LABOR STANDARDS LAW Construction of Labor Laws ―Retirement laws are liberally construed in favor of the persons intended
to be benefited, however, such interpretation cannot be made if there is a clear lack of consensual and statutory basis of the grant of retirement benefits.‖ [DIVINA S. LOPEZ vs. NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION] Limitations on Management Prerogative The exercise of management prerogative is not absolute. While it may be conceded that management is in the best position to know its operational needs, the exercise of management prerogative cannot be utilized to circumvent the law and public policy on labor and social justice. That prerogative accorded management could not defeat the very purpose for which our labor laws exist. By its very nature, encompassing as it could be, management prerogative must be exercised always with the principles of fair play at heart and justice in mind. [PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs. JOSELITO PASCUA, ET AL.] RA 8042; Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 An employee of a company or corporation engage in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment The employee or agent of a corporation engage in unlawful business naturally aids and abets in the carrying on of such business and will be prosecuted as a principal if, with knowledge of the business, its purpose and effect, he consciously contributes his efforts to its conduct and promotion however slight his contribution may be. [EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET.AL.vs CA] BOOK I Illegal Recruitment; Elements Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes either any activity within the meaning of ―recruitment and placement‖ defined under Art. 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code. [PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLOR GUTIERREZ Y TIMOD] Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale; Elements The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are: (1) the accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article 13(b) or in any prohibited activities under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas; and (3) the accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group. [PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSE DUJUA]
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale; Elements The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are: (1) the person undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13, paragraph (b), or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) said person does not have a license or authority to engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the act is committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group. The fact that the accused in an illegal recruitment did not sign nor issue some of the receipts for amounts received from complainants has no bearing on his culpability so long as complainants show through their respective testimonies and affidavits that the accused was involved in the prohibited recruitment. [PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. MARLENE OLERMO] Solidary Liability of Employer An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. Where it is shown that the employee was merely acting under the direction of his superiors and was unaware that his acts constituted a crime, he may not be held criminally liable for an act done for and in behalf of his employer. [PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ELIZABETH CORPUZ] BOOK III Double Holiday Pay Art. 94 of the Labor Code, as amended, affords a worker the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays. The provision is mandatory, regardless of whether an employee is paid on a monthly or daily basis. Unlike a bonus, which is a management prerogative, holiday pay is a statutory benefit demandable under the law. Since a worker is entitled to the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays, the fact that two holidays fall on the same date should not operate to reduce to nine the ten holiday pay benefits a worker is entitled to receive. [ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS] Double Holiday Pay The minimum allowable divisor is 287, which is the result of 365 days, less 52 Sundays and less 26 Saturdays (or 52 half Saturdays). Any divisor below 287 days means that the workers are deprived of their holiday pay for some or all of the ten legal holidays. [CEZAR ODANGO, ET AL. vs. NLRC, ET AL.] Leave Credits Despite their dismissal from the service, government employees are entitled to the leave credits that they have earned during the period of their employment. As a matter of fairness and law, they may not be deprived of such remuneration, which they have already earned prior to their dismissal. [ANSBERTO P. PAREDES vs. FRANCISCO S. PADUA] Liability of an Indirect Employer When the agency as contractor failed to pay the guards, the corporation as principal becomes jointly and severally liable for the guards' wages. Petitioner cannot evade its liability by claiming that it had religiously paid the compensation of guards as stipulated under the contract with the security agency. [MARIVELES SHIPYARD CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS]
Wage Order and its Exemption Section 7 of the NWPC Revised Guidelines on Exemption, which is the applicable rule on this matter, provides that the maximum period of exemption that can be accorded to a qualified applicant is only for one (1) year from the effectivity of the Wage Order. This non-extendable one year period of exemption is to afford protection to workers who may be unfairly affected by the deleterious effect of a prolonged exemption which is not in accord with the very purpose of the issuance of a Wage Order. [NASIPIT LUMBER COMPANY, PHILIPPINE WALLBOARD CORPORATION AND ANAKAN LUMBER COMPANY vs. NATIONAL WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, UNITED LUMBER AND GENERAL WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES and WESTERN AGUSAN WORKERS UNION] Wage Distortion A situation where an increase in prescribed wage rates results in the elimination or severe contraction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills, length of service, or other logical bases of differentiation. [BANKARD EMPLOYEES UNION-WORKERS ALLIANCE TRADE UNIONS vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION] Elements of Wage Distortion ―(1.) An existing hierarchy of positions with corresponding salary rates; (2) A significant change in the salary rate of a lower pay class without a concomitant increase in the salary rate of a higher one; (3) The elimination of the distinction between the two levels; and (4) The existence of the distortion in the same region of the country.‖ [BANKARD EMPLOYEES UNION-WORKERS ALLIANCE TRADE UNIONS vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION] BOOK V Money Claim Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. A money claim by a worker against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter only if there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the claim asserted and employee-employer relation. Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of justice. [EDUARDO G. EVIOTA vs. COURT OF APPEALS] Test to Determine Existence of Employer-Employee Relationship (1) the manner of selection and engagement; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of the power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of the power of control. Of these four, the last one is the most important. [EMPERMACO B. ABANTE, JR. vs. LAMADRID BEARING & PARTS CORP. and JOSE LAMADRID]
The converse holds true as well — the less control the hirer exercises. INC] Independent Contractor. [JOSE Y. annulment of judgment is allowed only where the ordinary remedies of new trial. several factors may be considered.] Litigation on the Merits As much as practicable.Independent Job Contractor Someone who (a) carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method. the more likely the worker is considered an independent contractor. MAERC INTEGRATED SERVICES. The principal employer becomes jointly and severally liable with the job contractor only for the payment of the employees' wages whenever the contractor fails to pay the same. COURT OF APPEALS] Independent Contractor In determining the existence of an independent contractor relationship. A radio broadcast specialist who works under minimal supervision is an independent contractor. The principal employer therefore becomes solidarily liable with the labor-only contractor for all the rightful claims of the employees. and CORAZON SAGUEMULLER vs. CA] CA Cannot Annul NLRC Decision The appellate court has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of a final and executory judgment of the NLRC. only vests in the Court of Appeals ―exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts. equipments. the contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. [SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs. Radio and Broadcast Talents The control test is the most important test our courts apply in distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor. SONZA vs. [NEW GOLDEN CITY BUILDERS & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. appeal. Petitioner's liability is that of a direct employer and thus solidarily liable. In Job-contacting.‖ Moreover. This test is based on the extent of control the hirer exercises over a worker. and (b) has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools. litigation should be decided on the merits and not on procedural technicalities. petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through s fault of petitioners. PAMPILO SEMILLANO]
. machineries. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORP.. The greater the supervision and control the hirer exercises. the law creates an employer-employee relationship for a limited purpose. The statement holds true especially in labor cases in which the defect has been cured by the motion for reconsideration. COURT OF APPEALS] Creation of Employer-Employee Relationship in Job Contracting In legitimate job contracting. [NEW GOLDEN CITY BUILDERS & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. work premises. [ELCEE FARMS. INC. [NOVELTY PHILIPPINES vs. free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof. Section 9 of BP 129 as amended. the more likely the worker is deemed an employee. and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of the business.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION] Computation of Benefits Respondent who was illegally dismissed from work is actually entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges as well as to his full backwages. JR. vs. rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. while illegality in the manner of dismissal is dismissal without due process. TONGSON] Well settled is the rule that technical rules of procedure shall not be strictly applied in labor cases. vs. A strict and rigid application of the rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be avoided. TOSTON]
. [BOLINAO SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION SERVICE. It is not enough for a company to merely declare that it has become overmanned.Final and Executory Judgments of the NLRC Except for correction of clerical errors. LIZO] Binding Effect of the Decision of the NLRC A position is redundant where it is superfluous. NLRC] Technicalities Not Strictly Applied in Labor Cases Article 221 of the Labor Code allows the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter to decide a case on the basis of position papers and other documents submitted by the parties without resorting to technical rules of evidence as observed in regular courts of justice. ARSENIO M. inclusive of allowances. even if the purpose is to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or of law. [CORPORATE INN HOTEL. final and executory judgments can neither be amended nor altered. evidence of business losses to justify the retrenchment of workers. [BONIFACIO ASUFRIN. dismissal based on the grounds provided by Article 282 of the Labor Code. [VAN MELLE PHILS vs. [TANJUAN vs. INC. JENNEVIE H. vs. employers may. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.] Litigation of the Case Should be on the Merits Cases should be determined on the merits. PHILIPPINE POSTAL SAVINGS BANK. The illegality of the act of dismissal constitutes discharge without just cause. ASPECT OF DUE PROCESS: ―(1) the legality of the act of dismissal. [CECONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. Pursuant to this policy. [PAL. after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses. It must produce adequate proof that such is the actual situation to justify the dismissal of the affected employees for redundancy. ET AL. vs. be allowed to present. INC. even on appeal. that is. on cogent grounds. VICTOR ENDAYA] Perfection of Appeal The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period for the same is jurisdictional in character. and (2) the legality in the manner of dismissal. INC.
are accorded not only respect but even finality and are deemed binding upon this Court so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. An appellee who has himself not appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the lower court. and public policy. AVINANTE. particularly where it is in absolute agreement with that of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. vs. vs. he is satisfied that they understand the terms and conditions of the settlement and that it was entered into freely and voluntarily by them and the agreement is not contrary to law. ET AL.YOLIBELLE S. as in this case. [TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE. INC. PEDRO M. COURT OF APPEALS ] Findings of Fact of the CA: When Binding to the Supreme Court Time and again the much-repeated but not so well-heeded rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. [SOLIDBANK CORPORATION vs. NLRC] Finality of Decision Once a decision or resolution becomes final and executory. GATAN] When Judgment has become Final and Executory A party who has not appealed from a decision cannot seek any relief other than what is provided in the judgment appealed from. that the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and secondly. MA. INC. representing her deceased husband. [GALLERA DE GUISON HERMANOS. It is only in rare instances that the court relaxes the rule upon a showing of substantial compliance with it and to prevent patent injustice. [R & E TRANSPORT. CRUZ] Validity of Compromise Agreement A compromise agreement entered into by the parties not in the presence of the Labor Arbiter before whom the case is pending shall be approved by him if. COURT OF APPEALS and GERARDO A.]
. [UNIVERSITY OF IMMACULATE CONCEPCION. ASUNCION C. particularly the complainants. LATAG] Payment of Appeal Bond Payment of the appeal bond is a jurisdictional requisite for the perfection of an appeal to the NLRC. ET AL. vs. vs. [FILSYSTEMS INC. after confronting the parties. ET AL. Such order is not appealable. LATAG. AVELINA P. GALO S. morals. vs..Consequence of Illegal Dismissal Firstly. [KING INTEGRATED SECURITY SERVICES. the payment of backwages corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement. and then seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. it is the ministerial duty of the court or tribunal to order its execution. GARCIA] Exhaustion of Remedies The remedy of an aggrieved party in a Decision or Resolution of the Secretary of the DOLE is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy. vs. INC. INC.
COURT OF APPEALS] Surface Bargaining.] Interpretation of CBA Contracts which are not ambiguous are to be interpreted according to their literal meaning and not beyond their obvious intendment.] Collective Bargaining Agreement. ET AL. unless restrained by the appropriate court. Signing Bonus A bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation but it may nevertheless be granted on equitable considerations as when the giving of such bonus has been the company's long and regular practice or even if not a practice. where neither concedes anything and demands the impossible. [SMC QUARRY 2 WORKERS UNION — FEBRUARY SIX MOVEMENT vs.] Jurisdiction of the Med-Arbiter and the Secretary of Labor It is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Med-Arbiter and the Office of the Secretary in certification election proceedings to resolve this issue. [TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS. The remedy of an aggrieved party in a Decision or Resolution of the Secretary of the DOLE is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy. TITAN MEGABAGS INDUSTRIAL CORP. ET AL. COURT OF APPEALS. [MINDANAO STEEL CORPORATION vs. even if the union acted in good faith in the belief that the company was
. Blue-Sky Bargaining Surface bargaining is defined as ―going through the motions of negotiating‖ without any legal intent to reach an agreement. [STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION vs.Blue-Sky Bargaining is defined as ―unrealistic and unreasonable demands in negotiations by either or both labor and management. There was no longer any emergency. CORPORATION WORKERS' ASSOCIATION (TMPCWA) vs. There is no showing in the record that despite the assumption by the SOLE of the dispute between the petitioner and the respondent. to the exclusion of all other adjudicating agencies.‖ It actually is not collective bargaining at all. When this case was filed. COURT OF APPEALS ] Strike and Lockout The respondents' claim of good faith is not a valid excuse to dispense with the procedural steps for a lawful strike. [GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION vs. CONFESOR. the Med-Arbiter and later on the Office of the Secretary acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and the parties to it. urgency or a pressing necessity for the CA to still issue a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus.MA. the entire records of the case shall be remanded to the office of origin for implementation of the Decision. NIEVES R. Upon finality of the Decision of the Secretary.Duty to Bargain The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement within three (3) years from the effectivity of the original CBA. the bonus was agreed upon by the parties or unilaterally offered as an additional incentive. the petitioner is bent on staging a strike against the respondent in defiance by the petitioner of the order of the SOLE. MINSTEEL FREE WORKERS ORGANIZATION (MINFREWO-NFL) CAGAYAN DE ORO] Jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor Decision or Resolution of the Secretary of the DOLE on appeal shall be final and executory. [PHILACOR vs.
JR. COURT OF APPEALS] Probationary Employee Probationary employee is one who. knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a valid ground for termination from employment of a union officer. the said strike is illegal. Computation Our computation of the 6-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the 6th month following. competence and attitude of the employee while the latter seeks to prove to the employer that he has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for permanent employment. is under observation and evaluation to determine whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. [SAN JUAN DE DIOS EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION EMPLOYEES UNION-ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS et. Thus. Substantial evidence. which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal. [GALLARDO U. INC. mere participation in an illegal strike is not a sufficient ground for termination of the services of the union members. DE LA CRUZ.committing an unfair labor practice. for a given period of time. in providing for the consequences of an illegal strike. vs. (HOSPITAL) and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION] Consequence of an Illegal Strike Article 264 of the Labor Code. must have participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL.al.]
. Hence. the need for a union to adhere to and comply strictly with the procedural conditions sine qua non provided for by the law in staging a strike. vs. [FLORENCIO M. ALCIRA vs. [GRAND BOULEVARD HOTEL vs. RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES] Consequences of an Illegal Strike In Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code it could be gleaned that while a union officer can be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. JOSEPHINE JULIAN ] BOOK VI Probationary Period under Section 2. Hence. like petitioners herein. [RADIN C. However. [STAMFORD MARKETING CORP. Rule VII. the dismissal of the union‘s officers is in order. COURT OF APPEALS] Illegal Strike Continuing a strike in defiance of the return-to-work-order is a prohibited activity under Article 264 of the Labor Code. that such action is appealable to the Commission. ET AL. During the probationary period. SAN JUAN DE DIOS EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION. But the employer must still comply with the two-notice rule in dismissing the union officer. if no notice of strike and a strike vote were conducted. LUCERO vs. BASCON vs. NLRC ] Probationary Employment. of the Rules Implementing the Civil Service Law An employee with original appointment must serve a 6-month probationary period and the employee may be dropped from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity anytime before the expiration of the probationary period: Provided. makes a distinction between union officers and members who participated thereon. vs. [ELIZABETH C. an ordinary striking employee. NLRC. the employer is given the opportunity to observe the skill. may suffice. There must be proof that they committed illegal acts during the strike.
thoughtlessly. Just and Valid Cause In order to effect a valid dismissal of an employee.Dismissal. ARC-MEN INDUSTRIES. affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay. [NUGUIT vs. NLRC]
. Ordinary breach will not suffice. provides that an employer can terminate the employment of the employee concerned for "fraud or willful breach by an employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative.] Breach of Trust. [DIAMOND MOTORS CORP. JOSEPH PARAMIO. INC] Abandonment of Work To constitute abandonment. When Willful Article 282(c) of the Labor Code. unless the affiant themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. heedlessly or inadvertently. or willful disobedience of a lawful order of the employee. the exercise by the private respondents of their right cannot be considered in law as insubordination. without justifiable excuse. ROGELIO EJANDRA] Hearsay. Requisites For abandonment of work to exist. two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. COURT OF APPEALS] Abandonment of Work. Dismissal may also be based on any of the authorized causes provided for in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code. vs. Deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of the employee to go back to his work post and resume his employment must be established. vs. Affidavits Where the adverse party is deprived of opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. There is no law that compels an employee to accept a promotion for the reason that a promotion is in the nature of a gift or reward. even if merely as a result of a transfer. [PHIL. and (2) that there must have been a clear intention to severe the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. The burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to go back to work rests on the employer. vs. [PT & T CORPORATION vs. [R TRANSPORT CORP. the second element is the more determinative factor and should be manifested by some overt acts. EMPLOY SERVICES and RESOURCES. [SAMUEL SAMARCA vs. it is essential (1) that the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason. INC. COURT OF APPEALS] Right to Refuse Promotion An employee cannot be promoted. the law requires that there be just and valid cause as provided in Article 282 and that the employee was afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. without his consent. which a person has a right to refuse. ET AL." The loss of trust and confidence must be based on the willful breach of the trust reposed in the employee by his employer. Hence. knowingly and purposely. Of the two. as distinguished from an act done carelessly. Absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. Mere absence is not sufficient. as amended. A breach of trust is willful if it is done intentionally.
of the decision to dismiss an employee — and in between such notices. vs. just because said business operation or undertaking is not suffering from any loss or simply to provide the workers continued employment. [ACD INVESTIGATION SECURITY AGENCY. NLRC] Two-Notice Requirement (a) A written notice containing a statement of the cause for the termination to afford the employee ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of his representative. and (2) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. it is essential (1) that the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason. indicating therein the acts or omissions complained against. of the intention to dismiss. [SHOPPES MANILA. an opportunity for him to answer and rebut the charges against him. stating clearly the reason therefor. INC vs. CAMA vs. unreasonable or unlikely. to all their regular
. And since private respondents' cessation and closure of business was lawful. When Made The owner. INC. Just as no law forces anyone to go into business. for any bona fide reason. This fact negated the obligation to pay backwages. can lawfully close shop at anytime. if he so desires. SINGER SEWING MACHINE] Constructive Dismissal Constructive dismissal exists where there is a cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible. DAQUERA] Illegal Dismissal. Abandonment of Work For abandonment of work to exist. It would indeed be stretching the intent and spirit of the law if SC were to unjustly interfere with the management's prerogative to close or cease its business operations. ] Closure of Establishment for a Lawful Cause. no law can compel anybody to continue in it. [SHOPPES MANILA.Summary Hearing of Labor Cases Formal hearing of the case on its merits is not mandatory in labor cases but is dependent on the discretion of the labor arbiter who has the sole power to determine whether or not there is a need for a hearing. INC. INC vs.] Closure of Establishment It is only in instances of ―retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses‖ that employees whose employment has been terminated as a result are entitled to separation pay. JONI’S FOOD SERVICES. [FERNANDO GO vs. (b) If the employer decides to terminate the services of the employee. Instead private respondents were required to give separation pay. [JOSEFINA A. the employer must notify him in writing of the decision to dismiss him. there was no illegal dismissal to speak of. Two Notice Rule Singer has shown compliance with the two-notice requirement — first. [GUTIERREZ vs. which they already did. INC. and second. PABLO D. It is also present when an employee's functions and such reduction is not grounded on valid grounds such as genuine business necessity. COURT OF APPEALS and MOLDEX PRODUCTS. NLRC] Illegal Dismissal.
INC. NLRC] Cessation Simply asserting a state of insolvency is not enough to show serious financial losses. has become the "law of the case" which now binds the NLRC and the private respondent. the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. Definition The clear legislative intent of the law amending the Labor Code (Rep. [CBL TRANSIT. Act. It is. plain and free from ambiguity and. PERFERIO ABELGAS et. without loss of seniority rights and other privileges. i. [FULGENCIO vs. Period Covered for Payment The Court's decision in G. a closer adherence to the legislative policy behind Rep. Thus. therefore.e. which directed the payment of the petitioners' backwages from the time they were dismissed up to the time they are actually reinstated. NLRC] Backwages An employee who is unjustly dismissed is entitled to reinstatement. must be applied without attempted or strained interpretation. [EMCO PLYWOOD CORPORATION vs.R. It must be exercised essentially as a measure of last resort. al. MICHAEL MOSQUEDA] Backwages. and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. [CBL TRANSIT. 114290. [PHIL. 6715) is to give more benefits to workers than was previously given them under the Mercury Drug rule or the 'deduction of earnings elsewhere' rule. Valid Causes Retrenchment is a management prerogative consistently recognized and affirmed by this Court. MAC ADAMS METAL ENGINEERING] Retrenchment. The "law of the case" doctrine has been defined as "a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings. INC. vs. No. inclusive of allowances.] Judicial Review of Labor Cases The findings of facts and conclusion of the NLRC are generally accorded not only great weight and respect but even clothed with finality and deemed binding on this Court as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. No. and to the payment of his full backwages. JOURNALISTS.employees. INC. however. DUMARPA]
. the provision calling for 'full backwages' to illegally dismissed employees is clear. [JACINTO RETUYA vs.. 6715 points to 'full backwages' as meaning exactly that. [MAC ADAMS METAL ENGINEERING WORKERS UNION-INDEPENDENT vs. vs. after less drastic means have been tried and found wanting. NLRC] Full Backwages. vs. No. Act. as a rule. without deducting from backwages the earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal. is from the time of his illegal dismissal) up to the time of his actual reinstatement. In other words. computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him (which. Index animi sermo est. subject to faithful compliance with the substantive and the procedural requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence.
CADIZ] Requisites of Agrarian Tenancy Relationship. thus sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards. Backwages In the present case. Death Benefits It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. or any work which a person of similar mentality and attainment could do. INC. CRUZ et. as its name denotes. which would be a pointless process. [GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs.al. petitioners should be awarded back wages. Inc. MERCEDES L. A retained area. NUMERIANO and CARMELITA ROMERO vs." They were not given any prior written notice. should not preclude such award. The fact that they worked for a sister company immediately after being dismissed from Insular Builders. [JOSE B. [SAMAHAN NG MAGSASAKA SA SAN JOSEP vs. the CA was correct in upholding the labor arbiter's finding that they had been illegally dismissed. as its name denotes.]
. Having been illegally dismissed. ET AL. TEODOSIO CUANANG] Permanent Total Disability The test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disability is the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. [SPS. PHILIPPINE GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS. thus sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards.Retirement Benefits and Separation Pay The right of the concerned employees to receive both retirement benefits and separation pay depends upon the provisions in the Retirement Plan. AND/OR ALFREDO PARUNGAO] Illegal Dismissal. [GSIS vs. MARIETTA VALISNO. and (3) there should be personal cultivation done by the tenants themselves. DUMARPA] SPECIAL LAWS PD 626. PARAB’S Jurisdiction (1) the subject matter should be agricultural land. which would be a pointless process. or work of similar nature. TAN] Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. but simply told that their services were terminated on the day they stopped working for Insular Builders. A retained area. is land which is not supposed to leave the landowner's dominion. (2) the purpose should be agricultural production. vs. but means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work. Permanent total disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness. Inc. Under the circumstances. LEO L. that he was trained for. [JACINTO RETUYA vs. is land which is not supposed to leave the landowner's dominion. petitioners were dismissed because of a "change of management.
is not entitled to retirement benefits under Article 287 of the Labor Code. Respondent terminated petitioner‘s services and having rendered twelve (12) years of service. docketed and was consolidated with case entitled ―Benito Anievas et al.D. herein petitioner. The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming the assailed Resolutions of the NLRC. the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). LOPEZ vs. she received her leave credits. ET AL. respondent employed and trained several employees for the operation of the projects. hence. herein respondent. she executed and signed a Release and Quitclaim.] PRELIMINARY TITLE CONSTRUCTION OF LABOR LAWS DIVINA S. The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying the petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration. She was appointed researcher. SALALIMA vs. and the official agency charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability. The Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner. Respondent issued a memorandum announcing the retrenchment of several workers at its Iligan and Pasig Plants and Makati Head Office. With this development. 626 The present law has not ceased to be an employees' compensation law or a social legislation. [AZUCENA O. petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for payment of retirement benefits against respondent. Lopez. particularly if they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC when supported by
. NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION [G. 149674. 13th month pay. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to retirement benefits. however. and uniform and rice subsidy differential. And after having been paid her separation benefits.R. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. vs. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the complaints.‖ Additionally. It bears stressing that as held by the Labor Arbiter. was paid by respondent representing her separation benefits at the rate of ―two months basic salary per year of service. embarked on two (2) massive projects.‖ The complainants here are also retrenched employees of respondent. she filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring that she is not entitled to retirement benefits and in holding that she is precluded from claiming such benefits because of her quitclaim. she was promoted as a senior researcher at respondent‘s Market Research Department. affirmed the Labor Arbiter‘s Decision. National Steel Corporation. HELD: While it is axiomatic that retirement laws are liberally construed in favor of the persons intended to be benefited. respondent adopted an organizational streamlining program. No. such interpretation cannot be made in this case in light of the clear lack of consensual and statutory basis of the grant of retirement benefits to petitioner. February 16.P. Consequently. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION. especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances. One of them was Divina S. Hence. 2004] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ: FACTS: The National Steel Corporation. not having reached the retirement age. This Court has always accorded respect and finality to the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. and that there is no indication that she was forced or ―duped‖ by respondent to sign the Release and Quitclaim. On appeal. Barely three (3) years thereafter. the liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still prevails. the Five-Year Expansion Program (Phase II-B) and the Integrated Steel Mill Project. there is no provision in the parties‘ CBA authorizing the payment to petitioner retirement benefits in addition to her retrenchment pay. the NLRC and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari to annul the NLRC decision but was dismissed and petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Although respondents were initially hired as part-time employees for one year. as in this case. [G. Private respondents dropped their money claim then pending before the Office of Executive Labor Arbiter Guanio. encompassing as it could be.R. thus leaving for consideration their complaint for "regularization" — conversion of their employment status from part-time to regular (working on an 8-hour shift). the NLRC. On certain occasions. Thus. During the pendency of the case. On appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred when it upheld the decision of the NLRC to accord respondents regular full-time employment although petitioner. not without sufficient and substantial reasons. finding for private respondents. and his employment shall continue while such activity actually exists. the exercise of management prerogative cannot be utilized to circumvent the law and public policy on labor and social justice. August 15. The reason for this is that quasi-judicial agencies. JOSELITO PASCUA. LIMITATIONS ON MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs. shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed. While it may be conceded that management is in the best position to know its operational needs. No. thereafter the over-all circumstances with respect to duties assigned to them. PAL President Garcia and PAL Chairman & Corporate Executive Officer Dominguez converted the employment status of private respondents from temporary part-time to regular part-time. Article 280 of the Labor Code 13 provides that any employee who has rendered at least one year of service. That prerogative accorded management could not defeat the very purpose for which our labor laws exist: to balance the conflicting interests of labor and management. Private respondent Joselito Pascua. whether such service is continuous or broken. ET AL. Hence. in his and on behalf of other 79 part-time station attendants. Finding private respondents' remaining cause of action was rendered "moot and academic" by their supervening regularization.substantial evidence. declared them as regular employees of PAL with an eight-hour work-shift. not to tilt the scale in favor of one over the other. management prerogative must be exercised always with the principles of fair play at heart and justice in mind. imbued as they are with public interest. By its very nature. the Executive Labor Arbiter dismissed the former‘s complaint. which was denied. this appeal. 143258. like the Arbitration Board and the NLRC. in the exercise of its management prerogative. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision. The same is true with greater force concerning contracts of employment. the
.] FACTS: PAL hired private respondents as station attendants on a four or six-hour work-shift a day at five to six days a week. HELD: It must be borne in mind that the exercise of management prerogative is not absolute. number of hours they were permitted to work including overtime. 2003. The contracts with private respondents were extended twice. requires only part-time services. and the extension of employment beyond two years can only lead to one conclusion: that they should be declared full-time employees. have acquired a unique expertise because their jurisdictions are confined to specific matters. filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a complaint for regularization and other benefits. but to guaranty that labor and management stand on equal footing when bargaining in good faith with each other. PAL compelled private respondents to work overtime because of urgent necessity. It is basic to the point of being elementary that nomenclatures assigned to a contract shall be disregarded if it is apparent that the attendant circumstances do not support their use or designation. the last of which appears to have been for an indefinite period.
(6) the law impair the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure. In People vs. (3) the penalty imposed by law. 6. and could deprived a licensed and registered recruiters of their right to due process.2. for illegal recruitment without regard to whether the recruitment agencies involved are licensed and/or authorized and (b) if the members of the respondent.(g). it was held that illegal recruitment is a crime of economic sabotage and must be enforced. Chowdury. Sec. discourage the business of licensed and registered recruitment agency. pars.&(m). J. being disproportionate to the prohibited acts.(l). An employee of a company or corporation engage in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal together with his employer. (1) the law discriminated against unskilled workers and their families as the law encourage the deployment skilled Filipino workers. upon a finding that it committed any of the prohibited acts under the law. The respondents contends that. it failed to adduce in evidence a certified copy of its Articles of Incorporation and the resolution of said members authorizing it to represent the said agencies in the proceedings. (2) the grant of incentives to service contractors and manning agencies to the exclusion of all other licensed and authorized recruiters is an invalid qualification. on its claim that a great number of duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped and suspended for fear that (a) their officers and employees would be prosecuted under the unjust and unconstitutional penal provisions af RA 8042 and meted equally unjust and excessive penalties. The
. pars. COURT OF APPEALS (May 25.Secs.. The petitioners assert that the law is presumed constitutional and. (7) the law abridge freedom to contract.(a)&(b). The court in this case upheld the validity of Sec. which are licensed and authorized. RA 8042 EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. including life imprisonment. Sec. 2004) CALLEJO. SR. decide to continue with their business.claim of management prerogative by petitioner ought to be struck down for being contrary to law and policy. with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law.(a)-(j). et. (5) the 90-day period which the labor arbiter should decide a money claim is relatively short. Petitioners contend that the petitioners has no locus standi. al. they face the stigma and the coursed of being labeled ―illegal recruiters‖. par. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the trial courts order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it enjoining the petitioners from implementing the the provisions of RA 8042. The respondent justified its plea for injunctive relief on the allegation in its amended petition that its members are exposed to the immediate and irreparable danger of being deprived of their right to a livelihood and other constitutional rights without due process. 7. (4) the law violates the prohibition against ex-post facto law and bill of attainder because it presumes that a licensed and registered recruitment agency is guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage. (8) the singling out of entertainers and performing artist under the assailed department orders (implementing rules and regulations of RA 8042) constitutes class legislation and violates the equal protection clause.: FACTS: ACRO-Phil filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC to declare as unconstitutional Sec. HELD: The assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction is mooted by case law. the respondent was burdened to make a case strong enough to overcome such presumption and establish a clear right to injunctive relief. (9)&(10) of RA 8042 (The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995). as such. fair play and good faith. 6 of RA 8042 which provides that employees of recruitment agencies may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment. if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. vs.
