G.R. No. 78909 June 30, 1989 MATERNITY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, represented by ANTERA L. DORADO, President, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND THE REGIONAL DlRECTOR OF LABOR, REGION X,respondents. MEDIALDEA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the Decision of the respondent Secretary of Labor dated September 24, 1986, affirming with modification the Order of respondent Regional Director of Labor, Region X, dated August 4, 1986, awarding salary differentials and emergency cost of living allowances (ECOLAS) to employees of petitioner, and the Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration dated May 13, 1987, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by the Board of Directors of the Cagayan de Oro Women's Club and Puericulture Center, headed by Mrs. Antera Dorado, as holdover President. The hospital derives its finances from the club itself as well as from paying patients, averaging 130 per month. It is also partly subsidized by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Cagayan De Oro City government. Petitioner has forty-one (41) employees. Aside from salary and living allowances, the employees are given food, but the amount spent therefor is deducted from their respective salaries (pp. 7778, Rollo). On May 23, 1986, ten (10) employees of the petitioner employed in different capacities/positions filed a complaint with the Office of the Regional Director of Labor and Employment, Region X, for underpayment of their salaries and ECOLAS, which was docketed as ROX Case No. CW-71-86. On June 16, 1986, the Regional Director directed two of his Labor Standard and Welfare Officers to inspect the records of the petitioner to ascertain the truth of the allegations in the complaints (p. 98, Rollo). Payrolls covering the periods of May, 1974, January, 1985, November, 1985 and May, 1986, were duly submitted for inspection. On July 17, 1986, the Labor Standard and Welfare Officers submitted their report confirming that there was underpayment of wages and ECOLAs of all the employees by the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, deficiency on wage and ecola as verified and confirmed per review of the respondent payrolls and interviews with the complainant workers and all other information gathered by the team, it is respectfully recommended to the Honorable Regional Director, this office, that Antera Dorado, President be ORDERED to pay the amount of SIX HUNDRED FIFTY FOUR THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY SIX & 01/100 (P654,756.01), representing underpayment of wages and ecola to the THIRTY SIX (36) employees of the said hospital as appearing in the attached Annex "F" worksheets and/or whatever action equitable under the premises. (p. 99, Rollo) Based on this inspection report and recommendation, the Regional Director issued an Order dated August 4, 1986, directing the payment of P723,888.58, representing underpayment of wages and ECOLAs to all the petitioner's employees, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Maternity and Children Hospital is hereby ordered to pay the above-listed complainants the total amount indicated opposite each name, thru this Office within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.

Thenceforth, the respondent hospital is also ordered to pay its employees/workers the prevailing statutory minimum wage and allowance. SO ORDERED. (p. 34, Rollo) Petitioner appealed from this Order to the Minister of Labor and Employment, Hon. Augusto S. Sanchez, who rendered a Decision on September 24, 1986, modifying the said Order in that deficiency wages and ECOLAs should be computed only from May 23, 1983 to May 23, 1986, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the August 29, 1986 order is hereby MODIFIED in that the deficiency wages and ECOLAs should only be computed from May 23, 1983 to May 23, 1986. The case is remanded to the Regional Director, Region X, for recomputation specifying the amounts due each the complainants under each of the applicable Presidential Decrees. (p. 40, Rollo) On October 24, 1986, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Secretary of Labor in his Order dated May 13, 1987, for lack of merit (p. 43 Rollo). The instant petition questions the all-embracing applicability of the award involving salary differentials and ECOLAS, in that it covers not only the hospital employees who signed the complaints, but also those (a) who are not signatories to the complaint, and (b) those who were no longer in the service of the hospital at the time the complaints were filed. Petitioner likewise maintains that the Order of the respondent Regional Director of Labor, as affirmed with modifications by respondent Secretary of Labor, does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which the award was based. In its "Rejoinder to Comment", petitioner further questions the authority of the Regional Director to award salary differentials and ECOLAs to private respondents, (relying on the case of Encarnacion vs. Baltazar, G.R. No. L-16883, March 27, 1961, 1 SCRA 860, as authority for raising the additional issue of lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings, p. 52, Rollo), alleging that the original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims is properly lodged in the Labor Arbiter, based on Article 217, paragraph 3 of the Labor Code. ISSUE: The primary issue here is whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case and if so, the extent of coverage of any award that should be forthcoming, arising from his visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128 of the Labor Code. The matter of whether or not the decision states clearly and distinctly statement of facts as well as the law upon which it is based, becomes relevant after the issue on jurisdiction has been resolved. HELD: This is a labor standards case, and is governed by Art. 128-b of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. No. 111. Labor standards refer to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules, and regulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary and welfare benefits, including occupational, safety, and health standards (Section 7, Rule I, Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Office, dated September 16, 1987). 1 Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises bothvisitorial and enforcement power over labor standards cases, and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money claims, provided there still exists an employer-employee relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not contested by the employer concerned. Prior to the promulgation of E.O. No. 111 on December 24, 1986, the Regional Director's authority over money claims was unclear. The complaint in the present case was filed on May 23, 1986 when

E.O. No. 111 was not yet in effect, and the prevailing view was that stated in the case of Antonio Ong, Sr. vs. Henry M. Parel, et al., G.R. No. 76710, dated December 21, 1987, thus: . . . the Regional Director, in the exercise of his visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128 of the Labor Code, has no authority to award money claims, properly falling within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. . . . . . . If the inspection results in a finding that the employer has violated certain labor standard laws, then the regional director must order the necessary rectifications. However, this does not include adjudication of money claims, clearly within the ambit of the labor arbiter's authority under Article 217 of the Code. The Ong case relied on the ruling laid down in Zambales Base Metals Inc. vs. The Minister of Labor, et al., (G.R. Nos. 73184-88, November 26, 1986, 146 SCRA 50) that the "Regional Director was not empowered to share in the original and exclusive jurisdiction conferred on Labor Arbiters by Article 217." We believe, however, that even in the absence of E. O. No. 111, Regional Directors already had enforcement powers over money claims, effective under P.D. No. 850, issued on December 16, 1975, which transferred labor standards cases from the arbitration system to the enforcement system. To clarify matters, it is necessary to enumerate a series of rules and provisions of law on the disposition of labor standards cases. Prior to the promulgation of PD 850, labor standards cases were an exclusive function of labor arbiters, under Article 216 of the then Labor Code (PD No. 442, as amended by PD 570-a), which read in part: Art. 216. Jurisdiction of the Commission. — The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the Labor Arbiters and compulsory arbitrators. The Labor Arbiters shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers whether agricultural or non-agricultural. xxx xxx xxx (c) All money claims of workers, involving non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay, maternity leave and other money claims arising from employeeemployer relations, except claims for workmen's compensation, social security and medicare benefits; (d) Violations of labor standard laws; xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied) The Regional Director exercised visitorial rights only under then Article 127 of the Code as follows: ART. 127. Visitorial Powers. — The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives, including, but not restricted, to the labor inspectorate, shall have access to employers' records and premises at any time of the day or night whenever work is being undertaken therein, and the right to copy therefrom, to question any

employee and investigate any fact, condition or matter which may be necessary to determine violations or in aid in the enforcement of this Title and of any Wage Order or regulation issued pursuant to this Code. With the promulgation of PD 850, Regional Directors were given enforcement powers, in addition to visitorial powers. Article 127, as amended, provided in part: SEC. 10. Article 127 of the Code is hereby amended to read as follows: Art. 127. Visitorial and enforcement powers. — xxx xxx xxx (b) The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of this Code based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their order. xxx xxx xxx

National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 125 (1988) -- The civil service does not include Government owned or controlledcorporations (GOCC) which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.F: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She claims she was illegally dismissed. NLRC ruled orderingher reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. NASECO as a government corporation byvirtue of its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is wholly owned by the Phil. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms andconditions of employment of its em¬ployees are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing v Juco. ISSUE: W/N employees of NASECO, a GOCC without original charter, are governed by the Civil Service Law. HELD: NO. The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retro¬active effect, that is to cases that arose before its promulga¬tion of Jan 17, 1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1973 Constibut prior to the ruling in NHC v Juco, this court recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms andconditions of employment in GOCC's, among them NASECO.In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Consti starkly differs from the 1973 consti where NHC v Juco wasbased. It provides that the "civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,including government owned or controlled corporation with origi¬nal charter." Therefore by clear implication, the civil service doesnot include GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law

G.R. No. L-68147 June 30, 1988

Failure and refusal to pay UNION dues and other assessments. Petitioners herein were among the members of the respondent union who were expelled by the latter for disloyaltyin that they allegedly joined the NAFLU — a large federation. petitioners. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. J. Provided. vs. the COMPANY. 64). on the basis of a board resolution of the UNION. PONCIANO FERNANDEZ. AMANCIA GAY. however. within 30 days after becoming regular join the UNION and continue to be a member in good standing thereof as a condition of continued employment in the COMPANY. and officers free from any and all claims and liabilities. (Rollo. pending such proceedings. On the basis of a board resolution of the UNION. shall suspend the member concerned. PARAS. Any employee hired during the effectivity of this agreement shall.AMADA RANCE.. Disloyalty to the UNION. 2. Commission of acts inimical to the interest of the UNION. that in case expulsion proceedings are instituted against any member of the UNION. VIRGINIA MALLARI. its executive. ESTER FELONGCO. 4. respondents. MELBA GUTIERREZ. CATALINO ARAGONES. ET AL. MERCEDES LACUESTA. shall during the term thereof or any extention. AND ANTONIO ANTIQUERA. continue to be a member in good standing of the UNION as a condition of continued employment in the COMPANY. 3.: A review of the records shows that a Collective Bargaining Agreement was entered into on April 30. POLYBAG MANUFACTURING CORPORATION. owners. EDUARDO MENDOZA. and provided further. shall hold and render the COMPANY. Organizing and/or joining another labor organization claiming jurisdiction similar to that of the UNION. POLYBAG WORKERS UNION. petitioners were dismissed by respondent Corporation. CONSOLACION DE LA ROSA. ROMAS VILLAMIN. Conviction for any offense or crime. that the UNION. JOHNNY LEE. p. jointly and severally with the officers and members of the board voting for the dismissal or suspension. Petitioners sued for reinstatement and . the COMPANY shall dismiss from the service any member of the UNION who loses his membership in good standing either by resignation therefrom or expulsion therefrom for any of the following causes: 1. or 5. 1981 by and between respondents Polybag Manufacturing Corporation and Polybag Workers Union which provides among others: ARTICLE V UNION SECURITY Any employee within the bargaining agreement who is a member of the union at the time of the effectivity of this agreement or becomes a member of the UNION thereafter. Because of the expulsion.

