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On 7/6/88 priv resp Guadalupe Gaspay Alfaro alleged @ TC that she‗s acknowledged IC of Flaviano with Claudia Pason, prayed for issuance of letters of admin of Flaviano‗s estate. Petitioners are Jr. (adopted son) and Eriberta (next of kin) who filed for an MTD (motion to dismiss) saying that Guadalupe is a stranger. TC denied the MTD saying that such was based on indubitable grounds but TC nonetheless dismissed petition saying that testimonial and documentary evidence failed to prove status of Guadalupe, failed to show Guad consenting to the acknowledgement as IC and that such action should have been filed in the lifetime of Flaviano. CA reversed TC on 9/30/91 saying that:
Flaviano, Jr. and Eriberta opposed the petition. Flaviano is the adopted son of the decedent while Eriberta is a next of kin. Both alleged that Guadalupe is a stranger, and even assuming her illegitimate status, there is no proof of her recognition or acknowledgment.
rsed the trial court. It found the evidence ample and sufficient to prove Guadalupe‘s filiation and recognition, and her consent to the recognition. The CA also held that actions based on voluntary recognition can be instituted after the death of the putative father.
ISSUE(S) / RATIO Did the CA err in finding that Guadalupe is entitled to letters of administration?
Issue: WON Guadalupe is an IC Held: YES. TC did not discount the testimony of Martin Garin (agent to logging concessionaire of Flaviano for 18 years) who verified handwriting and signature of Flaviano in a letter addressed to Lupe and Toming (Guad and his husband Bartolome Alfaro) regarding the hospitalization expenses of Guad‗s daughter. CA said that TC must have assumed that Flaviano‗s handwriting must have metamorphosed during the years but it could be possible that handwriting of Flaviano never changed at all. Also when Guadalupe filed said action, she still used Gaspay affixed to her legal surname as married to Alfaro, thereby shouting to the world her consent to the acknowledgment of an IC. As to the action being instituted after death of putative father, CA said ―action based on acknoweldgement may be brought even after death of putative father‖. She thereby proved entitlement to the admin of estate. Moreover, the petitioners neglected to apply for a letter admin 30 days after the death of Flaviano Gaspay.
HELD: NO Guadalupe has, in sum, proved her entitlement to be administrator of the estate of her father Flaviano, Sr., being an acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of the decedent. conjunction with subsection (c) thereof, that: s, under subsection (b) in
If the husband or widow, or next kin, neglects for 30 days after the death of a person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, x x x it may be granted to such other person as the court may select. lected to apply for letters of administration 30 days after the death of Flaviano, Sr. Not even Agueda Dionisio, widow of Flaviano, Sr., filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration. PETITION DISMISSED.
GASPAY, JR. v. CA and ALFARO 238 SCRA 163 (1994) RULE 78 – ORDER OF PREFERENCE
OTHER ISSUES FACTS ober 1983 in Tacloban City. He was then married to Agueda Dionisio. They were childless. Gaspay Alfaro filed a petition with the RTC-Naval, Biliran alleging among others that she is the acknowledged illegitimate daughter of the decedent. Guadalupe prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of the decedent‘s estate. On Guadalupe‘s claim as illegitimate daughter of Flaviano, Sr. The trial court held that the evidence presented failed to prove her purported status, and that even if the petition were to be treated as an action to compel recognition, it would not prosper because it should have been filed during the lifetime of Flaviano, Sr.
