[1989V49] JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.1989 Jan 262nd DivisionG.R. No.

75256D E C I S I O N PARAS, J.: Presented before Us is a special civil action for certiorari against the Honorable Judge Ignacio Almodovar of the City Court of Legaspi, Branch I, Legaspi City, raising beautiful questions of law which We are tasked to resolve, We impleaded the People of the Philippines as party respondents herein a resolution dated 17 September 1986 (p. 41, Rollo). The relevant facts gathered from the records are as follows: Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his bestfriend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other children in their backyard in the morning of 29 October 1984. They were targetshooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed around fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his unfortunate death. After conducting a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident. The victim's parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide through reckless Imprudence. The information dated 9 October 1985 was consequently filed, which narrated in part:

". . . the above-named accused, who is over 9 years but below 15 years of age and acting with discernment, did then and there, without taking the necessary precautions to prevent and/or avoid accident or injuries to persons, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously operate and cause to be fired, in a reckless and imprudent manner, an air rifle with .22 caliber bore with rifling, oxygen and bolt operated thereby hitting as a result of said carelessness and imprudence one TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE at the left side of the body with its pallet, causing injuries which directly caused his untimely death; . . ." (p. 8, Rollo) On 25 October 1985, petitioner moved to quash the said information on the following grounds: I THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE. II THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINS AVERMENTS WHICH IF TRUE WOULD CONSTITUTE A LEGAL EXCUSE OR JUSTIFICATION.

III THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGES AND THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT. (p. 9, Rollo) This motion, in an Order dated 4 April 1986, was denied with respect to the first and third grounds relied upon. However, the resolution of the second ground was deferred until evidence shall have been represented during trial. On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was filed, raising two (2) issues, to wit: I WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND II WHETHER THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT DID NOT PASS THRU THE BARANGAY LUPON. (Petitioner, p. 3, Rollo) Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing of a corollary controversy with respect to the first issue raised is evident, that is, whether the term "discernment", as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous with "intent." It is the position of the petitioner that "discernment" connotes "intent" (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of People vs. Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that case We held that the allegation of "with intent to kill . . ." amply meets the requirement that discernment should be alleged when the accused is a minor between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner completes his syllogism in saying that: "If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then the allegation in the information that the accused acted with discernment and willfully unlawfully, and feloniously, operate or cause to be fired in a reckless and imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber' is an inherent contradiction tantamount to failure of the information to allege a cause of action or constitute a legal excuse or exception." (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 97, Rollo) If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a quasi-offense under Article 265 of the RPC. On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and intent are two different concepts. We agree with the Solicitor General's view; the two terms should not be confused. The word "intent" has been defined as: "(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is essential to such intent; . . .; the design resolve, or determination with which a person acts." (46 CJS Intentp. 1103.)

It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom and intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term "discernment," as used in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise: "The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong . . ." (italics Ours) p. 583 From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both are products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desired of one's act while the latter relate to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his negligence. In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. 1 In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert 2 has stated: "The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant 3 (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability." It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a criminal act. On the other hand, minors above nine years of age but below fifteen are not absolutely exempt. However, they are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but which presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were "capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted with discernment." 4 The preceding discussion shows that "intelligence" as an element of dolo actually embraces the concept of discernment as used in Article 12 of the RPC and as defined in the aforecited case of People vs. Doquena, supra. It could not therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes "intent" for they refer to two different concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a distinct element of dolo as a means of committing an offense. In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasioffense. For him to be criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held liable for a said

We therefore rule that.' not 'punished.D. 1508. . 1508 applies to his case because the penalty imposable is reduced to not higher than arresto menor from an original arresto mayor maximum to prision correctional medium as prescribed in Article 365 of the RPC. 116 SCRA 415). or a fine exceeding P200. Savellano. Section 2 (3)." 5 The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited.D. a member of the committee that drafted P. 72 Phil. Hence. . 1508." Expounding on the above provision. it is clear that We did not mean to equate the words "intent" and discernment. From the above. . the former expresses the thought of passivity while the latter signifies activity." What We meant was that the combines effect of the words used in the information is to express a knowledge. which states: "xxx xxx xxx (3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days. He submits that considering his entitlement to a two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance due to his minority. supra." The former may never embrace the idea of the latter. any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must now considered." without any distinction or exception made. petitioner failed to present the qualifying sentence preceding the ruling he now invokes. . 1508 has said: "The law says 'punishable. 263. petitioner may not validly contend that since the information now in question alleged "discernment. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos." it in effect alleged "intent. . 69 SCRA 314. of the wrongness or rightness of her act. Nieto.' This allegation clearly conveys the idea that she knew what would be the consequence of her unlawful act of publishing her victim into deep water and that she knew it to be wrong. the penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the later should be considered. P. The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed (People vs. Dioquino vs. . ." into a deep place of the Penaranda River and as a consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and died right then and there. Coming now to the second issue of jurisdiction. In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words "intent" and "discernment" used under the law. . on the part of the accused Nieto. This is not correct. Purisima. in construing Section 2(3) of P. he cites the case of People vs. .D. People vs. However.D. Caldito. criminally and feloniously push one Lolita Padilla .00. which reads: "That requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the formation that she . it is contended by the petitioner that the case against him should have first been brought before the Lupong Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree No. Cruz and People vs. The same principle applies in constructing Section 2(3) of P. Hence.Article would reveal such fact as it starts off with the phrase "Any person . did then and there wilfully. 1508.' One should therefore consider the penalty provided for by law or ordinance as distinguished from the penalty actually imposed in particular cases after considering the attendant circumstances affecting criminal liability. . 'with the intent to kill.

D. However.The petitioner.232. the then acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza stated that the Office of the Solicitor General.: On 7 July 1976. Because the Petition for Review was signed by the City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City as counsel for the People. Melencio-Herrera (Chairman). No. J. The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the presentation of its evidence. BARRIOS. At the time of the alleged commission of the crime in April 1975. Accordingly. No cost. AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CITY COURT OF ROXAS CITY. 1508 has not been complied with. charging private respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.. As intimated in the case of Royales vs. SO ORDERED. Amin. which check therefore subsequently bounced. in his arguments.D.R. jurisdiction over the offense was vested by law in the City Court. LIBERTAD LAGON AND HON. [1990R433] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. by the time the criminal information was filed. Hence this Petition for Review brought by the People. PREMISES CONSIDERED. 1508 is not jurisdictional. 7362 and that it had erred in issuing its Order dismissing the case. IAC. respondents. JUDGE ISIDRO O. arguing that the City Court of Roxas City had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. the Court referred the petition to the Office of the Solicitor General for comment. The information charged that the accused had allegedly issued a check in the amount of P4. having been previously consulted by the Assistant City . However. vs. which penalty was beyond the City Court's authority to impose. in an Order dated 2 December 1976. JJ. the City Court dismissed the information upon the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the court's authority to impose. Sarmiento and Regalado. knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the check. the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case. this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Temporary Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. P. Padilla. 7362. 135 SCRA 438. WHEREFORE. Responding to the Court's resolution. asserts that since P. Let this case be REMANDED to the lower court for trial on the merits. a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas City and docketed as Criminal Case No. The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. This erroneous perception has been corrected long before. petitioner. the court dismissed the information without prejudice to its being refiled in the proper court.80 as payment for goods or merchandise purchased. paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code had already been amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused thereunder increased. 127 SCRA 470. concur. and not by the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime.1990 May 183rd DivisionG. 45815R E S O L U T I O N FELICIANO. and categorically stated in Ebol Vs.

the Court considers that petitioner has failed to show that the City Court had committed reversible error in dismissing the criminal information in Criminal Case No. the offense clearly fell within the jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City. subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the allegations of a criminal information. 1 Thus. The real question raised by the petitioner is: would application of the above-settled doctrine to the instant case not result in also applying Presidential Decree No. 2 the Court stressed that: xxx xxx xxx . as amended. at that time therefore. 818 (effective 22 October 1975) to prision mayor in its medium period." We do not believe so. the law governing the subject matter jurisdiction of municipal and city courts in criminal cases in 1975 and 1976. After deliberation on the instant Petition for Review. the penalty imposable for the offense charged under paragraph 2(d) in relation to the third sub-paragraph of the first paragraph. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. In People v. in disregard of the rule against retroactivity of penal laws? Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code permits penal laws to have retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony. At the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on 7 July 1976. No. In criminal prosecutions. of a court's legal competence to try a case ab origine. it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out . 818 had increased the imposable penalty for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. . who is not a habitual criminal. Under the penultimate paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.Fiscal of Roxas City.000. It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action. and asked that the petition be given due course. 818 to the present case. 7362 to a level in excess of the maximum penalty which a city court could impose. . . was arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. . in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine not exceeding P6." It appears that at the time of the commission of the offense charged on 5 April 1975. In the first place.D. 7362 without prejudice to its refiling in the proper court. No. . agreed with the position taken by the latter that the City Court had jurisdiction over the criminal case involved.00 or both . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction. .D. "[m]unicipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense within their respective jurisdictions. rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged. 7362 had been increased by P. jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to the then Court of First Instance of Roxas City considering that P. Purisima. . in accordance with the above rule. the penalty imposable for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. .

that lesser penalty may be imposed by the trial court (provided it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the rule above referred to) even if the reduced penalty otherwise falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court. . . or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial. for the reason already adverted to." 7 In the case at bar. Co Hiok. it may be that after trial. It may not be said. 7362 by P. jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial (People v. Buissan. be held to fall under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. No. 48 O. Cuello. it is retained regardless whether the evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the information (People v. impose a penalty that is proper for a crime within the exclusive competence of a municipal or city court as the evidence would warrant. that court may not impose that more onerous penalty upon private respondent Libertad Lagon (assuming the evidence shows that the offense was committed before 22 October 1975). Buissan. that is.D. 1 SCRA 814) or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented during the trial (People v. 818 (prision mayor in its medium period) is obviously heavier than the penalty provided for the same offense originally imposed by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (up to prision correccional in its minimum period). In such a case. for once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the information is filed. If the facts recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the complaint is presented has jurisdiction. after trial. that court must assume jurisdiction. not a city or municipal court. together with other legal obligations. a penalty lesser than the maximum imposable under the statute is proper under the specific facts and circumstances proven at the trial. 3 (Citations omitted) The same rule was set forth and amplified in People v. but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor. 6 the Court also said: xxx xxx xxx . .to the offender after trial. if said case. . But the Regional Trial Court would remain vested with subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decide the (refiled) . Purisima. 1330)" 5 Thus. In People v. [i]n criminal prosecutions. 4 in the following terms: xxx xxx xxx . therefore. on the basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or information (People v. it would impose penalty of not more than six months of imprisonment. Should the criminal information be refiled in the proper court.G. the increased penalty provided for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. may. 62 Phil. that the Court of First Instance would be acting without jurisdiction if in a simple seduction case. taking cognizance of a criminal case coming under its jurisdiction. the proper Regional Trial Court. 69 SCRA 347) constitutive of the offense charged. Mision. 503) but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes. crime or violation charged in the complaint. It is unquestionable that the Court of First Instance.

But.00 were claimed to have been given by Consolacion for the business. As a result. because of the trust they had for each other. The two later agreed to form a partnership with Consolacion to contribute additional capital for the expansion of Rosa's lumber business and the latter as industrial partner. During Rosa's employment she was regarded by the Leongs as an efficient and hardworking employee. the circumstance that P. Consolacion asked for the return of her investment but the checks issued by Rosa for the purpose were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.1997 Jul 281st DivisionG. 84-32334. [1997V581] ROSA UY.case even though the penalty properly imposable. J. Blg. par. the friendship between Consolacion and Rosa turned sour when the partnership documents were never processed. . 2 finding the accused ROSA UY guilty of violating B. In the meantime.: This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of respondent Court of Appeals 1 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 818 would be inapplicable to the refiled case would not result in the Regional Trial Court losing subject-matter jurisdiction. given the date of the commission of the offense charged. respondents. The preceding events prompted Consolacion to file a complaint for estafa and for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 22 were filed against petitioner.P. the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for Review for lack of merit. 84-32335 to 84-32340. with the funds contributed by Consolacion evidence by various receipts. 32. Various sums of money amounting to P500. Thereafter a lumber store with warehouse was constructed in Bulacan. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.P. Blg. The friendly relations between Rosa and Consolacion continued.R. On 15 March 1982.D. On 10 December 1984 an Information for estafa 3 and several other Informations 4 for violation of B. Rosa resigned. should be the lower penalty originally provided for in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which is otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City. of the Revised Penal Code in Crim. WHEREFORE. inclusive. and acquitting her of estafa under Art. Br. No costs. no receipt was ever issued. Case No. Bulacan. Cases Nos. The Order dated 2 December 1976 of the public respondent Presiding Judge of the City Court of Roxas City is hereby AFFIRMED. 119000D E C I S I O N BELLOSILLO.000. petitioner vs. unfortunately. No. 22 in Crim. Rosa Uy was employed as an accountant in Don Tim Shipping Company owned by the husband of complaining witness Consolacion Leong. however. The offenses were subsequently consolidated and tried jointly. No. a few months before she was to give birth. 315. 2 (a). In other words. nor in the case falling back into the City Court's exclusive jurisdiction. she helped her husband manage their lumber business.

00 from complainant with respect to Crim. Case No. (1) 068604 DATE PRESENTED 16 December 1983 REASON FOR DISHONOR Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped(Exh. testified on the following transactions with respect to the six (6) checks referred to in Crim. 6 . petitioner and her witnesses Fernando Abad and Antonio Sy maintained that no misrepresentation was committed and that the funds were utilized to construct the building in Bulacan. Bangit. 84-32335 to 84-32340. Bulacan. Bangit the prosecution tried to establish that petitioner Rosa Uy employed deceit in obtaining the amount of P500.P. manager of the Commercial Bank of Manila. 22.000. respondent appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. With respect to the issuance of the subject checks. "H") (3) 068603 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. After a joint trial. Bldg. Cases Nos. 84-32334. petitioner did not deny their existence but averred that these were issued to evidence the investment of complainant in the proposed partnership between them. and (b) whether the checks had been issued on account or for value. "E") (5) 043122 3 January 1984 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. where Rosa Uy maintained an account. 84-32335 to 84-32840 which were dishonored: CHECK NO. Malabon Branch. 5 On appeal. Petitioner now raises the following issues before us in this petition for review on certiorari: (a) whether the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations of the Bouncing Checks Law. Alexander D. Cases Nos. "F") (4) 068601 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. "I") For her part. "A") (6) 068660 24 January 1984 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. the Manila Regional Trial Court acquitted petitioner of estafa but convicted her of the charges under B.Through Consolacion Leong and Alexander D. As regards Crim. "G") (2) 068605 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh.

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. She maintains that the evidence presented established that (a) complainant was a resident of Makati. it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus.P. for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied.P. Taken altogether. necessarily. Blg. and. the elements of deceit and damage are neither essential nor required. petitioner contends that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the offenses under B. Rather.P. without valid reason.P. Blg. the court may validly take cognizance of the case. it is incorrect for respondent People to conclude that inasmuch as the Regional Trial Court of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case then it also acquired jurisdiction . The crimes of estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law are two (2) different offenses having different elements and. 10 For violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. Blg. 22 occurred in Manila. Respondent People of the Philippines through the Solicitor General on the one hand argues that even if there is no showing of any evidence that the essential ingredients took place or the offense was committed in Manila. 8 And once it is so shown. on the other hand. 11 Hence. 9 In the case at bar. the elements of B. However. ordered the bank to stop payment. what is critical is the fact that the court acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case because the same is the principal or main case and that the cases for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law are merely incidental to the estafa case. (b) the maker. petitioner concludes that the said evidence would only show that none of the essential elements of B. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the lower court stating that none of the essential elements constitutive of violation of B. and. the complaint for estafa and the various charges under B.As regards the first issue. Blg. if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else. deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrantconviction. (b) petitioner was a resident of Caloocan City. (c) the place of business of the alleged partnership was located in Malabon. drawer or issuer knows at the time of issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment. still she cannot be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. In the crime of estafa. (e) the checks were all deposited for collection in Makati. drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value. 22 are (a) the making.P. We disagree with respondent. Blg. 7 Furthermore. (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer. 22 was shown to have been committed in the City of Manila. 22 were jointly tried before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. (d) the drawee bank was located in Malabon. the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. 22 and that assuming for the sake of argument that she raised the matter of jurisdiction only upon appeal to respondent appellate court.

either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion. Respondent posits that it took some five (5) years of trial before petitioner raised the issue of jurisdiction. Blg. that the drawee bank is likewise located in Malabon and that all the subject checks were deposited for collection in Makati. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. There is no scintilla of evidence to show that jurisdiction over the violation of B. dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila. under Rule 117. 22 had been acquired. Blg. the acquisition of jurisdiction by the lower court over the estafa case. Blg. . (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or over the person of the accused. 22 however are on a different plain. of Section 3 of this Rule. provides that the accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: .P. The crime of estafa and the violation of B. the records clearly indicate that business dealings were conducted in a restaurant in Manila where sums of money were given to petitioner. which are essential elements necessary for the Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction over the offense. . Moreover. On this finding alone. all that the evidence shows is that complainant is a resident of Makati. On the contrary. Upon the contention of respondent that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality whether the accused be within one territory or another.over the violations of B. .P. delivered. under Sec. Blg. It may be true that B. the same is still without merit.P. we cannot countenance the inadvertence committed by the court. 12 After a careful perusal of the records. that petitioner is a resident of Caloocan City. 22. shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash. hence. lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged . . Blg. we can see that even if a party fails to file a motion to quash. . . The various charges for violation of B. there would be no basis in upholding the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense. In an attempt to salvage the issue that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction over the violations of B. respondent relies on the doctrine of jurisdiction by estoppel. . no proof has been offered that the checks were issued. 8 of the same Rule it is provided that the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information. 3. Clearly. Sec. (b) . as provided for in paragraph .P. .P.P. that the principal place of business of the alleged partnership is located in Malabon. As such. . petitioner or complainant was in Manila. 22 is a transitory or continuing offense and such being the case the theory is that a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed. he . We again find no iota of proof on the records that at the time of issue. from the above-quoted law. except the grounds of . 22 have to be treated as separate offenses and therefore the essential ingredients of each offense have to be satisfied. Blg. 22. it is crystal clear that petitioner timely questioned the jurisdiction of the court in a memorandum 13 before the Regional Trial Court and thereafter in succeeding pleadings. In this regard. We note however that knowledge by the maker or drawer of the fact that he has no sufficient funds to cover the check or of having sufficient funds is simultaneous to the issuance of the instrument. . Verily.

on the basis of the Tijam v. They questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court in a memorandum before the lower court. Ramirez. Instead. The exceptional circumstance involved Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and. virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception. such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. but rather the general rule. 16 the Court held that the ruling in the Sibonghanoy case is an exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. these objections may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover. It is to be regretted. by exercising due diligence. The Court stated further that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. No judgment has yet been rendered by the trial court in this case. the petitioner should be estopped. to do that which. the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by laches. Hence. Sibonghanoycase 15 in which respondent seeks refuge. the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court maybe raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply. laches is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time. even on appeal. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. As a matter of fact. she did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. Sibonghanoy does not control the present controversy. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. we hold that the ruling in Tijam v. 19 . 18 The circumstances of the present case are very different from Tijam v. The Court said: A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. We nonetheless find the jurisprudence of the Sibonghanoy case not in point. 14 Assuming arguendo that there was a belated attempt to question the jurisdiction of the court and hence. Petitioner is therefore not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. even on appeal. 17 In Sibonghanoy.may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on. finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent. warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it. as soon as the accused discovered the jurisdictional defect. it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. As defined in said case. however. could or should have been done earlier. In Calimlim v.

R. [2002V815] LUTGARDA CRUZ. which sought to nullify two orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The Antecedent Facts The City Prosecutor of Manila charged petitioner with the crime of "Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document" before the Manila Regional Trial Court. petitioner filed by registered mail a motion for reconsideration dated February 7. petitioner received a copy of the decision. to have no jurisdiction over Crim. 1994. SO ORDERED. the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration stating: Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 7. On February 10. THE COURT OF APPEALS. the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court dated 24 September 1991 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 1995. without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against petitioner with the court of competent jurisdiction when warranted. 1994. finding the Regional Trial Court of Manila. represented by MIGUEL C. ordering the return to the surviving heirs of the parcel of land located in Bulacan. J. 1994 acquitting petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. On April 18. 1994.[3] Petitioner executed before a Notary Public in the City of Manila an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of a parcel of land stating that she was the sole surviving heir of the registered owner when in fact she knew there were other surviving heirs. petitioner. inclusive. dated April 18. Br. 1995[1] and its Resolution dated December 1. After trial on the merits. the trial court rendered its decision dated January 17. respondents.WHEREFORE. the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal case. assailing the trial court’s ruling on the civil aspect of the criminal case. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the HEIRS OF ESTANISLAWA C.[4] On January 28. Since the offended party did not reserve the right to file a separate civil action arising from the criminal offense. 1994.: The Case This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31. 1994 and May 6. REYES.2002 Aug 293rd DivisionG. 84-32335 to 8432340. 32. Branch 53. No. REYES. 1994. 123340D E C I S I O N CARPIO. 1994. Case Nos. vs. In the same decision. filed by the accused through counsel and considering that there is nothing to show that the Office of the City Prosecutor was actually . the trial court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case.[2] The Court of Appeals dismissed for being insufficient in substance the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. Petitioner furnished the City Prosecutor a copy of the motion by registered mail.

Both must concur. 1994 of a copy of the Court’s decision dated January 17. as follows: . 1995. 10. [5] Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the trial court’s order of April 18. in ruling in the manner he did. If the service is by ordinary mail. 1994. Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served. Thus. [6] Left with no recourse. let the Motion for Reconsideration be Denied for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s order of April 18. 4). 1994 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals to nullify the two assailed orders of the trial court. respondent Judge cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The motion of accused dated 22 April 1994 is a violation of this rule. no party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment (Sec. Rule 13.furnished or served with a copy of the said Motion for Reconsideration within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days from receipt by the accused on January 28. Rules of Court. so that the same is already final and executory. The trial court denied the same in an order dated May 6. said motion is DENIED. Proof of Service. proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 5 of this rule. proof of service shall be made by (a) affidavit of the person mailing and (b) the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. Patent from the language of the said section is that in case service is made by registered mail. the Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition and dismissed the case for being insufficient in substance. [7] The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court’s order of May 6. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals On March 31. proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. 1994 denying the subsequent motion for reconsideration. 1994. provides as follows: SEC. 1994. In the case at bench. WHEREFORE. The Court of Appeals declared in part: Section 10. to wit: Under the Interim Rules. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon receipt thereof by the sender. 1994. Petitioner also asked the Court of Appeals to compel the trial court to resolve her motion for reconsideration of the decision dated February 7. or the affidavit of the party serving. or in lieu thereof the letter unclaimed together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. there was no such affidavit or registry receipt when the motion was considered. place and manner of service. containing a full statement of the date. If service is made by registered mail.

the civil action for the civil liability has been impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal case before respondent Judge. 87-54773 (SIC) OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA. the instant petition not being sufficient in substance is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and the case DISMISSED. the Court of Appeals declared: WHEREFORE.[12] Hence.xxx. petitioner raises the following issues: 1. Hence. The decision dated January 7. 1994 had long become final when the second motion for reconsideration was filed on 03 May 1994. Hence. the institution of a criminal action carries with it the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. There was neither reservation nor waiver of the right to file the civil action separately nor has one been instituted to the criminal action.outside the territorial jurisdiction of said court -does not hold water. [11] In a resolution dated December 1.[8] this is already academic. Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged. The Issues In her Memorandum. the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure. this petition. to wit: x x x. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS DULY FURNISHED WITH COPY OF THE PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE DECISION ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. [9] Finally. not the civil procedure rules which pertain to civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit. while there is merit in petitioner’s submission that the motion for reconsideration dated April 22. as contemplated in the Interim Rules because the motion sought to impugn the order dated 18 April 1994 not on the basis of the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration dated 07 February 1994 but on the erroneous legal conclusion of the order dated May 6. BRANCH 53. the pairing Judge who issued the order on 06 May 1994 had no more legal competence to promulgate the same. [10] In the dispositive portion of its assailed decision. the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 1995. the Court of Appeals upheld the assailed decision of the trial court on the civil aspect of the case. This is the law on the matter. The proposition submitted by petitioner that the court presided by respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the property because it is located in Bulacan . 1994 was not a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment. 1994. .