151). Under the circumutances. because they did not in fact affiliate themselves with another Union. petitioners cannot be blamed for seeking help wherever it could be found. Petitioners claim that the NLRC erred in ruling that the expulsion proceeding conducted by the Union was in accordance with its by-laws. some were laid-off as early as March 22.00 weekly. At most it was an act of self-preservation of workers who. driven to desperation found shelter in the NAFLU who took the cudgels for them. The proper remedy would be to drop the union as party to the action and place the names of the employees instead (Lakas v. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found the Collective Bargaining Agreement and the "Union Security Clause" valid and considered the termination of the petitioners justified thereunder. Marcelo Enterprises. p. 118 SCRA 422 [1982]) as what appears to have been done in this case before the Court. The laid-off employees did not receive any separation pay because as alleged by respondent company their dismissal was due to serious business reverses suffered by it. 216). Rollo. 84. the mere act of seeking help from the NAFLU cannot constitute disloyalty as contemplated in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. 46). 1982 (Rollo. was a 1/2 sack of rice monthly and P 50. which explains the lack of positive action on the part of the latter to help or even sympathize with the plight of the members. another labor union claiming jurisdiction similar to the former. Among the disputed portions of the NLRC decision is its finding that it has been substantially proven that the petitioners committed acts of disloyalty to their union as a consequence of the filing by NAFLU for and in their behalf of the complaint in question (Rollo. fell on deaf ears. 323). Their union leaders continued working and were not among those laid-off. On the contrary. it would have been pointless because NAFLU cannot file an action for members of another union. Respondent Polybag Workers Union as already stated expelled 125 members on the ground of disloyalty and acts inimical to the interests of the Union (Resolution No. It will be recalled that 460 employees were temporarily laid off. Most of the employees did not avail themselves of the aid as those who did were allegedly made to sign blank papers. Placed in proper perspective. pp. In fact even assuming that petitioners did authorize NAFLU to file the action for them. they claim that there is a connivance between respondents Company and Union in their illegal dismissal in order to avoid the payment of separation pay by respondent company. 6-4275-82 for them is borne out by the records which show that they did not sign the complaint. p. All they could offer was a statement "marunong pa kayo sa may-ari ng kumpanya" ("you know more than the company owners") (Rollo. p. The only aid offered by the company which was offered when the disgruntled employees began to discuss among themselves their plight. Significantly. Respondent Union had notified and summoned herein petitioners . 80). petitioners complained that their pleas for their union officers to fight for their right to reinstatement. 45-46). series of 1982. neither did they sign any document of membership application with NAFLU (Rollo. To aggravate matters. Petitioners' contention that they did not authorize NAFLU to file NLRC-AB Case No. the NAFLU. while still members of respondent union (Rollo. 1982 although the actual official announcement and notice of the intended shutdown was made only on May 27. p. Petitioners insist that their expulsion from the Union and consequent dismissal from employment have no basis whether factual or legal. none of private respondents was able to present any evidence to the contrary except for one employee who admitted having authorized NAFLU to file the complaint but only for the purpose of questioning the funds of the Union (Rollo. 16) based on the findings and recommendations of the panel of investigators.backwages stating their dismissal was without due process. they elevated their cause to the Supreme Court. for having committed an act of disloyalty to the Polybag Workers Union by having affiliated with and having joined the NAFLU. p. p. Losing both in the decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

copies of the minutes of the investigation proceedings of each individual member. In any event. s. it is obvious. It is the policy of the state to assure the right of workers to "security of tenure" (Article XIII. together with a consolidated list of Union members found guilty as charged and recommended for expulsion as members of the respondent Union. 83. Court of Industrial Relations. According to the minutes of the special meeting of the Board of Directors of respondent Union held on September 14. there is no basis for respondent Union's accusations.. 280. 116 SCRA 459 [1982] citing Kapisanan ng Mga Manggagawa sa MRR v. This fact was not disproved by private respondents who were able to present only a sample copy of proof of service. or constitutional right must be safeguarded against at all times. 109 SCRA 489 [1981] and a clear denial of due process. that in the absence of any full blown investigation of the expelled members of the Union by an impartial body. 100 SCRA 691 [1980]). Article 280 of the Labor Code has construed security of tenure as meaning that "the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by" the code (Bundoc v. 6-4275-82 appeared in the supposed investigation proceedings to answer the charge of disloyalty against them. p. All told. 3 of the New Constitution. and. The Board of Directors of respondent union would have acted as prosecutor. Annex "14" (Rollo. even if petitioners who were complainants in NLRC-AB Case No. 1982. p. those who came were not only threatened with persecution but also made to write the answers to questions as dictated to them by the Union and company representatives. 235). Rafael Hernandez. The proceeding would have been a farce under the circumstances (Lit Employees Association v. 203. This is especially true in the case at bar where there were 125 workers mostly heads or sole breadwinners of their respective families. People's Bank and Trust Company. p. Ponciano Fernandez. Again. (De Leon v. and two (2) members of the Board. 1982 was composed of the Chairman of the Board. National Labor Relations Commission. Ponciano Fernandez. Philippine Duplicators. Inc. that only two (2) of the expelled petitioners appeared before the investigation panel (Rollo. there was no impartial tribunal or union body vested with authority to conduct the disciplinary proceeding under the union constitution and by-laws. 307). The Board members examined the minutes and the list (Rollo. 20 SCRA 109). p. 84. The guarantee is an act of social justice. 219). nor timely notices of the hearings on the same (Rollo. that complainants were not furnished notice of the charge against them. Article II of the 1973 Constitution). his job may possibly be his only possession or means of livelihood. Petitioners contend that the requisites of due process were not complied with in that. 48). in the special meeting of the members of the Board of Directors as convened by the Union President on August 16. 215). these allegations were not denied by private respondents. 213). It is to be noted. Sec. It is the same Board that expelled its 125 members in its Resolution No. . p. The filing of the charge of disloyalty against petitioners was instigated by the Chairman of the Board of Directors and Acting Union President. They alleged that most of them did not receive the notice of summons from respondent Union because they were in the provinces. 103 SCRA 599 [1981]). however. 219). 214). s. he should be protected against any arbitrary deprivation of his job.to appear and explain why they should not be expelled from the union for having joined and affiliated with NAFLU. it could not have altered the fact that the proceedings were violative of the elementary rule of justice and fair play. p. Dismissal is not justified for being arbitrary where the workers were denied due process (Reyes v. pp. The Panel of Investigators created under the Board's Resolution No. Therefore. of 1982 (Rollo. Petitioners further claim that they had no Idea that they were charged with disloyalty. When a person has no property. Most of the petitioners boycotted the investigation proceedings. 1982 (Rollo. Section 9. These untoward incidents prompted petitioners to request for a general investigation with all the petitioners present but their request was ignored by the panel of investigators (Rollo. pp. investigator and judge at the same time. Samson Yap and Carmen Garcia (Rollo. the Chairman of the Board of Directors showed the members of the board.

G. respondent corporation and respondent union are solidarily ordered to pay. 90 SCRA 393 [1979]. No. as in the instant case. without any reduction or qualification..Time and again. seniority and salary. and (2) respondent corporation is ordered: (1) to reinstate petitioners to their former positions without reduction in rank. It is evident that private respondents were in bad faith in dismissing petitioners.00 each. SO ORDERED. therefore. and (c) to pay petitioners exemplary damages of P500.R. Inc. this Court has reminded employers that while the power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer. jointly and solidarily with respondent Union. 70615 October 28. (1) the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC-NCR-11-6881-82 dated April 26. Employers should. the private respondents. are guilty of unfair labor practice. the scandalous haste with which respondent corporation dismissed 125 employees lends credence to the claim that there was connivance between respondent corporation and respondent Union. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. Where reinstatement is no longer feasible. 1986 . Liberty Cotton Mills. In the case at bar. the same is not without limitations. respect and protect the rights of their employees. The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of his employees especially so when it is made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. 1984 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. which include the right to labor (Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. considering their length of service their corresponding separation pay and other benefits to which they are entitled under the law. PREMISES CONSIDERED. Due process must be observed in dismissing an employee because it affects not only his position but also his means of livelihood. They. Resolution). (b) to pay petitioners three-year backwages.

On July 5. otherwise.VIRGILIO vs. Upon approval on June 26. Respondent Carnation was therefore ordered to reinstate Virgilio Callanta to his former position with backwages of one [1] year without qualification including all fringe benefits provided for by law and company policy.: The issue raised in this petition for certiorari is whether or not an action for illegal dismissal prescribes in three [3] years pursuant to Articles 291 and 292 of the Labor Code which provide: Art. and damages against respondent Carnation. they shall be forever barred. petitioner Virgilio Callanta's employment with Carnation was terminated effective June 1. Virgilio Callanta filed with the MOLE.00. 1979 by MOLE Regional Director Felizardo G. Inc. Offenses. 1979. respondents. backwages. of said clearance application. 292. [Carnation. J. Danilo L.— Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three [3] years. Regional Office No. INC. 1982. Thus: . Baterbonia. respondent Carnation appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC] which in a decision dated February 25. an application for clearance to terminate the employment of Virgilio Callanta on the alleged grounds of serious misconduct and misappropriation of company funds amounting to P12.. respondent Carnation filed with the Regional Office No. for brevity] in January 1974 as a salesman in the Agusan del Sur area.000. Five [51 years later or on June 1. 1 set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter. xxx xxx xxx Art. X of the Ministry of Labor and Employment [MOLE]. CALLANTA. Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos rendered a decision finding the termination of Callanta's employment to be without valid cause. CARNATION PHILIPPINES. 1983. xxx xxx xxx Petitioner Virgilio Callanta was employed by private respondent Carnation Philippines. Pilapil for petitioner. respondent Carnation put in issue the timeliness of petitioner's complaint alleging that the same is barred by prescription for having been filed more than three [3] years after the date of Callanta's dismissal. 1983. petitioner. 1982. On April 18. more or less. It declared the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Virgilio Callanta to have already prescribed. Money Claims. — All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three [3] years from the time the cause of action accrued. On March 24. and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION FERNAN. In its position paper dated October 5. within ten [10] days from receipt of the decision. 1979. 1985. [NLRC]. a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for reinstatement. X. 291. It was likewise provided that failure on the part of respondent to comply with the decision shall entitle complainant to full backwages and all fringe benefits without loss of seniority rights.