a famous personality. Jovita was the barangay captain who had attended the birth and baptismal parties of Arturio 2. and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique‘s father Domingo Butch Aquino. Issue: WON Arturio is the legitimate child of Inocentes Held: Yes 1. were validly married a. When Arturio returned to the property upon Lourdes‗ invitation and sought to claim the share of his father on the land. a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Dominique died. with the Office of the City Civil Registrar.” He also said that he had used his mother‘s surname in his school records. The parents of Arturio. The baptismal certificate of Arturio show his parents to be Inocentes and Felicidad and his birth to be on July 21. in support of which she submitted the child‘s Certificate of Live Birth. contrary to Lourdes‗ claim that they had not. 2005. after the legitimate and legal wedding of Inocentes and Felicidad Family photos of Lourdes and Felix with Arturio‗s wife and children substantiate his claim that they had lived together in the property. a general order of default was issued. He said that his parents were never married. On the other hand. he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child. during his lifetime. GRACIA. Both affidavits attested. Court of Appeals 289SCRA 188. the pertinent portions of which read: Trinidad vs. the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for reconsideration. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. 189476. Coseteng-Magpayo G. On September 4. using his mother‘s surname. or legitimacy of marriage. instead of his father‘s. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled ―AUTOBIOGRAPHY‖ which Dominique. The Court stated that Edward‘s petition “goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. However. Isabel Meren and Jovita Gerardo testified that his parents‗ were married and cohabited as husband and wife i. After almost two months. 2005. and that his paternity had never been questioned. Republic (168 SCRA 294). burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation b. wrote in his own handwriting. No. For 3 successive elections in Quezon City. which “clearly directs that a petition which concerns one‟s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case. Jenie. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa. He wanted to use his mother‘s surname. or on November 2. Lourdes refused to partition the property and . And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by (Edward) before the RTC shows. Dulumbayan. who continued to live with Dominique‘s parents. Since nobody opposed the petition. Edward was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. Rizal. Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan certified that all its records of marriages and birth. 1998 Facts: Arturio Trinidad was born on July 21. Edward filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to change his surname. They resided in the house of Dominique‘s parents Domingo B. 1942. Jenie applied for registration of the child‘s birth. Lourdes and Felix) until he grew up and got married. Antipolo City.‖ The Court pointed out that his reliance on Rule 103 is erroneous. died single. where it was categorically held that “changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate…are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings…‖ The Court stated that he should have relied on Rule 108. Arturio claimed that his parents were legally married but failed to provide their marriage certificate and his birth certificate to show his relationship with Inocentes because these were lost during the war. that during the lifetime of Dominique.” The Court noted that Edward‘s petition was “filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City.Republic of the Philippines vs. inter alia.” The Court then laid down the rule that “when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations including those of citizenship.R. February 2. April 20. 1943. citing the case of Labayo-Rowe vs. The RTC then granted his petition. in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City. Antipolo City. neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto. and has no child. Teresa.” JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ “AQUINO. he said he ran and was elected as Councilor. using Dominique‘s surname Aquino. Inocentes and Felicidad. and „all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby‟ should be made parties in the proceeding.” represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ Vs RONALD PAUL S. and that his own child‘s birth certificate likewise used his mother‘s surname. Arturio lived with his aunt Lourdes in the property of Patricio Briones (father of Inocentes. The Supreme Court granted the Republic‘s petition and nullified the decision of the RTC. Upon the death of Inocentes. who allegedly married on May 5. among others. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. which was denied. were either lost. The RTC then ordered the usual posting and publication under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. forcing it to file this petition with the Supreme Court. 2011 claimed that Inocentes never married. Facts: For several months in 2005. legitimacy of paternity or filiation. then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Arturio was born during their marriage and cohabitation a. gave birth to her herein co petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz ―Aquino‖ at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital. presenting a certification from the National Statistics Office that his mother “does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage. Meren was one of the witnesses to the nuptials ii. 1943 from Felicidad Molato and Inocentes Briones.
THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER. permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register. AUTOBIOGRAPHY I‘M CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. September 23. does not. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW.) No. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. 9255. The complaint alleged that. Jenie‘s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique‘s father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. The recognition made in any of these documents is. the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the back of Municipal Form No. Daguimol. Second. a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. in itself. In summary. HELD: Yes. a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child‘s paternity. docketed as SCA Case No. CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S. 9255. private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith and it was approved 5. Paragraph 2. TOMAS AQUINO. the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. I HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO. 2005. on October 4. temporary custody should be granted to the father.T. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog. These circumstances indicating Dominique‘s paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that ―JENIE DELA CRUZ‖ is ―MY WIFE‖ as ―WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER‖ and ―NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER. inter alia. Provided. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS. hence. correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. I RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY. 1992. which provides: Article 176. unquestionably handwritten by Dominique. That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code.A. Ronald Paul S.A. The respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari asserting that temporary custody should be awarded to him because the child has lived with him all her life and ―It would certainly wreak havoc on the child‗s psychological make-up to give her to the custody of private respondent. Dominique died about two months prior to the child‘s birth. a motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to her. Rule 2 of A. . Article 176 of the Family Code. AS AMENDED BY R. or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument. 2002 FACTS: 1. or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Third. THEN WE BECAME GOOD COUPLES. x x x. 6. 2. On January 10. the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City. as amended by Republic Act (R. TEREZA RIZAL. No. A year after the birth of Gardin Faith. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR HOMETOWN.N. her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Court of Appeals 376 SCRA 523. which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof. TOMAS AQUINO. However. Gracia (respondent). and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. TERESA. 06-539. the denial of registration of the child‘s name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of the Family Code. 1989. AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. The trial court granted the motion and the case to determine custody of Gardin Faith is now pending. only to return her to petitioner should the latter prevail in the main case. RIZAL. Held: Petition granted. it did not ―unduly expand‖ the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners. 102 – Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity – or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father). no separate action for judicial approval is necessary. as amended. It is to petitioner minor child‘s best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate. Subjecting the child to emotional seesaw should be avoided‖ ISSUE: W. 7. merely articulated such requirement.A. TOMAS AQUINO. indeed. Series of 2004. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father (private respondent herein) and paternal grandparents.‖ In the eyes of society. Tonog vs.O. 1. THAT‘S ALL. illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register.2. petitioner left for the United States of America to work as a registered nurse 3. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A ―PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT‖ WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother. DULUMBAYAN. By letter dated November 11. February 7. as amended by R. MY FATHER‘S NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHER‘S NAME IS RAQUEL STO. petitioner Dinah B.AQUINO. Petitioner opposed. 1993. the relevant matters in the Autobiography. 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20 THIS COMING OCTOBER 31. Article 176 of the Family Code. denied Jenie‘s application for registration of the child‘s name. explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child‘s paternity must be signed by the putative father. (Underscoring supplied) Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS FATHER‘S SURNAME. 9255. 2005. First. 4.
