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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SAN ANTONIO DIVISION SHANNON PEREZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF TEXAS, et al., Defendants. ____________________________________ MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS, TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (MALC), Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF TEXAS, et al., Defendants. ____________________________________ TEXAS LATINO REDISTRICTING TASK FORCE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RICK PERRY, Defendant. ____________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-11-CA-360-OLG-JES-XR [Lead case]

CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-11-CA-361-OLG-JES-XR [Consolidated case]

CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-11-CA-490-OLG-JES-XR [Consolidated case]

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MARGARITA V. QUESADA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RICK PERRY, et al., Defendants. ____________________________________ JOHN T. MORRIS, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF TEXAS, et al., Defendants. ____________________________________ EDDIE RODRIGUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RICK PERRY, et al., Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-11-CA-592-OLG-JES-XR [Consolidated case]

CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-11-CA-615-OLG-JES-XR [Consolidated case]

CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-11-CA-635-OLG-JES-XR [Consolidated case]

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Defendants Rick Perry, in his official capacity as Governor, John Steen, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, and the State of Texas (collectively “Defendants”) hereby move to dismiss all claims in this case for lack of subject 2

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matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3). In support of their motion, Defendants respectfully submit the following memorandum of points and authorities. INTRODUCTION This is a redistricting case to prevent the implementation of electoral districts enacted by the Texas Legislature in 2011. The Legislature has enacted bills that repeal the 2011 plans and establish new plans for 2014 and future elections. The Governor has signed those bills into law. As a result, the vacated 2011 plans can never be used to conduct any election. Because those plans will never be implemented, they pose no threat of injury to the plaintiffs. It follows that any order regarding the 2011 plans can provide no effectual relief. As far as the defunct 2011 plans are concerned, there is no relief to grant. This case no longer presents a live case or controversy. The Court therefore lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. The only thing left to do is dismiss. FACTS The plaintiffs in these consolidated cases seek declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent Defendants from implementing bills enacted by the 82nd Texas Legislature in 2011 to establish electoral districts for the Texas House of Representatives (Plan H283) and the United States House of Representatives (Plan C185).1 The pleadings invoke a variety of statutory and constitutional provisions,

See, e.g., Plaintiff MALC’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 50) ¶ 21 (“The redistricting legislation for the Texas House districts, H.B. 150, was signed by the Governor on June 17, 2011. The redistricting legislation for the United States House of Representatives, S.B. 4, was passed by the Texas Legislature on or about June 15, 2011.”); Quesada Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (Doc.
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but the plaintiffs’ challenge to Plans H283 and C185 rests primarily on Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 On September 29, 2011, the Court entered an

injunction against implementation of Plans H283 and C185 because the plans had not been precleared under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.3 The parties stipulated that the Court’s order would be “effective as a permanent injunction, subject to being lifted by order of the Court as appropriate.”4 On June 25, 2013, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, No. 12-96, 2013 WL 3184629 (U.S. June 25, 2013), reversing 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), holding that the coverage formula in Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional and “can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance.” Id. at *18. On June 27, 2013, the Supreme Court vacated the D.C. District Court’s judgment denying preclearance of the 2011 legislatively enacted redistricting plans and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Shelby County. See Texas v. United States, No. 12-496, 2013 WL 3213539, *1 (U.S. June 27, 2013). On June 23, 2013, the Legislature passed new redistricting bills for the United States House of Representatives and the Texas House of Representatives.5 In addition to enacting Plans C235 and H358, the newly enacted redistricting bills

105) ¶ 2 (Plaintiffs file this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent Defendants from using the State’s Plan [Plan C185] in any future elections.”). 2 See, e.g., Order (Doc. 285) at 5–16 (enumerating the claims asserted by plaintiffs). 3 See Order Enjoining the Implementation of Voting Changes (Doc. 380) at 4. 4 Id. at 5. 5 See Tex. S.B. 3, 83d Leg., 1st C.S. (enacting Plan H358); Tex. S.B. 4, 83d Leg., 1st C.S. (enacting Plan C235).