there is no need to discuss the other issues raised in the appeal. SO ORDERED. the applicable law. Petitioner further claims that an action for illegal dismissal is a more serious violation of the rights of an employee as it deprives him of his means of livelihood. is Article 1146 of the New Civil Code which provides a four [4]-year prescriptive period for an action predicated upon "an injury to the rights of the plaintiff" considering that an action for illegal dismissal is neither a "penal offense" nor a mere "money claim. one who is truly aggrieved would immediately seek the redress of his grievance. and that on 5 July 1982. the dismissal without just cause of an employee from his employment constitutes a violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. 1979.e. that while it is admittedly a more serious offense as it involves an employee's means of livelihood. Such violation. this petition. — All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three [3] years from the time the cause of action accrued. on the other hand. 1982. 1979. thus. "Unlawful Dismissal" and "Backwages. was filed beyond the three-year prescriptive period as provided under Articles 291 and 292 of the Labor Code. an offense is an illegal act which does not amount to a crime as defined in the penal law. Money claims. hence. therefore. that assuming arguendo that the law does not provide for a prescriptive period for the enforcement of petitioner's right. 1985. The provisions of the Labor Code applicable are: Art. but which by statute carries . as naturally. it is nevertheless beyond dispute that the said right has already lapsed into a stale demand. by way of supplement. 291. With this finding. so that petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal filed on July 5. Obviously. counters with the arguments that a case for illegal dismissal falls under the general category of "offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations pursuant thereto" provided under Article 291 or a money claim under Article 292. does not amount to an "offense" as understood under Article 291 of the Labor Code. which We gave due course in the resolution dated September 18." as contemplated under Articles 291 and 292. barred by prescription. etc. i. dismissing the complaint. etc. Art. Verily. — Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three [3] years. We find for petitioner. they shall be forever barred. the complaint therefore having been filed beyond the three-year period from accrual date. one [1] month and five [5] days after his alleged dismissal on June 1. of the Labor Code. In its broad sense." Public respondent. WHEREFORE. or three [3] years. the causes of action. 292. 2 Petitioner contends that since the Labor Code is silent as to the prescriptive period of an action for illegal dismissal with claims for reinstatement. respectively." have already prescribed. Hence. Offenses. the Decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and another one entered. it should correspondingly have a prescriptive period longer than the three 13] years provided for in "money claims. private respondent was justified in terminating the employment. backwages and damages. in view of the foregoing. there is no logic in assuming that it has a longer prescriptive period. and that considering the seriousness of the act committed by petitioner. he filed the instant complaint against respondent for: Unlawful Dismissal with Backwages.. however.Records show that Virgilio Callanta was dismissed from his employment with respondent company effective June 1. otherwise.

an other cases of injury to rights of a workingman being governed by the Civil Code. is in the nature of a command upon the employer to make public reparation for his violation of the Labor Code. 7 The case of Valencia vs. which according to public respondent. sustained the sand of the Solicitor General that the period of prescription mentioned under Article 281. applies by way of supplement. it is not the principal cause of action in an illegal dismissal case but the unlawful deprivation of the one's employment committed by the employer in violation of the right of an employee. which the Code itself declares to be unlawful. . with or without backwages.000. 6 even though the practical effect is the enrichment of the individual. The award thereof is not private compensation or damages 5but is in furtherance and effectuation of the public objectives of the Labor Code. by reason of its practical effect. 1146. this Court. of the Labor Code. therefore. [1] Upon an injury to the lights of the plaintiff. It is true that the "backwwages" sought by an illegally dismissed employee may be considered. who sought reinstatement. no penalty of fine nor improsonment is imposed on the employer upon a finding of illegality in the dismissal. or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. backwages may be awarded without ordering reinstatement . the two are not necessarily complements. nor is the award of one a condition precedent to an award of the other.. 249 and 250 and illegal recruitment activities under Article 38. in proper cases. Fernando. had four [4] years within which to file her complaint for the injury to her rights as provided under Article 1146 of the Civil Code. now Article 292.with it a penalty similar to those imposed by law for the punishment of a crime. By the very nature of the reliefs sought. the award of backwages is not inredness of a private right. an action for illegal dismissal cannot be generally categorized as an "offense" as used under Article 291 of the Labor Code. otherwise. as a "money claim.. however that unlike in cases of commission of any of the probihited activities during strikes or lockouts under Article 265. Backwages is merely one of the reliefs which an illegally dismissed employee prays the labor arbiter and the NLRC to render in his favor as a consequence of the unlawful act committed by the employer. The following actions must be instituted within four years. is applicable in the instant case insofar as it concerns the issue of prescription of actions. but. While ordinarily. a 1959 case cited by petitioner. As an affirmative relief. merit in the contention of petitioner that the four [4]-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code. and must be brought within four [4] years. 4 And. any violation of the provisions of this code declared to be unlawful or penal in nature shall be punished with a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos [P1. Cebu Portland Cement.00] nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos [10. rather. this Court ruled that petitioner Marciana Santos. 3 It is in this sense that a general penalty clause is provided under Article 289 of the Labor Code which provides that ".. reinstatement may be ordered. in case there is bad faith in his dismissal. this Court had occasion to hold that an action for damages involving a plaintiff seperated from his employment for alleged unjustifiable causes is one for " injury to the rights of the plaintiff. in the instant case.000. It must be noted. In said case. unfair labor practices under Article 248. Besides. backwages and damages." [Emphasis supplied. the same is forever barred." However. 96 SCRA 448 [1980]." Accordingly. et al. if any. In either case. or imprisonment of not less than three [3] months nor more than three [3] years. 106 Phil. among others. must be brought within the period of three[3] years from the time the cause of action accrued. 732.] The confusion arises over the use of the term "illegal dismissal" which creates the impression that termination of an employment without just cause constitutes an offense. thru then Chief Justice Enrique M. Court of Appeals. to wit: Art.00]. the reliefs principally sought by an employee who was illegally dismissed from his employment are reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges. reinstatement is a concomitant of backwages. refers to and "is limited to money claims. 8 In Santos vs. Indeed there is. termination of an employment without just or valid cause is not categorized as an unlawful practice.

People's Bank and Trust Co. or three [3] years. to resolve once and for all the issue of the legality of the dismissal. In the instant case. Labor Code. As a statutory provision on limitations of actions. After the case had remained pending for five [5] years. where the delay in filing the case was with justifiable cause. MOLE on July 5. that right may be enforced by some other available remedy which is not barred. a statute of limitation extinguishes the remedy only. his job may possibly be his only possession or means of livelihood. still. under the attendant circumstances.. E. 15 Absent such an impartial investigation. 11 The right is considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process of law. It did not resolve the case of illegal dismissal on the merits. 1982. in fact.L. 1981." and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. 12 Clearly then. The misery and pain attendant on the loss of jobs thus could be avoided if there be acceptance of the view that under all the circumstances of this case. B. the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. Outright dismissal was too severe a penalty for a first offense. Goodrich Philippines. 1982. an action predicated "upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff. said the Court in Almira vs. the action for illegal dismissal was filed by petitioners on July 5. Branch V finally dismissed the same provisionally in . which must be brought within four [4] years. the delayed filing of the action for illegal dismissal with the Regional Office No. in the instant case. who has continuously served respondent Carnation for five [5] years was. 9 when a person has no property. Although the remedy to enforce a right may be barred. trade or calling is a "property right. justifies. it is deemed waived as it was never alleged before the Labor Arbiter nor the NLRC. Corsino. Public respondent dismissed the action for illegal dismissal on the sole issue of prescription of actions. in accordance with respondent's accounting and auditing policies. X. petitioners should not be deprived of their means of livelihood. or two [2] years after his questioned dismissal. a strict application of said provisions will not destroy the enforcement of fundamental rights of the employees. Even on the assumption that an action for illegal dismissal falls under the category of "offenses" or "money claims" under Articles 291 and 292. arbitrarily dismissed from his employment.L. he should be protected against any arbitrary and unjust deprivation of his job. 14 More so. 1979 which is well within the four [4]-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code. Articles 291 and 292 go to matters of remedy and not to the destruction of fundamental rights. in essence. hence. considering that the alleged shortage was explained to respondent's Auditor. 13 As a general rule. Besides. Unemployment. which private respondent did after all on June 22. 1981. The indecent haste of his dismissal from employment was. undoubtedly.F. respondent's auditor. profession. 10 brings "untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on the wage earners. Laches will not in that sense strengthen the cause of public respondent. one [1] month and five [5] days after the alleged effectivity date of his dismissal on June 1." as contemplated under Art. which provide for a three-year prescriptive period.xxx xxx xxx [Emphasis supplied] As this Court stated in Bondoc us. when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood. is well-recognized in this jurisdiction that one's employment." It is a principle in American jurisprudence which. 1146 of the New Civil Code. We find that petitioner. the action instituted to contest the legality of one's dismissal from employment constitutes. The alleged shortage in his accountabilities should have been impartially investigated with all due regard for due process in view of the admitted enmity between petitioner and E. The threat to petitioner that he would be charged with estafa if he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Corsino. the alleged shortage should not have been attended with such a drastic consequence as termination of the employment relationship. Nonetheless. aggravated by the filing of the estafa charge against petitioner with the City Fiscal of Butuan City on June 22.

