most strikingly in the teachings of certain nineteenth and twentieth century pandits and gurus who have helped revitalize the Saivism of Kasmir, or whom it has in some way influenced.2 A reference to an experience of ‘immersion’ may be found in the work of Gopi Krsna (207), and in this aphorism of the Maharasfrian guru Baba Muktananda (88), who has been instrumental in popularising Kasmiri Saivism,
Bhagawan Sri Nityananda was a perfect Guru. His essential the hub of all sacred places. Go there and roam in it.” teaching was, “The heart is

With this statement we may compare the prefatory verse of the JSA, the fifth chapter of Abhinava’s IPV,
We praise Siva who eternally ilhrmines (prak&zkah) the mass of objects which are immersed in his great heart (mahlfguhrS, secret place, cave) by means of the light of his cognitive power (1.5. intro/lSl: 4-5).3 a

It may be asked: what is meant by immersion in this radiant ocean of consciousness, this heart, and what might a classical Hindu theologian make of it?4 In this paper I shall begin to explore the treatment of this theme in
Journal oflndian Philosophy 7 (1979) 345407.0022-t791/79/0074-0345 Copyright 0 1919 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordreeht, Holland, $06.30 U.S.A.

and Boston,




the work of Abhinavagupta himself, for he understands the god diva to be ubiquitous, to be that ultimate reality in which both perfected and ordinary persons are constantly and dvnamically immersed. (ii) The historical context of Abhinavan theology. In early Hinduism, particularly in the Epic (c. 400 B.C.--400 A.D.), Saivism appears primarily as a system of mythology allied with various ritual, meditational, and iconographic traditions. During the course of the first millenium A.D. it seems to have undergone a complex reformulation. Reoriented by several new currents of Indian spirituality - e.g., bhakti; tantra, Saktism - Saivism produced a group of non-Vedic scriptures usually known asAgamas. 5 These texts tend to present themselves as the ipsissima verba of Siva himself, and in them Siva is believed to communicate his version of reality to the qualified pupil, typically to his consort, Sri Devi. In contrast to its distinctive mythology, the available evidence suggests that a uniquely Saivite theology developed slowly, largely in response to the systematic articulation of competing Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain traditions.6 Perhaps the oldest surviving Saivite theology is that of Kaundinya, the commentator on the P&upataszitras, whom Ingalls dates as no later than the fourth century (1962: 284). He, however, offers less an integral exposition of $aivite practices and experience than a redeployment of non-daivite philosophical notions in the service of Saivism (cf. Schulz: 6). By the last quarter of the first millenium there arose several regional Saivisms which not only drew upon Pura@c and Agamic traditions, but which were sufficiently secure to allow themselves to be influenced in varying ways by the systematization of Hindu and Buddhist thought which followed the work of Dignaga (c. 5th-6th) and Sarpkara (late 7th). Among these regional $aivisms the two most fertile flourished at opposite ends of the Indian subcontinent. One, usually called &tiva SiddhSnta, arose in Tamilnad perhaps as early as the seventh century. The other, with which I am here concerned, arose in KaSmir probably late in the ninth century.’ For the next two hundred years, in close dialogue with various Hindu and Buddhist traditions, it produced a remarkable series of liturgical, devotional, and theological works, but with the increasing Islamization of northern India finally fell into silence.* The southern traditions of $aivism, on the other hand, reached mature theological expression later than those of KaSmir, first in Sri Kaptha’s Saivite adaptation of viSi#idvaitaved&zta in the SaivabhrfSya (12th A.D.),








second in Meykanda’s ,$ivaj&inabodha (first half 13th A.D.).9 Therefore, the theological writing of Kasmiri $aivism occupies a privileged place in the history of Saivite thought. The work of its major representatives - Somananda (c. mid-9th A.D.), Utpaladeva (c. early 10th) Abhinavagupta (c. lOOO), and Ksemaraja (c. early 1 Ith) - forms the earliest surviving corpus of Saivite theological treatises.‘O Beyond this historical priority, the Saivism of Kasmir is also of particular systematic interest. For a variety of reasons - the many cross-currents of Indian spirituality in the second half of the first millenium, the peculiar cultural complexity of a border region such as Kasmir, the genius and individuality of its leading representatives - the Saivism of KaSmir developed a rich and suggestive syncretism: not the fusing of discrete historical traditions, but the fusing of sorts (or structures) of religious life which are often met separately. Here mythic, devotional, and meditative forms of Hinduism flowed together, interacting with various Hindu and Buddhist philosophies, and (not just in the work of Abhinava) aesthetic speculation. In the end, each contributed to the complex KaSmiri Saiva ideal of the religious hero (siddha) and each certainly contributed to Abhinava’s correspondingly complex theological version. In one sense there is nothing new in the Saivism of Kasmir at all. One could argue that in it no fundamental innovation appears, yet the rearrangement of traditional elements is strikingly original. Perhaps the tradition might be compared to that most Indian of games - chess. As in chess all the pieces are on the board from the start, the variety of moves is predetermined, yet in the hands of a master breath-taking originality may be achieved. Such, in my judgment, is the theology of Kasmiri Saivism, at least in the hands of its most brilliant player, the justly renowned Abhinava, for he achieved an original Saivite theology in which philosophical materials borrowed from various traditions were integrated in a system which respected Saivite myth and Saivite religious experience.” (iii) The shape of Abhinavan theology. (a) Problematic. In order to understand Abhinava’s analysis of Siva’s ubiquity, it must be seen in the context of his general theological endeavor, as well as in the context of KISmiri Saiva theologizing as a whole. In spite of the variety of positions taken within Kasmiri Saivism, from a broad perspective its theology is unequivocal in its central concern: to clarify the meaning and nature of human existence in

On the contrary. the impersonalistic which typically assumes monistic form. seems to reflect the views of an elite whose religious life centered upon reflection and meditation. and those that refer to consciousness in one sense or another (e. and vimarsa). philosophical ultimate for the personal one of the Saivite tradition. This diversity of Kasmiri Saiva religious language needs to be approached in light of two basic dichotomies that may be found in Hindu speculation at least as early as the Upanisads (c.).to substitute an abstract. “There are clear traces of a constant antagonism between theism and impersonalism in the anonymous . sarpuid. tit. Isvara. Within the impersonalistic current there is a second bifurcation: between a materialistic monism according to which the cosmos evolves through an automatic.12 The various traditions underlying the Saivism of Kasmir make use of a surfeit of terms for god that are not self-evidently synonomous. Paul Hacker (1961: 11 If.e.g.. One of the goals of his theology is. Although it is tempting to take it for granted that all these terms are meant to be co-referential to a single (and simple) religious object.. they obviously fall into two classes: those that denominate an individual being (e. from the mainstream of the Advaita Vedanta tradition which progressively came to absolutize the distinction between the ultimate as consciousness (bruhm). prakda. the Saiva Abhinava sets himself apart.C. The first is between personalism (i. citi.. 800-500 B. 62) .348 HARVEY P. and the ultimate as a personal being (B&ma). therefore. Abhinava employs the metaphor of consciousness with great subtlety in order to unfold as fully as possible the nature of the personal deity Siva in his own complex integrity. not least of Abhinava’s work. Siva.) observes.as some have argued (cf. n. Mahesvara. Nonetheless. even a cursory examination of the literature. theism) on the one hand and impersonalism on the other. to demonstrate at one and the same time the diversity of connotation and the actual co-referentiality of the various terms which designate ultimacy. An unprejudiced examination of the sources makes it clear that this division should not be taken as evidence that Abhinava (or other KaSmiri Saiva thinkers) seek . and an idealistic monism according to which it evolves within consciousness by virtue of consciousness’ own volition. as he so often does. mechanistic process. The personalistic current is clearly rooted in the mythic and liturgic life of early Hinduism. reveals a large and varied vocabulary that is routinely used to refer to the ultimate.g. and Svamin). With this as his goal. ALPER light of a complex set of experiences which may be identified collectively as the experience of Siva.

one examines the systematic positions taken within the emerging regional Saivisms. In doing this I shall particularly attend to the meaning of the term prakda. on the contrary.r3 The study of KaSmiri Saivism thus calls into question any assumption that myth and theism. . one finds that the tension between personalism and impersonalism (as weIl as that between materialistic and idealistic monism) does not simply vanish: it reappears in a new setting. Thus. in the subsequent centuries.1-9 in the first half of a chapter dealing with Siva’s ability to cognize (the J&za~akty6hnika). that is. Several of the terms he uses to refer to the ultimate in themselves seem to take for granted different objects of religious attention. as being of ultimate significance. and idealism on the other are incompatible religious positions. It suggests. on the one hand. the old opposition between theism and impersonalism was largely replaced by the new antagonism between Saivism and Vaisnavism. . that the two may appear as closely related objectifications of man’s chaotic experience interpreted religiously. however. particularly that of Kasmir. be no surprise that these dichotomies may be readily recognized in Abhinava’s theology.!&VA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 349 literature from prechristian times to about the 4th or 5th century A. Other terms. consciousness in itself. (b) Method. and to imply a dualistic theology which strongly distinguishes the worshipping subject from the object of worship. cannot be facilely classified and suggest the complexity of the idealistic elements in Abhinava’s theology. It should. and to Mahesvara. in the theologies of the Saivism of Kasmir we find an elaborate intermingling of personalistic and impersonalistic elements in a setting which is ultimately personalistic in that it is committed to the experience of the personal deity Siva as the ultimate anchor of the religious life.D. In the JSA Abhinava treats prakda as a mode of consciousness that is ultimately equivalent both to tit. and vimarda.” If. Personalistic terms such as deva or Mahesvara seem to refer without subterfuge to the mythic hero of the Saiva tradition. Hence delimiting the scope of the term prakda is .5.. then. which might also be translated ‘consciousness’ such as citii prakda. however.” but from about that time. “ . In this essay I shall explore Abhinava’s understanding of the ubiquity of god as consciousness (prakda) by examining his argument against the existence of anything external to illumination (against prakdabrihy@rthaMda) which is found at IPV 1. and seem to imply distinct metaphysical positions. which may be translated literally as illumination. The terms tit and saevid seem to refer to consciousness in itself and to imply a strictly non-dualistic idealism.

5. in deciphering the relationship between the idealistic and mythic metaphors in his religious vision as a whole. this internal complexity that is the most original element of Abhinava’s idealism. In my interpretation I shall focus on the relationship between the theology of prakdu and the theory of Wr&zr&k. different strands. and ‘doctrinal schemes’ which not infrequently are based upon several such strands. that is. The mythic and idealistic elements in his synthesis are the two dominant logical strands out of which his doctrinal scheme is woven. . and.10-21) where he argues that the inspiriting center of phenomena is personal judgment (v~Lw&z). and that distinguishes it from such similar systems as the various sorts of Vedanta and Vijrianavada Buddhism. the complementary theologies of prakda and vimda through which consciousness is focused as the process of coming into existence as world. and where.350 HARVEY P. In addition . thus. Here my analysis will fall into two sections. I am influenced in this style of analysis by the observation of Ninian Smart that metaphysical assertions are often disguised spiritual claims. Smart distinguishes between ‘logical strands’ which are determined by experiential context. “the genius of some doctrinal schemes lies precisely in their successin weaving together . and that. Abhinava’s genius appears to be precisely of this sort.the idealistic strand reveals itself to be a synthesis of several ‘theologies’ of consciousness: the theology of tit. one may not understand a doctrinal scheme without attending to the sometimes complex “religious activities which give [it] life and point” (4. seen especially in contrast to the illusionism of Advaita Vedarrta. ALPER a first step both in reconstructing the idealistic strand of Abhinavan theology. the theology of pruk&z is complemented by a theology of vim&a. In this light Abhinava will be seen to understand the ultimate as hw-who-is-prak. . ‘pure’ consciousness as such.r4 It is. . perhaps. 11. following the JSA’s kdrik5 by k&&i explication as fully as space allows. and which lend them a new doctrinal context. as being the ubiquitous. interpreting it. and. therefore. complicating and enriching Abhinava’s portrait of god as consciousness. Second I shall offer an interpretation of Abhinava’s portrait of god as prakda based on this exegesis. ultimately. He adds. even though their epistemological characters are distinct” (15). dynamic process of life as such. First I shall summarize Abhinava’s case against externality in a straightforward manner. In a subsequent study I hope to deal with the second portion of Abhinava’s argument for ubiquity (IPV 1. and 13).and this must be emphasized .

In Abhinava’s synthesis the personal and impersonal are juxtaposed in such a way that the latter appears as an outgrowth of the former. I am. for example.by virtue of the theology of vim&u . one which has room for both the reflective and the popular. nonetheless. The fifth chapter of the IPV is devoted to describing Siva’s ability to cognize @%ina&zkti). the perspective I have gained on it from this study may be summarized. I realize that I can hardly hope to demonstrate the validity of this conviction in this essay. for yogic abstraction and immersion in the world. I shall be satisfied if I can here convey enough of Abhinava’s integrity so that the reader will no longer be tempted to explain Abhinava away as just a Vedantic wolf in Siva’s skin.one that focuses the ultimate as fully existent as a multitude of personal agents in the extended. One must admit that much in Kasmiri Saivism remains obscure. with several sorts of Saiva idealism lends Abhinava’s theology a rich internal texture. the creative tension seems to allow Abhinava a rare achievement: the forging of a polytheistic theology which recognizes complexity within god. This intimate blending of a Saiva theism. Rather. It seems to me that Abhinava’s intermingling of theistic-mythic and idealistic models of reality is not merely the artificial grafting of an advaitic monism upon Saiva personalism because of.fhVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 351 (c) R&urn&. It should be obvious that the success or failure of Abhinava’s doctrinal scheme finally rests upon the skill with which he weaves together the various elements of his complex theology. In the end. and informed by a vision of ultimacy derived from the classical mythology of Siva. it is as if in the formation of the &iva traditions of KaSmir the impersonalistic current of early Hindu spirituality had ‘gone underground. objective universe which is itself also diva. rooted in a precise. persuaded that Abhinava’s theology is an organic expression of the Saiva spirit. specifiable set of religious experiences. and finally . nor . the immense prestige of Samkaran thought. and I am aware how easy it is to misconstrue the meaning of the texts. II. He does this neither in terms of objectivity. ABHINAVA’S CASE AGAINST EXTERNAL OBJECTS (i) Orientation. In it Abhinava sets out to account for the fact that there are in reality successful acts of knowing. In large measure its content is epistemological. Although it would be premature to offer a reconstruction of Abhinava’s doctrinal scheme as such.’ eventually surfacing as an integral unit of some of the Kabmiri &iva theologies.

a personal being. as he puts it. and cognitive objects by asserting that it must be grounded in a ‘pure’. that is the reality. whose nature it is to give rise to cognitive activity. iii. d). He rules out of court any theory of knowledge which would. diva. and utility. nor cognition in itself.be taken as the model for a dynamic ontology in which being and becoming (and thus the experiences of abstraction from and immersion in an object-field) are seen as fully integrated. Any epistemology which failed to account for these characteristics of the cognitive world would be invalid. lo). after asserting .attempts to achieve this reconciliation by proposing that one sort of meditative experience . appear in Siva. Abhinava’s argument against the existence of objects external to prakdu is formulated in terms of this twofold axiology. Fundamentally he desires to defend the axiomatic worth of two. however. ALPER subjectivity. that subjects and objects are connected in a way that facilitates purposeful action. Abhinava . cognitions. in some sense of the word. disparate sorts of experience: yogic abstraction and ordinary life.352 HARVEY P. albeit in a complex. In other words. l7 of cognitive objects. Abhinava wants to defend an ‘ordinary’ view of the world of human transactions (uyavah@~).that of yogic creation . on the surface. than a persuasive affirmation of his values.at least in part . the multiplicity of subjects and objects. He accounts for the existence of a world characterized by a multiplicity of routinely interacting cognizers. He is determined to assert the priority of the yogic withdrawal of the self into the self (hence of self-consciousness) without jettisoning the value of ordinary human experience (hence of objectivity). just as it reflects the dialectic tension between world affirmation and world reversal at the heart of many tantric disciplines. personal ultimate. In this sense Abhinava’s analysis is yet another illustration of the crux of ‘two truths’ which has so exercised VedSntic and Buddhist thought. As will be seen (II. He takes for granted: realism.16 One cannot help but conclude. leave the world ‘in the dark’. ‘unitary’. and (2) that their appearance is possible only because Siva is. In other words the solution Abhinava proposes to his epistemological problem is metaphysical. Rather he resorts to a transcendental analysis which attempts to delimit what in fact must be the case about reality as such for successful cognition to be possible.15 Hence the explication of Siva’s agility to cognize focuses on proving (1) that all objects which appear.b At the beginning of the secondaction of the JSIi(k. pluralism. peculiar sense. that Abhinava’s argument is less a convincing demonstration of his metaphysics.