The Court has stressed time and again that non-compliance with Sections 4. stated that petitioner had until February 12. 1994 complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 6. . INVOLVING A PROPERTY LOCATED IN BULACAN. Petitioner maintains that the motion was properly filed within the 15-day period. 1994. citing the registry return card which shows actual receipt on February 22. Moreover. RENDERED DECISION ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. making the trial court’s decision final and executory. by filing a motion for reconsideration without any proof of service. 5 and 6 of Rule 15 is a fatal defect. 3. 1994.2. 87-57743 FOR FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT. and 6 of Rule 15 is a useless piece of paper. [13] The Ruling of the Court We grant the petition. BRANCH 53. 1994 to appeal the decision or file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner. This includes the power to order the restitution to the offended party of real property located in another province. also on the offended party if the latter is not represented by a private counsel. We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner patently failed to comply with the mandatory requirements on proof of service insofar as the public prosecutor is concerned. When the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but is adjudged civilly liable. The Court of Appeals. his motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect must be served not only on the prosecution. 1994 by the City Prosecutor of a copy of the motion. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA. 87-57743. the reglementary period of petitioner to appeal continued to run and lapsed after the 15-day period. Rule 15 on proof of service. 1994. Hence. merely filed a scrap of paper and not a motion for reconsideration. and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA HAD JURISDICTION TO RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. it necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all matters that the law requires the court to resolve. Petitioner relies on jurisprudence that the date of mailing is the date of filing. Absence of Proof of Service The first issue is whether petitioner’s motion for reconsideration dated February 7. if the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the accused. The well-settled rule is that a motion which fails to comply with Sections 4. 1994. Petitioner asserts that both copies of the motion for reconsideration were sent to the trial court and the City Prosecutor by registered mail on February 10. noting that petitioner received a copy of the decision on January 28. arguing that the date of mailing of both motions was on February 10. Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court’s finding that the City Prosecutor was not duly and timely furnished with petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of February 7. 5.

Proof of Service. . 1994. 13. In the instant case. both of which must be appended to the motion. proof of service is mandatory. a motion is nothing but an empty formality deserving no judicial cognizance. 1994. However. 6. . If service is made by registered mail. petitioner failed to attach both the affidavit and the registry receipt to the motion for reconsideration as required by the Rules. either the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. an examination of the record shows that petitioner received a copy of the trial court’s decision of January 17. The defect of the motion is apparent on its face. [15] mphasis supplied) From the language of the rule. [16] mphasis supplied) If service is by registered mail. by registered mail. This raises the issue of whether the public prosecutor is the only proper party to be served with petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. a motion for reconsideration. there is no proof of service.Proof of service to be filed with motions. proof of service consists of the affidavit of the person mailing and the registry receipt. such motion is not entitled to judicial cognizance and does not stop the running of the reglementary period for filing the requisite pleading. The Rules require service only on the public prosecutor if the offended party is not represented by a private counsel. or worse both. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused.[14] Section 6 of Rule 15 reads: SEC. Section 13 of Rule 13 further requires that: SEC. petitioner filed on February 10. x x x. However. Without such proof of service to the adverse party. 1994 on January 28. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper as it did not contain the required proof of service. without proof of service of the notice thereof. Absent one or the other. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender. Within the reglementary period to appeal. The present Rules do not require the accused to serve a copy of his motion for reconsideration on the offended party who may not be represented by a private counsel. A judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. No motion shall be acted upon by the court. proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. However.If filed. petitioner is contesting that part of the decision of the trial court finding him civilly liable even as he is acquitted from the criminal charge on reasonable doubt. or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.

Trial court’s jurisdiction over the civil aspect. the accused is necessarily served a copy of the pleading through his counsel. the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused. This argument is contrary to the law and the rules. To fill in this lacuna in the present Rules. and considering that the present Rules are silent on the matter. In upholding the trial court’s jurisdiction. it is only fair to give petitioner a period of five days from receipt of this decision within which to serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended party. a lacuna arises if the offended party is not represented by a private counsel. This is in addition to service on the public prosecutor who is the counsel of record of the State. the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Petitioner asserts that the location of the subject property outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over the civil aspect of the criminal case. First. In the instant case. If the offended party appeals or moves for reconsideration.[18] In the instant case. In such a situation. he should serve a copy of his pleading on the offended party himself if the latter is not represented by a private counsel. Second. Third. Petitioner asserts that the Manila trial court had no jurisdiction over the parcel of land in Bulacan which is outside the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction.The acquittal ends the work of the public prosecutor and the case is terminated as far as he is concerned. any appeal or motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect of a decision in a criminal case must be served on the other real party in interest. the Court of Appeals held: Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged. we require that henceforth if the accused appeals or moves for reconsideration. the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject . If the accused appeals or moves for reconsideration. The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused. under the present Rules only the public prosecutor is served the notice of appeal or a copy of the motion for reconsideration. the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus. In the interest of justice. [17] We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court had jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case. There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can acquire criminal jurisdiction. the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed. not the civil procedure rules which pertain to civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit. the Court notes that petitioner did not serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended party who was not represented by a private counsel in the trial court.

[1988V31] RIZALITO VELUNTA. J. we remand this case for further proceedings in the interest of justice. concur. JJ. Recom. Leyte. respondents.ordering restitution even if the parcel of land is located in Bulacan.. No. Palo. and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. PRESIDENT GCM. RECOM VIII. One of the issues in a criminal case is the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime..R.1988 Jan 203rd DivisionG. PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY AND COLONEL SIMEON KEMPIS. The petitioner is a regular member of the Integrated National Police of Tacloban City with the rank of Patrolman. while we find no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals as to proof of service and the trial court’s jurisdiction on the civil aspect. the offended party did not reserve the civil action and the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal action. The action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action unless reserved by the offended party. Let this case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. vs. on leave. grounded on reasonable doubt. Puno. JR.: This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the General Court Martial. JR. THE CHIEF. Sandoval-Gutierrez. petitioner. Article 104 of the same Code states that civil liability x x x includes restitution.. and Panganiban. Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused. the Manila trial court had jurisdiction to decide the civil aspect of the instant case . The trial court also acquired jurisdiction over the person of accused-petitioner because she voluntarily submitted to the court’s authority.[19] In the instant case. the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to resolve. WHEREFORE. 71855D E C I S I O N GUTIERREZ. from assuming jurisdiction over a criminal case for homicide wherein the petitioner is indicted for the death of one Romeo Lozano..[20] Thus. SO ORDERED. . Consequently. the acquittal. petitioner is given five (5) days from receipt of this decision within which to serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended party.matter as the law has conferred on the court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa through falsification of a public document. VIII. J. The trial court also had jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. (Chairman). did not extinguish the civil liability. Although the trial court acquitted petitioner of the crime charged. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [E]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

1984 finding the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and meted the penalty of "Dismissal from the Service. the Adjudication Board modified its decision by finding the petitioner guilty only of Less Grave Misconduct and modified the penalty from dismissal to suspension from service for six months without pay. According to the petitioner. . 1040 as of July 10. 1985. the General Court Martial has no more jurisdiction to continue the hearing against him as a result of the provisions of Executive Order No. in relation to Executive Order No." On a motion for reconsideration. During the pendency of the administrative case.On April 16. The case was referred to the military authorities pursuant to P. filed an administrative complaint against the petitioner with the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). Fernandez. Tacloban City for grave misconduct. 1985 whereby supervision and control over all units and members of the Integrated National Police have been transferred to NAPOLCOM and placed directly under the Office of the President of the Philippines.D. the First Assistant City Fiscal of Tacloban City issued a resolution in I. and decide cases for criminal acts committed by members of the Integrated National Police. Region VIII. the Adjudication Board No. Tacloban City. 1040. Mrs. endorsed the filing of an information for homicide against the petitioner. thereby removing police officers from the supervision and control of the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary under the Department of National Defense. a tricycle driver at the left cheek causing the latter's death. then a member of the Integrated National Police stationed in Tacloban City "with deliberate intent and with intent to kill. Mrs. 1012. 1982.S. After hearings on the merits." shot with his service pistol one Romeo Lozano. 8. Finding that the offense was committed during the performance of official duties. On May 14. for violations of traffic rules and regulations. widow of Romeo Lozano. On October 30. the petitioner tried to apprehend Romeo Lozano. 1982. Manila rendered a decision dated August 9. No. which became effective last July 10. 1850 which authorized the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to convene courts martial to hear and try cases against members of the Integrated National Police for offenses committed while in the performance of their duties has been expressly repealed by Section 3 of Executive Order No. Sano of Tacloban City. 82-203 finding the existence of prima facie evidence that the petitioner. Lozano also filed a complaint for homicide with the City Fiscal's Office of Tacloban. 1850 which authorizes the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to convene court martials to try. Anacorita Lozano. An altercation occurred between them which resulted in the shooting and death of Romeo Lozano. 1982 at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening. It is further argued by the petitioner that P. hear. Second Assistant Fiscal Jose B. the City Fiscal recommended that the case be referred to the Tanodbayan for further investigation. With the approval of Tanodbayan Bernardo P. NAPOLCOM. the petitioner challenges the assumption of jurisdiction by the General Court Martial over the criminal case for homicide against him. a motorized tricycle driver. As stated at the outset.D. as deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutor. while directing traffic at the intersection of Burgos Tarcela-Lucente Streets.

it was declared that the courts of the Philippine Islands have no common law jurisdiction or power. 27 Phil. Section 1 of Executive Order No. provides: "SECTION 1. (West Coast Life Insurance Co. firemen and jail guards. as amended. (b) all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of War. in either of the aforementioned situations.) We have to look for an express provision of law to resolve the issue raised by the petitioner. "As used herein. In the instant case. such that the effectiveness of the overall peace and order campaign is negated. but only those expressly conferred by the Constitution and statutes and those necessarily implied to make the express powers effective. Provided. 401. As early as 1914. the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to police officers. Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice. Hurd. P. that is. (Conchada v. 408. may terminate the authority of the local executive(s) to exercise . Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding ---. 31 Phil. or court martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached before hand unless otherwise provided by law. for hearing and deciding cases. the operational supervision and direction exercised by the Philippine Constabulary over all units of the Integrated National Police (INP) force stationed or assigned in the different cities and municipalities all over the country. is hereby transferred to the city or municipal government concerned until further orders from the President of the Philippines. the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408.(a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No." Executive Order Nos. No. be as defined in Section 1 (e) of Presidential Decree No. Director of Prisons.D. on the other hand. 1012 and 1040. policemen. the President of the Philippines motu proprio. v. otherwise known as the Articles of War. are invoked by the petitioner. 1012 states: "The provision of special or general laws to the contrary notwithstanding. as amended. 94). 1850 which vests jurisdiction on courts-martial over criminal cases involving the members of the Integrated National Police. or upon recommendation of the provincial commander.We find the contention of the petitioner to be unmeritorious. "Whenever the power of operational supervision and direction is abused. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. 1162. provincial superintendent with the concurrence of the Regional Unified Commander. that. The term 'operational control and direction' shall.

The allegation of the petitioner that P. 1850. amended and modified accordingly. it shall exercise administrative control and supervision over all units of the Integrated National Police (INP) force throughout the country. 1040 which gives the city and municipal governments. Section 3 of the executive order provides: "All laws. in coordination with the Provincial or District Police Superintendent. 1040 provides: "The National Police Commission shall henceforth be under the Office of the President of the Philippines as may be directed by and under the control of the President of the Philippines.operational supervision and direction over units of the Integrated National Police. (as the case may be). Station Commander or Officer-in-Charge to insure public safety and the effective maintenance of peace and order within the locality." The aforecited provision does not repeal in express terms." It is specifically stated under Executive Order No. 1850. 1850 has been expressly repealed by the clear and precise provision of Section 3 of Executive Order No. P. or parts thereof. and Executive Order No. 1040 it is the exercise of "administrative control and supervision" over all units of the Integrated National Police forces throughout the country that was transferred to the President of the Philippines. One refers to how the police will perform their functions and who shall direct such performance while the other refers to the tribunals vested with power to try criminal cases against them. regulations and policies promulgated by competent authority. No.D." The distinction between operational supervision and direction over the Integrated National Police and jurisdiction or authority of a court-martial to hear. 1012 that it is only the "operational supervision and direction" over all units of the Integrated National Police force stationed or assigned in the different cities and municipalities that was transferred from the Philippine Constabulary to the city or municipal government concerned. No. The latter executive order also defines operational supervision and direction in P.D. Neither is there any inconsistency between P.D. which confers upon courts-martial. operational supervision and direction over . 1160. decrees. under Executive Order No. (sic)" Section 1 of Executive Order No. It is the power to see to it that the units or elements of the Integrated National Police perform their duties properly according to existing laws and the rules. rules and regulations and other enactments.D. No. 1040 is inaccurate. inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order are hereby repealed. jurisdiction over crimes and offenses involving members of the Integrated National Police. and the power to employ or deploy such units or elements. try and decide a criminal proceeding against a police officer so that the appropriate penalty for the commission of a crime or offense may be imposed is easily discernible. however the judgment of the President the exigencies as require. executive orders. 1 (e) as follows: "(e) Operational Supervision and Direction. Likewise.

Bureau of Labor Relations. Since jurisdiction had properly been exercised from the start. on the State maintaining a police force national and civilian in character is still in the process of being implemented. WHEREFORE. Davao del Norte and caught in flagrante the operators of said illegal cockfighting. including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto. 40080. received a mission order to proceed to Barangay Pangi. When the case was filed in 1982. Jalandoni v. 1987). 85 SCRA 261. it remains with the military court martial unless a law expressly divests it of that jurisdiction. Police forces continue to remain part of the PC-INP until the civilian police force is finally set-up as contemplated by the fundamental law. (49 SCRA 149). in an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. MOYA. Rodolfo Dela Cruz. 75952. Dela Cruz shot Cabilto. G. In compliance with said mission order. The operators of the illegal cockfights. 50 SCRA 10. Sto. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. respondents.members of the Integrated National Police.1988 Apr 273rd DivisionG. 1983. 1979. vs. Feliciano. October 20. (PAFLU v. Hon. On August 2. and The Philippine American Management Co. . Maco. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. SO ORDERED. Bidin and Cortes. petitioner. together with other PC men. the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. concur. Endaya. et al. Tomas. v. L-65192D E C I S I O N CORTES. Inc. It is an established rule that jurisdiction once acquired remains until validly transferred by the proper authority according to law. The provision of the Constitution. Dela Cruz was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao. catching up with them on the TagumMati National Highway.: Involving as it does a purely legal question. Davao for the purpose of verifying and apprehending persons who were allegedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. FELIX L. No. 1979. J.. JJ.. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle. followed the soldiers on their way back to the PC Headquarters.R. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Davao. such as gaffs and fighting cocks. Section 6. Article XVI. 72 SCRA 396. a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned to the Intelligence and Operations Section of the 432nd PC Company.R. The soldiers left the place but they brought with them to the PC Headquarters the evidence of the crime. (Barcellano v. Fernan (Chairman). [1988V349] RODOLFO DELA CRUZ. On February 23. The Philippine American Management Employees Asso. Major General Renato de Villa. Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. Dela Cruz and company proceeded to Maco. but said operators resisted arrest. No. Villegas v. the present petition for certiorari and mandamus was certified to this Court by the then Intermediate Appellate Court in its resolution dated August 30. Enrile.. there can be no question that the respondent General Court Martial had jurisdiction..

8 exercised exclusive jurisdiction over "(a)ll offenses committed by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the performance of their official duty or which arose out of any act or omission done in the performance of their official duty. Phil. Rilloraza v. Manila Railroad Co. Tuvera v. In the case at bar. Dela Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao a motion to transfer the case to the military authorities so he could be tried by court martial. 1. v. pages 6373-1 to 6378-3. 1979. But what is the significance of the proviso regarding the certificate to be issued by the Secretary of National Defense? .O. 747 (1953). 59 remained in force on said date. The motion was denied. et al. v.While the case was pending trial. In the instant case. "(Section 1. De Guzman. At issue is whether the civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of Criminal Case No. Military Commission. the information was filed on August 2. Hence. supra: Rizal Surety and Insurance Co. 82 SCRA 10. . 90 Phil. 59. petitioner dela Cruz was a member of the Philippine Constabulary. . CIR. 1981. One of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is that the court hearing the case must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. 1977. (July 11. 128 Phil. 706 (1965). Claiming that the crime for which he was charged was committed in relation to the performance of his duties. 739 (1952).) As no amendatory law was ever published in the Official Gazette between the time G. it is not disputed that at the time of the commission of the alleged offense. Arciaga. published in 73 Official Gazette (Supplement) #28. that for the purpose of determining whether an offense was committed while in the performance of official duty or whether it arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty.] And once jurisdiction is vested in the court. vesting in courts-martial jurisdiction over crimes committed by members of the Armed Forces or of the Philippine Constabulary in performance of their duties. Provided. 16 SCRA 908). [Pamintuan v.. 123 Phil.. Arciaga. a certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense to that effect shall be conclusive unless modified or revoked by the President . and that the shooting of the deceased Cabilto was committed while petitioner was executing the Mission Order. by virtue of General Order No. 1977). 93 Phil. 121 Phil. Land Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU). 766 (1966). Presidential Decree Nos. No. 1979. Tiglao. L-48366. 40080. [Silvestre v. If the court is acting without jurisdiction. it is retained up to the end of the litigation. 13 SCRA 729. People v. March 8. military tribunals created under General Order No. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by the President of the Philippines on January 16. 40080 was filed on August 2. 1978. dated June 24. 53 Phil. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Inc. then the entire proceedings are null and void. On such date. the present petition. 21 SCRA 717. Romualdo. 59 was published until the information in Criminal Case No. Rilloraza v. 799 (1967). (929). then said General Order No.

However. Truly. BONIFACIO URBANO.. RODOLFO MARIANO. J: . directing Dela Cruz. among others. PABLO ALULOD. The evidence of the prosecution presented in court likewise shows that Cabilto was shot while petitioner was executing the mission order. BAYANI PILAR.1997 Jun 192nd DivisionG. JJ. the same having been promulgated only in 1981. Fernan. Maco. PASTOR VELUZ. SEVERINO ROSETE. 59 cited above applies. CEFERINO ROMERO. Feliciano and Bidin. SILVA. The Solicitor General points out that at the time the information was filed. GERONIMO ESPLANA. Quezon City. ANANIAS HERMOCILLA. ERNESTO BANAY.The proviso merely states that the certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense is conclusive for the purpose of determining whether an offense was committed while in the performance of official duty. STEVE VELECINA. HERNANI ABOROT. RENAN HALILI. or arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty. ANDREW DE LA ISLA. 1822 and 1822-A which vest in the courts-martial jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of the AFP in the performance of their duties were not yet in effect. In the instant case. 110226D E C I S I O N ROMERO. [1997V455] ALBERTO S. WALLY LEONES. No. BERNABE GERONIMO. RICARDO ESCUETA. The proceedings in Criminal Case No. ANICETO ARBAN. for appropriate action. Camp Crame. General Order No.. NONILON DAWAL. ULDARICO GARCIA. FELOMENO BALLON. VICENTE CHAVEZ. Sto. Tomas. Presidential Decrees Nos. petitioners. VENTURA. Gutierrez. VICENTE SANTOS. concur. PD 1822 and 1822-A are inapplicable to the case at bar. signed by a certain Lieutenant Huerta. It does not in any way preclude the courts from making any finding as to whether an offense is duty-connected. These undisputed facts compel this Court to declare that respondent court was without jurisdiction to try the case against petitioner Dela Cruz. CARLITO CHOSAS. ERNESTO LITADA. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Judge Advocate of the Philippine Constabulary. WHEREFORE. vs. Nor does it make the certificate a condition precedent for the exercise by either civilian courts or military tribunals of their jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of the AFP.R. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILTREAD (FIRESTONE) TIRE AND RUBBER CORPORATION. RODOLFO JUAN. JAIME ACEVEDO. respondents. to proceed to Barangay Pangi. MARIO CREDO. VALERIANO MAUBAN. Jr. the record contains a copy of Mission Order No. ORLANDO MENDOZA. 7. ERNESTO BARENG. Davao to verify and apprehend persons reportedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. MANOLITO CUSTODIO. EDILBERTO VIRAY ANGELES BARON. 4008 are declared null and void but without prejudice to the filing of another action in the proper forum. the petition is GRANTED. RICARDO CUEVAS. even as no certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense was presented in court. and RICARDO B.

then rank-and-file employees and members of Philtread Workers Union (PWU). did not tackle the jurisdictional issue posed by Philtread in its position paper. pursuant to Article 217 (a) (1) of the Labor Code. petitioners. for brevity). as well as those former employees similarly situated for available positions provided they meet the necessary current qualifications. On its part. damages and attorney's fees against Philtread. however. which however. 1993. Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement concluded on July 5. and availed of. as mandated by the provisions of Section 4. 1992. 1983. namely: (1) that the NLRC lacked jurisdiction. Thus. The record unfolds the following facts: Sometime in 1985. the retrenchment program instituted by Philtread with the understanding that they would have priority in re-employment in the event that the company recovers from its financial crisis. Madriaga rendered a decision dismissing the complaint but directing Philtread to give petitioners priority in hiring. 1992 became final and executory when Philtread failed to seasonably file a motion for reconsideration within the ten-day reglementary period required by Article 223 of the Labor Code. petitioners lodged a complaint 3 with the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for unfair labor practice (ULP). Subsequent demands for re-employment made by petitioners were ignored. 4 In dismissing the complaint. on December 5. dated April 7. the Labor Arbiter. Petitioners. apparently having recovered from its financial reverses. Upon discovery of this development. Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. the CBA. 1988. challenging Philtread's motion to dismiss. 1992. he dwelt solely on the question whether the petitioners were entitled to priority in re-employment on the basis of the CBA.Petitioners. expanded its operations and hired new personnel. impute grave abuse of discretion on the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) 1 for issuing two resolutions. 1989. Philtread. . merely agreed to consider them for future vacancies. Instead. petitioners concluded that the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case. all former employees of private respondent Philtread (Firestone) Tire and Rubber Corporation (Philtread. petitioners filed their respective applications for employment with Philtread. which was cognizable by the regular courts. They allege that its resolution of April 15. which reconsidered a resolution it rendered on April 15. there being no employer-employee relationship between it and petitioners and that the basic issue involved was the interpretation of a contract. volunteered for. Both parties submitted their respective position papers. however. and (2) that petitioners had no locus standi. Being one for unfair labor practice. in accordance with Section 4. stressed that the complaint was one for unfair labor practice precipitated by the unjust and unreasonable refusal of Philtread to re-employ them. Article III of the 1986 and 1983 CBAs. On August 31. Even the request of the incumbent union for Philtread to stop hiring new personnel until petitioners were first hired failed to elicit any favorable response. Philtread moved for the dismissal of the complaint based on two grounds. and November 18. 2 In November 1986. not being privy to the CBA executed between the union and Philtread.