144664 March 15. respondents. 17 For. 1993. Inc.R. and DIRECTOR CHITA G. FILIPRO.'s taking over the business of Carnation. 1998. and then hide behind the pretext of loss of confidence which can be proved by mere preponderance of evidence. respondent Carnation Philippines. loss of trust and confidence arising from the same alleged misconduct is sufficient ground for dismissing an employee from his employment despite the dismissal of the criminal case. 21 WHEREFORE. G.an order dated February 21. COURT OF APPEALS. J. which bulletin the DOLE reproduced on January 23. HON. 1998 Decision3 of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators ruling that the said explanatory bulletin . 2) the July 31. Besides. has legally rendered the order of reinstatement difficult to enforce. which petitioner mentioned in his motion for early decision dated January 6. BACUNGAN as Voluntary Arbitrator. 16 However. LALWANI. Asian Transmission Corporation. vs. DECISION CARPIO-MORALES. Union representative to the Panel Arbitrators. 1986 18 that is. a supervening event. 20 In any case. Although We are strongly inclined to affirm that part of the decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering the reinstatement of petitioner to his former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges. HON. who can stop the employer from filing all the charges in the books for the simple exercise of it. Admittedly. The Hon. No. This decision is immediately executory. 2004 ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION. Araw ng Kagitingan and Good Friday". 2000 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals denying its petition to annul 1) the March 11. KISHIN A. petitioner. is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Virgilio Callanta backwages for three [3] years without qualification and deduction. CILINDRO in her capacity as Director of Bureau of Working Conditions. 1993 "Explanatory Bulletin" 2 of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) entitled "Workers’ Entitlement to Holiday Pay on April 9. Union. FROILAN M. seeks via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1995 Rules of Civil Procedure the nullification of the March 28. Inc. Thirteenth Division. 1986 for failure of the prosecution's principal witness to appear in court. FILIPRO. the very concept of social justice dictates that petitioner shall be entitled to backwages of three [3] years. it must not be indiscriminately used as a shield to dismiss an employee arbitrarily. LAGUESMA in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment. there is no law requiring that the purchasing corporation should absorb the employees of the selling corporation. Inc. No costs. unless there is an express agreement on assumption of liabilities 19 by the purchasing corporation.: Petitioner. BIENVENIDO T. BISIG NG ASIAN TRANSMISSION LABOR UNION (BATLU). We grant the petition and the decision of the NLRC is hereby reversed and set aside.

1998. 1998. (b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate. 1993. 94. which was amended by Executive Order No. Said bulletin was reproduced on January 23. 1998. "holiday" includes: New Year’s Day.. namely. issued an Explanatory Bulletin dated March 11. two regular holidays falling on the same day. The following facts. this Department is of the view that the covered employees are entitled to at least two hundred percent (200%) of their basic wage even if said holiday is unworked. the first of May. 203 issued on June 30. such that the regular holidays are now: 1. Trajano. when April 9. the twelfth of June. Araw ng Kagitingan April 9 (Bataan and Corregidor Day) . i. 1993 which apart from being Good Friday is alsoAraw ng Kagitingan. The bulletin reads: "On the correct payment of holiday compensation on April 9. that employees are entitled to 200% of their basic wage on April 9. through Undersecretary Cresenciano B. In accordance with Step 6 of the grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) existing between petitioner and BATLU. the fourth of July. Maundy Thursday Movable Date 3. the thirtieth of November. Araw ng Kagitignan and Maundy Thursday." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Subject of interpretation in the case at bar is Article 94 of the Labor Code which reads: ART. The first 100% represents the payment of holiday pay on April 9. Right to holiday pay. Good Friday Movable Date 4. Respondent Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU) protested. 1993 wherein it clarified. a legal holiday]. Maundy Thursday. 1993 as Good Friday and the second 100% is the payment of holiday pay for the same date as Araw ng Kagitingan.the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision directing petitioner to pay its covered employees "200% and not just 100% of their regular daily wages for the unworked April 9. which[. . the twenty-fifth and thirtieth of December and the day designated by law for holding a general election. as found by the Court of Appeals. 1998 which covers two regular holidays. Good Friday. petitioner [Asian Transmission Corporation] opted to pay its daily paid employees only 100% of their basic pay on April 9. is also Araw ng Kagitingan [which is also a legal holiday]. New Year’s Day January 1 2. and 3) the September 18.e. whether unworked. therefore. 1998 4 Resolution of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitration denying its Motion for Reconsideration.(a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays.applied as well to April 9. x x x x On July 31. are undisputed: The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). the controversy was submitted for voluntary arbitration.] apart from being Good Friday [and. the ninth of April. 1998. and (c) As used in this Article. inter alia. 1998 was both Maundy Thursday and Araw ng Kagitingan x x x x Despite the explanatory bulletin. except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers. 1987.

Independence Day June 12 7. Labor Day May 1 6." In the assailed decision. on whatever date they may fall in any calendar year. holding that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner and BATLU. National Heroes Day Last Sunday of August 8."5 The Court of Appeals further held that "in the absence of an explicit provision in law which provides for [a] reduction of holiday pay if two holidays happen to fall on the same day. clearly recognizes their intent to consider Araw ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday. like on April 9. as paid legal holidays during the effectivity of the CBA and that "[t]here is no condition. the Voluntary Arbitrator held that Article 94 of the Labor Code provides for holiday pay for every regular holiday. and that that the law. any doubt in the interpretation and implementation of the Labor Code provisions on holiday pay must be resolved in favor of labor. Rizal Day December 30 In deciding in favor of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU). QUASI-JUDICIAL." By the present petition. petitioners raise the following issues: I WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETING THE TERMS OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND SUBSTITUTING ITS OWN JUDGMENT IN PLACE OF THE AGREEMENTS MADE BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES II WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT ANY DOUBTS ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF THE POLICIES ENUNCIATED IN THE EXPLANATORY BULLETIN WAS LAID TO REST BY THE REISSUANCE OF THE SAID EXPLANATORY BULLETIN III WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE EXPLANATORY BULLETIN EVEN WHILE ADMITTING THAT THE SAID BULLEITN WAS NOT AN EXAMPLE OF A JUDICIAL. the law governing the relations between them. like 1993 and 1998. the computation of which is determined by a legal formula which is not changed by the fact that there are two holidays falling on one day.5. Bonifacio Day November 30 9. enumerates ten regular holidays for every year should not be interpreted as authorizing a reduction to nine the number of paid regular holidays "just because April 9 (Araw ng Kagitingan) in certain years. as amended. OR ONE OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THAT [Department of Labor and Employment] DOLE MAY PROMULGATE . qualification or exception for any variance from the clear intent that all holidays shall be compensated. 1998 when it was Araw ng Kagitingan and at the same time was Maundy Thursday. the Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator. Christmas Day December 25 10. is also Holy Friday or Maundy Thursday.

speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency. the 15-day period to appeal it under Rule 45 having expired. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against its perceived grievance. 1998 DESPITE THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT TO THE CONTRARY VI WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS’ ACTS WILL DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS BY THE "EXPLANATORY BULLETIN" AS WELL AS EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS The petition is devoid of merit. a petitioner must show that he has no plain. 2000. 2000 of a copy of the August 10. of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. he cannot avail himself of the writ of certiorari. any alleged errors committed by it in the exercise of its jurisdiction would be errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari.. petitioner lodged the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65. it filed the present petition for certiorari on September 15. and the decision accordingly becomes final and executory. final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case. The appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Rule 45 is clear that the decisions. . In this case. Technicality aside. [S]ince the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the petition under Rule 65. At the outset. respectively.e.IV WHETHER OR NOT THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE) BY ISSUING EXPLANATORY BULLETIN DATED MARCH 11. which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. If the aggrieved party fails to do so within the reglementary period. 1993.6 The records of the case show that following petitioner’s receipt on August 18. i. IN THE GUISE OF PROVIDING GUIDELINES ON ART. appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy. at which time the Court of Appeals decision had become final and executory. his predicament being the effect of his deliberate inaction. 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying its Motion for Reconsideration. COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 1993 AND IN ORDERING THAT THE SAME POLICY OBTAINED FOR APRIL 9. A remedy is considered "plain. AS IT LEGISLATED AND INTERPRETED LEGAL PROVISIONS IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO CREATE OBLIGATIONS WHERE NONE ARE INTENDED BY THE LAW V WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN SUSTAINING THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR IN REITERATING ITS EXPLANATORY BULLETIN DATED MARCH 11. this Court finds no ground to disturb the assailed decision. Under Rule 45 the reglementary period to appeal is fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or denial of motion for reconsideration. xxx For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to issue. may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review. regardless of the nature of the action or proceeding involved. it bears noting that instead of assailing the Court of Appeals Decision by petition for review oncertiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 94 OF THE LABOR CODE. now Rule 45 and Rule 65.

As reflected above.16 Moreover. In Wellington. Since a worker is entitled to the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays. Rule IV. affords a worker the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays. supplements or payments for unworked regular holidays as provided in existing individual or collective agreement or employer practice or policy. National Heroes Day (last Sunday of August). the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Sec.9 The provision is mandatory. the 1997-1998 CBA incorporates the following provision: ARTICLE PAID LEGAL HOLIDAYS The following legal holidays shall be paid by the COMPANY as required by law: 1. and deepen the spirit of patriotism. that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal." In the instant case. petitioner had obligated itself to pay for the legal holidays as required by law. It is elementary.7 Its purpose is not merely "to prevent diminution of the monthly income of the workers on account of work interruptions. including its implementing rules and regulations. Book III of the Omnibus Rules to Implement the Labor Code provides that "Nothing in the law or the rules shall justify an employer in withdrawing or reducing any benefits.15 In any event. shall be resolved in favor of labor. while the religious holidays designated in Executive Order No. in answering the issue in the negative."8 It is also intended to enable the worker to participate in the national celebrations held during the days identified as with great historical and cultural significance. 1993 Explanatory Bulletin does not lie. Trajano14 has "overruled" the DOLE March 11. Independence Day (June 12)."17 From the pertinent provisions of the CBA entered into by the parties. 94 of the Labor Code. 11. his holiday pay. Art.12 holiday pay is a statutory benefit demandable under the law. Araw ng Kagitingan (April 9). Thus. In other words. under the rules of statutory construction. promote national identity. Petitioner’s assertion that Wellington v. that is. observed that in fixing the monthly salary of its employees. Art. he earns what he should earn. 13 In the case at bar. although the worker is forced to take a rest. there is nothing in the law which provides or indicates that the entitlement to ten days of holiday pay shall be reduced to nine when two holidays fall on the same day. Holy Thursday (moveable) XIV . This Court. Bonifacio Day (November 30) and Rizal Day (December 30) were declared national holidays to afford Filipinos with a recurring opportunity to commemorate the heroism of the Filipino people. which is a management prerogative.10 regardless of whether an employee is paid on a monthly or daily basis. the fact that two holidays fall on the same date should not operate to reduce to nine the ten holiday pay benefits a worker is entitled to receive.11Unlike a bonus. For the working man’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. as amended. 203 allow the worker to celebrate his faith with his family. the issue was whether monthly-paid employees are entitled to an additional day’s pay if a holiday falls on a Sunday. Labor Day (May 1) is a day traditionally reserved to celebrate the contributions of the working class to the development of the nation. New Year’s Day (January 1st) 2. Wellington took into account "every working day of the year including the holidays specified by law and excluding only Sunday. 4 of the Labor Code provides that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of its provisions.Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative that the State shall afford protection to labor. the issue is whether daily-paid employees are entitled to be paid for two regular holidays which fall on the same day.

the COMPANY will give a day’s wage for November 1st and December 31st whenever declared a holiday. dated February 27. 1997 of public respondent is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDEand the decision.[4] . the employee will be paid according to Art. premises considered. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE. Christmas Day (December 25th) 9. When required to work on said days. Araw ng Kagitingan (April 9th) 5. the decision dated May 30. Costs against [herein petitioners].18 WHEREFORE. Independence Day (June 12th) 7. the petition is hereby DISMISSED The Case Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Bonifacio Day [November 30] 8. 2002 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. Rizal Day (December 30th) 10. if declared public non-working holiday 11.3. A paid legal holiday occurring during the scheduled vacation leave will result in holiday payment in addition to normal vacation pay but will not entitle the employee to another vacation leave. Good Friday (moveable) 4. National Heroes Day (Last Sunday of August) Only an employee who works on the day immediately preceding or after a regular holiday shall be entitled to the holiday pay. VI. Sec. 3B hereof. 50679. Under similar circumstances. Labor Day (May 1st) 6. 2001 Decision[2] and the January 29. 1997 of Labor Arbiter Andres Zavalla is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED in toto. General Election designated by law. seeking to set aside the July 27.