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repealed the 2011 plans challenged in this case.6

On June 26, 2013, the Governor

signed the newly enacted redistricting bills into law. See Exhibit A ((June 26, 2013 Letter from Office of the Governor to Texas Secretary of State). LEGAL STANDARD Article III of the Constitution permits federal courts to adjudicate only actual cases or controversies. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). This means litigants must suffer, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant’s actions, and that the federal court must be able to grant effectual relief. See id. This case-or-controversy requirement must be satisfied at every

stage of judicial proceedings. Id. If it is not, the federal court lacks the power to adjudicate the case and must dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. E.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs generally bear the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction, see Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001), including their own standing to sue, see Cobb v. Central States, 461 F.3d 632, 635 (5th Cir. 2006). When a party asserts that its own conduct has eliminated any live case or controversy, however, it bears a “heavy burden” to show that the change in circumstances makes it “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.

See Tex. S.B. 3, art. III, § 3, 83d Leg., 1st C.S. (“Chapter 1271 (H.B. 150), Acts of the 82nd Legislature, Regular Session, 2011 (Article 195a-12, Vernon ’s Texas Civil Statutes), is repealed.”); Tex. S.B. 4 § 3, 83d Leg., 1st C.S. (“Chapter 1 (Senate Bill No. 4), Acts of the 82nd Legislature, 1st Called Session, 2011 (Article 197j, Vernon ’s Texas Civil Statutes), is repealed.”).

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Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). Governmental entities, however, “are accorded a presumption of good faith because they are public servants, not selfinterested private parties.” Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011). ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES As a result of the Legislature’s enactment of new redistricting plans and its repeal of the redistricting plans enacted in 2011 by the 82nd Legislature, the claims asserted against the 2011 redistricting plans no longer present a live case or controversy. Because the 2011 plans have been repealed, the State cannot

implement them—no election is scheduled for the Texas House, the Texas Senate, or the U.S. House of Representatives between now and the effective date of the new plans. Nor is there any realistic threat that the State will reinstate the 2011 plans through future legislation. Indeed, the Legislature has enacted starkly different maps to be used in elections for the rest of the decade. As a result, the plaintiffs’ alleged injury from the 2011 plans no longer exists, and this Court cannot provide any effectual relief with respect to their claims against the 2011 plans. The case is moot, and the Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The Constitution confines the judicial power to actual cases or controversies. See U.S. Const. art. III § 2. The Supreme Court has explained that the “triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability constitutes the core of Article III's caseor-controversy requirement.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103–04 (1998) (footnote omitted). “To invoke the jurisdiction of a federal

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court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990); see also Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983) (per curiam) (“To satisfy the Article III case or controversy requirement, a litigant must have suffered some actual injury that can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”). When a

lawsuit no longer presents a live controversy, the court loses subject matter jurisdiction and can proceed no further: Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)). Because this case no longer presents a live case or controversy the plaintiffs’ claims against the 2011 redistricting plans are moot. “[A]n actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997). “A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000)

(quoting County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). The issues presented by the plaintiffs’ challenge to the 2011 plans are no longer live because the plans have no prospect of enforcement. A suit challenging the validity of a statute generally becomes moot when the statute is repealed. In 7

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that event, the challenge to the statute no longer presents a live controversy, and the case must be dismissed: If the challenged statute no longer exists, there ordinarily can be no real controversy as to its continuing validity, and an order enjoining its enforcement would be meaningless. In such circumstances, it is well settled that the case should be dismissed as moot. Ne. Florida Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 508 U.S. 656, 670 (1993); see also McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Suits regarding the constitutionality of statutes become moot once the statute is repealed.”). Similarly, the demise of the 2011 redistricting plans eliminates the plaintiffs’ concrete stake in the outcome of the case because they face no realistic threat of injury from Plans C185 or H283. To maintain a live case or controversy: [t]he parties must continue to have a “personal stake in the outcome” of the lawsuit. . . . . This means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477–78). For this reason, the doctrine of mootness is often characterized as “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).”7 E.g., Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 68 n.22; cf. Lujan v.