Daniel C. Abraham B. regardless of age qualifications and other pre-employment conditions. Gutierrez and Leogardo on May 5. He alleged that in the several conciliation conferences held. Gutierrez. Dismayed by the NLRC's sudden change of position. which. Gutierrez and Leogardo had already been dissolved. 1992 resolution of the NLRC had been properly served at the address of the law firm of Atty. 1992. this petition. 1993. as set forth in Article 262 of the Labor Code. it affirmed its earlier resolution dated November 18. On November 18. On April 15. In another resolution issued on April 7. This being the case. 1992. 1988. The NLRC. had already become final and executory since Philtread's counsel of record did not file any motion for reconsideration within the period of ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution on May 5. petitioners immediately moved for reconsideration. was erroneously served on him by the process server of the NLRC. They added that the amendment of Article 261 introduced by Republic Act No. 1992.Petitioners duly appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. was not convinced by petitioners' assertions. This resolution was received by Atty. 6715 took effect only on March 21. promulgated one of its challenged resolutions dismissing the complaint of petitioners. petitioners moved for its execution. ruling that even before the amendatory law took effect. Gutierrez and that no seasonable motion for reconsideration was ever filed by Philtread. acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. as shown by the bailiff's return. pursuant to Article 261 of the Labor Code. Being of the impression that the April 15. 1992. Borreta of the law firm of Borreta. subject only to existing vacancies and a finding of good physical condition. Petitioners further stressed that the resolution of April 15. 1992. It directed Philtread to re-employ petitioners and other employees similarly situated. 1992. the NLRC issued a resolution reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. 1989. Atty. it was Atty. the NLRC. It ruled that while petitioners had standing to sue. the complaint should have been filed with the voluntary arbitrator. since the primary issue was the implementation and interpretation of the CBA. . 1992. Borreta filed with the NLRC on May 20. Philtread opted not to interpose an appeal despite the Labor Arbiter's failure to rule squarely on the question of jurisdiction. petitioners argued that the subsequent amendment cannot retroactively divest the Labor Arbiter of the jurisdiction already acquired in accordance with Articles 217 and 248 of the Labor Code. according to him. however. 1992. an ex parte manifestation explaining that he was returning the copy of the resolution rendered on April 15. Gutierrez who exclusively handled the case on behalf of Philtread and informed the Labor Arbiter and petitioners that the law firm of Borreta. They pointed out that the NLRC's reliance on Article 261 of the Labor Code was patently erroneous because it was the amended provision which was being cited by the NLRC. Hence. or after the filing of the complaint on December 5. Subsequently. matters involving t bargaining agreements were already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator.

the case at bar presents no peculiar circumstances warranting a departure therefrom. In short. Gutierrez and Leogardo. is only relevant if the tribunal or body which takes cognizance of a particular subject matter indeed lacks jurisdiction over the same. this Court has been emphatic in ruling that the seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration within the 10-day reglementary period following the receipt by a party of any order. Philtread's counsel of record. 9 It was thus incumbent upon the NLRC to have dismissed outright Philtread's late motion for reconsideration. as erroneously contended by Philtread. 1992. then Philtread only had ten (10) calendar days or until May 15. as an administrative and quasi-judicial body. 1992 resolution only on June 5. Philtread claims. The Court is aware of Philtread's obvious attempt to skirt the requirement for seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration by persuading us that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction over petitioners' complaint. is not bound by the rigid application of technical rules of procedure in the conduct of its proceedings. To be sure. it is settled doctrine that the NLRC. 1992. Although there are exceptions to said rule. the filing of a motion for reconsideration and filing it ON TIME are not mere technicalities of procedure. 10 However. as the date of receipt of the April 15.As stated at the outset. The petition is impressed with merit. By doing exactly the opposite its actuation was not only whimsical and capricious but also a demonstration of its utter disregard for its very own rules. Jurisdiction. its motion could not be considered late The argument is not tenable. Certiorari. 1992 resolution by the law firm of Borreta. While we agree with the dictum that a void judgment cannot attain finality. . however. therefore. the rule adverted to is misapplied for it is actually the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which possess jurisdiction over petitioners' complaint and NOT the voluntary arbitrator. their decisions thereon were null and void and. it is uncontroverted that Philtread's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the April 15. In this case. They posit that since the bailiff's return indicated May 5. 7 In the case at bar. within which to file a motion for reconsideration. 1992. petitioners fault the NLRC for issuing the assailed resolutions even when the resolution sought to be reconsidered had already attained finality upon Philtread's failure to timely move for its reconsideration. Philtread maintains that the ten-day reglementary period could not have started running and. 8 or 31 days after receipt of said resolution. therefore. resolution or decision of the NLRC. Since Philtread indisputably failed to file any such motion within said period. is a mandatory requirement to forestall the finality of such order. Time and again. 5 The statutory bases for this is found in Article 223 of the Labor Code 6 and Section 14. These are jurisdictional and mandatory requirements which must be strictly complied with. lies instead with the voluntary arbitrator so that when the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC took cognizance of the case. said rule. Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. lies. therefore. incapable of attaining finality. petitioners deemed it highly irregular and capricious for the NLRC to still allow reconsideration of its April 15. 1992 resolution. resolution or decision.

The Court. one cannot immediately jump to the conclusion that jurisdiction is with the voluntary arbitrator. notwithstanding Philtread's claim that the real issue is the interpretation of the CBA provision on reemployment. then pursuant to the Sanyo doctrine.In this regard. While it appears that the dismissal of the private respondents was made upon the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause provided in the CBA. does not write finis to the discussion. then the same necessarily falls within the competence of the voluntary arbitrator pursuant to Article 261 of the Labor Code. it is not the voluntary arbitrator who can take cognizance of the complaint. did the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC validly acquire jurisdiction when both of them entertained the complaint? . to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. however.' the jurisdiction of which pertains to the Grievance Machinery or thereafter. only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators. We are of the opinion that these facts do not come within the phrase 'grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of (their) Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.' It is further provided in said article that the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is not settled in that level. We hold that the Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaints of the private respondents. otherwise. A more important question arises: If the voluntary arbitrator could not have assumed jurisdiction over the case. Canizares. They appear to share the view that once the question involved is an interpretation or implementation of CBA provisions. 11 where we clarified the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator in this manner: "In the instant case. we observe that there is a confusion in the minds of both Philtread and the NLRC with respect to the proper jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator. it shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitrators (or panel of voluntary arbitrators) designated in advance by the parties. It need not be mentioned that the parties to a CBA are the union and the company. Hence. To this effect was the ruling of the Court in Sanyo Philippines Workers Union-PSSLU v. When the issue concerns an interpretation or implementation of the CBA. Respondents' posture is too simplistic and finds no support in law or in jurisprudence. Article 260 of the Labor Code on grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator states that '(t)he parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. however. There is an equally important need to inquire further if the disputants involved are the union and the employer. the voluntary arbitrator cannot assume jurisdiction. which in this case is the re-employment clause. They shall establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies." Emphasis supplied) Since the contending parties in the instant case are not the union and Philtread.

1988. — Whenever a grievance arises from the interpretation or implementation of a collective agreement. To their mind. unless the parties agree to submit them to voluntary arbitration. whether agricultural or non-agricultural: 1. medicare and maternity benefits.A brief review of relevant statutory provisions is in order. 262. 4. — All grievances referred to in the immediately preceding Article which are not settled through the grievance procedure provided in the collective agreement shall be referred to voluntary arbitration prescribed in said agreement: Provided. Cases involving household services. Philtread's refusal to re-employ them was tantamount to a violation of the re-employment clause in the 1983 CBA which was also substantially reproduced in the . including those based on non. 261. the employer and the bargaining representative shall meet to adjust the grievance. the governing provision of the Labor Code with respect to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC was Article 217 which states: "ART." Articles 261 and 262. Where there is no collective agreement and in cases where the grievance procedure as provided herein does not apply.: "ART. including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts. 2. and 5.payment or underpayment of wages. Grievance machinery. ART. overtime compensation. viz. — (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for decision. as amended. separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement. the following cases involving all workers. (b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. conciliation or arbitration as provided elsewhere in this Code. hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment. That termination disputes shall be governed by Article 278 of this Code. damages and attorney's fees on December 5. All money claims of workers. 217. including disciplinary actions imposed on members of the bargaining unit. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code. Those that workers may file involving wages. 3. except claims for employees' compensation. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. on the other hand. Unfair labor practice cases. social security. Voluntary arbitration. defined the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator." Under the above provisions then prevailing. We note that at the time petitioners filed their complaint for unfair labor practice. grievances shall be subject to negotiation. one can understand why petitioners lodged their complaint for ULP with the Labor Arbiter.

Unfair labor practices of employers. even in the absence of stenographic notes. moral. 3. the present jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC is as follows: "ART. including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts. 1989. — (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide. 12 or the so-called "Herrera-Veloso Amendments. the NLRC and the voluntary arbitrator. those cases that workers may file involving wages. including those of persons in domestic or household service. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. Except claims for Employees Compensation. all other claims. involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5. 2. including the respective jurisdictions of the Labor Arbiter. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. Social Security." while that of the voluntary arbitrator is defined in this wise: .000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. and 6. At the time. (b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters." On March 21. As a result. Medicare and maternity benefits. 217. rates of pay. Unfair labor practice cases. (c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements." took effect. the following cases involving all workers. exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations. hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment. arising from employer-employee relations. Termination disputes. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code. 248. any violation of the CBA was unqualifiedly treated as ULP of the employer falling within the competence of the Labor Arbiter to hear and decide. 4. Republic Act 6715. within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension. amending several provisions of the Labor Code. Claims for actual. whether agricultural or non. Thus: "ART. however.1986 CBA. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice: xxx xxx xxx (i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.agricultural: 1. 5.

upon agreement of the parties. For purposes of this article. Dela Cerna. — The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. (Note that under par. gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice but as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. the allegations in the complaint should show prima facie the concurrence of two things. the Court already made its pronouncement that RA 6715 is in the nature of a curative statute. when this new law divested Regional Directors of the power to hear money claims. a significant change: The unqualified jurisdiction conferred upon the Labor Arbiter prior to the amendment by RA 6715 has been narrowed down so that "violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement. shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks. Thus in Briad Agro Development Corporation v. 261. has retroactive application. as amended. 6715. namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA. — The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. except those which are gross in character. and the NLRC to exercise its appellate jurisdiction.. however. 6. except those which are gross in character shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement." With the amendments introduced by RA 6715. 13 we held: "Republic Act No. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. Thus. the divestment affected pending litigations.00. violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement. thus: It now appears that at the time this case was decided the lower court had jurisdiction over Velasco's complaint although at the time it was filed said court was not clothed with such jurisdiction. It also affected this particular case. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. Accordingly. we categorically held that amendments relative to the jurisdiction of labor arbiters (under Presidential Decree No." Hence. for a ULP case to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter. The lack of jurisdiction was cured by the issuance of the amendatory decree which is in the nature of a curative . like its predecessors. 262.000. There is. It is further stated that "gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. Executive Order No. regional directors have jurisdiction). 1367. In several instances prior to the instant case."ART. we declared that it can be applied retroactively to pending cases." Emphasis supplied) "ART. it can be gleaned that the Labor Arbiter still retains jurisdiction over ULP cases. 111 and Article 217. . As such. where the claim does not exceed P5. . In Garcia v. divesting the labor arbiter of jurisdiction) partake of the nature of curative statutes. and (2) the violation pertains to the economic provisions of the CBA. Martinez. .

National Labor Relations Commission. Herein lies the problem. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with 'original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment. On March 31. it is even doubtful if the CBA provision on re-employment fits into the accepted notion of an economic provision of the CBA. Furthermore. sufficient details supporting the conclusion of bad faith and unjust refusal to re-employ petitioners must be indicated. Unsubstantiated conclusions of bad faith and unjustified refusal to re. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1004). in Calderon v. Although evidentiary matters are not required (and even discouraged) to be alleged in a complaint. reiterated that PD No. at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner. POEA was vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases. Inc.' At the time of the filing of the complaint. As in the instant case. Thus. . to our mind. do not constitute gross violation of the CBA for purposes of lodging jurisdiction with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. 1982. including money claims. the implication is that the qualified jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC should have been applied when the ULP complaint was still pending. the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same. . under present law.O. This means that petitioners should have been required to show in their complaint the gross nature of the CBA violation. Thus. finally. The Decision of this case. as well as the economic provision violated. while it would make out a case for ULP. the Court holds that the rationale behind it does not apply to the present case.J. may the Briad doctrine be applied to the instant case and cause its dismissal for want of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC? Upon a careful and meticulous study of Briad. 14 where we refused to give retroactive application to Executive Order No." 15 which jurisdiction was originally conferred upon the Labor Arbiter. 111. . however. v. In ruling against the retroactive application of the law. Garcia has since been uniformly applied in subsequent cases. still.S. Court of Appeals. 797 which created the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). without which the complaint would be dismissible. the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No.statute with retrospective application to a pending proceeding. . the Labor Arbiter's assumption of jurisdiction therein was likewise questioned in view of the subsequent enactment of E. like Civil Case No.employ petitioners. given the foregoing considerations. acknowledged the retrospective characteristics of Executive Order No. The Court's appreciation of petitioners' cause of action is that. We adopt instead the more recent case of Erectors. 9657 (See 82 C. 797. involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment. Under said law. the same falls short of the special requirements necessary to make it cognizable by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. 1367 [is] curative and retrospective in nature." With the Briad ruling in place. the Court explained its position as follows: "The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action.

No. 1989. A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings. created a situation where the jurisdiction of the Regional Directors and the Labor Arbiters overlapped. E. as well as the factual circumstances to which they were made to apply. and L. 6715.A. No. on November 9. No. amended Article 217 of the Labor Code to widen the worker's access to the government for redress of grievances by giving the Regional Directors and Labor Arbiters concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving money claims. E. instruments or acts of public authorities which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain existing legal requirements. is not a curative statute. It bears emphasis that the Court accorded E. 111. 797.M. does not seek reinstatement.O. . 6715 further amended Article 217 by delineating their respective jurisdictions.A. Dela Cerna cited by the petitioner is not applicable to the case at bar. no longer being employed. No. No. 797 an intention to give it retroactive effect. or househelper under the Code. however. No. in view of the promulgation of Republic Act (R." We do not find any reason why the Court should not apply the above ruling to the case at bar. amending Article 217 of the Labor Code. in a Resolution. This amendment.O. this is not the first time that the Court refused to apply RA 6715 retroactively. as amended by then Executive Order No. We fail to perceive in the language of E. the Court applied the exception rather than the general rule. 6715 are therefore curative statutes. reconsidered and set aside its June 29 Decision and referred the case to the Labor Arbiter for proper proceedings.O.O. R. The Court dismissed the petition in its Decision dated June 29. 16 Our previous decisions on whether to give it retroactive application or not depended to a great extent on what amended provisions were under consideration. E. and (3) the aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed P5. notwithstanding the fact that a different law is involved. All other cases within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. vs. they fall under the exceptions to the rule on prospectivity of laws. the underlying reason for applying RA 6715 retroactively was the fact that prior to its amendment. The case of Briad Agro Development Corp. 111.A. 111 and R. It ruled that the enactment of E.O. Briad Agro Development Corp. Article 217 of the Labor Code. In this case. the law in force at the time of the filing of the complaint. the Court. cured the Regional Director's lack of jurisdiction by giving the Labor Arbiter and the Regional Director concurrent jurisdiction over all cases involving money claims. As a remedy. created a scenario where the Labor Arbiters and .000.O.00. In Briad. Camus Engineering Corp. No. the Regional Director has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving money claims provided: (1) the claim is presented by an employer or person employed in domestic or household service. 111 and R.A. since Article 217 of the Labor Code.) 6715 which divested the Regional Directors of the power to hear money claims. In Briad. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. 6715 a retroactive application because as curative statutes. Actually. However. challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment over cases involving workers' money claims.E. vested in the Labor Arbiters exclusive jurisdiction over such cases. 797 did not divest the Labor Arbiter's authority to hear and decide the case filed by private respondent prior to its effectivity. 1989. . 111. .O. (2) the claimant. The law at bar. Under R.A.

where Atty. filed by Atty. This situation was viewed as a defect in the law so that when RA No. Gutierrez cannot now blame the NLRC for serving . the Court deemed it a rectification of such defect. is surprised to discover that the record bears a Notice of Change of Address dated March 12. 6715 was passed and delineated the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and Regional Directors. Commodore Condominium Arquiza corner M. The Court view it as merely a matter of change in policy of the lawmakers. 1988. Borreta. Guerrero Streets. it was incumbent upon him not to have used the firm's name in the first place. Gutierrez who exclusively represented Philtread and that the law firm of Borreta. Ermita. The Court. There is here no overlapping of jurisdiction to speak of because matters involving interpretation and implementation of CBA provisions. in the aforementioned notice to the NLRC? Moreover. It must be noted that the complaint of petitioners was filed on December 5. all ULP cases were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. We do not see anything in the act of re-apportioning jurisdiction curative of any defect in the law as it stood prior to the enactment of RA 6715. must be applied retroactively. the contention that it was Atty. As a lawyer. must be the rationale that prompted the amendment. as well as interpretation and enforcement of company personnel policies. his receipt of the adverse resolution should have alerted him of the adverse consequences which might follow if the same were not acted upon promptly. Borreta were once partners in their law firm. the instant case presents no defect in the law requiring a remedy insofar as the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the Voluntary Arbitrator is concerned. The same thing cannot be said of the case at bar. we uphold the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter which attached to this case at the time of its filing on December 5. Presumably. as what in fact happened here. Atty. instead of the inherent defect in the law. indeed. why then did he use the firm's name. if the law firm of Borreta. are lame excuses to cast doubt on the propriety of service to Atty. hence. in case the dissolution took place midstream. Finally. especially since the 1987 Constitution adheres to the preferential use of voluntary modes of dispute settlement. Like in Erectors. As for Atty. 1990. transpired at around that date. Gutierrez and Leogardo" whose address could be found at the "3rd Floor. Gutierrez supposedly declared that he was exclusively representing Philtread.the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) had overlapping jurisdiction over money claims. Gutierrez and Atty. therefore. why did Atty." If. Hence. Borreta to have at least advised his former partner of the receipt of the resolution. Borreta. or he should have withdrawn the appearance of the firm and entered his own appearance. however. the conclusion that it was curative in nature and. have always been determined by the Voluntary Arbitrator even prior to RA 6715. and its new address at that. Gutierrez and Leogardo had been dissolved. 17 This. Gutierrez. 1988. Similarly. Borreta take fifteen days to file his Manifestation and inform the NLRC of the "improper" service of the resolution to him? Why did he not object immediately to the service by the bailiff? Considering that Atty. What RA 6715 merely did was to re-apportion the jurisdiction over ULP cases by conferring exclusive jurisdiction over such ULP cases that do not involve gross violation of a CBA's economic provision upon the voluntary arbitrator. Manila. By failing to exercise either option. Gutierrez. Gutierrez declared during the Labor Arbiter's proceedings that he was exclusively representing Philtread. the preliminary conferences adverted to by Atty. it behooves Atty. Atty. indicating therein that the counsel for respondent (Philtread) was "Borreta. and Leogardo were really dissolved. Gutierrez.

14786) to the Court of Appeals. Regalado. WHEREFORE. Case No. as amended. containing an area of 350 sq. CHUPECO. motor No. more or less. defendantappellant. [1964V102E] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.. Jr.P. One complete set of welding instruments (local made). One D-6 Caterpillar tractor motor 626-134.its resolution at the address of the firm still on record. are SET ASIDE. was charged on 2 February 1951 before the Court of First Instance of Manila under the following information: "That on or about the 28th day of November. Length 8' swing 8". JOSE L. J. Dinalupihan. having previously on the 24th day of July. 1947. 2398-D. and April 7. JJ . Puno. had certified to the Supreme Court as a case in which the jurisdiction of an inferior court is in issue. and. One RD-14 Tractor with Bulldozer. 1993. 3 complete with carriage and w/60" inserted circular saw (new). the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. is not impressed. vs. One Air compressor (Aray type)..: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in its Crim. This Court. One Lathe machine — F. 1946. Reed Co. 6719028. plaintiff-appellee. pursuant to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. concur. The assailed resolutions of the NLRC dated November 18. 1992. executed a Chattel Mortgage on the following properties: "An open shed under construction to be used as sawmill building. No.L. Jose L. SO ORDERED. 1992. 18 To our mind. Serial No. in the City of Manila. C-17040.B. . it bears emphasizing. Chupeco.1964 Mar 31En BancG. but which the latter court. SAWMILL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT: One 'Wheland' Circular sawmill No.R. L-19568D E C I S I O N REYES. Mendoza and Torres. The accused-appellant. but looks incredulously at such superficial moves. these excuses cannot camouflage the clever ploy of Philtread's counsel to earn a last chance to move for reconsideration. the said accused being the owner of. Philippines. One Clitract International Caterpilar Motor No. located at Sitio Saguing.E. while its resolution dated April 15. is REINSTATED for immediate execution. Engine No. Bataan. J. One Gray Marine Full Diesel Engine 225 H. m. 13835..

with principal office at the City of Manila. the accused was arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty.935. in favor of the Agricultural and Industrial Bank. the accused interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. whose capital. thus leaving in force only the accusation of having transferred the encumbered ." The accused moved to quash the foregoing information on the ground that more than one offense is charged and that the court had no jurisdiction. Zambales. eliminating the portion referring to pledging already pledged property. Bataan.C. Dinalupihan. accounts. representing the unpaid balance of the aforesaid mortgage. an institution created and operating pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. contracts and choses in action were subsequently transferred to the herein complainant Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. located at sitio Saguing. but the court denied it.. 1947. remained un-amended. Philippines. thereafter) knowingly transfer and remove. Not satisfied. the court found the accused guilty of the said offense. One G.One planer for iron and steel — F. with intent to defraud the said Rehabilitation Finance Corporation.M. One Willys jeep Motor No. The accused then filed a motion to dismiss invoking the agreement.00 from said Agricultural and Industrial Bank. unlawfully and feloniously (on the aforesaid date of 28th day of November. or cause to be pledged and incumbered the same personal properties to one Mateo B. 85. KR-214658 — 1946 Plate No. assets. or cause to be transferred and removed the said properties to the municipality of Subic.000. 70485739 — Plate No. as formerly stated. The accused attacks the jurisdiction of the trial court on the strength of the agreement with the fiscal to discard the charge of repledging or reincumbering the chattels already mortgaged to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank. to secure a loan of P20. TRANSPORTATION UNITS: One Chevrolet truck Model 1941 Motor No. After the case was partly tried. pledge and incumber. Pinile without having fully satisfied the mortgage and during the term thereof and without the consent of the mortgagee bank written on the back of the mortgage. 10239. 9794. but the said court certified the case to the Supreme Court. and imposed a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. and. Upon denial of the motion.80. DP 2977 — Plate No. did then and there willfully. Philippine currency. One tracing machine and one vise (local made).E. and ordered that the case be tried on the charge "of having pledged property which had been previously pledged or mortgaged". After trial. also without the written consent of the mortgagee bank. to the damage and prejudice of the said Rehabilitation Finance Corporation in the sum of P15. the defense counsel and the fiscal entered into an agreement to have the information amended to the effect that the charge be only for removal of properties mortgaged. Reed & Co. The information. One International Baby truck Model 1938 Motor No. 1512". however. Army truck 6 x 6 Motor No. ND-13-6470.

. "One (1) bulldozer H. and that the accused pledged or encumbered. The original terms of the charge averred (and it is not disputed) the crime of repledging already encumbered property without the creditor's consent. It is well-established that once vested.000. 1947. No. 776). with dozer.-14. Make: Allis-Chalmers. Exhibit "D"." However. 83 SW. the Office of the Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of the accused on this very ground (Brief.. An essential element common to the two acts punished under Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code is that the property removed or repledged. even if the Court of First . Rule 110. Mardeville Dowling & Co. 220314218-Reg.G. assessed at P8. Dinalupihan. The descriptions are materially different. "Two (2) cargo trucks (6 x 6). In fact.property from Bataan to Zambales without the consent of the mortgagee.00 paid under O. the courts of the latter acquired no jurisdiction to try the case.R. Eng. We find this stand without merit. circular saw and all appurtenances. 3251541. The accused obeyed that directive. It is argued that since the place where the chattels were. Ingram. 17093. on the properties located in Bataan and listed in the information in favor of the Agricultural and Industrial Bank on 24 July 1946. 1331. in the City of Manila. because the offense was not committed within the Manila territory. No. Bataan. which in this case amounted to no more than an avowal by the prosecution that it could not establish the other elements of the offense. 10-11).. as well as the site to which they were moved. the jurisdiction is not tolled by subsequent amendment or stipulation (McClain vs. 5 NW. Walton vs. No. 132. Furthermore. But the fatal error in the decision appealed from is its disregard of the fact that the evidence fails to show that the properties mortgaged to the Bank are the same ones encumbered afterwards to Mateo Pinili. No. the court actually rejected the defense motion to dismiss. section 9).D. which are as follows: "One (1) sawmill with gray marine engine 125 H. There is no question that the herein accused executed in the City of Manila a Chattel Mortgage. 1260-V for 1947. Mission. Shankle vs. and one of the essential ingredients of the offense (the execution of the first mortgage) having been alleged to have taken place in Manila. 578.P. pp. dated May 14. there is nothing in the evidence to show that the properties listed in Exhibit "D" and in the information are the same properties listed in Exhibit "E". implements and parts. No. and directed that the case be tried on the original charge of repledging property already encumbered. as the case may be. and by so doing it renounced the claim that the information had been so amended as to discard that particular averment. camarin and housing improvements under Tax No. should be the same or identical property that was mortgaged or pledged before such removal or repledging. 48 O. the court of first instance of that city acquired jurisdiction over the offense under the Rules of Court (People vs. Therefore. 17094 and Eng. 220359225-Reg. are both outside of Manila. also building. 45 S. Kansas City Bridge Co. on 28 November 1947 the properties listed in Exhibit "E". Eng.E. 59318. 2d.