Its capability to be the home of the world processmay be called its ‘divine sovereignty’ (ui$varya). if penultimate. if that were not the case.sut+.5.l9 At the start Abhinava offers this definition: The lord’s cognitive power is said to be his illumining @r&i&la) of objects as diverse (Me&) in respect to their dependence upon perceivers [who are] fabricated [through tiyh] .5.f) (1. . On one side there is internality.in all its concreteness. then.5. that is. its ability to manifest @radar~am) the totality of particulars including the relations of cause and effect.f For Abhinava. that is.1/154: 4-6).[although ultimately] they are not different (ubhedu) from [his] unlimited (unujjhitu) consciousness (. 4-5/ 163: 12-164: l). .e Later he recapitulates: What must be established is the divine sovereignty (ui&rya) of unitary (eku) illumination (yak&a). that is. not of leveling. to employ an epistemicone. (ii) Ktirikds 1. comesinto existence out of an ultimate reality to which it is intrinsically internal. in regard to objects there is actually externality.SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 353 the unbroken continuity of God’s internality.2-3. his non-duality’ Abhinava takes pain to defend objectivity: On the other hand. or its ‘cognitive power’. [Objects] actually do [appear] there can be no question about that! For.5. defending Siva’subiquity is a way of celebrating. (a) Kdrikti 2. namely the judgment of ‘it-ness’ at the very time one has appropriately made the judgment of ‘I-ness’. that is] a variety of objects with different characteristics.r* d Complementingthis commitment to the ordinary Abhinava wishesto show that real.10/l%: 12-193: g). the world’s embarrassing complexity. a judgment shaped solely by the delight of consciousness (tit) being utterly ‘I’. externality is itself possible only if the whole world of cognitive transactions. it is convenient to considerthe progression of his argument ktirilai by kiriki The essentials of the caseagainstabsolute externality are summarizedin J&i 2-3. on the other side [there is externality. Because of its nature this ultimate may with equal propriety be called Lord or consciousness. to employ a theistic metaphor. ordinary human activities would be thrown into confusion (1. and succession and simultaneity (1. Utpala says: Unless an object depended intrinsically on illumination @rukddmuta~ it would remain . Although spaceprecludesa detailed examination of the give and take of Abhinava’s disputation with various pUrvupzkgzs(opponents).

g In his commentary on the first of thesekdrikas Abhinava setsout to show that the appearance of objects asexternal can be validly established. and without illumination it could not be known to exist (siddhyuti) (IPK 1.e.5. concrete.21.h In other words. “they present an insurmountable difficulty in bridging the gulf that divides the self from the not-self” (1963: 320f. a godheadwhoseperfection is inclusive of. namely the illuminative mode of consciousness. and as a result we logically conclude that an object essentially depends upon being illumined.and what is thus the most significant characteristic of illumination is not its connection to objects. in Pandey’s words. 156: 7) which is not exhaustedby its objectivity (i. the subject or to the fact of cognition on the ground that. ALPER unillumined (uprukdu) as it was previous [to its appearance] . nor its transcendence.2/154: 9-12). And if illumination were separated [from its object]. “What accountsfor the appearance of objects to perceivers?” Severalpossibleanswers are suggested. then there would be a coincidence of objects within undivided (ubhinna) [illumination] . He concludes: Therefore it is in no way to be supposed that a separate illumination is connected to an object. of ribhtisas) illumination must be unitary (158: 8-12). eachparticulariza- . for knowledge to be possiblethe svatipa of the object must be prakda The object must inhere in an illumination (prak&Mzd SQ [= urtkak] bkavet. its externalized. An object is illuminable @rukrSya) [because] it depends essentially on illumination @rukditm~. but Abhinava rejects all theories which attempt to explain knowledge by reference merely to the object..e. that is. but not exhausted by. What in the end allows appearance to be validly established.5. An object as such (ritmirtha) [participates in] illumination (1. which transcends its object.5.but its unity.20 He asks himself the question. for eachprakda would be selfcontained (svatmamdtrapalyavuscfna). The question remains: “Of just what kind is this eka evaprakda?” In the remainder of the ISA Abhinava will portray it asthat transcendentalreality which is the necessary ground of cognitive interaction. In contrast to theseviews Abhinava holds that it is the nature of objects to appearby virtue of their participation in a reality which transcendsthem. 154: 14-155: 1). Since in fact we all take for granted a world which is a web of coordinated acts of cognition (i. dependentworld. on not being separate from illumination (1.. Abhinava argues that if prakadawere different (Q~YQ) in eachinstanceof cognition there could be no coordination (anusa~dkrfna) of discreteacts of cognition.2/158: 4-8). artk&zrirottir#. The illumination [of an object] may not be separated (bhinna) [from it].).3/159: 3-6).354 HARVEY P.

us ground.given the non-duality of consciousness. but mutually necessary. 22 He wants to show that the unity of consciousness and the diversity of objects connected to it are not only compatible. 161: 2ff.3/160: l-3). first.5 tion of which. The k&ikS argues that if there were an essential separation of objects and illumination there wouuld.that is. be a coinciding of all objects within illumination that would. In his commentary on k. Abhinava. hence. isprecisely that which must be presupposed for it to exist. far from ruling out multiplicity.) without succumbing to a dualism (bhedmG&) which would reintroduce the separation of appearance and prak&. as a consequence. and consequently unconnected (bhinna) with it. he attempts to defend the objectivity and multiplicity of the cognitive world (i. and gets a confusion of objects in abhinna prakrfSa. If one separates objectivity and illumination . absolute non-dualism: If illumination.e. cognition is utterly other (unya) than its object.24 He then (163: l-l 1) sumsup his own position that unitary but connected illumination.one actually sacrifices the very multiplicity one is trying to defend. it is utterly undivided (ubheda) (1. if one holds that the svariipa of artha is bhinna from praktida . may be seen as fully sharing its transcendental perfection.to account for the multiplicity of objects without surrenderingthe separationof object and consciousness after all. which is to say. (159: 1. 2 Abhinava argues for a connection (abhinnatva) between cognitive appearance and consciousness as its illumining ground (‘JwuJ&) and for the unity (ekarva) of this conscio.163: 1) devoted to refuting a variety of hypotheseswhich might be advancedto this purpose ..i23 The problem facing the dualist is how . an absurd. and sterile. when ‘liberted’. while a dualism that denies the connection between objects and consciousness would actually entail an unacceptable.5. which complements it. thus. be non-dual. In the commentary on k. (b) K&&i 3. non-dualism of undifferentiated consciousness.He hasargued that a dualist can’t account for the diversity of the real world by reference to cognition or to objectivity and that a dualist can’t have recourseto non-dual illumination to account for reality because he would have no way of accounting for its . argues that dualism is self-contradictory and leads curiously to its opposite. 3. This summationrevealshow Abhinava shifts in his argument from epistemological to metaphysical categories. nilapitayoh bhedo.SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 35. Abhinava’s commentary is. then because in itself illumination is nothing but illumination.

in the first instance.5. then objects exist” @adi prakxii~ tad3 bhavati arthuh.5.. intro/l 51. in order to develop his casefurther he introduces a rather complex ptirvapaky . it is demonstrated that illumination is the form of the whole world (vi&rvapu~ prakduh) (1. Utpala: In this way these insentient [objects]. but only by reference to an ultimate power to cognize (jii&Azkti). Now.5. is the nature of Siva’screative ubiquity asprak&z.that the svabh&a of urtha is prakciia.4-9..14) of objects external to consciousness. In order to demonstratethis he argues in his commentaries on the secondand third k&k& that objects by nature inhere in consciousness . 158: 12). In J$A l-9 Abhinava argues that the diversity of cognitive objects (about whoseexistence there is general agreement)cannot be explained by reference to the independent existence (sudbhrSva. adding: And how is it that the object is illumination? Since the form of a pot is nothing but its illumination. 24).“ 25 ’ He had concluded the commentary on k. which are as good as nonexistent (asatknlpa) in themselves. a materialist realism. He supportsthis by quoting from another work of his mentor (his paramugunt). an ability to externalize that which is intrinsically internal. ALPER diversity in turn (160: 3-l 63: 1.5.356 HARVEY P.e. by means of being that which is other than itself (svupmitma) (1./163: 3-S)j In the end Abhinava finds himself contending that the only guarantor of epistemologicalaccuracy . Such. apraluida] for [otherwise] there would hardly be an error if something intrinsically blue [were to be considered] as yellow or as nothing at all (1. he concludesthe commentary on k. seen. 3 in defense of its necessary antithesis: “If there is illumination. apart from illumination.m The argument againstabsoluteexternality revealsitself asa defenseof relative externality.3/163: 9-1ij. 1. and a repudiation of absolutemonism. (a) Summary.artha evtfstu.of ordinary knowledge. 163: S). illumination alone exists in and of itself.3/163: 6-q.3. (iii) K&&is 1.e.5. Having rejected out of hand the view that only objects exist (i.is its being fully an expressionof a transcendent consciousness. 2 in defenseof the thesisof unity (eku evu prak&zh. 163: 1) he concludes: There is simply no demonstration of [the existence of anything whatsoever] which has not appeared [i. exist (s~ntz~ solely by virtue of illumination. and [the form] of a cloth is that same [illumination] .

but that they have no reality independent of consciousness.5. Still the argumentmust be summarizedfor the light it throws on his position. There he enunciateshis own view that god causes objects to appear (prak&q~ri.5:4). etc. which may be taken to representa Sautrantika perspective. in it Abhinava interprets the theory of cfbhrfsas analogically with the human experience of yogic creativity. 4-5) which attempts to show that one can demonstratethe existence of real externals by inference. or are illusory phantasms. K..): Opponent (cet): theseemingly accidental arising of thisor that appearance [in cognition] (cTkasmitiMz&) leads oneto infer the externalobject.SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 357 (k. Second. external to. Even more than in the previous section it is impossibleto do justice to the ins and outs of Abhinava’s conversation with the pzPvapuk!a here.0 The exposition of theseversesfalls into two parts.it is of significancefor Abhinava’s ontology in that it makesclear that the purposeof the argument againstprak&brlhycirthavada is not to contend that cognitive objects are unreal.26 n (b) Ktiriktis 4-5.for undivided consciousness (abhinnusya boddhasya) cannot be the cause (hetu)of diversified appearances (vicitnibhk). 185: 2f. contend that one may demonstratethrough inference the existence of a causefor the diversity of cognitions other than. Nor isthe diversified awakening of the ‘impressions’ [deposited by previous experiences] (vcrSanu.e. &hrisayati. the first (165: 5-167: 2) a brief r&umC of the Sautrsntika argument. The intrinsic interest of this section asan example of scholasticdebate aside.. 8-9 he concludes this section of the IPV by arguing that externals can’t be objects of inference because inference is basedon perception (as is generally acknowledged)and one could hardly infer the existence of anything which hasnever appeared. 4-5.) like a yogi without an external. the second(167: 2-176: 5) . It is of theological significancefor at least two reasons. sincewhatever appears to consciousness is self-evidently not external to it. Then in k. i. the characterfitic causaltheory through which Abhinava hazardshis solution to the problem of the one and the many.4-S/164: 11-16. Abhinava responds in his commentary on k. consciousness itself (prakrfSasya vicitrabhave hetvantaram. or even that they lack material concreteness. 164: If. material cause (nintpti&za). it offers a portrayal of god aspruktidain terms of ibhtisavrlda. for whatisthe source of the diversityof their awakening in its turn (tusyz)? (IPK 1. 6-7. and can never appear. its cause. and argues that one can’t demonstrate the existence of real externals through perception. 184: 11. First.

2a Thz two interlocutors (and Abhinava) here agree that undivided consciousness. the Sautrantika thesis is summarized: Undivided consciousness cannot be the cause of diversified appearances [in cognition] (vicitnibhcfsa) . For this reason the BTrhySrthavZdin supposes that each of these different forms (vicitra . in turn. in some sense. . [each] has a multiplicity of different forms which arise successively. The non-duality of consciousness being established. understanding it as the actualizing force (t!akti) of cognition which accounts for the diversity of cognitive forms (the objective content) of cognitions. P . . 6-9) advances the thesis that diversity can most simply (and elegantly) be explained as the spontaneous outpouring of unitary consciousness itself. Abhinava (k. nipa) . on grounds already familiar from the preceding portions of the JSA.358 HARVEY P. being ephemeral . devoted to a lengthy excursus dealing with the hypothetical inference of ‘other minds’ (169: 4-179:8). Finally. .5.svabh~vasarqxTdako) which amounts to its reflection in consciousness (vij~@nagafapratibirnbdtmaku”). it seems to be taken for granted by Abhinava. The Vijiianavadins attempt to deal with the problem by reference to v&zti.4-S/166:2-167. This argument is very brief. . and propose to account for cognitive diversity by reference to reflections @ratibimba) which are themselves the‘ products of imperceptible. and in reality the notion of the non-duality of cognitions seems to be the premise from which the discussion begins. Indeed. [Each external object is said:] to effect the expression of its respective nature ~sva. cannot in and of itself account for the diveristy of cognitions. ALPER a rather involved discussion in which the Sautrantika inference of externals is defended by refuting what is taken to be the sole alterantive: the Vijiitiavida attempt to account for the diversity of cognitions through the theory of vrl~rmti.29 The Sautrantikas respond that this is question-begging. but inferable external objects. for the unity of consciousness per se.~~ The second portion of that discussion is. moment by moment. because a divided effect (kiryabheda) cannot possibly have an undivided cause (hetau abhinne).2). . no matter how it is finally understood. it is only because of this conviction that cognition is non-dual (and consciousness.5:2-l 66:2) the piirvapak~a argues for the undivided nature of cognition (ubhinna bodha) and hence. In the first place (16. one) that accounting for actual cognitive diversity becomes such a peculiar dilemma.leads one to infer [the existence of] external objects. [and each] is in every way separate (pthagbhtita) from cognition fjti~na) (1.that is being known to have a cause which is not established through perception . [each] is similar to its own [reflected] form because it is appropriate [for the former to effect the latter].

external to consciousness.). one can’t account for a multiple awakeningof v&antis by appealto other centersof consciousness (svasarg& . The debate which occupiesthe remainder of JSA 4-5 allowstwo sorts of Buddhist philosophy . is portrayed as insufficiently cogent to refute the realist inference of externals.4 On the other hand. the Sautrantikas conclude. its appearance in cognition must be entirely unitary (eka eva. The Sautrantikas observethat v&m& must either be relatively real (suyvytisat) or ultimately real (pciramcirthika)(cf. but not divided from consciousness.asobjects are reflected in a mirror. if vdsamis are fully real. 168: 5f. that is. Frauwallner. the Sautrarrtikasgo on. Irrespective of the status of vrisuntiitself. Finally. Their argument. asthe piirvupak. unlike Abhinava’s. and denying the independent existence of objects. according to this view. that is. PB: 12Off. aswell asseparatefrom consciousness (bodhat . its awakening(pzbodha). If they are only relatively real they cannot be the causeof anything whatsoever. .5%9/185:14-186:5) .that underlies the integrity of ordinary cognition. The VijrGnavadins are put in the unenviable position of being not quite correct. It is finally the reflection of real objects in consciousness . A third possibility is that vtisan@s are fully real.even though the objects themselves do not appear. Abhinava givesthe Sautrantikas priority because it is their acceptanceof objectsexternal to consciousness which is most radically opposedto his own position.for: It is impossible for the [relatively] unreal (avusru) which characteristically lacks all capability (s&uzrthya) to have a nature which amounts to being capable of producing an effect (1.5. bhinna. 169:3) because it itself doesn’t have a diversified (vicitm) cause.whoseexistence must be inferred in order to account for ordinary cognitive transactions. then one must certainly admit that they are after all external objects in everything but name. .a addslater (1.SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 359 The resultant schemepictures a world of real objects. they still cannot account for cognitive multiplicity.4-S/168:2-4).). but for the wrong reasons.Sautrr%ntika ‘realism’and Vijrianavada ‘idealism’to be played off againsteach other. of recognizing the priority of consciousness. are not real objects but mere images which are related to them through reflection. What one doesperceive. even of somethingelserelatively real such asappearances in cognition (fibhtisus). In that case.consciousness being non-dual (abhinna).

360 HARVEY P. less logical than metaphysical. 169:5) as its cause. Here Abhinava sets out (1) to refute the brfhyrfrthmGdin’s inference of externals directly by demonstrating that there can be no valid means of establishing their existence (no slidhaka). cognitive multiplicity. 169:9). by pointing out the fundamental incoherence of the idea of there being objects external to consciousness which. and the process by which it causes the emergence of concrete. This particular sort of phenomenalism helps distinguish Abhinava’s understanding of ultimate consciousness from that of two closely related systems of idealizing mysticism . which is brought to a close . since. nonetheless. his ontology. that is. it is impossible for there to be distinction within consciousness (bodhavuiluk~mzya. the very notion of ‘other minds’ makes no sense. his failure to understand its nature as ultimate. he takes the occasion to expound his own theory of ‘phenomena’ or seemingly irreducible ‘appearance-elements’ (tibh&zs).Advaita Ved%nta with its theory of ‘illusionism’ (vivartm6da). and his theology. Abhinava does not display any special argumentative skill in attempting to refute Sautrantika externalism. for various reasons. is central to Abhinava’s system . after all. and Vijnanavada Buddhism with its notions of momentariness. accordingly. one still couldn’t account for cognitive multiplicity because each of them would. While this response to the panuzpak$a seems formally adequate according to the canons of scholastic argumentation. In terms of the JSA’s discussion of p&&z. The importance of JSA 6-9 is. From Abhinava’s perspective the error of the VijGnavadin is not his assertion of ‘consciousness-only’. be self-contained and non-dual all over again30 So the ptirvapaksa concludes with the refutation of the VijGnavHda position even though it is remarkably similar to Abhinava’s. Rather. (c) Kciriktis 6-9. and (2) to demonstrate the nonexistence of externals once and for all. but his misapprehension of consciousness. hardly compelling enough to discredit belief in real externals. The response to the pzirvapaksa occupies the next section of the J&$(6-9/176:6-191:12). and even if there were multiple centers of consciousness. and v&znd Abh&zvcida is.to his epistemology. implicitly. articulated in a manner which lends it even greater persuasiveness as metaphor than as metaphysical theory.31 This ‘phenomenalism’ (tibh&vtida). to provide a valid rebuttal (bcidhaka) of it. appear. That is to say. co-dependent origination.are. which is of much theoretical interest in its own right. moreover.not unlike those of the Vijriinavadin piirvapak~a . one cannot help but recognize that Abhinava’s arguments . ALPER navartini bodhtinta@i.

9. external objects. essentially inseparable. and the creation of objects by the meditating yogi. and for the complex quiddity of consciousness: that consciousness is intrinsically objective. one must be cautious in generalizing. which can’t exist anyhow (IPK 1. It provides an important clue to the class of personal experiences which. postponing more systematic reflection on @bh@sunidu to Section III of this essay. in terms of the argument for Siva’s ubiquity as prak&z the analogy with yogic fabrication does more than merely set Abhinava’s theory off from various alternatives.5. In contrast Abhinava suggests with his yogic analogy a more organic. and a more dynamic model of phenomenal appearance which tends to emphasize the rootedness of appearances in that consciousness which is god. from the vantage point of JSA 7 one may say that Abhinava by and large repudiates those theories of appearance which emphasize the secondary or unreal nature of that which appears. but since ordinary activity is confined what good isanything else. 7) introduces what may well be the most suggestive idea in his entire discussion of the ubiquity of god as praktiia . 176:9-177:2)? For god (deva) who is. 6-9. In expounding the cosmogonic significance of rfbhtisa Abhinava (in k. In response to kirikis 4-5 Utpala says: All right. i.. without doubt. which portray appearances as being no more real than ghostly objects reflected in glass. nonetheless. the theory of rlbhrfsav&&z must be understood less as of epistemological than of cosmological significance. This analogy with the fabrication of objects in yogic trance is introduced specifically as an alternative to the various theories which interpret the emergence of the universe in terms of reflectionism .$IVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 361 with k. By means of cibh&ru&&z Abhinava accounts for the fact that ‘appearance does appear’. Considering the scope and complexity of Abhinava’s system. In the remainder of this section I shall summarize the argument of k.an analogy between the ‘creation’ of objects by god (who is in several different senses consciousness).in analogy with the appearance of objects in a mirror.e. are formally objectified in the idea of god’s ubiquity as consciousness. and play the role in Abhinavan idealism that the (various) cosmogonies play in mythic Hinduism. thus. essentially to just these appearances (avabhlfsas). Abhcisanidu and the theory of prakcida are.32 In any case. that Siva is in actualization many. one may hypothesize. It thus opens up for examination the social and existential substratum which must underlie even so rarefied a theological notion as ubiquity.6/ consciousness (tit) is able to cause the .

why [posit] external objects? In their case there is no valid means of establishing their existence while the primary valid means of disproving it is obviously this: if [external objects] are separated from illumination (prukdit bhede) they do not appear even though they may be objects of inference (1. There has.s Abhinava summarizes his interpretation admirable brevity: of these verseswith . without a material cause [external to consciousness].6/177:9-178:7). however. to shine forth (bhrl). for the establishment of ordinary activity is solely through appearances. in no way [previously] been the appearance (ibhisu) [of anything] external to appearance (&h&f~ brlhya)! Therefore. they serve no purpose [literally: nothing whatsoever may be done with them]. even by that unsound claim. These problems cannot be wholly resolved here (nor. svalak. (IPK 1. which you accept.7/182:3-6). ALPER mass of objects which are internal to hhn to appear @ruk&r~et) as external though the power of his volition (icch~vud~7t) hke a yogi. is to appear . 7 is the pivotal section of the portion of the IPV with which this essay is concerned.or. Abhinava’s commentary on k. To be actual.e. indeed.paramiyu .G9/ 186:6-187:2).t In effect this is to say that there is no reason to postulate any reality beyond appearances (&h&zs) because they in themselves provide an accounting for all of reality. because here the theological vision underlying the argument for god’s ubiquity as consciousness is revealed .ana. therefore. not even through inference (IPK 1. This analogy raises several significant problems of interpretation. The senses have certainly appeared because entities which are causes (fietuvustu) have appeared.5.g. but the . No amount of logical manipulation can create by means of inference what every sort of human experience ordinary and extraordinary. The inference [of an object] which has not previously appeared @~ibhitaplSrva) is surely inadmissable. for no ordinary activity whatsoever [may occur] by means of permanent objects of inference. It follows that any object proposed as the cause of cognitive multiplicity . for example. seeds. waking and sleeping . v&wnd. bti/z~@rha.362 HARVEY P.5.5. there can be no proof of [the existence of external] objects whatsoever. put more literally. according to this scheme. without control of Abhinava’s work on the modes of meditation)..focused by an analogy between the divine and the yogic fabrication of objects.will upon investigation turn out to be either nonexistent or within the net of dbhrfsas after a11.for once - If you posit [the existence of] external objects.33 (d) Kirikci 7.shows to be nonsensical: realities which are ~JJde@zition beyond perception.