1994. as well as letters of .300. 1994. Petitioner however. Land and housing corporation vs Esquillo The Facts The antecedents are narrated by the CA as follows: [Respondent] Marianito C. Although [respondent's ] employment contract was supposed to be valid until July 26. for the reason. a local placement agency. claims that the reason adduced was 'negated by the fact that a lot of transferees from other sites were taken in and promotions as well as re-classifications in the lower ranks were done as shown by the list of fifteen (15) transferees from Riyadh effective November 5. He commenced employment on July 27. with an initial monthly salary of US$1.00. 1989. through an Inter-Office Memo on Notice of Termination. on account of his good performance and the annual renewal of his employment contract. until it reached US$1. 'reduction of force. Private respondent Land & Housing Development Corporation (LHDC'). Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 1995. it was pre-terminated.The assailed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. facilitated [respondent's ] employment papers.00 that was gradually increased. allegedly.000. Esquillo was hired as a structural engineer by [Petitioner] ABV Rock Group (ABV') based in Jeddah. dated November 17.

as final settlement of his claims and was issued an exit visa that required him to immediately go back to the Philippines. [Respondent] subsequently received the amount of twenty-three thousand. bonus and other benefits in the total amount of US$6. The parties were required to file their position papers and responsive pleadings.00) from [Petitioner] ABV. As a result of the foregoing. Upon the submission of the case for resolution. With respect to the alleged confiscation of [respondent's ] iqama. reduction of force. Due to the Gulf War. one hundred fiftythree Saudi Riyals (SR23. dated May 30. dated February 27.00. San Pablo City. IV.192. 1994 up to July 26.S. docketed as NLRC NCR CA No. He further claimed that [Petitioner] ABV maliciously confiscated his 'iqama or resident visa despite the fact that it was [respondent's ] previous employer.716. as follows: WHEREFORE. before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration which was referred to the National Labor Relations Commission. the projects of [Petitioner] ABV were reduced and it was forced to 'terminate the contracts of workers whose job were not so immediate and urgent and retain only those workers whose skills were needed just to maintain the projects. When [petitioners] filed their joint appeal.. which secured his 'iqama. judgment is hereby rendered ordering [petitioners] jointly and severally to pay [respondent] his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract from December 19. one month in advance. Dollars (US$9. SO ORDERED. 1995 in the total amount of NINE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN U. overtime pay. FEAL IBC.promotion and re-classification. decreeing. All other claims of [respondent] are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. and docketed as SRAB-IV-4-0053-96-L. that is. reversed the aforecited decision and dismissed the . 1997. [respondent] filed a complaint for breach of contract and/or illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Andres Zavalla issued his Decision.00) and ten percent (10%) of his monetary award as attorney's fees both in Philippine currency to be computed at the prevailing rate at the time of payment. [the NLRC] in a Decision. the Hon. [petitioners] alleged that the law requires its surrender to the Saudi authorities upon the termination of the employee's contract of employment. 012650-97. 1997. Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. [petitioners] maintained that [respondent's ] dismissal was for valid cause. and he was paid his salary. [Respondent] was informed. of the pretermination of his contract. Consequently. In their position paper.447. [respondent] was prevented from getting another job in Jeddah. premises considered.00 or Saudi Riyals SR25.153.

dated July 10.[5] Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals ruled that despite the absence of a written categorical objection to the sufficiency of the payment received as consideration for the execution of the quitclaim. 1997. . [Respondent's ] motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution.[respondent's ] complaint for lack of merit.

granted the respondent monetary award. Hence. recommending that the decision dated May 30. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it took cognizance of an issue of fact which was raised for the first time on appeal. and. 1997 of the NLRC be annulled and set aside and that . Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its 27 July 2001 Decision and 29 January 2002 Resolution by affirming the 27 February 1997 Decision of the Labor Arbiter which rendered as null and void and without binding effect the release and quitclaim executed by the respondent in favor of the petitioners.jurisprudence supported the right of respondent to demand what was rightfully his under our labor laws. The Court's Ruling The Petition has no merit.[6] The Issues Petitioners raise the following issues for this Court's consideration: A. the issue is whether respondent. despite having executed a quitclaim. this Petition. B. he should have been allowed to recover the difference between the amount he had actually received and the amount he should have received. At the outset. in addition to what he had already received. Hence.[7] In the main. the Court notes the Manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). thereafter. The appellate court held that respondent was entitled to the salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his Contract. is entitled to a grant of his additional monetary claims. The CA also found that the NLRC had erroneously applied RA 8042 to the case.

who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions. are generally accorded not only respect but finality. in the total amount of US$9.[9] In the present case.447. The factual findings of the NLRC and the CA on this matter were not contradictory. inclusive of allowances and other benefits.[13] states: KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: . the Court finds no reason to deviate from their factual finding that respondent was dismissed without any legal cause. the Contract of respondent was until July 26. 1995. he is entitled to be paid his salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of his Contract. an employee cannot be dismissed except for cause. Indeed. and to be paid full back wages. With regard to contract workers. which was prepared by Petitioner ABV Rock Group. in cases arising before the effectivity of RA 8042 (the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act[11]).[Respondent] Esquillo be awarded the total amount of his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract of employment. and only after due notice and hearing Employees who are dismissed without cause have the right to be reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other privileges. 1994. it is settled that if 'the contract is for a fixed term and the employee is dismissed without just cause. Main Issue: Entitlements of a Dismissed Employee Who Has Executed a Quitclaim The factual findings of labor officials. We now go to the Release and Quitclaim signed by respondent. Since his dismissal from service effective December 18. as provided by law. he is entitled to the payment of his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract. Hence. plus proven damages. The document.[12] In the present case. was not for a just cause. the labor arbiter found respondent's dismissal to be illegal and devoid of any just or authorized cause.

from any and all claims. the LAND & HOUSING DEVP.[14] Petitioners claim that the foregoing Release and Quitclaim has forever released them from 'any and all claims. . arising from my employment with aforesaid company/firm/entity. demands. ESQUILLO. or causes of action arising from respondent's employment with them. actions. dues. demands. dues.153) receipt of which is hereby acknowledged to my full and complete satisfaction. and I further agree that this release may be pleaded as absolute and final bar to any suit or suits or legal proceedings that may hereafter be prosecuted by me against aforementioned companies/entities. ABV ROCK GROUP KB. or causes of action. SIGNED MARIANITO C. actions. 'I hereby certify that I am of legal age. & its recruitment agent. ESQUILLO do discharge my employer. I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MY HANDS THIS 29 day of NOV. They also contend that the validity of the document can no longer be questioned. I.MARIANITO C. IN WITNESS WHEREOF. 1994 'at JEDDAH. CORP. debts..That for and in consideration of the sum of Saudi Riyals SR: TWENTY THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THREE (SR23. JEDDAH. that I fully understand this instrument and agree that this is a full and final release and discharge of the parties referred to herein.

The law strictly scrutinizes agreements in which workers agree to receive less compensation than what they are legally entitled to. National Labor Relations Commission. we do not perceive any in the case at bar. Because. Renuntiatio non praesumitur. They pressed it. is that petitioners did not relent on their claim. therefore. which we quote: We have heretofore explained that the reason why quitclaims are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy. jurisprudence does not support their stance. inter alia. and why they are held to be ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the workers' legal rights. His. in Marcos v. is the fact that the employer and the employee obviously do not stand on the same footing. One thing sure. we have more trenchantly declared that quitclaims and/or complete releases executed by the employees do not estop them from pursuing their claims arising from unfair labor practices of the employer. then. While there may be possible exceptions to this holding. Along this line. however.Unfortunately for petitioners. out of a job. The acceptance of termination does not divest a laborer of the right to prosecute his employer for unfair labor practice acts. The employer drove the employee to the wall. xxxxxxxxx . They are deemed not [to] have waived any of their rights.[15] The reason for this policy was explained. null and void. He thus found himself in no position to resist money proffered. The basic reason for this is that such quitclaims and/or complete releases are against public policy and. is a case of adherence. That document does not always bar them from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled. The fact that employees have signed a release and/or quitclaim does not necessarily result in the waiver of their claims. he had to face the harsh necessities of life. The latter must have to get hold of money. not of choice.

this Court set the guidelines and the current doctrinal policy regarding quitclaims and waivers. 22 of the Civil Code which provides that no one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another. Article 6 of the Civil Code renders a quitclaim agreement void ab initio where the quitclaim obligates the workers concerned to forego their benefits while at the same time exempting the employer from any liability that it may choose to reject.. that: While rights may be waived.We have pointed out in Veloso. This runs counter to Art. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person. Department of Labor and Employment. as follows: Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. et al. it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. et al. or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face. morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. vs. public policy. the same must not be contrary to law.[16] In Periquet v. public order. NLRC. that the law will step in to annul the questionable .