This shorthand description of mootness doctrine, first expressed in Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973), “is not comprehensive” in the sense that it does not reflect certain exceptions to mootness, see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000), none of which vest the Court with jurisdiction in this case.
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Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (explaining that Article III standing requires the plaintiff to identify “a concrete and imminent invasion of a legally protected interest that is neither conjectural nor hypothetical”); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.”). Because the claims asserted by all plaintiffs are directed at legislation that has now been repealed and replaced, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that they are likely to be harmed by the challenged redistricting plans. Plaintiffs’ inability to identify any threat of injury deprives them of a concrete stake in the outcome of this case, rendering the case moot and divesting this Court of subject matter jurisdiction.8 The fact that the Texas Constitution postpones the effective date of the newly enacted redistricting bills9 does not save this case from mootness for at least two reasons. First, the repeal is automatic. No further action is necessary before the new redistricting plans take effect and the old redistricting plans are repealed. The effective date will come, and the 2011 redistricting maps—the maps at issue in this case—will cease to exist. Second, there are no election dates for the Texas House,

Plaintiffs’ claims for attorney’s fees are “insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim.” Lewis, 494 U.S. at 480 (citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 70–71 (1986)). “[A] determination of mootness neither precludes nor is precluded by an award of attorneys’ fees. The attorneys’ fees question turns instead on a wholly independent consideration: whether plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party.’” Murphy v. Fort Worth Ind. Sch. Dist., 334 F.3d 470, 471 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (quoting Doe v. Marshall, 622 F.2d 118, 120 (5th Cir.1980)). 9 See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 39 (“No law passed by the Legislature, except the general appropriation act, shall take effect or go into force until ninety days after the adjournment of the session at which it was enacted, unless the Legislature shall, by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each House, otherwise direct . . . .”).
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the Texas Senate, or the U.S. House of Representatives between now and the effective date of the newly enacted redistricting plans. It follows that this Court can no longer provide any effectual relief with respect to claims against the 2011 redistricting plans. “The ‘case or controversy’ requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution prohibits federal courts from considering questions ‘that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.’” C&H Nationwide, Inc. v. Norwest Bank Texas NA, 208 F.3d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)). A case no longer presents a live case or controversy, and thus becomes moot, “when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013). The constitutionally delayed effective date of the 2013 redistricting bills cannot sustain an Article III case or controversy because it does not change the fact that the 2011 plans will never be implemented.10 The fact that the challenged statutes have been repealed provides an absolute assurance that the conduct sought to be enjoined—implementation of Plans C185 and H283—will not occur. To be sure, a party urging mootness based on voluntary cessation of the challenged conduct bears a “heavy burden” to demonstrate that it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to
Even if the effective date of SB 3 and SB 4 somehow preserved an Article III case or controversy, the case is still moot, and dismissal is required, because the Court cannot provide any relief on the claims asserted. See, e.g., First Indiana Federal Savings Bank v. F.D.I.C., 964 F.2d 503, 507 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Even if First Indiana’s claims constitute a ‘case or controversy’ under Article III of the Constitution, those claims should be dismissed for prudential reasons because there is no practical purpose in requiring their adjudication on the merits. Irrespective of the abstract validity of any of First Indiana’s claims against Old United, there are no set of circumstances under which First Indiana can recover any money or property as a result of those claims.”) (footnotes omitted).
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occur.”

Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189.