and creative. in regard to the variety of diverse appearances in the world why shouldn’t one accept the self-dependence of what is absolutely nothing but consciousness (cidrltmana eva) as demonstrated along with its self-awareness (svasarpedanasiddho)? Why torture oneself by taking pains to search for another cause (hetvantura) (1. it cannot disappear(anadhik@tmat8~~ anup&z). and aspossessing a unique power of volition (icchdviJe. and potency (bkti). because of the power of its special volition. It is not so much that Abhinava hasidentified someentity or substance. In Abhinava’s own words: Yogic consciousness (yogisapvid) itself has a power (z?aakti)which is such that it causes the multiplicity of objects to come forth @ruti$uyari) in the form of a variety of appearances (ribhtisus).SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 363 issues posedmay be articulated. having the form ‘this’ . Abhinava interprets Utpala (for the ktirikti seeabove. asthat he hasfixed upon a certain description of the whole processof the life of the cosmoswhich he has concluded one cannot verbally better. 355) asconcluding in this versethat the searchfor a causeof cognitive multiplicity external to consciousness is unnecessarybecause there is a simpler and more direct explanation: consciousness itself is ultimate. It is assuchthat he considersit unobstructed (apratigh&). moreover.5. one must conclude that it is ‘pregnant’ with all things. 3s He saysthat ultimate consciousness (tit) is primally self-consciousness (svasamvedana). and hasthe power to cause cognitive multiplicity.7/184:9-185:6)?u The crucial point being made in this passage . This power of ultimate consciousness may. too.and one may without difficulty find many like it in Abhinava’s corpus . self-dependence (svtituntrya). body. ‘consciousness’.is that the ultimate must be characterized simultaneously in three ways: asfundamentally conscious. intellect.e. Therefore. causes the multiplicity of objects which exist entirely internal to it to appear (kbhc5sayati) as external.34 [Consciousness is capable of doing this] because it is characterized as unobstructed.because breath. Since it hasno secondessence standingalongside it.a).. and an interpretation consistentwith the picture of god asprakrisacontained in J&4 l-9 proposed. whose selfdependence (sv&mtrya) is acknowledged.i. it is my hypothesis that consciousness itself. since it does not have an additional essence [beyond itself]. p. The theology of prakda aspresentedin J& l-9 is an articulation of this one aspectof the . It is assuch. and because of the fact that. Therefore. that it may be consideredasboth one and many. be understood by comparing it to the power of a yogi’s consciousness which hasthe power to generatevarious objects of cognition without the aid of any causeexternal to itself. and other [objects] are forms in which consciousness is limited and distributed. it never disappears. asabsolute(though one could arguably interpret his work asif he had). self-sufficient.

causes the manifestation of objects without a material cause. It is in order to understand the cosmogonic power of ultimacy that the analogy with-yogic fabrication is introduced. One problem of interpretation is particularly vexing in regard to this analogy. understand the k&z&i to be saying “bogisavvidb~hyam] niruptidtinam” .x Second.u presupposed in JSA 7. In his summary of the first udhikciraof the IPK. however. is sentiency. aussen erscheinen ( 196 2 : 3 7). First. . Third. Utpala wrote “devo .. Frauwallner similarly translated “ohne jede materielle Grundlage” (27). et par le pouvoir en lui (MM: par essence. C.364 HARVEY P. They have no existence outside of yogic consciousness. and most significant. K. all of the diverse effects of yogic cognitive multiplicity are held to have a single cause. ubiquitous reality. there are three characteristics of yogic cosmogony as Abhinava understands it which make an analogy to divine cosmogony particularly useful to him. the objects whose essential nature which are within Him. tel un yogin.” Such is the understanding of Silburn: Dieu. yogiva nirupddtinam arthajdtam prak&ayet. Conscience d’aucune cuuse.37 .and the ptirvapak.” i. Pandey: That Lord. the creation of objects in yogic trance is ‘special’ rather than ordinary. like a Yogin. l’ensemble des chases qui resident 1 18). without (requiring) any rnateriai One can. . the objectification of yogic consciousness violates the ordinary law of cause and effect. the yogi’s consciousness. Does Abhinava believe that there is a material cause (uptidtina) in yogic and divine cosmogony or not? In order to deal with this problem one must return to Utpala’s k&?/c@.“without any other cause. lasst gleich einem Yogin kraft seines Willens die in ihm befmdlichen GegenstSnde. In spite of the difficulties raised. ALPER complex ultimate nature of the cosmos: the cosmogonic drive of unitary. So. Thus Frauwallner translates: Denn Gott. all will.e. like a yogi. der seinem Wesen nach geistig ist. yogic objects do not have well-known or familiar (prasiddhn) causes. externally according to His free manifests. that is. fait. cause (1954: 65). apparaitre a l’exterieur sans se servir de sa seule volonte. in the case of yogic fabrication the multiple effects are not separate from their single cause.” At first glance this certainly seems to say that god. ohne dass ein materielles Substrat vorhanden w&e. “without a cause external to the yogi’s consciousness. too.

iIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 365 What is at issue in these diverse translations is clarified by reference to the arguments of the pUrvapak~~ by and large tacitly presupposed by Abhinava (182: 7. It seems to me that while neither of these interpretations are to be dismissed out of hand. what appears can be accounted for only by the affirming of its appearance.38 Systematic considerations make clear that from Abhinava’s perspective (as well as from Utpaladeva’s) the correct translation of k. so in the appearing of the cosmos as such. tends to undercut any ultimate distinction between an efficient (nimittu) and a material (up&&r) cause. and a single ubiquitous causal process governing the one cosmos. or vice versa. external atoms.” This would seem to leave two possibilities. For Abhinava. and as consciousness. namely real. It is at once personal and impersonal. Siva-who-is-consciousness who is cause of the world cannot be ‘described’ as material as opposed to ethereal. and mind and matter. and are thus unreal (auastu) or they are real. He is at once both and neither.but immaterial . must have a material cause. so there is ultimately a single cause.as usual an externalist . but that in both cases unique sorts of causal relationship apply. in all its .claims that in analyzing divine or yogic cognition there can be only two possibilities: either the objects of such cognition have no material cause. as a consequence. or he might hold that consciousness itself is to be understood as the material cause of its own objectification. and. Once again metaphysical assertion reveals itself as the assertion of ultimate value reflecting the priority given to certain sorts of experience.cause of its own objects. It transcends the ordinary distinctions between subject and object. just like the Vedantin’s analysis of bruhman. In the case of yoga this affirmation is made by asserting the ‘sovereign power’ of yogis. 7 must be “without a material cause [external to consciousness] . It is in order to establish the special status of the origin of the cosmos that the analogy between the yogic and the cosmic fabrication of objects is proposed.184:9). The point is that as in yogic creation. as reality is an allencompassing field of tibhisfsas. the second is by far the more compatible of the two with Abhinava’s general position. The truth is that Abhinava’s vision of the cosmic process as ultimate. Then in analogy with yogic experience whose ultimate value is taken for granted the appearance of the cosmos. The opponent . Abhinava’s answer is that the objects of divine and of yogic creation are real. This cosmic process can be named as god. Abhinava might hold that divine (or yogic) consciousness is such that it is the sole .

itself inconceivable.in fact constantly creates the cosmos. (e) Ktirikcis 8-9. including once again the rather bizarre if significant experience of yogis! Abhinava’s intention is never unclear: he wishes to account for real cognitive diversity without positing any ultimate ontological rupture in the universe. that the yogic analogy stands at the center of Abhinava’s scheme: of his axiology as well as his process ontology. for multiple. As we have seen. which is unitary. religiously affirmed.366 HARVEY P. so these assertions themselves depend upon a religious validating of human experience. ordinary and extraordinary. this is to say that illumining consciousness must necessarily be objective. impersonal matrix in which subjectivity and objectivity are inextricably bound. 7 thus point! back. A realistic and pluralistic . if perhaps partly subconscious. The whole of Abhinava’s argument has actually been on behalf of one simple claim: external objects that are met in ordinary cognitions are validly established. ultimate whole. too. This suggests that he does not understand it merely as an example which gives some idea of how divine creation. he portrays that very reality as a flowing. 39 In order to do this he.who is. to the mythic vision of $iva as one of the most significant. after all. conceived of mythically as the supreme yogi . The yogic analogy reveals. objective appearances to be valid there must be an intrinsic connection between them and illumining consciousness. that just as Abhinava’s epistemological problem depends for its solution on a set of metaphysical assertions. on the one hand. It appears then. and which avoids opting for any one unsublatable description of ultimacy. circle. quietly but insistently. is affirmed by asserting the creative self-dependence of Sivawho-is-consciousness. In this way he seems to achieve a metaphysics which avoids strict dualism or strict monism. K. There cannot be an ultimate separation between them. but more earnestly as a model of how Siva . In other words.ALPER complexity. In making this latter affirmation Abhinava is supporting a complex metaphysical position which he sees as having fidelity to the whole range of human experience.40 To understand their validity one must recognize that they are in reality not pure externals but aspects of a complex. On the other. sources of Abhinavan theology. affirms the basically personal nature of reality. Conversely. Let us recapitulate. which allows for the sort of ordinary epistemic interaction whose legitimacy he does not wish to surrender. in Abhinava’s system epistemology and metaphysics are locked in a tight. might have taken place.

With this argument the Siddhantin rests his case against the inference of prak&abcihytirthas by externalists such as the Sautrantikas. For Abhinava. as the phrase goes. is the only metaphysical and theological model fit to account for individual acts of knowing. it is solely the person Siva. however .but not illusory . in all its sentiency and in all its concreteness. and into that of the mythic figure of $iva -Abhinava feels that it can only be understood as personal. the Saiva. since it is (speaking strictly) empirically unevidenced. however. that while people ordinarily think that they perceive nothing but external objects they are in fact perceiving god as well. Abhinava contends. who is so spacious as to be able to contain within himself the entire world of epistemic transactions. in his several modes as consciousness. are not so simple to pin down. Sometimes he speaks as if the cosmic process were ‘mechanical’. of personas-macrocosm. adds nothing substantive to his case in 8-9. .SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 367 epistemology is underwritten by the ontological claim that unity and objectivity are necessarily concommitants of each other. Abhinava portrays this concommitance through a variety of metaphors. e. interpreted mythically or abstractly. personal and impersonal. Only the personal metaphor is sufficiently complex. as well as impossible by definition. they are. In the end. He contends that reality really is made up of ISbh&as. atoms. like god and other ‘things-in-themselves’. albeit in a highly distorted.under ordinary circumstances . having discussed the yogic analogy in JSA 7. because they have deceived themselves by means of that conspiracy of language and thought generally known as nUyti. Abhinava elaborates and defends this complex vision primarily in terms of rlbhlfsavrfda. sometimes as if it were ‘organic’.be understood only analogically with the atypical experience of world-imagining yogis.g. and eccentric . can hardly be demonstrated even by inference. These dbhdsas. moreover. Their occurrence can .following out the theology of prakda into that of vim&a.way. Hence from an on the surface entirely common sense realism he is led rather far afield into what might look like a repudiation of just that common sense viewpoint he claims to be defending. notoriously unavailable for empirical examination. He only reformulates from a slightly different perspective his root assertion that reality is a net of tibhtisas and that the appearance of externals.42 Hence to sew up the argument against externals Abhinava. and. 41 The model of dynamic personal identity. and sufficiently ambivalent to describe the facts as man must experience them. as well as his own thesis concerning god’s complex ubiquity..

x This passage. should we say. [alternatively]. or ‘effervesce’ changingonly nuancenot the substance of the position. . . It is also the case that external objects are not established even by inference (1. . the argument of J$A 8-9 revealsitself assimple.8-9/185:14-186:4).. while plausible.8-g/187:3-7). separate from] the mirror of consciousness (v~ti~&~rp~~nciririkra).g. in analogy to [the fabrication of objects by] a yogi.for this reasonaloneinferring the existence of somethingbeyond illumining consciousness is unthinkable. e. Thus Abhinava writes: It is not only the case that . 362) suggests that he himself recognized that his argumentagainstexternals. which is in fact to say [a cause] thought to be external to it.) All technical reasons aside.~~ Should we conclude (kalpuyema) that the cause of the variety of appearances reflected in cognition ~~~in~praribimbatlibhrlsovaicitrya) is beyond [i. ALPER Abhinava’s introduction to k.though certainly not simpleminded. Abhinava’s philosophicalobjection to externalism comesdown to just that it Gould postulate an ontological openness . p. it could not lead to establishing [the existence of external objects] which is being discussed . Seenin this light. Emotionally speakinghe objects to externalism because it would violate his religiousvision of reality asa seZf-sufficientwhole. because perception amounts to absolutely nothing more than consciousness being self-illumined (svQ~-Q~E~QsQ~@~~~~Q) so that.which he finds unwarranted by human experience.44indicates that for him the cosmos is a ‘closedshop’.y He explains: In regard to the establishing of external objects inference cannot possibly come into play. in analogy with an [object] such as a pot which is reflected in a mirror? Or.. that nothing other than the self-dependence of consciousness (su~vi~~&z~q~~) is the cause [of the variety of appearances in cognition]? (1. a blue object shines forth (bh&) .5. Inference is a predicative cognition . ‘to be’ is ‘to appear’. ‘pulsate’. For Abhinava being is becoming.for the reasons pointed out in previous verses. 8-9 (for the latter seeabove. a self-contained systemof appearances.e. Abhinava’s argument for ubiquity finally standsat the abstract correlate of yogic experience and Saivite myth.45(For the verb ‘appear’ one could substitute ‘shine forth’. wasfar from ‘air-tight’. Even if it did come into play.368 HARVEY P.5. besides accentuatingAbhinava’s rejection of reflectionist models of cosmogony. ‘be manifested’. He writes: [Utpala] anticipates a possible objection: all that having been said (evum) there still happens to be two different hypothetical inferences (sumbhcTvati~urn&t~).external objects do not appear in perception. for example.a rupture a reality .

be summarized. whatever proof @ruti~a) is proposed to demonstrate [the existence of] external objects is. lf a blue or another object is not reached (i. Pensa:108114). in fact. an inference.8-g/191:4-ll). Thosewith lesstaste for either the mythical or the metaphysical. after dealingwith only one potential objection (187: 15-191:4). i.” Therefore. self-contradictory. has not been perceived. that is to say. In his own words: Therefore.e. in the case of something which has ln no way previously appeared. neither surprisingnor exceptionable. then it would in fact really be nothing but illumination @mk&m&usvabh~vu). the tradition of bhedcibheda . even normative. asin the rest of his philosophical writing. however. even one that is inferential. conceptual.46 to move directly to the peroration of JSA l-9. Its statusin situ can. an inferential conclusion (unumitivyrlpcira) which is predicative cannot be accepted by any philosopher (1. and predicative. asthat singleset which contains an infinite supply of desirables . determinate. Therefore. he feelsfree. and in its folk manifestations(cf. and a .. especiallyin light of the influence of the School of Dignagaon his work. because of the principle [stated in k.2 Abhinava’s taking for granted that inference is predicative (i. His conclusion. both in its reflection. vision of the Hindu world.of the universeasluminouswhole.There can be little doubt that Abhinava in the JSA. omzvk[a) by an illumining cognition @ruti&z). as‘full pot’. The evidence suggests that.seems to be somethinglike the central.e. it would not be external. Hindu and Buddhist. penentrated.. must be judged persuasive rather than convincing.this vision might persuade many. displayswide familiarity with the Indian scholastictradition.. verbal) and dependent upon perception is. Therefore. 21: “[Unless an object depended intrinsically on illumination] it would remain unillumined as it was previous [to its appearance] .5. nonetheless.8-g/187:8-15).his vision of reality asbeing a diversewhole which is itself the ultimate object of religious awe and celebration. Whom will Abhinava persuade? Those who share. for it conversely demonstrates their nonexternality (1. In spite of the attention lavished on Advaita Ved%ntaboth inside and outside of India in recent centuries.SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 369 (vikolpa) and it is recognized that every predicative cognition is rooted in perception. and control of the accepted techniquesof argumentation.e. Were it to be reached by [such a cognition] after all.5. sectarianand socialconsiderationsaside.aa This is not the place to provide a critical evaluation of Abhinava’s case againstexternality and for god’scomplex ubiquity.or through personalreorientation come to share. then it certainly may not be inferred.

insofar as I was able.I hope responsible . and the state of Abhinavan scholarship makes it impossible to demonstrate their validity by marshalling a representative sample of (clear and comprehensible) proof texts from the whole range of Abhinava’s dense and intricate corpus. It is certainly not simple to perform such a task of re-imagining. if the universe is the complex whole we have described. of . ALPER more discriminating eye for philosophical sleight of hand might argue that Abhinava’s case against externals is little more than an elaborate unpacking of his assumptions. To interpret any aspect of Abhinava’s theology judiciously requires that one situate the exposition of text passages by means of an imaginative recreation of their historical context. Abhinavans could respond: perhaps.GOD AS PRAKzidA (i) Orientation. I shall focus here on a single problem of interpretation: the understanding of pm&&z in terms of cfbhcisanidu as a theology of cosmogonic process. of that systemic and experiential situation which provided Abhinava’s point of departure. I recognize. hopes. my suggestions are informed not just by Abhinava’s work. for Abhinava’s theology is at once scholastic and tantric. and to whose fears. but by the movement of my own sensibility in response to his probing. thereby broadening the scope of the discussion of Abhinava’s and other theologies of northern Saivism. In it I sought to set out. My suggestions go beyond the text of J&4 l-9 per se. themselves unargued. but productive vision is rather the best that can be done. In this section I wish to complement my exegesis by exploring some of the systematic and imaginal implications and presuppositions of Abhinava’s argument.370 HARVEY P. This would have little disuasive impact. My goal is to draw out of the texts various layers of meaning. and assumptions his theology spoke. to be sure. such an incestuous. and thus of the reasons behind his saying it. as well as alive to aesthetic and linguistic nuances which are only occasionally made explicit. #at I venture is an . Hence my reflections on the context and significance of the theology of prakdu are obviously tentative.reconstruction not of what Abhinava said. In this endeavor there is. polyvalent theology. recognizing that my attending to them has already helped shape my exegesis. Furthermore. precisely what Abhinava had to say in J$A l-9 about Siva’s ubiquity as pr&i&z. The previous section of this essay (II) was largely exegetical. considerable hermeneutic risk. III. about prak&z/&zE~u. but of what he might have felt about what he said.

a ‘causal’ theory . is the ontological status of each ‘cognitive appearance’? Should one understand an tibh&sa as ultimately illusory. the ultimate. root metaphors.of great importance for Hindu gnosis from the time of the Upanisads . In addition it must be understood against the alternatives proposed by competing traditions. further.47 I shall. Abh&zvlida is the theory by which Abhinava attempts to explain the manifestation of the ‘ordinary’ from. as an epistemology (accounting for correct cognitions). as a projected form of ultimate reality? . In the end it shall have to be understood against the background of alternative Kasmiri Saiva theories having similar functions which are themselves incorporated into Abhinava’s complex theology. As one would expect it serves both as a cosmogonic theory.!hVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 371 course. For the sake of clarity and convenience I shall here examine Cbhrfsuvtidu largely in terms of the well-known Ved%ntic theories of pu?i@mav~da and vivartavtida. What. Only as a means of drawing the entire discussion to a close shall I allude to some of these additional lines of interpretation. 1959b. or as in some sense ultimately real. and ultimately . It is presented as an alternative to any sort of realism which accepts the existence of objects external to consciousness. iii. Prakti$a and tibh&vrfda. an alternative to a realistic reflectionism such as that of the Sautrantikas discussed above. being guided by the discussion of those theories in Paul Hacker’s monograph Vivarta. 1963 and 1975 and Gnoli. however.as is integral to Abhinava’s exposition of the ubiquity of prak&z. and. in particular the theory of spanda (vibration or movement).for short. (a) Background. especially Advaita Vedanta and Vijrianavada Buddhism. It provides a general theory of relationships . in connection with Abhinava’s yogic analogy. c) the theory of abhrZr. that this is only one of a number of issues raised by Abhinava’s portrayal of god as prukda. focus heavily on the cosmogonic function of tibhrfsavtida because that highlights the special character of the theology of prak3da. a mere appearance. 1959a. Potter: 172). and the theory of the progressive evolution of V&Y(utterance) (on the latter see Padoux. and its relationship to. As has been indicated above (see II. and 1965). as an alternative model to any sort of reflectionism. and analogies (cf.which is articulated in terms of a variety of overlapping models. and to an illusionistic reflectionism such as is advocated in some sorts of Vijrianavada Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta.also as a theory of error (accounting for erroneous cognitions). that is. (ii>.