447.900.was silent on the matter.in his pleadings before the labor arbiter -. in order to determine their validity.[18] Consistent with this doctrine. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily. His actions spoke loudly enough. These agreements cannot be set aside merely because the parties have subsequently changed their minds. To determine whether the Release and Quitclaim is valid. petitioners themselves offered the Release and Quitclaim as a defense. . a tribunal has the duty of scrutinizing quitclaims brought to its attention by either party. he nonetheless filed this case and questioned his dismissal immediately.[17] Hence. quitclaims in which employees voluntarily accept a reasonable amount or consideration as settlement are deemed valid. and (2) US$9.716 or SR23. with full understanding of what he was doing. his salaries for the unexpired portion of his Contract. The NLRC considered the amount of 'US$6. he was eloquently taking issue with the validity of the quitclaim. In the present case.153 reasonable. one important factor that must be taken into account is the consideration accepted by respondent. words were not necessary. the amount must constitute a 'reasonable settlement. and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable.transaction. the three-month salary that he would have been entitled to recover if RA 8042 were applied. a few days after setting foot in the Philippines. when compared with (1) $3. the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. Even though respondent -. In asking for payment for the unexpired portion of his employment Contract.

in order to give flesh and vigor to the pro-poor and pro-labor provisions of our Constitution. This amount is exclusive of the SR23. 'This Court has allowed supervisory employees to seek payment of benefits and a manager to sue for illegal dismissal even though. laws should be interpreted to favor the working class -. vacation pay. the consideration stated in the Release and Quitclaim cannot be deemed a reasonable settlement. The latter amount was comprised of overtime pay. indemnity. that respondent was dismissed prior to the effectivity of RA 8042. that agreement must be set aside. contract reward and notice pay -. hence. faced as he was with the prospect of unemployment in a country not his own. . they executed deeds of quitclaims releasing their employers from liability. That respondent is a professional structural engineer did not make him less susceptible to disadvantageous financial offers. For these reasons. Costs against petitioners. however.It is relevant to point out. 'in case of doubt. for a consideration.whether in the government or in the private sector -.[20] WHEREFORE.items that were due him under his employment Contract.[19] To stress.153 that he received based on the November 29. the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED . As discussed at the outset. 1994 Final Settlement. he is entitled to his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his Contract.

RODRIGO VASALLO. sick leave. a second overseas contract was executed by the PNCC which was accepted by private respondents. 1985 contract by providing for a monthly salary of US$260. night differential pay. and Benigno M. SECOND DIVISION. J. Abrico and Rodrigo J. Eduardo A. MANASIS. The contract was for a two-year period. Sevilla for private respondents. No. However. and vacation leave benefits. overtime pay.. THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. on May 12. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION. SIBBALUCA. However. In disposing of the complaint. and BENIGNO M. The facts are as follows: Herein private respondents Raul C. Rodrigo Vasallo. 1987.00/month salary. Eduardo A. It modified the April 15. When the period lapsed. 1985. These were submitted to the POEA and were validated by the latter on April 22.: Subject of this petition is the Resolution ** of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirming the decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) which held herein petitioner Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) liable to private respondents Raul Abrico. Sibbaluca. (c) assigning Friday overtime guarding duties to non-guards. 1985. 1985. Manasis were deployed by herein petitioner for overseas employment to Iraq as security guards pursuant to individual appointment contracts dated April 15. and Benigno M.G. all of them filed their voluntary resignation effective August 31. Manasis for salary. EDUARDO A. Apolinar L. Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioner. Abrico. private respondents were repatriated and were extended local employment. and completion bonus differentials. 1987 so that they could avail of more benefits under the Retirement Program offered by the PNCC. respondents. the POEA ruled as follows: The issues to be resolved in these are: . (a) non-payment of promotional pay increase for Raul C. Sibbaluca. (b) underpayment of salaries.R. private respondents filed a complaint before the POEA for.00 for the same position. The contracts provided for a US$350. On August 17. Rodrigo Vasallo. petitioner. Vasallo. among others. JR. 101535 January 22. vacation and sick leave. bonuses. CAMPOS. overtime pay. RAUL ABRICO. vs. 1993 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION.

. 7. In connection with the second issues of vacation and sick leaves (sic) differentials as well as bonus differential. this Office finds it proper to award the complainants the difference of the two (2) aforementioned amounts as far as their vacation and sick leaves (sic) benefits as well as completion bonus are concerned. "G". are also entitled to be paid thereto based on the monthly salaries of US$350. that is US$260.00. Complainants having been granted voluntarily by the respondent a two-hour daily overtime (Exh. As correctly invoked by complainants paragraph (1) of Article 34 of the Labor Code prohibits the substitution or alteration of employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor from the time (of) the actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor. "G-1") during the durations of their contract. This can be inferred from the POEA approved contract of employment and by the certification issued by respondent's chief recruiting officer. the PNCC appealed to the NLRC. . Whether or not herein complainants are entitled to vacation leave and sick leave differentials. 2. after a thorough examination of the allegations as well as the evidence of the parties finds the answer of the first issue to be affirmative. instead of US$350. It alleged that the POEA erred in applying Article 34(i) of the Labor Code. affirmative also to the second issue as far as vacation and sick leaves (sic) differentials as well as bonus differential are concerned and negative as to the rest of the issues. The said leaves (sic) benefits are commutable to cash at the rate of 100% of the employee's salary at the end of employees foreign assignment (subpar. this Office finds it proper for the respondent to pay to complainants the difference of the two aforementioned amounts.00.00. Whether or not complainants Raul Abrico and Rodrigo J.1. Respondents having paid the complainants the said benefits in accordance with the monthly rate they actually received while working in Iraq. Vasallo are entitled to promotional pay differential. 15). This being so.00 and not US$260. . 1985. With regard to the first issue in this case the approved contract of employment of the herein complainants with the respondent is US$350.00 a month or US$260. Subparagraph a of paragraph seven of the master employment contract of the respondent in its Iraq project during the year 1985 provides a vacation leave of 20 days and sick leave of 10 days or a total of thirty (30) days leave for each of their employees for twelve (12) months service. 1985 which provided for a salary of US$260. dated April 15. Whether or not herein complainants are entitled to salary and overtime pay differentials. herein complainants have the right to be paid as monthly salaries the aforementioned amount. their salary rate in their approved employment contract. The only dispute which remains unsolved is whether or not the monthly salary of herein complainants is US$350. Respondent's master employment contract also provides for completion bonus of fifteen (15) days for every year of service (par. This Office. providing for a monthly salary of US$350.00.00/month. bonus differential and night shift differential. 1 From the decision of the POEA. c par. there being no refutation from the respondent of the allegation of the complainants that they were paid the said benefits in accordance with the monthly rate they were receiving while working in Iraq.00 was the actual overseas employment contract instead of the one dated May 12.00 a month. 3. . and in holding that the notice of employment. respondent's Master Employment Contract).

the approved employment contracts of complainantsappellees were for US$350. Rollo 179. It must be noted that complainants-appellees presented its (sic) claims (Annex "M". the NLRC relied upon the admission made by the PNCC. thus within the context of prohibited practices under Art. "N".. We find no sufficient ground to annul the decision of the NLRC due to a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. it held: . and the formula bases for the aforestated computation were detailed besides. 1985 was the actual employment contract and that Article 34 (i) of the Labor Code was applicable. Absolutely no evidence appears to have been submitted for respondent-appellants relative to satisfaction of the aforementioned claims: whether of payments for any overtime as authorized and rendered. 1991. where the pertinent employment records. . petitioner filed this petition for certiorari alleging that the public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that the notice of employment dated April 15.00 a month salary. as well as its (sic) Exhibits "G" and "G1". As validated by the POEA. The petitioner's claim that the public respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding that the private respondents were entitled to a monthly salary of US$350. the approval of the Department of Labor . . 1985 were amended or modified on May 12. beyond question . .00. 3 The assailed NLRC decision which affirmed the POEA ruling was based on the exhibits presented by the parties. 1987 stating that the approved rate for the position of a company guard for the PNCC was US$350. 180). xxx xxx xxx Relative to the last assignment of error. ." and/or the POEA. The record is bereft however. . as well as for fringe benefits usually are for the account of the deploying employer. etc. as per POEA Accreditation Department certification dated 25 June 1987. . or availment of leave benefits or its computation (sic) to cash. as amended. Solis certified to the aforesaid salary as PNCC Recruitment Head (Rollo 25-28). 1985" (Rollo 60) the latter sans ". (Rollo24). particularly disbursements for services rendered. that the contracts dated April 15. 2 A Motion for Reconsideration of this Resolution having been denied on August 23. 73-98) for differentials in overtime pay. Thus. of evidence of compliance with the aforesaid employment contracts relative to the aforesaid claims. all of which served as POEA bases for entitlement (Rollo 181. 1985 employment contract has not been adequately substantiated. One of the axioms governing judicial review through certiorari is that the administrative decision may properly be annulled or set aside only upon clear showing that the administrative official or tribunal has acted with grave abuse of discretion. 34 (i) of the Labor Code. Ms. . 7. "P". . in the assailed decision (pages 6. "O". 182) to the several money claims. also.00 pursuant to the April 15. . the NLRC stated: . sick leave and vacation leave benefits and completion bonus. suffice it to state that in its aforestated Rejoinder respondent-appellant corporation admitted as ". . More importantly.In affirming the POEA decision. among which were the confirmation letters 4 issued to each of the private respondents and the certification 5issued by the POEA on June 25. respondent-appellant corporation insists that the POEA('s) basis for the computation of the awarded differentials are erroneous for being without evidentiary basis or contrary to the evidence. Rollo122-136.

00 and which was accepted by private respondents. Petitioner further stated that the real contract of employment was the one executed on May 12. beyond question . this petition is DISMISSED. The mandate of the law for a liberal interpretation of labor contracts in favor of the working man was applied in the case of Ditan vs. Petitioner alleges further that it was never signed and accepted by private respondents. xxx xxx xxx Under the policy of social justice. the questioned Resolution of the NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED. POEA Administrator [G. the approval of the Department of Labor . through its local agent. 1985 document. the latter sans "." and/or the POEA. as amended. . that the contracts dated April 12. 1990] Post under case digests. . . . 1985 were amended or modified on May 12.. . . 79560 December 3. . POEA Administrator 8 where We made the following pronouncement: A strict interpretation of the cold facts before us might support the position taken by the respondents. . Consequently. we are dealing here not with an ordinary transaction but with a labor contract which deserves special treatment and a liberal interpretation in favor of the worker . suffice it to state that in its aforestated Rejoinder respondent-appellant corporation admitted [Emphasis supplied] as ". . the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privileges in life should have more privileges in law. 6 The PNCC now finds fault in that decision by saying that the April 15. thus within the context of prohibited practices under Art. While the allegations of the PNCC may cast doubt on the real nature of the April 12. . 1985" (Rollo 60). labor law at Wednesday. . Ditan vs. all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborers. . . 1985 document was but a mere notice/offer of employment. Consequently. it never became a binding contract between the parties concerned. 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: Andres E. No. However. Ditan was recruited by private respondent Intraco Sales Corporation. the Constitution mandates the protection of labor and the sympathetic concern of the State for the working class conformably to the social justice policy. 1985 which provided for a monthly salary of US$260. in view of the foregoing. . With costs. to work in Angola as a welding supervisor. the other private respondent. . our Civil Code 7 states: In case of doubt. . . The . 34 (i) of the Labor Code. WHEREFORE. . . Asia World. March 28.R.