In Philippine Association of Service Exporters. the preservation of the state.R.employee or agent of a corporation engage in unlawful business naturally aids and abets in the carrying on of such business and will be prosecuted as a principal if. In JMM Promotion and Management. the enforcement of said provisions cannot be enjoined. the court held that the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. Inc. No. In her defense. Equally important. a profession. CA. the SC held that RA 8042 is but an amendment of the Labor Code of the Philippines and is not an ex-post facto law because it is not applied retroactively. Until the court. Nevertheless. 124439. the public health and welfare and public morals. business or trade has always been upheld as legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions. J. no right is absolute. including the imposable penalties therefore. It does not require absolute equality. ELEMENTS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. declares that the said provisions are unconstitutional.
. calling. the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong. into every contract is read provisions of existing law and always a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject impressed with public welfare. vs. Upon learning from the POEA that she was not so licensed. BOOK 1 ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE. complainants decided to verify if the accused was a licensed recruiter. the accused was ―employed‖ as a Marketing Directress of Sarifudin Manpower and General Services. 2004] TlNGA. she could not be held liable for illegal recruitment. Inc. but merely all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. vs. trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because this are property rights. by final judgment. It is not to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to the object to which it is directed and by the territory in which it is to operate. At the time complainants applied for overseas employment. they proceeded to the Philippine Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) to execute their respective affidavits. its purpose and effect. a duly licensed agency with License No. She admitted that she had no authority to recruit in her personal capacity. and the proper regulation of a profession.: FACTS: With the promises of jobs abroad unfulfilled. Drillon. Diaz. the accused claimed that as an ―employee‖ of a duly licensed agency who was tasked to recruit and offer job placements abroad. In People vs. with knowledge of the business. FLOR GUTIERREZ Y TIMOD [G. but that her authority emanated from a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) and a Certification issued by a licensed agency. The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. profession or calling vis-a-vis the equal protection clause and the non-impairment clause were raised and it was held that. he consciously contributes his efforts to its conduct and promotion however slight his contribution may be. The accused was arrested on an entrapment operation. By its rulings. February 5. the issue of the extent of the police power of the state to regulate a business. The investigator confirmed with the POEA that the accused was not licensed or authorized to recruit overseas contract workers. the court thereby affirmed the validity of the assailed penal and procedural provisions of RA 8042.
R. shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. in any manner. Art. the World Pack Travel and Tours. notably appellant‘s own version. transporting. 149014-16. Mateo. with the addition of a third element: the recruiter committed the same against three or more persons. The crime becomes Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale when the two elements concur. of even date shows that neither is the World Pack Travel and Tours authorized to recruit workers abroad. the promise to send Beldon to work in Japan remained unfulfilled. Private complainants Jaime Cabus. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE. Editha Singh. Good faith is not a defense. 13(b) of the Labor Code defines ―recruitment and placement‖ as ―any act of canvassing. He also filed a complaint against the accused. 1994.but acknowledged receiving the money
. indicates that she was running her own labor recruitment business. Illegal recruitment in large scale is malum prohibitum. who told him that he must pay a processing fee and make an advance payment. Nos. Beldon filled up the form and submitted it to Ramon. Beldon was promised work as a factory worker in Japan. contracting. went to the accused‘s office. namely: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. As found by the trial court. As appellant committed illegal recruitment against three or more persons. and managed by his mother Rose Dujua. Director II. and includes referrals. February 5. He advanced money for his processing fees and other expenses. prompting him and his fellow applicants to file a complaint at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). A Special Power of Attorney (SPA) from Sarifudin. promising or advertising for employment. and (2) he undertakes either any activity within the meaning of ―recruitment and placement‖ defined under Art. offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons. Another Certification. individually or as a group. however. ISSUE: Whether or not. J. 34 of the Labor Code. enlisting. Beldon never recovered his payments. Upon Beldon‘s inquiry. ELEMENTS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. The accused Ramon Dujua denied that he was a recruiter. Ramon Dujua said that he sends applicants abroad and gave Beldon an application form. not malum in se. the conviction of the accused should be upheld even though she is licensed recruiter. she is liable for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. 13(b). Beldon asked Ramon to give him back his money. 2004] TINGA. Despite such payments. That any person or entity which.OS-91-LB-61193-NL issued by the Department of Labor and Employment. hiring. or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. utilizing. or procuring workers. Accused Flor Gutierrez filed the present appeal seeking the reversal of her conviction. locally or abroad. stating that Ramon Dujua is not licensed or authorized by the POEA to recruit workers abroad. He claimed that he was a mere janitor. contract services. the evidence on record. He admitted he did not have a license to recruit. Appellant cannot escape liability by claiming that she was not aware that before working for her employer in the recruitment agency. The company is owned by his aunt. Licensing Branch of the POEA. whether for profit or not: Provided. ROSE DUJUA [G. HELD: Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur. Roberto Perlas and Romulo Partos suffered the same fate as Beldon. states that she was authorized. The prosecution presented a Certification issued by Hermogenes C. messenger and errand boy of the World Pack Travel and Tours.: FACTS: Complainant Beldon Caluten. she should first be registered with the POEA. dated May 1.
ISSUES: a) Whether or not appellant was engaged in recruitment and placement. She thus explained that she only offered complainants Villanueva. and First. vs. appellant alleged that she was only helping him process his trainee's visa. committed against Jaime Cabus. MARLENE OLERMO [G. No. 2018. particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers. He said. There is no adequate showing that any of them was impelled by any ill motive to testify against appellant. 127848. however. possess such license or authority. 34 of the Labor Code.given by complainants but denied knowing what it was for. Second. Furthermore. Complainants were firm and categorical. Appellant Olermo denied all the charges against her. J. either locally or overseas.: FACTS: In separate informations filed before the RTC of Valenzuela. the testimonies of the complaining witnesses satisfactorily prove that appellant promised them employment and assured them placement overseas. this appeal. that his mother only asked him to count the money. committed against Cabus and Perlas. b) Whether or not appellant Olermo is guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. as amended. Hence. (2) the accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. paragraph (b) of the Labor Code. RTC convicted Dujua of illegal recruitment in large scale. and of two counts of estafa. ELEMENTS PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. and five counts of estafa. as amended by P. Appellant's acts of promising. appellant did not have any license or authority to recruit persons for overseas work.R. the trial court rendered a decision convicting appellant of the crimes charged. as shown by the Certification issued by the POEA. The fact that she did not sign nor issue some of the
. the World Pack Travel and Tours. HELD: a) YES. It is the contention of the appellant that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. Marlene Tolentino was accused of illegal recruitment in large scale as defined and penalized under Article 38 in relation to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code. July 17. HELD: Yes. offering and assuring employment overseas to complainants fall squarely within the ambit of recruitment and placement as defined in Article 13.D. the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused in illegal recruitment in large scale by means of proof beyond reasonable doubt. With respect to the accusation of complainant Berador. The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are: (1) the accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article 13(b) or in any prohibited activities under Art. Marlene Olermo a. All of them positively identified appellant as the person who recruited them for employment abroad. She alleged that she was engaged only in visa assistance. However. 2003. Beldon Caluten and Roberto Perlas. Aparicio and Majarucon assistance in processing their tourist visas. ISSUE: Whether or not. Their testimonies dovetail each other on material points. AquinoVillanueva.a.] AZCUNA. Neither did his employer. she contends that her alleged act of illegally recruiting at least three persons was not sufficiently established by the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE. She denied ever having represented herself as possessing authority to deploy workers for overseas employment.k.
They were introduced by an ―Aling Josie‖ to the agency's President and General Manager Mrs. private complainants filed their complaint for illegal recruitment in large scale against appellant.000. The complainants herein were recruited individually on different occasions. 1998. Erlinda Pascual and Restian Surio went to Alga-Moher International Placement Services Corporation to apply for employment in Taiwan. When they talked to Mrs. on the telephone and told the latter to receive private complainants' processing fees. Reyes. Thus. The law applies whether the workers were recruited individually or as a group. Thereafter. appellant received the processing fees of private complainants. The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are: (1) the person undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13. and (3) the act is committed against three or more persons. For her part. Settled is the rule that the existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally causes the corporation to commit a crime. Two months later. Moreover. SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. All these three elements were proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code. undoubtedly to reach more people seeking jobs abroad. private complainants decided to ask for the refund of their money from appellant who told them that the processing fees they had paid were already remitted to Mrs. Reyes. Second. First. herein appellant Elizabeth Corpuz. Reyes asked them to accomplish the application forms. In fact.: FACTS: Private complainants Belinda Cabantog. Third. No. Private complainants returned to the agency to pay the processing fees. The culpability of the employee therefore hinges on his knowledge
. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant guilty of the crime charged. Reyes was not at the agency that time. it was even proven that appellant advertised her services in a newspaper. if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. Article 38 of the Labor Code renders illegal those recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority from the POEA. they were told to return to the office with P10. The complainants have shown through their respective testimonies and evidence that she was indeed involved in the prohibited recruitment. nothing happened to their applications. individually or as a group. Mrs. together with his employer.00 each as processing fee. In compliance with the order of her employer and since the cashier was absent. appellant undertook the recruitment of not less than three workers. The trial court found appellant guilty. Thus. Reyes.R. appellant did not have any license to recruit persons for overseas work. An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal. J. she had no knowledge that the agency's license was suspended by the POEA on July 29. paragraph (b). October 1. appellant advised the private complainants to wait for the contracts to arrive from the Taiwan employers. HELD: No. Concepcion San Diego. Mrs. ELIZABETH CORPUZ G. (2) said person does not have a license or authority to engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. the complaining witnesses have satisfactorily established that appellant promised them employment and assured them of placement overseas. b) YES. 148198. the day before the fact. she told them that the money she received from appellant was in payment of the latter's debt. 2003 YNARES-SANTIAGO. The Licensing Division of the POEA issued a certification to this effect. Evelyn Gloria H. Appellant even had her services advertised in a newspaper. Thereafter.receipts for amounts received from complainants has no bearing on her culpability. appellant resolutely denied having a hand in the illegal recruitment and claimed that she merely received complainants' processing fees in compliance with the order of her employer. but she called her secretary of three months.
More importantly. Whether or not. 1998 which covers two regular holidays. 144664. of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. speedy and adequate‖
. Reyes on the same day she received it from them. COURT OF APPEALS [G. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against its perceived grievance. an event which appellant did not have control of. that employees are entitled to 200% of their basic wage on April 9. 2004] CARPIO-MORALES. HELD: The petition is devoid of merit. he may not be held criminally liable for an act done for and in behalf of his employer.of the offense and his active participation in its commission. No. While we strongly condemn the pervasive proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain employment abroad. a petitioner must show that he has no plain. Relief under Rule 65 is the proper remedy of the petitioner. Since the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the petition under Rule 65. as paid legal holidays during the effectivity of the CBA and that ―there is no condition. The Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision directing petitioner to pay its covered employees ―200% and not just 100% of their regular daily wages for the unworked April 9. 1998. 94 of the Labor Code. the law governing the relations between them. She neither gave an impression that she had the ability to deploy them abroad nor convinced them to part with their money. Her failure to refund their money immediately upon their demand was because the money had been remitted to Mrs. March 15. now Rule 45 and Rule 65. Where it is shown that the employee was merely acting under the direction of his superiors and was unaware that his acts constituted a crime. the controversy was submitted for voluntary arbitration. therefore.: FACTS: The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). respectively. As already established. A remedy is considered ―plain. nevertheless. For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to issue. R. issued an Explanatory Bulletin wherein it clarified. 1993. qualification or exception for any variance from the clear intent that all holidays shall be compensated. Despite the explanatory bulletin. she had no knowledge that the license was suspended the day before she received the money.‖ ISSUE: Whether or not. on whatever date they may fall in any calendar year. In accordance with Step 6 of the grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) existing between petitioner and BATLU. The appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Their failure to depart for Taiwan was due to the suspension of the license. petitioner [Asian Transmission Corporation] opted to pay its daily paid employees only 100% of their basic pay on April 9. we find the pieces of evidence insufficient to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. is also Araw ng Kagitingan [which is also a legal holiday]. Reyes who ordered her to receive the same. clearly recognizes their intent to consider Araw ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday. Araw ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday. any alleged errors committed by it in the exercise of its jurisdiction would be errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari. inter alia. whether unworked. 2. a legal holiday]. namely. J. The prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove appellant's active participation in the illegal recruitment activities of the agency. Respondent Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU) protested.further adding that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner and BATLU. which apart from being Good Friday [and.‖ The Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator. the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing an explanatory bulletin interpreting Art. BOOK III DOUBLE HOLIDAY PAY ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION vs. appellant received the processing fees of the private complainants for and in behalf of Mrs.
Rule IV. Martin Funeral Home v. In this case. Rule IV of Book III gave rise to a right to be paid for un-worked days beyond the ten legal holidays. Petitioners then elevated the case to this Court through a petition for certiorari. Technicality aside. The provision is mandatory.R. The use of a divisor less than 365 days cannot make ANTECO automatically liable for underpayment. On Motion for reconsideration. Moreover. affords a worker the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays. No. Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative that the State shall afford protection to labor. shall be resolved in favor of labor. Unlike a bonus. which is a management prerogative. no pay" principle. which the Court dismissed for petitioners' failure to comply with Section 11.
. 4 of the Labor Code provides that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of its provisions. CA then dismissed the complaint. [G. Rule IV of Book III is valid. less 52 Sundays and less 26 Saturdays (or 52 half Saturdays). petitioners' claim will still fail. ISSUE: Whether or not. supplements or payments for unworked regular holidays as provided in existing individual or collective agreement or employer practice or policy. Art. DOLE found ANTECO liable for underpayment of the monthly salaries of its employees. the minimum allowable divisor is 287. Even assuming that Section 2. it also gives rise to an invidious classification. The 304 days divisor used by ANTECO is clearly above the minimum of 287 days. the fact that two holidays fall on the same date should not operate to reduce to nine the ten holiday pay benefits a worker is entitled to receive. HELD: No. which is the result of 365 days. June 10. 94 of the Labor Code. In any event. Any divisor below 287 days means that ANTECO's workers are deprived of their holiday pay for some or all of the ten legal holidays. thirty-three (33) monthly-paid employees filed complaints with the NLRC Sub-Regional Branch VI. regardless of whether an employee is paid on a monthly or daily basis. as amended. The DOLE directed ANTECO to pay its employees wage differentials which ANTECO failed to pay. NLRC. Petitioners' line of reasoning is not only a violation of the "no work. this petition. The basic rule in this jurisdiction is "no work. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. vs. petitioner had obligated itself to pay for the legal holidays as required by law.] CARPIO. holiday pay is a statutory benefit demandable under the law. The MR was also denied. the Court set aside the dismissal and referred the case to CA following the doctrine in St. no pay. ANTECO appealed reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision. J. damages and attorney's fees. including its implementing rules and regulations. ET AL. Thus. Hence." The right to be paid for un-worked days is generally limited to the ten legal holidays in a year. DOUBLE HOLIDAY PAY CEZAR ODANGO. Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners granting them wage differentials. Thus. Iloilo City. Since a worker is entitled to the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays. 147420. Sustaining petitioners' argument will make monthly-paid employees a privileged class who are paid even if they do not work. In effect.: FACTS: Petitioners are monthly-paid employees of ANTECO. Petitioners' claim is based on a mistaken notion that Section 2. the petitioners are entitled to their money claim. Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy.if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency. NLRC. a violation of the equal protection clause. the unworked half of Saturdays and other days that they do not work at all. 2004.‖ The provision of the CBA entered into by the parties. The facts show that petitioners are required to work only from Monday to Friday and half of Saturday. ET AL. 11. petitioners demand that ANTECO should pay them on Sundays. praying for payment of wage differentials. Sec. Book III of the Omnibus Rules to Implement the Labor Code provides that ―Nothing in the law or the rules shall justify an employer in withdrawing or reducing any benefits. Art. this Court finds no ground to disturb the assailed decision.
it found the services unsatisfactory and inadequate. petitioner corporation engaged the services of Longest Force Investigation and Security Agency. However. 2003 QUISUMBING. the application of the aforementioned cases and of the amended Civil Service Rules is in order. his destitution is aggravated by the bad state of his health. FRANCISCO S. for having falsified the former's signature on a document captioned "Authority to Sell" and for having obtained money with the use of that document. Ordered also LF to reinstate to former or equivalent positions the respondents without loss of seniority rights and privileges with full backwages. 144134 November 11. nonpayment of overtime pay. it religiously complied with the terms of the security contract with Longest Force (LF). CA-91-3-P April 14. we concur with the court administrator. J. PAREDES vs.
.M. LIABILITY OF AN INDIRECT EMPLOYER MARIVELES SHIPYARD CORP. HELD: As regards the leave benefits. COURT OF APPEALS G. Respondent Padua. The dismissal of respondent has exposed him to the attendant humiliation and tremendous suffering and virtually stripped him of his dignity and livelihood. No. Petitioner denied liability on account of illegal dismissal.LEAVE CREDITS ANSBERTO P. causing it to terminate its contract with LF.: FACTS: Judge Ansberto Paredes filed a complaint against his cousin. premium pay for holiday and rest day. These private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. service incentive leave pay. In the interest of justice and in consideration of the present plight of respondent. and ten (10) years since the finality of respondent‘s dismissal from the service. The Court dismissed respondent from the service and forfeited his retirement benefits. and attorney‘s fees against LF and petitioner before the Labor Arbiter. They also wanted the cross-claim be dismissed. considering that he is already in the twilight of his life. Longest Force deployed its security guards at petitioner‘s shipyard at Mariveles. however. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is entitled to leave benefits after dismissal from service. The Court. J. He should be granted the leave credits that he earned during the period of his government service. We allow him to claim such credits in order to provide him and his family a lifeline and possibly to keep him from again succumbing to the dark temptations sometimes caused by financial woes. NLRC affirmed in toto. The Labor arbiter declared LF and petitioner jointly and severally liable to pay the money claims of complainants. owing to some intervening factors or circumstances that merited the mitigation of their sentences. underpayment of wages. Bataan.R. PADUA A. Inc.: FACTS: In October 1993. LF. LF filed a crossclaim against petitioner. The Court Administrator observed that twelve and one-half (12 ½) years had passed since the filing of the Complaint. report and recommendation. vs. has modified and even reduced the penalties already imposed on some offenders. to render security services at its premises. terminated the security guards (private respondents). in turn. Further. stressing that no employer-employee relationship existed between it and the private respondents. CA denied petitioner‘s special civil action for certiorari. No. The Court referred the Petition to the OCA for evaluation. According to petitioner. 2004 PANGANIBAN. 13th month pay.
legislated wage increases are deemed amendments to the contract. employers cannot hide behind their contracts in order to evade their (or their contractors' or subcontractors') liability for noncompliance with the statutory minimum wage. Subsequently. On appeal.: vs. provides that the maximum period of exemption that can be accorded to a qualified applicant is only for one (1) year from the effectivity of the Wage Order.00 allowance per day. NATIONAL WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY
FACTS: The Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (RTWPB) of Region X. This Wage Order mandated a P7. Labor standards are enacted by the legislature to alleviate the plight of workers whose wages barely meet the spiraling costs of their basic needs. RX-03. when the agency as contractor failed to pay the guards. Following Article 106.
. This non-extendable one year period of exemption is to afford protection to workers who may be unfairly affected by the deleterious effect of a prolonged exemption which is not in accord with the very purpose of the issuance of a Wage Order. citing the continuous business decline in the wood processing industry. Thus. which is the applicable rule on this matter. WAGE ORDER AND ITS EXEMPTION NASIPIT LUMBER COMPANY COMMISSION G. CASE DOCTRINE: When the agency as contractor failed to pay the guards. In this case. Petitioner cannot evade its liability by claiming that it had religiously paid the compensation of guards as stipulated under the contract with the security agency. petitioner became an indirect employer of private respondents pursuant to Article 107 abovecited. 128296 September 8. 107 and 109 of the Labor Code.R. petitioners. RX-03. Northern Mindanao.ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming that LF and petitioner corporation is jointly and severally liable for payment when there is clear showing that petitioner honored its contract with LF. On December 8.00 increase in the minimum daily wage of all workers and employees in the private sector in Region X receiving a daily wage of not more than P130. 2003 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. filed for extension of their full exemption for another year.00 per day and an additional P10. Petitioner‘s liability is joint and several with LF pursuant to Articles 106. 1994. when petitioner contracted for security services with Longest Force as the security agency that hired private respondents to work as guards for the shipyard corporation. Labor laws are considered written in every contract. J. 1994. Section 3 of Wage Order No. RTWPB denied the application. Section 7 of the NWPC Revised Guidelines on Exemption. The RTWPB granted petitioners a full exemption from compliance with the said Wage Order for a period of one (1) year or from December 8. ISSUE: Whether or not the period of exemption under Wage Order RX-03 can be extended for more than one (1) year. issued Wage Order No. 1993 to December 7. HELD: We rule in the negative. the corporation as principal becomes jointly and severally liable for the guards' wages. Cagayan de Oro City. it was affirmed by NWPC. claiming they are distressed establishments whose paid-up capital has been impaired by at least twenty-five percent (25%). RX-03. Similarly. Petitioners claim that the NWPC exceeded its jurisdiction (1) in deleting the phrase "renewable for another year provided the conditions still persist and warrant the exemption" from paragraph 4. Petitioners contend they are entitled to an extension for another year of their full exemption as distressed establishments on the basis of paragraph 4. HELD: No. Stipulations in violation thereof are considered null. the corporation as principal becomes jointly and severally liable for the guards' wages. No. RX-03. petitioners filed their separate application for exemption from compliance with Wage Order No. Petitioner cannot evade its liability by claiming that it had religiously paid the compensation of guards as stipulated under the contract with the security agency. Section 3 of Wage Order No.
Bankard‘s move drew the Bankard Employees Union-WATU (petitioner). HELD: Upon the enactment of R. Bankard took the position. among others. to wit: Level I. February 17. length of service.
. (3) The elimination of the distinction between the two levels. the salaries of employees who fell below the new minimum rates were also adjusted to reach such rates under their levels. when the dispute was certified by the Secretary of Labor and Employment for compulsory arbitration. 1993. No. Article 124 of the Labor Code) on June 9. 1993 on the ground of discrimination and other acts of Unfair Labor Practice (ULP). In accordance with its ruling in St. the duly certified exclusive bargaining agent of the regular rank and file employees of Bankard. NLRC [G. that there was no obligation on the part of the management to grant to all its employees the same increase in an across-the-board manner. The ―New Salary Scale‖ increased the hiring rates of new employees. or other logical bases of differentiation. 1993 on the grounds of refusal to bargain. the petition was referred to the Court of Appeals which. On May 28. A director of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board treated the Notice of Strike as a ―Preventive Mediation Case‖ based on a finding that the issues therein were ―not strikeable‖. Petitioner thereupon filed a petition for certiorari before this Court. dismissed the case for lack of merit. finding no wage distortion. WAGE DISTORTION. its Board of Directors approved a ―New Salary Scale‖.000.Moreover. Level III. however. and (4) The existence of the distortion in the same region of the country. Inc. for the purpose of making its hiring rate competitive in the industry‘s labor market.‖ Prubankers Association v. to wit: Levels I and V by one thousand pesos (P1. Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the case was denied. NLRC. and other acts of ULP .00).) An existing hierarchy of positions with corresponding salary rates. J. and Level V. however. Prudential Bank and Trust Company laid down the four elements of wage distortion.A. regular employees. discrimination. Martin Funeral Homes v. it filed a Notice of Strike on August 26. Petitioner filed another Notice of Strike on October 8. to wit: (1.00). No. ISSUE: Whether or not the unilateral adoption by an employer of an upgraded salary scale that increased the hiring rates of new employees without increasing the salary rates of old employees resulted in wage distortion within the contemplation of Article 124 of the Labor Code. made retroactive to April 1.: FACTS: Bankard. to press for the increase in the salary of its old. the NWPC lays down the guidelines which the RTWPB implements. but also to issue exemptions therefrom. denied the same for lack of merit. 6727 (WAGE RATIONALIZATION ACT. by October 28. 140689. 1999. and Levels II. (2) A significant change in the salary rate of a lower pay class without a concomitant increase in the salary rate of a higher one. the NWPC did not act with grave abuse of discretion. In short. ELEMENTS BANKARD EMPLOYEES UNION-WORKERS ALLIANCE TRADE UNIONS vs. Accordingly. Level II. The NLRC. In affirming the RTWPB's Resolution denying petitioners' application for extension for another year of their full exemption from compliance with Wage Order No. the term ―wage distortion‖ was explicitly defined as: ―A situation where an increase in prescribed wage rates results in the elimination or severe contraction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills.R. (Bankard) classifies its employees by levels. the NWPC has the power not only to prescribe guidelines to govern wage orders. 2004] CARPIO-MORALES. 1989. 1993. III and IV by nine hundred pesos (P900. Level IV. The strike was averted. RX-03. amending. As the continued request of petitioner for increase in the wages and salaries of Bankard‘s regular employees remained unheeded.union busting.
the Bank incurred expenses in carrying out its part of the contract. The mere factual existence of wage distortion does not. J.: FACTS: The respondent Standard Chartered Bank and petitioner Eduardo G. As already stated. For this reason. 1993. 2003. Article V (Salary and Cost of Living Allowance) of the parties‘ Collective Bargaining Agreement. the entry of new employees to the company ipso facto place[s] them under any of the levels mentioned in the new salary scale which private respondent adopted retroactive [to] April 1. absent a law or other source of obligation which requires its rectification. VP (M21). Put differently. Apart from the findings of fact of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that some of the elements of wage distortion are absent.wage distortion does not appear to exist. ipso facto result to an obligation to rectify it. moral and exemplary damages. is a valid and legally enforceable source of rights between the parties. As did the Court of Appeals.
. petitioner cannot legally obligate Bankard to correct the alleged ―wage distortion‖ as the increase in the wages and salaries of the newly-hired was not due to a prescribed law or wage order. COURT OF APPEALS [G. Hence. As a result. The differing wage rate for each of the existing classes of employees reflects this classification. His resignation.R. Even assuming that there is a decrease in the wage gap between the pay of the old employees and the newly hired employees. to our mind said gap is not significant as to obliterate or result in severe contraction of the intentional quantitative differences in the salary rates between the employee group. the classification under the wage structure is based on the rank of an employee.. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action for damages of the respondent bank was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under paragraph 4. July 29. 152121.e. This CBA provision. Eviota never complied with the Bank's demand that he reimburse the latter for the expenses incurred on his account. which did not comply with the 30-day prior notice rule under the law and under the Employment Contract.In a problem dealing with ―wage distortion. Bankard‘s right to increase its hiring rate. It is thus clear that there is no hierarchy of positions between the newly hired and regular employees of Bankard. and not on the basis of their length of service. i. . ISSUE: Whether or not the labor arbiter has jurisdiction to award the damages. the ―historical‖ classification of the employees prior to the wage increase must be established. which is based on legitimate business-judgment prerogatives of the employer. Wage distortion is a factual and economic condition that may be brought about by different causes. Article 217 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Thus the employees of private respondent have been ―historically‖ classified into levels. hence. EVIOTA vs. I to V. to establish minimum salaries for specific jobs. MONEY CLAIM EDUARDO G. No. as amended. SR. not on seniority. the first element of wage distortion provided in Prubankers is wanting. BOOK V JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR ARBITER. Eviota executed a contract of employment under which the petitioner was employed by the respondent bank as Compensation and Benefits Manager. the respondent bank filed a complaint against the petitioner with the RTC of Makati City for actual. was so unexpected that it disrupted plans already in the pipeline. and to adjust the rates of employees affected thereby is embodied under Section 2. To determine the existence of wage distortion.] CALLEJO. the petitioner abruptly resigned from the respondent bank barely a month after his employment and rejoined his former employer. this Court finds that the third element provided in Prubankers is also wanting.‖ the basic assumption is that there exists a grouping or classification of employees that establishes distinctions among them on some relevant or legitimate bases. however. However.
Under the control test. In response. (3) the presence or absence of the power of dismissal. In the case at bar. To ascertain the existence of an employer-employee relationship. namely: (1) the manner of selection and engagement. he was also tasked to collect payments from his various customers. jurisprudence has invariably applied the four-fold test. It seeks to recover damages agreed upon in the contract as redress for private respondent's breach of his contractual obligation to its "damage and prejudice. as a commission salesman. and (4) the presence or absence of the power of control. 2004. petitioner sent a letter addressed to the counsel for respondent corporation.] YNARES-SANTIAGO. (2) the payment of wages.:: FACTS: Petitioner was employed by respondent company Lamadrid Bearing and Parts Corporation as a salesman earning a commission of 3% of the total paid-up sales covering the whole area of Mindanao. 159890. respondents ―tricked‖ petitioner into signing two documents. In the interim. Not contented with the issuance of checks as security for the bad accounts. J. LAMADRID BEARING & PARTS CORP. TEST TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP ABANTE. is an employee of respondent corporation. which he later discovered to be a Promissory Note and a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. A money claim by a worker against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter only if there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the claim asserted and employee-employer relation. No. Aside from selling the merchandise of respondent corporation. vs.HELD: None.R. petitioner received a subpoena from the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. Petitioner does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code of the Philippines. the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner was confronted by respondent Lamadrid over the bad accounts. On appeal. refund of deductions. ABANTE his awarded separation pay. Sometime in 1998. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner. Jose Lamadrid. JR. May 28. an employeremployee
. back wages (partial) unpaid commissions. damages and attorney‘s fees. Of these four. Petitioner challenged the decision of the NLRC before the Court of Appeals which denied the petition. petitioner encountered five customers/clients with bad accounts. While doing his usual rounds as commission salesman. before the NLRC. and JOSE LAMADRID [G. Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or viceversa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Petitioner thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against respondent company and its president. The so-called ―control test‖ is commonly regarded as the most crucial and determinative indicator of the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship. Respondent deposited the remaining checks which were dishonored by the drawee bank due to ―Account Closed. and jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the regular courts.‖ Counsel for respondent corporation sent a letter to petitioner demanding that he make good the dishonored checks or pay their cash equivalent. The Labor Arbiter declared respondents to pay jointly and severally complainant EMPERMACO B. the complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of justice. which directed the corporation to off-set the amount to his commission." Such cause of action is within the realm of Civil Law. petitioner was handed by his customers a letter from the respondent company warning them not to deal with petitioner since it no longer recognized him as a commission salesman. the last one is the most important. The fact that the private respondent was the erstwhile employer of the petitioner under an existing employment contract before the latter abandoned his employment is merely incidental. Petitioner sent another letter to respondent Lamadrid that he intends to seek legal advice regarding the matter. HELD: NO. 22 filed by respondent Lamadrid. Absent such a link.