But a governmental entity’s

conclusive abandonment of the challenged policy is sufficient to demonstrate that the threat of injury has abated, even when the change in policy is not accomplished by a statutory repeal or amendment. See, e.g., Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 325 (holding that the TDCJ director’s affidavit explaining a revision to the policy in question was sufficient to establish that the plaintiff would no longer be subject to the challenged restrictions on attendance at religious services); Coalition of Airline Pilots Ass’n v. F.A.A., 370 F.3d 1184, (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he agencies’ commitment to draft new regulations that will provide additional administrative review procedures—a commitment made both to this court and in the formal entry in the TSA rulemaking dockets—provides sufficient assurance that the agencies will never return to [the] allegedly unlawful procedures.”). Government entities are entitled to a

presumption of good faith when a change in policy eliminates the case or controversy. See Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 325 (“Without evidence to the contrary, we assume that formally announced changes to official governmental policy are not mere litigation posturing.”). The Legislature’s formal repeal of the statutes at issue in this case demonstrates beyond any doubt that the State will not reanimate the challenged redistricting plans. With no prospect that the 2011 plans will be used to conduct elections, any order enjoining their use or declaring them unlawful would serve no purpose, as it would not change the plaintiffs’ position. Because ruling on the

validity of the repealed 2011 plans can provide no relief to the parties, any such

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ruling would constitute an advisory opinion, which the federal courts lack power to issue. E.g., Prieser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (“[A] federal court has neither the power to render advisory opinions nor ‘to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.’” (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971))). This case no longer presents a live controversy because the Legislature has repealed the redistricting plans challenged by the plaintiffs. The statutes that

created Plans C185 and H283 will not take effect. Those plans will not be used to conduct any election. Any order to prevent their implementation would be an

advisory opinion. This Court lacks jurisdiction. The case should be dismissed as moot. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Dated: June 28, 2013

Respectfully submitted. GREG ABBOTT Attorney General of Texas DANIEL T. HODGE First Assistant Attorney General /s/ David C. Mattax DAVID C. MATTAX Texas Bar No. 13201600 Deputy Attorney General for Defense Litigation J. REED CLAY, JR. Special Assistant and Senior Counsel 12

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to the Attorney General PATRICK K. SWEETEN Chief, Special Litigation Division ANGELA COLMENERO Assistant Attorney General MATTHEW H. FREDERICK Assistant Solicitor General P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, TX 78711-2548 (512) 463-0150 (512) 936-0545 (fax) ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS, RICK PERRY, AND JOHN STEEN

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this filing was sent on June 28, 2013, via the Court’s electronic notification system and/or email to the following counsel of record: DAVID RICHARDS Richards, Rodriguez & Skeith LLP 816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1200 Austin, TX 78701 512-476-0005 davidr@rrsfirm.com RICHARD E. GRAY, III Gray & Becker, P.C. 900 West Avenue, Suite 300 Austin, TX 78701 512-482-0061/512-482-0924 (facsimile) Rick.gray@graybecker.com ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS PEREZ, DUTTON, TAMEZ, HALL, ORTIZ, SALINAS, DEBOSE, and RODRIGUEZ JOSE GARZA Law Office of Jose Garza 7414 Robin Rest Dr. San Antonio, Texas 78209 210-392-2856 garzpalm@aol.com MARK W. KIEHNE mkiehne@lawdcm.com RICARDO G. CEDILLO rcedillo@lawdcm.com Davis, Cedillo & Mendoza McCombs Plaza 755 Mulberry Ave., Ste. 500 San Antonio, TX 78212 210-822-6666/210-822-1151 (facsimile) ATTORNEYS FOR MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS 14 GERALD H. GOLDSTEIN ggandh@aol.com DONALD H. FLANARY, III donflanary@hotmail.com Goldstein, Goldstein and Hilley 310 S. St. Mary’s Street San Antonio, TX 78205-4605 210-226-1463/210-226-8367 (facsimile) PAUL M. SMITH, MICHAEL B. DESANCTIS, JESSICA RING AMUNSON Jenner & Block LLP 1099 New York Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20001 202-639-6000 J. GERALD HEBERT 191 Somervelle Street, # 405 Alexandria, VA 22304 703-628-4673 hebert@voterlaw.com JESSE GAINES P.O. Box 50093 Fort Worth, TX 76105 817-714-9988 gainesjesse@ymail.com ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS QUESADA, MUNOZ, VEASEY, HAMILTON, KING and JENKINS