No pronouncement as to costs.J. 1999. the defendant failed to vacate the property. C. the defendant failed to pay the agreed rentals for the landholding based on said patent. to secure a patent and title over the property in his name but the plaintiff. In his answer to the complaint. he had been cultivating the same lot. J. sometime in 1965. SUMAWANG. 1988. Dizon..2004 Sept 82nd DivisionG. he built a house of strong materials in the property where he and his family resided. Padilla. he cultivated a portion of the property and was one of the farmers-beneficiaries of the landholding. thenceforth. 31683 over the landholding. designated as Lot 33. ERIC D. and no amicable settlement of the matter was arrived at by the parties in the Office of the Barangay Captain. Concepcion. Nueva Ecija. he swapped the portion of the property he was cultivating with Lot 33 which was cultivated by Antonio Ferrer and. Respondent. 1999. No. JJ.: On June 8. . Emancipation Patent No. filed a complaint in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guimba. as listed in the Office of the Municipal Agrarian Reform. 150106D E C I S I O N CALLEJO.. he sought the assistance of his first cousin. on December 12. secured through fraud an emancipation patent and title over the property in his name. designated as Lot 1402. and prayed that the complaint be dismissed on those grounds. the father of the plaintiff. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS. Bengzon.R. 3778. the accused cannot be found guilty on the evidence on record of the crime for which he stands indicted. The plaintiff prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant to vacate the property and to pay damages and attorney’s fees.Instance of Manila had jurisdiction over the case. concur. located in Macatcatuit. SR. in 1994. despite his demand on March 10. who was the son of Judge De Guzman and an engineer by profession and a non-resident of Guimba. Judge Felix de Guzman. [2004V974] AMANDO G. as plaintiff. versus ENGR. and that he be awarded damages and attorney’s fees.. which was placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) EP No. over a parcel of agricultural land. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Chupeco. The plaintiff alleged therein that the President of the Philippines issued. Bautista Angelo. the defendant alleged that Gloria Zulueta Rominquit was the owner of a large tract of agricultural land. Nueva Ecija. Labrador. Barrera. for unlawful detainer with damages. Paredes. he leased a portion of the property to the defendant where the latter constructed a small hut. with an area of 9. the appealed decisions is hereby reversed. Sumawang. and remitted the rentals therefor. DE GUZMAN. thereafter. The defendant interposed the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the action and the subject matter thereof. and another one entered acquitting the accused Jose L.970 square meters. on August 19. against Amando G. Petitioner. Regala and Makalintal. Guimba. 288843 in his favor. Engineer Eric de Guzman. in the early part of 1999. 1988.

94-10032-00515. ordering the latter to: 1.970 square meters. the property was designated as Lot 33.100 square meters. free of any encumbrance. he built a house of strong materials thereon. since 1969. Vacate the property and to remove his hut/house erected thereon. 3. He declared the property under his name under Tax Declaration No. in 1991. 2000. it had jurisdiction over the action. Reimburse plaintiff P170. who transferred the property to the plaintiff.The plaintiff adduced evidence that per Parcellary Mapping Survey (PMS) No. 0114427 issued to Antonio Ferrer. through his father. foregoing considered. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant. The defendant. he was granted Emancipation Patent No. based on the facts on record. covered by Certificate of Land Title (CLT) No. but Antonio Ferrer.00 per month from March 12. but per final survey. the beneficiary of the property. Judge Felix de Guzman. 067. he had been the tenant on the farmland covered by CLT No. 0114427 under the name of Antonio Ferrer. suggested a sharing system between the plaintiff and the defendant. The RTC ruled that. he employed the plaintiff as farmerworker to whom he remitted sums of money for the expenses for the cultivation of the property such as soil.00 representing the amount spent for filing fees. as certified by the Office of the Municipal Agrarian Reform. and Pay the costs of suit. 4. 1999 until he finally vacates the same.[1] The trial court ruled that the defendant was not the legitimate tenant-beneficiary over the property. and that there was no landlord-tenant relationship over the property between the plaintiff and the defendant. 31683 was issued by the Register of Deeds. . and that. 2. seedlings. in 1987. whereby the plaintiff will provide monetary assistance for the expenses for the cultivation of the property by the defendant and would share in the produce thereof and net of expenses. 2000. during the period from 1991 to 1997. the subject property owned by Rominquit was designated Lot 12011. the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. with an area of 9. with an area of 9. the controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant was an agrarian dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB). after paying the amortizations due to the Land Bank of the Philippines. reversing the decision of the MTC. hence. presented certifications from the former barangay captains that. 288843 over Lot 33 and on the basis of said patent. for his part. TCT EP No. On June 27. fertilizer. the farmer-beneficiary thereof. and that. rentals for a rotorator. The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE. The defendant appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which rendered judgment on October 9. etc. the plaintiff. Pay plaintiff reasonable rental for the use of the property at the rate of P500.

The plaintiff, then the petitioner, filed a petition for review of the decision with the Court of Appeals (CA), which rendered judgment on September 25, 2001, reversing the decision of the RTC and reinstating the decision of the MTC. The appellate court held that it was not prepared, based on the record, to hold that the petitioner was the agricultural tenant of the respondent therein. The respondent therein, now the petitioner, filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court contending that: 1. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion, that it is not prepared to declare petitioner-appellant not (sic) a tenant (p. 128, Records), concluding that petitioner’s occupation of subject land is by mere tolerance of private respondent and without any contract between them, petitioner-appellant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand (p. 129, Records) (italics, ours); 2. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in not taking cognizance of the doctrine of estoppel, as against the private respondent-appellee (pp. 7-8, Comments to Petition for Review); 3. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in not applying the provisions of R.A. 6657 (New CARP Law), as applied by the court ad quem, considering that the petitioner-appellant has met the six (6) requirements that concur to make a tenancy relationship (pp. 6-8, Comments to Petition for Review).[2] The petitioner asserts that he had been a farmer-beneficiary of the land since 1965 and even after the respondent fraudulently secured title over the property, the latter allowed him to cultivate the property and supplied him with farm inputs and implements; the respondent also shared with him the harvests therefrom on a 50-50 basis, net of costs of production. The petitioner asserts that, under the factual milieu, he was the agricultural tenant of the respondent and not merely his farm worker. Hence, the dispute between them is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB as held by the RTC, and not the MTC, as ruled by the CA. The threshold issue is whether or not the MTC had jurisdiction over the action of the respondent. The resolution of the issue is anchored on our resolution of the issue of whether or not the petitioner was the agricultural tenant of the respondent or merely the latter’s farm worker. The petition has no merit. The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter on the existence of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.[3] In Basco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation,[4] we had ruled that the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant.[5] Once jurisdiction is vested,

the same is retained up to the end of the litigation.[6] The Municipal Trial Court does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties.[7] But it is the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy.[8] If, after hearing, tenancy had, in fact, been shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.[9] In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[10] we held that: Indeed, a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this allegation. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. As we ruled in Chico v. Court of Appeals: "Each of the elements hereinbefore mentioned is essential to create a de jure leasehold or tenancy relationship between the parties. This de jure relationship, in turn, is the terra firma for a security of tenure between the landlord and the tenant. The leasehold relationship is not brought about by a mere congruence of facts but, being a legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be primordial." Thus, the intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important. The requisites of a tenancy relationship are as follows: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvests. All these requisites are necessary to create tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants.[11] In this case, the petitioner failed to prove his claim that he had been installed by the respondent as agricultural tenant on the landholding. He relied solely on his bare claim that he and the respondent, through the latter’s father, Judge Felix de Guzman, had agreed for the petitioner to be the agricultural tenant of the respondent, sharing the produce therefrom on a 50-50 basis, net of costs of production. There is no evidence on record that, indeed, the respondent had authorized his father to enter into such an agreement with the petitioner. In Valencia v. Court of Appeals,[12] we held that the right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a landowner. For Judge de Guzman to be able to install the petitioner as agricultural tenant, he must be specifically authorized by the respondent. The petitioner failed to adduce a morsel of evidence that he received a share of the produce of the property from the respondent.

The petitioner’s reliance on the lists of expenses, incurred by the respondent for the cultivation of the property, is misplaced. In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[13] citing Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[14] we emphasized that: The respondents’ self-serving statements regarding tenancy relations could not establish the claimed relationship. The fact alone of working on another’s landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. There must be substantial evidence on record adequate enough to prove the element of sharing. Thus: Nor is there any basis for petitioner’s claim that he is an agricultural tenant. One of the essential requisites for the existence of a tenancy relationship is sharing, by the landowner and tenant, of the produce and no proof of this fact has been shown in this case. As we have held: ‘All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites does not make the alleged tenant a de jure tenant as contradistinguished from a de facto tenant.’ To prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented. Self-serving statements are deemed inadequate; competent proof must be adduced.[15] IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED. WE CONCUR: [2005V1304] YUSUKE FUKUZUME,* Petitioner, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.2005 Nov 112nd DivisionG.R. No. 143647D E C I S I O N AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 13, 2000 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21888, which affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 146 dated October 21, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 95-083, finding herein accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years and to pay private complainant the sum of P424,000.00; and the CA Resolution dated June 16, 2000 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.*2+ The facts of the case are as follows: Private complainant Javier Ng Yu (Yu) is a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires.[3] Sometime in July 1991, Yu, accompanied by a friend, Mr. Jovate,[4] who was the vicepresident of Manila Electric Company, went to the house of herein accused-appellant Yusuke Fukuzume (Fukuzume) in Parañaque.[5] Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation (Furukawa) and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires.[6]

000. P50. Fukuzume gave Yu a letter of even date.00.[24] Subsequently.[21] Unable to get the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound.00. Philippines.*7+ Believing Fukuzume’s representation to be true. 1992.[14] Subsequently.[17] Thereafter.000.[19] Hence.000. did then and there willfully. 1991. with intent to prejudice and defraud Javier Yu y Ng.00. Fukuzume was nowhere to be found. given on October 18.Fukuzume confirmed this information and told Yu that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). Yu gave Fukuzume money and.[16] On January 17. and that Furukawa’s authorized representatives are allowed to withdraw and dispose of said scrap wires. given on July 22.[9] Yu gave Fukuzume sums of money on various dates which eventually totaled P290.[15] Fukuzume instead told him not to worry because in one or two weeks he will give Yu the necessary authorization to enable him to retrieve the aluminum scrap wires from NAPOCOR.[20] NAPOCOR also refused to acknowledge the certifications dated December 17. Fukuzume agreed to accompany Yu when the latter is going to take the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound. Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume. P20.[25] In an Information.00. 1991 and December 27. 1992. Yu proceeded to show the documents of authorization to NAPOCOR personnel. dated November 4. he asked money from the latter telling him that it shall be given as gifts to some of the people in NAPOCOR. 1991 and December 27.000. a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. 1991. unlawfully and feloniously make false representation and fraudulent manifestation that he is the duly authorized .000.000. Fukuzume gave Yu two certifications dated December 17.*23+ When Fukuzume failed to comply with his undertaking. Yu sent him a demand letter asking for the refund of P424.00. 1992.[8] The initial agreed purchase price was P200. 1991 up to September 17. in exchange. Yu filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Metro Manila.00. Rodriguez. Yu talked to Fukuzume and asked from the latter the refund of the money he paid him. broken down as follows: P50.00 plus loss of profits. Fukuzume was charged with estafa committed as follows: That sometime in the month of July.[10] Fukuzume admitted that he received the same from Yu and that he still owes him the amount of P290. 1994. However. 1991 claiming that these are spurious as the person who signed these documents is no longer connected with NAPOCOR as of December 1991. in the Municipality of Makati. 1991 purportedly issued by NAPOCOR and signed by its legal counsel by the name of R.000.[11] To support his claim that the aluminum scrap wires being sold are indeed owned by Furukawa. they were dishonored on the ground that the account from which the checks should have been drawn is already closed. 1991. Y. signed by the Director of the Overseas Operation and Power Transmission Project Divisions of Furukawa.000.[12] At the time that Fukuzume gave Yu the second certification. 1991. filed with the RTC of Makati.[13] However.000.*22+ Fukuzume promised to return Yu’s money. Yu called up Fukuzume to inform him that the checks bounced. authorizing Fukuzume to dispose of excess aluminum conductor materials which are stored in their depots in Tanay and Bulacan. the latter issued two checks.[18] When Yu arrived at the NAPOCOR compound on the scheduled date. P170.00. the people from NAPOCOR did not honor the authorization letter issued by Furukawa dated January 17. given on July 12. that these scrap wires are with NAPOCOR.00. the above-named accused.00 and the other for P34. and. one for P100. given on October 14.000. when Yu deposited the checks.

the judgment appealed from. CONTRARY TO LAW. 1995.[30] Hence. Fukuzume filed an appeal with the CA.000. In its Decision dated October 21. as the minimum.00 plus legal interest from the date of demand until fully paid. the Court hereby finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and hereby orders him to suffer the maximum penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years. in the Philippines. it failed to determine the minimum penalty for the offense committed (prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period but imposed in the maximum period). with intent of gain.[29] Accordingly.[27] Trial ensued. Fukuzume pleaded not guilty. SO ORDERED. With respect to his civil liability. hence. herein petition filed by Fukuzume based on the following grounds: . to the damage and prejudice of Javier Yu y Ng in the aforementioned amount of P424. the penalty is modified to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its minimum period. as maximum.00. the CA promulgated its decision affirming the findings and conclusions of the trial court but modifying the penalty imposed. who believing said representations to be true.. all the foregoing premises considered.[26] Upon being arraigned on February 28. SO ORDERED. accused is hereby ordered to pay complainant the amount of P424. On March 13. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads: WHEREFORE. is hereby AFFIRMED. 1996. unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence.00 but the accused once in possession of the money.[28] Aggrieved by the trial court’s decision.000. the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads: WHEREFORE. to not more than twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal in its maximum period.000. 2000. except for the aforementioned modification in the prison term of appellant. and was authorized to sell excess aluminum conductor materials not being used by Napocor and Furukawa. the trial court found Fukuzume guilty as charged. Ltd. applied and used for his own personal use and benefit the said amount and despite repeated demands failed and refused and still fails and refuses to account for. gave and delivered the total amount of P424. the accused knowing full well that those representations were false and were only made to induce and convince said Javier Yu y Ng to buy said materials.representative of Furukawa Electric Co. thus: … although the trial court correctly imposed the maximum penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years. far from complying with his obligation to deliver said aluminum conductor materials to herein complainant.

The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI on April 19. 15.[31] We agree with Fukuzume’s contention that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE ALLEGED FALSE PRETENSE WAS EXECUTED PRIOR TO OR SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE FRAUD. Now.000. Yusuke Fukuzume through Mr. would you enlighten us under what circumstance you came to know the accused? I know the accused Mr.00 for said transaction was made at the Hotel Intercontinental in Makati City (Record. pp. 1991 he gave the amount of P50. Mr. Hubati. you testified the last time that you know the accused in this case. . The CA ruled: The trial court of Makati has jurisdiction.000. Hence. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE ORIGINAL TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN NOVATED AND CONVERTED INTO A MERE DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONSHIP. an element of the crime – that the offended party was induced to part with his money because of the false pretense – occurred within the jurisdiction of the lower court giving it jurisdiction over the instant case. It is not disputed that Fukuzume’s house is located in Parañaque.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. Yu testified thus: Q Mr. However. 1994[32] and the affidavit of Fukuzume which was subscribed on July 20. 15. he gave Fukuzume the amount of P50.00 to Fukuzume in the latter’s house. which was presented in evidence by the prosecution. appellant and private complainant nevertheless admitted that the initial payment of P50. 1994. Rules of Court). sir. Sec.THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI HAS JURISDICTION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT. Witness. we agree with Fukuzume’s contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that on July 12. 1991. 68). in all criminal prosecutions. Subject to existing laws. Yusuke Fukuzume? A Q A Yes. Although the false representation and verbal contract of sale of the aluminum scrap wires took place at appellant’s residence in Parañaque.000.[33] With respect to the sworn statement of Yu. it is clear that he alleged therein that on July 12. THEREBY EXTINGUISHING THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY THEREOF. IF ANY. the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place (Rule 110.

Mr. please tell us what really was that transaction that took place at the house of Mr. FISCAL E. It is not responsive to the question. Q A How much is the amount of money which you agreed to give to the accused? Our first agreement was for P200. Hubati. Fukuzume and game (sic) him some amount of money. if you know? Mr. And what transpired during that time you met Mr. A Q A July 12. Fukuzume on that particular date? A Our agreement with Mr. Q Now. Q Now. may the witness be allowed to consult his memorandum. 1991. HIRANG Your Honor please.000. N. Hubati come to know the accused. HIRANG Q A When was that. COURT Please wait until the answer is completed. sir. Hubati? We went to the house of Mr. sir. How? He came to me offering me aluminum scrap wires. may I move to strike out the answer. Fukuzume is that. you met this Mr.Q A And why or how did Mr. Hubati and with Mr. would you tell the Court the reason why you parted to the accused in this case the amount of money? A In payment of the aluminum scrap wires and we have documents to that effect. ATTY. . Q A Now. Witness? That was in 1991. I am going to give money in payment of the aluminum scrap wires coming from Furukawa Eletric Company. COURT When? FISCAL E. Hubati came to my place dealing with the aluminum scrap wires. SERING Your Honor.

the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. People[38] that: It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court. However.000. the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.Q Where is that aluminum scrap located? A The electric aluminum scrap wires was or were under the care of the National Power Corporation but according to Mr. 1991. Thus. FISCAL E. A Q A On July 12.[39] mphasis supplied) Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings. the court may validly take cognizance of the case. N.000 on that date. Q In short. I am asking how much the complainant gave to the accused on that particular date. sir. or anywhere in Makati for that matter. if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else. Witness. Mr. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.[36] Citing Uy vs. Your Honor.[40] .[37] we held in the fairly recent case of Macasaet vs. And once it is so shown. HIRANG The complainant testified he gave P50. Fukuzume it belongs to Furukawa Electric Company. we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. I gave him P50. it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Not P200. the court must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing it to take jurisdiction and to try the case and to render judgment. Court of Appeals.[35] More importantly. you only gave to the accused the amount of P50.000? ATTY.[34] Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court. SERING Objection. Furthermore. the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. on July 12.000? No.

000. Yu suffered damage. paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. may not be considered evidence. therefore.[41] The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However. fraudulent act. to wit: that on July 12. P50. Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires.000. to corroborate Yu’s sworn statement or to prove that any of the aboveenumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. 1991. the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts of P50. the crime of estafa. that is. That as a result thereof. the elements of which are as follows: 1.000. 1991. the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense. fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. On the contrary. the testimony of Yu established that all the elements of the offense charged had been committed in Parañaque.000. 1991 was given in Makati. fraudulent act or fraudulent means. as defined and penalized under Article 315. we cannot rely on this affidavit for the reason that it forms part of the records of the preliminary investigation and.00 on July 12. 1991. or fraudulent means. he received P50. that as a result.00 on July 22. 3. That there must be a false pretense.In the present case. the latter pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires. Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque. aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19. paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. fraudulent act. 2. by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires.[43] this Court held that the fact that the affidavit formed part of the record of the preliminary investigation does not justify its being treated as evidence because the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the RTC.00. 1994. testimonial or documentary. He was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315.00 from Yu at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. shall not form part of the record of the case in the RTC. or fraudulent means. Indeed. whether conducted by a judge or a prosecutor.00 on October 18. the offended party suffered damage. The Office of the Solicitor General argues that Fukuzume himself alleged in his affidavit dated July 20.[42] In People vs. was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter’s house in Parañaque and. he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense.00 on October 14. That such false pretense. 4. that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of P50. that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume. It is settled that the record of the preliminary investigation. and the trial court is not compelled to . Stated differently. Crispin. Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money.000. that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires. Such record must be introduced as evidence during trial. 1991 and P170. P20. the prosecution presented no other evidence. Neither was there proof to show that the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. 1994 that in an unspecified date.000. However.

Hence. WHEREFORE. JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS. jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused. to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction. and P/Col. J. much less evidence. we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case.. JR. HON. it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. 118013-14D E C I S I ON DAVIDE. JR. the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction. Branch 146. and EDGAR HILADO.1995 Oct 111st DivisionG. FERNANDEZ. having found that the RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction to try the case against Fukuzume. Sibonghanoy. ROLANDO R. PO VICENTE CANUDAY. From the foregoing.R. DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY. DEMOSTHENES L. respondents. Bacolod City.[46] While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA. P/INSP. PO JOSE PAHAYUPAN. PO MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ.[45] Moreover. CESAR PECHA. Branch 54. JAIME GARGALLANO. 95-083 is DISMISSED without prejudice. however. Nos.[47] wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be barred by laches. TORRES. It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction over the offense charged.R.. petitioner. a civil case.take judicial notice of the same. CR No.[44] Since neither prosecution nor defense presented in evidence Fukuzume’s affidavit. 21888 are SET ASIDE on ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court of Makati. NICOLAS M. Criminal Case No. we find it unnecessary to consider the other issues raised in the present petition. and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law. [1995V655] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. SO ORDERED. the same may not be considered part of the records. as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court. Thus. the instant petition is GRANTED. TEODY DELGADO. ADONIS C. without prejudice.: At issue in this special civil action for certiorari is whether it is the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City or the Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction over the two criminal cases for kidnapping for ransom . MAGALLANES. ABETO. vs. by express waiver or otherwise. since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court. CHARLES DUMANCAS. Nonetheless. which justified the departure from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal case.

Case No. VICENTE CANUDAY. JOSE PAHAYUPAN. Jr. to wit: P 50. Jose Pahayupan. Bacolod City Station. Abeto. 000. Abeto. namely.. (Criminal Case No. in Crime. Jaime Gargallano. On 13 January 1994 two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder were filed with the RTC of Bacolod City against fourteen persons. ALL AS PRINCIPALS BY PARTICIPATION.00 . then and there wilfully. in the first case and Danilo Lumangyao in the second. Torres. save for the accessories for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353. ROLANDO R. Teody Delgado. Jose Pahayupan. NICOLAS M. ABETO. with knowledge that the said Gangar [and Lumangyao. Adonis C. Barangay Alijis. 94-15562) and DANILO LUMANGYAO (Criminal Case No. exerted by P/Col. evident premeditation and treachery nocturnity and the use of motor vehicle. unlawfully. 94-15563 were victims] of violence. and feloniously to wit: Acting upon the inducement of spouses Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and Charles Dumancas. committed as follows: That during the period beginning in the late afternoon of August 6. under the direction cooperation and undue influence. JR.with murder wherein some of the accused implicated as principals are members of the Philippine National Police (PNP). of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER. Edwin Divinagracia.000.00 each. and Dominador Geroche. Bacolod City. conspiring. JR. 1992. did then and there secretly bury the corpses in a makeshift shallow grave for the purpose of concealing the crime of murder in order to prevent its discovery for a fee of P500. DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY. civilian (police) agents Rolando R. also taking advantage of their respective positions. taking advantage of his position as Station Commander of the Philippine National Police. . and Vicente Canuday. while being handcuffed and blindfolded.as indemnity for death. later docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and ending the late evening of the following day in Sitio Pedrosa. shortly thereafter at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening of August 7. POLICE INSPECTOR ADONIS C. Police officers Mario Lamis. Torres. Mario Lamis. P/Insp.. confederating and concurring in a common criminal intent and execution thereof with one another.. the other nine are civilians. did then and there shot and kill the said victims. POLICE OFFICERS MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ. Fernandez. that accused Cesar Pecha and Edgar Hilado. CHARLES DUMANCAS (BOTH AS PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION). FERNANDEZ. EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA. the above-named accused. TEODY DELGADO. kidnap and detain one RUFINO GANGAR. P/Col. The informations. failing in their aforesaid common purpose to extort money and in furtherance of said conspiracy. TORRES (AS PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION AND BY DIRECTION AND/OR INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION). 15562 and 15563 in Branch 47 of the said court. 94-15563). are similarly worded. aforesaid act or acts has caused damage and prejudice to the heirs of said victims. JAIME GARGALLANO. CESAR PECHA AND EDGAR HILADO. other police officers Vicente Canuday. with the direct participation and cooperation of Police Inspector Adonis C. POLICE COL. concurring and affirming in the said criminal design. BOTH AS ACCESSORIES. Jr. did. thus: The undersigned hereby accuses JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANGAS.00. Jr. Nicolas M. who are Rufino Gargar. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Nicolas m. except as to the names of the victims. with the use of motor vehicle abduct. five of whom are members of the PNP.