Moreover. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings. what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. and his adopted twin daughters. As regards parental authority. being purely personal. whether father or mother. Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned. as an admitted illegitimate child ASis as an adopted child. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another. we rule only on questions of law. Is the compelling reason the fact that her mother is in the states? Is it the fact that the child is already staying at the father’s house and moving the child to and fro would cause the child distress? Are these reasons compelling enough for the court to award temporary custody to the father? I don’t know Are cases regarding temporary custody exceptions to Articles 176 and 213? I don’t know. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor.When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another. since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated. The best answer I could find is stated in the next paragraph saying that the SC cannot decide on questions of fact. It should be recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari. A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to imply a preference toward the father (herein private respondent) relative to the final custody of the minor. No. moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation. unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. to denigrate the important role fathers play in the upbringing of their children. Lazatin and was lated adopted by him. While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature.‖ COMMENT: The court never expounded on what these compelling reasons are. but a sum of duties. and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration. is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. . It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the children‗s physical preservation and development.Article 220 of the Family Code thus provides that parents and individuals exercising parental authority over their unemancipated children are entitled. among other rights. We are not in the best position to assess the parties‗ respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for custody. the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this decision OBITER: Parental Authority and its Renunciation Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter‗s needs. For reference. has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years. Gardin Faith. no complex of rights. that petitioner was an ―illegitimate son‖ of Dr. This is not intended. If she has erred. brother of the deceased Dr. a fortiori. such as a friend or godfather. no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor. guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution. Mariano Lazatin. . being purely personal. The right attached to parental authority. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor. however. unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. Article 213 of the Family Code provides that ―[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother. what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. guardianship and surrender to a children‗s home or an orphan institution. Likewise. The trial court is directed to immediately proceed with hearing Sp. temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father WHEREFORE. Lazatin v. we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Proc. on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin. it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of the child. and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment. the law still disallows the same. Mariano Lazatin. ―to keep them in their company. ―there is no power. Likewise. In the case at bar. respondents Nora and Irma menced an intestate proceeding the estate of Dr. Gardin Faith. This affidavit was later modified . But it still does not answer why custody was granted to the father.Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. Article 213 of the Family Code provides that ―[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother. such as a friend or godfather. for the present and until finally adjudged.‖ GR: Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. The right attached to parental authority. . Gardin Faith. the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of EXC: adoption. Nor should it be taken to mean as a statement against petitioner‗s fitness to have final custody of her said minor daughter. the law still disallows the same.In custody disputes. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest. Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. even in a document. and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor. pride. her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the custody over her person. as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. even in a document. It shall be only understood that. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for ―compelling reasons‖ for the good of the child. we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor. Meanwhile. but a task. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest. Campos 92 SCRA 250 FACTS: Margarita de Asis. as in cases of adultery. It is not so much the suffering. either parent. I also posted the full text of the case. And the determination of w/n the mother is a good mother is indeed a question of fact.
re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. Fajardo 169 SCRA 575 FACTS: minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. and Amelia Ramos. abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. After the paternal grandmother passed away. he had been supported by them until their death. Clara‖ when the deceased spouses refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife. the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption. that …. the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children. Carreon. 2006 (Special Proceedings – Adoption: Consent and Abandonment) Moreover. petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. natural children of Manuel Ramos. the former‘s brother. formerly he was known as ―Renato Lazatin‖ but was compelled to change his surname to ―Sta. that he had recognized the deceased spouses as his parents.on Aug. Indeed. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy. estate of Margarita. the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors. . (ADOPTION DEFINED PAGE 259!!!! Too long for me to reproduce) o Petitioner‗s flow of evidence in the case below doesn‗t lead us to any proof of judicial adoption. who are common-law husband and wife. Instead. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. 1975 to state that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano and Margarita. par (b) of RA 8552. provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child. To dispense with the requirements of consent. and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. law. o No proof of specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding initiated by the late spouses o No judicial records of adoption or copies Petitioner cannot properly intervene in the settlement of the estate as an adopted son because of lack of proof. which creates between 2 persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Cervantes v. a proceeding in rem. petitioner attempted to prove. 19. she voluntarily consented. Section 9. if known is necessary to the adoption. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died. Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee‘s biological mother. However. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. Held: No. the petitioners. at which hearings petitioner presented no decree of adoption hi his favor. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption. Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin. Republic GR No. In this case. 164948. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers. Landingin vs. the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption. June 27. (Page 257) Court barred the introduction of petitioner‗s evidence adoption A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia. over private respondents‗ objections. ISSUES: evidence HELD: o Adoption is a juridical act.