00. Specifically. Some of them had diarrhea. along with otherforeign workers. capital of Angola.00 or US$275.196. and contained the required standard stipulations for the protection of our overseas workers. Issue: Whether or not this case is within NLRC jurisdictiona and if Ditan is entitled to any relief? . 1984. They subsisted on meager fare. It was only on March 16. that the hostages were finally released after the intercession of their governments and the International Red Cross. However.50 as the value of his lost belongings. 2 This was affirmed in toto by respondent NLRC in a resolution dated July 14. 1984. US$1. and moral and exemplary damages in the sum of US$50. at a monthly salary of US$1. he was assured by the INTRACO manager that Kafunfo was safe and adequately protected by government troops. They trekked for almost a thousand kilometers. 1984. Ditan was reluctant to go. US$2.00. 1987. US$25. On December 29.000. he relented and agreed. some 350kilometers east of Luanda. Achacoso in a decision dated January 27.100. This was the place where. 1984. the petitioner was assigned as an ordinary welder in the INTRACO central maintenance shop from December 2 to 25. he was told he would be sent home if he refused the new assignment. Arriving on November 30.675. representing hissalaries for the unexpired 17 weeks of his contract. The rebels and their captives walked through jungleterrain for 31 days to the Unita stronghold near the Namibian border.100 for unpaid vacation leave. he sought the amount of US$4. The Unita rebels attacked the diamond mining site where Ditan was working and took him and sixteen other Filipino hostages. he filed in June 1985 a complaint against the private respondents for breach of contract and various other claims. earlier that year. his fears were confirmed. Ditan having been excluded.00 as war risk bonus. Ditan and the other Filipino hostages were back in the Philippines. On December 26. and eventually eleven of them were taken back. Their feet were blistered. 1985. 3 which is now being challenged in this petition.contract was for nine months. Naturally. The repatriated workers had been assured by INTRACO that they would be given priority in re-employment abroad. 1987. to his distress that would be transferred to Kafunfo. the rebels had attacked and kidnapped expatriate workers. with much misgiving. In the end. killing two Filipinos in the raid.00 weekly. Six days later. he was informed. plus attorney's fees. All these claims were dismissed by POEA Administrator Tomas D.000. in Luanda. moreover.

issued pursuant to themandatory war risk coverage provision in Section 2. Rule VI. Over his objection. the promise was not fulfilled. it was merely exercising its rights under theemployment contract that Ditan had freely entered into. categorizing Angola as a war risk took effect only on February 6. We find. after his reluctant consent." Consequently. The fact that stands out most prominently in the record is the risk to which the petitioner was subjected when he was assigned. 1985"after the petitioner's deployment to Angola on November 27. When INTRACO assigned Ditan to that place in the regular course of its business. considering the totality of the circumstances attending this case. he was sent to a dangerous assignment and as he feared was . without indication of any particular place of assignment in the country. The promise of INTRACO was that they would be given priority in re-employment should their services be needed. presumably so they could recover from their ordeal. he cannot now complain that there was a breach of that contract for which he is entitled to monetary redress. In the particular case of the petitioner. one strictly in favor of the employers and the other liberally in favor of the worker. This meant he agreed to be assigned to work anywhere in that country. The choice is obvious. including Kafunfo. 1984. 4. It is not explained why the petitioner was not paid for the unexpired portion of his contract which had 17 more weeks to go. This was a dangerous area. The petitioner went to Angola prepared to work as he had promised in accordance with the employment contract he had entered into in good faith with the private respondents. The hostages were immediately repatriated after their release. The paramount duty of this Court is to render justice through law. That choice would have required him to come home empty-handed to the disappointment of an expectant family. and not again required. that the petitioner is entitled to relief. The law in this case allows two opposite interpretations. of the POEA Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment. it is argued. It would seem that his work was terminated. The petitioner had gone to that foreign land in search of a better life that he could share with his loved ones after his stint abroad. the stipulation could not be applied to the petitioner as it was not supposed to have a retroactive effect. The private respondents stress that the contract Ditan entered into called for his employment in Angola. The private respondents also reject the claim for war risk bonus and point out that POEA Memorandum Circular No. to the rebel-infested region of Kafunfo. because it was really intended all along to assign him only to Kafunfo.Held: Yes. Hence.

Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees Union (IBAAEU) v.R. L-52415 (October 23. 9 issued by Respondent (then Secretary of DOLE).2. The petitioner was left only with a bleak experience and nothing to show for it except dashed hopes and a sense of rejection. In the case at bar. It has been held that where the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Petitioner filed for a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiters decision of paying the holiday wages and the motion was granted. He was immediately repatriated with the promise that he would be given priority in re-employment. the same must be declared null and void. . 2 of Implementing Rules and Policy Instruction No. the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privileges in life should have more privileges in law. Later. The Petition was granted and IBAA paid for the holiday wage. Upon his release. 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code and the Policy Instruction No. IBAA then appealed to NLRC and NLRC dismissed the appeal. Under the policy of social justice. if a contemporaneous construction is so erroneous. And also. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari charging Respondent of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.HELD:A judgment in a labor case that has become executory cannot be revoked after finality of judgment. 1984) FACTS: Petitioner first filed a complaint to the lower Court against Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) for not paying the holiday pay. No. 9 are both null and void since they amended the provisions of the Labor Code. IBAA filed a motion for reconsideration to Respondent. IBAA waived its right to appeal by paying the holiday wage and is therefore deemed to have accepted the judgment as correct. Sec. 9 are valid . To rub salt on the wound. 2 and Policy Instruction No. ISSUE:1. At this point. W/N the decision of the Labor Arbiter can be set aside by Respondent considering that it has become final and had been partially executed. Respondent granted IBAA s motion for reconsideration. Inciong Case No. IBAA stopped paying the holiday wage incompliance to the issuance of Sec. which never came. many of his cohostages were re-employed as promised. he was immediately sent home and was not paid the salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract. 62G.taken hostage in a rebel attack that prevented him from fulfilling his contract while in captivity. W/N Sec.

PETITIONER-APPELLANT. nor is the risk of contracting said disease increased by her working conditions. for the death of his spouse." Upon operation. was filed by petitioner with the GSIS. The late Lourdes Bonifacio was a class room teacher assigned to the district of Bagamanoc. 1978. GOVERNMENT 15. it was found that her entire gastro-intestinal tract was enveloped by carcinoma. she died on October 5. she complained of "abdominal pain. carcinoma of the breast with metastases to gastro-intestinal tract and lungs. on appeal. affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System of petitioner's claim for benefits under PD No. .[G.R. including its implementing rules and regulations. in case of doubt in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code. On September 1. Thereafter a claim for death benefits under P. is not an occupational disease for her particular work as a teacher. SYSTEM [MINISTRY AND EMPLOYEES' EDUCATION COMMISSION. 1978. vomiting. No. The Employees Compensation Commission.: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission dated August 19. 1978 from carcinoma of the breast metastatic to gastro-intestinal tract and lungs. No. In 1976. and failure to pass stools inspite of laxatives. Petitioner now assails the decision of the respondent Commission on the following grounds: a] The respondent Commission's affirmance of the denial by respondent System totally ignored the Supreme Court's pronouncements on compensation cases. J.D. 626. as amended. b] We hold that the GSIS and the Employees Compensation Commission did not err in denying petitioner's claim. 626. the same shall be resolved in favor of the laborer. SERVICE 1986] INSURANCE CULTURE] JUAN BONIFACIO. 62207. and Under the law. The same was however denied on the ground that the decedent's principal ailment. 1982. Despite chemotherapy. Lourdes Bonifacio. OF COMPENSATION December VS. RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES. The facts are undisputed. when her ailment was noted to have metastasized to her abdomen. affirmed the decision of the respondent System. 1965 until she contracted carcinoma of the breast with metastases to the gastro-intestinal tract and lungs which caused her death on October 5. as amended. Ministry of Edu cation and Culture from August. Division of Catanduanes. Corazon Yabes-Almirante of the Ospital ng Bagong Lipunan certified that the late Lourdes Bonifacio underwent radical mastectomy for cancer of the breast in 1973. Dra. abdominal enlargement. DECISION FERNAN. she submitted herself to an operation known as "exploratory laparotomy" in March of the same year.

The petitioner evidently overlooked that his claim is now within the ambit of the Labor Code and the rulings under the old law." [Sulit v. it became incumbent upon petitioner to prove that the decedent's working conditions increased the risk of her contracting the fatal illness. 1982). no longer control. 3812.. [Winrobe.A. nasal cavity and sinuses Nature of Employment Woodworkers. As to the "metastases to the gastro-intestinal tract and lungs" the Commission lists such disease as occupational only in the following employment: "Occupational Disease" 16. pp. This onus." (pp. 584-585]. Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine. Mosby. al. liver and brain. which favor the employee". skin and subcutaneous tissues generally. as amended. Thus. Mammary carcinoma is likely to metastasize relatively early to the regional lymph node's axillary and supra clavicular. Amended Rules on Employees Compensation]. Anderson. 17. Act No. Rollo. ECC decision dated August 19. provided for "the presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness. We note the following medical report on breast cancer which the Employees Compensation Commission cited in its decision and which the petitioners failed to controvert: "x x x Recent observations on the epidemeology of breast cancers suggest that it is intimately linked to 'estrogenic hormones' [W. less frequently to the brain. Cancer of stomach and other lymphatic and blood forming vessels. 38. effective May 1. the sickness must be the result of an accepted occupational disease listed by the Employees Compensation Commission [Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation]. 1978]. 7th edition pp. wood products industry carpenters. 1. Cancer of the lungs.A compensable sickness means "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Employees Compensation Commission. [Sec. et. and "paved the way for the latitudinarian or expansive application of the Workmen's Compensation Law in favor of the employee or worker. The old law as embodied particularly in Section 43 of RA No. 167(1) Labor Code as amended by P. petitioner failed to satisfactorily discharge. plastic workers. if the primary site is in the outer half the breast.D. Vinyl chloride workers. Amended Rules on Employees Compensation." [Art.P. [Annex A. loggers and employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood mills. or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. 772 amending Act No.489] The presumption in essence states that in any proceeding for the enforcement of the claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act "it shall be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary that the . for the sickness or the resulting disability or death to be compensable. see p. the Commission is empowered to de termine and approve occupational diseases and work related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment. From thence it spreads primarily to the bones. Rule II. No.] The cancer which affected the deceased not being occupational in her particular employment. or any other sickness caused by employment subject to proof by claimant that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. 1368. ECC. Pathology 5th edition. For this purpose.. 98 SCRA 483. 1217-1218]. 3428. Carcinoma of the breast with metastases to the gastro-intestinal tract and lungs is not listed by the Commission as an occupational disease. Petitioner's contention that the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission totally ignored the Supreme Court's pronouncements on compensation cases is unmeritorious. lungs. 3-4.