Adonis Abeto. Jaime Gargallano. P/Insp.000. the prosecution presented state witness Moises Grandeza. Despite opposition by the prosecution. The latter told them: "You who are here inside. the prosecution rested its case and the trial court started to receive the evidence for the accused.. 1 These cases were consolidated. then to Casa Mel Lodge. CONTRARY TO LAW (Articles 268 and 248 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code). Jr. 300. they filed their respective motions for bail. Later.50. then to Moonlit Inn. arrested and abducted the two swindling suspects. however.000. Edgar Hilado. Conformably with Torres's order. granted bail in favor of only six of the accused. where the two were shot and killed. She then asked about the money that the group had received from her. Rolando Fernandez. Torres and reported that the killing had been done. At the hearings thereof. per Judge Edgar G. P/Col. the two suspects were transferred to D' Hacienda Motel. The other eight accused who were denied bail are now detained at the City Jail of Bacolod City. namely.exemplary damages.actual damages. 50. Upon being told by Lumangyao that the money had already been divided among his partners long time ago. The team forthwith went to the office of P/Col.00 . the two suspects were brought to Dragon Lodge Motel.00 . Police Officers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday. and Moises Grandeza. Judge Garvilles voluntarily inhibited . Accused Torres and Abeto presented their respective evidence." 3 Thereafter. the trial court. 2 Through the testimony of Grandeza. Presentation of evidence by the other accused was. together with civilian agents. and back to D' Hacienda Motel.00 .moral damages. suspended because of the motions of several accused for the inhibition of judge Garvilles . Geocadin so that proper cases could be filed against them. but you have to hide because the NBI's are after you. specifically to Dominador Geroche: "Doming. Each of the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. There. police Officer Mario Lamis.compensatory damages (lost income). nobody knows what you have done.00 . they were investigated by Police Inspector Adonis Abeto and Police Officers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday. bring these two to the PC or police and I will call Atty.000. the alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator in the commission of the complex crimes. Garvilles. she said to the accused. the prosecution established that in response to the complaint of spouses Charles and Jeanette Dumancas. Edwin Divinagracia. After the completion of his testimony. 100. where Jeanette Dumancas identified Lumangyao as a member of the group that had swindled her. Charles Dumancas." Thereafter. Jr. They were then taken to the Ceres Compound.000. and Cesar Pecha. namely. Nicolas Torres instructed his men to look for Rufino Gangar and Danilo Lumangyao who were allegedly members of the group that had swindled the Dumancas spouses On 6 August 1992. Teody Delgado.

and Geroche. thru the respondent Judge. Delgado. represented by the office of the Solicitor General. the private prosecutors moved for the transmittal of the records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan on the ground that. 11 On 27 February 1995. 10 the trial court issued an order denying the motion because People vs. as well as his three witnesses. Relying on People vs . Asuncion 4 the trial court has no jurisdiction over the cases because the offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. no such intimate connection exists and the informations emphasize that the accused were moved by selfish motives of ransom and extortion. since in that case there was (a) an intimate connection between the offense charged and the public position of the accused and (b) a total absence of personal motive. The cases were then re-raffled to Branch 49 of the RTC of Bacolod City. 8 the prosecution moved to reconsider the said order. filed with us a petition for certiorari. ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the subject cases because the informations do not state that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. Citing People vs. Accused Gargallano. and arguments adduced in the petition as well as in the comments of the private respondents. Montilla. On 5 December 1994. 5 In its order of 15 August 1994. The respondent Judge then resumed the reception of the evidence for the other accused. It further stated that a public office is not a constituent element of the offense of kidnapping with murder nor is the said offense intimately connected with the office. the respondent Judge voluntarily inhibited himself on 15 September 1994. we required the respondents to comment on petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the public respondent or his successor to desist from proceeding with the trial of the subject cases. in these cases. we gave due course to the petition and required . after considering the allegations. had already completed their respective testimonies when.himself from further hearing both cases. Lamis. the prosecution. Montejo. issues. On 12 December 1994. 6 the trial court. In his Manifestation with Urgent Motion to Transmit Records. Montejo is not applicable. Fernandez. whereas. upon motion of the prosecution. pursuant to our decision of 11 March 1994 in Republic of the Philippines vs. and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order challenging the refusal of the respondent Judge to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan. presided by herein public respondent Judge Demosthenes L. On 24 June 1994. Magallanes. 9 On 7 September 1994. which were thereafter re-raffled to Branch 54. It then denied the motion for transfer of the records to the Sandiganbayan and declared that the trial of the case should continue. 7 it held that the allegation in the informations that the accused PNP officers took advantage of their office in the commission of the offense charged is merely an allegation of an aggravating circumstance. prohibition. the State Prosecutor adopted the motion of the private prosecutors.

which pertinently provides as follows: SEC. xxx xxx xxx In case private individuals are charged as co-principals. we held in Aguinaldo vs.D. Domagas 14 that for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or felonies committed by public officers or employees under . in their respective jurisdiction. including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations. No. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Applying this section. . we are convinced that public respondent Judge Magallanes committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that it is his court and not the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the two cases for kidnapping for ransom with murder. Republic Act No. Metropolitan Trial Court. At the time the informations in the said cases were filed. 13 Deliberating on the arguments adduced by the parties. resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts. Title VII of the Revised Penal Code: (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office. that offenses. and Chapter II. Most of them submitted their memoranda. HOWEVER. resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in cases originally decided by them in their respective territorial jurisdiction.000.the parties to submit their respective memoranda.D. including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations. or a fine of P6.000. they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees. the law governing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was Section 4 of P. 1379. 4. where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years. while the petitioner and some of the private respondents adopted their initiatory pleadings as their memoranda. No. Jurisdiction. On 22 March 1995. Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.00: PROVIDED. Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court (b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction: (1) On appeal. as amended by P. 16O6. accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees. Section 2. 3019. (2) By petition for review.The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: (a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: (1) Violations of Republic Act No. from the final judgments. or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6. private respondent Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas filed an urgent motion for the grant of bail. from the final judgments. 12 which we noted on 15 May 1995. whether simple or complexed with other crimes.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court. 1861. as amended.

who died in consequence thereof. of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner further asserts that the allegations in the informations reading "taking advantage of his position as Station Commander of the Philippine National Police" and "taking advantage of their respective positions" presuppose the exercise of the functions attached to the office of the accused PNP officers and are sufficient to show that the offenses charged were committed in relation to their office. Brown. the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six. 20 There is no dispute that the prescribed penalties for the offenses charged in Criminal Cases Nos. special policemen.00. and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such. Title Seven. . . or if the office is a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute. Montejo 19 that the offense must be intimately connected with the office of the offender. We also reiterated the principle in People vs. for instance. supervision and control. we restated the principle laid down in Montilla vs. 17 In Sanchez. at Tipo-tipo. they did so in the course of the investigation conducted by them as policemen. It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. the petitioner submits that the crimes charged in the subject cases were connected with public office because the accused PNP officers. City Mayor of Basilan City. as such. . Demetriou. and we further intimated that the fact that the offense was committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the information. arrested the two swindling suspects in the course of the performance of their duty and not out of personal motive. 22 In Montejo 23 where the amended information alleged: Leroy S. which is under his command . Asuncion. and if they demanded from the two suspects the production of the money of the Dumancas spouses and later killed the two. appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then established a camp . . 16 and Republic vs. together with the civilian agents. 15562 and 15563 before the court below are higher than prision correcional or imprisonment for more than six years. where his codefendants were stationed.Section 4 (a) (2) above it is not enough that the penalty prescribed therefor is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years. We reiterated this pronouncement in Sanchez vs.000. his codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag. . has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and . Felix. The only question that remains to be resolved then is whether the said offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. . . 21 and not by the result of evidence after trial. Relying on its evidence and on the Montejo case. entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations. such as. and acting upon his orders. 15 Natividad vs. or a fine of P6. as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court. Hilario 18 that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the office if it cannot exist without the office. it is also necessary that the offenses or felonies were committed in relation to their office. The petitioner then concludes that the cases below fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Unlike in Montejo. in Bartolome vs. and failing in their common purpose. and even as an aggravating circumstance. The allegation of "taking advantage of his position" or "taking advantage of their respective positions" incorporated in the informations is not sufficient to bring the offenses committed in relation to public office. as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows: . kidnapped. though improper or irregular.00. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. In Dumancas's and Torres's motions for the early resolution of this case and in Abeto's Supplement to Comment with Motion to Dismiss all filed in July 1995. besides. The informations merely allege that the accused. the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. introduced by R. Also. abducted. 24 such an allegation was considered merely as an allegation of an aggravating circumstance. and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial. they shot and killed the said victims. the subject cases come within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court 27 and not of the Sandiganbayan as insisted by the petitioner.A. still the Regional Trial Court would have jurisdiction over the subject cases in view of the amendments to Section 4 of P. it is contended that even assuming that the informations do charge the accused PNP officers with crimes committed in relation to their office. whose Section 2 provides: SEC." this Court held that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because "[t]he information [did] not allege that there was an intimate connection between the discharge of official duties and the commission of the offense. its materiality arises. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction. No. as amended. the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime. not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime. People of the Philippines. it is these allegations that shall control. No. 7975. of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not held their office. It says: But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element.000. thus. 26 despite the allegation that the accused public officers committed the crime of falsification of official document by "taking advantage of their official positions. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No." In Montilla vs. Hilario. for lack of an allegation in the informations that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers or were intimately connected with the discharge of the functions of the accused." Accordingly. 2. 16O6. 1606. for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353. not from the allegations but on the proof. and detained the two victims.we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was perpetrated while they were in the performance. which was approved on 3O March 1995.D. there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused. 25 and not as one that qualifies the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

6758).14 and 14A. city treasurers. and other provincial department heads. . directors or trustees. Section 2. and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. specifically including: (a) Provincial governors. (b) City mayors."SEC. engineers. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1379. without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution. whether in a permanent. acting or interim capacity. otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. vice-governors. Jurisdiction. and Chapter II. state universities or educational institutions or foundations. 4. Republic Act No. and other city department heads. 3019. naval captains. members of the sanggunian panlalawigan. (e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank. and all officers of higher rank. assessors. b. or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations. (g) Presidents. and officials and prosecutors in the office of the Ombudsman special prosecutor. Violations of Republic Act No. of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. vice-mayors. as amended. assessors. (d) Philippine army and air force colonels. 1. and provincial treasurers. (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions. otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher. (c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. c. engineers. where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government. .The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. at the time of the commission of the offense: (l) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher. Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution. (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants. members of the Sangguniang panlungsod.2.

32 14. as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court. its jurisdiction over other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office is no longer determined by the prescribed penalty. No. it is enough that they are committed by those public officials and employees enumerated in subsection a. Moreover.000. including those employed in government-owned or . 6758. No. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments. 15562 and 15563 because none of the five PNP officers involved therein occupy the rank of chief superintendent or higher.. 30 it retains only cases where the accused are those enumerated in subsection a. it retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to or in connection with E." or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration. 7975: In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher. 1. 34 The respondents maintain that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos." Assuming then for the sake of argument that the informations in the said cases allege that the crimes charged were committed by the five PNP officers in relation to their office. as the case may be.A. Metropolitan Trial Court. P/Col. 1606. Section 4 above. viz. R. Section 4 above and. it would appear indubitable that the cases would fall within the jurisdiction of the court a quo. or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent 35 or higher. No. mphasis supplied). they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them. 31 2. No. or their equivalent.controlled corporations. Under Section 4 of P. generally. 28 as amended. 129.A. No.A.A. 3019. national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R. viz. However. resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade "27.00. As a consequence of these amendments. Senior Superintendent whose salary grade under the said Act is Grade "18. accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees. Section 2. 6758.. or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher.In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher. 29 and Chapter II. that which is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years or a fine of P6.A. Nos. Municipal Trial Court. 6758). 6758 and of the five.O.D. and Municipal Circuit Trial . No. 33 and 14-A. Metropolitan Trial Court. as further amended by R. and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. the Sandiganbayan partly lost its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving violations of R. xxx xxx xxx In case private individuals are charged as co-principals. pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court. or their equivalent. or are classified as Grade "27" or higher under R. as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. Municipal Trial Court. 1379. Nicolas Torres has the highest rank.

(b) Whenever the grant of bail is a matter of discretion. the governing law was Section 4 of P. Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. Hence. cases which were previously cognizable by the Sandiganbayan under P. No. No. and assuming further that the informations had already been filed with the said tribunal but hearing thereon has not begun yet. the application therefor may be filed only in the particular court where the case is pending. No. jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. therefore. city or municipality other than where the case is pending. 37 Hence. be a futile exercise to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan because the same would anyway be transferred again to the Regional trial Court pursuant to Section 7 of the new law in relation to Section 2 thereof. or. pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. No. as the case may be. 1606. In the instant case. with another branch of the same court within the province or city. would that jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan be affected by R.D.A. Bail. But. the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases. 36 Under the above assumption then. the Sandiganbayan can no longer proceed to hear the cases in view of the express provision of Section 7 of R. 7975. as amended by P. in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof. the cases should have been filed with the Sandiganbayan since at the time the informations were filed. 7975. 7975? Ordinarily. As regards the motions for bail of accused-respondents Jeanette Dumancas and Nicolas Torres. where filed. 1606. 7975. They retain their jurisdiction until the end of the litigation. all criminal cases in which trial has not yet begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts. with any metropolitan trial judge.D.D. shall be referred to the latter courts if hearing thereon has not yet been commenced in the Sandiganbayan. or. Even if we labor under the foregoing assumption that the informations in the subject cases do charge the respondent PNP officers with offenses committed in relation to their office so that jurisdiction thereof would fall under the Sandiganbayan. cannot be divested of jurisdiction over cases filed before them by reason of R. It remains with the court until the case is finally terminated. . Section 17. . If the accused is arrested in a province.(a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending. the same must fail. as the informations were filed not before it but before the Regional Trial Court.Court. municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein. the Sandiganbayan or the courts. It would.A. if no judge thereof is available. or on appeal." However.A. No. whether for preliminary investigation. No. trial. but are already under the jurisdiction of the courts by virtue of the amendment introduced by R. or the accused seeks to be released on recognizance. as the case may be. 17. No.A. 129. That section provides that upon the effectivity of the Act. the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. as amended. 1861. bail may be filed also with any regional trial court of said place.

still the same would not prosper for not having been seasonably filed. were treated as petitions for certiorari. existing jurisprudence requires that the same be filed within a reasonable period of time from receipt of the questioned judgment or order. and the motions for bail of accused-respondents Jeanette Dumancas and Nicolas Torres are DENIED. This decision is immediately executory. not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there. J. Jr. Young 43 it was held that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court should be filed within a reasonable period of three months from notice of the decision or order. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo and Hermosisima. Hon. Even if their respective Comment and Reiteration of Motion for Bail 40 and respondent Dumancas's Motion for Bail 41 filed on 22 March 1995. and the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City is directed to immediately resume the hearings of Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 and to thereafter resolve them with reasonable and purposeful dispatch. In Enrile vs. city or municipality where he is held.. that they challenged the denial premised on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was not strong. Salazar. about nine to ten months had already elapsed before the respondents assailed the denial of their motions for bail.. and even then.(c ) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province. Court of Appeals. the instant petition is DENIED. the motions for bail filed by the said accused-respondents with the Regional Trial Court where the cases against them are pending were denied sometime in February. In any event. It was only on 26 December 1994. 39 this Court said: "only after that remedy [petition to be admitted to bail] was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court [be] invoked.frame for the filing of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. WHEREFORE. concur. when they filed their respective comments on the instant petition. in Philec Workers' Union vs." There is no showing that the said accused-respondents have question the denial of their applications for bail in a petition for certiorari either before the Court of Appeals or this Court. Here. the private respondents who were denied bail are not precluded from reiterating before the trial court their plea for admission to bail. concurring and dissenting: . The temporary restraining order issued on 12 December 1994 is LIFTED. 38 as reiterated in Galvez vs. In the instant case. The challenged orders are AFFIRMED. 1994. While the Rules of Court does not fix a time .. JJ. 42 And. Separate Opinions PADILLA. Romeo A.

in my view. Of note is a portion of the testimony of the alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator turned state witness. their direct superior. Accused Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas should. The wording of the two (2) informations clearly shows that P/Col. shall be referred to the proper courts. Act No. Bacolod Station. whether or not the offenses are committed in relation to their office. all criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under P. This act of Torres is undoubtedly "intimately connected" with his position as Station Commander of the PNP. Act No. be released on bail for the following reasons: 1. Act No. Nicolas M. where he declared that Jeanette Dumancas told accused Dominador Geroche to bring the two (2) swindling suspects to the police station and that she would call a certain Atty. Torres used his authority over his subordinate officers when he ordered them to arrest the two (2) swindling suspects/victims in connection with the complaint of the Dumancas spouses. Act No. I agree with Mr. 7975. In turn. disregard technicalities and rule on the motion for bail filed with this Court.00. 1606 which gave the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction cover offenses committed by law is higher than prision correctional or imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6. the cases were not filed in said court. I arrive at this conclusion based solely on the provisions of Rep. The above view notwithstanding. Justice Hilario G. unlike the majority. 7975 has revised the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. much less instigated. Justice Santiago M. they can remain in said regional trial court. 7975. the kidnapping and murder of the victims. In the present case. Kapunan that the Court should exercise its discretion. No. Geocadin so the . On the issue of whether accused Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas should be granted bail. The spouses Dumancas were included in the informations as accused merely because they were the ones who complained to the police that the two (2) victims had swindled them. Since the cases now fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under the express provisions of Rep.000. Section 7 of Rep.D. There is no showing that the spouses knew. none of the accused PNP officers has the rank of superintendent or higher. as earlier discussed.D. Davide. the offenses having been committed in relation to the accuseds' office. No. In the present case. Under such circumstances. that the accused PNP personnel committed the crime alleged in the two (2) informations in relation to their office. Moises Grandeza. the Regional Trial Courts now have jurisdiction over offenses committed by PNP officers with ranks below that of superintendent or its equivalent. even if the criminal cases were then within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. the two (2) informations would have been properly filed with the Sandiganbayan since the law in force at the time was P. Under said revised jurisdiction. 1606 where trial has not begun in said court.While I agree with the ponencia of Mr. Rep. 7975 also provides that upon effectivity of said Act. that the two (2) informations subject of the present petition should remain in the Regional Trial Court. It is my considered opinion. yet. the other accused PNP personnel who detained the two (2) victims were performing their functions as law enforcers under orders from. Jr.

3. apparently. Certainly. Possibly out of sheer over zealouseness. However. Dumancas her constitutional right to bail. specifically Domingo Geroche to "bring (the two men) to the PC or police" so that she could in the meantime locate her attorney for the purpose of filing the proper charges against them. has written in this case. this is not indicative of a probability of her later jumping bail should she be released on bail. Such statements of Dumancas indicate lack of any criminal intent unless the contrary is later proven during the trial. subject to this court's action. After respondent Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas identified them. 2. which under the facts and circumstances so far available to the lower court. for us to exercise our discretion to grant bail in her case. risking incarceration in order to face the charges against her. both men were brought elsewhere and shot. who have been deprived of her care for over a year. <b>KAPUNAN. the lone witness for the prosecution in this case testified that she requested the accused. Justice Hilario G. I see no reason why. to grant Mrs. she is the mother of two minor children. here and now. . Jr. mainly for humanitarian reasons. Davide. The facts so far established in the case at bench with respect to the spouses Dumancas as narrated in the court's opinion simply show that they were civilians who complained to the authorities (respondents herein) to the effect that they were swindled by Rufino Gangar and Danilo Lumangyao. I think this Court. she came back to the country from abroad. the only reason why the spouses were charged as principals by inducement was because. 4. at least with respect to petitioner Jeanette Dumancas.the chain of events which led to the death of the victims in the case at bench. aged seven (7) and one (1) years old.. they initiated-through their apparently legitimate complaint . This narration clearly casts enough doubt regarding the strength of the evidence of guilt against Mrs. pending the determination of her guilt or innocence in the trial court. J. a motion for reconsideration should be addressed to the trial court or to the Court of Appeals (if the said motion were denied by the lower court).proper cases could be filed against them. is antagonistic not only to her constitutional right to bail but also to the ideals and demands of a just and humane society. Second. as possible victims of a group of alleged swindlers. even with the knowledge that she would face possible arrest. or for reasons not yet established in the trial court. While I agree that normally. which ought to be sufficient. The trial court has already refused to grant her petition for bail. To deny bail to a mother of two (2) minor children in the absence of direct evidence that she was indeed a principal by inducement as alleged in the two (2) informations. Jeanette Dumancas came back from abroad even after the charges against her had been filed. for compelling humanitarian reasons. constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. the alleged murder-kidnapping victims. Firstly. Thus. should exercise its discretion to grant said petitioner her constitutional right to bail. we should not exercise our discretion. The situation of Jeanette Dumancas is no different from that of her husband who was granted bail by the trial court. Dumancas. concurring and dissenting:</b> I fully agree with much of what my esteemed colleague.

Republic Act No. I vote to grant Mrs.Petitioner. unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and intimidation commit acts of lasciviousness on the person of one CRISTINA B. The workers were facing the street so that the two were not seen. 64-year old Isidro Olivarez.R. She dutifully approached him. and one named Liezel were at their work when the accused who was near the main door called for her.2005 Jul 291st DivisionG. kissed her on the lips. deem appropriate. her two brothers Macoy and Dodong. 1997. in the making of sampaguita garlands. against her will. Her brother . he embraced her and held her breast. 22860[1] which affirmed the judgment[2] rendered by the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro. Branch 93. 0505-SPL finding petitioner Isidro Olivarez guilty of violating Section 5. versus COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.: For review is the Court of Appeals’ decision in CA-G. At about 11:30 o’clock in the morning of July 20.[4] and its resolution denying reconsideration thereof. Province of Laguna. said accused actuated by lewd design did then and there wilfully. Within the compound and at about three armslength from the main door of the house was her workplace. The accused asked her if she had told her mother that he gave her money. Laguna which was the basis upon which an information for violation of R. and when she said that she did not. CRISTINA B. by touching her breasts and kissing her lips. For one year she had been reporting for work during weekends at the residence of the accused. The offended party Cristina Elitiong was a 16-year old high school student who with her brothers were employed by the accused. CR No. ELITIONG. ELITIONG. closing the kitchen door.[5] The case originated from a complaint filed by the offended party with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro.R. 7610 was filed against Isidro Olivarez..A. Cristina. 163866D E C I S I O N YNARES-SANTIAGO. Respondents. 7610. CONTRARY TO LAW. J. Laguna. in the Municipality of San Pedro. She pushed him away and went back to her station. [2005V861] [1/2] ISIDRO OLIVAREZ. No. He pulled her to the kitchen and. Dumancas petition for bail.[6] The established facts of this case are as follows: . to her damage and prejudice. within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court..[3] in Crim. committed as follows: That on or about July 20.Without prejudice to whatever the lower court would in the course of hearing the case. Case No. hereby accuses ISIDRO OLIVAREZ of the crime of “VIOLATION OF RA 7610”. to wit: The undersigned 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecution (sic) of Laguna upon a sworn complaint filed by the private complainant. 1997.