Each major advaitic theorist . change takes place on a single level of reality: the effect is as real as its material .4g Here I wish to point out some of the more salient features of Abhinava’s position. and the world of objective multiplicity.372 HARVEY P. 1953: 189-194) the meaning of par&iinavtsda and vivartavddu. Basically they are causal theories applicable to the question of how brahman might have been the cause of cosmic manifestation. seen in contrast to the advaitism of the centuries preceding him in general.48 Secondly.offered his own sometimes highly individualistic understanding of the relations between brahman. What came to be accepted as the ‘normative’ causal theories. emphasizes the essential identity of a material cause and its effects and holds that an effect is the real ‘transformation’ of its material cause. and early Vedanta. In contrast to both of those non-dualisms there were the too often neglected. ALPER In answering this question historically and systematically it is natural to compare @bh&savidu with the two allied Vedantic theories of pari@mavtida and vivartavada. In making this comparison one must not lose sight of the complexity of the Vedantic tradition. and Visisfadvaita Ved%nta. Obviously my observations can hardly be complete. Pari~rimavrlda. and how they came to be used in Vedantic theology. Whatever the historical relationship. and thus the ‘classical’ illusionism. and whose theories had a signal influence on his work. avidyd (nescience). According to this view.some half dozen figures from say Samkara in the late seventh century through Vacaspatimisra in the tenth . the ‘self-non-dualism’ (&tidvaitu) of G aud apada and his successors was only one of several sorts of Vedanta. the advuitu tradition of Samkara and his followers had up to and including the time of Abhinava a more flexible character than it later assumed. Before proceeding it might be helpful to summarize (largely following Hacker. My@. accepted by Samkhya. just as curdled milk is nothing but another state of milk. of Advaita VedFtnta were still at that time in the process of developing. as well as by Bhedabheda-.another is Dharmakirti .with whom Abhinava is most familiar. they are intended to highlight an area meriting considerable scholarly investigation. In the first place. Alongside it there was the ‘word-non-dualism’ (kzbdcjdvaita) of BhartIhari (late 5th) who is one of the figures . if any. It was represented by Bhartrpraparica (6th?) and Bhaskara (8th). but fundamental Vedarrtic tradition of bhedebheda (or dvaittidvaita) which attempted to mediate between dualism and non-dualism. the study of Abhinava makes it apparent that there are important structural similarities between Bhedabheda Vediinta and the various theologies of northern Saivism.

It is in order to cope with this ‘second-order’dualism that the advaita tradition evolvesineluctably toward illusionism. on the other hand. tends to have the unwanted consequence of reimporting dualismin defenseof monism. vivartavrida) m@y@zvidy@ is held to be integral to brahman. but in reality is not. but they diverge radically in their treatment of non-dualism.Vivartav@dais.50 Certain aspectsof these theoriesmerit attention. Daraus folgt erstens. asatya) of reality: the effect can have no independent existence. precisely to protect the purity of its monism strictly distinguishes consciousness and matter. taking its monismstraightforwardly tends to minimize the distinction between consciousness and matter.asAbhinava takesgleein pointing out (compare above II. By virtue of a peculiar and virtually undefinable relationship (i. “Die Maya alsUrstoff und die Welt alsProdukt gehoren ja demselben ontologischen Bereich an.. nur zu sein und nicht werden zu k&men. To bridge the gap between being and becomingthe allied conceptsof tiyti and avidyti are invoked.however. dass innerhalb seiner Sphtie kein Pari$ma mijglich ist. and holds that an effect is only the ‘apparent manifestation’ of its material cause.e. . In other words advaitism reachesthe formulation that the world is vivarta of brahman. the theory that evolved asthe advaita tradition moved towards the adoption of illusionism.Pari@zuvrida. ii).relationship to mriyi/avidyti. dass also jeder Par@ma ganz in Bereich des Nichtwahrhaftseienden oder Unbestimmbaren geschenen muss.” Both intend to be fundamentally non-dualistic (or one may fairly say monistic). in contrast. just asa stick may appear to be. or. satya) to a lower level (the not truly real. und zum Wesen dieses Seienden geh&t es. As Hacker expresses it (190): “der Allgott oder dasAbsolutum ist zugleich Schopfer und Urstoff der Welt. Both allow brahmanto be identified asat once the efficient (nimitta) and material (uprfdrfna)cause of the world. a snake. Vivartavddu. but pari@ma of rnbya.SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 373 cause.According to this view.51 Hence there eventually emerges various individual variations of this scheme (Hacker: 191): Der Advaitin kennt mu ein wahrhaft Seiendes: das Brahman. change is a movement from a higher level (the truly real. innerhalb dessen die ParinamaBeziehungstatthaben kann” (192).This strictness. while the world of multiplicity is held to stand in a pari@ma.It emphasizes the ontological discontinuity between causeand effect. In its view brahrnan must be left absolutely unmoved by the movement of the cosmos.

‘identity’) in the end comes down to a peculiarly dialectical defense of the relative autonomy of the cognitive object. The dialectic nature of tibh&zvtida merits emphasis. but at the same time he holds that it is no less than a projection5* or . distinctions arise.e. Therefore his discussion of praktida’s ubiquity (i. The argument of JSA l-9 shows that Abhinava is fundamentally determined to avoid the absurdity of any position which. most real to the least real. ALPER to use an epistemological model. Abh&zvtida is his attempt to devise a causal theory which will allow him to achieve this reconciliation. in agreement with most forms of Saivism and Vedanta. According to it change (i.e..e.. comprehensive reality who is the meditating yogi. In accordance with sdtk&vavtida. but relative. were it true. ribh&avtfda.374 HARVEY P. Hence the importance of the yogic analogy outlined above (II. but without its illusionism) that this real process of transformation represents a progressive decline in level of reality from the. as it were. the emergence of the cosmos) is like the arising of a real world of cognitive appearances within the single. It seems to me that it is formulated not only in terms of the scholastic distinctions I have been discussing. He wants to hold (with pari@mavEda) that the evolution of the cosmos is a real transformation taking place wholly within a single reality. if not the. would entail the nonexistence (or unreality) of cognitional activity (i. primary model in whose terms cfbh&v&da is understood. iii. d). but also with an eye to Abhinava’s particular understanding of liberation asJivanmukti. At the same time he wants to hold (with vivartavtida. and the yogic analogy Abhinaa holds that the manifested world is secondary in the sense that it is merely an effect. Abhlisavtfda is at once the cosmological and epistemological articulation of this dialectic designed to protect both the discrete integrity and the inseparability of ultimate and penultimate reality. On the basis of the argument against externals outlined above the reader should now be able to imagine where Abhinava wants to position himself in this discussion. and to the meditative and tantric practices believed to lead to it. or even . ‘difference’).. the ultimate is at once the efficient and the material cause of the phenomenally manifested world.I think it is arguable . This model allows Abhinava to preserve the systematic and practical advantages of both paribtima and vivartavtida: it pictures the ultimate as the single horizon within whose bounds real. This analogy provides a. that the snake is vivarta of the stick. For Abhinava. but paripcima of avidya.its ultimate religious devaluation. (b) AbhrssavtIda as dialectical.

i. cause and effect. On the one hand each effect. it seems to me. the cognitive identity. of objects. Thus for him there cannot be an absolute distinction between consciousness and matter.but to become. (c) Prak&a es Cosmogonic. is believed to exist necessarily. For Abhinava as a Saiva ‘in good standing’ it is of the nature of the ultimate not merely to be . taken as a whole. As Abhinava says. ultimacy. Philosophical and practical religiosity here coincide. Relationship as such is ‘internal’ to. although it is usually identity which is given poetic pride of place. Indeed. subject and object. The argument against absolute externals is certainly epistemological. 53 At the same time the totality of effects. it is dependent on others (par&znOya). Abh&&da then seems to assert a metaphysics which can most accurately be called bhedcbheda. It seems to me that virtually every page of the IPV testifies to Abhinava’s conviction on this . Identity and difference are seen to subsist within each other. 347). Thus it is simply said: “The establishing of objects is effected by illumination” (prak&zbal@t bhrlvavyavasthlf) (1. What then is the relationship between the notion of prak&z and clbh@sav&da Praktia. or between the elements of any relationship whatsoever. it is that without which there would in fact be no establishment of the relative independence. p. is in itself lacking in self-dependence (lacking in Wtantrya).s4 Here cosmology and epistemology work together.of the ultimate. “yadi pruk&zh tadi bhavati arthah (see above. .to use a more abstract term a ‘cognitive concretization’ ..SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 375 form (tipa.17/2 17: 12). An ultimate wholly lacking in cognitive activity (and hence objectivity) is unthinkable. that is. that is to say each cognitive objectification or @bh&sa. it is precisely the nature of its becoming.that would be insufferably boring! .5 . vupus). intrinsic to.. yet the theory of prak& basically assumes the . This fact lends multiplicity (and thus prak&z) a rather complex ontological status. According to it there is at one and the same time real ontological continuity and real ontological discontinuity between Siva-who-is-consciousness and the world. for then god would not be that complex object of religious interest in whom one fully participates. but would be of no more interest than a bump on a log.e. is simply that mode of the ultimate which accounts for the actualization of the multiplicity of objects. What distinguishes Abhinava’s scheme is the subtle and methodical working out of these theses in the service of the Saiva vision of reality.in itself hardly original .point. the perfection of its self-limitation which makes the ultimate ultimate.

the theology of ‘judgment’. the ‘incompleteness’ of the theology of prakada is manifest. Abhinava beginshis analysisof objects external to consciousness with the assumptionthat real objects in somesense participate in a reality which is greater than they are.that Abhinava has an easy time delimiting prakdda in either cosmogonic or epitemological terms. in J$A 15. One does not get the impression . Assumingthat my interpretation is broadly correct.376 HARVEY P. As such its own polyvalence is revealed: while ultimately identical to the subject. What finally is the nature of this reality which may be identified by somany different terms?I seeno reasonto conclude that Abhinava was of one mind on this question. potentially objectifiable. If.ss As such.its being undivided (abheda). Abhinava rejects this on the groundsthat the pzIrvapak. between different objects] shouldbe acceptedaseffected by illumination” (iha prakddabahitnilapitayoh bhedo ‘bhyupagantavyah) (1. As such prak&a focuses ultimacy precisely as the constant becoming of that world within whose bounds epistemic interaction alone takes place. I go on to make a few historical-philosophical observationsabout the theology of prak&a .religiousimplications of viewing Abhinava not assomesort of third-string Samkaranbut as a dialectical. In describing it he strives to occupy the ‘middle ground’ between a strict non-dualism and a strict dualism.and to point out someof the historical. The closeness of his position to both may account for the lengths to which he has to go to establish relative externality while refuting absolute externality. For example. ‘identity-in-difference’ Saiva. its calling forth a complementary personal (subjective) idealism.31 161: 2-3). and separated(bhinna) from appearance (seeabove II. to Siva. vim&a. and this suggests both a real ambivalenceon his part .e.. the pr. ALPER role of a cosmogonic theory .a suggests that “the distinction between blue and yellow [i.3 a pOrvapak. to tit.in J$A l-9 or elsewhere . however.a simultaneously asserts the radical non-duality of prakda .albeit a highly impersonal and non-mythical one. too. one substitutesa dialectic understandingof non-duality for an absoluteone. as cosmogonic praMa serves as that impersonal prime ‘matter’ out of which and within which multiplicity is chiseled. and actually objective! s6 (d) npological observations.which might better now be called the theology of prak&a/5bh&a .5. ii).IrvapakSa turns out to be giving preciseexpressionto Abhinava’s position after all: prak&a is at one and the sametime ultimately unitary. One easily notices a variety of emphases in his work.

Das heisst: Er behalt die Begriffe der altvedantischen. and even by temperament.moves toward illusionism: “!&nkaras kosmologie ist eine Art illusionistischer Pariyimavllda.!hVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 377 and perhaps the evolving of his position during the course of his career. but expected and welcomed ambivalence.) What distinguishes the theories of these four figures is the degree and direction of the qualification.and out of . 58 If .even if a highly qualified .) has shown. hence volition) and dtmun in itself. That is clearly determined not only by considerations of logic. one considers another side of his idealism . one would be tempted to say that Abhinava pictures that in . of course. consciousness as such . to the fundamentally dynamic and polyvalent thrust of Abhinava’s understanding. it is important to recognize that Abhinava is dealing essentially with the same problematic that has plagued Ved%nta (and in a somewhat different way Buddhism. as Hacker (1953: 210f. Therefore.in itself. it should not be surprising that his scheme turns out to be broadly parallel to that of several Vedantavadins usually seen as arch-opponents of each other.still a third strand of Abhinava’s idealism -points the way to a more comprehensive understanding. (That in the first instance is what tibh&zvtida amounts to. While the tantric influence on Abhinava’s metaphysics may make it appear rather ‘baroque’ in comparison to the somewhat more familiar metaphysics of Vedanta. but by practical religious differences. one which is in accord with both the mythology of Siva and the dialectical soteriology of Saivite tantra: for Abhinava the ultimate is the life process in its awesome (but hardly ineffable) totality. If one considers one side of Abhinava’s idealism . with the other strands of Abhinava’s idealism.the theology of tit or samvid.that is. fiigt ihnen aber immer wieder illusionistische Gedanken hinzu. Samkara. one could get the impression that Abhinava pictures the ultimate as the supreme subject. I believe.Abhinava not only tolerated. like Samkara (the seventh century dttidvaitin).” Although . on the other hand. The theology of pruiWu/&z&r~ (in conjunction. The theology of pruk&%z/Ebh~sa . Like Bhartrhari (the fifth century $abd@dvaitin). and like Bhaskara (the eighth century dvaitlidvaitin) Abhinava may be understood as teaching a qualified . and with the mythic strand of his theology) points. too) for centuries.parigimavdda.which the world emerges as a supreme substance.the theology of vima& (judgment.57 I want to suggest that up to a certain point . realistischen Emanationslehre bei. insofar as it did not go beyond the bounds of the medieval Brahmanic/$aiva world .

over againstthe simpleidentity-in-difference monismof Bhaskara.the nature of his Lakti theory. or even more broadly againstpar@imavtida.Abhinava postulatesa more comprehensiveand multi-faceted alternative: a theology of constant movement that might be called a Saiva ‘monism’of cosmicprocess.He emphasizes neither the illusory nor the substantialist‘lessons’ which might easily be seenasimplicit in the theory of #bh&as and the yogic model.59 Both Bhartrhari’s IGi@q&@z (VP) and the commentary (vrtti) on it certainly incorporate an element of illusionism.ganz 3nrlich wie es die nichtillusionistische Vedanta-Theorie der ‘Einheit in der Unterschiedlichkeit’ (bhed2#redav&) getan hatte . .which is self-dependent. over againstthe word-monismof Bhartrhari.call it what you will . asHacker (199) observesabout the VP.It is this process which is Siva-whois-consciousness in all its modalities. As hasbeen pointed out by Hacker and Potter (among others) there is a telling argumentagainstany sort of BhedabhedaVedWa.whose schemes themselves show real similarity. the ‘power of consciousness’ @@zaSakti)to create itself asworld. Hacker (200) notes: . Thus Potter (156) speakingof Bhartrpraparica: Since the transformation of Brahman into selves is a real transformation (cause and . What Abhinava constructs is not after all an illusionistic paricrimavrida.378 HARVEY P. including that of prak&a. he highlights throughout the constant dynamic of world emergence and subsidence. Hence. Over againstthe selfmonismof mainstreamadvaita.Nonetheless. . Man konnte Bhartrharis Standpunkt als illusionistischen Bhedabhedavdda charakterisieren: das Absolutum ist flir ihn realiter identisch mit seinen scheinbaren Entfaltungen und zugleich scheinbar von ihnen verschieden.in distinction from later advaitism. . . [Bhartrhari] belasst das Absolutum in einer gewissen Vermengung mit der Welt . It is the inclusive spontaneity of the cosmichappening . (e) Prakddaasan essentiallyqualified ultimate. the complex process which is Siva asitself being ultimate.60 What distinguishes Abhinava’s position from either dabdddvaitaor dvaitadvaita? Certain details of his cosmology and metaphysicsaside. He standssystematically and temperamentally far closer to Bhartrhari and Bhaskara. ALPER there are passages one might cite to support the opposite position. . the usehe makesof the samkhyanschemeof emanationone above all elsenotices a fundamental difference in tone and in emphasis. I believe that basically Abhinava doesnot follow $arpkaraand his tradition in this direction. in asserting the identity of appearance and being. On the contrary. Bhartrhari persists.