.Additional: (just copy-pasted. among others. this was granted and the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed his name to Jose Melvin Lahom. It was also months after the effectivity of the R. an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five–year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. 1972.Ratio: SC begins with a brief background on the law: welfare of the adopted started becoming of paramount concern creation of written instruments that would protect and safeguard the rights of the adopted children adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility and its underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child R. otherwise. decreed on May 5. 2003 Facts: Spouses Dr. . ‖ at the petitioner‗s residence on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her mother. No. 1999. adopter may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Art.R. being in the best interest of the child. 8552 secured these rights and privileges and affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child. a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised. 1999: Mrs. has the adopter‗s action prescribed? . Matters relating to adoption. except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted Lahom vs. Legal ground for the petition have been discovered and known to petitioner for more than 5 years. this is in relation to the prescription period ) Interestingly. are subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly.Issue: May the subject adoption. 8552 that Isabelita filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a “right. he even wanted to revoke the adoption but was only stopped by Isabelita Diosdado further desired to give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future.Held: The Petition was DISMISSED. her petition could no longer be pursued. Sibulo G. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption: Jose Melvin refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges. hence the action had already prescribed. It was only in 1971 that the spouses petitioned for adoption. 8552? In the affirmative. prior to the filing of the instant petition of December 1.A.oner spouses took care and custody of the child when she was barely 2 weeks old. treating him as if he were their own child. However. in utter disregard for the feelings of the spouses Before her husband died. Therefore. The new law also withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.‖ Respondent objects to motion RTC: dismissed the petition There is a lack of cause of action Said rights of petitioner to rescind should have been exercised within the period allowed by the Rules. 143989. July 14. there is an uncomfortable relationship between the two the only motive to respondent‗s adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of the spouses Lahom 1998: RA 8552 provided grounds committed by adopter for the rescission of adoption and also stated that ―Adoption. In 1972. still be revoked or rescinded by an adopted after the effectivity of R. including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree. shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter. of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom took in Isabelita‗s nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo since he was two years old. No.A. even before the passage of the statute. 919 of the Civil Code. they would get back their child.A.000.” the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. . It is a privilege that is governed by the state‟s determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. executed by respondent Gina oenrs over the child Cervantes demanding to be paid P150. Respondent failed to show concern for Petitioner and remained indifferent He does not act like a son. Gino brought the child to her house ISSUES: HELD: o Respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina his open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the minor that desireable atmosphere o Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with full knowledge and consent of respondents A decree of adoption has the effect. No. .
No.G. petitioner's son. de Leon. married to respondent Bernardo de Leon. Mariano M. Clara. respondent Irma L. Mariano Lazatin. respondent Bernardo de Leon. J. after having earlier filed a motion to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her pre-deceased husband as his admitted illegitimate [not natural] son). Margarita de Asis. she removed everything from the box. at which time it was found to be empty. One month after Mariano's death. Dr. leaving a & holographic will executed on May 29. BERNARDO DE LEON. respondents. RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA. Arturo E. He likewise prayed for the opening of the safety deposit box. Under the same date of November 22. filed a motion in the probate court. . in view of her mother's death and so. Five days after Margarita's death. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C. married to Francisco Veloso. however. and stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon. On November 22. Respondent Nora L. de Lazatin and to settle her estate as her adopted son. Respondent Nora L. son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. 1974. Days after having learned that respondent Nora L. his widow. Margarita de Asis. private respondents filed a petition to probate the will of the late Margarita de Asis. Ramon. de Leon had opened this safety deposit box." Respondent judge correctly ruled that he could not allow petitioner (who had filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings to probate the will of the late Margarita de Asis Vda. one Lily Lazatin also intervened. 1970. respondent Nora L. Proc. the widow.ñët On June 3. ARLENE DE LEON and IRMA L. Mariano M. claiming to be another admitted illegitimate (not natural) child. Upon the order of the probate court.. survived by his wife. (b) her adoption papers and those of her sister. to introduce evidence that he had "enjoyed . Clara. During her lifetime.R. 1974. the death of Margarita de Asis. Diokno Law Office private respondents the Leons. No. over the opposition of private respondents. the status of an adopted child of the without his first producing competent and documentary that there had been judicial proceedings for his by the said spouses which resulted in the final judgment of a competent court decreeing his adoption. de Leon to deliver the properties taken from the safety deposit box to the Clerk of Court. Lazatin with one Helen Munoz. Subsequently.. 