December 11. but to serve as a guide and to upgrade his skills for a more efficient marketing performance. Respondent company did not prescribe the manner of selling the merchandise. CREATION OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
NEW GOLDEN CITY BUILDERS & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. thus. Nilo Layno Builders hired private respondents to perform work at the project. such that a dismal performance or even a dead result will not result in any sanction or provide a ground for dismissal. Pursuant to the contract. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. COURT OF APPEALS [G. 2003. Loyola Heights. an employer-employee relationship is notably absent in this case. entered into a construction contract with Prince David Development Corporation for the construction of a 17-storey office and residential condominium building along Katipunan Road. J. Petitioner decried the alleged intimidation and trickery employed by respondents to obtain from him a Promissory Note and to issue forty-seven checks as security for the bad accounts incurred by five customers. it instituted a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. it may equally be true that petitioner did so in recognition of a valid financial obligation. Although he had the whole of Mindanao as his base of operation. private respondents were deemed employees of the petitioner. a corporation engaged in the construction business. the NLRC held that private respondents were illegally dismissed and ordered petitioner to reinstate them and to pay their full backwages. Applying the aforementioned test. No. After the completion of the phase for which Nilo Layno Builders was contracted. While it is true that he occasionally reported to the Manila office to attend conferences on marketing strategies. Since petitioner's motion for a reconsideration of the decision was denied.] YNARES-SANTIAGO. he was not designated by respondent to conduct his sales activities at any particular or specific place.R.: FACTS: Petitioner New Golden City Builders and Development Corporation. He pursued his selling activities without interference or supervision from respondent company and relied on his own resources to perform his functions. Quezon City. non-payment of 13th month pay. form works and steel rebars works". Manuel Sy. non-payment of 5 days service incentive leave. Both parties appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. but also the manner and means to be used in reaching that end. He was not required to report to the office at any time or submit any periodic written report on his sales performance and activities. 154715. Yet no quota was imposed on him by the respondent. in consideration of the total contract price of P5 Million. with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for "unfair labor practice." Labor Arbiter Felipe Garduque rendered a decision finding that Nilo Layno Builders was a laboronly-contractor. The NLRC affirmed with modification the Labor Arbiter's decision. Petitioner engaged the services of Nilo Layno Builders to do the specialized "concrete works.
. INDEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP JOB CONTRACTOR. As modified. Moreover. illegal dismissal and severance pay in lieu of reinstatement. alleging that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in totally discarding uncontroverted evidence and in relying merely on conjectures and assumptions not supported by facts. he was left alone to adopt any style or strategy to entice his customers. sometime in 1996. Metro Manila. private respondents filed a complaint case against petitioner and its president.relationship exists where the person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end achieved. petitioner was free to offer his services to other companies engaged in similar or related marketing activities as evidenced by the certificationsissued by various customers. It is undisputed that petitioner Abante was a commission salesman who received 3% commission of his gross sales. it was intended not to control the manner and means to be used in reaching the desired end. While petitioner may have been coerced into executing force to issue the said documents.
Nilo Layno Builders hired its own employees. and that as employer of the private respondents. the Court finds that Nilo Layno Builders maintained effective supervision and control over the private complainants. As admitted by Nilo G. In legitimate job contracting. to ensure that the employees are paid their wages. INC. he had the power to terminate or dismiss them for just and valid cause. Rule VIII. (2) We hold that there existed an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondents albeit for a limited purpose. except only to the results of the work.. 2. sorting. machineries.
.] BELLOSILLO. equipments. i. Other than that.. HELD: The Court finds partial merit in the petition.e. the petitioner did not. principally those on statutory minimum wage. and (b) has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools. Indubitably. J." i. vs. (MAERC) an alleged an independent contractor whose primary corporate purpose was to engage in the business of cleaning. he undertook the contract work on his own account and responsibility. This is exactly the situation obtaining in the case at bar. MAERC INTEGRATED SERVICES. the principal employer is not responsible for any claim made by the employees. in the same manner and extent that it is liable to its direct employees.R. [G. and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of the business. They were paid on a per piece or pakiao basis except for a few who worked as checkers and were paid on daily wage basis. an independent contractor is one who undertakes "job contracting. The principal employer becomes jointly and severally liable with the job contractor only for the payment of the employees' wages whenever the contractor fails to pay the same. The joint and several liability of the employer or principal was enacted to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Code. (1) Under Section 8. receiving. No. The means and methods adopted by the private respondents were directed by Nilo Layno Builders except that. Book III. free from interference from any other persons. it could not be held liable for backwages and separation pay. to do specialized work in the Prince David Project of the petitioner. from time to time. Whether there existed an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondents. and the principal as the indirect employer of the contractor's employees.e. The contractor or subcontractor is made liable by virtue of his or her status as a direct employer. July 10. illegally dismissed the private complainants. etc. the law creates an employer-employee relationship for a limited purpose. 144672. Hence. They washed and segregated various kinds of empty bottles used by SMC to sell and distribute its beer beverages to the consuming public. The test to determine the existence of independent contractorship is whether one claiming to be an independent contractor has contracted to do the work according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of the employer. INDEPENDENT CONTACTOR SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION. glass and metal containers. Inc. a person who: (a) carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method. except as to the results. classifying. as it could not.: FACTS: Respondents were workers hired by San Miguel Corporation (SMC) through its agent or intermediary Maerc Integrated Services. Nevertheless. that he was the one paying the salaries of private respondents. of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. Layno.. work premises. it is jointly and severally liable with Nilo Layno Builders for the private complainants' wages. 2003. free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof. the private respondents. the engineers of the petitioner visited the site to check whether the work was in accord with the plans and specifications of the principal. From the foregoing disquisition. Whether Nilo Layno Builders was an "independent contractor" or a "labor-only" contractor.ISSUES: 1.
for illegal dismissal. In fact. materials and labor. machinery and work premises.: FACTS: Respondent ABS-CBN signed an Agreement with the Mel and Jay Management and Development Corporation. Petitioner's liability is that of a direct employer and thus solidarily liable with MAERC. manner and terms of payment. such as. SMC stopped them from performing their jobs. RADIO AND BROADCAST TALENTS JOSE Y. appliances. clarified that it was not enough to show substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools. Sonza resigned as a
. displayed the characteristics of a labor-only contractor and in labor-only contracting. and the mode. tools. the statute creates an employer-employee relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. HELD: YES. When the service contract was terminated. G. MAERC and SMC were also ordered to jointly and severally pay complainants their wage differentials and to pay attorney's fees. ISSUE: Whether or not MAERC is a labor-only contractor and that complainants were employees of SMC. the term and duration of the relationship. the duty to supply premises. 2004 CARPIO. etc. several factors may beconsidered. June 10. the nature and extent of the work. and for separation pays. whether the contractor was carrying on an independent business. the Supreme Court.R. underpayment of wages. Inc. While it is true that MAERC had investments consisting of buildings. the control and supervision of the workers. (respondent herein)." MJMDC agreed to provide SONZA's services exclusively to ABS-CBN as talent for radio and television. MAERC. but not necessarily confined to.. nonpayment of service incentive leave pays and other labor standards benefits. INDEPENDENT JOB-CONTRACTOR. to be considered an independent contractor. It also provided for its automatic renewal on a month-to-month basis after the two (2)-year period and required that a written notice to the other party be given thirty (30) days prior to the intended date of termination. SMC informed MAERC of the termination of their service contract. The principal employer therefore becomes solidarily liable with the labor-only contractor for all the rightful claims of the employees. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding that MAERC was an independent contractor and dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal but ordered MAERC to pay complainants' separation benefits. Hence. petitioner seeks this petition for review. the skill required. in Vinoya v. 138051.It appears that SMC entered into a Contract of Services with MAERC engaging its services on a nonexclusive basis for a year and was renewed for two (2) more years. the right to assign the performance of specified pieces of work. MAERC is a labor-only contractor and not an independent labor contractor. The appellate court also denied SMC's motion for reconsideration. The workers filed their complaints against San Miguel Corporation (petitioner herein) and Maerc Integrated Services. machinery and equipment. No. should a party decide to discontinue with the contract. the control of the premises. jurisprudential holdings were to the effect that in determining the existence of an independent contractor relationship. NLRC. citing its plans to phase out its segregation activities due to the installation of labor and cost-saving devices. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled that MAERC was a labor-only contractor and that complainants were employees of SMC. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORP. Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the NLRC. equipment. Subsequently. firing and payment of the workers of the contractor. SONZA vs. J. The contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. the power of the employer with respect to the hiring. however. Referred to in the Agreement as "AGENT. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction with this Court which then referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.
and 13th month pay" which the law automatically incorporates into every employeremployee contract. In either case. Case law has consistently held that the elements of an employer-employee relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee. It was paid because of his skills. Medicare. ABS-CBN did not instruct SONZA how to perform his job. Sonza is an independent contractor. The last element. there would be no need for the parties to stipulate on benefits such as "SSS. and (d) the employer's power to control the employee on the means and methods by which the work is accomplished. all the talent fees and benefits paid to SONZA were the result of negotiations that led to the Agreement. service incentive leave pay. The control test is the most important test our courts apply in distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor. (b) the payment of wages.talent for ABS-CBN and sent a letter to Eugenio Lopez III rescinding the agreement of May 1994. He complained that ABS-CBN did not pay his salaries. Power of Control Applying the control test to the present case. B. ABS-CBN filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and that Sonza was an independent contractor. If SONZA were ABSCBN's employee. Hence. talent and celebrity status not possessed by ordinary employees. We must consider all the circumstances of the relationship. However. Bargaining power of fees way above the salary scales of ordinary employees is a circumstance indicative. ABS-CBN did not exercise control over the means and methods of performance of SONZA's work. 13th month pay. There is no case law stating that a radio and television program host is an employee of the broadcast station. SONZA appealed to the NLRC. is the most important element. SONZA was still an independent contractor since ABS-CBN did not supervise and control his work. separation pay. the method of selecting and engaging SONZA does not conclusively determine his status. Sonza‘s motion for reconsideration. ABS-CBN's sole concern was for SONZA to display his talent during the airing of the programs. ABS-CBN must still pay SONZA's talent fees in full until the expiry of the Agreement. was denied by the NLRC. Whatever benefits SONZA enjoyed arose from contract and not because of an employer-employee relationship.
. the more likely the worker is deemed an employee. A. we find that SONZA is not an employee but an independent contractor. ABS-CBN's control was limited only to the result of SONZA's work. Clearly. SONZA maintains that all essential elements of an employer-employee relationship are present in this case. but not conclusive. (c) the power of dismissal. The greater the supervision and control the hirer exercises. talent and celebrity status. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Even though ABS-CBN provided SONZA with the place of work and the necessary equipment. with the control test being the most important element. Selection and Engagement of Employee The specific selection and hiring of SONZA. Payment of Wages ABS-CBN directly paid SONZA his monthly talent fees. of an independent contractual relationship. This test is based on the extent of control the hirer exercises over a worker. but not conclusive. this petition. of an independent contractual relationship. SONZA filed a complaint against ABS-CBN before DOLE NCR. but it affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. is a circumstance indicative. the socalled "control test". Further. C. In any event. signing bonus. We find that ABS-CBN was not involved in the actual performance that produced the finished product of SONZA's work. travel allowance and amounts due under the Employees Stock Option Plan ("ESOP"). Sonza filed special civil action for certiorari with the CA which was likewise dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not. whether to broadcast the final product or not. HELD: Yes. Sonza alleges that the mode of fee payment shows that he was an employee of ABS-CBN. because of his unique skills. Sonza‘s huge talent fees indicate more an independent contractual relationship rather than an employer-employee relationship.
for lack of merit. RUMN‘s executive board adopted a resolution sanctioning union officers and members who failed to join big rallies. September 17. Rey Hilado and Roberto Montaño.R. COURT OF APPEALS [G. No. October 17.: FACTS: A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by 144 employees before the Regional Arbitration Branch of Bacolod City against (a) petitioners Elcee Farms and Saguemuller. petitioner temporarily held in abeyance the implementation of the check-off on the special assessment made by RUMN. which modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter by holding all defendants liable for the payment of separation pay and adding the payment of P5. The foregoing judicial policy acquires greater significance where there has been subsequent compliance with the requirements of the rules.00 as moral damages to each complainant for all the troubles and sufferings from
. The voluntary arbitrators held that there was sufficient compliance on the part of RUMN with the provisions of the Labor Code and the CBA provisions between the parties. Of the 144 named complainants. petitioner rejected RUMN‘s persistent demand of a checkoff. and (b) Hilla Corporation. 146125. Petitioner also requested the DOLE Sec. Indeed. denied the course to the petition for failure of the personnel office of petitioner to attach (1) his authority to institute the action and (2) the required proof of service. ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS OF NLRC ELCEE FARMS. No. vs. petitioner Novelty elevated the matter to the CA by way of petition for certiorari under Rule 65. 2003] AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. Novelty issued a Memorandum announcing that it would deduct from the salaries of union members who failed to attend the mobilization amounts equivalent to their one-day salary pursuant to the resolution of the RUMN. When some members of the union allegedly complained of the salary deduction. 2003] PANGANIBAN.: FACTS: Reform the Union Movement in Novelty (RUMN). Nevertheless. HELD: No. Consequently. Procedural niceties should be avoided in labor cases in which the provisions of the Rules of Court are applied only in suppletory manner. only 28 submitted their affidavits and evidence of employment. Hilado and Montaño.R.LITIGATION ON THE MERITS NOVELTY PHILIPPINES vs. After the denial of the petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration with the panel of voluntary arbitrators. however. RUMN continued to insist on the implementation of the checkoff. J. The MR was also denied by the CA because the required authority to file had been executed only after 20 days from filing. with a penalty equivalent to their salary for one day. Not satisfied with the decision. as in this case in which petitioner has submitted the Special Power of Attorney together with its Motion for Reconsideration.000. RUMN raised the matter for grievance. private respondents and Hilla Corporation appealed to the NLRC. citing an Opinion rendered by the legal office of the DOLE. the labor union of petitioner Novelty Philippines Inc (Novelty) started assessing penalties against its erring members. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA justified in dismissing the case despite petitioner‘s substantial compliance with the requirements of the rules. J. 150286. PAMPILO SEMILLANO and NLRC [G. Since no settlement was reached during the grievance procedure. the case was elevated to the NCMB. Saguemuller. INC. rules of procedure may be relaxed to relieve a part of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of noncompliance with the process required. The Labor Arbiter ordered Hilla Corporation to pay each of the 28 complainants their separation pay but dismissed all claims against Elcee Farms. his opinion on the matter. The CA.
to their prejudice.the disturbance of their rights to labor. Petitioners claim that the Resolution was not sent to the address of his counsel as expressly stated in the petition itself but to counsel‘s former address when the case was still with the NLRC. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over petitions for annulment of judgments of NLRC. The NLRC issued a Resolution modifying its decision by: (a) absolving Hilla Corporation from liability and held only petitioners Elcee Farms and Saguemuller liable for the separation pay. appeal.‖ Moreover. it is likewise not within the jurisdiction of this Court in the present petition to act on private respondents‘ motion for remand of the records and for the issuance of an order directing the Labor Arbiter to issue a writ of execution. The Court entertains serious apprehensions on the validity of the service of the Resolution which required petitioners to deposit for costs and to submit their memorandum. Petitioner Saguemuller filed before the NLRC a Motion to Stay Execution on the ground of absolute nullity of decision. moral and exemplary damages. non-compliance of which inevitably caused the dismissal of their petition for certiorari. Hence. Said resolution was also sent to the wrong address. In this case. such concerns cannot be raised and resolved in a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals or in the instant petition for review. It held that petitioners cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the said court pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because said rule refers to decisions of regional trial courts and not to quasi-judicial bodies. petitioner Saguemuller together with Elcee Farms filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals. The First Division of the SC gave due course to the second petition for certiorari and required: (a) the petitioners to pay the deposit for costs. In fact. petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioners. and (b) increasing the number of awardees from 28 to 131 based on the list of remitted SSS contributions as of 1990.
. they twice sought recourse with this Court via petitions for certiorari but both petitions were dismissed. The Court is even more concerned with the Resolution of the NLRC increasing the number of awardees from 28 to 131 which was apparently based only on the list of remitted SSS contributions as of 1990 when it is an undisputed fact that only 28 employees submitted their affidavits and evidence of employment before the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment on ground of lack of jurisdiction. However. annulment of judgment is allowed only where the ordinary remedies of new trial. They are proper questions for resolution in the petition for certiorari before the First Division of this Court should it decide to reinstate the petition.Consequently. With the dismissal of the petition for certiorari. (b) both parties to submit their respective memoranda. All the parties moved for reconsideration. Section 9 of BP 129 as amended. Be that as it may. this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the ground that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it refused to assume jurisdiction and annul a patently unjust decision of the NLRC. and. HELD: The appellate court has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of a final and executory judgment of the NLRC. the said resolution was sent at another address instead of the address provided for in the petition for certiorari. The appellate court also noted that petitioners had availed of the relief of certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court but they were not diligent in pursuing the same. Petitioners filed petitions for certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court through different counsels. But. the NLRC Resolution became final and executory. upon proper showing that the subject Resolution was indeed sent to an incorrect address without the fault of petitioners but which unduly deprived petitioners of opportunity to present their case . Thus. only vests in the Court of Appeals ―exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts. without awaiting the resolution of its pending motion with the NLRC. The Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for non-compliance with said resolution requiring abovementioned deposit for costs and memorandum. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the same. petitioners were well-aware that they had the available remedy of a petition for certiorari to this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. petitioners failed to comply.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GILBERT SUMCAD PANGANIBAN. could no longer be subjected to a new trial and hearing. Petitioner was ordered to reinstate Sumcad to his former position. there are no supervening events that would make the issuance of a writ of execution unjust. petitioner appealed to the NLRC. an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to full back wages.: FACTS: Private Respondent Sumcad filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Petitioner. an appellate court may still modify or alter it when intervening circumstances render execution of that decision unjust and inequitable.
. premium pay for holidays and rest days. especially when that which it seeks to present is unnecessary.NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment certifying that its Resolution had become final and executory. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals may still modify a Final and Executory Decision of the NLRC. despite ample opportunity to do so. pay differential. this Petition. It alleged that the Complaint should be dismissed. The CA then ordered the LA to issue a writ of execution for the immediate reinstatement of private respondent and the payment of his back wages. Under Republic Act No. being already final and executory. as well as attorney's fees. however. Petitioner claimed that private respondent was a project — not a regular — employee. when the basis for modification is previously existing evidence that a party fails to adduce during the hearing on the merits. This principle does not apply. J. Hence. the Decision and Resolution. service incentive leaves. alleging that he was a regular employee dismissed without cause and proper notice. other privileges and benefits. Unconvinced. and attorney's fees. whose services had been fully paid upon the completion of the project. and prayed for reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights. FINAL AND EXEUTORY JUDGEMENTS OF NLRC C-E CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. The CA held that. and 13th month pay for three (3) years counted backward from the date the Complaint was filed. even after a judgment has become final and executory. Thus. The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of Sumcad. final and executor judgments can neither be amended nor altered. Settled is the rule that. even if the purpose is to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or of law. petitioner cannot be allowed to present evidence again. if any.The petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit but without prejudice to a more appropriate remedy. 6715. Petitioner appealed to the CA. HELD: True. without any diminution or reduction by earnings derived elsewhere during the period of illegal dismissal. with payment of full back wages from the time his salary had been withheld until his actual reinstatement. NLRC found Sumcad to be a regular employee and ordered the payment of his back wages for one (1) year. Here. except for correction of clerical errors. full back wages from the time of his illegal dismissal until his actual reinstatement.
extortion and bribery under the company's Code of Discipline.R. But when they boarded the plane. Tanedo and her family in completing their travel documents and in obtaining the boarding passes for her and her husband. Subsequently petitioner conducted clarificatory hearings. Thus. 36 for the processing of their travel documents and gave him their travel documents and the amount of P2. October 14. 221: TECHNICALITIES ARE NOT STRICTLY APPLIED IN LABOR CASES PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. This prompted Ms.: FACTS: Jacqueline Tanedo and her family were at counter No. J. The proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are non-litigious in nature as provided for in Section 6.00 as payment for their discounted travel taxes. Responding in the negative. bribery) Respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal. However the Court of Appeals reversed it on the ground that "Jacqueline's complaint/report cannot be considered as substantial evidence of the commission of corruption by conspiracy for not only was this not verified or sworn under oath. extortion. representing their travel taxes.ART. 102 of PAL bound for Los Angeles.00.. PAL found them guilty of serious misconduct (corruption. Upon receipt of their boarding passes.‖ ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint/report and deposition are hearsay. vs. Tongson volunteered to assist Ms. At about the same time. 2003. Inc. When Ms. Ms.He did not issue the corresponding receipt but issued boarding passes to her children. Jacqueline was never presented or her deposition taken in order to give Tongson a chance to cross-examine her. petitioner charged both Arriola and respondent Tongson with corruption. HELD: No. approached her and asked if they have already paid the required travel taxes. when one of its employees. INC. This piece of evidence is thus hearsay and of no probative value. Tanedo and her family were checking-in they were again charged the amount of P3. TONGSON [G. The argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC. which they reluctantly paid. Article 221 of the Labor Code allows the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter to decide a case on the basis of position papers and other documents submitted by the parties without resorting to technical rules of evidence as observed in regular courts of justice.000. California. a written complaint against Arriola and respondent Tongson. herein petitioner. but respondent and Arriola failed to appear despite notice. No.240. Tanedo realized that their seats were apart from each other. they opted to take the succeeding flight scheduled the following day. Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. Arriola assured her that the stewardess would make the necessary arrangement to enable them to be seated together. which was subsequently affirmed by the NLRC. Arthur B.] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. After a thorough investigation. no such arrangement was made. the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding respondent guilty of serious misconduct and upholding petitioner's notice dismissing him from the service. 153157. After the submission of the parties' pleadings and position papers. Tanedo and her family followed Arriola at counter No. where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only. as amended. Tanedo to file with the Philippine Airlines. 29 of the Manila Station International to check-in for flight No. Joseph Arriola.
. ARTHUR B. another PAL employee. Ms.
the Labor Code directs labor officials to use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts speedily and objectively with little regard to technicalities and formalities. Respondent Pedrito Torres. Respondent Torres informed petitioner of his preventive suspension for a period of 90 days in view of the pending administrative investigation against him. statement of financial conditions. J. Respondent appealed the decision to the NLRC stating that the arbiter hastily decided the case even if they did not adduce evidence to support their claim of business losses.ART. No.: FACTS: Petitioner Prudencio Tanjuan was employed by respondent Philippine Postal Savings Bank. INC [G. Torres wrote a letter addressed to all employees informing them of the impending reorganization and enjoining them to apply for their desired positions. In the instant case. Petitioner then received a Notice of Termination informing him that his employment shall cease 30 calendar days from date of receipt of notice on the ground of abolition of the position.R. The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling. petitioner elevated the case to CA. Petitioner filed a case of illegal dismissal with money claims. They were given five days to submit written explanations. In the interest of due process. PHILIPPINE POSTAL SAVINGS BANK. The Board of Directors of PPSBI approved the bank‘s reorganization via retrenchment of employees and re-alignment of functions and positions for the purpose of preventing further business losses. delay in the submission of evidence should be clearly explained and should adequately provide the employer‘s allegation of the cause of termination. They presented audited consolidated statements of conditions. It is well settled that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence even for the first time on appeal. NLRC issued a resolution admitting the evidence presented by respondents on appeal and finding the same adequate to prove the existence of serious business losses. the respondents reserved the right to introduce evidence to the labor arbiter. Dissatisfied with the ruling of the NLRC. Petitioner submitted his explanation alleging that he merely validated the findings of the Property Appraiser. and COA annual audit report among other things.] PANGANIBAN. 155278. PRUDENCIO TANJUAN vs. Inc. 2003. because technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases. income and loss statements. issued Memorandum 145-98 addressed to petitioner and five other employees belonging to its Account Management Dept and Credit Supervision and Control Dept. 011-99 amending of the order of preventive suspension against the former from 90 days to 30 days. (2) Whether or not the petitioner was validly terminated. Reasons of confidentiality and the
. (PPSBI). Petitioner did not apply for any position in the new organizational set-up. 221:TECHNICAL RULES NOT STRICTLY APPLIED IN LABOR CASES. Petitioner countered that the preventive suspension should not exceed 30 days as stated in the Labor Code. Respondent Torres issued OP Order No. HELD: (1) No. PPSBI President and CEO. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the respondent PPSBI is barred from attaching as annexes to the Memorandum on Appeal evidence not submitted to the Labor Arbiter. a government financing institution and a subsidiary of the Philippine Postal Corporation (Philpost). charging them with negligence in the performance of duties and misrepresentation in violation of the bank‘s rules for approving the applications for loan of Corinthian de Tagaytay and Clavecilla Marine Service. which may have a new title. September 16. However. as Property Appraisal Specialist and Officer-in-Charge of its Credit Supervision and Control Department. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring PPSBI guilty of illegal dismissal and ordering it to reinstate petitioner to his former position. This rule applies equally to both the employee and the employer. if and when required to do so.
hence. VICTOR M. J. It has been the consistent holding of the Supreme
. SC agree with the petitioners that even assuming that the Rules require all attachments to a petition for certiorari to be certified true copies. Such evidence was absolutely necessary to resolve the issue of whether the petitioner‘s employment was validly terminated. Labor Arbiter Manuel P.. The petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari with a prayer for injunctive relief against the complainant and the labor arbiter. which made downsizing the only recourse for the bank to follow. Paragraph 1 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. had exclusive jurisdiction over the complaint because his dismissal as president and general manager of the respondent VMPI was not effected through a resolution of the Board of Directors and. 902-A. and substantial losses.D. necessitating the presentation of the respective contentions of the parties in evidence. not the SEC. and a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC as provided for in a Sec.volatile nature of PPSBI‘s business as a banking institution prompted respondents to limit the presentation of evidence at the outset. real. the CA should have nevertheless taken cognizance of the petition. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution. The CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.: FACTS: Victor Endaya filed a Complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against Van Melle Phils. SR. ART. Instead of filing an Answer to the complaint. and not the labor arbiter. 5 of Presidential Decree No. petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the same on the ground that the SEC.. The petitioner was validly terminated on the reason of serious business losses. affirming those of the NLRC showed real and grave financial reverses. September 23. the case was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC. Indeed. Both the NLRC and the CA found that the audited financial statements submitted by respondents adequately supported their claim of actual. He also averred that he was constructively dismissed by his immediate superior because of racial discrimination. Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.R. Hence the present petition. The findings of the CA. The respondent opposed the motion to dismiss. 902-A. 221: TECHNICALITIES ARE NOT STRICTLY APPLIED IN LABOR CASES VAN MELLE PHILS. within the context of Article 212. ENDAYA [G. just because it had not been presented before the labor arbiter. involving as it was the election of a corporate officer of the respondent VMPI. He averred that his dismissal could not be considered as an intra-corporate controversy because no such election or appointment of Niels Have or his representative took place. had jurisdiction over the complaint pursuant to Section 5 of P. No. ISSUE: Whether the labor arbiter had exclusive jurisdiction over a complaint involving the election of a member of the board of directors and a corporate officer. vs.] CALLEJO. was not a corporate act. insisting that the NLRC. HELD: The petition is meritorious. (VMPI) for Illegal Dismissal/Constructive Dismissal. patently an intra-corporate controversy between the private respondent and the petitioners. (2) Yes. The labor arbiter held the resolution of the motion in abeyance until after the parties submitted their respective position papers. Indeed it would be foolhardy for the NLRC and the CA to reject the evidence. He insisted that the dispute between him and the respondents was a labor dispute. retrenchment of the petitioner was the consequence of the bank‘s reorganization and a cost saving device recognized by jurisprudence. The CA issued a Resolution denying due course and dismissing the petition for failure of the petitioners to comply with Section 3. They claimed that the controversy between the complainant and the respondents was an intracorporate controversy. therefore. 2003. 143132. Asuncion issued an order stating that the ground invoked by the respondents therein in their motion to dismiss was treated as a matter of defense considering that the intricate issues involved in the said motion were legal and factual. Inc. No.
148279 May 27. Thus. respondent. No. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION [G. engaged the services of Jennevie Lizo. ET AL. it bears stressing that the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of the right must comply with the statute or rules. the ends of justice would be better served. then a department of respondent San Miguel Beer Corporation (SMC). In so doing. in dismissing the petition before it. After reviewing petitioner‘s qualifications.Court that cases should be determined on the merits. vs. vs. No. hired petitioner as a utility/miscellaneous worker.
. A strict and rigid application of the rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be avoided. 156658. Several positions were abolished including petitioner‘s position as Stock Clerk. the mandatory 10-day period of perfecting an appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter may be disregarded. Petitioner received complaints from its clients against her for undesirable conduct. HELD: No. Twenty-one (21) days after her employment. promulgated by authority of law. petitioners are mandated to perfect their appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law and failure to do so renders the judgment of the Labor Arbiter final and executory. He became a monthly paid employee promoted as Stock Clerk. JENNEVIE H. March 10. At the outset. REDUNDANCY BONIFACIO ASUFRIN.: FACTS: Corporate Inn Hotel. NLRC dismissed the same for being late. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution. CA affirrmed in toto the NLRC Resolution.The Labor Arbiter rendered Lizo was illegally dismissed. he was designated warehouse checker at the Sum-ag Sales Office.Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. Sometime in 1984. Her performance was evaluated after which she was recommended to undergo an additional training under maximum supervision. ISSUE: Whether or not. Bacolod City Sales Office were reorganized. 2004] YNARES-SANTIAGO: FACTS: Coca Cola Plant. the sales office and operations at the Sum-ag.R. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. Thus. JR. petitioner terminated her services. the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period for the same is jurisdictional in character.R. the appellate court clearly put a premium on technicalities and simply brushed aside the issue posed by the petitioners — whether the labor arbiter committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground that the SEC (now the RTC) had exclusive jurisdiction over the said complaint. BINDING EFFECT OF THE DECISION OF THE NLRC. rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. She filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims against petitioner. LIZO G. akin to the Rules of Court. as a probationary account executive. 2004 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. have the force and effect of law. The NLRC Rules. after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses. Under Article 223 of the Labor Code. J. Thus. On appeal. PERFECTION OF APPEAL CORPORATE INN HOTEL. petitioner. a decision of a Labor Arbiter is final and executory unless appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) days from notice of the said Decision.
Petitioner opted to remain and manifested to Acting Personnel Manager Salvador Abadesco his willingness to be assigned to any job. considering that he had three children in college. it would be surprising to find duplication of work and two (2) or more people doing the work of one person. Respondent ―has not shown how the cessation of operations of the Sum-ag Sales Office contributed to the ways and means of improving effectiveness of the organization with the end in view of efficiency and cutting distribution overhead and other related costs. citing the leading case of Wiltshire File Co. does not show that his position had not become redundant. and respondent is ordered to reinstate him to his former or equivalent position. We believe that redundancy. properly terminable is an exercise of business judgment of the employer. Respondent filed a petition with the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the judgment of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal. owing to the implementation of the ―pre-selling operations‖ scheme.