from the fact that the transformation relation is too strong (or so the critic argues): to break such a relationship. mit dem Weder-noch vollen Ernst zu machen. sie kann aber ebensowenig . one must conclude that Brahman is itself infected with the very evils of bondage which infect its constituent factors. des WederSeienden-noch-Nichtseienden. and since the attachment of the selves to habits is a real attachment. . macht also deutlich.h. In assessing thesecriticisms . . . He goeson to observe: Mit der Unklarheit der ontologischen Grundlegung h%ngt es zusammen.which could equally well be directed against Abhinava asagainstBhartlprapafica and Bhaskara. den Begriff der illusorischen Entwicklung von dem der normalen Entwicklung zu differenzieren. letztere Vivarta. das man zwischen solcher Entwicklung. . .and in imagininghow Abhinava might respond to them it is important to recognize that they happen to depend upon a singlereligious assumption. Identitlt sein. d.SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 379 effect are equally real). wenn die Vivarta-Lehre logisch haltbar sein ~011:die Beziehung des ‘Fiktiver’. wie BhartFhari will.) sharpens his portrait of this dilemmaby citing a criticism of Bhartrhari offered by Vimuktatman (10th) in his Igasiddhi. nur der Begriff der Identitlt ist ausgemerzt und durch das ‘Weder identisch noch verschieden noch beides zugleich’ ersetzt. unterscheiden m&e: erstere ist Pari+ma. since they preexist in Brahman. 61 He summarizes: Vimuktatman . one must crush a part at least of Brahman itself. die von der hijheren Stufe zur niederen fiihrt. unberiihrtes. This being the caseVedtita would be compelledto adopt illusionism: “The point of introducing vivarta in place of pari@ma [is] . zum Realen kann nicht.which is explicit in . Hacker (1953: 200) elaboratesmuch the samepoint in considering Bhartlhari: Bhartlhari’s Illusionismus leistet also nicht das. dass es notwendig ist. The difficulty stems. Er behtiilt dabei die Begriffe des Fiktiven und des Substrates bei. to avoid visiting the stablerelatum in a dependencerelation with the defects of the unstable one” (Potter 162). . Hacker (226f. und solcher. sie kann ihrerseits such nur durch die Weder-noch-Formel beschrieben werden . one must destroy both of its terms. Verschiedenheit oder Sowohl-Verschiedenheit-als-such-Identitat sein. Die Systematiker entdeckten spCter. Really to crush all those evils which constitute bondage. die innerhalb des niederen Seinsbereiches verlguft. ruhendes Sein zu erweisen. dass BhartIhari es such nicht fiir n6jtig h&.sie muss ‘unbestimmbar’ sein. was eigentlich seine Funktion sein sol&e: nlmlich das Absolutum wirklich als unvertiderliches. Abschliessend definiert Vimuktstman das Vertiltnis des Absolutums zur Welt.

a qualified ultimate . is rooted in none other than the religious vision of illusionistic advaita and in the practice of a certain sort of yoga designed essentially . first of all.on all levels of reality. With such a point of departure we may imagine Abhinava’s response. that mutability is in one sense of the essence of the ultimate. in that sense alsocharacterizesSiva-who-isconsciousness. For tantric gaivism. as perfectly uninvolved with the cognitive world. In other words he could arguethat illusionismdoes not connect the ultimate and the apparent world with sufficient coherence to allow one to make sense out of the actual religiouspractices(the path) one follows in order to obtain liberation while alive. It is certainly consistentwith the mythology of Siva: what after all is god aspraktida. As a tantric Saiva Abhinava could offer a radical alternative. It is the assumption that the optimum characterization of the ultimate (brahman) must be as unchanging. The formal consistency of vivartav&da and classical yoga would then be seenasa religiousliability. any sort of bhedribheda finally means that an ultimate distinction between substratum and error is fatally compromised. Abhinava . that what characterizesthe world. if one prefers) is indeed implicit in the discussion of prak’da’s ubiquity that I have examined.Inta . but the . admitting. of creation and destruction. To this. he could respond that it is just what the advaitin finds systematically wanting .ALPER the position of Vimuktatman.to extricate (or abstract) consciousness from the taint of embodiment. and unmoved. in distinction from Ved5nta and classical yoga.that is of the greatestreligiousutility.in spite of the many ways in which he is indebted to the schools of Mahayana Buddhism and Ved. It seems to me that such an affirmation (or ‘concession’. of life and death . the central problematic of man’s spiritual life is that of properly recognizing and personally affirming the at once daunting and enchanting constant dynamic inextricability of spirit and matter. This assumption. then this criticism of bhedbbheda might be seen to lose much of its sting. however. He would certainly have to admit the logical force of the Vivartavadin’s critique: any sort of qualified or contextual advaita. If belief in the necessity or plausability of this assumption is shaken.clearly takes for granted a different point of departure: the mythic vision of diva and the sort of dialectical yoga which may be called tantric. however. the ultimate asin one sense objective. rather more tacit in the case of Hacker and Potter.no matter with what terminological subtley it is expressed . untouched.380 HARVEY P. embodiment being accurately enough recognized as implying activity and death.

I do not see how it can follow from the observation that all consciousness is of one sort that there is only a single consciousness. he who is necessarily perfect in his imperfection? IV. I feel able to offer certain observations about that and to suggest some directions future inquiry might take. nonetheless. abheda. avicchinna). apythak. This claim. It seems to me that the argument is haunted by the failure to distinguish decisively between ‘singularity of kind’ and ‘singularity of number’. As more of Abhinava’s philosophical writings are made the object of detailed scholarly examination. anatirikta. with a degree of confidence. however. that seems to be all that Abhinava is arguing. I suspect. It similarly confutes the . by his terminological inexactitude.in any case dubious . it shall require rethinking and refining. that the material I have discussed discloses something of the nature of Abhinava’s theological position in general.SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 381 abstract correlate of the dancing Siva. yet. CONCLUSION My analysis of Abhinava’s argument against the existence of objects external to prakrlsa and of the theory of &rtius related to it is preliminary. theistic dualism to an idealistic non-dualism which received its highest expression in the work of Abhinava and his disciple Ksemaraja. and the essential similarity of consciousness in the case of all subjects.) is ‘undivided’ (abhinna. Therefore.hypothesis of certain scholars that KaSmir Saivism evolved (they really mean ‘improved’!) steadily from an agamic.62 (2) Since I am primarily interested in the history (as well as the sociology and psychology) of ideas I wish to refrain from offering a philosophical critique of Abhinava’s argument. etc. Abhinava begins with observations about the integrity of individual self-consciousness. (1) To reiterate an historical point: Abhinava’s portrayal of god as prak& reveals how misleading it is to classify him as a crypto-Advaita Vedantin. This is illustrated. (This is the ‘identity’ half of his portrayal of prak&z in terms of ‘identity-indifference’. He concludes with the metaphysical assertion of the unity of consciousness as such. in summary and conclusion. that recognizing its weakness as argument can help one appreciate its theological efficacy. I am persuaded. Abhinava basically makes one claim . I think.that consciousness (tit.) The conclusion seems to me to be of an entirely different order from the evidence upon which it purports to be based. in the end. and all these terms seem to cover both the premises .

after all may one cognize such an all-inclusive reality. what is ultimate for Abhinava is the totality of all relationships: the cosmic process itself. as it calls for a revaluation of the cognitions one ordinarily has. presupposes the possibility of a comprehensive. (b) lacking internal division. This yields. and perhaps. that is an adjustment in the manner in which one cognizes at all times. and the way it functions in his theology suggests that Abhinava would not find the sort of critique I have outlined very telling. but as ultimately . If Abhinava himself admitted the validity of this criticism would it lead him to abandon his argument for the ubiquity of pruk&a? I think not. For Abhinava metaphysical argument is no end in itself. As such the notion of prukdu presents real difficulties: how. in one sense. the reality of liberating insight into the nature of the cosmos as a whole. and what status would such an eccentric cognition have? As far as I can tell. It does not so much point out a special object to cognize.that consciousness is ‘one’ (all of the above terms and eka). This is precisely as it should be. if my analysis is correct as cosmic process rather than as cosmic substance in the strict sense. ultimate cognition. it is less transformative than fiduciary.that consciousness is (a) not separate from its object.and the conclusion . the argument of JSA l-9 far from dealing with these issues. He describes this embodiment in terms of a ‘modal’ theology which highlights in turn the various aspects of the single figure of Siva. (3) It seems to me self-evident that the theology of prukdu/tilhisa forms part of a larger whole in which Abhinava attempts to devise a picture of ultimacy consistent with the dynamic vision of god in Saivite mythology. and the theology of the numberless M&s. the correlated theologies of prakdu and vimda. refers to consciousness (or reality) grasped as a whole . ALPER of his argument . nor even organic. in a word. presupposes. Prak&z is a term which. but whether it induces an appropriate religious response. He portrays Siva-who-is-consciousness as being the embodiment of oppositions in the sense of being ‘unity within multiplicity’ and vice versa. as it functions. Considering the intention of his argument. In other words. and (c) common to all subjects . for example. In this sense it is in its intention less descriptive than transformative (cf. This he finally understands as being not just mechanical.albeit.382 HARVEY P. It is certainly true that Abhinava’s metaphysical claims are meant to be ‘descriptive’.). for Abhinavan metaphysics is not merely descriptive. the final arbiter of an argument’s success has to be not whether it compels agreement. Streng: 15Off.

some overlapping .within a complexly structured theological whole. to be consistent to inconsistency. in the case of Abhinava.and that means apprehended. brought together for social convenience. iii. He does seem to have a coherent but unstated goal: to encompass . fairly call Abhinava’s theology non-dualist. are not the so-called ‘school’ traditions (spanda. On the contrary. taught . some referring to a being.without reconciling . even defined most narrowly in terms of the IPK and its commentaries. experienced. or monist. objective consciousness over against subjective. consciousness who is Siva. These ‘component’ theologies. in a group of theologies . Does Abhinava have a system in the strict sense? I think so. to attempt to be faithful to the confusion ofexperience. One may. in a sense. others to consciousness. krarna.some parallel. some complementary. a). Abhinava produces exactly the sort of ‘Lebensphilosophie’ . To call the ultimate both Siva and tit is not an arbitrary and contradictory way of naming a single reality. though I am not certain. world-disparaging passages in Abhinava’s works. What then is one to make of Abhinava’s advaitism? One certainly cannot deny that there are advaitic. nor does it mean that two different realities are being artificially. and ex post facto. the relationship between the two sorts of consciousness being held entitrely within the transcendental. What I urge is that the ‘escapist’ strand of his theology (the theology of tit?) should not be given priority in an off-hand and uncritical manner.pluralistically: for the Saiva traditions of Kasmir there are a plurality of ultimates that inform each other.SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 383 personal. celebrated. This understanding allows one to evaluate the juxtaposition of terms for ultimacy. but a relative advaitism which points out the nondual aspects of a complex world. The theology of pratida as one and many illustrates how a variety of oppositions may be held in tension through the personal metaphor of Siva: praktida is god as consciousness . Hence my use of the rough classificatory handle ‘bhedtibheda’. kula. This results. personal consciousness. I do not think this surprising.as impersonal.contradictions. and so forth) but are within the confines of the pratyabh@iti itself. noted at the beginning of this essay (I. in Abhinava’s tradition the ultimate is from the beginning understood . it should be noted. personal. It should be set alongside other strands of the theology so that one can gauge its place in the total picture. that is. but only if one understands that his is not the absolute advaitism towards which some of the followers of the school of Samkara moved.

or in terms of some unifying structure (an ‘over-theology’) such as the process understanding of prakrfsa I have proposed in this essay. I myself hope in future studies to address the question of the role of . are hardly ever studied concurrently. Abhinava’s theology is of special comparative interest: it reveals one shape an idealistic monism may take if it strives to express rather than repudiate a polytheistic setting.to the plurality of ‘moksas’ he recognized. ALPER one might expect in a polytheistic milieu: a vision of god as the sum of an infinity of horizons. after all. be explored independently. but to the intinite modes of human experience which is. This. even a ‘high god’ may be conceived pluralistically! Hence. but imaginally. It is finally my understanding of Abhinava’s monism as ‘polytheistic’ which persuades me that his theology must be interrogated not just conceptually. It has particularly unfortunate results in the case of someone like Abhinava who. the real concern of polytheism.to borrow a phrase used by Robert Gimello (192) to speak of Mahayana Buddhism .in intricate ways resisting decipherment .384 HARVEY P. and in light of the rich set of religious experiences that . as a result of historical conflation. The result is what I call a ‘polyvocal monism’ . on the one hand. besides being rooted in the world of mythic gaivism. as a result of conceptual confusion.63 (4) From what I have sketched above the task facing the student of Abhinava should be clear.add up to ‘a truly quotidian enlightenment’. I would offer this guideline for such study: Incongruities in Abhinava’s thought can be explained roughly in three ways. (5) Indian philosophy. perhaps in a polytheistic setting. in the final analysis the most progress will be made by reflecting upon Abhinavan theology and slfdhand together. What is called for is not more grand surveys and vague interpretations but detailed philological and conceptual exploration. for the plurality of Abhinava’s theologies are tied . and Indian mythology and symbolism. I fear. up to a point. the first two alternatives should by no means be ruled out of court until Abhinavan scholarship has performed the same sort of chronological and conceptual reconstruction for Abhinava that Paul Hacker has provided over the past three decades for Samkara. In spite of that proposal. is a student of ntitya alert to the poetic overtones of word and gesture. on the other. says more about divisions of labor in the western intellectual world than it does about traditional India.a monism which is true not to the numerical plurality of gods. While Abhinava’s theological and tantric texts may. Achieving such a reconstruction will not be an easy matter.

(6) However great the discontinuities between contemporary. filling and emptying. It hints at the dissolution of ordinary ego consciousness. the bottomless center of all phenonema. I realize that some will see these remarks as a mere flight of fancy. popular Hinduism and the classical tradition. draw their inspiration in large measure from a common well. it seems to speak of overflowing. by the notion of ubiquity. open and shut. ET: 35. for it is a theology which seems to serve as a sustained meditation upon the inexorable. at immersion in the cave. The theology of pruk&a speaks not only the language of scientific prose. These clues suggest two related lines of imaginal explication: p&c&z as spatial effervesence. and antinomies underlying human life. in fact. they do. The essential clues are provided. There is no . To borrow a felicitous phrase of Somananda (referred to in Gnoli. however. and by experiences of immersion in consciousness which is often apprehended as a sea of light. but a ‘tidal’ theology. two motifs that open up worlds of imagery extending back far into the Hindu past. Liberation is to recognize and accept that creation and destruction inhere within each other. is never sought for its own sake. but also in what one might call a language of spiritual and emotional liquidity. IXssoIution is balanced by the emitting of the material world. nor even the philosophical concerns of an Abhinava. experiences like those described or alluded to in the preface to this essay. and prakda as the sea at the heart of all things. being brimful. as its counterpoint prakda as solidification.” This counterpoint is reflected in practice: for the Saivite tantric immersion. the dissolution of ordinary consciousness. Following out these intimations I am tempted to call the theology of prak&a not a modal theology. of being afloat in the depths of the sea. 1 believe. ambivalences. unfathomable rhythms of in and out. it is sought for the sake of the return. and to take up the question of the imagery of prak&z left unexplored in this essay. If contemporary figures such as Muktananda and Gopi Krishna do not have the theological sophistication and quickness. The ‘deep’. still their religious passions fall clearly into a single family with his. and the solid world of multiplicity are to be seen as both the same and different. some of the subliminal regularities. Here I wish only to indicate one direction the latter inquiry might take.SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 385 Saivite myth in Abhinavan thought. a passage not speaking directly of prakdia) it is balanced by the “at first imperceptible wave which furrows the tranquil waters of consciousness.Prakda as liquidity has. For me it is more a pledge to return to the inquiry here initiated.

syntactically fantastic.5.. characteristically elegant. March 1977). that is as clearly manifest. especially of Chatterji’s frequently followed monograph. of course. and at a Religious Studies Colloquy at SMU. Texas NOTES ’ Certain sections of this paper draw upon material presented at a meeting of the AARSW (PhillIps Univ.[although ultimately] they are not different (ubhedu) from [his] unlimited (urzu~~~itu) consciousness (sayid) (1.bb Southern Methodist University. For their encouragement and stimulation I wish to thank my colleagues Frederick J. Louis. Margaret Hamzy and Pat Rogers of SMU’s Fondren Library. free of responsibility for the final form it has taken. Although there was some earlier notice the Saivism of KaSmIr was effectively brought to the attention of western scholarship with the publication of Btihler’s Report in 1877. ALPER doubt in my mind that the experiences of the former.shed light on each other. that is as differentiated (bhinna) because of their mentaJly fabricated [i. and finally for their patient preparation of the manuscript.’ They appear as external. Oklahoma. [Their appearance as external] may be established through prum@u only because they are interior to the supreme perceiver who consists of pure consciousness (tit).1/ 153: n-154:6). and a plenitude of spiritual techniques available to each .. St. Kliever.despite important differences in position . and ‘movements’ of K?&miri Saivism. (kalpitu)] mayic separateness from perceivers in states ranging from &inyu through &rriru. Ludo Rocher and Wilhelm Halbfass of the University of Pennsylvania. for their assistance in obtaining material unavailable in Dallas. in the form ‘this.386 HARVEY P. Other sections are to be drawn upon for presentations at the AAR in New Orleans. Enid. ‘traditions’. that is because they have not lost their identity with him. All that is really clear is that there were a series of overlapping preceptorial lines.e. Streng and Lonnie D. November 1978. November 1977. Dallas. ‘sects’. Peggy McNear and Kathleen Triplett. and the thought of the latter . For various suggestions and observations during the gestation of this essay I wish to thank Profs. sentence: Objects (te$rn = bh&inlfm) appear as present. and. ‘imagined’. Therefore the Lord’s cognitive power is said to be his illumining @ruk&nu) of objects as diverse @he&) In respect to their dependence upon perceivers [who are] fabricated [through m@y&] . For the most part the subject was not treated as a living variety of Hinduism before the publication of Silburn’s fist monograph in 1957. April 1979. and at the AOS. There has been an unfortunate looseness in discussion of ‘schools’. It is for-this reason that they are distinguished (uicchinnu) from perceivers [who are mentally fabricated] through tiyd. Hence I ask the reader to bring together for himself Gopi Krishna’s experience of immersion with the picture of pa&da’s creativity which Abhinava presents at the beginning of the J$A in a single. They are. Investigation of its theology only began after 1910 with the publications of Barnett.

SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 387 teacher.D. Standard works such as Underhill. After all. in this context. For a recent summary see Gonda. the Vimar&ni (IPV). e. e. and karikd.13/204: 3-4) . All students of this subject stand in their debt.refer to adhik&ra. and one could fairly say that they are theological. the Sanskrit texts for translated passages by Roman letters. Note that Abhinava uses the word igama quite broadly seemingly to indicate any authoritative treatise. It is of some interest to note that Romain Rolland’s experience of ‘oceanic’ oneness with the universe. 11. and 12. however. for a more general treatment Gonda. and Gonda. Quotations from KSTS 33 (= IPV II) are indicated by ‘II’ before the page and line. 1977: 153-79. Silburn speaks of her teacher Laksman Brahmacarin. Brunner. Bhagavan Nityananda). The pioneering work of Chatterji and the monumental study of Pandey may still be consulted with profit. Of a more specialized nature the studies of Silburn. Citations from the IPV . until recently its de facto boundary has been little more than the publications of the research department of the state of Jammu and KaSmir! For basic bibliography. (1. 7 Neither Abhlnava’s thought nor the Saivism of KaSmir in general are well represented in the scholarly literature. I of tbe Bh&kari unless otherwise indicated. are taken from volume 22 (= IPV vol. and Zaehner may be consulted. serves as the point of departure for Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents. . and kuZa remains to be worked out. Occasionally I have adopted a reading of the IPV’s commentator. Filliozat.g.e. as does the systematic relationship between these ‘groups’.. applaud the observation of Gerald J. Ifhnika. is still imperfectly understood. ’ On the Saivagamas see. Larson in a recent review (1978: 239) that whatever it may be K6Smh-I Saivism is not an ‘entity’. MM & HK). spanda. 4 Space does not allow discussion of the literature on the motif of ‘sinking’. 1977: chs. The exact social and ideological referent of terms such as prutyobh~titi. and Gnoli are indispensable. Gopi Krishna and Baba Muktananda (and-his teacher.. Agama. 3 Please note that documentation is incorporated in the text between parentheses. All quotations from Utpaladeva’s &‘varapratyabhijCk&ik&s (IPK) and from Abhinava’s commentary upon it. and Kaw. 6 The evolution of Saivite thought between say 100 and 1300 A. 1. or of the one ms. To be sure. early works such as the &et&atara Upanisad possess a distinctive viewpoint on human existence. In my understanding of the word theology I am influenced by the definition in Harvey: 239ff. BhHskara (Bh). Citations from Bh are from vol. One brief and readily available introduction is the essay of Basu. * For example.g. 1963: 188-252. or ‘immersion’ in mystical writing. I) of the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies (KSTS) unless otherwise indicated. of the IPV I have consulted (UP). Saivism becomes an object of sustained and critical reflection in that sense at a comparatively late date. apparently under the influence of the Ramakrishna movement. and then page and line. and the defense of that viewpoint with arguments designed to demonstrate its superiority to various alternatives.. to use the phrase ‘Saivite theology’ more narrowly to mean the systematic articulation of the Saivite viewpoint in accordance with standards common to Indian philosophizing in general. 7. State. All translations are my own unless reference is made to another translator.5. Bhartrhari’s Eikyapadiya. I find it clearer. see n. Padoux. Supplementary notes are indicated by Arabic numerals. and his teacher Harabhatta SHstri. One must. Sharma. This is always indicated in the notes. krama (on which see Silburn.g. One may also consult the surveys of Rudrappa. but they should be read in light of the critical discussion in Katz.

perhaps reinforced by the Hindu ‘renaissance’ interpretation of India’s religious history .62. l6 The first. author of the TAviveka. often blurred in the JSA. by Utpala. i. Christian’s definition of a religious interest (60f. The term citi is treated in the JSA in terms of vimars?a.111-117.. to be sure. Jayaratha (12th/13th). and since he wants to hold that the liberated person ultimately recognizes that the ordinary and transcendental act of cognition can be distinguished only because they are the same. l4 Since tit and samvid are. l3 References to god in the IPV are hardly infrequent. that Andre Padoux. author of KaimIrI devotional poems collected as the Lalldv&vlfni. 1963: 229-242. Among the latest KHhIri Saiva figures (with dates as calculated by Pandey) are: Mahe&nImurda (12th). author of the Bh&sskurI on the IPV. 1968.” This is an adaptation of William A. especially 23 l-34. Sound method demands that they be taken seriously. 20). and ~01s. on which see the works of Gnoli and Padoux. the subject of this essay.to classify Pratyabhijril Saivism as merely another idealistic monism in imitation of Advaita Vedtita. 22 and 33. Abhinava does not resort to the theory of tuttvu evolution to explain this in the JSA. 1963. l5 The distinction between ordinary and transcendental cognition is. It is. to These dates which seem to have received general acceptance are discussed in Pandey.14/210: l-2): “being is great because it pervades even [self-contradictory cognitions] such as of a ‘flower-m-the-sky’. the most famous deal with aesthetics.5. although that plays a more important part in some of his writing. ‘* I understand by ultimate “whatever is apprehended by someone as more important than anything else whatsoever. In contrast to Christian.1-9. clear that he considers all objects of cognition. l1 Abhinava’s two major theological treatises are written in the form of commentaries on a 190 verse exposition of Saivism. is taken up at 1. r’ Because of his multi-level view of reality Abhinava could give no single answer to the question of the ontological status of objects. attempts to distinguish tit and samvid. Except for the scholarly tendency . the second is discussed at 1. and Bh%skarakantha (late lfith). as far as I can tell. indistinguishable! By and large. Note. since Abhinava must analyze the former in order to demonstrate the nature of the latter. all &h&s including the objects of illusory or erroneous cognitions. its discussion will be postponed. of multiple ultimates. See more generally the discussion of error as ‘imperfect’ (apti?a) appearance.the IPV and the VivytivimaAini (IPVV) . See the discussion of tibhrSsav@da below (III). Thus (1.5. which is to say. to have what is in one sense genuine but in another sense qualified reality. this point would not need to be stressed. The most voluminous of Abhinava’s works deal with tantra. and 65 respectively). 9 For a summary of the development of southern Saivism see Gonda. ALPER a No reconstruction of the history of the Saiva traditions of KaSmIr has yet been attempted.have been published in the KSTS (~01s. and Gnoli.and. a student of Saivism must focus on the question of polytheism.e. I shall use them interchangeably to refer to consciousness as such. therefore.388 HARVEY P. 60.3. LalH (14th). but on the Buddhism of KaSmIr see Naudou.5.10-21. in his latest work (1975: 72.). on which see Masson and Patwardhan. . however. n. 2. the IPK (Verses on the Recognition of God).13/11.” (si = satta] ca khapu@dikam api vylpnoti iti mahatii. Both of these commentaries . synonomous. An English translation of the IPV by Pandey (1954) can be used most profitably by someone who already controls the Sanskrit. author of the MM. nonetheless.

). that is of vicitrabhasa. but prak&a isabheda. (c) that appearance to a subject can only be inferred from the clarity of a cognition which is itself a characteristic of the object . the single ground or necessary horizon of diversity.). l9 To be sure in the classical language oisvaryu is just an abstract term for ‘potency’. and k. 16 where it is said that god “allows himself to be used” (prabhur . I feel that it has a fuller. 21 Among the rejected answers are (a) that the object is responsible for its own appearing . 1 Utpala says. be able to perceive the fact of god’s externalisation directly. underscores the nature of prak5sa as consciousness which becomes objective. sa tlrvaj jridnasya na svartipam. as one thing. 25 My translation of this rather elliptical verse is somewhat free. In the KSTS edition of the APS (published in 1921) the verses of Utpala are vyavahdra . rather than positive (with KSTS. In addition the view that appearance is brought about by cognition itself is rejected as. 162:2). sa tavat jrianasya svanipam). Abhinava seems to be arguing for consciousness as ultimate. in the IPV the world sakti rarely has the personal sense of ‘goddess’.‘for the sake of illumination’. or UP. in the end. reducible to the view that the object causes the appearance (156: 9ff. 22 This entire section must be read as a simultaneous repudiation of dualism and a defense of realism.). are rejected on the ground that they cannot account for the appearance of objects to some. or a variety of causes (karanadi. 24 Namely: that one can’t account for diversity by jtina (160:3-161:1). vyarahcirayet). On the other hand. In this theological context.indriyaZokadiksanavargtit . 161:7).the prakatatavrfda of KumZrila (155:l l-156:9). 162:5). and one can’t account for its diversity by reference to the objects themseleves (16 1: 4f. In contrast. so it must be by prak#sa (161: 2ff. antahshitavatarn eva ghatate bahiratmana (153: 8-l 1). and is subject to reconsideration. This quotation. but has the impersonal sense. .as the SautrZintikas argue. 2o In k. then. Abhinava glossesghafate aspramanena upapadyate uktam tat pram&am dar$ayati (154: 7f). ‘capacity’.). or memory impressions (samskSra. I thus take the point of the verse to be the articulation of a fundamental antinomy: prakasa alone exists for itself precisely by means of becoming other. which would tend to reduce cognitive appearance to an epiphenomenon of objectivity.). . but in effect Abh’inava implies that one may infer the process of the externalizing of abhdsas which are internal to god from the fact of their appearance. more etymological meaning. however.avabhcfsrfnrim .which in no way transcends its objects na punarapard kacit arthasarirottirna (154:13-155:9). sa na tdvat jridnasya svartipam. nor by artha (161: If. the liberated person would. I take prakasasya and svatmanah as ‘objective’ genitives . No formal argument is provided.). The appearance in is a stepping out as well. 23 One might discriminate this argument for the abhedatva (non-duality) of praktisa from Abhinava’s earlier argument for its ekatva (unity). presumably. Note that the sense requires reading 160:5 as negative (with Bh. as one world. or vaicitrya. (b) that appearance is brought about by a complex of concomitant causes . and ‘for the sake of being itself’. Abhinava had argued that only a unitary conscious ground allows one to account for the coordination of diverse cognitions. 162: 8f. or through a causal complex (ekasamagrTka. can have neither internal divisions nor plurality. Here the dualists seem to argue that illumination having no connections. but not to other perceivers (155: lff.SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 389 l8 On the centrality of vyavahara to the Utpala-Abhinava scheme see also k. All of these views. 6 where and cfbhdsa (appearance) are equated. . (155:9-11). or reflection (pratibimba. That is an argument for consciousness as absolute.

pra-sphy. A careful examination of the Buddhist material in the IPV is a desideratum.in verse six he [Utpala] shows that even if one doesn’t accept vlisand [the correct view] is in no way obstructed. sentient.) 26 In his own words Abhinava summarizes: “Then. suspecting that [belief in] the independent existence of objects external to illumination has been reinforced by the refutation in verses four and five of nis~nl . intro. nach Ansicht der Sautrantikas existiert es ebenfalls. prak&awhich-issQr?rvid alone. D.[a theory] advanced by the vz@inavcida .. of the IPV. Bh (210) glosses brfbydrthawidibhib: bauddhavide!aih kathitam.5. In this parvapaksa there are two Interlocutors. Schastri. Jayanta (a 9th KaBmiri) in the NM summarizes (Brahmananda Gupta: 18): “Denn nach Ansicht der Vaibhasikas existiert ein Ding in der Aussenwelt. because of that the being (SQUVQ) of [objects] which by nature are nonexistent in themselves is nothing but the fact of their being connected with the subject @I&!+) whose nature is prakcfda./l51:13-152:5). consisting of both subjects and objects. This identification as Sautrantika is correct. Thus. and is particularly well versed in the school of Dignaga. unless insentient objects depended upon samvid. and insentient. they would be virtually non-existent (QSQ~). may come out @rasphuret) as the multiplicity of the world which has been caused to appear (” ulldsite) through its own nuiydsfakti. as well (1. Wayman). nach Ansicht der YogacPas gibt es nur die Erkenntnis. and cf. While I am not able. to determine the sources for. Sautrantika. but requires qualification. however. Then in verses eight and nine he rejects [the theory] that external objects are inferable. which would yield a reversal of nuance.. Hence I follow Abhinava in calling it Vij%navHda. welche eine (bestimmte) From hat (S%ktiam). Guenther: 92). since it is characterized as moving within itself (sv~S~~OCC~QZQ~“). while setting forth the nature (~QWVQ) of objects according to his own view. ALPER accompanied by a brief commentary provided by Pandit Harabhatta Sastrr.” This picture has been challenged (e. 28. As to A. but it is attested in Tibetan texts (Iida. 65f. Abhinava himself identifies B as a Vijrianavadin (see n. ist aber nur erschliessbar. 27 It is clear that Abhinava is quite familiar with intraBuddhist polemics. certain observations seem appropriate. ud-[as. For text see note n. Therefore. if not really of intent. I further describe it as ‘idealist’ because it. or the precise identity of A and B. like Abhinava. nach Ansicht der Madhyamikas ist (diese) Erkenntnis rein und enth%lt keine Form (Akara). For text see Note 1. MRS. by means of its double. Such is the unfolding of SVQtQntIyQVcfdQ according to Vanactiya(?). refers specifically to the Sautrantikas (164: n.g. the second (B) defending the theory of v&n&. und jene (Erkenntnis) ist wahmehmber. B does fairly represent the position of the Yogacara-VijnPnavLda tradition. requires interpretation (see n. His remarks on this verse are of some interest: “Thus.390 HARVEY P. the first (A) arguing for real externals. In general. This appellation. asserts the primacy of consciousness. the ed. . (One wonders whether atirikteneva should read atiriktenaiva.. as it were as being separated and not separated from its own svanipa. YogacHra. at this point.” Note the use here of some of the cosmogonic vocabulary characteristic of Saiva dynamism: ud-dal. und dies ist wahrnehmbar. and pra-ud-mil. and Madhyamika. 5 1-64) as lacking support in Indian Buddhist texts. and has at times been challenged (e. aber Keiner Gegenstand in der Aussenwelt. Abhinava seems to be writing in conformity to a widespread Hindu tradition according to which there are four systems of Buddhism: Vaibhasika. 60 and 61). the whole array of objects.g. 26). he rejects perception as proving (pramdnatva) the independent existence of external objects. Then in verse seven. N. especially as formulated in the so-called epistemological school of Dignaga.

that “the cognition possessesthe form @k&z) of the object within itself” or. 2. 1907-11: vol. one should see PS I. cf. II..60. with the comm. tr.670-711. Eng. tr.. 14ff. while the Vijrianavadins (and so Abhinava’s B) may be considered qualified idealists. close relationship with the Sarvastivada-Vaibhhikas. 108).80-102). 2. 97-111).g. IV. 108). and (c) Stcherbatsky.. as to the Sautmntikas whom he describes as nomlnalists). sometimes critically. in a relatively straightforward way... For them.1.4.. 28. 118ff. TattvaS. and partially reconstructed Skr. Eng. On the case against externals. 64. 9-10 (Eng. Some guidelines.s~kBajrLinavtida.250-252). Due to the historical and systematic complexity of this debate. BL: vol. text. The epistemology of each school may be analyzed in terms of three issues: (1) whether it accepts the theory of . app. and their later merging with the epistemological school of Dign%ga. nir~k&+Linmida. sometimes positively. Bareau). For the appellation of this position as ‘realist’.97ff. conversely. in contrast to Vijiianavada idealism see n. and a certain prejudice against entities . or merely as object (102. (2) whether it considers cognition to be twofold in form (dvitipom). as well as the soteriological context of the ‘nothing but consciousness’ theory in the Yog&ira tradition before Dlgmiga see: (a) MSA 11:31-35 (Bagchi: 63f.SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 391 also Guenther). and 6 in the numbering of Stcherbatsky and Nagao (1.2. 1. and 7 in that of Pandeya). ShPstri: vol. Aiyaswami Sastri: l-65).103. with particularly helpful notes. ** To appreciate the issues at stake in this discussion reference should be made to the dispute over the reality of external objects among the various Buddhist ‘traditions’ .as they had come to be understood by Abhinava’s time. Eng. II. Their positions are not after all diametric. 3. 1936: 38. 114-16).. which considered itself essentially Vijrianavada (Frauwallner. In comparison to this position the Sautrantikas (and so Abhinava’s pzirvapak~a A) may be considered qualified realists. the history of the Sautrantllcas is still unclear. also.. but is clearly Sautrarrtika as that tradition is represented. For parallel debates between realists and idealists: (a) TattvaS ch.14 and 8. may be of assistance. tr. based largely on Hattori’s discussion of Dignaga’s thought. It is likely that Abhinava was familiar with some of this literature.20 (Lamotte: vol. and who do not appeal to cognition as svasqzvitti. Fr. especially 352-372 from Vlcaspatimisra’s Nyrfynkuniki. tr. Levi. app. Stcherbatsky. (b) BSK (= On the Establishment ofExternal Objects. tr. of Jinendrabuddhi and especially Hattori: 23-30. For the locus classicus of this discussion. Jha: vol. 377-400.is the (%rvastivada-) Vaibhiisika who hold cognition to be nirdkmi and ekarcipa. 23 (bahirarthapariksa~ D. BL: vol. (3) whether it accepts the theory of cognition being ‘selfcognition’ (svusa~vitri). (Pandeya: 7f. e. II. (b) MV. 19-22. In these terms the Buddhist school which comes closest to an unqualified realism in spite of the theory of momentariness. in the writings of Dignaga and his successors. IV. It is complicated by their having an early. a cognition is determined as the cognition of one thing rather than of another by its actually having one or the other external reality as its object (101.936-88). and (c) MS 2. 104-107..42-45. The fact is that A is not really Sautmntika in a strict Hinay%na sense (for it seems as close to the Sarvastivadins whom FrauwaIlner (62) describes as realists. that the cognition is itself formless while the object has form (Hattori: 98). especially with Sthiramati’s TikH. it is not a simple matter to formulate normative positions for the various parties. namely as ‘appearance as itself’ (svcibh&) and ‘appearance as object’ (@rthibhrSsa). or of one form (eJc&pu).. As Frauwallner (PB: 62) observes. however. 2. be it strictly as itself. but are in . “that a cognition is cognized by itself and does not need another cognition to cognlze itself” (101). Stcherbatsky.




certain sensesreconcilable, for both pull back from the extremes of strict dualism or strict monism (as does Abhinava). Both the Sautrtitikas and - insofar as it is relevant to this discussion (cf. Hattori: 98; also Kajiyama, 1965, who mentions another sort of sikira/ninikara distinction) the Vijrianavadins understand cognition as siktira, as dvinipa, and as svasamvitti. How then do their epistemologies differ? For the Sautraritikas there really is an object outside of consciousness (the b&hy@rtha; in the final analysis: the ‘real particular’, svalaksana), but this object does not appear in cognition as itself, rather the cognitive object is its product, that is, its reflection. This reflection is related to the object itself through similarity (Czipya) with it (Hattori: 102). From this appearance in cognition as reflection the external object is to be inferred. For the Yogac%ras, in contrast, “the object is essentially immanent in the cognition” (104). “ . . . Consciousness (a#%~) itself appears (ffbhcfti . . . ) as subject (svdbhtisa . . . ) and object (arthribhdsa . . . )” (102). Hence nothing whatsoever exists externally. The distinction between subject and object, however, does hold true from the perspective of empirical, qualified reality (samvytisat). From an ultimate perspective there is only self-consciousness (svasa?vitti): “The cognitive phenomenon itself is not differentiated into subject and object, nor into act and result.” There is nothing but pure consciousness (vijtianamlitra) which is itself not an entity, but it differentiated into subject and object by the imagination (parikalpita) through metaphor (upaclru) (104,106). For general background to this see Frauwallner, PB: 350-365, an intro. to the Vi&atik& and Vetter: ch. 4, ‘Das Problem der Anschauung’. In dealing with Abhinava’s Buddhist material I am particularly indebted for his aid to Professor Ernst Steinkellner (U. Wien), who, however, should not be held responsible for errors in which I might still have fallen. 29 According to the Vijr’iPnavPda tradition v&anti (‘permeation’) is a connecting force which mediates between the unity of consciousness as such (aZayavij@nn) and the streams of cognitions. In terms of the epistemology discussed in note 28 it is the capacity of consciousness which accounts for its particularization in a continuing process of cog&ions. It is closely related, in origin, to the notion of bfja (seed). See: (1) MS 1.15-16, and 23-25 (Lamotte: 33f., 41-46); Lamotte observes (lo*) “Lesgermes ne sont ni differents ni nondifferents de l’Alaya, ‘parce qu’ils sont faits siens, appropries (uptitta) par I’Alaya, embrasds (parigrhita) dans son etre, partageant son destin bon ou mauvais (ekuyogaksema)’ [quoting: VMS-HT, de La Vallee Poussin: vol. I, 1241;” (2) T-VMS 18-19 (Levi, 1925: 36; Fr. tr., Levi, 1932: 107ff; Ger. tr., Frauwalhrer, PB: 388) where rSlayavijrilfna is said to possess ‘all seeds’ (sarvabfja) meaning that it possesses the capability to produce all things (sarvadharmotptidanadakti); and (3) VMS-HT (de La Vallde Poussin: I, lOOff.) where it is said, “Les BIjas, par rapport au Vijrilna, par rapport au fruit, ne sont ni identifiques, ni differents . . . . Tel est, en effet, le mode de relation entre la chose (svabhiva), VijiiHna, et l’activite (karitra), Bija; entre la cause (hetu), Bija, et la fruit @hala), Dharma actuel;” also, Frauwalhrer, PB: 328 and 354. 3o The interesting dispute about the inference of other minds is not in and of itself, central to Abhinava’s concern. See SAS (Kitagawa), SAD (Kajiyama, 1965a), and Stcherbatsky, BL: I. 521-24. 31 It is difficult to Fmd a happy English equivalent for ribhisa. By translating it as ‘appearance’ I do not mean to imply that it means ‘what something looks like.” On the contrary, Ebhlfsa is the objective aspect of every cognitive event, it is ‘that which has appeared’. As Abhinava uses the term, an rfbhlTsais never the ‘image’ of something else, it is itself the ultimate objective element in the cognitive world. Hence, tibhlisa is closely