2326. 2326-P. Subsequently. for a legacy of cash. Mariano. and (c) jewelry belonging to her and to her mother. believing that it was held jointly by her and her deceased mother. Balbastro for privates respondent Veloso. No. Lazatin (Sp. 1974. Roxas Boulevard branch. Proc. as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child. 1975. CAMPOS. Clara. On January 13. de Leon admitted that she opened the box but there was no will or any document resembling a will therein. 2326-P. because prior thereto respondent Nora L.. or seven months after. When she was to close the deposit box. Ramon Sta. Zshornack. the two cases (Sp. intervened. Virgilio and Yvonne. the safety deposit box was opened on November 6. docketed as Sp. jewelry. Jr. de Leon claims that she opened the safety deposit box in good faith. Margarita de Asis. L-43955-56 July 30. also died. and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. 1974.P). de Leon. filed a petition in the estate proceedings of Margarita de Asis to examine private respondents on the contents of the safety deposit box. opened the safety deposit box and removed its contents: (a) shares of stock. a granddaughter. TEEHANKEE. a son of her late sister. Whereupon. providing. among others. Oscar. petitioner's son. claiming that the deceased had executed a will subsequent to that submitted for probate and demanding its production. 1979 Two months after or on April 11. Proc. vs. the bank personnel informed her that she needed an authority from the court to do so. on January 31. VELOSO. before docketed as Sp. No. commenced an intestate proceeding before the Court of First Instance of Pasay. the probate court ordered respondent Nora L. Jose W. Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the People's Bank and Trust Company. which either she or respondent Nora L. claiming to be admitted illegitimate (not natural) children of Dr. Ernesto T. 1974. presided over by Judge Arsenio B. a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo. CLARA. No.:1äwphï1. for petitioner. 2341-P of respondent Court. and his adopted twin daughters. accompanied by her husband. Her sole reason for opening the box was to get her stock certificates and other small items deposited therein. Alcantara. Veloso. Proc. JR. respondent Nora L. Lazatin diamond intestate in Pasay City. and 2341-P. petitioner. NORA L. The Court dismisses the petition which seeks to overrule respondent judge's orders declaring that petitioner has failed to establish by competent evidence his alleged status as an adopted child of the deceased Lazatin spouses and prays for judgment of this Court "declaring as established the fact of (his) adoption as a son of the deceased spouses entitling him to succeed in their estates as such. de Leon had already removed its contents. DE LEON. 1974. petitioner intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of the late Dr. and respondent Irma Lazatin. de Leon could open.
1976. however. Manila. Sp. they transferred to the Mercy Hospital at Taft Avenue. de Leon and Bernardo de Leon to produce all those papers and items removed from the safety deposit box and to deliver the same to the custody of the court within one week. 2341-P. Campos. On March 4. Lazatin and his wife Margarita de Asis. 1976. petitioner invokes the sanction of Rule 29. e. Respondent court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate of Margarita de Asis. de Leon guilty of contempt of court for not complying with the orders of January 31. 2326-P. petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias Renato Sta.£îhqwâ£ On May 29. We find the ruling of the respondent court to be in conformity with law and jurisprudence. and taking into consideration the evidence heretofore presented by the petitioners. with notice to the parties. Photographs were also intended to be presented by petitioner. Lazatin and was later adopted by him. de Leon's refusal to comply with the orders of respondent court to deposit the items she had removed from the safety deposit box of Margarita de Asis. on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin. On September 29. photograph of Irma Veloso where she addressed herself as sister of petitioner. where they continuously resided up to the present. This affidavit was later modified on August 19. Clara through their counsel do not prove or have no tendency to prove the existence of any judicial proceeding where the adoption of the parties above named were taken up by any court. 1975. requiring her to produce and deliver to the court an the papers and items removed from the safety deposit box. An inventory was conducted by respondent court. Instead. he and his wife stayed at the residence of Engracio de Asis. 1975. in both cases. since according to him. and on March 26. de Leon deposited with respondent court the items she had removed from the safety deposit box. Within the period ordered. Section 3 of the Rules of Court. would not prove or tend to prove the fact of their adoption but rather of a recognized natural child. and Sp. photograph of deceased Margarita de Asis and petitioner when he was a boy. ruling on petitioners motion for definite resolution on his previous n declare as established the fact of adoption. Proc. any further introduction of similar evidence. favor. On June 3. sentenced to pay a fine of P00. father of Margarita. that he had recognized the deceased spouses as his parents. Clara" when the deceased spouses refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife.Margarita de Asis) were transferred to the sala of respondent Judge Jose C. Petitioner then filed on March 16. at which hearings petitioner presented no decree of adoption in his. Proc. No. Judge Campos found respondent' Nora L. No. 1975 and May 29. Respondent court first reserved its ruling on private respondents' objections to the admission of petitioner's evidence. a motion to declare as established the fact of adoption in view of respondent Nora L. respondent Nora L. formerly he was known as "Renato Lazatin" but was compelled to change his surname to "Sta. 2341-P. he had been supported by them until their death. document showing that petitioners real name is "Renato Lazatin. No. issued the f order: têñ. Proc. petitioner attempted to prove. Her former counsel was also found guilty of contempt. the order of the court for the production of the items in the safety deposit box can be considered as an order for production and inspection of documents under Rule 27." 