. with full backwages computed from date of dismissal up to his actual reinstatement. Petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which set aside the Labor Arbiter‘s decision and ordered respondent SMC to reinstate petitioner to his former or equivalent position with full backwages. no employee may be dismissed without observance of the fundamentals of good faith. It must produce adequate proof that such is the actual situation to justify the dismissal of the affected employees for redundancy. we explained the nature of redundancy as an authorized cause for dismissal thus: ―Redundancy in an employer‘s personnel force necessarily or even ordinarily refers to duplication of work. Petitioner‘s request that he be given an assignment in the company was ignored by the Acting Personnel Manager. but human and must be dealt with from the standpoint of human interest. That no other person was holding the same position that private respondent held prior to the termination of his services. Respondent is likewise ordered to pay petitioner the sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of his total monetary award as attorney‘s fees. HELD: In the case at bar. one of the authorized causes for dismissal. In Dole Philippines. exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. provided there is no violation of law and no showing that it was prompted by an arbitrary or malicious act. Inc. Indeed. In other words. therefore. 1922 ―labor is neither a chattel nor a commodity. To quote what has been aptly stated by former Governor General Leonard Wood in his inaugural message before the 6th Philippine Legislature on October 27. the employees of Sum-ag sales force were informed that they can avail of respondent‘s early retirement package pursuant to the retrenchment program.Respondent SMC thereafter wrote a letter to petitioner informing him that. in any well-organized business enterprise. Inc. thus. petitioner was dismissed on the ground of redundancy. Petitioner was surprised when he was informed by the Acting Personnel Manager that his name was included in the list of employees who availed of the early retirement package. while those who will not avail of early retirement would be redeployed or absorbed at the Brewery or other sales offices. Respondent. it is not enough for a company to merely declare that it has become overmanned. NLRC.‖ It bears stressing that whether it be by redundancy or retrenchment or any of the other authorized causes. NLRC. clearly resorted to sweeping generalization[s] in dismissing complainant. all positions of route and warehouse personnel will be declared redundant and the Sum-ag Sales Office will be closed effective April 30. v. Thereafter. ISSUES: Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner is based on a just and authorized cause. Petitioner thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. The wisdom or soundness of this judgment is not subject to discretionary review of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was denied.‖ Accordingly. for purposes of the Labor Code.. The determination that employee‘s services are no longer necessary or sustainable and. petitioner‘s dismissal is declared illegal. v. 1996.
HELD: We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent‘s dismissal from the service was without justifiable cause and without notice and hearing as required by the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming in toto the NLRC Decision and Resolution.: FACTS: Arsenio M. however. This prompted respondent to file with the SSS an application for sickness/medical benefits. Respondent then filed with petitioner an application for a one month leave of absence as well as sickness and/or medical benefits. Urbano S. and (2) the legality in the manner of dismissal. that is. J. valid and legal cause which justifies respondent‘s removal from employment. Lucy Caasi. The illegality of the act of dismissal constitutes discharge without just cause. the NLRC affirmed with modification the Arbiter‘s assailed Decision in the sense that the award of moral and exemplary damages was deleted. This provision has two aspects: (1) the legality of the act of dismissal. 139135. Hence. vs. USAID submitted its report to petitioner recommending that respondent and Nicolas be relieved from their posts. in-charge of remitting petitioner‘s contributions to the SSS. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court. there is no showing of a clear. He could not report then for work due to the pendency of his complaint with the Labor Arbiter. while illegality in the manner of dismissal is dismissal without due process. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed from employment. At this instance. Upon appeal. he reported the matter to the SSS. respondent. Respondent who was illegally dismissed from work is actually entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges as well as to his full backwages. this petition for review on certiorari. After conducting an investigation. The Labor Arbiter ordered that respondent was illegally dismissed from employment and ordering petitioner to reinstate him to his former position and to pay his full backwages. for illegal dismissal and non-payment of wages and other benefits.COMPUTATION OF BENEFITS. While on duty. Caasi. Thereafter. petitioner failed to discharge its burden. inclusive of allowances. January 29. It is a settled doctrine that ―the employer has the burden of proving the lawfulness of his employee‘s dismissal. Neither did petitioner serve two written notices to respondent prior to his termination from employment as required by the Labor Code. Jr.. he came to know that petitioner failed to remit to the SSS its monthly contributions for nine (9) consecutive months. In the case at bar. While petitioner approved his one-month leave of absence. Toston.‖ Clearly. petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. dismissal based on the grounds provided by Article 282 of the Labor Code.R. No. Clearly.‖ Respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against petitioner and its president. and
. INC. scolded and rebuked respondent and told him not to report for work and that his name would be ―dropped from the rolls. petitioner was shot by another guard when informed the latter that he is being investigated in the alleged illegal lotto betting within the company premises. The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code provide that no worker shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after due process. was employed as a security guard by petitioner. Consequently. this is a case of illegal dismissal. ASPECTS OF DUE PROCESS BOLINAO SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION SERVICE. Metro Manila. with prayer for reinstatement and payment of full backwages. TOSTON [G. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. ARSENIO M. 2004] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. it rejected his claim for benefits. Petitioner sent a letter to respondent declaring him absent without leave (AWOL). Eventually. petitioner assigned respondent at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) situated Taguig. The validity of the charge must be clearly established in a manner consistent with due process.
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL. file any complaint against the petitioner with the NLRC on account of his dismissal. Article III of Rep. However. HELD: The normal consequences of a finding that an employee has been illegally dismissed are.R. A more equitable disposition would be an award of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay. Aladdin F. the payment of backwages corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement. allowances and other benefits. that the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and secondly. Trinidad. February 16. SR. 6425). Rizal which found probable cause to hold him for trial. The private respondent filed a complaint with the NLRC against the petitioner for illegal dismissal. However. The court. The private respondent posted a bail bond and was released from his detention cell. On said date. Apparently. J. vs. he was promoted as ―Liason Officer‖ of the school with the Department of Education. 152568. whichever is higher (with a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year). The private respondent executed a sworn statement claiming that (a) there was no factual basis for his dismissal. antagonism caused a severe strain in the relationship between him and petitioner company. The case was dismissed for lack of merit.: FACTS: Private respondent Pedro Natividad started working with petitioner Tomas Claudio Memorial College (TCMC) in Morong. Thus do these
. on certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The private respondent was arrested by the Morong police authorities.to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C. The private respondent appealed the decision to the NLRC which affirmed the same. The private respondent was arrested anew by police authorities for violation of Section 27. as amended. He did not. rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of legal basis. or one month pay for every year of service. INC. the appellate court affirmed. on the said date. No. with modification. holding that although there was a valid cause for the private respondent‘s dismissal. The private respondent was thenceforth barred from entering the school without the petitioner‘s approval. issued a warrant for the private respondent‘s arrest.. while the grant of backwages allows the same employee to recover from the employer that which he had lost by way of wages as a result of his dismissal. A preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Court of Morong. 6425. the petitioner did not follow the procedure for the termination of his employment. Act No. sent a Memorandum to the private respondent informing him that his employment was already terminated. the circumstances obtaining in this case do not warrant the reinstatement of respondent. COURT OF APPEALS [G. the private respondent posted a bail bond and was released from detention. firstly. Reinstatement restores the employee who was unjustly dismissed to the position from which he was removed. Rizal. In time. 2004] CALLEJO. for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act (Republic Act NO. that is. Ramos. A criminal complaint was later filed against him. The NLRC also denied the private respondent‘s motion for the reconsideration of the said decision. ITS CONSEQUENCES TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE. in addition to his full backwages. These twin remedies-reinstatement and payment of backwages – make the dismissed employee whole who can then look forward to continued employment. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent was illegally dismissed thus entitling him to backwages. without any warrant therefore. The statutory intent on this matter is clearly discernible. The petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals. The petitioner. Culture and Sports (DECS) and with the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) with the rank of Assistant Registrar. through its president. to his status quo ante dismissal. and (b) he was deprived of his rights to due process. however. the decision of the NLRC.
the latter procured a medical certificate and went on sick leave. we find no reason to disturb the unanimous findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. Due to the alleged ill treatment and harassment by the management. one from the other. CRUZ G. hence. Indeed. NCR. Asuncion G. Sumawang. NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. FINDINGS OF FACT OF CA. Sumawang. she was designated as liason officer.: FACTS: Private respondent Ma. the inappropriateness or nonavailability of one does not carry with it the inappropriateness or non-availability of the other. and Pacita G.
. a complaint for illegal dismissal. No. the instant petition raises a fundamental factual issue which has already been exhaustively discussed and passed upon by the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals which ruled that Cruz was illegally dismissed and the dismissal was attended by bad faith on the part of the petitioners. 5137. she was asked to return to work on a ―no work. Cruz was a cashier and stockholder of Petitioner Gallera de Guison Hermanos. 5251. 2004 TINGA. After a careful consideration of the records of this case. Atty. ET AL. Galera (sic) notified private respondent thru a letter that the latter should report for work and explain why private respondent has not been reporting for work. The labor arbiter issued a decision declaring private respondent to have been illegally dismissed. as in this case. are accorded not only respect but even finality and are deemed binding upon this Court so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. particularly where it is in absolute agreement with that of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. Atty.‖ We reiterate the statement in this case. the State Prosecutor found no probable cause for the detention of the private respondent and resolved to dismiss the case. Thereafter. Gallera is engaged in the operation and maintenance of a cockpit arena in Quezon City and petitioners Carlos H. Private respondent filed with the Department of Labor. Sr.R. vs. INC. Though the grant of reinstatement commonly carries with it an award of backwages. ―time and again the much-repeated but not so well-heeded rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. Private respondent wrote Gallera requesting that she be assigned as Liaison Officer. earn any income. Gallera‘s counsel. We stated then. Her designation as liason officer was removed. Inc. Reyes. In 22 payrolls. ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz was dismissed for cause. he is presumed innocent until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. The award of backwages is not conditioned on the employee‘s ability or inability to. in the interim.‖ except the allowances and other cash entitlements to the position. The two forms of relief are distinct and separate.two remedies give meaning and substance to the constitutional right of labor to security of tenure. the private respondent did not report for work. ASUNCION C. WHEN BINDING TO THE SUPREME COURT GALLERA DE GUISON HERMANOS. MA. Reyes are the chairman of the Board of Directors and President. the petitioners are solidarily liable for Cruz‘ monetary claims consisting of separation pay. HELD: Indeed.. wrote private respondent to report for work on a no work no pay basis in the meantime that the management is studying to which position private respondent will be transferred. no pay basis. J. Nevertheless. informed her through a letter that the Board is not in a legal position to consider the request because an employee cannot be appointed to another position which would result in the reduction of his existing salary and that the duties and responsibilities of a Liaison Officer are already being performed by some of the management staff. While it may be true that the private respondent was detained in Criminal Case No. respectively thereof. 159390 June 10. The private respondent has not yet been convicted by final judgment in Criminal Case No. backwages and attorney‘s fees. Meanwhile.
Latag however died and subsequently. Avelina Latag.was specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence. Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. Hence. Such is the situation in the present case. Latag transferred to R & E Transport. vs. with her then counsel. According to the appellate court.00. though. When he recovered. because petitioners‘ appeal before the NLRC was not accompanied by an appropriate cash or surety bond. LATAG. rep. He asked Felix Fabros. as mandated by law.00) as a taxi driver. Latag got sick and was forced to apply for partial disability with the SSS. the doors to a review are open. Whether the labor arbiter‘s Order of May 23. ISSUES: 1. (1) The power of the CA to review NLRC decisions via a Rule 65 petition is now a settled issue. the administrative officer of petitioners. The CA thus ruled that the labor arbiter‘s January 10. this Petition. Likewise settled is the rule that when supported by substantial evidence. AVELINA P. Thereafter. Hence. substituted him.R. 2000 involved a monetary award. Respondent appealed to the CA. the CA -. Moreover. Inc. an employer‘s appeal of a decision involving monetary awards may be perfected only upon the posting of an adequate cash or surety bond. 2004] PANGANIBAN: FACTS: Pedro Latag was a regular employee of La Mallorca Taxi. such appeal was not perfected. if and when necessary. Martin Funeral Homes v. HELD: The Petition is partly meritorious. and that such petition should be filed with the CA in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. we have definitively ruled that the proper remedy to ask for the review of a decision of the NLRC is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. thus. it has already been explained that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa 129. The NLRC came out with the assailed decision. as amended by Republic Act 7902. was invited to the office of petitioners‘ counsel and was offered the amount of P38. he filed a case for payment of his retirement pay before the NLRC. As early as St. when factual findings of the NLRC are contrary to those of the labor arbiter. when there is a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record. which she accepted. he reported for work but was no longer allowed to continue working on account of his old age. When La Mallorca ceased from business operations. factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts. his wife. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution. Thus. Whether the CA acted properly when it overturned the NLRC‘s factual findings. Petitioners interposed an appeal before the NLRC which the latter dismissed for failure to post a cash or surety bond. Respondent Avelina Latag. Respondent was also asked to sign an already prepared quitclaim and release and a joint motion to dismiss the case.
. the Labor Arbiter issued an order that decision stands and the Labor Arbitration Associate is directed to prepare the Writ of Execution in due course. the evidentiary facts may be reviewed by the appellate court. for his retirement pay pursuant to Republic Act 7641 but he was ignored.pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari -. 2000 Decision and May 23. February 13. 2000 Order had already become final and executory. These findings are not infallible. they may be examined by the courts. He was receiving an average daily salary of five hundred pesos (P500. which was granted.VALIDITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS R & E TRANSPORT. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Latag. to resolve factual issues. NLRC. INC. 2. 155214. PEDRO M. No.500. LATAG [G. contending that under Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 3. which gave due course to the motion for reconsideration.her deceased husband.
Nonetheless. Jr. Thus. however. his retirement pay should be computed on the sole basis of his salary. however. he is not entitled to the 13th month and the service incentive pay. they submitted evidence that respondents were project employees and that their dismissal was due to the discontinuation of the Jaka Tower I project where they were assigned. in petitioners‘ other contention that the May 23. the appellate court committed no error when it ruled that the document was invalid and could not bar her from demanding the benefits legally due her husband. and look with disfavor upon quitclaims and waivers that bargain these away. an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. the CA found that Pedro was earning an average of five hundred pesos (P500) per day. In this case. Courts have stepped in to annul questionable transactions.: INC. He sustained their claim of illegal dismissal as petitioners failed to adduce contrary evidence.000. but retain only those sums in excess of the ―boundary‖ or fee they pay to the owners or operators of their vehicles. Quinto. a quitclaim in which the consideration is ―scandalously low and inequitable‖ cannot be an obstacle to the pursuit of a worker‘s legitimate claim. The NLRC nevertheless assumed jurisdiction over the
. if the judgment involves a monetary award. It is accepted that taxi drivers do not receive fixed wages. December 11. Moreover.] QUISUMBING J. 13th month pay and night shift differential was filed by respondents against petitioners before the National Labor Relations Commission. the basis for computing their benefits should be the average daily income. Petitioners were ordered to reinstate respondents. award or order must be made within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of a copy thereof by the party intending to appeal it. Respondents complied. and the acceptance of benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel. The monetary claims of the respondents were likewise granted. (2) We cannot concur. The rules implementing the New Retirement Law similarly provide the formula for computing the one-half month salary. however. procedural lapses may be disregarded because of fundamental considerations of substantial justice or because of the special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits or the amount and the issue involved. We thus compute his retirement pay as follows: P500 x 15 days x 14 years of service equals P105.R. assailed the jurisdiction of the NLRC over the appeal for failure of the petitioners to file the appeal bond within the ten (10)-day reglementary period. 2000 Order did not involve a monetary award. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
FACTS: A complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims for service incentive leave. vs. 2003. was unconscionable. especially where there is clear proof that a waiver. or where the agreement or settlement was ―unconscionable on its face. 153859.‖ A quitclaim is ineffective in barring recovery of the full measure of a worker‘s rights. The inaction was construed as a waiver by petitioners of their right to present evidence.850 he received. Courts. for instance. For the first time. This is not say that all quitclaims are invalid per se. and. are wary of schemes that frustrate workers‘ rights and benefits. hence. Compared with this amount. Petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. was wangled from an unsuspecting or a gullible person. As amended. which represented just over one third of what was legally due him. The complaint was assigned to Labor Arbiter Donato G. this provision explicitly provides that an appeal from the labor arbiter‘s decision. PAYMENT OF APPEAL BOND FILIPINAS SYSTEMS "FILSYSTEMS. The Labor Arbiter decided the complaint on the merit and ruled in favor of respondents. but not the petitioners despite several warnings and time extensions. Respondents. No. the P38. Since Pedro was paid according to the ―boundary‖ system. who ordered the parties to file their position paper.As to the Quitclaim and Waiver signed by Respondent Avelina Latag. They further contended that it was too late for petitioners to present evidence in the NLRC." COMMISSION [G.
J. Petitioners filed a motion for partial reconsideration but it was denied for lack of merit. Such a practice cannot be tolerated for it will defeat the speedy administration of justice involving our poor workers. 1998. Due to the evidence presented by petitioners on the issue of illegal dismissal. In the case at bar. petitioners interposed an appeal to the NLRC. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed with modification the Resolutions of the NLRC. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in finding and ruling that the NLRC has not acquired jurisdiction on the appeal of the petitioners for submitting an appeal bond seven (7) days beyond the ten (10)-day reglamentary period in perfecting an appeal. the Labor Arbiter issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution. 1998. respondent. and/or Mina King. 1992. The NLRC Resolution. INC. 1998. it remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. Petitioners should have adduced their evidence on the issue of illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. vs. Given these facts. From this order. petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the NLRC Resolution dismissing their appeal. but their appeal bond to stay execution of the decision was executed only on November 17. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration proved futile. filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal deduction and underpayment of wages against King Integrated Security Services. Moreover. otherwise. FINALITY OF DECISION KING INTEGRATED SECURITY SERVICES. Petitioners should have filed the present petition within fifteen days under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Inc. but it was dismissed. Their memorandum of appeal was dated November 9.appeal.. petitioners alleged that they received a copy of the Arbiter's decision on October 31. It was only when an adverse decision was rendered against them by the Arbiter that they offered to submit their evidence before the NLRC refuting respondents' complaint of illegal dismissal. No.
. The appellate court ruled that the NLRC did not have jurisdiction over the appeal since the appeal bond of the petitioners was filed out of time. the late filing of the bond divested the NLRC of its jurisdiction to entertain petitioners' appeal. On appeal. Forthwith.: FACTS: Galo S. Their motion for reconsideration was denied. 1990 to February 10.] CALLEJO. 143813. Respondents then repaired to the Court of Appeals on a Petition for Certiorari. it smacks of unfairness. The records show no partial payment of the bond was made during the reglementary period nor was there any explanation for its late filing. we cannot countenance the late submission of petitioners' evidence with the NLRC. the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) issued a Resolution modifying the Labor Arbiter's Decision by deleting the amount representing respondent's wage differential for the period from November 2. SR. They failed to do so despite the opportunities given to them by the Arbiter. 2003. HELD: Payment of the appeal bond is a jurisdictional requisite for the perfection of an appeal to the NLRC. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied. July 7. It is only in rare instances that the court relaxes the rule upon a showing of substantial compliance with it and to prevent patent injustice. Gatan. Likewise. It reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter. GATAN [G. pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor Code which provides that all money claims arising from employer-employee relations shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued.Eventually. the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Gatan. GALO S.R. having become final and executory. they shall be forever barred.
: FACTS: Private respondent Garcia is petitioner‘s documentation clerk and signature control. by setting justiceable controversies with finality. been executed. The ruling therefore of the NLRC that he was entitled to only a year of backwages due to some neglect became binding and final to him and can no longer be modified. He prayed for separation pay. otherwise." Petitioner appealed with the Court of Appeals by filing a special civil action for certiorari but the appellate court decided instead to grant Garcia full backwages. The well-settled rule with respect to civil cases is that a party who has not appealed from a decision cannot seek any relief other than what is provided in the judgment appealed from. and the charge was not even established. HELD: The petition lacks merit. however. HELD: Yes. there would be no end to a case. He added that he was terminated without just cause and in violation of his right to due process." WHEN JUDGEMENT HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY SOLIDBANK CORPORATION vs. Petitioner found Garcia responsible for clearing the forged checks and informed him that his employment is being terminated for cause. and nothing can be done therewith except its execution.ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the right to appeal. There are. exceptions to the rule. which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order. thus setting at naught the main role of courts of justice. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred when it increased the original award of the NLRC considering such award was never elevated on appeal or by certiorari by private respondent. there would be no end to litigations. It had the effect of an admission that he was not entirely fault-free in carrying out his duties and that he was accepting the one-year award. due to such neglect. as there was some sort of neglect on his part on the performance of his duties. In Fabular vs. which partially granted the appeal. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing Garcia's complaint for lack of merit. Garcia filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC Arbitration Branch.
. We have ruled that an order of execution of a final and executory judgment is not appealable. or of this Court for that matter. GARCIA PUNO. COURT OF APPEALS and GERARDO A. The NLRC granted backwages but limited it to a period of one year after it found that "there was some sort of neglect on his part in the performance of his duties. otherwise. moral damages. Garcia cleared three different Solidbank checks which turned out to be forgeries. J. Settled is the rule that after a judgment has become final. Court of Appeals. Garcia appealed to the NLRC. to modify the same. ruling that Garcia was illegally dismissed but limited the award of backwages to only one year as it found that he "is not entirely faultless. He alleged that he was charged with syndicated forgery and falsification without investigation and hearing. 6 we held: "The judgment in this case had long become final and had in fact. his failure to contest the limited award is fatal. and relinquishing his claim for full backwages." Given this finding. the highest rank position of a check verifier. It is now beyond the power of the lower court. An appellee who has himself not appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the lower court. backwages. attorney's fees and the cost of suit. no additions can be made thereto.
EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES UNIVERSITY OF IMMACULATE CONCEPCION, ET AL. vs.YOLIBELLE S. AVINANTE, ET AL. G.R. No. 143557 June 25, 2004 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ J.: FACTS: Avinante, Labor and Employment Officer III sent to the University of Immaculate Concepcion, a notice requesting the inspection of its payroll, proof of payment to its employees and a record of its capital and total assets. Upon receipt, petitioner's directress, Sister Maria Jacinta De Belen, RVM filed a motion seeking to enjoin respondent Avinante from inspecting its records. Despite petitioners' motion, respondent Avinante proceeded with her inspection. But she was refused access to petitioners' records, so she issued a "Notice of Inspection Results," specifying the violations against labor law as well as occupational safety and health standard laws committed by petitioners. They then filed an opposition to this Notice. The Regional Director of Regional Office No. XI issued an Order finding petitioners liable for violation of the above laws and directing them to pay by way of restitution to their 193 employees. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Regional Director. On appeal, the Office of the DOLE Secretary with modification the assailed Orders. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. This prompted petitioners to file a petition for certiorari with this Court which we referred to the Court of Appeals which the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for being late. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied by the Appellate Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for being late. HELD: The filing of a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court (now before the Court of Appeals pursuant to the ruling in St. Martin's Funeral Home vs. NLRC) shall not stay the execution of the order or decision unless the aggrieved party secures a temporary restraining order from the Court within fifteen (15) calendar days from the date of finality of the order or decision or posts a supersedeas bond in an amount which is adequate to protect the interests of the prevailing party subject to the approval of the Secretary." In National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma, we ruled that "the remedy of an aggrieved party in a Decision or Resolution of the Secretary of the DOLE is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure." Under this Rule, petitioners should have filed their petition for certiorari within 60 days from receipt of the DOLE Secretary's Order denying their first motion for reconsideration. Suffice it to say that even if petitioners' second motion is in order, however, it is a pro forma motion. As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals, "the second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was a mere reiteration of the arguments raised in their first motion for reconsideration and passed upon." In Vda de Espina vs. Abaya, we held that a second motion for reconsideration, being pro-forma, does not suspend the period to file a petition for certiorari. Furthermore, the second motion for reconsideration has not stated new grounds.
DUTY TO BARGAIN GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 146728. February 11, 2004] QUISUMBING J.: FACTS: In its two plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-Lapu City, petitioner General Milling Corporation (GMC) employed 190 workers. They were all members of private respondent General Milling Corporation Independent Labor Union (union, for brevity), a duly certified bargaining agent. GMC and the union concluded a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which included the issue of representation effective for a term of three years. The CBA was effective for three years retroactive to December 1, 1988. Hence, it would expire on November 30, 1991. On November 29, 1991, a day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted within ten (10) days. As early as October 1991, however, GMC had received collective and individual letters from workers who stated that they had withdrawn from their union membership, on grounds of religious affiliation and personal differences. On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the union‘s officers stating that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a union which no longer existed. On January 13, 1992, GMC dismissed Marcia Tumbiga, a union member, on the ground of incompetence. The union protested and requested GMC to submit the matter to the grievance procedure provided in the CBA. GMC, however, advised the union to ―refer to our letter dated December 16, 1991.‖ Thus, the union filed a complaint against GMC with the NLRC, Arbitration Division, Cebu City. The complaint alleged unfair labor practice on the part of GMC. The labor arbiter dismissed the case with the recommendation that a petition for certification election be held to determine if the union still enjoyed the support of the workers. The union appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC held that respondent union remained as the exclusive bargaining agent with the right to renegotiate the economic provisions of the CBA. Consequently, it was unfair labor practice for GMC not to enter into negotiation with the union. On GMC‘s motion for reconsideration, the NLRC set aside its decision. Hence, the union filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court rendered a decision which granted the petition of the union. A motion for reconsideration was seasonably filed by GMC but the CA denied it for lack of merit. ISSUES: Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in (1) finding GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for violating the duty to bargain collectively and/or interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization, and (2) imposing upon GMC the draft CBA proposed by the union for two years to begin from the expiration of the original CBA. HELD: The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should last for five years. The relation between labor and management should be undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year. Hence, it is indisputable that when the union requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991, it was still the certified collective bargaining agent of the workers, because it was seeking said renegotiation within five (5) years from the date of effectivity of the CBA on December 1, 1988. The union‘s proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of said period. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union. For refusing to send a counter-proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA, the company committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code. The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. Both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a
new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation. Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the union‘s proposals, GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair labor practice. Perforce, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that GMC is, under the circumstances, guilty of unfair labor practice. Finally, did the CA gravely abuse its discretion when it imposed on GMC the draft CBA proposed by the union for two years commencing from the expiration of the original CBA? The provision mandates the parties to keep the status quo while they are still in the process of working out their respective proposal and counter proposal. The general rule is that when a CBA already exists, its provision shall continue to govern the relationship between the parties, until a new one is agreed upon. The rule necessarily presupposes that all other things are equal. That is, that neither party is guilty of bad faith. However, when one of the parties abuses this grace period by purposely delaying the bargaining process, a departure from the general rule is warranted. Since it was GMC which violated the duty to bargain collectively, it had lost its statutory right to negotiate or renegotiate the terms and conditions of the draft CBA proposed by the union. SURFACE BARGAINING; BLUE-SKY BARGAINING STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION vs.MA. NIEVES R. CONFESOR, ET AL. G.R. No. 114974 June 16, 2004 CALLEJO, SR., J.: FACTS: Standard Chartered Bank is a foreign banking corporation doing business in the Philippines. The exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the Bank is the Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union. The Bank and the Union signed a five-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a provision to renegotiate the terms thereof on the third year. Prior to the expiration of the three year period but within the sixty-day freedom period, the Union initiated the negotiations. The Bank took note of the Union‘s proposals. The Bank attached its counter-proposal to the non-economic provisions proposed by the Union. Before the commencement of the negotiation, the Union suggested that the bank lawyers should be excluded from the negotiating team. The Bank acceded. Meanwhile, the Bank suggested that Umali, the President of the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), be excluded from the Union‘s negotiating panel. However, Umali was retained as a member thereof. The parties met and set the ground rules for the negotiation. Both parties agreed to place the notation ―DEFERRED/DEADLOCKED on items that remained unresolved.‖ Diokno stated that, in order for the Bank to make a better offer, the Union should clearly identify what it wanted to be included in the total economic package. Umali replied that it was impossible to do so because the Bank‘s counter-proposal was unacceptable. The Union declared a deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). On the other hand, the Bank filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) and Damages before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Manila. The Bank alleged that the Union violated its duty to bargain, as it did not bargain in good faith. It contended that the Union demanded ―sky high economic demands,‖ indicative of blue-sky bargaining. The complaint for ULP filed by the Bank before the NLRC was consolidated with the complaint over which the SOLE assumed jurisdiction. After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the SOLE dismissed the charges of ULP of both the Union and the Bank, explaining that both parties failed to substantiate their claims. Dissatisfied, the Union filed a motion for reconsideration with clarification, while the Bank filed a motion for reconsideration. The SOLE issued a Resolution denying the motions. The Union filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was, likewise, denied.
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.The Bank and the Union signed the CBA. Immediately thereafter. ULP under Article 248(a) in connection with Article 243 of the Labor Code is committed. substantial evidence is required to support the claim. The Office of the Solicitor General. It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an afterthought. However. and. restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or the right to form association. the parties were not able to agree and reached a deadlock. Neither was it shown that the public respondent exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. the Union bases its claim of interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude Umali from the Union‘s negotiating panel. Whether or not the petitioner is estopped from filing the instant action.
. the wage increase was effected and the signing bonuses based on the increased wage were distributed to the employees covered by the CBA. find that the Union failed to substantiate its claim that the Bank refused to furnish the information it needed. the fact that the Bank made use of the aforesaid guestimates. The right to self-organization necessarily includes the right to collective bargaining. Admittedly. if an employer interferes in the selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of negotiators a representative of the Union. making bad faith non-economic proposals. considers it an unfair labor practice when an employer interferes. HELD: The petition is bereft of merit. it is herein emphasized that the duty to bargain ―does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. as alleged by the Union. as the Labor Code requires. amounts to a validation of the data it had used in its presentation. We. (3) No Grave Abuse of Discretion On the Part of the Public Respondent While it is true that a showing of prejudice to public interest is not a requisite for ULP charges to prosper. prayed that the petition be dismissed. The records show that the Bank‘s counterproposals on the non-economic provisions or political provisions did not put ―up for grabs‖ the entire work of the Union and its predecessors. the parties‘ failure to agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for violation of the duty to bargain. ISSUES: 1. The Union has not been able to show that the Bank had done acts. surface bargaining. both at and away from the bargaining table. The complaint was made only after a deadlock was declared by the Union. in representation of the public respondent. equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or excess thereof.‖ Hence. 2. and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise to right to selforganization or on the right to collective bargaining of the employees. Moreover. Whether or not the Bank is guilty of ―interference‖ with its choice of negotiator. The minutes of meetings do not show that the Bank had any intention of violating its duty to bargain with the Union. The Union. likewise. which tend to show that it did not want to reach an agreement with the Union or to settle the differences between it and the Union. In the case at bar. send a written request for the issuance of a copy of the data about the Bank‘s rank and file employees. Whether or not the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she issued the assailed order and resolutions. and refusal to furnish the Union with copies of the relevant data. it cannot be said that the public respondent acted in capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. 3. Parenthetically. The Duty to Bargain Collectively Surface bargaining is defined as ―going through the motions of negotiating‖ without any legal intent to reach an agreement. In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code. It asserted that the Union failed to prove its ULP charges and that the public respondent did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order and resolutions. (1) Article 248(a) of the Labor Code. did not.