Days later. Two hours later. 7610 and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years. which are age of the offended party and that she is an abused or exploited child as defined in the law. the mother.[10] Hence. The girl’s mother was demanding P30.[7] The trial court found Olivarez guilty of violating Section 5 of R. By 10 A..00 as moral damages and to pay the costs. He left shortly thereafter and passed by the market before going home. The next several days were uneventful for him until his laundrywoman Maritess told him that there was a complaint against him at the barangay office. When she arrived at her home. A meeting took place between him and the girl’s family in the presence of the barangay authorities. His daughter Analee Olivarez was staying in another house in the compound and attended a morning mass.000. In the defense version.M. The accused testified that he was at the Caltex station for two and a half hours waiting for the shipment of flowers from Pampanga. When Isidro woke up in the early morning to relieve himself. the offended party and her brothers had slept overnight in the house of the accused. but went to the faucet and washed her face.M. the laundrywoman. he left for the Caltex Service Station which was only a five minute ride from his home by tricycle. accompanied the offended party to the San Vicente Barangay Hall on July 26 to report the incident and give a statement. who was washing clothes outside the kitchen. Finally. She did not say a word. When pressed for a reason. Maritess Buen.Macoy saw her crying when she came out of the house. The offended party continued to finish the garlands she was working on. the decision of the trial court[8] was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. saw the accused earlier. Article III of Republic Act 7610. Cristina gave another statement to the local police. The goods arrived at 12:15 P. to indemnify the minor Cristina Elitiong in the amount of P15.M. When she returned at 10:30 A. He arrived at 12:30 P. and waited until the afternoon for her wages.M. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that the essential elements in Violation of Section 5.A. she said basta po mama ayaw ko ng magtuhog. she first told her mother that she no longer wished to go back. The motion for reconsideration[9] filed by the accused was denied. he saw the girl sleeping on the sofa. He returned by noontime. He went back to his room and slept until 8 A. when she entered the house. she no longer saw her father. this petition for review[11] on the following grounds: I.. he already left. she told her mother what happened.. He admonished her to join her brothers in the basement. Aurora Elitiong. four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. On appeal. not having been .M. at 10 A. but he refused to cave in and told a barangay official Jaime Ramos that he would rather see his accusers in court than give a centavo because he did not commit the crime.M.000 for the settlement of the case.

are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. is below 18 years of age.. who for money. the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335. That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period. Article XIII. paragraph 3. had substantially complied with the requirements of due process for the accused.alleged in the Information.[12] Petitioner alleges that his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated for failure to allege in the information the essential elements of the offense for which he is being charged. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. which was not alleged in the Information. 7610 defines lascivious conduct as follows: . but failing to allege the essential elements of said offense. 5.. Republic Act 7610. 3. That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age. II. as amended. profit. 3815.” talics supplied) The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5.A. petitioner/accused cannot be found guilty of said offense and must be acquitted. whether male or female. as the case may be: Provided. Article III of R. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the Information charging petitioner/accused of Violation of Section 5... 7610 states: SEC. Republic Act 7610. . Section 5. or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: . (b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided. Article III of R. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.A. for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 2. The child. for rape or lascivious conduct. syndicate or group. III. of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred and gravely abused its discretion in not reversing the judgment of the trial court convicting the accused/petitioner and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for alleged Violation of Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. whether male or female. the Revised Penal Code. indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.A. – Children. 7610 are as follows: 1.[13] Section 32.

a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit. People:[17] . not necessarily for money or profit... of any person.[T]he intentional touching.A. It must be observed that Article III of R.. Furthermore. SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE.’ I would like to amend this. either directly or through clothing. not necessarily for money or profit. It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit. degrade. profit. In this case. As we observed in People v. This is clear from the deliberations of the Senate: Senator Angara.. OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT. ‘who for money or profit. inner thigh. et cetera. . is likewise present.e. but also one in which a child. whether of the same or opposite sex.. or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult.A. groin. mphasis supplied) We reiterated this ruling in Amployo v. engages in lascivious conduct. or any other consideration. when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money. I refer to line 9.[15] The second element. masturbation. Act No. but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation. It was established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner kissed Cristina and touched her breasts with lewd designs as inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances. Larin. syndicate or group. anus. that the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. . The law covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse. 7610 is captioned as “Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse” because Congress really intended to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct. 7610. Cristina was sexually abused because she was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct. through coercion or intimidation. As succinctly explained in People v. Mr. lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person. it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse occurred only once. anus or mouth. the abuse may be habitual or not. or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. or buttocks. bestiality. harass. breast. i.. Section 5 of Rep. to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into this lascivious conduct. PROFIT. The proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR MONEY. so that we can cover those situations and not leave loophole in this section.[14] mphasis supplied) The first element obtains in this case. As expressly provided in Section 3 (b) of R. with an intent to abuse. President. of the genitalia. humiliate. or the introduction of any object into the genitalia.. Larin:[16] A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. Thus.

that there may be situations where the child may not have been used for profit or . Senator Lina. because we are still talking of the child who is being misused for sexual purposes either for money or for consideration. So. What does the Sponsor say? Will the Gentleman kindly restate the amendment? ANGARA AMENDMENT Senator Angara. No. which he claims was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Mr. The President Pro Tempore. Subject to rewording. The new section will read something like this.. President. Will it no longer be child prostitution? Senator Angara. What I am trying to cover is the other consideration. Because the essence of prostitution is profit. Because. The President Pro Tempore. President. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none. . it is no longer prostitution. PROFIT.’ shall we change that too? Senator Angara. (Italicization supplied)[18] Petitioner makes much of the failure to allege in the information that Cristina was a child below 18 years of age at the time the offense was committed. Yes. Not necessarily. still. no. he had no personal knowledge of Cristina’s age. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none. Mr. Yes. Mr. it is limited only to the child being abused or misused for sexual purposes. x x x. here. Well. Is that not what we would call probable ‘child abuse’? Senator Angara. to cover the expanded scope. only for money or profit. Maybe the heading ought to be expanded. The President Pro Tempore. ‘Child Prostitution. He insists that the Court of Appeals mistakenly relied on the case of People v. WHETHER MALE OR FEMALE. Senator Angara. The President Pro Tempore. How about the title. Mr. That would mean also changing the subtitle of Section 4. I see. I am contending. the President will agree that that is a form or manner of child abuse. OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT. Mr. the amendment is approved.The President Pro Tempore. the Gentleman is right. et cetera. Rosare*19+ because unlike in Rosare. President: MINORS.. President. It is accepted. SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE IN SEXUAL INTERCOURSE. But. President. Mr. the amendment is approved. President. The President Pro Tempore. WHO FOR MONEY.

and declares it to be the basis upon which the information was filed. the accused was fully apprised of the accusation against him. the information signed only by the fiscal ushered in the formal trial process. If there is no designation of the offense. The purpose and objective of the constitutional mandate are discharged and satisfied. the approximate date of the commission of the offense.[24] . the age of the offended party. reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. it held: Before us is an information for violation of RA 7610 that. and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. and the place where the offense was committed.In all criminal prosecutions.[22] The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. to which the accused had adequately responded. It forms part of the initial records of the case and comes before the posting of bail and entry of the plea of not guilty before the RTC. Rosare. the sworn complaint of the offended party. but makes allusion to another document. the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. the Court of Appeals found the information to be sufficient. While the criminal action was instituted by the complaint of the offended party.[23] In the present case.[21] The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute. A complaint is under the Rules one of the two charging instruments for the offense of which the accused was tried and convicted here. Laguna in which she stated that she was 16 years old at the time of the offense. It appears that after the charge was filed with the MTC. But both are accusations in writing against the accused and serve the purpose of enabling him to take the necessary legal steps for his defense. This instrument is the complaint filed by the offended party with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro. aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense. What is important is that the information states that the accused is being charged of an offense under RA 7610 based on the complaint of the offended party. fails to mention an indispensable element of the offense. The accused may not be said to be taken by surprise by the failure of the information to state the age of the offended party. Relying on the principle laid down in People v. when he had received the initiatory complaint where he was told how old the offended party was. the accused filed a manifestation stating that he had filed a counter-affidavit to the charge and reserved the right to file a motion to quash the information if it was filed. the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. as in Rosare. The MTC found probable cause against him and elevated the records to the provincial prosecutor for filing of the information. and as the preliminary investigation went underway. Under these conditions. the name of the offended party.[20] A complaint is sufficient if it states the name of the accused. the designation of the offense given by the statute.

[26] the information failed to allege the age of the offended party but since a copy of the order issued by the investigating judge was attached in the record of the preliminary investigation clearly stating that the complainant was nine years old. It ruled that there was substantial compliance with the mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him. Therein. . a copy of which was attached in the record of the preliminary investigation.. We hold. there was substantial compliance with the constitutional mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him when the Order issued by the investigating judge. the information did not allege that the victim was a mental retardate which is an essential element of the crime of statutory rape. therefore.[28] the information for rape failed to allege the element of force or intimidation. 92-0197 dated June 2. This Court however sustained the trial court’s judgment of conviction holding that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor which formed the basis of the information. we have decided to motu proprio take cognizance of the resolution issued by the investigating prosecutor in I.[25] In People v. clearly stated that the complainant was nine years old.*27+ In People v. it was held that there was substantial compliance with the mandate to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation. which formed the basis of and a copy of which was attached to the information for rape filed against herein appellant. He insists that such failure was a fatal defect that rendered the Informations void. Pursuant to Section 8. Consequently. Villamor. Thus: Appellant avers that because the Informations on which he was arraigned and convicted did not allege the element of force or intimidation. Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.S. .. the acts charged negate the commission of the offense for which he was convicted by the lower court. the defense cannot invoke the element of surprise as to deprive it of the opportunity to suitably prepare for the accused’s defense.. Galido. It was also declared that the defense cannot invoke the element of surprise as to deprive it of the opportunity to suitably prepare for the accused’s defense. it is clearly stated that the offended party is suffering from mental retardation. thus: . No. absent this element. even if the information filed did not allege that the complainant was nine years old.We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals. 1992. Thus: Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of statutory rape because the fact that the victim was a mental retardate was never alleged in the information and. that this should be deemed a substantial compliance with the constitutional mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him. In People v. stated that the offended party is suffering from mental retardation. Furthermore. he was deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Court ruled that this omission is not fatal since the complaint specifically charged the accused with three counts of rape committed by means of force and intimidation. Rosare.. a copy of which is attached thereto.

This omission is not fatal. hence he was adequately informed of the age of the complainant. In the present case. Torellos. Thus. by kissing and touching her private parts and embracing her against her will. 1980..[29] The same ground was adopted in People v. San Pedro. the defect in the latter is effectively cured. In the instant case.As a rule. the failure to do so is not an irremediable vice..[31] the Court treated the information for rape which failed to allege force and intimidation as merely defective and that the deficiency was cured by the failure of the accused to assail the insufficiency of the allegations in the Information and by competent evidence presented during trial. CONTRARY TO LAW. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused with lewd design did then and there willfully. of July 20. while it is necessary to allege the essential elements of the crime in the information.” In People v. of the crime of VIOLATION OF RA 7610.[32] Petitioner was furnished a copy of the Complaint which was mentioned in the information. committed as follows: That on or about 11:30 A. 1997 at Brgy. When the complaint or the resolution by the public prosecutor which contain the missing averments is attached to the information and form part of the records. Laguna. their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them would be violated. 16 years old. Otherwise. appellant correctly pointed out that the element of “force or intimidation” should have been expressly alleged in the Informations. San Vicente.[33] The third element of sexual abuse is therefore present. . the missing averment in the information is supplied by the Complaint which reads in full: COMPLAINT The undersigned complainant. accuses ISIDRO OLIVAREZ. unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. the accused cannot be convicted of an offense. Laguna was presented showing that she was born on October 17. because the Complaint specifically accused him of three counts of rape committed by means of force and intimidation. We ruled therein that it was not a fatal omission because it was stated in the complaint that accused Rosendo raped Virginita “by means of force. Mendez[30] which involved an information for rape that failed to allege force or intimidation. Cristina testified that she was 16 years old and a certification from the Office of the Local Registrar of San Pedro. unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of lasciviousness against one CRISTINA ELITIONG Y BALDONO. and the accused cannot successfully invoke the defense that his right to be informed is violated. however.M. The prosecution has also established the minority of the offended party through competent evidence.

Denial. People:[39] It does not end there. The prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner committed acts of sexual abuse against Cristina. 7610. or any immediate member of his family if the latter is the perpetrator of the offense. What is determinative of the offense is the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.A.[38] In addition to moral damages. is worthy of faith and belief.000 for each count of lascivious conduct in addition to the award of moral damages on the justification that – It will be noted that Section 5. and with respect specifically to lascivious conduct amounting to child abuse under Section 5(b) of Rep. like alibi. to which the Philippines became a party on August 21.[36] In the face of the accusations against him. The trial court found Cristina’s testimony to be clear.000.00 should likewise be imposed pursuant to our ruling in Amployo v.A. 1990. and straightforward. 7610. we imposed a fine of P30. The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated. Act No. but it is all to evident that the body of the information contains an averment of the acts alleged to have been performed by petitioner which unmistakably refers to acts punishable under Section 5 of R. given in a categorical.[37] Not only did Cristina identify the petitioner as her assailant but no ill-motive was adduced why she would impute against him so grave a charge.A. provided that the same is to be administered as a cash fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child victim. True. the information herein may not refer to specific section/s of R. straightforward. Article XII (Common Penal Provisions) thereof allows the imposition of a fine subject to the discretion of the court. As to which section of R. spontaneous and candid manner. they may be conclusions of law.A. This provision is in accord with Article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. a fine in the amount of P15. Nonetheless. 7610” without citing the specific sections alleged to have been violated by petitioner. is an inherently weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and categorical identification provided by eyewitnesses.*35+ Her testimony. Section 31(f). 7610 alleged to have been violated by the petitioner. absent any indication that some material fact was overlooked or a grave abuse of discretion committed. Nevertheless. but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. we do not find this omission sufficient to invalidate the information. None of the exceptions obtain in the instant case. Abadies. In People v.[34] The sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or defective designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprise the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. This Court will not interfere with the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses. which stresses the duty of states parties to . candid.The information merely states that petitioner was being charged for the crime of “violation of R. 7610 is being violated by petitioner is inconsequential. 7610 provides for the penalty of imprisonment. petitioner could only interpose uncorroborated alibi and denial. Article II of Republic Act No.

DELFIN VIR. as Presiding Judge. CR No." as well as of the order dated 22 April 1974 of the same court denying the motion for reconsideration of said earlier order. . petitioner Isidro Olivarez is also ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P15.000. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES). J. SUNGA. Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. is hereby ordered lifted and has no force and effect. the court a quo issued the now assailed order which reads: "Considering that the offended party. dated 20 March 1974. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 9. On 10 August 1964. 22860 and its resolution dated June 4.00) on petitioner. of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur.00 as moral damages. respondent Rafael Anadilla who had not yet been arrested by the police authorities. Accused. the court a quo issued an order for the arrest of said accused. HON.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order . vs.000. In addition to the award of P15. Branch I. 1974.R. the petition is DENIED. ARISTON ANADILLA. 2004. and at the same time set the trial of the case for 29 and 30 July 1974. . 10th Judicial District. L-38634D E C I S I O N PADILLA. Jose Dadis is no longer interested in the further prosecution of this case and there being no objection on the part of the accused Ariston Anadilla. 2004 in CAG. an information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur against accused-private respondents Rafael Anadilla. Trial of the case was set on 11 and 12 March 1974. postponed in view of the absence of one of the accused. petitioner. RAFAEL ANADILLA and JOSE ANADILLA. this case is hereby DISMISSED with costs de oficio. entitled "People of the Philippines. Complainant versus Ariston Anadilla. Camarines Sur. CFI Branch I. are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. we impose a fine of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15. L-244. On 20 March 1974. "Consequently.R. however. Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. On the same date. The facts are not disputed.ensure the physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of abused and exploited children in an environment which fosters their self-respect and human dignity.00. the order of arrest issued by this Court against the accused Rafael Anadilla dated March 11. The hearing set on 11 March 1974 was. "The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby ordered cancelled. With the case of Abadies as guidepost. respondents. SO ORDERED. No. dismissing motu proprio Criminal Case No. [1988V473] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.1988 Jun 202nd DivisionG.000. WHEREFORE.

In Crespo v. 3 This petition was thereupon filed before this Court.B. he requests the Prosecuting Fiscal for the dismissal of the said case."In the case of Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. et al. the petition was dismissed. the Court held: xxx xxx xxx "The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. R. the Undersecretary of Justice directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. The issue in this petition is whether the court a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended party. "SO ORDERED. that his material witnesses could no longer be contacted and that without their testimonies the guilt of the accused cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Review of the Court of Appeals decision was then sought by the accused with this Court. relied upon by the aforequoted order. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. that: "That he was the complainant in Criminal Case No. and that in view of these circumstances. which is the authority to hear and determine the case." 1 The affidavit of desistance. the Court had occasion to state the rule in regard to the respective powers of the prosecuting fiscal and the court. which case is pending before the first branch of this Court. after the complaint or information has been filed in court. Ariston Anadilla. 4 promulgated on 30 June 1987.. Resolving. Torrecampo. L-244. Reversing the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. The Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment. however. for Attempted Homicide. may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial of the case on the merits. Mogul. but without a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal. It alleged. In the Crespo case. deferred because of a pending appeal by the accused/respondent to the Secretary of Justice. the Provincial Warden is hereby ordered to release said accused from their detention immediately upon receipt of this order. The issue presented is not novel." 2 The Provincial Fiscal moved to reconsider the order of dismissal. entitled. the issue raised was whether the trial court. acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review. On a certiorari recourse to the Court of Appeals. People vs. This was denied by the court a quo in an order dated 22 April 1974. that he is no longer interested in the further prosecution of this case and that he has already forgiven the accused for their acts. was executed by the offended party on 20 March 1974 and subscribed and sworn to before the branch clerk of court Atty. Arraignment of the accused and trial of the case were. In said case. an information for Estafa had already been filed by the Assistant Fiscal before the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the . among others. the Provincial Fiscal filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence. Upon such instructions. raising the issue previously stated herein.

" 5 In the case at bar. the Court has taken note that before the case was set for trial. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. as above stated. manifested that his material witnesses could no longer be contacted. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. It is only after hearing the . unusual that the complainant-offended party. The prosecuting fiscal in his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case. To avoid similar situations. almost ten (10) years had elapsed from the date of filing of the information. In turn. the permission of the Court must be secured. obviously believed that despite such manifestation of the complainant. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. without their testimony. in control of the prosecution of the case and he may have his own reasons why the case should not be dismissed. the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. after all. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. at such stage. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not [sic]. therefore. still. It was not. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. "The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. but. xxx xxx xxx "The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court and disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. any move on the part of the complainant or offended party to dismiss the criminal case. should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal for his own view on the matter.accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. in his affidavit of desistance. even if without objection of the accused. while the Crespo doctrine has settled that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed (after the complaint or information has been filed in court). once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. the guilt of the accused could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. the Court takes the view that. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. he (fiscal) could prove the prosecution's case. He is.

Jr. MOGUL. may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.J. Paras and Sarmiento.prosecuting fiscal's view that the Court should exercise its exclusive authority to continue or dismiss the case. 3 A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G. concur. JJ. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. 2 A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5. 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.). the presiding judge. [1987V317E] MARIO FL. Melencio-Herrera. J. No. the petition is hereby DISMISSED. LEODEGARIO L. respondents. L-53373D E C I S I O N GANCAYCO. SP No.. vs.R. petitioner. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Yap (C. 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. CRESPO. On April 18. 4 In an order of August 17. resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. denied the motion. 06978. 1 When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. Catalino Macaraig. Without costs. 5 In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course. represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL. ET AL. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was docketed as Criminal Case No.1987 Jun 30En BancG. 6 On May 15. HON. 9 attaching ... 1978 with the trial court. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77. Presiding Judge. 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. Mogul. CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY. Leodegario L. 8 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10. 1977. 9th Judicial Dist. In an order of August 1.R. Hon.. 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18. 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice. 7 On March 22. RICARDO BAUTISTA. WHEREFORE. His Honor.: The issue raised in this case is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review. SO ORDERED.

as suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice. No. 1979. 16 In a resolution of May 19. within ten (10) days from notice.thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig. WHEREFORE. it being meritorious. 1980. . 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto. 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. evident from Annex "A" of the motion wherein. 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment stating: "ORDER For resolution is a motion to dismiss this case filed by the prosecuting fiscal premised on insufficiency of evidence. SP-08777. In an order of August 2. the motion is considered as without merit and therefore hereby DENIED. 15 Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and set aside. Jr. the Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the reason that the check involved having been issued for the payment of a pre-existing obligation the liability of the drawer can only be civil and not criminal. declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect. and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition required the respondents to comment to the petition. 1981. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the comment and a separate comment to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case. the Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the petition. SO ORDERED. a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court's independence and integrity. respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case. as it is hereby set for December 18. 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that the petition be given due course. among other things. 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23. 14 A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19. 1981.R. let the arraignment be. In the resolution of February 26. In the resolution of February 5. not to file a motion to dismiss. 1980." 11 The accused then filed a petition for certiorari. prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G. 12 On January 23. The motion's trust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice. 10 On November 24. the Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. 13 In a decision of October 25.

28 On the other hand. 22 It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction.Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information. according to whether the evidence in his opinion. neither an injunction. 18 The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 32 When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court . 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise. 21 They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant. modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. 31 The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who. are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information. 25 Thus. follow or not follow that presented by the offended party. a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so. It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. since this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. and Courts that grant the same commit no error. that an information be filed in Court. the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. He may or may not file the complaint or information. 30 However. preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner. which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. 24 Neither has the Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time. is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law. according to the evidence received from the complainant. 27 In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did.