1 Private respondents opposed the motion. On August 20.. 2341-P. The evidence. is not the legal basis for which Renato and Ramon seek to intervene in this proceedings. Nora L. All the evidence submitted by Renato and Ramon Sta. the petition at bar. 1976. Proc. Mariano M. Judge Campos issued an order requiring counsel for respondents Nora L. On April 26. . 1976. as an adopted child. In view thereof. Jr. on her testimony that she. Mariano M.£îhqwâ£ As far as the case of Renato Sta. As authority therefor. 1975. Neither do the evidence tend to establish the presence of any record of a proceeding in court where the adoption of the above named persons was held. when petitioner could not present evidence on the issue of his alleged legal adoption. but a few months later. Hence. 1975 to state that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano M.00 and suspended from appearing in the two cases (Sp. brother of the deceased Dr. The Court has ruled that he has failed to establish such status. not the items themselves. respondent court barred the introduction of petitioner's evidence because: têñ. that at first. Lazatin. Sp. owned by the deceased spouses. respondent court discontinued the hearing and gave the parties time to file memoranda on the question of the admissibility of the evidence sought to be introduced by petitioner. however. over private respondents' objections. 1976. respondent court denied petitioner's motion. Margarita de Asis). Clara filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis. but on November 14. No. 1975. Lazatin. documentary or oral. de Leon. respondent Nora L. 1975. tends to prove a status of a recognized natural child which. Clara is his Petition to establish his status as an adopted child.g. the petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr. The any motion for reconsideration unless based on some documentary proof. de Leon deposited with the Clerk of Court. but two keys to a new safety deposit box which could only be opened upon order of the court. and the items surrendered consisted only of pieces of jewelry and stock certificates. acted upon his advice. respondent court.
Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. but is wholly and entirely artificial. petitioner failed to establish the former existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent loss or destruction. Lazatin. the absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its non-existence. 17 As earlier pointed out. in proving an adoption. negatively reported "(T)hat among the salvaged records now available in this Office. that he intended to adopt a child as his heir. We can not pluck from his chain of evidence any link to the real existence of a court decree of adoption in his favor. the adoption is an absolute nullity. the clear right and duty of petitioner was to duly reconstitute the records as provided by law. clothed. the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out. execution. there is a better proof available and it should be produced. And of course. if indeed there was an order. Rule 99. there has not been found. 6 The fact of adoption is never presumed." The certification of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila "(T)hat our pre-war records relative to decisions of the Court of First Instance were either destroyed or burned during the Liberation of the City of Manila. We do not discount though that declarations in regard to pedigree. since the point in favor of receiving hearsay evidence upon matters of family history or pedigree is its reliability. as a member of his family. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it has first beer. at page 3 hereof) 2. Apparently on the assumption that the adoption was commenced in Manila. This is indispensable. before a declaration of a deceased person can be admitted to prove pedigree. educated. Petitioner's failure on this point is anotherer strong indication of the non-existence of the one who gave the written consent of the non-existence of the adoption paper. the records thereof should have existed and the same presented . Clara allegedly filed sometime in the years 1928 to 1931 by the spouses Dr. may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy. not his parent. it has been set forth as a condition upon which such evidence is received that it emanate from a source within the family. the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. petitioner does not even manifest. 10 Nor does the fact that the deceased spouses fed. Petitioner's flow of evidence in the case below does not lead us to any proof of judicial adoption. established that such adoption paper really existed and was lost. or ancestry. and that he had adopted him. and has been treated as a child to establish such adoption. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence. We also observed to the adoption (Section 3.1. after hearing." does not furnish any legal basis for a presumption of adoption in favor of petitioner. as provided by the statute. 3 Only an adoption made through the court. (Supra. But. Lazatin or others who have witnessed that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child. after a diligent search. or unable to testify. however. 15 Section 33 of Rule 130 states: "The act or declaration of a person deceased. not an adopted child which status of an admitted illegitimate child was — the very basis of his petitioner for intervention in the estate proceedings of the late Dr. is not sufficient to establish the fact of adoption. much less show. contents. although hearsay. or a branch thereof. recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child. Adoption is a juridical act. where. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court. otherwise. from infancy until he attained his majority. or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person. prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence. 18 Petitioner's supposed adoption was only testified to by him and is allegedly to be testified to a brother of the deceased Mariano M. under the provisions of the statute. If adoption was really made. 13 But. Mariano M. recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child. any record regarding the adoption of Mr. 5 To establish the relation. The whereabouts of the child's family and circulation of the jurisdiction in which they resided and investigation in those courts where adoption are usually granted would surely produce an adoption order. Petitioner merely proceeds from a nebulous assumption that he was judicially adopted between the years 1928 and 1932. petitioner's counsel secured a certification from the Court of first Instance of Manila which. whether the parents or orphanage. Petitioner's proofs do not show or tend to show that at one time or another a specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding initiated by the late spouses an order approving his adoption as a child of the latter. or outside of the Philippines. but must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. Moreover. as above stated. 16 The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case.. 8 3. if there was really such adoption. 7 Where. No judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof are presented or attempted to be presented. Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. Pursuant to this view. petitioner could have conveniently secured a copy of the newpaper publication of the adoption as required under Section 4. Lazatin and Margarita de Asis Lazatin. an adoption is effected by a court order.." 4. a judgment of approval was rendered by said court. a proceeding in rem 2 which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Rule 99 of the Rules of Court (formerly Section 4. made in his lifetime. the relationship of the declarant. 14 Besides. if the war. On the contrary. 11 Withal. are admitted on the principle that they are natural expressions of persons who must know the truth. There are no witnesses cited to that adoption proceeding or to the adoption decree. The destruction by fire of a public building in which the adoption papers would have been filed if existent does not give rise to a presumption of adoption nor is the destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to be presumed. necessarily establish adoption of the child. 12 Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best that the nature of the case admits and because greater evil might arise from the rejection of such proof than from its admission. must ordinarily be established by competent evidence. by either of blood or affinity to the family in question. and of the fact that the child resided with the deceased. and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such actor declaration . Rule 100) or a certification of the publishing house to that effect. By what particular court was the adoption decreed or by whom was the petition heard. loss. in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage. Rules of Court). does not appear on this point is not so difficult and such proof must be presented if only to prove the real existence of the adoption. the attempts of petitioner to prove his adoption by acts and declarations of the deceased do not discharge the mandatory presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. 4 It is not of natural law at all. 9 Even evidence of declaration of the deceased. The thrust of petitioner's evidence is rather to establish his status as an admitted illegitimate child. This is because there was no proof that petitioner was really adopted in Manila or that an adoption petition was filed in the Court of first Instance of Manila by the deceased spouses. the records of such court constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established. although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.
" 27 and that a party's recourse when proferred evidence is rejected by the trial court is to make a offer stating on . third. 1976. 2341-P) was as her adopted child on the basis of the affidavit of a brother of the deceased Dr. No. which as amended on July 21. the affected party will nevertheless be allowed to spread the excluded evidence on the record. As a necessary consequence. de Leon to produce the document of adoption. but are to be assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case. Proc. Lazatin' and Special Proceedings No." We cannot entertain the plea of petitioner that the sanction of Rule 29 should be applied to consider as established the fact of his adoption due to the refusal of respondent Nora L. petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. 5. 1976 and June 3. legitimated. 1976 a temporary restraining order. Benjamin Lazatin. August 10 and 12. and fourth. Lazatin (Sp. 24 On January 24. executed August 19. we hold that no grave abuse of The Court's resolution allowing the advance testimonies of petitioner's witnesses was but in application of the Court's long standing admonition to trial courts is reaffirmed in Lamagan vs. 23 To succeed. whether the will is probated or not. Mariano M. 1975 in the estate of Margarita de Asis. widow of the deceased Dr. 2341-P as an adopted child because of lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an estate proceeding.£îhqwâ£ Substantially. 1976 and no document of adoption in favor of petitioner was listed as found in the safety deposit box. but stated that affiant knew petitioner to be "an illegitimate son" of Dr. if that be the case. both brothers of the deceased Dr. 2326-P entitled 'Intestate Estate of the Late Mariano M. a child must be ligitimate. no rights are acquired by the child and neither the supposed adopting parent or adopted child could be bound thereby. the Court issued on June 16." The Court thereby permitted in effect the advance testimonies of petitioner's witnesses. Mariano L. No.a Margarita de Asis Vda. requiring the submission of evidence to establish heirship in Special Proceedings No. intervention should be denied as it would merely result in unnecessary complication. for review on appeal. principally among them Rafael Lazatin and Esteban L. because first. 