Labor Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and issued a return to work order. the conclusion of the CBA was included in the order of the SOLE. as clearly explained by Caltex. The parties agreed on fourteen items. CBA. Brillantes.00 to each employee as an "early conclusion bonus. We. If it is not agreed upon by the
. leaving wages. 149434. it took exception to the award of the signing bonus. In sum. While the approval of the CBA and the release of the signing bonus did not estop the Union from pursuing its claims of ULP against the Bank. Petitioner filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration stating that while it accepted the decision of Secretary Laguesma. J. we find the latter did not engage in ULP. likewise. petitioner offered P4. June 3.(3) Estoppel not Applicable The respondent Bank argues that the petitioner is estopped from raising the issue of ULP when it signed the new CBA. After all. During the collective bargaining negotiations between petitioner and respondent union. However. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied. The Union Did Not Engage In Blue-Sky Bargaining We. 2004. Petitioner invokes the doctrine laid down in the case of Caltex v. hold that the Union is not guilty of ULP. signing. HELD: The petition is meritorious.: FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation where respondent United Philacor Workers UnionNAFLU is the duly elected collective bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of petitioner. ET AL.] YNARES-SANTIAGO. there were eighteen unresolved items between petitioner and respondent union. On a conciliation and mediation conference before Conciliator Velasco. we find that the public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the questioned order and resolutions. ISSUE: Whether or not. Secretary Laguesma further issued that the signing bonus should be given as part of the incentive and benefits. The said case involved similar facts and circumstances. Laguesma denied petitioner's motion. and retroactive bonus unresolved. where it was held that the award of the signing bonus by the Secretary of Labor was erroneous. No. the Union twice filed a motion for reconsideration respecting its ULP charges against the Bank before the SOLE. Moreover. a signing bonus may not be demanded as a matter of right. The minutes of the meeting show that the Union based its economic proposals on data of rank and file employees and the prevailing economic benefits received by bank employees from other foreign banks doing business in the Philippines and other branches of the Bank in the Asian region. the approval of the CBA and the release of signing bonus do not necessarily mean that the Union waived its ULP claim against the Bank during the past negotiations. Sec. do not agree that the Union is guilty of ULP for engaging in blue-sky bargaining or making exaggerated or unreasonable proposals. petitioner accordingly gave this early signing bonus.R." Upon conclusion of the CBA negotiations. the signing bonus should be included as a part of the incentives although no CBA was renewed by the parties. Petitioner and respondent union began their negotiations. Respondent union sent notice to petitioner of its desire to negotiate a new CBA. however. But a deadlock was declared. A Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals was dismissed. A strike was staged and lasted for eleven days and resulted in the stoppage of manufacturing operations as well as losses for petitioner. SIGNING BONUS PHILACOR vs. The Bank failed to show that the economic demands made by the Union were exaggerated or unreasonable. likewise. The award of the signing bonus was affirmed. [G. In the case.000. rice subsidy. while the signing bonus was included in the CBA itself. COURT OF APPEALS.
: FACTS: Mindanao Steel Corporation and Minsteel Free Workers Organization MINFREWO-NFL Cagayan de Oro City executed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) providing for an increase of P20. two things militate against the grant of the signing bonus: first. To begin with. the condition sine qua non for its grant — a non-strike — was not complied with. 2004] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. INTERPRETATION OF THE CBA MINDANAO STEEL CORPORATION vs.e. the giving of the bonus should have been done over a long period of time. MINSTEEL FREE WORKERS ORGANIZATION (MINFREWO-NFL) [G. and respondent union does not dispute. in a Submission Agreement agreed to submit the case for voluntary arbitration. J. The test or rationale of this rule on long practice requires an indubitable showing that the employer agreed to continue giving the benefits knowing fully well that said employees are not covered by the law requiring payment thereof. such as the P20. any doubt or ambiguity in the contract between management and the union members should be resolved in the light of Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides: ―(I)n case of doubt. i. RX-02." however. and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate. and second.parties or unilaterally offered as an additional incentive by Caltex. In the case at bar. petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. this petition for review on certiorari. the condition for awarding it must be duly satisfied. it may nevertheless be granted on equitable considerations as when the giving of such bonus has been the company's long and regular practice. shall not include any wage increase that may be provided by law as a result of any economic change. Verily. all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer. we have consistently ruled that a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation.‖ Pertinent is Section 3.00 provided under the CBA. Article VII of the CBA which provides: ―It is hereby agreed that these salary increases shall be exclusive of any wage increase that may be provided by law as a result of any economic change. the non-fulfillment of the condition for which it was offered. that it offered an "early conclusion bonus" or an incentive for a swift finish to the CBA negotiations. the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision ordering petitioner to pay respondent‘s members and other workers their ECOLA. After the parties had submitted their position papers and other pleadings. Thereafter. No. aside from the P20. respondent‘s members are also
. March 4. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is exempt from paying the ECOLA in light of the CBA entered into by the parties. 130693. the speedy and amicable conclusion of the CBA negotiations. To be considered a "regular practice.. Petitioner refused to implement the Interim Wage Order No. HELD: Petitioner‘s contentions lack merit. Petitioner admits. prompting respondent to file with the National Mediation and Conciliation Board (NCMB) a complaint for payment of ECOLA against the former. Furthermore.00 in the workers‘ daily wage. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. a signing bonus is justified by and is the consideration paid for the goodwill that existed in the negotiations that culminated in the signing of a CBA.00 CBA wage increase. True. Hence. The Appellate Court promulgated its Decision affirming the Voluntary Arbitrator‘s Decision The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration. Hence. the failure of respondent union to prove that the grant of the said bonus is a long established tradition or a "regular practice" on the part of petitioner. Then the parties.R. In the present case.‖ The provision is clear that the salary increases.
A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Office of the DOLE Secretary in a Resolution as it was late by seven (7) days. Rule XI. contending that members of petitioner union are not its employees but of Stitchers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (SMC). Respondent opposed the petition. Finally. as amended. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. any party to a certification election may appeal the order of the Med-Arbiter directly to the Secretary of Labor who shall decide the same within fifteen (15) calendar days. Laguna by petitioner SMC Quarry 2 Workers Union-February Six Movement (FSM) Local Chapter. The CBA provision under Section 3. Regional Office No. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration. TITAN MEGABAGS INDUSTRIAL CORP. Contracts which are not ambiguous are to be interpreted according to their literal meaning and not beyond their obvious intendment. the CA erred in setting aside the final and executory Resolutions of the Dole Secretary. HELD: (1) Under Article 259 of the Labor Code.R. IV. With 151 but not more than 300 employees P400 / month 4. Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at Calamba. or in anticipation of the fuel price hikes. The Court of Appeals set aside the resolutions of the Office of the DOLE Secretary and disallowed the conduct of a certification election. affirmed in toto the Med-Arbiter‘s Order authorizing a certification election. With 21 but not more than 150 employees P300 / month 3. J. respondent. 218 JURISDICTION OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR SMC QUARRY 2 WORKERS UNION — FEBRUARY SIX MOVEMENT vs. unless restrained by the appropriate court. Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides that the Decision or Resolution of the Secretary of the DOLE on appeal shall be final and executory. 150761 May 19. In its petition for certification election. the Office of the DOLE Secretary. Upon finality of the Decision of the Secretary.
. G. Section 15. ISSUES: 1. 2. Article VII needs no interpretation. the P20.‖ Note: Category for Establishment Amount of ECOLA 1. With more than 300 employees P500 / month ART. 2004 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. On appeal. the employer has the locus standi to question the certification election of its employees. The MedArbiter held that respondent is the employer of the members of petitioner union and directed that a certification election be conducted by its regular rank and file workers.00 daily wage increase granted by petitioner to its employees under the CBA can not be considered as creditable benefit or compliance with the Interim Wage Order because such was intended as a CBA or negotiated wage increase and not ―because of. With not more than 20 employees P200 / month 2. petitioner alleged that it is a legitimate labor organization that seeks to represent the regular rank-and-file workers at Titan Megabags Industrial Corporation. Along this line.: FACTS: The controversy at bar arose from a petition for certification election filed with the MedArbitration Section. the entire records of the case shall be remanded to the office of origin for implementation of the Decision. Whether or not.entitled to the ECOLA under the Interim Wage Order. alleging that the Office of the DOLE Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in its decision and in ordering a certification election. No. Whether or not. an independent contractor.
it has no right or material interest to assail the certification election. it sought to be declared as the certified bargaining agent of the respondent at its Sta. It asserted that the petitioner's membership is the same as that of the TMPCLU. SR.. the respondent put up and implemented its Three-Function Salary Structure for its personnel/employees. The respondent submitted a list of 1. 105 out of the 120 employees whose eligibilities had been questioned by the petitioner were able to cast their votes. J. and then seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. the DOLE rendered a Decision reversing the Med-Arbiter's decision. questioned the eligibility of the 120 employees in the list. 148924. the. And without a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed within the ten-day reglementary period. it is good policy of the employer not to have any participation or partisan interest in the choice of the bargaining representative. Laguesma.In National Federation of Labor vs.R. alleging that the 105 challenged votes should have been opened and considered in the tabulation of the results of the election. Med-Arbiter Lameyra resolved to dismiss the petition.] CALLEJO. CORPORATION WORKERS' ASSOCIATION vs.: FACTS: This Court ruled that the employees of the respondent Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation (TMPC) belonging to the Level 5 positions under its Single Salary Structure set up were supervisory employees. She held that the challenged voters
. No. The decision became final and executory. the employer is a bystander. they should not. Rosa and Bicutan Plants. Respondent filed its position paper. While employers may rightfully be notified or informed of petitions of such nature. Nonetheless. 2003. The DOLE denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration of the said decision. however. we ruled that the remedy of an aggrieved party in a Decision or Resolution of the Secretary of the DOLE is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy. September 24. Thereafter. During the certification election.110 employees however the petitioner. when a petition for certification election is filed by a legitimate labor organization. the merits of the case can no longer be reviewed to determine if the Secretary could be faulted for grave abuse of discretion. (2) Even if there was no procedural flaw on the part of respondent. in effect. petitioner asserted that it garnered the majority votes of the 943 votes cast (less the challenged votes). rendered final and executory the resolutions of the Secretary of the DOLE. hence. and ordering the conduct of a certification election. Consequently. but these votes were not opened and considered. whose registration certificate has been cancelled. We have held that "in certification elections. The respondent TMPC opposed the petition on the ground that a case was pending before the Supreme Court between it and another union. Respondent‘s failure to file its motion for reconsideration seasonably is jurisdictional and fatal to its cause and has. Petitioner Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers' Association (TMPCWA) filed a petition for certification election in an unorganized establishment. The respondent further alleged that under the Three-Function Salary Structure of its personnel the following were rank-andfile employees: Med-Arbiter Zosima Lameyra issued an Order certifying the petitioner as the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Toyota in the said plants. particularly for the rank-andfile employees before the Med-Arbitration Unit of DOLE-NCR. be considered parties thereto with an inalienable right to oppose it. which sought to represent the same bargaining unit. COURT OF APPEALS [G. JURISDICTION OF THE MED-ARBITER AND THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS. the questioned Decision or Resolution of the Secretary becomes final and executory." Thus. the Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union (TMPCLU). the certification election proceeded as scheduled. With 503 affirmative votes and the exclusion of the 105 challenged votes. On appeal. still the Appellate Court should have denied respondent‘s petition for certiorari.
except for the 18. And that petitioners may exercise all their rights and claim all legal benefits as rank-and-file workers. DOLE. the petitioner gave several days for the respondent to "mend" its mind and to cease and desist from committing unfair labor practice. Nevertheless. Rosa and Bicutan Plants of the respondent and filed a manifestation with the NCR-National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCR-NCMB) informing the latter of its intention to stage a strike. Whether or not public respondent Secretary gravely abused her discretion. The respondent interposed an appeal from the said order before the DOLE. and thus ineligible to vote in the certification election among the company‘s rank-andfile employees. Assuming arguendo that the respondent had the burden. The respondent asserted that the challenged voters were rank-and-file employees. and not merely a bystander in the certification election. the Med-Arbiter and later on this Office had jurisdiction to resolve the principal issue on the status of the workers whose rights. The public respondent SOLE cannot consider the affidavits of the challenged voters as defective by concluding that the same were not properly notarized. rank-and-file employees. the challenged voters is admissible in evidence. This issue is interwoven with the principal issue on the merits of the petition. are supervisory employees. The petitioner filed a manifestation with the NCR-NCMB that the respondent had dismissed three hundred union members and officers. indeed. it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Med-Arbiter and the Office of the Secretary in certification election proceedings to resolve this issue. Tomas. Thus. in declaring that the challenged voters. Labor Arbiter ruled that the Constitution mandates that the State shall accord protection to labor. 3.were supervisory employees under the Three-Function Salary Structure. 2. In so acquiring jurisdiction. thru Secretary Patricia Sto. Whether or not the respondent is entitled to injunctive relief. as found in the Constitution and the Labor Code. through the issuance of the
. By granting the respondent's plea for a writ of preliminary injunction. has a material and substantial right sought to be protected. The petitioner further stated that the union members would stage a protest in front of the company premises. Whether or not Med-Arbiter and the Office of the Secretary has jurisdiction in certification election proceedings. There is no showing in the record that despite the assumption by the SOLE of the dispute between the petitioner and the respondent. in effect." (2) Specifically. "may be rendered inutile if their status is unresolved. the petitioner is bent on staging a strike against the respondent in defiance by the petitioner of the order of the SOLE. the Med-Arbiter and later on the Office of the Secretary acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and the parties to it. ruled that the respondent is the real party-in-interest. TMPCWA is hereby certified as the bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the company. to the exclusion of all other adjudicating agencies. (3) There was no longer any emergency. HELD: (1) Indeed. ISSUES: 1. the respondent asserted that the petitioner bears the burden of proving that the 105 challenged voters are supervisory employees. inasmuch as the petitioners never challenged the matter before the Med-Arbiter below. The petitioner voted to stage a strike at the Sta. whether or not the respondent is the real party-in-interest to assail the resolution of the SOLE and the resolution of the Med-Arbiter. issued a resolution denying with modification the motion for reconsideration of the respondent. All the affidavits of the challenged employees are admissible in evidence and entitled to credence. hence. the petitioner has no legal right to negotiate and bargain with the respondent for a collective bargaining agreement. the CA. amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When this case was filed. it adduced overwhelming evidence that the challenged voters are. Proceedings before labor agencies merely require the parties to submit their respective position papers and supporting affidavits. nevertheless. If not elected by the majority of the rank-and-file employees of the respondent. so the Labor Arbiter surmised. The DOLE affirmed the order of Med-Arbiter. urgency or a pressing necessity for the CA to still issue a writ of preliminary injunction. Hence.
e. On October 31. When the petitioner learned of said decision. 1990 notice of strike. The respondent union protested the actions of the petitioner invoking Section 15. the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. 1990 notice of strike was a mere reiteration of its September 27. the strike vote and the strike vote report. which. as the notice filed by the union on September 27. Article VI of the CBA. 2003. On October 16. the officers of the respondent union and some members staged a picket in the premises of the hotel. 153664. It ratiocinated that the compliance by respondents of the requirements laid down in Arts.
. b) Coercion of employees. On September 27.: FACTS: Petitioner and respondent union entered into and signed a CBA covering the period of July 10. RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES [G. the petitioner's general manager. and e) Illegal termination and suspension of employees. GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL. petitioner terminated the employment of the officers and members of the respondent union. the respondent union filed on November 16. alleging that it had complied with the requirements laid down in Arts. The SOLE issued a return-to-work order. On November 28. there was no need for the respondent union to comply with Arts. The next day. 263 and 264 of the Labor Code. 1990. 1990.R. By way of riposte. The SOLE had determined that the industry engaged in by the respondent is indispensable to the national interest. The CA took into account the pleadings of the parties and their admissions during the hearing of respondent's plea for injunctive relief. the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner and declared the union officers to have lost and forfeited their employment. No. July 18. to lessen the daily financial losses being incurred by the petitioner. 263 and 264 of the Labor Code. Hence. its members and officers would no longer stage a strike because of the certification election. Petitioner however filed a complaint with the Regional Arbitration Office of the NLRC for illegal strike against the respondents on the ground that the latter failed to comply with the requirements provided under Arts. The respondent prayed the CA for a writ of preliminary injunction on its claim.] CALLEJO. c) Harassment. the petitioner terminated the employment of 148 employees. 1990. After trial. in turn. 1990 another notice of strike because of what it perceived as the petitioner's continuing unfair labor practices (ULP). the CA in effect had prejudged the principal issue before it. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction is NULLIFIED.writ.. i.. After due trial. STRIKE AND LOCKOUT GRAND BOULEVARD HOTEL vs. obstructing the free ingress and egress thereto. the strike ban. the SOLE issued a status quo ante bellum order certifying the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and enjoining the parties from engaging in any strike or lockout. In their answer. The respondent union appealed the decision to the NLRC. which the respondent officers and members complied. The petitioner assured the CA and the respondent that in view hereof. 263. the SOLE issued an order certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC. 1991. The members of the respondent union voted to stage a strike. On the same day. the respondent union informed the DOLE-NCR that the union will conduct a strike vote referendum. it forthwith barred the officers and members of the respondent union from entering the hotel. The following day. 263 and 264 of the Labor Code because its November 16. the respondent union filed a notice of strike based on the following grounds: a) Violation of CBA. 1990. 1990 was sufficient compliance with the law. wrote the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE for brevity) informing him of the petitioner's decision to retrench 171 employees on a staggered basis. DOLE-NCR was thereafter informed of the results of the strike vote referendum. complied with all the requirements of the aforementioned articles. Subsequently. The petitioner wrote the SOLE of its decision to implement its retrenchment program to stem its huge losses. the respondents alleged that the petitioner committed ULP prior to the filing of the November 16. SR. The remaining employees were also informed that it will close in six months. the cooling-off period. d) Arbitrary transfer of employees. J. spread over a period of 60 days. 1988 to July 9. 1990 notice of strike. ART.
‖ While it may be true that the petitioner itself barred the officers of the respondent union from working and sent out circulars of its decision to retrench its employees effective December 16. 1990. 1990 were for the same grounds as those contained in their notice of strike on September 27. and (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. the dismissal of respondents were unjustified and without legal basis. as amended. Thereafter. 1990 notice of strike filed by the union cannot be carried over to the November 16.
. The grievances of the respondent union could still very well be ordered and acted upon by the SOLE before December 14. 264(a) of the Labor Code. for failure of the union to comply with the aforementioned requirements for its November 16. Thus. The requirements are mandatory and failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. 1990 was illegal.263 and 264 of the Labor Code respecting the September 27. this petition. 1990. 1990. Resultantly. which provides that ― x x x No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. despite the issuance by the SOLE of an assumption or certification order. the respondent union filed its notice of strike with the DOLE on November 16. strike vote and strike vote report. Consequently. becomes a prohibited activity and. if no notice of strike and a strike vote were conducted. thus. the respondents appealed NLRC‘s decision to the CA and the latter ruled that the strike was legal. in violation of the law. The respondents cannot argue that since the notice of strike on November 16. 1990 simultaneously with its notice of strike. the strike staged on November 16 up to November 29. 1990 notice of strike. 1990 and on the same day. the respondent union nevertheless staged a strike on November 16. A strike simultaneously with or immediately after a notice of strike will render the requisite periods nugatory. strike ban. (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. thus violating Art. the strike staged by them on November 16. 1990 was lawful. There was no immediate and imperative need for the respondents to stage a strike on the very day that the notice of strike on November 16. 1990 notice of strike. 1990 a status quo ante bellum order enjoining the respondent union from intending or staging a strike. hence. the same were not valid justifications for the respondents to do away with the statutory procedural requirements for a lawful strike. The respondents' claim of good faith is not a valid excuse to dispense with the procedural steps for a lawful strike. staged a picket on the premises of the hotel. Moreover. HELD: NO. The notice of strike and the cooling-off period were intended to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. In this case. 1990 which complied with the requirements of the law on the cooling-off period. the union officers and members are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act. 1990 had already been taken cognizance of by the SOLE when he issued on October 31. as amended. the said strike is illegal. The matters contained in the notice of strike of September 27. ISSUE: Whether or not the strike staged by the respondent union on November 16 was legal. a strike that is undertaken. even if the union acted in good faith in the belief that the company was committing an unfair labor practice. illegal pursuant to Art. Despite the SOLE order. The requisites for a valid strike are as follows: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE thirty days before the intended date thereof or fifteen days in case of ULP. Hence. 264 of the Labor Code. Hence. the need for a union to adhere to and comply strictly with the procedural conditions sine qua non provided for by the law in staging a strike. 1990 was filed because the retrenchment envisaged by the petitioner had yet to take effect on December 14. The requisite seven-day period is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the approval of the majority of the union members.
2004] QUISUMBING. and dismissed the complaint. Thus. the Court may look into the records of the case and reexamine the questioned findings. In St. 1996.CONSEQUENCES OF AN ILLEGAL STRIKE ELIZABETH C. NAMA-MCCH asked MCCH to renew their CBA. 1995. Cole. the instant case. Petitioners Bascon and Cole were then served notices terminating their employment. MCCH deferred the CBA negotiations until there was a determination as to which of said unions had the right to negotiate a new CBA. must have participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. however. the Court can review the records to determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts. 144899. On appeal. The other petitioner.R. the CA can supplant its finding of facts with that of the commission? 2. had been working as a nursing aide. Whether or not. like petitioners herein.: FACTS: The petitioners were employees of private respondent Metro Cebu Community Hospital. resort to judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is generally limited to the question of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Labor Arbiter found the termination to be valid and legal. Both petitioners were dismissed by the respondent hospital for allegedly participating in an illegal strike. as in the instant case. where the NLRC reverse itself. However. the Court of Appeals can review the factual findings or the legal conclusions of the NLRC. Hence. placards and posters. the findings of facts of the NLRC contradict those of the Labor Arbiter. Where the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter disagree on their finding of facts. (2) In Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code it could be gleaned that while a union officer can be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. we held that the special civil action of certiorari is the mode of judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC either by this Court or the Court of Appeals. a labor union of MCCH employees. in the exercise of this power. They denied having participated in said mass actions or having received the notices. BASCON vs. but the latter court is the more appropriate forum in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts and that. as a general rule. (MCCH) and members of the Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Metro Cebu Community Hospital (NAMA-MCCH). NFL opposed this move by its local affiliate. There must be
. Thus. an ordinary striking employee. The CA is not a trier of facts. ISSUES: 1. February 5. NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and ordered the reinstatement of petitioners with full backwages. Inc. the findings of facts of the NLRC are deemed binding and conclusive upon the Court. A motion for reconsideration was filed. COURT OF APPEALS [G. NLRC. They marched around the hospital putting up streamers. They admit. the mother federation of NAMA-MCCH. which was to expire on December 31. to wearing armbands for union identity while nursing patients as per instruction of their union leaders. Whether or not. An intra-union conflict arose between the NAMA-MCCH and the National Labor Federation (NFL). Petitioners again claimed they did not receive said order. Martin Funeral Home v. MCCH ordered petitioners to desist from participating in the mass actions conducted in the hospital premises with a warning that non-compliance therewith would result in the imposition of disciplinary measures. Bascon and Cole filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. No. Petitioner Bascon had been employed as a nurse. a departure from the general rule is warranted. an employee should be terminated for participating in an illegal strike? HELD: (1) Yes. J. The members and officers of NAMA-MCCH staged a series of mass actions inside MCCH‘s premises starting February 27. where.
. Thus. informed him that. neither such wearing of armbands nor said putting up of placards can be construed as an illegal act. Rodolfo Calucin. In the meantime. the Foundation filed a petition before the NCMB to declare the strike illegal. Jr.: FACTS: San Juan de Dios Educational Foundation. (HOSPITAL) and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION [G. The Foundation wrote Calucin. directing the striking employees to go to work. The Union agreed with this arrangement. Jr. the Union filed a Notice of Strike before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. then Executive Secretary of the Union. There was no finding that the armbands or the placards contained offensive words or symbols. Jr. In fact. Inc. the Foundation refused to give the twenty-seven employees the equivalent of their salaries for the period they were refused reinstatement.. SAN JUAN DE DIOS EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION. why his services should not be terminated for gross and habitual neglect of his duties. This prompted the employees. The Foundation filed a petition with this Court assailing the order of the SOLE. claimed that he had already served the maximum suspension of one week for his past tardiness. The Foundation denied the Union's request.] CALLEJO.proof that they committed illegal acts during the strike. No. through its Personnel Officer Doringo. The SOLE issued an Order directing the Foundation to comply with her directives. they are within the mantle of constitutional protection under freedom of speech. informing the latter that his employment had been terminated for gross and habitual neglect of duties under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code. The Foundation and the Union entered into an agreement submitting to a voluntary arbitrator their differences. In the meantime. Substantial evidence. May 28. 2004. more or less. We cannot in our conscience allow MCCH to unjustly deny petitioners their lawful occupation.al. San Juan de Dios Educational Foundation Employees Union-Alliance of Filipino Workers. the officers and striking members of the Union defied the order of the DOLE and continued with their strike. Nevertheless. The Court denied the said motion. SR. the Foundation allowed the payroll reinstatement of the twenty-seven (27) employees subject to the outcome of its petition filed with this Court. is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees in the Foundation. vs. he had incurred tardiness and that such tardiness had affected his efficiency. is a domestic foundation operating as a college and hospital with a 200 bed capacity. Then DOLE Secretary certifying the case to the NLRC. The Union informed the Foundation that the night-shift duty would be reporting back to work and the other shift will report on a later date. which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal. In this case. had been employed at the Foundation as a medical clerk for almost twelve years. complemented by 400 hospital personnel. Nevertheless. The employer‘s power to dismiss must be tempered with the employee‘s right to security of tenure. ILLEGAL STRIKE MA. in writing. Calucin. may suffice. filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal before the National Arbitration Branch. On the same date. and directing the Foundation to accept all employees under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. He furthered that he had not incurred tardiness for the past four months. Jr. per se. through
. INC. his superior had given him a performance rating of FAIR. The Foundation. COUNSELO MAQUILING. per its records. SAN JUAN DE DIOS EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION EMPLOYEES UNIONALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS et.R. The Court ruling that the SOLE did not act with grave abuse of discretion and affirmed her order. He was required to explain. Calucin. the Court of Appeals found that petitioners‘ actual participation in the illegal strike was limited to wearing armbands and putting up placards. 143341. J. especially at this late point in their lives when it would be a near impossibility for them to find another employment. Moreover.
Whether or not the strike staged by the officers and members of the Union was illegal. J. On the other hand. in that the money claims of the twenty-seven employees were granted. thus. they could not have defied the same. legal and peaceful. Consequently. The CA rendered a decision partially granting the petition. Calucin. Hence. 145496.
. Apacible. The Commission held that the strike staged by the Union at its inception. The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution directing the respondents to file their Comment on the Petition. However. Dissatisfied with the decision and resolution of the NLRC. the Union and its officers filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. the petitioners failed to prove their claim that the respondent Foundation committed unfair labor practices and discrimination of its employees. Commercial and Industrial Workers‘ Union (PACIWU-TUCP). JOSEPHINE JULIAN [G.the Union. February 24. In this case. a presumption exists that a sheriff has regularly performed his official duty. 2004] QUISUMBING. the striking employees' defiance of the RTWO of the SOLE rendered the strike illegal. the strike staged by the Union is a prohibited activity under Article 264 of the Labor Code. However. the dismissal of its officers is in order. The union demanded that management recognize its existence. The bare denial by the petitioners of receiving copies of the order will not suffice. The Union filed a motion for reconsideration from the said decision. The petitioners assert that the respondent Foundation failed to prove that the petitioners and their counsel were served with copies of the Return-to-Work Order issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment and that. 2. consequently. We do not agree. To controvert the presumption arising therefrom. the Union officers and members refused to do so and defied the same. the Foundation and the Union executed a new CBA. ISSUE: 1. the Foundation reneged on this agreement and terminated the services of the Union officers immediately after the new CBA was signed and approved. justified in terminating the employment of the petitioner Union's officers. to file a complaint against the Foundation before the NLRC. It bears stressing that the sheriff's report is an official statement by him of his acts under the writs and processes issued by the court in obedience to its directive and in conformity with law. the treasurer and general manager of herein petitioners. Hence. president of the Philippine Agricultural. discord reared its ugly head. Shortly thereafter. Jr. On the last issue. per findings of the public respondent. The records of this case do not show any hint that Calucin's [Jr. We agree with the following discerning findings and encompassing disquisitions of the Court of Appeals on this issue. Despite the receipt of an order from then SOLE to return to their respective jobs. Said letter advised Apacible that the rank-and-file employees of the aforementioned companies had formed the Apacible Enterprise Employees‘ Union-PACIWU-TUCP. and rancor came hard on its wake. In the meantime. The respondent Foundation was. The NLRC dismissed the claim of unfair labor practice arising from the illegal dismissal of Rogelio Calucin.'s] dismissal is due to his trade union activities.: FACTS: The instant controversy stemmed from a letter sent by De La Cruz. the petitioners failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption. there must be clear and convincing evidence. the Foundation was able to support with documents how Calucin [Jr. CONSEQUENCE OF AN ILLEGAL STRIKE STAMFORD MARKETING CORPORATION vs. For the foregoing reasons.Whether the petitioner Union's officers were legally dismissed. In the absence of contrary evidence. Jr. Among the conditions for its approval was that the termination of the Union officers as adjudged by the NLRC would not be enforced. No. and HELD: The petition is bereft of merit. Jr.'s dismissal is valid. to Rosario A. then. The NLRC denied the motion. they insist they were illegally dismissed by the respondent Foundation.R.] declared himself irrelevant in the Foundation through his tardiness and shallow excuses..
rest day premium. a move which culminated in their outright dismissal from employment. herein petitioner Stamford alleged that private respondents abandoned their work without any a notice or an explanation. salaries for services actually rendered. The Complaint alleged that when Apacible received the letter of PACIWU-TUCP. Subsequently. Stamford Marketing Corp. the Labor Arbiter found petitioners liable for salary differentials and other monetary claims for petitioners‘ failure to sufficiently prove that it had paid the same to complainants as required by law. GSP Manufacturing Corp. against the petitioners herein for payment of their monetary claims. Petitioner corporations. 13th month pay for the year 1994. Labor Arbiter Reyes ruled the reassignment and transfer of complainants in NLRC NCR Case No. Metro Manila. the NLRC affirmed the decision in NLRC NCR Case Nos. president of the newly organized labor union. the NLRC set aside the judgment with respect to NLRC NCR Case No. It was informed that no such labor organization was registered either as a local chapter of PACIWU or of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP). vs. a Complaint before the Arbitration Branch of NLRC. citing the ruling in NLRC NCR Case No. the three dismissed employees alleged that petitioners had not paid them their overtime pay. and that illegal deduction had been made without their consent from their salaries for a cash bond. without any just or lawful cause.. holiday pay/premiums. Commercial and Industrial Workers’ Union. 00-03-02114-95). (3) 13th month pay for 1994. Hence. NLRC NCR Case No. respectively. 00-03-02114-95 and ordered the remand of the case for further proceedings. vs. NLRC NCR Case No. board member and member of the said union. In NLRC NCR Case No. In NLRC NCR Case No. The Labor Arbiter ordered the three cases consolidated as the issues were interrelated and the respondent corporations were under one management. (2) unpaid salaries/wages for work actually rendered. et al. The three dismissed employees filed suit with the Labor Arbiter.Josephine Julian. 00-01-10437-95. were effectively dismissed from employment. (4) cash equivalent of the service incentive leave. vs. it was duly established that the employees‘ union was not registered with the Bureau of Labor Relations. private respondents had engaged in an illegal strike since the right to strike maybe availed of only by a legitimate labor organization. 00-11-08124-94 A day after Apacible received the letter of PACIWU-TUCP. NLRC NCR Case No. PACIWUTUCP charged petitioners herein with unfair labor practice. 05-03064-96 to support their position that respondents herein had conducted an illegal strike and were liable for unlawful
. et al. It claimed that it had verified with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) whether a labor organization with the name Apacible Enterprises Employees‘ Union was duly registered. However. Philippine Agricultural. maintained that they have been paying complainants the wages/salaries mandated by law and that the complaint should be dismissed in view of the execution of quitclaims and waivers by the private respondents. Petitioners herein seasonably appealed the decision of Labor Arbiter Reyes. management began to harass the members of the local chapter. GSP Manufacturing Corp. et al. The dismissed employees demanded the payment of (1) salary differentials due to underpayment of wages. GSP Manufacturing Corporation (GSP) denied the union‘s averments. and (5) illegal deductions from their salaries for cash bonds. Petitioners then moved for reconsideration of the NLRC ruling. 00-11-08124-94 and 00-01-10437-95. averred PACIWU-TUCP. it being management interference in the complainants‘ formation and membership of union. and Jecina Burabod. et al. 00-11-08124-94 as unfair labor practice. Jacinta Tejada. In their Complaint. 00-01-10437-95 This separate case was also filed by the dismissed union members (complainants in NLRC NCR Case No. It was a clear case of union-busting. Lucita Casero. For its part. filed on behalf of 50 employees allegedly illegally dismissed for union membership by the petitioners. 00-03-02114-95 PACIWU-TUCP. herein private respondents Josephine Julian. however. 00-03-02114-95.
treats differently mere union members. Petitioners timely moved for reconsideration. The law. i.e. Second. as in other termination cases. With respect to union officers. entitled to reinstatement and payment of backwages for lack of sufficient evidence that they engaged in illegal acts during the strike. First. since such were meant only to secure economic benefits for themselves so as to improve their standard of living. ISSUES: 1. however. HELD: (1) In the instant case.bound to guide their members to respect the law. it has not been shown to the satisfaction of this Court that said union is a legitimate labor organization. respectively. 2. rank-and-file union member who participated in such a strike from losing his job. Petitioners utterly failed to show proof that Julian and Tejada had the intent to abandon their work and sever their employment relationship with petitioners. and notice of termination. Unwilling to let the matter rest there. They were in good faith in believing that their actions were within the bounds of the law. The NLRC resolved to partly grant the Motion for Reconsideration. entitled under Article 263 (c) to file a notice of strike on behalf of its members.