allied with pruk&z: to say that objects are illumined is to say that rsbhrisas appear. To say that god appears as the world (or that objects arise in god) is to say that god is constantly becoming the stream of rTbhrisas. How god generates clbh&rs and how our view of them is distorted by m@yriso that we see them in isolation from god are separate questions which are not directly relevant here. It should, however, be observed that, in accordance with his two-level (really multi-level) vision of reality, Abhinava seems to hold that Irbhdsus are only relatively ultimate, that is, they are ultimate within the sphere of the perceptible, cognitive world, but they are sublatable by consciousness as such (or god) which in some sense does transcend them. In German lrbhdsu may be translated as Erscheinungsbild. This more nearly conveys the elemental nature of dbhisu than the English ‘appearance’, but one must still be careful to remember that for Abhinava dbhrisa is not an image of a cognition which itself has a separate existence, but the objective aspect of a single flash of cognition. 32 Since Abhinava pictures the ultimate (Siva-who-is-consciousness) as that comprehensive reality which takes form as both the subject and the object, he is impelled to hold that everything which appears is, in some sense, conscious, even though he does not want to obviate the distinction which holds true on a penultimate plane between the sentient (~~a&) and the insentient (ia&). For example, this is discussed in JSA 11 where Abhinava observes that “because an object such as a crystal is unable to cognize (parcTmru!pm) either itself (dtmanam) or an object such as a pot it is insentient (iu@r)” (198: 3ff.), but then goes on to conclude that “ultimately everything in the world is clearly sentient (uja$zm evu)” (199: l-3). (The discussion in JSA 10-l 1, in particular pages 198 and 199, should be consulted.) For texts see note r. It follows that Abhinava is limited in using an insentient crystal or mirror as a model for any aspect of the cpmplex cognitive interaction which, in sum, is god because it might tend to suggest a static and unconscious view of ultimacy. Nonetheless, one should not be surprised that Abhinava does press reflectionist analogies into service in some contexts. It is important to keep this in mind when evaluating the thesis that Abhinava teaches a sort of cryptoadvuita and vivurtuvtidu. See Section III, below. 33 The remainder of JSA 6 (178:7-181:lO) presents supplementary rebuttals (ubhyuccuyubddhuku) to externalism, the rebuttal based on cTbhcisav#du being considered primary. These secondary arguments do not enlarge the presentation of god’s ubiquity but they are of systematic interest, and in passing, illustrate the particularly close relationship between the Buddhist and Saivite traditions in tenth century KaSmir. In general Abhinava here follows the Buddhist refutation of the Vaisesika argument for externalism, the latter being based on the concept of uvuyavin (a ‘whole’), and upon atomism. Against the Vaisesikas Abhinava argues that neither the notion of avuyuvin nor atomism strengthens the externalist case because (1) one cannot demonstrate how there can be a whole which is different from (i.e., greater than) its constituent parts, and (2) one cannot show how atoms, being indivisible and minute, may aggregate to form concrete objects. For background to this discussion see Frauwalhrer, HIP: 5356,105-108, 115-118,159f.; D. N. Shastri: 158-179,256-261; and Hattori: 88ff., notes 1.38-41; 136f., note 4.12. It is quite likely that Abhiiava had Buddhist sources. Cf. in this regard: AK I.43 (Fr. tr. de La Vallee Poussin: I. 87-94, esp. 89) and III. 100 (Fr. tr., II, 209-214), and V-VMS 12-14 (Fr. tr., Levi, 1932: 52-54; Ger. tr., Frauwalhrer, PB: 373-376). The fiojti&%ik&z of Samkaranandana (or Samkararumda) which Abhinava mentions has apparently not survived. On this intriguing author who seems to have bridged Saivism and Buddhism see Gnoli, PV: xxiii-xxvi. It may also




be remembered that Kabmir was considered one of the strongholds of the Vaibhasikas. 34 The clause prdnabuddhidehldeh viti~akiyanmdtrasa~vidnipfit (185 : 1f.) is not entirely clear to me. Pandey translates it as if it were subordinated to bdhyatvena, “as external to vital air, intellect, and body, to which limited power of consciousness is given” (1954:66). If, however, the meaning ba71yatvena were ‘external to . . . ,’ or ‘outside of. . . ’ it is my impression that Abhmava would typically have preceded it with a compound having a final term declined to mean ‘in regard to’, or ‘in the case of’, such as “apek~ayd’, or “ tve’, rather than a compound declined in the ablative. In any case, I believe that the sense supports a different translation. ‘Pr@za, buddhi, and deha’ is a sequence representing the increasing evolution or concretization of consciousness as such, its increasingly gross manifestation. The purpose of the clause is not to distinguish between the subject and object in cognition, but to distinguish between all manifested objects (including egos) on the one hand, and unmanifested consciousness in which objects are merely latent on the other. It seems to me that the clause gives a reason for the fact that objects which are externalized from consciousness, starting with pr@a, still do appear, albeit as concrete, in the form ‘this’. The reason is not that they are entirely external to consciousness, but that they do possess a portion, if only a diminished portion, of it. What Abhinava is getting at is just the inextricability of objectivity from - its inherence in - ultimate consciousness. As Silbum says(in a context which leads her to refer to JSA 7) “. . . la conscience integre tout a elle-mbme. Seul existe done ce qui est connu, n’existe pas ce qui n’est pas objet de connaissance” (MM: 118). I take it that the central terms in the clause are vitiya and kiyat. Bh glosses the latter as ZeSaindicating that kiyat means ‘diminished’, and also, I feel, that it implies a substantive or material contraction. VitiFa must be understood as the opposite of utti?a (e.g., 155: 1). Uttirpa, from ud-tr, ‘to pass beyond’, ‘go above’, indicates superiority and transcendence. Consciousness as such, in one sense, is utti?a to cognitive objectivity. Vi&a, from vi-r?; ‘to pervade’, or ‘extend through’, indicates the splitting apart of something and its being distributed through some reality (in this case itself?), hence immanence. Thus consciousness as such is, in a second sense, vitti?a within itself. As objective it is Oyavahdra. BhHskara (I, 228,1. 18-21) seems to say that pr@a. buddbi, and deha may be thought of as subjects Cgruhaka) in the sense that they are reduced forms of consciousness and thus still capable of grasping objects of their own (?). They are external in the sense that they are separate, i.e., individualized (prthaktva), but they are not utterly separate from supreme consciousness as such f.purasa?+Q. If that were not the case, then they would not appear at all (aprak&p&a), as was indicated in k. 1.5.2. It seems that BhHskara is stressing that ‘externals’ are not entirely removed from prah-&. Hence my reading of the ablative as ‘because’, rather than as ‘different from’. MRS (p. 185, n. 225), if I am taking him correctly, offers little assistance. He states that Abhinava says ‘pr@u’, and so forth, in order to point out how that which is external from supreme prak&a (paraprah&id bahirbhtitutve) in that it is not connected with the event of appearing (aprak&muinat~puttiprasafigdt) is established in regard to mayic perceivers (hzlpitapraml). For texts see note v. 35 It is, obviously, much beyond the scope of this paper to present arguments for my suggestion that Abhinava does not take tit as an absolute entity. I in general propose a process rather than an essentialist interpretation of Abhinava’s theology. The question is whether he holds that there is any unsublatable entity. It seems to me that Abhinava holds that the only ‘thing’ which is unsublatable is the whole cosmic process itself.

therefore. they are subject to two sorts of causal relationship. Thus Pandey while translating IPK 1.4. the two possibilities . (3) He more radically asserts that the subject . of this world. given his understanding of language. such is his self-dependence! Perhaps.10 where it is asserted that a yogi creates objects mrdbije vinaivecch&z’ena . who brings immediately into existence the innumerable objects. In other words. (See below. and the means of cognition very much like a Yogin. ‘like a Yogin . (1) He accepts SQttiryQVcidQ (IPK 2. appreciate the metaphorical or hypothetical nature of any theological utterance? While I am not certain about this. are special cases.” that is without a material cause (II. which at the time of each cognition manifests externally anew the subject. .). Does Abhinava.. holds that the phenomenon of knowledge owes its being solely to the will power of the Universal Consciousness. If one peruses the literature on Kasmiri Salvism. 37 The italics in the quotations from Frauwalhrer. (For discussions of this verse cf. and adds that god (as magician) is ‘habutuated to play’ (kri&i.7 as we have seen. of meditation. since such objects are not ordinarily seen. too.. .135:4-S and 7. his metaphysics is finally bhedribhe& rather than ~dvait~. without the assistance of any external thing whatsoever” (1963:400). he conveys something of the religious amazement underneath Abhinava’s metaphysical speculation when he quotes the enigmatic SSU 1 .SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 395 Hence. its Nimitta-kcfrana (the efficient cause). without requiring any material cause . one finds that while no one has dealt directly and fully with Abhinava’s interpretation of niiup&ddna creation. and Shrinivas Iyengar: 258. ordinary causation. viz. MukGnanda: 4Of. Penultimately.e. K. without recourse to any extraneous substance”’ (151)! Nonetheless he later concludes. Section III. they are subject to the ordinary law of cause and effect.l50:9f. . “The teacher means to say that icchl (will). ..3/11.) An intriguing question arises from these considerations. subdivisions.4. i.4. in another place says.GZ~). which he desires. Kaw unintentionally sums up the lack of clarity by managing to interpret ?kiiprSdanQ both ways in a single sentence: “He [Utpala] says. .). 136:5-6). and also yogic causation. of aesthetics.) See: Bh I. in IPV 2. . sometimes in the same volume. nirtitrta as being the primary cause (11. Pandey. viz. Ultimately they are subject to the special causal law governing the constant divine fabrication of the cosmos. 39 For a more technical discussion of causation one may turn to IPV 2. karvt& and kriya‘ (the act of causation)” (219). the Lord . (2) He interprets relation between cause and effect (krlryak&?~bh~vva) in terms of relation between actor and action (karvkarmabhlfva) and thus identifies agency (kart?TC. R. He answers that reality is in fact the fabrication of a magician (indr~jdzh). “The Pratyabhijna. He questions (rhetorically) why an analogy is made with objects fabricated by yogis. it seems to me that it might be the case. . 227-29. especially n. 38 Since all ordinary objects are also held to be objects of divine creation according to Abhinava. the object.. To condense a complicated matter. sv&mtrya of the Lord (freedom of consciousness) itself has the characteristic of being Up&ddna-kdr@a (material cause). from which valid inferences may be drawn. .4 Abhinava draws the following picture of causation. Silburn and Kaw are mine. by sheer force of will. hetutd.1-21 which deals entirely with causal theory.5. 36 The comments of Bh on yogic creativity are of some interest. 138:8ff.“WithOUt an uprSdcma” and “without an upridrIna external to consciousness ‘I both recur regularly. 58. of divine causation.“by means of his will and entirely without clay or seed. manifests externally all the objects .12: vismayo yogabhtimiko (“the [various] (?) stages of yoga are astonishing”). See especially IPK 2.

is his argument that the declensional nature of language itself . or illusory objects appear as if real and external. a magician’s ‘crystal ball’.8/11.4. however.1-13). might best be translated loosely as ‘hypothesis’.reflecting. L. and personalizing Saivism. an ‘inference which is an hypothesis’. sphatika. his deep but not slavish indebtedness to Bhartrhari . examples of various specific upddanas]” (IPV 2. 11. Cf.god alone appears (bhasate) as being a sprout by virtue of being associated with the appearances of seed.3. Thus Bh (230) says. speaking of a pre-Abhinavan $gamic text observes. for text see note w. le pratibimba qu’admettant les Sivaites Trika n’existe que comme un reflet dam le miroir de la Conscience universelle: le monde ne peut done Ztre percu comme &pare du miroir” (VB: 159).13). but to ontology.” Abhinava is not here contrasting two competing inferences but two models of . and. Silburn. equivocal Ved%nta.146:4-6). one externalist. Abhinava clearly positions himself in favor of god as the single. and 2. on the other. 43 The context suggests that the word sambhavantinumdna. 44 This important point (see Section III) tends to be obscured by two facts. Abhinava tends to use the very words. but to its variant ‘being is at the same time both identical to and different from becoming’.g. onto whose surface internal.144:14). associated with reflectionism in articulating his own anti-reflectionist model. consciousness as a translucent orb. He does not here address the question of whether abhdsas themselves must be demonstrated through inference or are known through perception. I would venture the hypothesis that Abhinava subscribes not to the simple equation ‘being is becoming’.cosmogony. and ‘possibility’. let us say. in his view completely contained within consciousness. “a la difference du bimba qui est independant du miroir. See. e. cause of the diverse cognitive world.4. The contrast is between. 45 Although the matter still requires considerable investigation. In other words. “tarkanipam anumanam. 41 One of the most interesting aspects of Abhinava’s theology . Abhinava does use reflectionist language in describing the internal ‘mechanism’ of acts of cognition. ubiquitous. consciousness as a mirror in which external objects are reflected. the discussion of mahdsattri JSA 14 (209:15-211:4). na tu drdham anum&am. which should be consulted.4.. . 42 The tension between Abhinava’s notion of the ubiquity of prakasajabhtisa and his realistic pluralism obviously raises some thorny issues. It takes much scholastic ingenuity for Abhinava to delimit perception and inference.21 (11. Second. or ‘analogy’. that is its having pram&z. for instance IPV 2. the demonstrating to someone that something exists.or metaphors for . the fact that in the Sanskrit language nouns are declined in various cases . sidh) of something. objective realities are projected. but tempers this by insisting that the subject invariably appears as a material cause with whom the subject as personal cause associates.396 HARVEY P.that is. with overtones of ‘theory’. but ‘bimodal’. ALPER (identified with god) is the sole cause (pranuitaiva karanam bhavati na jadah. Abhinava’s predilection for this argument. Such acts are. reflects a fundamental difference in metaphorical preference between impersonally oriented Buddhism. pratibimba.indicates the necessarily personal nature of the universe as ultimate. darpana.10 (11. god is both material and efficient cause: “This is the fmal thing to say about the matter . earth and water [i. and n. 4o One should remember that the establishing (stha) or demonstrating (sddh.14-16..e. is not intended to refer primarily to argumentation. while defending the latter (on which see IPV 2. the other internalist. and to articulate a theory of error (on which see IPV 2.1-17). no doubt. of course. 35 and 58.3.186:1-187:4).153.4. that in fact it does exist. The matter is summarized at the conclusion of 2. on the one hand.

ato dycasambandha. tr. not to be confused with eyes. on the ground that one in general recognizes the principle of causality. The first sort of inference is said by Sahara to be based upon pratyak. was irgendeinmal bereits Gegenstand der Wahmehmung war . the most logical procedure . Ruben. a view which both Sarikara and RZm%nuja declined to accept without profound modification. conditioned by real updhis [‘limitations’] .for Abhinava. and ‘that based upon a generalized relationship’ where the actual connection between the cause (e. 47 For a more complex philosophical analysis of these notions than I shall be able to present here. and chapter nine . yet questions the ultimate validity of the conditions of this change and consequently of the change itself. [Samkara’s] view is. all effects have causes.!&crabhti~ya here takes for granted the twofold division of inference of the M-~&n&i tradition: ‘that based upon a directly perceived relationship’. in the nature of things. und Ursachen an sich sind aus der Erfahrungbekannt. the sun being in different positions in the sky) has never been. raises the possibility that there might be inferable objects which have not appeared. The p~rvapuk~u using the words of the . with the significant caveat that . part I. I.” Van Buitenen encapsulates Bhaskara’s teaching as “uupddhikavlida: [the] doctrine that B&man. in the final analysis.1. at least. the reader may consult Hacker.internal organs. . See in this regard van Buitenen’s essays‘The SadvidyP in Ved%nta’.5. a development of a more ancient Ved%nta view .of Potter. 235).as represented later on by Bhaskara . constitutes the phenomenal world” (221. the second upon uirminyato dfltasambandha.SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 397 46 The p&vupuk~. he cites the inference of senseorgans (indtiyas .g. also 251-256. (Jha. In order to place Abhinava and this ptirvapuksa in the context of the rather involved question of types of inference. ‘central’ teaching of the Brahmasiitras. and. He observes (16): “Bhaskara would seem to represent a more traditional view of Ved%nta which admitted pari@ma within the absolute and perfect B&man. see: Athalye.NySti 1. SbBh 1.that BhHskara’s bheddbheda represented a conservative sort of non-illusionistic Vedanta which one might even argue should be accepted as the ‘original’ or. See also the important article of Ingalls (1967) who observes that the neglect of Bhsskara “may be due to the popularity of Bhaskara’s opponent.. ed. Samkara. can never be observed. . As an example. . die zwar an sich unwahmehmbar sind. Aussere Gegenstlnde ausserhalb der Erscheinungsbilder im Erkennen sind aber nie und nimmer wahrzunehmen und konnen daher such nicht erschlossen werden” (1962:27). 392).. n. for text Mimkosa. He argues that one can infer externals as the cause of which cognitive diversity is the effect. TurkuS: 45.‘Strong Dependence Relations’ . 15. ears.. 1 and 2 of his introduction to RBmamrja’s Vedfrthosumgraha). 8. and ‘The Ancient Masters’ (ch. or it may be because the tenets of his system were more subtly elaborated in succeeding centuries by the ViSistadvaita in South India and by the Saiva systems in Kashmir” (61)! Much of what Ingalls has to say about BhLskara would also hold true .g.5: 3 and 157-161 and the articles of Oberhammer. Frauwallner aptly summarizes the kdrikds which are replying to this: “iiberdies kann durch Schlussfolgerung mu erschlossen werden. die aber bloss als Ursache der Wahmehmung erschlossen werden. the sun’s movement) and the effect (e. . Das gilt such fttr die Sinnesorgane. . 48 It is quite possible .on systematic grounds one could say likely . as in the case of seeds being the cause of sprouts. implicit in k. vol. and so forth) which have not appeared from their effects (sense perceptions). Sarikara’s modification toward illusionism was perhaps the simplest and. and Wezler.allowing for translation to a Saivite and tantric milieu . on the given premises.in that it accepts some effected change of and in B&man.