The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. the permission of the Court must be secured. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not. in spite of his opinion to the contrary. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. as above stated. 36a Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court. In turn. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possible designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice. 33 The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. 35 The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 38 The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. However.and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested. 36 or the right of the People to due process of law. at such stage. Thus. one may ask. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should . 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The answer is simple.

and by means of other similar deceit. when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. Sarmiento and Cortes. as amended. entitled People of the Philippines v. dismissed petitioner’s appeal of the trial court’s judgment of conviction for failing to post a new bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal. the Secretary of Justice should.. the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs. Fernan.be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. assailing the twin Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA). 24077. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. as in fact she gave and delivered to said . Paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.[2] respectively.R. 1993. No.S. CR No. the said accused. Yap. in CA-G.J. to wit: the said accused. 1993 up to December 18. Narvasa. in the City of Manila.00. Padilla. reserving the filing of a separate opinion. Teehankee.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Philippines. [2006V387] ARNOLD ALVA.000. by means of false manifestation and fraudulent representation which he made to said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to the effect that he could process the latter’s application for U. Visa provided she would give the amount of P120. refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal. WHEREFORE. committed as follows: That in or about and during the period covered between October 18. The CA. Bidin. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. Paras. J. JJ. Respondent. did then and there willfully (sic). COURT OF APPEALS.. C. alleging as follows: The undersigned accuses ARNOLD ALVA of the crime of ESTAFA. Feliciano. Melencio-Herrera. in the assailed resolutions. 157331D E C I S I O N CHICO-NAZARIO.R.2006 Apr 121st DivisionG. In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court.. Gutierrez. inclusive. unlawfully and feloniously defraud YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA in the following manner. Cruz. SO ORDERED. The Facts The present petition stemmed from an Information[3] charging petitioner with having committed the crime of estafa defined under Article 315. induced and succeeded in inducing said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to give and deliver. concur. as far as practicable. versus HON. Petitioner. Arnold Alva. Jr. dated 18 October 2002[1] and 19 February 2003.

the decretal part of which reads: WHEREFORE. as in fact he did obtain the amount of P120. petitioner’s counsel filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation*7+ praying for the resetting of the 5 May 1999 schedule of promulgation of the RTC’s decision to 17 June 1999 in view of the fact that said counsel already had a prior commitment on subject date. paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Visa is not genuine and were made solely to obtain. judgment is hereby rendered: finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Article 315. a certain Joey Perez personally delivered to the RTC a hand written medical certificate*9+ expressing petitioner’s inability to attend the day’s hearing due to hypertension.000. On 4 May 1999. claiming to be petitioner’s representative. On 5 September 1995.[5] pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. was deferred only until 19 May 1999. however. The resultant criminal case was filed and docketed as Criminal Case No. Philippine Currency. After the trial on the merits. he wilfully (sic).S. presided by Judge Manuel T. the RTC considered the case submitted for decision. William Bayhon. In its decision dated 25 March 1999. Muro. In response to the aforestated acts of petitioner and counsel. to the damage and prejudice of the said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA in the aforesaid amount of P120.000. The RTC granted the motion. misapplied and converted the said amount to his own personal use and benefit.00 on the strength of said manifestation and representation said accused well knowing that the same were false and untrue for the reason that the U.accused the amount of P120. duly assisted by counsel. petitioner’s counsel again moved for the deferment of the promulgation.”*8+ On 19 May 1999. petitioner. The promulgation. Upon arraignment on 7 December 1995. No. In his stead. Branch 54. then Executive Judge of the RTC of Manila. A day before the rescheduled date of promulgation. in an Order[6] dated 6 April 1998. unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated. the RTC issued a Recall Order[4] of the Warrant of Arrest issued on 18 July 1995 against petitioner in view of the approval of his bail bond by Hon.00 which amount once in his possession with intent to defraud.00.[11] the RTC found petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa under Article 315. 95-143803 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. 2(a) of the RPC and sentences him to an indeterminate term of . due to prior “undertakings of similar importance. or on 18 May 1999. CONTRARY TO LAW.000. the RTC issued an Order[10] directing the promulgation of its decision in absentia and the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner for his failure to appear before it despite due notice. petitioner and counsel both failed to appear in court despite due notice.

judgment was rendered against Eastern Insurance and Surety Corporation. ratiocinating thus: The “Notice of Appeal” filed by accused cannot be given due course as it was filed out of time. hand delivered by a certain Remedios Caneda. Police Superintendent Ramon Flores De Jesus. On 21 July 1999. Although accused filed a “Motion for Reconsideration” dated 23 July 1999. or on 3 September 1999. a document entitled Personal Bail Bond[12] dated 21 May 1999 issued by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation. On 2 September 1999. De Jesus reassured the RTC that “the name of the accused will be included in our list of wanted persons for our future reference. a Termination of Legal Services was filed by petitioner before the RTC informing it of his decision to terminate the services of his counsel and that he was currently in the process of hiring a new one. immediately following an original duplicate copy of the aforequoted decision.[13] For such reason. the RTC declined to give due course to said motion for failure to set it for hearing. petitioner appeared to have been admitted to bail anew after his conviction. The next day. petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal[19] before the RTC. On 15 July 1999. Meanwhile. and further for the accused to return the P120. for failure to produce the person of petitioner within the 10 day period earlier provided and to explain why the amount of its undertaking should not be forfeited.00. as appearing in the records of the RTC.00 to the complainant with an interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) compounded annually from January 1. however. Incongruous to the above inference.000. the RTC again declined to give due course to the Notice of Appeal. In an Order[18] dated 30 August 1999. the Court considered it as a mere scrap . In the interregnum. 1994 (the amount has been given to the accused in October and December 1993). On 26 July 1999. seemed to have been filed before and approved by the RTC as evidenced by the signature of Judge Muro on the face of said bail bond. in the amount of P17. petitioner wrote[16] the RTC requesting for a certified photocopy of his exhibits submitted to it during trial.” Examination of the records of the case revealed that petitioner already moved out of his address on record without informing the RTC. the bonding company that issued petitioner’s original bail bond. first. and the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Chief of Warrant and Subpoena Section. in an Order[14] dated 25 May 1999.[15] manifested to the RTC the return of the unexecuted Warrant of Arrest issued on 19 May 1999 “for the reason that the address of the accused (petitioner) is not within our area of responsibility. thus. petitioner received the above Order.000. treating it as a mere scrap of paper.[17] petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC. In an Order[20] dated 20 September 1999. x x x” Nevertheless.imprisonment of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as maximum of reclusion temporal in accordance with the provisions of Article 315.

x x x x. On 29 October 2001. to wit: Considering the arrest warrant issued by the trial court against the accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment. governing motions. appellant is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice why his appeal should not be dismissed outright. it did not stop the reglementary period to file appeal. and it appearing from the record that no new bond for his provisional liberty on appeal has been posted. and for purposes of appealing the decision subject of the instant case. The Decision has examined and discussed the evidence presented and the merits of the case. which issued the questioned decision. on May 21. the full text of which states: The Motion to Resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of the accused. 1999. the appellate court required petitioner to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed it appearing that no new bail bond for his provisional liberty on appeal had been posted. The presiding judge of the lower court. together with three (3) copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes be transmitted to the Hon. . and the appeal is given due course. accused immediately posted a new bond for his provisional liberty. Court of Appeals. dated November 20. same is denied for lack of merit. the RTC granted the abovestated motion. Because of the pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration. through new counsel. Upon learning of the course of action taken by the presiding judge. petitioner. among others. Let the records of the case. hence. considering that the one who prepared the Motion for Reconsideration appears to be the accused himself. Certified true copy of the bond is hereto attached as Annex “3” and made an integral part hereof. On 25 November 1999. On appeal before the Court of Appeals. Acting on the said Motion for Reconsideration itself. petitioner filed anew a motion praying for the RTC’s categorical resolution of his 23 July 1999 Motion for Reconsideration. who may not appear to be a lawyer and may not be conversant with the rules.of paper and was not acted upon as the same was not set for hearing. In an Order dated 7 December 1999. in a Resolution[21] dated 16 October 2001. the appeal is deemed filed on time. duly approved the new bond. 1999 is granted in the interest of justice. filed a Compliance[22] essentially stating therein that: xxxx 3.

WHEREFORE. interposed objections. . respondent People of the Philippines (People). had already extended the period covered by its 21 May 1999 bail bond. he was of the understanding that the “Show Cause” Resolution of 16 October 2001 merely sought an explanation vis-à-vis the absence of a bail bond guaranteeing petitioner’s provisional liberty while his conviction was on appeal. According to petitioner’s counsel. All the same. and in view of the fact that his personal bail bond posted in the lower court had already expired. Asked to comment on the Motion for Reconsideration. 2001. Attached to said motion was a Bond Endorsement[25] extending the coverage of the bail bond from 21 May 1999 to 21 May 2003. through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).+ Hence. x x x.” and 2) that “bail on appeal is a matter of discretion when the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years.In a Resolution[23] dated 18 October 2002.[26] respondent People raised two arguments: 1) that “an application for bail can only be availed of by a person who is in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. appellant’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 2002.” On 19 February 2003. In its Comment.[27] disposing of petitioner’s motion as follows: Finding no merit in appellant’s motion for reconsideration (citation omitted) filed on November 12. this petition. * mphasis supplied.” Undaunted. the Court of Appeals. nonetheless dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner for “appellant’s failure to post a new bond for his provisional liberty on appeal despite our directive as contained in our Resolution dated October 16. petitioner’s counsel manifested that Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation. petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[24] thereto seeking its reversal. the Court of Appeals issued the second assailed Resolution. We agree with the appellee that appellant has failed to submit himself under the jurisdiction of the court or under the custody of the law since his conviction in 1999 and that there was no valid bail bond in place when appellant took his appeal. the same is hereby DENIED. II. The Issues Petitioner now comes to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging the following errors:[28] I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.

IV. and VI. THE COMPLAINCE FILED BY THE PETITIONER WHICH SHOWED THE FACT THAT INDEED THERE WAS A BAIL BOND FILED FOR THE PROVISIONAL LIBERTY OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO SUBMIT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OR TO THE CUSTODY OF LAW DESPITE THE BAIL BOND POSTED ON MAY 21. 1999.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION DOCKETED AS CA G. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER AS SUBSTANTIAL. all six can be encapsulated in one solitary question.R. and 2) whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the custody of the law despite the posting of the subject bail bond. 24077 ON THE GROUND OF ALLEGED FAILURE TO POST A NEW BOND FOR PETITIONER’S PROVISIONAL LIBERTY AND THAT THE PERSONAL BAIL BOND POSTED IN THE LOWER COURT HAD ALLEGEDLY ALREADY EXPIRED. V. whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing the appeal in view of petitioner’s alleged failure to post a valid bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal. The Court’s Ruling . that is. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO VALID BAIL BOND IN PLACE WHEN THE PETITIONER TOOK HIS APPEAL. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT IGNORED THE RECENT BAIL BOND EXTENSION ATTACHED TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE PETITIONER. CR NO. The bombardment of errors notwithstanding. III. only two issues are raised in this petition: 1) with the exception of the fifth assignment of error.

”*29+ In issuing said resolution. then the respondent Hon. 1999 was executed in favor of petitioner by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation two days after the promulgation of the Decision. which states in full: Respectfully returned this unexecuted Warrant of Arrest for the reason that the address of the accused is not within our area of responsibility. said court rendered judgment against the bail bond issued by Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation executed to secure petitioner’s provisional liberty during the trial. or that there was no valid bail bond when the appeal was taken when the records of the case would readily prove the contrary.” To illustrate its point.” Petitioner rationalizes his deduction in the following manner: x x x [T]he records of the case readily reveals (sic) that several pleadings were filed by the petitioner before the lower court even after the promulgation of judgment was made. x x x. etc. there must be a showing by the prosecution with notice to the accused of the fact that. has committed an offense while under probation. just the same. or on 25 May 1999. Chief of Warrant and Subpoena Section. 1999 signed by P/Superintendent Ramon Flores De Jesus. there is nothing on record which shows that petitioner had surrendered. If the posting of the bond which was approved by the same Regional Trial Court who rendered the decision subject of appeal is not yet a submission to the jurisdiction of the court. petitioner further posits that: x x x Although it is respectfully submitted that an accused shall be denied bail or his bail shall be cancelled if sentenced to an imprisonment exceeding six (6) years as provided in Section 5. 2) the fact that six days after the decision of the RTC was promulgated. Court of Appeals must have been thinking of another matter beyond the comprehension of the petitioner and obviously outside the matters being contemplated by law and the Rules of Court. Further request that the warrant of Arrest be forwarded to the Police Station which has Jurisdiction over the address of the accused. in contrast.[30] Respondent People. the accused is a recidivist. there are circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail. petitioner concludes that the Court of Appeals made “x x x no careful examination of the records x x x. evaded sentence. has previously escaped from confinement. for the bondsman’s failure to produce petitioner before the court. Equally. Right after the promulgation of the decision in the lower court. counters that “x x x *a+lthough a personal bail bond dated May 21. Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. But there was none of the said instances that may be attributable to herein petitioner. was arrested or otherwise deprived of his liberty after the promulgation of the judgment of his conviction in his absence. the name of the accused will be included in our list of wanted persons for our future reference. respondent People cites the following facts: 1) the return of the Warrant of Arrest issued on May 19. to wit: . However.Petitioner faults the appellate court for expressing “x x x in its questioned resolutions that herein petitioner did not submit to the jurisdiction of the court or custody of the law. herein petitioner went to the court and posted a bail bond.

did not automatically confer on petitioner the benefits of an effective bail bond. or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstances of reiteration.[31] Respondent People explains that the first two facts make it improbable to conclude that there existed a valid bail bond securing petitioner’s provisional liberty even after conviction.In view of the failure of Eastern Insurance & Surety Corporation. – Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death. Stated in another way. as amended.00) Pesos. or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled. And. evaded sentence. with notice to the accused. Bail. 5. when discretionary. may admit the accused to bail. bondsman of herein accused. (c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation. of the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That the accused is a recidivist. upon a showing by the prosecution. 3) “that petitioner belatedly attached a bond endorsement to his motion for reconsideration dated November 7. If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years. judgment is hereby rendered against said bond in the amount of Seventeen Thousand (P17. the petition must fail. Section 5 of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court. intrinsically addresses the foregoing prefatory matter viz: SEC. to produce the herein accused within the period granted it by this Court. but not more than twenty (20) years. hence. may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.”*32+ as petitioner made no extension of the previous personal bond before the same expired. or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification. (b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement. The court. quasi-recidivist. or habitual delinquent. on application. 1999 x x x.000. the court. We disagree in petitioner’s assertions. petitioner’s admission to bail presumes that the latter surrendered. 2002 submitted before the Court of Appeals. in its discretion. A definitive disposition of the issue relating to the existence and validity of petitioner’s bail bond on appeal presupposes that the latter was allowed by law to post bail notwithstanding the RTC’s judgment of conviction and the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as maximum of reclusion temporal. was arrested or he had otherwise submitted himself under the custody of the law. parole. or under conditional pardon. reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. purportedly to extend the expired personal bond dated May 21. . the accused shall be denied bail.

to say the least. that the posting of a bail presupposes that the accused and/ or accused-appellant is detained or in the custody of the law. or (e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal. [ mphasis supplied. with notice to the accused. That the prosecution appears not to have been given the chance to object. as there has been no related Order of Release issued by any court. neither in the RTC nor the Court of Appeals. x x x. such approval did not render the subject bail bond valid and binding for it has been established that petitioner was not entitled to bail on appeal.] From the preceding quoted provision. the RTC is given the discretion to admit to bail an accused even after the latter has been convicted to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of more than six (6) years but less than twenty (20) years. Nothing in the records of the case. It is incongruous. The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court. to the application or approval of the subject bail bond (with notice to the accused).[34] All told. Be that as it may. It is beyond dispute that the subject bail bond issued by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation was irregularly approved. to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed. the bench warrant issued by the RTC on 19 May 1999 still remains unserved. Quite clearly. on motion and with notice to the adverse party. Basic is the principle that that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature. However.[33] In the case at bar. petitioner was convicted by the RTC to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate term of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as maximum of reclusion temporal. Worth noting is the fact that nowhere in the records of the case is it shown that petitioner applied for bail through a motion duly filed for such purpose nor is there showing that the RTC issued an Order of Approval or any other court process acknowledging such document.(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail. In the case at bar. as evidently required under the quoted rule. . demonstrates that petitioner was ever arrested. the same also provides for the cancellation of bail bonds already granted or the denial of a bail bond application upon the concurrence of two points: 1) if the judgment of the Regional Trial Court exceeds six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years. the accused may commit another crime. the approval of petitioner’s application for bail was discretionary upon the RTC. even granting for the sake of argument that it was indeed approved by Judge Muro. or that he voluntarily surrendered or at the very least placed himself under the custody of the law. and 2) upon a showing by the prosecution. no bail should have been granted petitioner. of the presence of any of the five circumstances therein enumerated or other similar circumstances.

at the very least. not to mention violative of respondent People’s right of procedural due process. petitioner and counsel had already been notified of the 19 May 1999 schedule of promulgation. What's more. with notice to the accused. that as early as 4 May 1999. thus. allegedly a representative of petitioner. Appropriately. It is on this basis that judicial discretion is balanced in determining whether or not an accused-appellant should be admitted to bail pending appeal of his conviction vis-à-vis the increased possibility or likelihood of flight. the subject medical certificate[36] merely states that petitioner was diagnosed to be suffering from hypertension. Upon examination. Another telling evidence of the violation of petitioner’s original bail bond is revealed by the Process Server’s Return. Nowhere in the original records of the RTC does it even show that the prosecution was informed of petitioner’s application for bail. much less the approval of such application. Approval of an application for bail on appeal. a medical certificate was hand delivered and filed by a certain Joey Perez. His absence was a clear contravention of the conditions of his bail bond to say the least. As evidenced by the undertaking printed on the face of the bond issued by Eastern Insurance and Surety Corporation and likewise required under Section 6[35] of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Noting that the raison d'être for such requirement is the discretionary nature of the admission to bail of an accused after conviction. Further.fortifies the declaration as to its invalidity. failing to allow it to object. As when there is a concurrence of the enumerated circumstances and the range of penalty imposed. The first having been postponed in view of the Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation (on 5 May 1999) filed by petitioner’s counsel. though discretionary. It failed to elucidate further any concomitant conditions necessitating petitioner’s physical incapability to present himself before the court even for an hour or two. on the day of the promulgation of the latter’s judgment. indicating petitioner’s change of address without prior notice to the RTC. is not the product of sound judicial discretion but of impulse and arbitrariness. it ordered the promulgation of its judgment in absentia. stating therein the reason for the latter’s absence. it should be recalled as well. absent any justifiable reason. the subject document failed to indicate evidence of affiant’s*37+ identity making its due execution doubtful. it considered the absence of petitioner unjustified.*38+ indicated at the dorsal portion of the RTC’s Produce Order. It also issued a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner. the prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to object and present evidence. petitioner must present himself before the court for the reading of the judgment of the RTC in order to render himself to the execution thereof. despite due notice. the RTC found insubstantial the explanation proffered. While. though notarized. indeed. absent the knowledge of the prosecution of such application or. it states: . such assessment must be exercised in accordance with applicable legal principles. if necessary. This is especially true in this case as a close scrutiny of the original records of the case at bar reveals that petitioner violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification – his failure to appear before the RTC.

undersigned return (sic) again to Fersal Apartelle located at 130 Kalayaan Ave. there can be no other conclusion than that at the time petitioner filed his notice of appeal and during the pendency of his appeal – even until now – he remains at large. As pointed out by the Court in the case of People v. therefore. he losses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. petitioner’s alleged failure to post a bail bond on appeal is. Rule 124 of the Rules of Court presents the procedural requirements regarding appeals taken to the Court of Appeals. the act of jumping bail. petitioner failed to hold himself amenable to the orders and processes of the RTC. placing himself beyond the pale. The court may also. he is disallowed by law to be admitted to bail on appeal. having jumped bail and eluded arrest until the present. as amended. The issue of the validity of petitioner’s bail bond on appeal having been laid to rest by Section 5 of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court. . the issue of whether or not petitioner has lost his right to appeal his conviction now ensues. upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. Arnold Alva. – The appellate court may. Thus. Appropriately. had no (sic) longer been residing nor holding office at the aforementioned address. under the circumstances. among otherthings. Prescinding from the above discussion. (sic) 1999. Inexorably. dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule. Quezon City for confirmation and indeed the addressee. The manner of review of petitioner’s conviction is governed by the Rules of Court.] By virtue of the second paragraph of the abovequoted provision. and protection of the law. for all legal intents and purposes. viz: SEC. the conviction of petitioner to a period beyond six (6) years but less than twenty (20) years in tandem with attendant circumstances effectively violating his bail without valid justification should have effectively precluded him from being admitted to bail on appeal. Section 8 of said Rule finds application to the case at bar. upon motion of the appellee or its own motion and notice to the appellant. 8. inconsequential as. (sic) Diliman. It was an unmistakable arrant breach of the conditions of his bail bond. By failing to inform the RTC of his change of address.PROCESS SERVER’S RETURN This certifies that on the 17th day of May. will result in the outright dismissal of petitioner’s appeal. dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.[39] the reason for said rule is that: [O]nce an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country. except in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio. Mapalao. [ mphasis supplied.

petitioner impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the RTC final and executory. However.[41] we enunciated that: There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself. petitioner revealed his contempt of the law and placed himself in a position to speculate at his pleasure his chances for a reversal. the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. then the respondent Hon. petitioner has waived his right to appeal. Within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure. In the case of People v. to diminish the confusion brought about by ostensibly equating the term “jurisdiction of the court (over the person of the accused)” with that of “custody of the law”.[43] Evidently. He rationalizes that: [T]he records of the case readily reveals that several pleadings were filed by the petitioner before the lower court even after the promulgation of judgment was made. such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced (citation omitted). This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision.Thus. once acquired. On the other hand. For the resolution of the second issue. If the posting of the bond which was approved by the same Regional Trial Court who rendered the decision subject of appeal is not yet a submission to the jurisdiction of the court. and yet not be in the custody of the law. Once more. such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant.[42] Moreover. but continues until the case is terminated. as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. petitioner is . by jumping bail. he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him x x x. herein petitioner went to the court and posted a bail bond. This. Ang Gioc. The term: Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender (citation omitted). one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. is not lost at the instance of parties. the question posed has now become academic. it is fundamental to differentiate the two. Right after the promulgation of the decision in the lower court. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.[40] By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the land. He may avail of it or not. jurisdiction. Coming now to the second issue of whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the custody of the law. while (the term) jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance (citation omitted). we cannot condone. as when an accused escapes from the custody of the law. Court of Appeals must have been thinking of another matter beyond the comprehension of the petitioner and obviously outside the matters being contemplated by law and the Rules of Court. but the right of appeal is not one of them. it should have been sufficient to state that for reasons stated in the foregoing discussion. petitioner argues that his act of filing several pleadings after the promulgation of the RTC’s judgment plus his filing of the application for his admission to bail should be considered a submission to the court’s jurisdiction. despite the posting of the subject bail bond.

The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. Anghad to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders. which dismissed petitioner’s appeal. but is not limited to. the petitioner has remained at large even as he hopes that his appeal. and it is hereby ordered: . Judge Manuel Muro is DIRECTED to issue forthwith a warrant of arrest for the apprehension of Petitioner Arnold Alva and for proper disposition of the case in line with the foregoing discussion. and consequently. No. In fine. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. SP No. WHEREFORE. alas. As to whether or not petitioner has placed himself under the custody of the CA. the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. he cannot be granted any relief by the CA. until and unless he submits himself to the custody of the law. Respondent. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. Parenthetically. Costs against the petitioner. It includes. the instant petition for certiorari. we cannot say the same for “*b+eing in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person.R. detention. J. He hopes in vain. will succeed and he can then appear before the Court to claim his victory. CR No.”*44+ In the case at bar. we cannot end this ponencia without calling attention to a very disturbing fact – that petitioner admits of being the author of a falsified public document was treated nonchalantly by authorities. OCON. assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 24077. TULIAO. mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE.correct in that there is no doubt that the RTC already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused petitioner – when he appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged – notwithstanding the fact that he jumped bail and is now considered a fugitive. ALBERTO P. versus VIRGILIO M.R. [2006V472] JOSE C. binding him to become obedient to the will of the law (citation omitted). this petition. In this connection. finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D.2006 Mar 311st DivisionG. SO ORDERED. and ROMEO B. who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty. DALMACIO. are hereby AFFIRMED. 158763D E C I S I O N CHICO-NAZARIO. petitioner. in CA-G. MIRANDA. Petitioners. being a fugitive. in the manner of being under the jurisdiction of the courts.

On 27 April 2001. all issued by public respondent Judge Anastacio D. as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos. On 22 April 1999. SPO2 Maderal was arrested. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 2. Sometime in September 1999. Order dated September 21. son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program. to reinvestigate. PO3 Romeo B. 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14. the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose “Pempe” Miranda. 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6. 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan. PO3 Romeo B. Dalmacio. Miranda. On 25 June 2001. SPO2 Alexander Micu. Dalmacio. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17. which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that. 2001. Agustin. a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe. 2001. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. On 29 June 2001. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City. he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. 2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder. Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño. and SPO3 Alberto P. SPO3 Alberto P. SPO1 Ruben B. on 9 October 2001. AFFIRMING[. Ocon. Joint Order dated October 16.] and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25.1. Isabela. and 3. In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001. Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners. Ramon. SPO2 Rodel Maderal. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Boyet dela Cruz. The venue was later transferred to Manila.[2] The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows: On 8 March 1996. and Amado Doe. and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we. Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. and another entered UPHOLDING. since the court did not acquire . being at large. SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan. acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt. Criminal Cases Nos. Isabela. two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan. and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.

No. Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari. On 25 October 2001. 16 October 2001. we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondent’s petition for certiorari. the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City.jurisdiction over their persons. he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. Hence. On 19 November 2001. erred in . 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524. On 18 December 2002. On 12 November 2001. mandamus and prohibition with this Court. this Court took note of respondent’s cash bond evidenced by O. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001. with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order. State Prosecutor Leo S. In the meantime. this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision. September 21. 2001 and November 14. On 17 August 2001.R. Reyes to the Department of Justice. prohibition and mandamus. seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case. Consequently. Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt. Anghad dated August 17. petitioners bring forth to this Court the following assignments of error: FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR With all due respect. 2001. the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. and. petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T.” On 21 November 2001. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. this petition. and 22 October 2001. the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003. alleging that Judge Anghad “deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder. The facts of the case being undisputed. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution. 2001. but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001. 21 September 2001. and issued the temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits. and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001. October 16. as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad. the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D.