. however. Thus.acts. it is not the business of this Court to determine whether the acts committed by them are illegal. Nothing in Article 264 of the Labor Code authorizes an immediate dismissal of a union officer for participating in an illegal strike. petitioners did not give the required notices to the union officers. substantial and convincing proof of illegal acts committed during an illegal strike. The Labor Code protects an ordinary. It is established that an employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his layoff cannot be said to have abandoned his work. On this matter. for review of factual issues is not proper in this petition. we find no reason to disagree with the findings of the NLRC that the strike conducted by the respondent union is illegal. In this case. Hence. Union officers are duty. union officers must be given the required notices for terminating an employment. notice of hearing to enable them to present their side. The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the NLRC that petitioners had failed to support their claim of having paid herein respondents their money claims. There is simply nothing on record to show that Julian and Tejada were discouraged or prohibited from joining any union. we cannot sustain the appellate court‘s ruling that the dismissal of Julian and Tejada was tantamount to unfair labor practice. provided that he did not commit an illegal act during the strike. We affirm the appellate court‘s ruling that the union members who are parties herein were illegally dismissed and thus.. Besides. Review of labor cases elevated to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari is confined merely to questions of law. and not of fact. there is no dispute they could be dismissed for participating in an illegal strike. because belated evidence presented by petitioners is bereft of any probative value. Whether the respondents union officers and members were validly and legally dismissed from employment considering the illegality of the strike. makes a distinction between union officers and members who participated thereon. Thus. the other requirements under Article 263 (c) and (f) were not complied with by the striking union. On this point. separation pay and reinstatement. but the appellate court denied said motion. we affirm the findings of the appellate court that Julian and Tejada did not abandon their employment. as factual findings generally are conclusive on this Court. Nonetheless. absent any clear. in providing for the consequences of an illegal strike. However. Whether the respondents union officers and members are entitled to backwages. Article 264 of the Labor Code. Mere participation in an illegal strike is not a sufficient ground for termination of the services of the union members. the petitioners cannot be held liable for unfair labor practice. the record is bare of any showing to the contrary. should their explanation prove unsatisfactory. petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which brushed aside petitioners‘ theory that the illegality of strike makes the respondents‘ dismissal legal. an ordinary striking worker or employee may not be terminated from work. knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a valid ground for termination from employment of a union officer.
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure. then Vice-President of the Cash Division. The CSC referred Lucero's letter to the PNB for comment and appropriate action. and the award of separation pay to said union officers is hereby DELETED. However. J. The PNB. to work as an administrative assistant at the bank's cash division. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. as a sanction for non-compliance with notice requirements for lawful termination by the petitioners." Lucero filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the PNB before the Labor Arbiter. which reversed the assailed decision of the Labor Arbiter and held that Lucero had been illegally dismissed by the PNB. which used to supply the manpower requirements of the PNB. petitioner was given by the PNB an original appointment as Liaison Officer I. Lucero wrote to the Civil Service Commission protesting his dismissal by the PNB and asking for his reinstatement. it found Lucero not to have been illegally dismissed. a manning agency. and accepting thereby the terms appurtenant to his new appointment. and 3. Lucero was served his termination papers. the Court of Appeals denied the motion. ISSUES: 1. Dismissal of the union officers is declared NOT INVALID. the PNB wrote to Lucero and furnished him with copies of the evaluation reports of his superiors at the bank. Acting on the memorandum.R. [G. OF THE RULES IMPLEMENTING THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW GALLARDO U. LUCERO vs. nevertheless. thereby foregoing his previous relationship with the bank. Lucero went on appeal to the NLRC. 152032 July 3. 2. RULE VII. nevertheless. Thus. petitioners‘ appeal for us to re-examine certain pieces of documentary evidence concerning monetary claims cannot now be entertained. Meanwhile. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not taking in consideration the subsequent
. we likewise affirm the Court of Appeals in upholding the findings of both the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter regarding the validity or invalidity of quitclaims and the award of other monetary claims. issued a memorandum to Gaerlan. contending that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the case and in ruling that Lucero's dismissal was illegal. The CSC acknowledged the response of the PNB to the former's letter regarding Lucero's complaint and informed the PNB that it considered the complaint "closed. Gaerlan wrote to the HRD requesting that Lucero's name be dropped from the official roll of PNB employees effective at the close of business hours. Lucero filed a motion for reconsideration. Vice-President of the Human Resources Department (HRD) of the PNB.(2) For the same reasons. Whether or not Lucero‘s appointment is on regular basis at the time of his dismissal. It is not our function to assess and evaluate the evidence all over again. ET AL. Whether or not Lucero is covered under the Civil Service Law or Labor Law. particularly where the findings of both the Arbiter and the Court of Appeals coincide. the Court of Appeals rendered a decision to the effect that the NLRC properly assumed jurisdiction over the case. COURT OF APPEALS.: FACTS: Petitioner was hired by Excellent Manpower Services. 2003] VITUG. BOOK VI PROBATIONARY PERIOD UNDER SECTION 2. Questions on whether the quitclaims were voluntarily executed or not are factual in nature. In compliance with the directive of the CSC. The NLRC issued its judgment. informing the latter that the management approved the termination of services of Lucero due to the "unsatisfactory" performance rating obtained by him during the probationary period of his employment. backwages are AWARDED to the union officers computed from the time they were dismissed until the final entry of judgment of this case. Ledesma. No. with a permanent status. as aforesaid.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION [G. this petition. among other things. PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE FLORENCIO M. Dacay. (3) In the instant case.. PNB was still a government agency subject to civil service rules and regulations that. Petitioner asked Llanto for something to do with the drop in the company's sales.. that such action is appealable to the Commission. On appeal by respondents. The performance by Gallardo was found inadequate by the PNB that entitled it to drop him from the service. was not controlling. vs. Lucero proved himself unworthy of permanent employment. the point in question being his performance during the probationary period of the employment. Shemberg's human resource department manager." (2) The Court of Appeals. J. His subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. indeed. Rule VII.500. Whether. that he was still on trial during which time his qualification for his career employment would be determined. PNB cannot be faulted for terminating his services. In a decision labor arbiter Carreon ruled that petitioner Florencio de la Cruz was illegally dismissed and granted his claim for separation pay. Ernesto Dacay. JR.R. backwages and unpaid wages. It would be difficult to sustain the stand taken by petitioner that the Court of Appeals erred in ignoring his subsequent high performance rating. A probationer may be dropped from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity anytime before the expiration of the probationary period: Provided. Hence. The high rating of "very satisfactory" obtained by petitioner after his reinstatement. held that at the time of the services of petitioner were dispensed with the PNB when he was still under probationary status. the NLRC dismissed the appeal.
. in compliance with the order of the NLRC. DE LA CRUZ. reiterating the findings of the NLRC. 145417. Jr. His request to be furnished a 30-day written notice was also denied by the management. Respondents answered that petitioner's dismissal was due to his failure to meet the required company standards and for loss of trust and confidence. petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. HELD: (1) At the time of the appointment. subjected appointments "into the career service under a permanent status" to a probationary period. The position of senior sales manager was then newly created in line with Shemberg's objective of product positioning in the consumer market.e. Llanto. December 11. 2003. The NLRC partially granted the motion for reconsideration and modified its previous resolution."(a) All such persons must serve a probationary period of six (6) months following their original appointment and shall undergo a thorough character investigation. the findings on which. Jr. Section 2.] CORONA. 13th month pay and damages against Shemberg. No. Consequently. Jr. of the Rules Implementing the Civil Service Law reads: "Section 2. and Lilybeth Llanto. that performance was satisfactory or unsatisfactory. was hired by private respondent Shemberg Marketing Corporation (Shemberg) as senior sales manager with a monthly salary of P40.: FACTS: petitioner Florencio M. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari but it was dismissed for lack of merit. de la Cruz. However. summoned petitioner and informed him of the management's decision to terminate his services. would be binding on this Court. i. was a factual question best addressed for final determination by the Court of Appeals. but was told that the decision of the management was final. when supported by substantial evidence.high performance rating of Lucero. Original appointment refers to initial entry into the career service under a permanent status of a person who meets all the requirements of the position including the civil service eligibility. non-payment of salary. backwages. Petitioner then requested a meeting with Shemberg's vice president. Hence.
In general terms. respondent Middleby terminated petitioner's services. The employer could well decide he no longer needed the probationary employee's services or his performance fell short of expectations. there appears to be substantial evidence to show that petitioner indeed is guilty of the same — but only with respect to the reimbursement of plane ticket fares. not being a trier of facts. this meant that he was terminable anytime. Technicalities should not be permitted to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. PROBATIONARY PERIOD RADIN C. As long as the termination was made before the expiration of the six-month probationary period. enjoyed only temporary employment status. respondent Shemberg had good reason to terminate petitioner's employment and that was his dishonesty.: FACTS: Respondent Middleby Philippines Corporation (Middleby) hired petitioner as engineering support services supervisor on a probationary basis for six months. ALCIRA vs. A probationary employee is one who. We thus subscribe to the following findings of the Court of Appeals in affirming the NLRC decision. Petitioner was holding a managerial position in which he was tasked to perform key functions in accordance with an exacting work ethic. NLRC. Petitioner failed to present any persuasive evidence or argument to prove otherwise.
. The bone of contention centered on whether the termination occurred before or after the six-month probationary period of employment. As found by the court a quo. ET AL. 149859 June 9. the evidence on record clearly showing that petitioner was well informed of the standards to be met before he could qualify as a regular employee. competence and attitude of the employee while the latter seeks to prove to the employer that he has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for permanent employment. The length of time is immaterial in determining the correlative rights of both the employer and the employee in dealing with each other during said period. There is no dispute that petitioner.R. J. for a given period of time.ISSUES: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it refused to award backwages notwithstanding the fact that respondent failed to comply with the two-notice requirement. as a probationary employee. this obviously did not cover acts for his own personal benefit. With respect to the unauthorized use of company funds. While petitioner could exercise some discretion. 2004 CORONA. This Court notes. We reiterate the well-established rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and are not generally reviewable by this Court when supported by substantial evidence. During the probationary period. His act amounted to fraud or deceit which led to the loss of trust and confidence of his employer. A contrary interpretation would defect the clear meaning of the term "probationary. is under observation and evaluation to determine whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. His position required the full trust and confidence of his employer. The rationale is that this Court. he committed a transgression that betrayed the trust and confidence of expenses out of company funds. permanent employment not having been attained in the meantime. G. etc. No. however. Apparently unhappy with petitioner's performance. Petitioner vigorously contends that he was not a probationary employee since Shemberg failed to disclose to him the reasonable standards for qualifying as a regular employee. that petitioner's dismissal was for a just cause. the employer was well within his rights to sever the employer-employee relationship. HELD: The petition is without merit." In this case. the employer is given the opportunity to observe the skill. relies in good part on the assessment and evaluation of evidence by the lower courts.
ISSUE: 1. presenting their respective copies of Alcira's appointment paper. they brought their attention to the manager who told them to forget about it and refrain to air their complaints. Pio Gabito. the six-month probationary period ended on November 20. Phil.R. Our computation of the 6-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the 6th month following. Whether or not. DISMISSAL. 144786 April 15. (PSRI for brevity). We ruled that November 15. respondent Middleby exercised its option not to renew the contract when it informed petitioner on the last day of his probationary employment that it did not intend to grant him a regular status. vs. They paid P19. Employ Services and Resources. Inc. Roco. JOSEPH PARAMIO. et al. this petition for review. without specifying the ground or cause therefor. the parties are free to either renew or terminate their contract of employment.)" and a remark that "after five months (petitioner's) performance shall be evaluated and any adjustment in salary shall depend on (his) work performance. JUST AND VALID CAUSES PHIL. J." considering that.: FACTS: Respondents applied for employment in Taiwan with petitioner. 1995 was within or outside the six-month probationary period. 20 he claimed he was illegally dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the NLRC. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that petitioner's dismissal was before his "regularization. This means they may only be terminated for just cause or when they otherwise fail to qualify as regular employees in accordance with reasonable standards made known to them by the employer at the time of their engagement. the petitioner was allowed to work beyond his probationary period and was therefore already a regular employee at the time of his alleged dismissal. (2) It is settled that even if probationary employees do not enjoy permanent status. Hence. who arrived
. 1996 according to petitioner and May 27. claimed conflicting starting dates of employment: May 20. et al. since the number of days in each particular month was irrelevant. 1996. this Court dealt with the same issue of whether an employment contract from May 16. 1995 was still within the six-month probationary period. The respondents were deployed in Taiwan. petitioner was illegally dismissed when respondent Middleby opted not to renew his contract on the last day of his probationary employment.. the same cannot be deemed illegal.000 each as placement fee. [G. 1996 according to respondent. Whether or not.The parties. But we have also ruled in Manlimos. 1996. SR. Respondents claim he showed poor performance in his assigned tasks. The manager of their employer summoned the police. were summoned by the management and told that they were to be repatriated. INC. In CALS Poultry Supply Corporation. They pleaded that they be informed of the cause or causes for their repatriation. counting from May 20. Respondent Navarra and another employee. Both documents indicated petitioner's employment status as "probationary (6 mos. vs. Although we can regard petitioner's severance from work as dismissal. NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter. ET AL. Manlimos concluded that "(t)his development has rendered moot the question of whether there was a just cause for the dismissal of the petitioners. Contending he has become a regular employee as of the said date of Nov. 2004] CALLEJO. When they encountered problems. EMPLOY SERVICES and RESOURCES. but their requests were rejected. HELD: (1) NO. No. 1995 to November 15. 2. they are accorded the constitutional protection of security of tenure.. petitioner was still a probationary employee when respondent Middleby opted not to "regularize" him on November 20." Petitioner asserts that respondent Middleby withheld his time card and did not allow him to work. vs. et al. 1996. On that date. In short. National Labor Relations Commission that this constitutional protection ends on the expiration of the probationary period." In the case at bar.
As such. He was brought to the hospital where he was operated on and treated for his wound. Respondent Paramio got ill as a result of the employer's failure to give breakfast on the said date and dinner the night before. In order to effect a valid dismissal of an employee. The NLRC set aside the decision of the NLRC. his employer told him a week after his release from the hospital that it would be better for him to go home to the Philippines to recuperate. apply in this case. Sarmienta and Guillermo was voluntary. In the landmark case of Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corporation vs.
. The Labor Arbiter declared that the dismissal of the respondents were illegal. The petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that respondent Navarra's repatriation was based on a valid. 000 sufficient to conclude his waiver of right against illegal dismissal. but the NLRC denied the motion in a Resolution. and other laws affecting labor. valid and legal grounds. instead. We have more reason to rule that the repatriations of petitioners Paramio and Navarra were not voluntary. Upon respondent Navarra's arrival in Manila. National Labor Relations Commission. The petitioner merely alleged that it was made clear to respondent Navarra that his repatriation was due to the fight he had with his supervisor. in consideration thereof. the petitioners were made to suffer unbearable conditions in the workplace and the inhuman treatment of their employer until they were left with no choice but to quit. His manager still ordered him to work. Hence this petition for certiorari. he was asked to explain the reason thereof. 2. Respondent Paramio was. HELD: (1) Yes. unreasonable or unlikely:" In the case at bar. the rule lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs. It is highly unlikely that these workers. When he could no longer bear the pain in his thumb. When he pleaded that he be allowed to take some rest. its implementing rules and regulations. made to carry a container weighing around 30 kilograms. For failure to report to work. Thus.and escorted them to the airport. the manager told him that he had to stop working and would just have to wait for his plane ticket for his repatriation.000 to the said respondent but. Whether or not. et al (171 SCRA 164) the Supreme Court ruled that "a constructive discharge is defined as: "A quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible. the manager refused. the petitioners were illegally dismissed when they repatriated by their Taiwan employees. It is not necessary that there be an express termination of one's services before a case of illegal dismissal can exist. Therefore. Due to his condition. legal and just cause. the latter executed a quitclaim releasing the petitioner from any or all liabilities for his repatriation. Dismissal may also be based on any of the authorized causes provided for in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code. the container slipped from his hands and he injured his thumb. He was given his paycheck and later in the evening of the same day. Navarra‘s repatriation and execution of quitclaim and receipt of P 49. Bautista. The respondent did as he was told. The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution. after having invested so much time. An official from the Taiwanese Labor Department intervened for respondent Paramio and his employer was told that it had no right to repatriate the respondent because the accident which caused the injury happened while the latter was at work. Incensed. After the negotiations. effort and money to secure their employment abroad would just quit even before the expiration of their contract. Whether or not. Respondents‘ dismissal was not based on just. the law requires that there be just and valid cause as provided in Article 282 and that the employee was afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. the petitioner agreed to pay P49. Instead of giving him financial assistance for his hospital bills. he took a break. the Labor Code. he was ordered to return to work. the petitioner sought to settle his complaints. Respondent Paramio refused and contended that he could not resume work because of his thumb injury. respondent Paramio was repatriated to the Philippines. It cannot be gainsaid that the instant complaint for illegal dismissal indicates that the resignations and repatriations of the petitioners were not done freely on their part. ISSUES: 1. it cannot be said that the resignation and repatriation of complainants Curameng. When the manager saw him resting.
not of choice. Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for the payment of earned salary. There is constructive dismissal if an act of clear discrimination. The records reveal that respondent Navarra executed a deed of release and waiver for and in consideration of only P49.: FACTS: Petitioner Diamond Motors Corporation hired respondent Cadao and subsequently appointed him Special Accounts Manager with a fixed monthly salary excluding commission for every car sold. as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay. or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it would foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. petitioner investigated the said transaction and it was found out that two customers were not employees of TAPE. If (a) there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person. With regard to the deed of quitclaim and acceptance. Inc. insensibility. The report further noted that Reate was not the authorized signatory for the purchases considering that only Mr. unreasonable or unlikely. WHEN WILLFUL DIAMOND MOTORS CORP. or (b) the terms of the settlement are unconscionable. Dionisio. it is a well-settled principle that the law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than what a worker is entitled to recover nor prevent him from demanding benefits to which he is entitled. petitioner filed a petition for
. Therefore. It exists where there is cessation of work because "continued employment is rendered impossible. waivers or releases are looked upon with disfavor and are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the measure of a worker's legal rights. or its sister corporation." (2) We rule that the deed of release executed by respondent Navarra did not completely release the petitioner from its liability on the latter's claim. No. it cannot diminish petitioner's entitlement to the full compensation provided in their contract. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT. private respondent appealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and declared his dismissal illegal. Its purchasing officer. M-Zet. Quitclaims executed are ineffective to bar recovery for the full measure of the worker's rights. Respondent was awarded separation pay plus backwages. Inc. the production companies manifested that they will not pay for the purchase orders. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Inc. sent three letters of intent to respondent confirming an order for three units of Mitsubishi Lancer. Inc.. or. in his absence. Esper Reate. such amount can be considered an advance on his claim.000. is one of petitioner's clients on a fleet sale basis. such quitclaims must be struck down as invalid or illegal. 282. December 1. TAPE. AVP for Administration. Aggrieved. Thereafter. Ms. There is no evidence that he was informed that he was entitled to much more than the said amount. BREACH OF TRUST. can sign for them. As a rule. including a refund for the placement fee he paid to the petitioner. vs. quitclaims. His tasks included the promotion and sale of Mitsubishi vehicles to precisely listed corporate clients on fleet basis. 2003] YNARES-SANTIAGO. Thereafter.We thus rule that the respondents were constructively dismissed from their employment. J. TAPE. and on their face invalid. such that quitclaims usually take the form of contracts of adherence. subsequently sent purchase orders to petitioner for the three units.R. However. ART. petitioner terminated the services of respondent. commission and other accrued benefits against the petitioner before the NLRC. 151981. ET AL. The reason why quitclaims are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and they are ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the worker's legal rights is because the employer and employee do not stand on the same footing. Respondent was accused by petitioner of dishonesty and deceit in the conduct of said sale. COURT OF APPEALS. Tuviera as the President of TAPE. At the most. still. The transactions are usually done through letters of intent or purchase orders submitted by the client. Assuming arguendo that the quitclaim was executed voluntarily. [G.
the private respondents' bargaining agent. i. PT&T Workers Union-NAFLU-KMU. September 29. knowingly and purposely. the private respondents and other petitioner's employees were directed to "relocate" to their new PT&T Branches.R. GROUNDS THEREFOR. respondent knowingly violated company rules and regulations. CA. thoughtlessly. 152057. (b) it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper. In their reply to the
.. the private respondents explained that the transfers imposed by the management would cause enormous difficulties on the individual complainants. In their respective replies to the petitioner's letters. this petition. Subsequently. No.review with the CA. the petitioner alleged that the private respondents' transfers were made in the lawful exercise of its management prerogative and were done in good faith. which warrants dismissal from the service. Hence. PT & T CORP. among whom were private respondents. LABOR CODE. SR. hence. The CA however dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Inc. Indeed. not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith. For its part. COURT OF APPEALS. It employed various employees. as distinguished from an act done carelessly. the Labor Arbiter ruled that based on the evidence adduced by the parties. TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER. he already knew that the would-be end users are not employees of TAPE. Inc. 282. The fact that respondent attempted to deprive petitioner of its lawful revenue is tantamount to fraud against the company. Petitioner maintained that respondent's dismissal was for a valid cause pursuant to Article 282 of the Labor Code and jurisprudence. Private respondents received separate letters from the petitioner. (c) it should not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Thereafter. the private respondents were dismissed from work. 2003 CALLEJO. provides that an employer can terminate the employment of the employee concerned for "fraud or willful breach by an employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative. Dissatisfied with this explanation. as amended. Moreover. The private respondents rejected the petitioner's offer. The guidelines for the application of the doctrine of loss of confidence was laid down in the case of Concorde Hotel v. vs. A breach of trust is willful if it is done intentionally. In the case at bar..e. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent‘s dismissal from service was illegal. J. the petitioner sent letters to the private respondents requiring them to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for their refusal to be transferred/relocated. and (d) it must be genuine. The petitioner offered benefits/allowances to those employees who would agree to be transferred under its new program. illegal or unjustified.: FACTS: The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of providing telegraph and communication services thru its branches all over the country. giving them the option to choose the branch to which they could be transferred. respondent cannot deny that at the time he was negotiating what he claimed to be a fleet sale to TAPE. The petitioner came up with a Relocation and Restructuring Program. Ordinary breach will not suffice. the petitioner considered the private respondents' refusal as insubordination and willful disobedience to a lawful order. the employees who would agree to the transfers would be considered promoted. HELD: NO. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code. G. (a) the loss of confidence should not be simulated.. without justifiable excuse. heedlessly or inadvertently. ET AL. ART. Hence." The loss of trust and confidence must be based on the willful breach of the trust reposed in the employee by his employer. filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice for and in behalf of the private respondents. There was also a clear taint of deceit on his part when he passed off what was otherwise a retail sale as a fleet sale.
ART.petitioner's position paper. the respective transfers of the private respondents were in fact promotions. or willful disobedience of a lawful order of the employer. the exercise by the private respondents of their right cannot be considered in law as insubordination. TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER SAMUEL SAMARCA vs. Respondent. the indispensable element for there to be a promotion is that there must be an ‗advancement from one position to another‘ or an upward vertical movement of the employee's rank or position. The SC referred the petition for disposition to the Court of Appeals. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack of merit and declaring the dismissal of complainant as valid and for cause but the complainant is entitled to his proportionate 13th month pay. Inc. During the pendency of this complaint. without his consent. On appeal. 2003] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. which a person has a right to refuse.‘ Apparently. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied with finality by the NLRC. Hence. advancement or reduction or a transfer that aims to 'lure the employee away from his permanent position cannot be done without the employees' consent. ordering respondent to reinstate petitioner to his former position without loss of seniority rights and to pay his backwages from the date of dismissal up to his actual reinstatement but limited to a maximum period of three (3) years. Petitioner filed an application for an emergency leave of absence on account of his son's hospitalization. he could not report for work. there was no valid cause for the private respondents' dismissal. petitioner's 30-day suspension ended. he refused explaining that because of the pendency of his complaint for illegal suspension with the Labor Arbiter. As such. respondent directed petitioner to report for work immediately.: FACTS: Samuel Samarca was employed as a laborer by Arc-Men Industries. Petitioner filed an amended complaint for illegal dismissal. Petitioner filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch a complaint for illegal suspension against respondent. the refusal to accept the transfers could not have amounted to insubordination or willful disobedience to the "lawful orders of the employer. Inc. A transfer that results in promotion or demotion. NLRC: ―Promotion. v. There is no law that compels an employee to accept a promotion for the reason that a promotion is in the nature of a gift or reward. they had the right to refuse or decline the positions being offered to them. With or without a corresponding increase in salary. ARC-MEN INDUSTRIES. The Court of Appeals rendered a
. decided to terminate his services via a notice of termination. even if merely as a result of a transfer. petitioner was immediately served with a notice of respondent's order suspending him for thirty (30) days effective for alleged violation of company Rules and Regulations. [G. 2.R. finding that the petitioner failed to submit a sufficient written explanation. Respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari." ISSUE: 1. and usually accompanied by an increase in salary. following the ruling enunciated in Homeowners Savings and Loan Association. However. Any increase in salary should only be considered incidental but never determinative of whether or not a promotion is bestowed upon an employee. Whether or not the denial of a promotion is a just and authorized cause for dismissal? HELD: (1) Yes. INC. (2) No. the private respondents opined that since their respective transfers resulted in their promotion. No. is ‗the advancement from one position to another with an increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized by law. Resultantly. 282. J. the NLRC reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter's Decision. Subido. Upon his return for work. Whether or not the respective transfers of the private respondents are considered promotions. 146118. An employee cannot be promoted. Consequently. as we defined in Millares v. October 8.