das nicht die gleiche Seinsart wie die materielle Ursache be&t. est essentiellement conscience. for example. is organized precisely to facilitate such/7vanmukti. 85. The corpus of Abhinavagupta is then interrogated with these questions. n. convey the cognitive-material ‘precipitation’ of the world out of. Das Bestreben.” . ” In this sense pruk& is structurally parallel to such notions as pruk# in SIrpkhya.obwohl er. er al. All of these verbs. far from denying with Bhaskara the possibility of liberation while alive. ” Hacker’s summary merits quoting (193). Nur der Illusionismus kann hier den traditionell-vedantischen Monismus retten. no less!) in terms of Advalta Vedtita meaning by that thk recent. In other words. namely the nature of the self. wj. the foundation for the comparative analysis is derived almost exclusively from Salikara (and Salikara as read through the modern. “Der par@mavHda lehrt die Einheit von Urstoff und Produkt: beide sind eines und dasselbe. . das Produkt ist bloss eine andere Form oder ein anderer Zustand der causa materialis. .” To this one can only say. Cf. and rniyti in some sorts of Vedtita. wenn ein Produkt entsteht. the goal of becoming a siddha. not excluding Sarpkara. die absolute Transzendenz und vor allem die Wandellosigkeit des Brahman zu verteidigen. 53 Only the subject qua subject . however. This principle. Neo-Vedtita eyes of Murti. Sharma’s Kashmir Suivism: “Although the book purports to be primarily about Abhinavagupta. Das ist eine Art Monismus.” VeaSntuputibh&i I. Silbum (MM: 34. and pru-ktid itself.398 HARVEY P. the means of knowledge. sind viillig verschieden. the subject to the extent that it becomes object of this reflection is no longer self-dependent! Hence the fascinating discussion of the Htman’s being at once svutuntru andnim2itu (fabricated) (J& 16.).is self-dependent. unter einem gewissen Aspekt betrachtet.215:13-217:li).” 52 The English word ‘projection’ may translate a large variety of Sanskrit terms deriving. N. (To protect the unwary let it be added that this Bh%skara is different from the considerably later and less formidable commentator on the IPV). What would be much more interesting and valid would be to reverse this perspective or at least to allow Abhinavagupta’s questions to interrogate Sarikara. die ungeistige Welt. Thus Gerald Larsen (241) on L. but he is aptly encapsulating Abhinava’s position. as used by Abhinava. So Hacker (1953: 191) cites the appropriate and concise formulation of Dharmarija Adhvarin (17th): “‘Puri~~mu liegt vor. ALPER Abhinava’s theology. pruth. diva-who-is-consciousness. einen scharfen Dualismus zu vertreten scheint . 49 I go into this much detail because there has been an unfortunate tendency to interpret KSSmiri &ivism (seen as a unit. though this is sometimes read back into earlier figures. the theory of error. for while the subject is defined as subject precisely by being self-reflective. 5): “F?uk& correspond au don& d ce qu’est la mat&e pour les syst&mes r&listes mais qui. from the roots bhl (also: &bhd and uvu-bhuj. 1) “parinamo ntia upldtia-sama-satt%ka-klyripatta.” that is (191.&patti~. vivarto n$ima upLdtia-visam-sattaa-k?i. hat also zunlchst scheinbar einen Dualismus geschaffen: das geistige Absolutum und sein Produkt. wenn ein Produkt entsteht. Vivurtu. das die gleiche Seinsart besitzt wie die materielle Ursache. Nun will aber gerade der Vivartavsda monistisch sein . but still within. .on whatever level of reality . gives rise to some nice puzzles. 54 This is actually put in the mouth of a piirvapaksa. and so forth. only Sarikara’s questions are asked. homogenized version. the comparison of Abhinava and the advuitu traditions is an invaluable aid in understanding Abhinava provided that the comparison is executed in a discriminating manner. ‘Indeed!’ Still. n. pour les Sivaites monistes.

. uno mistico. the concepts of citi. If my process interpretation is correct. JSA 10-21. and. A considerable amount of scattered and diverse evidence has persuaded me that the premier problem of research for students of both the ritual and philosophical history of the Saiva traditions of KasmIr must be the relationship between the various forms of Buddhism and Saivism in KaSmIr. in realm. until the ultimate becomes nothing more than a web of changing relationships. etcetera) a quelle di mole maggiore.g.. It seems to me that this very ambiguity is itself evidence that Abhinava subordinates a ‘conventional’ (or prestigious) view of the ultimate as sustance to his own.). (On this compare Silburn. and the references cited. in support of a process interpretation of ultimacy. 35) . it suggests a historical hypothesis: that Abhinava . 11. see Frauwallner. e.18/224:4-12. ‘without a back drop’. a move quite congenial to bhedribheda. esprimendosi di tempo in tempo in questa o quell’opera..10. besides the theory of vim&a. (4) Stinya. tutto lascia pensare the questi tre interessi abbiamo convissuto pacitlcamente insieme.5. of course.253. more daivite and tantn’c understanding of it as process. 57 Pandey’s attempt (1963: 41-43) to divide Abhinava’s career and works into three ‘periods’.18/223: 3-6. VB: 51-59).g. and even textual difficulties. to one extent or another. This. To get a fuller taste the reader might consult a few passages from the complementary discussion of vimar&. n. 1964: 104f. vitalistic equation of being as such with citi (‘expansive consciousness’) and sphuratti (IPK 1. 259) with Abhinava’s dynamic. the theology of prak& reveals only one angle of Abhinava’s theory of manifestation. Note. Demonstrating that this is indeed the case would involve a careful interrogation of Abhinava’s use of several concepts. Gnoli. implying in part that the ‘actors’ (themselves not substantial either!) make up the ‘stage’ by the process of their acting as they go along. sono affatto arbitrari e. e l’altro fiiosofico.1-11.14/208:7209:3 and the subsequent quotations.of whether he holds that there is any unsublatable entity (cf. and (d) 1. (c) 1. da quelle phi piccole (inni. 58 The question of to what extent Abhinava does hold a substantialist view . and evidence may be adduced on both sides. ET: 19-26. (Cf. (5) bhitti. These passages introduce. for example: (1) sv&zntrya. for example. span&. On Buddhist influence in the origins of KLBmIri Saivism see. the idea that the world picture is painted upon ‘no-wall (abhitli). unfortunately lacks credibility. For the purposes of this .far more than Bhartrhari. Unfortunately space precludes their discussion here. This.) In general it seems to me that Abhinava goes far beyond Bhartrhari in subordinating essences to processes. (2) hkti.SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 399 s6 For sure. StC 9 quoted by Abhinava IPV 2.” Cf.15-16/213:8-15. to accept a version of apohana (IPV 1. Silburn.4. for example: (a) 1. but the reader should be forewarned that they are not without their interpretive. literally allows him to have his cake and eat it too. l’altro estetico. Padoux (1975: 9. (3) mah&atti. Gnoli comments (ET: 14): “I tentativi fatti di voler scorgere in Abhinava tre grandi momenti.5. Minoru Hara: 214. dovetails nicely with the fact that Abhinava is known to adopt ksanikavdda. and tiya. 3) where he (and according to him Silburn.14/207:12-208:2.5. to speak of a series of ‘emptinesses’ (Stinyas) (see.is certainly complex. n..6. 1961: 28f. Bhartrhari’s understanding of mahcfsattd (Subramania Iyer: 246. ” I follow Hacker’s and Potter’s discussion of these figures.5. JSA 14/209: 15-210:2). or even Samkara.(b) IPK 1. e. was heavily influenced by the anti-substantialist polemic of Buddhism. to take only one instance. along with both the Saiva and Buddhist tantras. and Laksman Brahmacarin) dispute Pandey’s chronology.12-13.5. All of these can be read.

For comparison see Subramania Iyer (16-36) and Biardeau (1964: l-21). N. Hacker (1953: 202) notes the subordination there of the formula “the ultimate is neither this nor that” to the formula “the ultimate is this as well as that. in the introductions to his translations of the TS and TA. c ant%rupatL na trufyati . though one may note that Hacker and Subramania Iyer agree in assigning it to BhartIhari himself.2/155:8f. SANSKRIT NOTES a mah&guhrIntarnirmagnabhgvajHtaprak. too. Sharma. He is particular stresses the flexibility and dynamism of Abhinava’s vision. “the internality [to god of objects which appear] is not ruptured . . . intro/l51:4f. Pandey. or even that the Saivagamas (or more accurately different ggamic pericopes) may be classified in terms of the categories advaita and dvaita is itself highly questionable.). la coscienza fosse priva di parti. Gonda’s characterization (1970: 41) of the theology of puriinic Saivism may serve to caution against too clumsy a Vedtitic reading of the history of Saivism in general: “It is. Indeed the assumption that ?@mic Saivism is dualistic. points out the similarities of the uytti’sposition to bhe&ibheda and concludes “ . my theses are most unlike those of L. essa.h sivam // (1. nor with the question of the authorship of the Vrtti. wie wir gesehen haben.10/192:8-10). .5.). . .5. 63 Space does not aBow me to delineate the similarities and differences between my interpretation and that of others. come abbiamo veduto. It seems to me that they are in general compatible with the interpretation of Gnoli as expressed. em iUusionistiches Element einschliesst. ma una cosa o anzi il nuBa” (see also 38ff.” Bh and UP read ahan t&BpatL ‘egoness’ for KSTS anttiupata (1.&kah / j%na&aktipradIpena yah sadg tam stuma. perch6 rappresentano lo stesso attuarsi deIla coscienza come uniti e identita. but the interested reader should consult his translation of this unusually lucid passage.400 HARVEY P. . 6o Such is the case with the VPvrtti. for example. different versions of his theory are offered by Chatterji. ALPER essay it is not necessary to deal with the differences between the VP and the VPvrtti. tat ca sadaiva. dass er. non sarebbe phi neppure coscienza. I have unfortunately not had access to the text. ihr Inhalt unterscheidet sich vom System eines BhartIpraparica oder Bhbkara mu dadurch. sufficiently clear that Sivaite speculation. infatti. Sharma who interprets Abhinava to teach ‘Saiva absolutism’. Se.). and Kupetz. Commenting on a passage of Abhinava’s treatise on the Malinivijaya Tantra that deals with the relation of multiplicity and unity he observes (ET: 59): “Questa molteplicita e queste distinzioni sono reali.5. I question its correctness not only in the case of Abhinava. utilizing elements of an ancient cosmological myth and guided by the influential SPmkhya theory of the evolution of the world and the cosmic processes. b iti andhat jagatah (1.” He says the former only serves as a means of describing the ontological paradox of the appearance of a world. 62 For example. had remodelled the ancient idea of God’s eight aspects distributed over the whole universe into a system of His eightfold manifestation. presence. but also in terms of his predecessors Utpala and Somtianda. . In brief. and this internality is continuous. and activity which at the same time expressed the fundamental truth that God and the world are one” (see note 48).” 61 For the sake of brevity I quote only Hacker’s summary. to conclude. reaiissime.

3/159. intro/151:13-152:5). j aprakasasya prasiddhir eva na kHcit. yadi hi na syat . g prag ivartho ‘praka.5. .5.pi. Bh.5. n tato dvayena prakLSab%hyannHmartha@r sadbhavam vijr%avHdopagatavHsanadusanena drdhikrtam Bsarikya.5. tathapi yat es@ kPanam tat vastusad eva arigikZryam] .3/163:9-11).5.4-S/163: 12164:1). tasmat sa sa vicitranilapitadirtipa akasmiko ‘jriHtapratyaksasiddhahetukah san bahyam vijr%Inagatapratibimbatmakasvasvabhavasampadakam aucityava&t nijarirpasadrsam kramopanipatadrtipabahutarabhedatmakam jr&at sarvatha prthagbhutam anumapayati iti sambhhayate bahyarthavfdi (1.5.3) (163:3-5).. KSTS.1/154:4-6). tat ca iha nil&Gm asty eva. iti sarpkiryeranvyvaharah (1.4-5/166:2-167:2).iti svatantryavadasya pronmilanam sucitav%nnHc%ryah // (KSTS 34. h tasmat bhinnah prakaso ‘rthasya sarpbandhi bhavati iti sambhavanaiva nasti / ataS ca idam upapattya Lyatam . p. 5 of the first set of ntiguri nos.SIVA AND THE UBIQUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 401 d kim tu tatra [ Bh: tasmin bhavajate] aham iti ucite paramarse yo ‘yam idantapara markah saiva bIihyatI.@r syat praklsatmataya vlna / na ca prakaso bhinnah syad atmarthasya prakasata // (IPK 1.). trtiyena tadanabhyupagame ‘pi &vat na kiiicit uparudhyata iti darsayati / atha Slokena svadarlane ‘rthatattvam upadarsayan bWy%rthasadbhHve pratyaksam nirakaroti pram*atvena / tato dvayena anumeyat?im api bahyasya nirasyati (1. and UP agree on siddhyatz’ rather than sidhyati. bhinne prakase cabhinne samkaro visayasya tat / prakalatma prakasyo ‘rtho napraka6aS ca siddhyati // (IPK 1. o tattadakasmikabhaso bahyam ted anumapayet / na hy abhinnasya bodhasya vicitmbhasahetuta // na vasanaprabodho ‘tra vicitro hetutam iyat / tasyapi tatprabodhasya vaicitrye kim nibandhanam (1. k evam atmany asatkalpah prakasasyaiva santy ami / jade prakasa evasti svatmanah svaparatmabhih // (Aja@upramdtysiddhz~ [Demonstration of the Existence of a sentient Perceiver] 13.avastunah sarvasamarthya- . 1 ittham jadabhav%nam samvidvi&ntim vinlsatkalpatvlt svatmany asatsvabhav%nam jriLtuhpraklSasvabhHvasya bamhandhitayaiva sattvam. 6 of the first set of miguri nos. e anujjhitasarpvidabhedasya bhavasya kalpitapramatrapeksaya bhedena prak&anam bhagavato jrianasaktir ity uktam bhavati (1.5. tasmat samvitprakasa eva svatmocchalattaya svamaylSaktyullasite visvavaicitrye jadajadabhavarasidvayena vedyavedakatmakena svarupanatiriktenltirikteneva prasphuret. m prakHSaS ca asau katham / yadi prak&ataiva ghafasya vapuh saiva patasya ity adi visvavapuh prak&ah siddhih (1.5.2/158:4-8).5.arthasya svartipam prakasamtiatvam prakasabhinnatvam iti (1. iti tavat paryavasayayitavyam (1. quoted: 1. KSTS 34 (Siddhitrayi) p. tarhi svatmani tasya prakasamatrarupatvat abheda eva (1. tat kim dusyet (1. svatmani hi niIam yadi pitam na kirpcit va. f ekasyaiva prakasasya evambhiitakramakramakaryakaranabhavadivipyaprada&nasamarthyariipam’aisvaryam.2/154:9-12). 3-6).3/ 163:6-7).hetau abhinne karyabhedasya asambhavat. tat ca iha antahsthitatvam aham ity etiivata citsamucitenaiva vapusa paramarsanam.5. . p tasya [= bodhasya] ca abhinnasya kadacit &ibhHsata kadacit pitabhasata iti ye vicitrabhasalr tatra klranatvam hi yasmat na upapannam .10/192:12-193:9). q [yadyapi ZbhastinLm jnHnZntarvartinHm aparamarthikam samvrtisattvam ucyetZ.5. i yadi arthat anya eva jiiHnatmH prakatah ata eva bhinno ‘rthatah.3/160:1-3).5. na tu nasti iti.5.4-5/164:11-165:4).

. niladih arthair tat na anumita eva syHt / atha avista eva. anyatha ‘prf+g ivarthah’ iti uktanyayena aprakL&pHtLt (Bh 1.5. yad .5. X nanu evam ubhayathlpi saqrbhavan%num%nam unmisati. s syHd etad avabhasesu tesv evavasite sati / vyavahtie kim anyena bahyen%nupapattinH // (IPK 1.8/11.8-g/191:4-11). tadabahyatam eva pratyuta prasadhayati iti viruddham eva (1. 225). .svavisayagraharxtmatrasamartham le&uupam. y na kevalam anantara~lokanirdistabhih yuktibhih pratyaksena bfthyo ‘rtho na abhasate.5.5. ajadam eva. v pr$tabuddhidehPdeh . tat iha vilvariipLbhLsavaicitrye cidatmana eva svatantryarp kim na abhyupagamyate svasarpvedanasiddham.5.4S/167:11-168:4).yat sarnvit eva abhyupagatasvatantrya apratighatalaksanat icchavi~esava&t sanwido ‘nadhikHtmatayH anapayat antalwthitam eva sat bhavajatam idam ity evam pr?qtabuddhidehadeh vitirnakiyanmLtrasanwidrtipat bahyatvena Ibhrisayati iti.8-g/186:6-187:2).6/176:9-177:2) cidatmaiva hi devo ‘ntal#hitam icchavaild bahih / yogiva nirupad%nam arthajatarp prakagayet // (IPK 1.4.5. W tata& ceivara eva bijabhUmijalibh&&hityeniWrkuWtmanH bhasate. sar&n tuvastuto . aa tena anumtiavikalpfrtmanapi prakaSena yadi anavisto .prthaktvena.7/185: n.ananubhtitacararp tatra anumanam anumitivyLp?iro vikalpHtmH naiva kenacit vadinL isyate (1. kim iti hetvantaraparyesa@prayhena khidyate / (1.7/182:3-6) anum&nam anlbhatapurve naivestam indriyam / abhatam eva bijader abhh%d dhetnvastunah // abh&@t punar abhasad bahyasyasit katharpcana / arthasya naiva tenasya siddhir nHpy anumzinatah // (IPK 1.7/184:9185:6). sarpvidrtiparp yasya tad@. tatra anumZnarp . .10/198:3~5). tatra kim makurapratibimbitaghatldidrstantena jGnapratibimbatabh&avaicitrye vijti%nadarpanHtiriktam tata eva bahyabhimatam hetum kalpayema? kim vH yogidmtfmtena samvitsvatantryam eva hetubhavena bruyiima? tad idam s%$ayikarp vartate iti BSaiikya (1.gr%hakatvenabhimatHt pri+radeh. ALPER virahitalak~asya ktiyasampPdanapr@itasamarthyatmakasvabhavtiupapatteh (1.228:18-21) atra hi paraprakl&d bahirbhiitatve aprak%~m%ratapattiprasaiigiit tatsiddhaye kalpitapramatradara iti darbayann gha pranety Bdi (MRS. y&at anumLnenlpi na asya b%hyasya siddhih (1.5. .5.8-9/185:14186:4). IPV 1. na bayah / tena b$tye sadhye yat kirpcit pram@am Bniyate. bahyatvena . r tatra anumZnam atra naiva pravartitum utsahate / pravrttam api na prakrtasiddham Idadhyat iti.8-g/187:3-7).6/177:9-178:7). na tu parasamvida prthaktvena. bb vartamanatvena sphufataya avabhasanam idam ity evam Lkkam yesam teem.5.vikalpah. (1. * Btmanam tam ca ghatadikzup sphatikadih na parHmrastum samartha iti jadah . . sarvaSca ayam vikalpo ‘nubhavamiila iti prasiddham / tena yat sarvatha anabhatapiirvam .5. .yat Hbh%avaicitryariipam arthajatam prakagayati iti / tat asti sambhavah .5.yat n&up bhati iti svaprakL8asamvidruparp nadhikarp kimcit iti. HbhHsair eva taih bhavata abhyupagataih vyavahtiasiddheh.8-g/187:8-15). t anayapi kastakalpanaya b&y%n arthan prasadhayata bhavata taih na kinwit kartavyam. (1.10/199:1-3). u yogisamvida eva SPtPd$i &aktih . . badhakam ca prakH&t bhede anumeyatayapi prak&nabhava iti that mukhyam (1. . kid@? arthat parasarhvidaiva vithnam kiyanmatram . . tarhi “pnig ivtitho ‘prakHO#t syat” iti nyayena prak&mltrasvabhava eva.5.itiy$n atra paramtithah (2. na hi nity%numeyena kaScit vyavahtia iti kim b%hyena. yatra sadhakam ca nHsti pramanam. iyad eva hi pratyaksam . 146:4-6)..5.402 HARVEY P.

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