Thus. petitioners argue.upholding.”*4+ Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in applications for bail. 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan. RTJ91-764. to reinvestigate. to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either through compulsory process. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Wit all due respect. SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR With all due respect. and in ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners. assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest. 1992). Jr. Philippines. such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. November 6. Furthermore.[3] Proceeding from this premise. such as warrant of arrest. the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda. A. the order of dismissal issued therein having become final and executory. . It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M.. the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. Combing. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City. Philippines. affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6. Pico vs.M. an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused. on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City. the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. nor custody of law over the body of the accused. 36-3523 and No. Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their “Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation. Alfonso V. and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners. The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals’ ruling that: [A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. No. such jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion. or through his voluntary appearance.

The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads: . in Santiago v. Vasquez[7]: The voluntary appearance of the accused. On the matter of bail. and yet not be in the custody of the law.[11] Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person.[13] cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that case. In Allado vs. through Justice Florenz D. Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail. 12a). Judge Combong. binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. The outright dismissal of the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a). whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty. is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover. such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. Jr. appearing for arraignment. detention. Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion. petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera: Except in applications for bail. Diokno (232 SCRA 192). Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307). petitioners invoke our pronouncement. On the other hand. In Paul Roberts vs.[9] while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. The statement in Pico v. but is not limited to.[8] Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender. entering trial) or by filing bail. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 102[5]). the Court ordered the case transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause. the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs. Regalado.. the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been arrested. one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.[6] In arguing. It includes. since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused.In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications for bail.[10] One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. on the other hand. it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief.[12] Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused.

A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the application for bail.[14] While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.[15] As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance. Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan,*16+ we held that “*t+he purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, ‘bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law.’” The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor.[17] There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included;[18] (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest. To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law. In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody

of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest: 1. In Allado v. Diokno,[19] on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us. 2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,*20+ upon the accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused. 3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,[21] on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest. We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to enswer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the case. Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time of the day and night.[22] Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt. In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights,[23] demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after. Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion. We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to the

Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the case. After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, “x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper.”*24+ Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutor’s resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor’s resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest. In Webb v. de Leon,[25] we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing of the information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same ground. The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question: In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accusedmovant, Jose “Pempe” Miranda.*26+ Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.[27]

8. Section 2. Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost .[31] The supporting documents are the following: 1. Information dated 22 June 2001. however. for the arrest of the petitioners is apparent from the face of the order itself. In failing to find probable cause. procedurally. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio. Ocon. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao. focused on the substantive part of said section. According to petitioners: In this case. 9. i. Judge Anghad. 6. 97-160355. 5. following the requirement under Lim. Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. which clearly stated that the determination of probable cause was based on the certification. under oath. Judge Tumaliuan’s Joint Order contains no such indication that he relied solely on the prosecutor’s certification. of the Constitution. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan.*28+ Petitioners’ claim is untrue. Reyes. Felix[30] and People v. of the fiscal and not on a separate determination personally made by the Judge. including the supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause. and 10..e. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon. Inting. Sr. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez.[29] The records of the case show that the prosecutor’s certification was accompanied by supporting documents.However. Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz. the Court proceeded to determine the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x x. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case. we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III. 2. 3. Hence. 4. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal. 7. we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion. the existence of probable cause. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary: Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based only on the fiscal’s certification. v.

the October 9.”*32+ We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan. x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. certainly makes his sworn Statements a “narration of falsehood and lies” and that because of the decision acquitting said officers “who were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27. It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the province of the determination of probable cause. (2) it was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years.” it requires “less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction. of what use is Maderal’s statements when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case No. Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground. United States. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to. that there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of Justice. and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other. Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As we held in Webb[33]: A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Indeed.” This Court agrees with the defense’s views.two years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation. et al. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x. 97-160355. while probable cause demands more than “bare suspicion. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.” A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution. RTC. Manila. and (4) it was given during the election period amidst a “politically charged scenario where “Santiago City voters were pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S. not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the following explanation: Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information. neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely. 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder. Branch 41. . However. Navarro. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt. he pinpointed to Mr. fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value. 2001 statements. Miranda – the mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators. As well put in Brinegar v.. it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful. Wilfredo Leano. among other things. and based from his sworn statements. the probative value of his statements is practically nil.

The bond was filed the day after the informations were dismissed. even of this Court. acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the prosecution in that case. Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceeding. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a .[34] This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. 2001. G. praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause.xxxx This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18. since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence. upon the filing of a bond. who was still at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leaño case was presented. too. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order. Accordingly. Judge Anghad’s dismissal of the informations two days after we resolved to issue. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leaño was based on reasonable doubt. the two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed. without a personal determination of probable cause. A decision. 13886. It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leaño. fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value. an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of the prosecution’s version of the facts therein. acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime. We cannot let unnoticed. a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case. No.. whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. We disagree. we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal.”*35+ On the contrary.[36] According to the petitioners. The accused in Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao’s son. petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan. but instead directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of arrest. We never ruled in Leaño that the crime did not happen.R. if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leaño. which interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Court’s resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad. In their second assignment of error. et al. “it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful. Wilfredo Leaño. it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done so.

As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. and are also available to this Court. As we have ruled in Allado v.matter of scrupulous semantics. Court of Appeals. allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. 2001. the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits. Diokno and Roberts v. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari.[38] . 36-3524. therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed. especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction. the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order of November 14.) Joint Order dated October 16.) Joint Order dated August 17. 2001. 2001 of Judge Anghad. 2001. it would have been legally permissible for them to do so. the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest based on a determination of probable cause. the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. and 4.) Order dated September 21. we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause. Firstly. only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private respondent. Obviously. the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan. the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. 3. to wit: 1. also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 2001. 36-3523 and No. According to petitioners: It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated November 14. Hence. 2. in the same vein. Judge Anghad’s order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified. 2001. Even if. the determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria.) Joint Order dated October 22. petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. however. There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment In their third assignment of error. alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision. The records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals.[37] which issued the warrants of arrest. the Joint Order dated November 14. Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals. Secondly. Certainly.

We further resolve to follow the case of People v.[40] As to respondent Tuliao’s prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case. the petition is DENIED. however. antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. with the modification that Criminal Cases No. respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt. we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliao’s filing of a bond in the amount of P20. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005. pursuant to Article VIII. alleging that Judge Anghad “deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder.00.000. seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent. respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave abuse of discretion. of the Constitution. While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt. WHEREFORE. Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In any case. 36-3523 and No.[39] the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should be construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order. Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15 November 2001. the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy.[41] by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. In this connection. The Court of Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. but with this Court. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001. . we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals. we hold that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order. Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals. around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila.” On 21 November 2001. Section 4. in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliao’s petition for certiorari. prohibition and mandamus. In claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. SPO1 Leaño. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution. 36-3524 to the City of Manila.

Ocon. conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002. delivered a speech in the “Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the Philippines” held at the Balay Kalinaw.[6] . No. who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof. 4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance. No. 2002[3] and the September 18.2009 Apr 24En BancG. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. while involving the same issues. 154473 On January 31.[5] The speech was subsequently published in the February 4 and 5. Alberto P. 2002[4] Orders of the RTC of Quezon City.1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago. Q-02-109407. Benipayo. and (2) G. 2002 issues of the Manila Bulletin. 2002[2] Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. Respondent. No. J. is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases. Costs against Petitioners. and 5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch. Branch 101 in Criminal Case No. SO ORDERED. Maderal. 154473 assailing the June 18. 154473DECISION NACHURA. Isabela. University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus. Petitioners. 3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer. Dalmacio.: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed under Rules 45 and 122 of the Rules of Court: (1) G. then Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Q-02-109406. and accused Rodel T. 6) Finally. respondent Alfredo L. Quezon City.R. Branch 102 in Criminal Case No. 2002. 155573 challenging the June 25. rest on different factual settings. Judge Anastacio D. The petitions. 2002[1] and the June 23.R. versus ALFREDO L.R. BENIPAYO. 2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago. Isabela. [2009V437E] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION.R. Miranda. thus: G. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Romeo B. No.

they are at it again. No.[14] Aggrieved. the City Prosecutor filed an Information[10] for libel against the respondent.[7] filed. believing that it was the one alluded to by the respondent when he stated in his speech that Even worse.5 billion-peso price tag. it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of all other courts. While the said motion remained unresolved. docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02109407 and considering as moot and academic petitioner’s motion to inhibit. Now. While the RTC found that respondent was no longer an impeachable officer because his appointment was not confirmed by Congress. an Affidavit-Complaint[8] for libel. On motion for reconsideration. it was the Office of the Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.5 billion contract for a registration solution that could have been bought for 350 million pesos. respondent. moved for the dismissal of the case on the assertion that the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an impeachable officer and thus. could not be criminally prosecuted before any court during his incumbency. But reason intervened and no contract was signed. petitioners timely filed before the Court. Accordingly. with the RTC of Quezon City. respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP-QC). Q-02103406. the trial court adhered to its ruling that it was not vested with jurisdiction to hear the libel case. Q-02-109407. through its authorized representative. and that. 2002. which is the subject of G. Branch 102. and an ID solution that isn’t even a requirement for voting. Arguing that he was an impeachable officer. on pure questions of law. trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly disadvantageous to the government that it offends common sense to say that it would be worth the 6. the Commission came right up to the brink of signing a 6.[9] Despite the challenge. the trial court issued the challenged Order[13] dismissing Criminal Case No. Salazar of Branch 102 could not impartially preside over the case because his appointment to the judiciary was made possible through the recommendation of respondent’s father-in-law.THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FIRST RESOLVED THE MOTION TO INHIBIT BEFORE RESOLVING THE MOTION TO DISMISS.R. .Petitioner corporation. for his part. Petitioner later filed a Motion for Inhibition and Consolidation. the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[15] under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following grounds: I. assuming he can be criminally prosecuted. 155573] pending with Branch 101 of the RTC.[12] On June 18.[11] contending that Judge Jaime N. it ruled that the case had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction considering that the alleged libel was committed by respondent in relation to his office—he delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair. Petitioner further moved that the case be ordered consolidated with the other libel case [Criminal Case No.

what for*?+ *T+hey wouldn’t tell me. as COMELEC Chair. [who is+ funding this? I think it’s pretty obvious. it is what’s been *so+ happening to the Photokina deal.*18+ Petitioner considered respondent’s statement as defamatory. the following conversation transpired: Drilon: Are you saying. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT “IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE”.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE. Q-02109406 by filing the corresponding Information[21] with the RTC of Quezon City.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY ACCUSED “IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE. they have already spent in excess of 2.” AND III. according to *c+hargé d’*a+ffaires of the U. on pure questions of law. [d]ollars. that COMELEC funds are being used for a “PR” campaign against you? Is that what you are saying? Benipayo: No. he being an impeachable officer. however.[16] G.*25+ Displeased with the rulings of the trial court. Q-02-109406 for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. The television show’s episode that day was entitled “COMELEC Wars. 155573 On March 13. The RTC. 2002. *it’s+ Photokina funds.+ in a letter sent to me in July of 2001.R. 2002. and COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda Tangcangco were guests of the talk show “Point Blank. Now you asked me. At that time*. Chairman. respondent. . AND II. No.4 [m]illion U. the trial court issued the assailed Order[23] dismissing Criminal Case No.[20] The City Prosecutor. admittedly. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION IN THE INFORMATION THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE. and. even if criminal prosecution were possible. filed a Complaint-Affidavit[19] for libel.” hosted by Ces Drilon and televised nationwide on the ANC-23 channel.”*17+ In that episode. Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information raising similar arguments that the court had no jurisdiction over his person. you see. 2002 Order. through its authorized representative. You know.*24+ denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. petitioners seasonably filed before this Court. Branch 101.[22] On June 25. another Petition for Review on Certiorari[26] under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following grounds: I. in the further assailed September 18.+ that’s about 120 *m+illion pesos and I said. and that.II. I think *it’s+ not COMELEC funds.S. Embassy*. Respondent similarly questioned the jurisdiction of the OCP-QC. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE BELOW. consequently instituted Criminal Case No. jurisdiction rested with the Sandiganbayan.S.

thus: The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter. if the said courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction to try the offense. EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE. unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.[32] is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations. in Jalandoni v. is whether. under our current laws. jurisdiction over libel cases. 4363. as aforesaid. which the parties.[28] consolidated the cases. the Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense xxx. and even the trial court. is shared by the RTC with the Sandiganbayan. the Regional Trial Court] that is specifically designated to try a libel case. it would be pointless to still determine whether the crime is committed in relation to office. The Court.”*37+ and despite the fact that the phrase “by similar .[27] Considering that the two petitions. The Ruling of the Court The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their pleadings on the issue of whether the alleged criminal acts of respondent are committed in relation to his office.III.[34] acknowledged the unmistakable import of the said provision: There is no need to make mention again that it is a court of first instance [now.[30] Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).] More than three decades ago. All that is required is application. This is one of those statutory provisions that leave no room for interpretation. the Court. notes that both parties are working on a wrong premise. failed to identify. or written defamations to be more specific.[31] as amended by Republic Act No. Its language is categorical. They are of the conviction that the resolution of the said question will ultimately determine which court—the RTC or the Sandiganbayan—has jurisdiction over the criminal cases filed. the Court.[33] [Underscoring and italics ours. upon the recommendation of the Clerk of Court. What the law ordains must then be followed. Endaya. shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now.[35] This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written defamations is echoed in Bocobo v. however.[29] The core issue for the resolution of the Court in these twin cases is whether the RTC has jurisdiction over libel cases to the exclusion of all other courts. its meaning is free from doubt.[36] where the Court further declared that jurisdiction remains with the trial court even if the libelous act is committed “by similar means. Estanislao. The foremost concern. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ENDORSED THE CASE TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT OUTRIGHT. involve the same issues and the same parties. Indeed. Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action.

This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter in G. although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trail Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts. Upon elevation of the matter to us. which it is commanded to remand to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition. 1995 are declared null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction. The Court in Bocobo vs. and October 18. 360. In that case. 72 SCRA 520 and Jalandoni vs. and said Court is enjoined from further taking cognizance of and proceeding with Criminal Case No. “Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court.means” is not repeated in the latter portion of Article 360.” Another case involving the same question was cited as resolving the matter: “Anent the question of jurisdiction. in Manzano v. as follows: “WHEREFORE. the MTC judge opined that it was the first level courts which had jurisdiction due to the enactment of RA 7691. Even if it is a later enactment. Branch 32 and Isah v. Valera. the Court had been unwavering in its pronouncement that the expanded jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts cannot be exercised over libel cases. 1995. a law of a special nature. has laid down the rule that Regional Trial courts have the exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases. hence. 1995. 32 [2]). correctly cited by the Court of Appeals. because it is a well-settled principle of construction that.[39] we explained at length that: The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. we now hold that public respondent committed an error in ordering that the criminal case for libel be tried by the MTC of Bangued.A. The contention ** that R. For. 7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel cases cannot be sustained. it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC. in case of conflict between a general law and a special . respondent judge’s orders were nullified for lack of jurisdiction. People vs. the petition is granted: the respondent Court’s Orders dated August 14. 55 SCRA 261. Hon. No. and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts (such as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law.” Conformably with [these] rulings. said law however. Estanislao. the expanded jurisdiction conferred by R.*38+ In these cases. said law is of a general character. Thus. 7691 (Sec. are special in character. September 7. No. we ** find no reversible error committed by public respondent Court of Appeals in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.” A later enactment like RA 7691 does not automatically override an existing law.A. Red wherein a similar question of jurisdiction over libel was raised. 43-00548. which categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases [is] lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts). and in those that followed. excludes therefrom ** cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts **.A. Revised Penal Code) which imposable penalty is lodged within the Municipal Trial Court’s jurisdiction under R. 7691 to inferior courts cannot be applied to libel cases. 123263. MTC of Quezon City.R. Endaya. While libel is punishable by imprisonment of six months and one day to four years and two months (Art.

hence settled the matter with finality: “RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING. from the provisions of R. Lastly. there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases. CARNAPPING. in brief. this Court delineated the proper jurisdiction over libel cases. The two laws. MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES.” nderscoring supplied)*40+ As we have constantly held in Jalandoni. MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS. 32. in Administrative Order No. as it still stands at present. similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs. and analogous cases. In the law which broadened the jurisdiction of the first level courts. effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. in the absence of an express repeal or modification. 129. the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Furthermore. therefore. People v. as amended by Republic Act . ROBBERY. did not divest the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is committed in relation to office. 104-96 issued 21 October 1996. 1606. jurisdiction over defamations in writing or by similar means. for an implied repeal.P. in the same way. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES. then the amending law should have clearly so indicated because implied repeals are not favored. Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.[42] The grant to the Sandiganbayan[43] of jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to (public) office. the specific provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC.[41] Manzano. a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. The inconsistency referred to in Section 6 of RA 7691. Moreover. we must. xxxx C “LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS. that is. A special law cannot be repealed. 7691.A. Presidential Decree No. a substantial conflict should exist between the new and prior laws. declare herein that the law.law. there is no absolute prohibition barring Regional Trial Courts from taking cognizance of certain cases over which they have been priorly granted special and exclusive jurisdiction. Br. A subsequent enactment of a law defining the jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override. The broad and general phraseology of Section 4. as aforesaid. As much as possible. a pre-condition must be found. dictates that criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts. DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES. Bocobo. Such grant of the RTC (previously CFI) was categorically contained in the first sentence of the amended Sec. 32 of B. does not apply to cases of criminal libel. amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. If there was such intent. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by a general law on the MTC. Absent an express repeal. must be absolutely incompatible.

NACHURA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: [1984V134E] MAYOR FRANCISCO LECAROZ. Rollo) . Criminal Cases Nos. sell the gasoline therein to the public issuing the invoices of said gasoline station and some pieces of yellow pad paper for the purpose. in the municipality of Sta. taking advantage of his public position and which offense was committed in relation to his office. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. "CONTRARY TO LAW.1984 Mar 22En BancG. whether it be right or wrong. Cruz.: On October 21. 8249. wilfully. Philippines.[44] cannot be construed to have impliedly repealed. the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair. WHEREFORE. gross error. petitioner. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 are REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for further proceedings. it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation to office. Province of Marinduque. depriving Pedro Par of the possession and exercise of a lawful trade or occupation. 1980. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 and their remand to the respective Regional Trial Courts for further proceedings. the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are GRANTED. Marinduque. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. orders the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos.[45] Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification.R. force and/or violence. vs. J. which reads: "That on or about July 2. following the above disquisition. and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case.No. unlawfully and feloniously take over the operation and control of the gasoline station owned by Pedro Par. premises considered. is. respondent. and padlock dispensing pump thereof without authority of law. or even simply modified. therefore. 10. did then and there. the above-named accused. L-56384D E C I S I O N RELOVA. petitioner was charged with the crime of grave coercion in an information filed before the respondent court. SO ORDERED. such exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC. a public officer. by means of threat. Having said that." (p. SANDIGANBAYAN. 1979. Thus. the Court finds unnecessary any further discussion of the other issues raised in the petitions. This Court. Cruz. being then the mayor of Sta. No. thereby preventing said Pedro Par from doing something not prohibited by law or compelling him to do something against his will.

the President of the Philippines. 1486 which mandates in Section 4(c) thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over "other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees. petitioner instituted this proceeding for certiorari seeking the same relief. and shall remain accountable to the people. loyalty. 5. Accordingly. It states: "SEC. alleging that — 1. Public office is a public trust. 1486. as amended. which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Hence. Assuming that respondent has jurisdiction to try this case. Said constitutional provision delegates to the lawmaking body the determination of "such other offenses" committed by public officers over which the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction." Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information principally on the ground that the respondent court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the case and that it should have been filed with the ordinary courts in Marinduque where the alleged crime was committed. the information was amended with the insertion of the phrase "by ordering his policemen companions" between the words "Pedro Par" and "to sell the gasoline.On November 27. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility. Presidential Decree No. The intention of the framers of the New Constitution is patent from the explicit language thereof as well as from Section 1 of the same Article XIII titled "Accountability of Public Officers. and 3. is violative of the provision of Section 5 of Article XIII of the New Constitution because the former enlarges what the latter limited. though not involving graft and corrupt practices." There is no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 4(c) of Presidential Decree No. in relation to their office as may be determined by law. as may be determined by law. exercising his lawmaking authority and prerogative vested in him by the Constitution. The offense for which he was charged is not related to his office as mayor. 1486. a far away island. 1980. issued Presidential Decree No. Article XIII of the Constitution. integrity. it committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the transfer of the hearing of the case to the Court of First Instance of Marinduque because all witnesses of both the prosecution and defense will have to come from Marinduque. including those employed in government-owned or . as amended." which provides:. Respondent court denied the motion." It is clear from the above-quoted constitutional provision that respondent court has jurisdictional competence not only over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices committed by public officers and employees but also over other crimes committed by them in relation to their office. "SECTION 1. The National Assembly shall create a special court. provides for the creation of a special court known as the Sandiganbayan and defines the jurisdiction thereof. Section 5. 2. and efficiency. to be known as Sandiganbayan. including those in government-owned or controlled corporations. The offense of grave coercion is not among those mentioned or determined by Section 4(c).

respondent court retains jurisdiction over the case subject of instant petition. respondent's denial of petitioner's request for the transfer of the case to the Court of First Instance of Marinduque was well-grounded and certainly not a grave abuse of discretion." mphasis supplied) When the lawmaking authority chose to include all public office-related offenses over which respondent court shall have jurisdiction. if petitioner were not the mayor he would not have allegedly directed the policeman and the latter would not have followed his orders and instructions to sell Pedro Par's gasoline and padlocked the station. like constitutional officers. it must continue exercising the same to the exclusion of all other courts. 1861 states: "SECTION 2.controlled corporation. 1606.00. including those in government-owned or controlled corporations. they are no longer within the concurrent jurisdiction of respondent court and the regular courts but are now vested in the latter. Respondent court. Section 2. as amended." mphasis supplied) The information against petitioner was filed in 1980. pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. has concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts. 1861 amended Presidential Decree No. or fine of P6. Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides: .000. 1606. is penalized by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding P500. All cases pending in the Sandiganbayan or in the appropriate courts as of the date of the effectivity of this Decree shall remain with and be disposed of by the courts where they are pending. and it provides. 31 SCRA 551. The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with jurisdiction over "public officers and employees." Thus. however. It is enough that the act is within the constitutional power of the lawmaking body or authority and. Section 2 of said Presidential Decree No. Presidential Decree No. However. ordering his policemen to sell the gasoline therein and padlocking the dispensing pump thereof without legal authority. In Laquian vs. 1983. We ruled that "in case of concurrent jurisdiction. that where the penalty for offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six(6) years. the courts are bound to follow and apply. if it is. Stated differently. The crime for which petitioner is charged. It is true that on March 23. it is axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts. The original and amended information clearly alleged that petitioner took advantage of his position as mayor when he intimidated the gasoline station's owner in taking over the operation and control of the establishment." There are exceptions. as amended.00 under the first paragraph of Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code. among others. particularly those declared to be removed by impeachment. the courts will not review questions of legislative policy. Baltazar. in relation to their office. The fact that he is the mayor did not vest him with legal authority to take over the operations and control of complainant's gasoline station and padlock the same without observing due process. therefore. grave coercion. Well established is the rule that once a court acquires jurisdiction in a case where said jurisdiction is concurrent with another court.

It is quite apparent from the explicit character of the above provision that the. Fernando. tried and thereafter punished in accordance with law." Thus. but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution. effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor. to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an offense that carries the penalty of removal from office. 465-466). the Members of the Supreme Court. and conviction of. the filing of a criminal action "in accordance with law" may not prosper. would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law. SO ORDERED . and that if the same does not result in a conviction and the official is not hereby removed." The clear implication is. 1982 is hereby DISSOLVED. It is equally manifest that the party thus convicted may be proceeded against. and punishment. The above provision is a reproduction of what was found in the 1935 Constitution. otherwise. trial. trust or profit under the Republic."SEC. the provision proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method. 2. bribery. trust. other high crimes. trial and punishment according to law. the petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the temporary restraining order issued on March 12. or graft and corruption. treason. There can be no clearer expression of the constitutional intent as to the scope of the impeachment process (The Constitution of the Philippines. culpable violation of the Constitution. in his authoritative dissertation on the New Constitution. states that "judgment in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and disqualification to hold ANY office of honor. the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution. and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed from office on impeachment for. ACCORDINGLY. Chief Justice Enrique M. The President. pp. or profit under the Republic of the Philippines. in accordance with law.