Decision reversing the Resolutions of the NLRC and reinstating the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. Appellants' defense of denying the existence of employer-employee relationship with the complainant based on the manner by which complainant was being paid his salary. for an employee who takes steps to protest his dismissal cannot by logic be said to have abandoned his work. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges as well as to his full backwages. vs. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was validly dismissed on ground of abandonment of work. inclusive of allowances. He also claimed that there was no employer and employee relationship between him and the respondent. Petitioner claimed that private respondent abandoned his job. cannot hold
. apprehended him for obstruction of traffic for which his license was confiscated. he was told that the company was still studying whether to allow him to drive again. it is essential (1) that the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason. Moreover. Private respondent was likewise accused of causing damage to the bus he used to drive. Hence. and (2) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. the NLRC held that complainant was not afforded his right to due process prior to the severance of his employment with respondents. The filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the charge of abandonment. Labor arbiter Rogelio Yulo decided in favor of private respondent.R. Antagonism caused a severe strain in the relationship between him and respondent. Absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. and (2) his full backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent from his dismissal up to the time of his supposed actual reinstatement. Petitioner did not abandon his job but was illegally dismissed by respondent. we find no indication that petitioner has shown by some overt acts his intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. Petitioner's absence is not without a justifiable reason. for almost six years. Finally. it was unlikely that petitioner had abandoned his job for no reason at all considering the hardship of the times. In disputing petitioner's claim that private respondent was not its employee and was not therefore entitled to notice and hearing before termination. ABANDONMENT OF WORK R TRANSPORT CORP. 148508 May 20. Deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of the employee to go back to his work post and resume his employment must be established. However.: FACTS: Private respondent Ejandra alleged that. No. Respondent is hereby ordered to pay petitioner (1) his separation pay (in lieu of his reinstatement) equivalent to one month pay for every year of service. Pasquin that he was ready to report for work. J. NLRC rendered a decision affirming the decision of the labor arbiter. 2004] CORONA. We hold that the above twin essential requirements for abandonment to exist are not present in the case at bar. Makati City. Private respondent informed Mr. the circumstances obtaining in this case do not warrant the reinstatement of petitioner. He was able to retrieve his license only after a week. An officer of LTO of Guadalupe. He was asked to take a vacation which the manager did not specify for how long. this petition for review on certiorari. And the burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to go back to work rests on the employer. he worked as a bus driver of petitioner R Transport Corporation. ROGELIO EJANDRA [G. and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution. However. HELD: Jurisprudence holds that for abandonment of work to exist.
water. ISSUE: Whether or not, the respondent abandoned his work. HELD: No, to constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason and (2) a clear intention to sever the employeremployee relationship. Of the two, the second element is the more determinative factor and should be manifested by some overt acts. Mere absence is not sufficient. It is the employer who has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning. In the instant case, petitioner fell short of proving the requisites. Petitioner's absence was justified because the LTO, Guadalupe Branch, did not release his license until after a week. The process of redeeming a confiscated license, based on common experience, depended on when the apprehending officer turned over the same. Second, private respondent never intended to sever his employment as he in fact reported for work as soon as he got his license back. Third, labor arbiter Yulo correctly observed that, if private respondent really abandoned his work, petitioner should have reported such fact to the nearest Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment. Petitioner made no such report. In addition to the fact that petitioner had no valid cause to terminate private respondent from work, it violated the latter's right to procedural due process by not giving him the required notice and hearing. HEARSAY; AFFIDAVITS ANICETO W. NAGUIT, JR. vs. NLRC, ET AL. [G.R. No. 120474. August 12, 2003.] CARPIO-MORALES, J.: FACTS: Petitioner Aniceto W. Naguit, Jr., an employee of respondent Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) was dismissed after 32 years of service. Petitioner informed his Supervisor-Branch head Ortega, Jr. that he would render overtime work on June 6, and that after concluding his field work on that day, he would proceed to Pagbilao, Quezon to accompany his wife to a wedding. On June 6, petitioner arrived at the office at 7:50 a.m. At 12:00 noon, he, along with his co-employee Cabuhat who drove his jeep, proceeded to Pagbilao, Quezon. On June 8, the timekeeper of the MERALCO office prepared an Overtime Notice and the corresponding timesheet wherein it was reflected that petitioner worked from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on June 6 and 7. Petitioner corrected the documents by erasing the entries made for June 7, and were approved by Ortega. Petitioner was thereafter paid for overtime work on June 6. Documents including petty cash voucher covering Cabuhat's alleged overtime work were also prepared on account of which petitioner, as custodian of petty cash, released to Cabuhat the meal allowance and rental for a jeep. MERALCO wrote a letter to the petitioner regarding the incident. After hearings were conducted, it informed petitioner that he was, for falsification of time card and encouraging and inducing another employee to perform an act constituting a violation of the Company Code on Employee Discipline, dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all rights and privileges. Petitioner filed a complaint with the NLRC against MERALCO for illegal dismissal and prayed for reinstatement, backwages, damages, attorney's fees among others. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. MERALCO appealed the Labor Arbiter's decision to the NLRC which reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner's dismissal is valid HELD: In labor cases, this Court has consistently held that where the adverse party is deprived of opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay,
unless the affiant themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. Thus, such affidavits of Cabuhat are inadmissible as evidence against petitioner. Despite the inadmissibility of the affidavits, the Court finds that MERALCO had reasonable grounds to fault petitioner based on the sworn statements given during its investigation. As custodian of the petty cash fund, the petitioner had the duty to ascertain that the circumstances which brought about any claim therefrom were in order. He cannot now shirk from this responsibility by indirectly pinning the blame on the approving officer and asserting that the transgression was the result of mere inadvertence, given his admission that he very well knew that Cabuhat did not conduct any field work, he having merely driven for him to Pagbilao. Petitioner thus committed dishonesty and breached MERALCO's trust, which dishonesty calls for reprimand to dismissal under MERALCO's rules. Dismissal is, however, too severe as a penalty in petitioner's case, given his 32 years of service during which he had no derogatory record. At the time petitioner was dismissed, he was still below the retirement age of employees of MERALCO at 60. To date, however, he is now about 65. Imposing a penalty less harsh than dismissal and ordering his reinstatement are thus functus oficio, the Labor Arbiter's order for his reinstatement not having been executed. To this Court, a denial of the award of backwages to petitioner from the time of his dismissal up to his age of retirement suffices as punishment for his dishonesty. He should not, however, be deprived of his retirement benefits. SUMMARY HEARING OF LABOR CASES; TWO-NOTICE REQUIREMENT SHOPPES MANILA, INC vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION [G.R. No. 147125. January 14, 2004] CALLEJO, SR., J.:. FACTS: The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in garments manufacturing using the brand name ―KAMISETA.‖ The petitioner employed private respondent Torno as trimmer. The private respondent and a co-employee, Maricar Buan, were tasked to handle the inventory of finished products. Sometime thereafter, the petitioner started to receive information from the head of its production department that, according to other employees, Buan and the private respondent had been stealing ―KAMISETA‖ items from the factory. The petitioner had the witnesses interviewed. Respondent agreed to have her house inspected and searched for the alleged stolen items. The private respondent‘s supervisor, conducted the inspection and submitted a report to the effect that she found the KAMISETA items in the private respondent‘s house. On the basis of the said report, the petitioner issued a disciplinary action form suspending the private respondent indefinitely without pay. A notice of dismissal was addressed to the private respondent specifying the charge against her, the factual basis thereof and the imposable penalties for the said charge if proven. The private respondent failed to appear during the scheduled hearing. Consequently, the petitioner decided to dismiss the private respondent from her employment. When notified of the petitioner‘s decision, the private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages, non-payment of service incentive leave pay and 13thmonth pay against the petitioner before the National Capital Regional Arbitration Branch. Despite mandatory conferences, the parties did not reach an amicable settlement. In due course, they submitted their respective position papers and replies. Acting on the motion, LA Tumanong set the case for full blown hearing during which the witnesses can be cross-examined by the opposing counsel. However, the hearing failed to materialize because of the absences of either the private respondent or her counsel. In the meantime, LA Tumanong was replaced by Labor Arbiter Ermita Abrasaldo-Cuyuca who issued an order declaring that the case was submitted for decision. LA Cuyuca rendered a decision holding that the respondent was illegally dismissed and directed the petitioner to pay backwages and separation pay to the private respondent. However, according to the labor arbiter, reinstatement could no longer be effected, as the relationship between the private respondent and the petitioner had been strained and ruptured. Aggrieved, the
petitioner appealed the decision to the NLRC, alleging that it was deprived of its right to a formal hearing before the labor arbiter rendered her decision. LA Cuyuca‘s failure to conduct a hearing deprived the petitioner of its vested right; consequently, her decision was null and void. The NLRC issued a resolution dismissing the appeal and affirming the decision of the labor arbiter. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC. Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the NLRC and the finding of both the NLRC and LA Cuyuca. The petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was denied in a CA Resolution. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the absence of a formal hearing amounts to denial of petitioner‘s right to due process; 2. Whether or not termination of the private respondent‘s employment was based on a just and valid cause. HELD: The petition is barren of merit. (1) We agree with the CA that the petitioner did not have a vested right to a formal hearing simply and merely because LA Tumanong granted its motion and set the case for hearing. Pursuant to Section 5, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiter has the authority to determine whether or not there is a necessity to conduct formal hearings in cases brought before him for adjudication. The holding of a formal hearing or trial is discretionary with the labor arbiter and is something that the parties cannot demand as a matter of right. It is entirely within his authority to decide a labor case before him, based on the position papers and supporting documents of the parties, without a trial or formal hearing. The requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers wherein they are supposed to attach all the documents that would prove their claim in case it be decided that no hearing should be conducted or was necessary. (2) Similarly, we affirm the finding of the CA that the private respondent was illegally dismissed. In order to effect a valid dismissal, the law requires that (a) there be just and valid cause as provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code; and (b) the employee be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. As stated by the CA, the petitioner had failed to show that it had complied with the two-notice requirement: (a) a written notice containing a statement of the cause for the termination to afford the employee ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires; (b) if the employer decides to terminate the services of the employee, the employer must notify him in writing of the decision to dismiss him, stating clearly the reason therefor. ABANDONMENT OF WORK ACD INVESTIGATION SECURITY AGENCY, INC. vs. PABLO D. DAQUERA, [G.R. No. 147473. March 30, 2004] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: FACTS: Pablo Daquera in his complaint against petitioner Alfonso Dilla, Sr. and Public Estates Authority , alleged that he was employed as a security guard by petitioner. He was reassigned to Public Estates Authority as a security officer . However, he was illegally suspended and thereafter illegally dismissed for dishonesty, without prior written notice and investigation. Petitioner Dilla claims that HE received several complaints against respondent for abandonment of post, drinking liquor while on duty, and extortion from subordinate security guards. In an administrative investigation, petitioner found respondent guilty of dishonesty and neglect of duty. Petitioner reassigned him to another post. However, he refused and took a leave of absence to seek employment elsewhere. After one week, respondent still failed to report for work and instead filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against petitioner.
(2) Respondent who was illegally dismissed from work is actually entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges as well as to his full backwages. Deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of the employee to go back to his work post and resume his employment must be established. allowances and other benefits. A more equitable disposition would be an award of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay for every year of service in addition to his full backwages. "Gusto ko. in a Memo informing Gutierrez of the latter's violation of company rules and regulations. eh" (It is my pleasure).‖ However. Antagonism caused a severe strain in the relationship between him and petitioner. and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. without loss of seniority rights and pay him backwages. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the NLRC Decision and Resolution. When asked if he had seen anyone urinate at the door where the sign was posted and the latter replied in the negative and answered. HELD: (1) We have been very careful in cases of dismissal based on dishonesty. ISSUES: 1. worded as follows: After a thorough investigation of the incident and after having found your explanations to be unsatisfactory and due to your refusal to comply with my memo to you which constitutes willful defiance or disregard of
. and 3. Petitioner Gutierrez was hired by Singer as Audit Assistant on contractual basis. but discharging Dilla the employer from liability. Second. the above twin essential requirements for abandonment to exist are not present in the case at bar. On appeal. Whether or not. TWO-NOTICE RULE GUTIERREZ vs. Whether or not. Gutierrez refused to remove the sign when requested to do so. serious misconduct and willful breach of trust are valid causes for dismissing respondent from the service. the group continued to watch the video. 2. Asset Manager Consunji." (No Urinating Here). Whether or not. A motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC. the Appellate Court erred in awarding respondent his monetary benefits considering his quitclaim. Absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. dishonesty. Thereafter. affirmed the Arbiter‘s Decision. the circumstances obtaining in this case do not warrant the reinstatement of respondent. he acquired regular status as Asset Auditor when he was dismissed from employment. we are also not convinced that respondent abandoned his work and that terminating his services is a lawful sanction. Consunji. Gutierrez posted at the door Department Office a notice. private respondent is entitled to reinstatement with backwages since he abandoned his work. Another Memo was issued by Mr. He became an Accounts Checker on probationary status. CA affirmed in toto the assailed decision. which read "MAIPARIT TI UMISBO DITOY. Despite reminder. the NLRC. And the burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to go back to work rests on the employer.The Labor Arbiter declared the dismissal of the complainant as illegal and ordered for his reinstatement. inclusive of allowances. serious misconduct. (3) Quitclaims by laborers are frowned upon as contrary to public policy and are held to be ineffective to bar recovery for the full measure of the workers‘ rights ILLEGAL DISMISSAL. On another occasion. SINGER SEWING MACHINE FACTS: This is a complaint for illegal dismissal. and loss of trust and confidence because the same can easily be concocted by an abusive employer. However. It appears that Gutierrez and three other were caught watching a video tape inside the office.
petitioner averred that he was not investigated. respondent corporation dismissed a number of its personnel. Whether or not the was a violation of due process. petitioner was asked to submit a courtesy resignation to the respondent. of the intention to dismiss. 158922. indicating therein the acts or omissions complained against. But since the petitioner was not involved in the anomalies. we agree with the Court of Appeals in finding that in this case procedural due process was not violated by management. of the decision to dismiss an employee — and in between such notices. The affidavit is not sufficient to establish complainant's guilt of vandalism. ISSUES: 1. [G. J. hired private respondent. Whether or not the grounds relied upon were sufficient to warrant dismissal HELD: (1) The record shows that Singer's evidence against petitioner was based on three affidavits made by three of its employees. Singer has shown compliance with the two-notice requirement — first. This difficulty in collection necessitated the conduct of an investigation by the respondent. and 2. Among the sales personnel investigated was a member of petitioner's division. Inc. commission and other benefits due him on account of his long and dedicated employment with the respondent. This is merely in keeping with the spirit of our Constitution and laws which lean over backwards in favor of the working class. The penalty imposed on the erring employee ought to be proportionate to the offense. the management deems it fitting and proper to impose upon you the penalty of dismissal effective immediately upon receipt hereof. No.] YNARES-SANTIAGO. Consequently. CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL: FERNANDO GO vs. even on the assumption that Gutierrez in fact committed the cited infractions. INC. Fernando Go as a salesman. On the other hand. (2) We agree with the NLRC that petitioner's dismissal from employment was unjustified and illegal. It appears that the accounts handled by the petitioner and his staff experienced collection problems. COURT OF APPEALS and MOLDEX PRODUCTS. in our view they are only minor ones which do not merit the supreme penalty of dismissal from employment. and mandate that every doubt must be resolved in their favor. the respondent also granted to petitioner a distributorship agreement for the right to be a distributor of its products. private respondent worked himself within petitioner's corporate structure until he eventually attained the rank of Senior Sales Manager. Over the years. The complainant likewise justified his action in relation to his act of watching video films. In addition. taking into account its nature and surrounding circumstances. On this score. he was promised payment of separation pay. petitioner worked for the release of his clearance and the payment of 13th month pay and leave pay benefits. 2004. an opportunity for him to answer and rebut the charges against him. We must also stress that. he submitted a letter of resignation. We agree with the complainant that the questioned poster cannot be interpreted as an act of vandalism. To be lawful. While on leave. Respondent claimed that it also questioned petitioner and that "obviously feeling guilty for not exercising effective supervision over his subordinates.
. May 28. Petitioner further alleged that after the investigation. In exchange. which led to the discovery of anomalies.Company authority. he was surprised to receive an advice from the respondent that his services were being terminated by the latter on account of command responsibility. the courts and other agencies of the government are guided by the social justice mandate in our fundamental law. petitioner's responsibility as the senior sales manager of the respondent was eventually stripped from him. Thereafter. and second.R. the cause for termination must be a serious and grave malfeasance to justify the deprivation of a means of livelihood.: FACTS: Petitioner Moldex Products. In the application of labor laws.
March 10. remittance of SSS and Pag-Ibig contributions. The NLRC affirmed with modification the Labor Arbiter's decision. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which annulled and set aside the twin resolutions of the NLRC. Petitioner Santiano filed her separate complaint charging JFSI with violations similar to those aired by her co-petitioners. HELD: After a careful review of the records of this case. Except for the sworn statements previously discussed. JONI’S FOOD SERVICES. It is present when an employee's functions. Co-respondent Jose Antonio Feliciano is its president and general manager. formal hearings ensued before the Labor Arbiter. The totality of the evidence indubitably shows that petitioner resigned from employment without any coercion or compulsion from respondent. cannot be given credence.R. However. The NLRC declared respondent Joni‘s Food Services. and such reduction is not grounded on valid grounds such as genuine business necessity. As such. (JFSI) not guilty of illegal dismissal as above-discussed. It is thus incumbent upon him to substantiate his claim that his resignation was not voluntary but in truth was actually a constructive dismissal. service incentive leave pay. Respondent sought a reconsideration of the NLRC decision which was denied. [G. Inc. and refund of excess withholding taxes against JFSI. with several branches or outlets. Following failed attempts to reach an amicable settlement between complainants and respondents. we find sufficient reasons to uphold respondent's contention. when uncorroborated by the evidence on record. the NLRC deleted the award of attorney's fees for lack of factual basis but it affirmed the rest of the Labor Arbiter's award in favor of herein petitioner. however. 2004] QUISUMBING. As modified. CAMA. CLOSURE OF ESTABLISHMENT JOSEFINA A. the NLRC held the petitioners entitled to separation pay. vs. et. except Prima P. JFSI shut down more outlets. have already been paid to him by respondent. Constructive dismissal exists where there is a cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible. leaving it with just three operating outlets. 153021. the Labor Arbiter opined that petitioners were retrenched as a result of the closure of the respondent‘s
. The remaining branches were also closed. petitioner did not present any other proof of the alleged stripping of his functions by the respondent. Santiano‘s separate complaint and was consolidated with NLRC-NCR. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. he shall only be entitled to his 13th month pay and leave pay benefits. His resignation was voluntary. As a result. separation pay. 13th month pay. unreasonable or unlikely. Al. is engaged in the coffee shop and restaurant business. J.: FACTS: Respondent Joni‘s Food Services. which we have found to be lacking in probative value. Petitioners were employees of JFSI having been hired on various dates. Inc. attorney‘s fees. it shut down three of these shops to avert serious business losses. One month before the target closure date of its remaining outlets. separation pay. JFSI had eight (8) outlets however. No. Petitioner's bare allegations of constructive dismissal. INC. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was constructively dismissed rather he voluntarily resigned from the respondent. service incentive leave including damages and attorney's fees against the respondent. JFSI operations in the red. These. which were originally supervisory in nature. The failure of the petitioner to fully substantiate his claim that the respondent stripped him of his duties and functions is fatal to his present petition.Petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint for constructive dismissal. JFSI sent notices of closure to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and to the complainants who were then employed in the remaining branches or outlets. were reduced. The petitioners. Labor Arbiter Abrasaldo-Cuyuca rendered in favor of the complainant and against the respondent. Santiano. It should be remembered that the petitioner has submitted a letter of resignation.
In other words. fell squarely within the coverage of Article 283 of the Labor Code. J. the company found no recourse but to shut down its outlets. No. Ours is a system of laws. Insisting that the closure of MAME and GBS was illegal as it was calculated to bust their union. as found by the Court of Appeals. To stem these serious losses. filed by petitioner MAMEWU and its president. denied petitioners' allegations. The second complaint.R. HELD: Respondents assert that the company was taking losses of such magnitude which left its survival or future existence in the dark. It is only in instances of ―retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses‖ that employees whose employment has been terminated as a result are entitled to separation pay.. The Constitution. Thus. Garcia. petitioner Mario A. Hence. To require an employer to be generous when it is no longer in a position to do so. recognizes ―the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments. in our view. while affording full protection to labor. ISSUE: Whether or not the termination of petitioners‘ employment due to serious business losses suffered by JFSI precluded payment of separation pay. would be unduly oppressive.e. Respondent company. In their answer. 141615. The decision appealed from was affirmed with the modification deleting the award for attorney‘s fees. respondents appealed to the NLRC raising the issue of whether the complainants below were entitled to the monetary award decreed by the Labor Arbiter. Aggrieved. filed by the last eight petitioners led by Halim Roldan. MBS Machine and Industrial Supply (MBS) and MVS Heavy Equipment Rental and Builders (MVS). alleged that aside from ULP and illegal dismissal. authorizes neither the oppression nor the self-destruction of the employer. Sison decided to
. Respondent Lydia V. private respondents were likewise liable for non-payment of premium pay for holidays and rest days. unjust. proprietors of GBS and MAME respectively. Thus. nonetheless. JFSI. In both complaints. MAC ADAMS METAL ENGINEERING [G.‖ In line with this protection afforded to business by the fundamental law. the instant case. but this was denied by the NLRC in its resolution. and the law in protecting the rights of the working man. Hence. petitioners prayed for alternative reliefs for reinstatement with backwages and/or separation pay. Article 283 of the Labor Code does not obligate an employer to pay separation benefits when the closure is due to serious losses. MBS and MVS were impleaded as respondents in the complaint for allegedly being run-away shops of MAME and GBS. and hence. petitioners claimed that MAME and GBS continued doing business under new business names.] CORONA. CLOSURE OF ESTABLISHMENT AND REDUCTION OF PESONNEL. on the ground that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by incorrectly applying Article 283 of the Labor Code. MAC ADAMS METAL ENGINEERING WORKERS UNION-INDEPENDENT vs. October 24. private respondent spouses Geronimo and Lydia V. 2003.coffee shop operations and/or to prevent losses. it filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The petitioners seasonably moved for reconsideration. and to expansion and growth. The Court of Appeals granted the writ of certiorari prayed for by JFSI. i.: FACTS: The present controversy stemmed from two separate complaints: the first complaint. Sison. and unfair to the employer. night differential pay and 13th month pay. for and in behalf of 29 other petitioners. Article 283 of the Labor Code clearly makes a policy distinction. but the appellate court denied the motion in its resolution. and illegal dismissal. charged private respondents MAME and GBS with unfair labor practices (ULP) committed through union busting and illegal closure. then moved for reconsideration. respondents had no option but to lay off employees and eventually close shop.
MAMEWU and its members started resorting to concerted activities such as work slowdown. Her health did not improve despite proper medical attention. Manuel Pranada. ISSUE: Whether the closure of private respondents' business was done in good faith and for legitimate business reasons. Aggrieved. or one month pay. In the general meeting of the workers she announced her plan to close shop. some employees formed a union ostensibly for the purpose of making representations with the management to reconsider its decision to cease business operations or. Instead private respondents were required to give separation pay. however. On appeal to the NLRC. Finally. The appellate court. It would indeed be stretching the intent and spirit of the law if SC were to unjustly interfere with the management's prerogative to close or cease its business operations. Accordingly. For their part. led by Halim Roldan. at least. just because said business operation or undertaking is not suffering from any loss or simply to provide the workers continued employment. The announcement in advance was intended to give the workers ample time to look for alternative employment. After the workers' general meeting. Just as no law forces anyone to go into business. picketing. refusal to report for work and ultimately. MBS and MVS denied being run-away shops of MAME and GBS. Sison could formally notify the employees and the concerned government agencies of the intended closure and cessation of her business. can lawfully close shop at anytime. Hence the petition. Meanwhile. which they already did. the assailed decision of the labor arbiter was affirmed. a proposal private respondents rejected. The labor arbiter rendered a decision declaring that the closure of business of MAME and GBS was legitimate. even before respondent Lydia V. petitioners filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals questioning the decision of the NLRC. HELD: Yes. This fact negated the obligation to pay backwages. The records reveal that private respondents complied with the requirements. As it turned out. Felixberto Mirana. since private respondents' cessation and closure of business was lawful. The owner. modified the assailed decision and declared the second group of petitioners. no law can compel anybody to continue in it. strikes. As a consequence. she declined to accept new projects and proceeded with the winding up of her business. for any bona fide reason. Guillermo Macaraeg. to all their regular employees except petitioners Rolando Cortes. the union leadership demanded separation pay computed at 45 days for every year of service. In the course of negotiations with the management. Ruben Saringan and Ramon Seraspi who refused to accept their separation pay. see to it that all benefits due the affected employees would be paid. whichever is higher. Hence. as regular employees also entitled to separation pay. The employer need only comply with the following requirements for a valid cessation of business operations: (a) service of a written notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least one month before the intended date thereof. (b) the cessation of or withdrawal from business operations must be bona fide in character and (c) payment of termination pay equivalent to at least one-half month pay for each year of service. having been done in good faith and in accordance with law. there was no illegal dismissal to speak of. GBS was also forced to close and cease its business operations. the workers of GBS joined in the concerted activities in sympathy with the striking employees of MAME. Arsenio Ortiz. Herminigildo Justo. Explicit from Article 283 of the Labor Code is that closure or cessation of business operations is allowed even if the business is not undergoing economic losses.
. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the findings of both the labor arbiter and the NLRC that there was a legitimate and bona fide closure and cessation of business by MAME and GBS. no unfair labor practice or illegal dismissal was committed.retire from business when she became sickly in 1988.
represented by Lim. The law looks with disfavor upon quitclaims and releases by employees pressured into signing by unscrupulous employers minded to evade legal responsibilities. after less drastic means have been tried and found wanting. Resorted to by employers to avoid or minimize business losses. It must be exercised essentially as a measure of last resort. The employer bears the burden of proving the existence or the imminence of substantial losses with clear and satisfactory evidence that there are legitimate business reasons justifying a retrenchment. The respondents then filed Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. 2004. The CA also held that before EMCO resorted to retrenchment. section heads. 2. the Quitclaims were therefore not voluntarily entered into by respondents. the appellate court concluded that the retrenchment was illegal. the quitclaim is proper. It is. the retrenchment was valid and proper. subject to faithful compliance with the substantive and the procedural requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence. operating through its sawmill and plymill sections where respondents used to be assigned as regular workers. Their consent was similarly vitiated by mistake or fraud. 148532.
. al. ISSUES: 1. which had not complied with the one-month prior notice requirement under the Labor Code. All in all.RETRENCHMENT. frequent machinery breakdown. Hence. HELD: (1) Retrenchment is one of the authorized causes for the dismissal of employees. it is recognized under Article 283 of the Labor Code. low market demand and expiration of permit to operate its sawmill department. Retrenchment is a management prerogative consistently recognized and affirmed by this Court. The appellate court added that the corporation had not served on the employees the required notice of termination. Not every loss incurred or expected to be incurred by a company will justify retrenchment. addressed to all its foremen.R. PERFERIO ABELGAS et. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. No. Whether or not. this Petition. supervisors and department heads. the dismissal shall be deemed unjustified. Whether or not. J. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the claim of the respondent employees. The CA held that the evidence was insufficient to justify a ruling in favor of EMCO. deeds of release or quitclaim cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal. April 14. informed the DOLE of its intention to retrench some of its workers. Should the employer fail to do so. EMCO. (2) Since the retrenchment was illegal and of no effect. A memorandum was thereafter issued by EMCO. The losses must be substantial and the retrenchment must be reasonably necessary to avert such losses. The intended retrenchment was grounded on purported financial difficulties occasioned by alleged lack of raw materials.] PANGANIBAN. The acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel. however. the latter had failed to adduce evidence of its losses and to prove that it had undertaken measures to prevent the occurrence of its alleged actual or impending losses. As a rule. [G.: FACTS: EMCO is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of wood processing. VALID CAUSES EMCO PLYWOOD CORPORATION vs. because of EMCO's failure to comply with the legal requirements.
March 11. Inc. To enforce the Court‘s resolution. Unconvinced. As such. were. Judicial review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which its labor officials‘ findings rest. No. the findings of facts and conclusion of the NLRC are generally accorded not
. despite their regular employment status. and is favorable to the complainants. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. the parties themselves agreed on the basis for the computation of the respective award of backwages and separation pay ¾ the monthly average earnings of the individual private respondents appearing on their SSS forms for the years 1988. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION [G. and 1990.R.: FACTS: Private respondents were regular employees hired as drivers and conductors/conductresses by petitioner CBL Transit. A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by herein respondents at the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Inc. HELD: (1) Petitioner‘s contention that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it sustained the labor arbiter‘s order awarding backwages and separation pay to private respondents is devoid of merit. and California Bus Lines. It claimed that the termination of private respondents was a consequence of its closure of operations due to bankruptcy. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC but the appeal was dismissed for lack of merit. Mr. was not based on what was agreed upon by the parties. petitioner‘s accountant failed to appear and instead filed a manifestation and motion assailing the computation and authority of Ricardo Atienza. On the other hand. 1989. petitioner again filed its comment. Inc. the computation. J. per agreement of both parties. it alleged that the computation made by the Acting Chief.JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LABOR CASES CBL TRANSIT. categorically denied the allegations of the private respondents. As the matter remained unsettled. vs. they were not given work assignments beginning December 1990. Since the actual payrolls were not available. Iniego found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal. petitioner CBL Transit. this time submitting its own formula and pertinent figures. ISSUES: 1. the NLRC upheld the decision of the labor arbiter. On appeal. however. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. in reality. the determination of which is the statutory function of the NLRC. It rejected petitioner‘s claim that it was forced to close shop due to bankruptcy. National Capital Region. In a pleading filed by respondent. Subsequently. Research and Information Unit of this Office. due to the unavailability of the actual payrolls. petitioner and its directors/stockholders were ordered to pay private respondents separation pay equivalent to one-month salary for every year of service. This issue is definitely a question of fact. this petition./California Bus Line. NLRC. Whether or not private respondents are entitled to separation pay. Hence. However. a single enterprise owned and operated by one and the same family. both parties agreed to meet again. Consequently. Inc. Whether or not petitioner ceased operations because of bankruptcy. The only difference was in the manner of computation thereof. 2. labor arbiter Iniego directed Atienza of the Research and Information Unit to call for a conference with the parties in order to determine the individual money claims of private respondents. It should be pointed out that. This time. Inc. in a resolution the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the reinstatement of private respondents with backwages up to the time of their actual reinstatement. or separation pay in the amount of one month for every year of service in case reinstatement was not feasible. INC. Atienza submitted a report consisting of the computation of private respondents‘ respective monetary awards. was based on the monthly average earnings of the individual private respondents appearing on their Social Security System (SSS) forms. 128425. However. Labor arbiter Cresencio R. They also averred that CBL Transit. 2004] CORONA.
it would be unfair. Officer-in-charge of PJI's Administrative Services Division. for and in behalf of respondent and other members. was sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and it was placed under the management of PCGG. (PJI). filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal suspension. as affirmed by public respondent NLRC. to hold an employer who is bankrupt. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding that respondent and the other five employees were illegally dismissed from employment and ordered for their reinstatement and payment of backwages and moral and exemplary damages. to protect the properties. liable for separation pay. The union filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal.000 common shares. vs. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and reinstated the Arbiter's award of backwages. attempted to regain control of the PJI management. petitioner. However. During a stockholders' meeting. INC. We find no basis for deviating from the aforestated doctrine without any clear showing that the findings of the labor arbiter. Through its authorized accountant.R. BACKWAGES PHIL. 141430 May 7. The petitioners did not even bother to give notice to the DOLE and to its employees that it was closing its business due to serious financial reverses as required by Article 283 of the Labor Code. Simply asserting a state of insolvency is not enough to show serious financial losses. petitioner agreed that the computation of backwages and separation pay should be based on the monthly average earnings of the individual private respondents appearing on their SSS forms for 1988-1990. In other words. but was denied. and damages against petitioner. No. However. who owns 20% or 1. (2) There is no dispute that the cessation of operations of an establishment due to serious business losses is a just cause for terminating the services of employees. are bereft of sufficient substantiation. the Journal Employees Union (Union). A motion for reconsideration was filed. Respondent submitted his explanation the next day. NLRC deleted the award of backwages. along with five (5) other members. and designated Michael Mosqueda. through its nominees to the Board of Directors. Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing. They were placed under preventive suspension pending the investigation. Petitioner submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Research and Information Unit of the NLRC. 2004] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. unfair labor practices and damages. Abraham J. On appeal. Buenaluz. unfair labor practice. considering that the payrolls were no longer available. Inc. as grave abuse of discretion. Rosario Olivares.