22 SCRA 282] "Once the disease had been shown to have arisen in the course of employment." While we do not dispute petitioner's contention that under the law. the burden of proof shifts to the employer and the employee no longer suffers the burden of showing causation. that it arose out of it. and that the contents of verified medical and surgical reports introduced in evidence by claimants for compensation are correct. . it is presumed by law. No costs. are affirmed." Thus. in case of doubt in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code. the "latitudinarian or expansive application of the Workmen's Compensation Law in favor of the employee or worker" no longer prevails as the burden of showing proof of causation has shifted back to the employee particularly in cases of sickness or injuries which are not accepted or listed as occupational by the Employees Compensation Commission. [supra] "the Labor Code abolished the presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness caused by the nature of the employment. it is not necessary for the claimant to carry the burden of proof to establish his case to the point of demonstration [Abana vs. the doubt shall be resolved in favor of the laborer. 22 SCRA 1278]. With this legal presumption in the old law.claim comes within the provisions of the said Act. It is "not necessary to prove that employment was the sole cause of the death or injury suffered by the employee. May 31. the petition is dismissed and the decisions of the GSIS and the Employees Compen sation Commission denying the claim. Employees Compensation Commission. 1965]. ECC. L20202. that sufficient notice thereof was given. Quisumbing. including its implementing rules and regulations." [Hernandez vs." [Fontesa vs. As stated in Sulit vs. WHEREFORE. ECC. we find that the same has no application in this case since the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code leave no room for doubt either in their interpretation or application. that the injury was not occasioned by the willful intention of the injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or of another. Under the present Labor Code. in the absence of substantial evidence to the con trary. al. that the injury did not result solely from the intoxication of the injured employee while on duty. et. It is sufficient to show that the employment had contributed to the aggravation or acceleration of such death or ailment. under the Workmen's Compensation Law.

however. Rubberworld filed with the Department of Labor and employment a notice of temporary shutdown of operations to take effect on September 26. 902-A is clear that “all actions for claims against corporations. Rubberworld filed with the SEC a petition for declaration of suspension of payments with a proposed rehabilitation plan. 1994. however. Hence. board or body shall be suspended accordingly. NLRC [336 SCRA 433 (July 26. 1994. SEC issued an order suspending all actions for claims against Rubberworld in accordance with P.) vs.D. Before the effectivity date. partnerships. private respondents filed with the NLRC a complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal and non-payment of separation pay.Rubberworld (Phils. On November 22. a corporation established in 1965. On November 11. 1994. bags and garment. . any resolution decisions or order that is rendered without jurisdiction is a nullity. Rubberworld filed with the SC a petition to annul the NLRC resolution. or associations under management or receivership pending before any court. is engaged in the manufacture of footwear. On August 26.” NLRC thus acted without an in excess of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to decide the case despite the suspension order. On December 28.D. Issue: Whether or not NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction? Held: P. declaring its shutdown illegal and making the corporation liable for damages and payment of separation pay. Rubberworld was forced to prematurely shutdown its operations. 1994. 1994. As a consequence. 2000)] Jurisdiction of the SEC Facts: Petitioner Rubberworld. the Labor Arbiter ruled against Rubberworld. Private respondents are employees of the said corporation. tribunal. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. 902-A. Despite this order.

the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and converted the restrainingorder into an injunction upon posting of a bond. Reuben Zamora. to form unions.'sm o t i o n t o r e c a l l t h e decision of the Court of Appeals was also denied in view of theSupreme Court's denial of the motion for reconsideration. p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e S t a t e " s h a l l g u a r a n t e e t h e r i g h t s o f a l l workers to selforganization. including those in the public sector. et. Ramon Modesto. allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS. SSSEA. and agencies of the Government." that "the right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. 8]. XIII. be ordered to pay damages. Issue: Whether SSS employees. Baylon. or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. tostrike. night differential pay and holiday pay." Parenthetically. al. Virgilio De Alday. and payment of the children's allowance of P30.the Bill of Rights also provides that "the right of the people. associations. moved to recall the Court of Appeals' decision.Held: The 1987 Constitution.Sergio Araneta. Juanito Madura. In the meantime. may conduct a strike. O n 1 1 J u n e 1 9 8 7 . resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals. Sec. conversion of temporary orcontractual employees with 6 months or more of service into regular and permanentemployees and their entitlement to the same salaries. after finding that the strike was illegal. including those employed in the public and private sectors. In the meantime.in cluding the right to strike in accordance with law. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunctionbefore the Supreme Court (GR 79577). et. SSSEA.including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. in furtherance of labor interests. and Virgilio Magpayo. which ordered the strikers to return to work. the Court on 29 June 1988 deniedthe motion for reconsideration in GR 97577 for being moot and academic. which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues. The strikers refused to return to w o r k . 3 ) . al. in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights (Art. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression. and peaceful concerted activities. while there is no question thatthe Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize. for in the SubArticle on the Civil Service Commission.S e c . al. SSSEA . collective bargaining and negotiations. but during its pendency the Court of Appealson 9 March 1988 promulgated its decision on the referred case.al. the officers and members of Social Security System EmployeesAssociation (SSSEA) staged a strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building. On11 June 1987. after defining the scope of the civilservice as "all branches. praying that a writ of preliminaryinjunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work. al. In a resolution dated 21 October 1987.Dionisio T. the RTC issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. the Court.through the Third Division. the SSSEA.00.et. instrumentalities. The SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act onthe union's demands. On22 July 1987.p r e v e n t i n g n o n s t r i k i n g e m p l o y e e s f r o m r e p o r t i n g f o r w o r k a n d S S S m e m b e r s f r o m transacting business with the SSS.a n d a f t e r t h e S S S d e d u c t e d c e r t a i n a m o u n t s f r o m t h e s a l a r i e s o f t h e employees a n d allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.Social Security System Employees Association v. et." By itself. t h e S S S f i l e d w i t h t h e R e g i o n a l T r i a l C o u r t o f Q u e z o n C i t y a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the SSSEA. al. filed amotion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. this provision would seem torecognize the right of all workers and employees. III. Asthe SSSEA's motion for the reconsideration of the order was also denied on 14 August 1988. Placido Agustin. et. and that the strike be declared illegal. subdivisions. SSSEA. filed a motion for reconsideration thereof.that SSSEA. it provides. it is silent asto whether such recognition also includes the . Thus. CA Facts: On 9 June 1987. The strike wasreported by the Social Security System (SSS) to the Public Sector Labor-ManagementCouncil. payment of accrued overtime pay. et. SSSEA filed the p e t i t i o n t o review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees toorganize. it will be recalled thatthe Industrial Peace Act (CA 875). In fine. having been created under RA 1161. they areprohibited from striking.right to strike.including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" and thatthe SSS is one such government -controlled corporation with an original charter. t h e L a b o r C o d e i s s i l e n t a s t o w h e t h e r o r n o t g o v e r n m e n t employees may strike. series of 1987 of the Civil ServiceC o m m i s s i o n u n d e r d a t e 1 2 A p r i l 1 9 8 7 w h i c h . recognizing t heir right to do so. or regulating the exercise of the right. But then the Civil ServiceDecree (PD 807). government employeesmay through their unions or associations. likeworkers in the private sector. This being the case. Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government Employees to SelfO r g a n i z a t i o n . to implement theconstitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to organize. and agencies of the Government. in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees tostrike. either petition the Congress for the bettermentof the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legisla tion ornegotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those whichare not fixed by law. " T h e a i r w a s t h u s c l e a r e d o f t h e confusion. the Presidenti s s u e d EO 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right t o o r g a n i z e o f government employees. the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions orassociations only. Asnow provided under Sec. all government officers and employees from staging s trikes." The President wasapparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. for such are excluded from its coverage. but excluding entities entrusted wit h proprietaryf u n c t i o n s . But employees in thecivil service may not resort to strikes. its employees are part of the civil service and are coveredby the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. 6.including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-owned andcontrolled corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees thereinshall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof. Statutorily.demonstrations. mass leaves. " p r i o r t o t h e e n a c t m e n t by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under p a i n o f administrative sanctions. walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result int e m p o r a r y s t o p p a g e o r d i s r u p t i o n o f p u b l i c s e r v i c e . U n d e r s t a n d a b l y . the dispute may be referred tothe Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action.expressly banned strikes by employees in the Government. subdivisions. which was repealed by the Labor Code (PD 442) in 1974. Resort to the intent of thef r a m e r s o f t h e o r g a n i c l a w b e c o m e s h e l p f u l i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e s e provisions. to pressure the Government to accede to their demands. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil serviceembraces all branches. including instrumentalitiesexercising governmental functions. it is provided that "the Civil Service law andr u l e s g o v e r n i n g c o n c e r t e d a c t i v i t i e s a n d s t r i k e s i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t s e r v i c e s h a l l b e observed. on 1 June 1987. by express provision of Memorandum Circular 6 and as implied inEO 180. walkouts and other temporary work stoppages. 4. w h i c h t o o k e f f e c t a f t e r t h e present dispute arose. Thus. The Court is of the considered view that the SSS employees are covered by theprohibition against strikes.the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. If there be any unresolved grievances. In Section 14 thereof." . At present. without including the right to strike. subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress. is equally silent on the matter. "the terms and conditions of employment in the government. instrumentalities.

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