1975. which failed to estate by "oversight" petitioner. 21 The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. the testimony of the above-named witnesses will be on the fact that they had been informed by the deceased spouses. Proc. 1976 denying petitioner's petition "to declare as established in this proceeding the fact of adoption" and denying "any motion for reconsideration unless based on some documentary proof. either as one who would be benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. by adoption unless the act of adoption has been done in strict accord with the statue. 1975 (which affidavit modified a first affidavit executed on May 31. there is no proof that such document of adoption is in the possession of respondent Nora L. the items deposited in the safety deposit box have already been surrendered by respondent Nora L." The Court finds no basis to grant the affirmative relief sought in this proceeding by petitioner for a rendition of judgment "declaring as established the fact of your petitioner's adoption as a son of the deceased spouses entitling him to succeed in their estates as such in accordance with the applicable law on succession as to his inheritance. adduced. 19 Assuming the mere fact that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child does not justify the conclusion that petitioner had been in fact judicially adopted by the spouses nor does it constitute admissible proof of adoption. 2326-P) as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child. March 26. 20 A child by adoption cannot inherit from the parent creditor. de Lazatin. Lazatin. acknowledged illegitimate natural child or natural child by legal fiction or recognized spurious child. 25 while his intervention on August 20. 26. 1976. Lazatin and as stated in petitioner's motion of January 11. Sp. 2341-P. 1977." With the Court's determination of the issues as herein set forth.m. Proc. In the face of the verified pleadings of record (constituting judicial admissions) which show that petitioner sought to intervene on November 22. Until this is done. entitled 'Testate Estate of the late Margarita de Asis Vda. de Leon. the Court upon petitioner's motion resolved to conditionally allow respondent judge "to take the deposition of petitioner's witnesses to perpetuate their testimonies pursuant to Rule 134. 1976 at 8:30 a. Upon the filing of the petition." The Court therein once again stressed the established rule that "it is beyond question that rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of the trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of separate appeal or review on certiorari.' and from proceeding with the probate of the alleged holographic will of the deceased Doñ. 1977: têñ. "to be liberal in accepting proferred evidence since even if they were to refuse to accept the evidence. He must prove compliance with the statutes relating to adoption in the jurisdiction where the adoption occurred. the motu proprio order of the court for Nora de Leon to produce the items retrieved from the safety deposit box cannot be treated as a mode of discovery of production and inspection of documents under Rule 27. 1976. De la Cruz.at the hearing or subsequent thereto or a reasonable explanation of loss or destruction thereof. second. Section 7 of the Rules of Court. subject to the Court's ruling in due course on the admissibility of such testimonies. de Lazatin scheduled on June 29. it is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate. discretion nor error of law as committed by respondent judge in issuing the questioned orders of March 4. 22 A fortiori if no hereditary interest in the estate can be gained by a claimant who failed to submit proof thereof. Clara cannot properly intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de Asis. there is no longer any need for restraining the proceedings below and the said restraining order shall be immediately lifted. No. restrained respondent judge "from proceeding with the hearing scheduled on June 17. Lazatin who later "legally adopted (him) as a son before the Court of First Instance of Manila sometime between the years 1928 and 1921") and prescinding from the question of whether a natural or spurious child may be legally adopted by the putative father. Mariano and Margarita Lazatin that your petitioner was their [Mariano's and Margarita's] judicially adopted son and to elicit further from them the fact that your petitioner enjoys the reputation of being their judicially adopted son in the Lazatin family. 1976 and on any other dates. Lazatin. Lazatin (Sp. de Leon on April 26. the fact or real existence of petitioner's adoption had not been established.. 1974 in the estate proceedings of his alleged adoptive father Dr. adopted.
effective immediately. his recourse in the event of an adverse ruling against him is to make a formal offer of proof and of his excluded evidence. SO ORDERED. the petition is dismissed and the questioned orders denying petitioner's petition below "to declare as established in this proceeding the fact of [his] adoption" are hereby affirmed. The temporary restraining order issued on June 16. as reserved to him by the court below. Without costs. .m child of Margarita de Asis (unless. de Lazatin.and whose intervention in the estate of the deceased Dr. ACCORDINGLY. Whatever be his theory and his course of action and whether or not he may be duly snowed to intervene in the proceedings below as such alleged admitted illegitimate child. oral and documentary. Mariano Lazatin is as an admitted illegitimate child. win have to decide whether he will pursue his first theory of having the of such admitted illegitimate child of said deceased. At the continuation of the proceedings below for declaration of heirship and for probate of the alleged holographic the deceased Margarita de Asis Vda. 1976 is ordered lifted. pet who has failed to establish his status as an alleged . 1976 and amended on July 21. he can show some documentary proof). and seek a reversal on an appeal in due course.the record what a party or witness would have testified to were his testimony not excluded. as well as to attach to the record any rejected exhibits.
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