.only great weight and respect but even clothed with finality and deemed binding on this Court as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Respondent failed to appear clarificatory hearing despite notice and also failed to present evidence. JOURNALISTS.: FACTS: Philippine Journalists. respondent. damages and attorney's fees.xxx and to explain twenty four hours after notice. damages and attorney's fees. The motions for reconsideration filed were denied. funds and assets of PJI and enforce or implement directives. instructions and orders of the Olivares group. as Chairman of a Task Force. issued a memorandum to respondent charging them with "serious misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the company and/or present management. Petitioner terminated the services of respondent and the other members of the Task Force. and useless. Labor Code). Prior to the investigation. the fact of serious business reverses or financial losses and the consequent closure of the establishment must be sufficiently shown by the employer. In such a situation. the NLRC's deletion of the award of backwages. It cannot now be allowed to question the latter‘s jurisdiction. the law is clear that the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause rests on the employer (Article 277. We agree that petitioner has failed to discharge the burden of proof resting on it. MICHAEL MOSQUEDA [G. J.
leadsman. employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION [G. the backwages shall be computed from the time of their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision. and its January 18. inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. 54641 which dismissed outright the petitioners' petition for certiorari for alleged failure to comply with the formal requirements of the rules.A. such as tinsmith. SP No. without loss of seniority rights and privileges and with payment of backwages from the day they were dismissed up to the time they are actually reinstated.668. 00-05-02789-92 and 00-07-0369992. The private respondent's motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC. SR. welder and painter. a writ of execution was issued by the Labor Arbiter directing the sheriff of the NLRC to accompany complainants to the premises of respondent for the purpose of reinstating them to their former position and collect from said respondent the amount of P3. computed from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. In due course. the award of backwages in favor of respondent is proper. If reinstatement is no longer possible. The Court denied the said motion.960. The judgment of the court became final and executory.R. RECKONING POINT FOR PAYMENT OF BACKWAGES. computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him (which. J.ISSUE: Whether or not.: FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On appeal. and to the payment of his full backwages. the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor arbiter's findings.45 corresponding to complainants' backwages and attorney's lien. 279 of the Labor Code.R. Under Art. as a rule. aircon mechanic. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing the complaints for lack of merit. 2003. The private respondent filed a motion for clarification claiming that it had offered reinstatement to the petitioners but that the latter spurned its offer. the petitioners joined other employees in filing three separate cases of illegal dismissal against the private respondent. The private respondent served the petitioners with uniformly worded notices of termination of employment. contending that by
. docketed as NLRC-NCR Nos. As a result. Inc.. under R. petitioners were among those hired by the private respondent to work in various capacities. The case was remanded to the NLRC for implementation.] CALLEJO. 00-03-01930-92. The proceedings in all the cases were subsequently consolidated. the private respondent filed a petition for certiorari assailing the above-quoted decision with the Supreme Court which rendered judgment holding that petitioner has failed to discharge its burden of proof in the instant case and therefore ordering the reinstatement of private respondents as regular employees of petitioner. ROBERTO FULGENCIO vs. and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. September 12. is from the time of his illegal dismissal) up to the time of his actual reinstatement. The petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the above-quoted decision. 141600. assailing the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. Meanwhile. 6715. inclusive of allowances. The private respondent appealed the Order of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC which awarded backwages of the complainant and such will not be reduced by their salaries obtained elsewhere during the period of their dismissal until the offer of reinstatement was made. The private respondent Raycor Aircontrol Systems. In connection with such installation work. HELD: Yes. No. the Research and Information Unit of the NLRC computed the benefits due the petitioners and submitted an updated computation. Similarly. 2000 Resolution denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. installer. The Labor Arbiter approved the computation. an employee who is unjustly dismissed is entitled to reinstatement. was engaged in the installation of airconditioning systems in the buildings of its clients. without loss of seniority rights and other privileges. on motion of the petitioners.
The Supreme Court was convinced beyond cavil that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in reversing the order of the Labor Arbiter. petitioners. No. NLRC. they refused. the Court finds compelling reasons to disregard the petitioners' procedural lapses in order to obviate a patent injustice and to avert further delay. Eventually. 114290 in a manner contrary to the explicit terms thereof. the NLRC sought to enforce the final judgment in G. has become the "law of the case" which now binds the NLRC and the private respondent. which directed the payment of the petitioners' backwages from the time they were dismissed up to the time they are actually reinstated. the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's dismissal of the case and directed the payment of backwages. Among them were Jose B.R. PHILIPPINE GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS. CRUZ vs. 1992. The court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. 114290. RECKONING POINT FOR PAYMENT OF BACKWAGES JOSE B. If the private respondent believed the aforesaid computation to be erroneous in the light of the factual circumstances obtaining between the parties. No. thus sustaining the claim of the private respondent that when the petitioners were directed to return to work on the said date. they executed and signed a ―Release. 1995. 1998. 114290. In so doing. May 28. It bears stressing that in our decision in G. We note that in its Decision dated June 16. crystal-clear that the manner of the computation of the petitioners' backwages is an issue which was already resolved by this Court in its decision in G. It is. directed the payment of the petitioners' backwages from the time of dismissal up to July 13. v. Then after having been paid their separation pay. Vicente A. Rigos. from the time of their dismissal up to the time of their actual reinstatement. supervisory and confidential positions. on October 17. HELD: The Supreme Court gave due course to the petition to avert a miscarriage of justice on account of technicalities. 1998 Decision. Waiver and Quitclaim. respondent paid petitioners their separation pay at the rate of 1 ½ months salary per year of service.computing the backwages of the petitioners the NLRC modified the already final and executory decision of the Supreme Court. we specifically enjoined the petitioners' reinstatement coupled with the payment of backwages. respondent suffered substantial financial losses. petitioners filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for payment of retirement benefits. in its assailed June 16. the Court's decision in G. therefore. Gregorio A. [G. With this development. Lingal and Olivia P. Inc. for in so doing.] SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. the Labor Arbiter
. However.‖ However. Hence. the NLRC.R. 114290 assailing the said NLRC judgment.. J p: FACTS: Philippine Global Communications. 1997. The NLRC issued an order denying the said motion. 114290 which had long acquired finality. is a corporation engaged in the principal business of communications through telex and telegram. the NLRC modified the decision of this Court in Raycor Aircontrol Systems. As a result of a decline in the volume of recorded messages sent via telex and telegram. AND/OR ALFREDO PARUNGAO. Cruz.R. with various branches nationwide. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with the CA which outrightly dismissed the petition in a Resolution. No.R. 141868. On July 31. Rodolfo C. it should have assigned the same as an error when it filed its petition for certiorari in G. damages and attorney‘s fees against respondent and its president.R. No. Inc. to be reckoned from the time of the petitioners' dismissal up to the time of their actual reinstatement. respondent. respondent adopted an organizational streamlining program that resulted in the closure of its branches and termination from the service of forty-two (42) workers. Francisco. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to payment of backwages from the time they were illegally dismissed up to the time of their actual reinstatement. INC. who occupied managerial.R. In this case. No. Delos Santos. 2004. Alfredo Parungao. No.
engaged in the construction business. which ever is the greater amount. on the other hand. Article VI 12 of respondent‘s Retirement Plan. whichever is higher. Inc. of which plaintiff is a member. whichever is higher. the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying petitioners‘ motion for reconsideration. ILLEGAL DISMISSAL. at the same time. respondent opted to pay petitioners separation benefits computed under the Retirement Plan. also. in case of retrenchment or cessation of operations.. of which plaintiff is a member.: FACTS: Petitioners were workers who have rendered services in various corporations of private respondents. affected employees. NLRC. the employees are entitled to a retirement pay equivalent to one and a half (1 ½) months pay for every year of service computed on the basis of their basic monthly salary at the time of retirement. .‘ Pursuant thereto. this Court. Inc. reversed the Labor Arbiter‘s Decision and dismissed petitioners‘ complaint for payment of retirement benefits. under the above case... 1998. he had a right to one of the two benefits. the same being higher than what Article 283 of the Labor Code. Inc. whichever is the greater amount. as amended. HELD: In Cipriano case. thus: ―Plaintiff's contention is manifestly devoid of merit. DUMARPA [G. father. 148848 August 5. Thus. said right is subject to the limitations prescribed in the agreement. the Appellate Court promulgated its Decision affirming the assailed Decision of the NLRC. namely Mindanao Integrated Builders. 2003] PANGANIBAN. and his son. the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). the right of the concerned employees to receive both retirement benefits and separation pay depends upon the provisions in the Retirement Plan. Inc. petitioners are entitled only to either the separation pay provided under Article 283 of the Labor Code. not to both. Under Article 283 of the Labor Code. the former discharged the latter
. whichever is higher. or retirement benefits prescribed by the Retirement Plan.‖ Clearly. 1998.‘ . Private respondent. Under Section 4. is a family-owned corporation managed and operated principally by Antonio Murillo. No. but.R. petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari which we referred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to our ruling in St. as amended. by the qualifying phrase ‗whichever is the greater amount.rendered a Decision sustaining petitioners‘ claim for retirement benefits under respondent‘s Retirement Plan. The exclusion of one by the other is clearly deducible. J. . Chief Justice Concepcion. On July 30. 2000. Insular Builders. On March 23. and Queen City Builders. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. are always given termination or separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least ½ month pay for every year of service. in a Decision dated March 2. BACK WAGES JACINTO RETUYA vs. 1999. provides.‘ In other words. Sta. ruled that regular employees who were separated from the service are entitled either to the amount prescribed in the retirement plan or the separation pay provided by law. On February 4. Martin‘s Funeral Home vs. not only from the terms ‗either‘ and ‗or‘ used in the agreement. Upon appeal by the parties. whichever is higher. Here. His right to the benefits of the aforementioned plan came into existence by virtue of the agreement between the defendant and the labor union. Clara Plywood. Article X of which reads: ‗Regular employees who are separated from the service of the company for any reason other than misconduct or voluntary resignation shall be entitled to either 100% of the benefits provided in Section 2. At the height of the feud between private respondents Antonio Murillo and Rodolfo Murillo. Rodolfo Murillo. Inc. Hence. Insular Builders. as amended. Admittedly. In denying petitioners‘ claim for retirement benefits. ISSUE: Whether or not employee separated from the service is entitled to either the amount prescribed in the retirement plan or the separation pay provided by law. plaintiff was entitled to ‗either‘ the amount prescribed in the plan or the severance pay provided by law. Article VIII hereof. regardless of their length of service in the company or to the severance pay provided by law. through Mr. This is pursuant to the agreement between the company and the labor union.
Whether or not. In the present case. petitioners were dismissed because of a "change of management. the CA was correct in upholding the labor arbiter's finding that they had been illegally dismissed. since he had likewise been dismissed from employment by the elder Murillo. Inc. it should not have reduced the amount of their separation pay. their employers must pay them full back wages. petitioners are entitled to their full backwages.. because there was no cessation of work when they were transferred from Insular Builders. Inc. Inc. to Queen City Builders. Petitioners found themselves in the middle of the crossfire and were told to temporarily stop working. Later. hence. Inc. This rule has been uniformly applied in subsequent cases. petitioners should be awarded back wages. 2. the NLRC (Fifth Division) set aside its earlier decision then remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings. in accordance with R. Inc. Therefore.. HELD: (1) The Supreme Court in Bustamante v. Furthermore. Inc. however. Under the circumstances. On the other hand. there was no employer-employee relationship that existed between the petitioners and Rodolfo Murillo. Petitioners were however made to continue their work. Whether or not. Antonio Murillo and Insular Builders. 13th month pay. and retirement pay. Petitioners filed with the NLRC. petitioners are entitled to full back wages and separation pay in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code. It was not he but Antonio Murillo who dismissed them. NLRC. non-payment of wages. Inc. Petitioners averred that they were terminated from employment without prior notice and also in absence of any valid cause. managed and controlled by private respondent Rodolfo Murillo. Moreover. held that illegally dismissed employees were entitled to full back wages that should not be diminished or reduced by the amount they had earned from another employment during the period of their illegal dismissal. a complaint for illegal dismissal. as manager of Insular Builders. Inc.
. but should have instead awarded them full back wages in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code. The fact that they worked for a sister company immediately after being dismissed from Insular Builders." They were not given any prior written notice. Having been illegally dismissed. rendering the same services. private respondent Antonio Murillo dismissed petitioners and reported the matter to the DOLE. While litigating. 6715. ISSUES: 1. That no employer-employee relationship existed between him and petitioners was shown by the fact that. On reconsideration. Both parties appealed to the NLRC which reversed and set aside the labor arbiter's ruling. Petitioners contend that because the CA reinstated the labor arbiter's finding of illegal dismissal. as penalty for their illegal dismissal. and assumed control of the company. They alleged that their termination was an off-shoot of the supposed personal rift and disagreements between private respondents Antonio Murillo and Rodolfo Murillo. in the same place. the appellate court held that Rodolfo Murillo had incurred no liability. The NLRC of denied their appeal and affirmed the labor arbiter's Decision in toto. locality and at the same office but under a different company. but simply told that their services were terminated on the day they stopped working for Insular Builders. from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. (2) Rodolfo Murillo was not the employer of petitioners when they were dismissed from Insular Builders. employees must still earn a living.from his position as manager of Insular Builders. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and upheld the Decision of the labor arbiter. No. Rodolfo himself was dismissed together with them. Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding private respondents guilty of illegal dismissal. Inc. inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. counter that petitioners were not illegally dismissed from employment. as evidenced by the Dismissal Report submitted to the DOLE. In fact.A. should not preclude such award. the Queen City Builders. there exists an employer-employee relationship that existed between the petitioners and Rodolfo Murillo.
A claim for benefit for such death cannot be defeated by the mere fact of separation from service. that her condition started to worsen. Therefore. also known as coronary occlusion or just a "coronary"...R. for Bronchial Asthma and Pneumonia. as amended. and these factors include stress. while she was still in the service. Acute Myocardial Infarction generally occurs with the abrupt decrease in coronary blood flow that follows a thrombotic occlusion of a coronary artery previously narrowed by astherosclerosis. J. the commission affirmed GSIS. was formerly employed as an Elementary Grade Teacher. her death. 1972. and Bronchial Asthma and Hypertension as underlying causes.: FACTS: Carmen T. claims falling under the Employees' Compensation Act should be liberally resolved to fulfill its essence as a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working man and woman in our society. She was promoted to Teacher I and later to Teacher II. It is common knowledge among medical practitioners that hypertension is one major risk factor among multiple coronary risk factors that can precipitate an acute coronary acclusion. Cuanang was confined at the University of the East Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Medical Center. the wife of the respondent died a year after her retirement. death benefits should be paid although it occurred after separation from government service. TEODOSIO CUANANG G. Petitioner denied the claim as the death occurred out of service. Cuanang. Estreras Jr. When the deceased joined the government service on October 1.SPECIAL LAWS PD 626. It is only this kind of interpretation that can give meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code. which states that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations should be resolved in favor of labor. DEATH BENEFITS GSIS vs. a Diplomate in Internal Medicine who issued the Death Certificate. She applied for early optional retirement after completing almost twenty six years of government service. This expert opinion is fully supported by the facts leading to Carmen Cuanang's deteriorating health condition. June 3. Rheumatic Heart Disease (RHD) and Mitral Stenosis. Arsenio A. Therefore Acute Myocardial Infarction which she suffered can be a consequence also of her chronic hypertension vis-à-vis her rheumatic heart disease. the requisite substantial evidence came from the expert opinion of Dr. she was in perfect health. the period between her retirement and demise was less than one year. Myocardial Infarction. It is of common knowledge that the job of a teacher can be very stressful. Cuanang was hypertensive and also had bronchial asthma. In the instant case. The immediate cause of her death was determined to be Cardio Pulmonary Arrest with Acute Myocardial Infarction as the antecedent cause. the degree of proof required under PD 626 was satisfied. It goes without saying that all these conditions contributed much to the deterioration of her already precarious health. It was only in 1997. Stress appears to be associated with elevated blood pressure. HELD: Yes. Predisposing factors for myocardial infarction are the same for all forms of Coronary Artery Disease. CA reversed the decision of ECC and GSIS. Clearly. "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. i. 2004 YNARES-SANTIAGO. On appeal to the ECC. Hence. and ultimately. They later filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
." Probability and not ultimate degree of certainty is the test of proof in compensation proceedings. Respondent filed with petitioner GSIS a claim for death benefits under PD 626. 158846. Cuanang died at the age of 65. ISSUE: Whether or not. is a life threatening condition.e. deceased wife of respondent Marc Dennis Cuanang. In the case at bar. No. We hold in the affirmative.
then the said employee undoubtedly suffers from a permanent total disability regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. Respondent moved for reconsideration of the evaluation but the same was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is entitled to permanent total disability benefits. Estrada. Hence. Consequently.PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. Estrada modified her recommendation by retaining respondent's temporary total disability benefits but downgrading the permanent total disability benefits to compensation equivalent to 8 months permanent partial disability benefits. he applied for early retirement due to "an ailment causing paralysis of the left hand and slurred speech rendering him unfit to discharge further his duties and responsibilities as a police officer. Dr. Hence. CADIZ [G. in a more detailed manner. Dr. He was transferred to the Siliman University Medical Center where he was diagnosed to be suffering from a heart ailment. or any work which a person of similar mentality and attainment could do. 2003.R. PNP. approved the claim and granted respondent permanent total disability benefits and temporary total disability benefits. San Carlos City. he was retired from service and granted permanent total disability benefits. Most of all. In the case at bar. J. July 8. Medical Officer of GSIS. Dumaguete City. On appeal by respondent. Pasay City. The Medical Service Group of GSIS.: FACTS: Respondent Leo L. and to deny permanent total
. respondent's entitlement to permanent total disability was established by his medical records and by the investigation of the very agency he worked for. He was absorbed by the Philippine National Police (PNP). respondent filed a petition with the Court of Appeals which. Permanent total disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness. In a number of cases. Estrada to revise her recommendation. the decision of the PNP to retire him at the age of 55 for being unfit for police service is a clear indication that his heart ailment rendered him incapable of effectively and competently performing his job as a Police Chief Superintendent without serious discomfort or pain and without material injury or danger to his life. as in the case at bar. Subsequently. GSIS. describes what constitutes temporary total disability). directed Dr. No. with a rank of Police Chief Inspector. stating that respondent retired from the PNP due to a permanent total disability. the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the findings of the GSIS. LEO L." After its own examination of respondent. 641. Estrada. Cadiz was appointed as a Provincial Guard of Negros Oriental. the PNP. or work of similar nature. attaching to his application his service record and PNP General Order No. filed the instant petition. HELD: We rule in the affirmative. 154093. The test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disability is the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. proves that he was really disabled totally to further perform his assigned task. the Medical and Dental Service. which set aside the decision of the ECC and granting respondent's claim for permanent total disability. Dumaguete City evinced that respondent is really qualified for permanent total disability benefits. declared him "UNFIT FOR POLICE SERVICE". however. respondent filed a disability claim with the GSIS. The medical records of respondent revealed that he suffered a heart attack and was hospitalized at the San Carlos Planters Hospital. as the agency charged with the management and administration of the trust fund of the ECC. Even the initial findings of Dr. which found him "UNFIT FOR POLICE SERVICE". Medical Officer of the GSIS.] YNARES-SANTIAGO. If by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained. the position he held until his retirement at the age of 55. that he was trained for. but means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work. it was ruled that the early retirement of an employee due to a work-related ailment. Respondent's rank was adjusted to Police Chief Superintendent. the employee is unable to perform his customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability (which.
In September 1999. filed with the RTC of Malabon. The case at bar neither concerns a recurring illness previously compensated. Region III (PARAB). MERCEDES L. as well as lack of jurisdiction by the MTC.R. REQUISITES OF AGRARIAN TENANCY RELATIONSHIP. PARAB rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners. February 27. J. including lack of cause of action to file the petition. Branch 55. According to petitioners. nor a claim for additional/conversion of disability benefits. Petitioners filed a complaint for maintenance of peaceful possession and issuance of mandatory preliminary injunction with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. and/or res judicata. conformably with the provision on venue in the lease contract. respondents had already elevated the controversy to the appellate court. RTC dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action and failure to prosecute. Petitioners amended their complaint to include intervenor Kenneth Bautista as one of the defendants. TAN [G. and thus ordered the immediate execution of MTC judgment. Intervenor claims that he has the right of possession over the subject fishpond as respondents. despite petitioners‘ counter-offer to match the increase in the rent. NUMERIANO and CARMELITA ROMERO vs. that petitioners would vacate the leased premises not later than December 1999. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss premised on culpability of petitioners for forum shopping. He alleged that he had entered into a one year joint venture agreement dated November 1998. to expire on December 1999. Bautista filed a motion for intervention. The PARAB denied the motion to dismiss. order. respondents appeared bent on removing petitioners from the premises. 2004] QUISUMBING. 147570. herein petitioners 21 days before the expiration of the lease contract and the date to relinquish possession of the fishpond pursuant to the compromise agreement. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss it. respondents were constrained to file an ejectment case against petitioners before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Malabon. governed by the Civil Code. They add that the existing contract between them and petitioners is an ordinary lease. and compromise agreement. is
. lack of assistance by counsel in arriving at the compromise agreement.disability benefits when he was forced to retire would render inutile and meaningless the social justice precept guaranteed by the Constitution. a petition for annulment of the MTC judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not the PARAB had jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint for maintenance of peaceful possession and issuance of mandatory preliminary injunction. They present cash vouchers and hand-written receipts covering the period 1987 to 1997. As it turned out. HELD: These issues depend on whether the fishpond. Petitioners raised issues concerning the tenancy relationship. PARAB’S JURISDICTION SPS. No. However. Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing decision of the PARAB. which is the subject of the controversy. MTC issued a judgment based on a compromise agreement wherein the parties agreed. which ruled that the PARAB had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint filed by petitioners. Accordingly. alleging lack of jurisdiction. improper venue and litis pendentia. respondents aver that there is no relationship of lease-tenancy by petitioners to speak of. with the petitioners to augment their harvest and enhance their fishpond technology. For their part. In the meantime. respondents gave verbal notice to terminate petitioners‘ lease.: FACTS: Petitioners allege that they have been in peaceful possession of the fishpond as tenant lessee since 1985. Respondents further claim that petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental covering the period January 1997 to December 1997. but involves a review of the ECC decision which classified respondent's early-retirement-causing disability as permanent partial instead of permanent total. respondents wanted to terminate the contract because a third party offered to pay higher rent. Petitioners filed before this Court an appeal via a petition praying for reversal of the above stated CA decision. while the complaint before the PARAB was pending. Court of Appeals set aside the PARAB decision. even before the RTC‘s Order of dismissal came out in their favor.
we also find that petitioners failed to prove their personal ―cultivation‖ of the area in question. Dr. it follows that the PARAB has no jurisdiction over the instant case. and (3) there should be personal cultivation done by the tenants themselves. 158314. Among these tenants was Dominador Maglalang. Secretary. Rosa. the amendment has excluded private lands actually. as implied by this Court in the Atlas case. Nueva Ecija. Act No. we rule that there is no agrarian tenancy relationship to speak of in this case at this time. J. including disputes concerning farm workers associations or representation of persons in negotiating. changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. situated in La Fuente.R. In reversing the PARAB‘s findings. Before Presidential Decree No. whether leasehold. over lands devoted to agriculture. There is personal cultivation if the tenant (lessee) cultivates the land himself or with the aid of the immediate farm household. directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds from the coverage of the CARL. since certain requirements set by present law on the matter have not been met. AND disputes and incidents in connection therewith (DARAB New Rules of Procedure. Act No. Act No. 2 of Rep. by virtue of the amendments to the CARL. was formerly registered in the name of Dr. Sr. Bautista and petitioners shall have equal share in the net profits. Sta. the land was the subject of a judicial ejectment suit. which amended Section 10 of Rep. The jurisdiction of the PARAB in this case is limited to agrarian disputes or controversies and other matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Rep. the operation of a fishpond is no longer considered an agricultural activity. June 3. This agreement provides. Valisno mortgaged 12 hectares of his property to Renato and Angelito Banting. but it also shows the nature of their fishpond operation is that of a large scale commercial venture. pay the agreed rentals to the registered owner of the land. Act No. and that after deducting all operational expenses. Clearly. [G. 3844 had included fishponds in its definition of agricultural land within its coverage.] YNARES-SANTIAGO. (2) the purpose should be agricultural production. and Renato Banting. v. the Valisnos' tenants were ejected from the property. Among these are: (1) the subject matter should be agricultural land. 27. 2004. Nicolas Valisno. An agrarian dispute is defined as any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements. MARIETTA VALISNO. that Bautista will share in the operation and management of the fishpond. Section 2). determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases. No. Act No. Here. 7881 expressly provides that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL. Expressly. otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). maintaining. who represents the SMSJ in the instant proceedings. tenancy. 6657. Act No.: FACTS: The original 57-hectare property. stewardship or otherwise. Although Section 166 (1) of Rep. Not only does it reflect lack of personal cultivation by petitioners. Rule 2. 7881. and a parcel of land devoted to fishpond operation is not agricultural land as therein defined. Particularly fatal to petitioners‘ cause is the joint venture agreement with Bautista. which refers to the members of the family of the tenant (lessee) and other persons who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him in the activities. ET AL. of Agrarian Reform where we held that Rep. COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM SAMAHAN NG MAGSASAKA SA SAN JOSEP vs.governed by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). among others. Angelito Banting. Rep. Dept. The mortgage on the 12 hectare portion
. the appellate court stated that the provincial adjudicator‘s jurisdiction is only to hear. this definition must be considered modified in the light of Sec. The property was subdivided into ten lots on individual titles were issued in the name of the eight children of Nicolas. 6657. 3844 and other agrarian laws. whereby in 1971. Consequently. fixing.The Court of Appeals in ruling that the PARAB has no jurisdiction relies on our ruling in the case of Atlas Fertilizer Corp. and considering further that lands devoted to fishing are not agricultural lands because the use of the land is only incidental to and not the principal factor in productivity.
Nevertheless. at the time of which redemption three of the four Redemptioner-Grandchildren were minors. On June 14. who held that the property is covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. specifically objecting to the award in favor of the Grandchildren-Awardees because they are not actually tilling nor directly managing the land in question as required by law. but the titles to the land were not transferred to the redemptioners until November 26. DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer ("PARO"). to pay the price thereof. before the issuance of PD 27 into tracts of approximately six hectares each. likewise covering a 6-hectare property in La Fuente. Sr. four grandchildren of Dr. The Court of Appeals found the following facts relevant: First. The factual findings are borne out by the record and are supported by substantial evidence. are entitled to retention rights as landowners under Republic Act No. issued in the name of Angelito Banting. the grandchildren of the late Dr. the entire 57-hectare property became the subject of expropriation proceedings before the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR"). Rosa. in their own right. The redemption made by the four petitioners has never been annulled. On appeal. In the case at bar. We are not persuaded. Dominador Maglalang. covering a 6-hectare property in La Fuente. however such transaction is valid until annulled. assailing the right of retention of the four. The SMSJ. issued in the name of Renato Banting. 6657. Respondents contend that the redemption made by the petitioners was simulated. Maria Cristina. The evidence clearly demonstrates that Renato Banting and Angelito Banting became the registered owners of the property in 1972. subject to the retention rights of the heirs of Nicolas. that the mortgages were constituted over a 12-hectare portion of Dr. HELD: The appeal lacks merit. Nicolas Valisno Sr. opposed the Consolidated Application for Retention. Nicolas Valisno. 1973. filed a petition for coverage of the subject landholding under the CARL. Nueva Ecija. it is valid. These two separate properties were
. 1973. Respondent heirs filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. in behalf of the SMSJ. This motion was denied. being then 26 years old. Sta. calculated to avoid the effects of agrarian reform considering that at the time of redemption the latter were still minors and could not have resources. The Valisno heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order. or a total of 12 hectares. At the time of the redemption. and affirmed the retention rights of the Redemptioner-Grandchildren over three hectares each. these properties were redeemed by the Redemptioner-Grandchildren on October 25. the DAR Secretary affirmed the Order of the Regional Director. Subsequently. only Benedicto was of legal age. It is a well-settled rule that only questions of law may be reviewed by the Supreme Court in an appeal by certiorari. The Court of Appeals reversed the Orders of the DAR Secretary. Rogelio Chaves. Petitioners filed a partial motion for reconsideration. Valisno's estate in 1972. which petition was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. thus. through Dominador Maglalang. The transfer of the titles to the two 6-hectare properties in 1972 removed the parcels of land from the entire Valisno estate. Third. or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. 1995. On appeal. Sta. ISSUE: Whether or not. While it is true that a transaction entered into by a party who is incapable of consent is voidable. PARO Chaves added that the excess over the five-hectare retention limit could still be covered under RA 6657. Leonora and Gregorio were all minors.was foreclosed and the property sold at public auction. but the same was denied. Rosa. that the titles to the property were transferred to the names of the mortgagees in 1972. granted the award of one hectare each for the seven Grandchildren-Awardees. issued a Memorandum stating that the property had been subdivided among the heirs of Dr. The motion for reconsideration filed by the heirs of Dr. Second. Nicolas Valisno Sr. The redemption was made on October 25. Valisno was denied. no reason exists for us to disregard the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. Nueva Ecija. This was reversed by then Secretary Garilao. the Office of the Regional Director declared the Valisno property exempt from the coverage of PD 27 and RA 6657. redeemed the same from the mortgagees. They then filed a consolidated application for retention. 1998.
metastatic".‖ A claim for compensation benefits under P. ISSUE: Whether or not. when all the Valisno heirs filed their Consolidated Application for Retention and Award under RA 6657. 626 was filed by his surviving wife. Tuberculosis is a disease characterized by lesions in the lungs as well as tuberculous scars. This right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right. with the SSS. which would be a pointless process.then transferred to the Redemptioner-Grandchildren in 1973. A retained area. ET AL. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. The claim for benefit was denied on the ground that Adenocarcinoma of the Lungs (Cancer of the Lungs) had no causal relationship with Juancho's job as a route salesman. deceased is proper. they were undoubtedly of legal age in 1994. PD 626 AZUCENA O. which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It is worth noting that tuberculosis is most commonly confused with carcinoma of the lung because the highest incidence of both diseases is in the upper lobe of the lungs and in older men. Leonora and Gregorio were all minors in 1973. As owners in their own right of the questioned properties. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. Moreover. It escapes reason as well as one's sense of equity that Juancho's heirs should now be denied compensation (death) benefits for the sole reason that his illness immediately before he died was not compensable in his line of work. is land which is not supposed to leave the landowner's dominion.D. No.R. The combination of fatigue and the pollutants that abound in his work environment verily contributed to the worsening of his already weak respiratory system.D. and of course were likewise of legal age in 1997. 2004] YNARES-SANTIAGO. the denial of the claim of the death benefits under P. was employed for twenty-nine years as a route helper and subsequently as route salesman for the Meycauayan Plant of Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Petitioner brought the case to the ECC.: FACTS: Petitioner's husband. poorly differentiated. thus sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards. in light of Juancho's continued exposure to detrimental work environment and constant fatigue. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION.Later. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection.D. 626 is merely substantial evidence. the possibility that Juancho's Adenocarcinoma of the lungs developed from the worsening of his pulmonary tuberculosis is not remote. Redemptioner-Grandchildren enjoyed the right of retention granted to all landowners. Juancho was diagnosed with minimal pulmonary tuberculosis. No. In the Court of Appeals affirmed ECC. In 1989. P. which affirmed SSS. and regardless of their minority. Azucena. is said to have abandoned the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation prevalent under the Workmen's
. as amended. His biopsy revealed that he had "Adenocarcinoma. He underwent chemotherapy.. His continuous exposure to these factors may have led to the development of his cancer of the lungs. Incorporated. when SMSJ initiated the petition for coverage of the subject landholding under the CARL. they became the legal owners of the property in 1973. SALALIMA vs. He was confined at the Makati Medical Center and died two days due to "Adenocarcinoma of the Lungs with widespread metastasis. HELD: Yes. [G. he was found to be suffering from pneumonia. petitioner herein. 146360 May 20. as its name denotes. J. Regardless of the source of their funds. Juancho S.D. 626. Juancho's job required long hours on the streets as well as his carrying of cases of soft drinks during sales calls. Salalima. What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation. although Maria Cristina. Thus. ECC stated that Juancho's exposure to smog and dust is not associated with the development of lung cancer. 626. The degree of proof required under P.
Compensation Act. especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances.
. however. the present law has not ceased to be an employees' compensation law or a social legislation. and the official agency charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability. hence. the liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still prevails. Despite such abandonment.