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NINA PERALES nperales@maldef.org MARISA BONO mbono@maldef.org Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund 110 Broadway, Suite 300 San Antonio, TX 78205 210-224-5476/210-224-5382 (facsimile) MARK ANTHONY SANCHEZ masanchez@gws-law.com ROBERT W. WILSON rwwilson@gws-law.com Gale, Wilson & Sanchez, PLLC 115 East Travis Street, Ste. 1900 San Antonio, TX 78205 210-222-8899/210-222-9526 (facsimile) ATTORNEYS FOR TEXAS LATINO REDISTRICTING TASK FORCE, CARDENAS, JIMENEZ, MENENDEZ, TOMACITA AND JOSE OLIVARES, ALEJANDRO AND REBECCA ORTIZ JOHN T. MORRIS 5703 Caldicote St. Humble, TX 77346 281-852-6388 JOHN T. MORRIS, PRO SE MAX RENEA HICKS Law Office of Max Renea Hicks 101 West Sixth Street Suite 504 Austin, TX 78701 512-480-8231/512/480-9105 (facsimile) ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS CITY OF AUSTIN, TRAVIS COUNTY, ALEX SERNA, BEATRICE SALOMA, BETTY F. LOPEZ, CONSTABLE BRUCE ELFANT, DAVID GONZALEZ, EDDIE RODRIGUEZ, MILTON GERARD WASHINGTON, and SANDRA SERNA 15

LUIS ROBERTO VERA, JR. Law Offices of Luis Roberto Vera, Jr. & Associates 1325 Riverview Towers San Antonio, Texas 78205-2260 210-225-3300 irvlaw@sbcglobal.net GEORGE JOSEPH KORBEL Texas Rio Grande Legal Aid, Inc. 1111 North Main San Antonio, TX 78213 210-212-3600 korbellaw@hotmail.com ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENORPLAINTIFF LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS ROLANDO L. RIOS Law Offices of Rolando L. Rios 115 E Travis Street, Suite 1645 San Antonio, TX 78205 210-222-2102 rrios@rolandorioslaw.com ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENORPLAINTIFF HENRY CUELLAR GARY L. BLEDSOE Law Office of Gary L. Bledsoe 316 W. 12th Street, Ste. 307 Austin, TX 78701 512-322-9992/512-322-0840 (facsimile) garybledsoe@sbcglobal.net ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENORPLAINTIFFS TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, SHEILA JACKSONLEE, ALEXANDER GREEN, HOWARD JEFFERSON, BILL LAWSON, and JUANITA WALLACE

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STEPHEN E. MCCONNICO smcconnico@scottdoug.com SAM JOHNSON sjohnson@scottdoug.com S. ABRAHAM KUCZAJ, III akuczaj@scottdoug.com Scott, Douglass & McConnico One American Center 600 Congress Ave., 15th Floor Austin, TX 78701 512-495-6300/512-474-0731 (facsimile)

VICTOR L. GOODE Asst. Gen. Counsel, NAACP 4805 Mt. Hope Drive Baltimore, MD 21215-5120 410-580-5120/410-358-9359 (facsimile) vgoode@naacpnet.org ATTORNEY FOR TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES

ROBERT NOTZON ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS CITY Law Office of Robert S. Notzon OF AUSTIN, TRAVIS COUNTY, ALEX 1507 Nueces Street Austin, TX 78701 SERNA, BALAKUMAR PANDIAN, 512-474-7563/512-474-9489 (facsimile) BEATRICE SALOMA, BETTY F. robert@notzonlaw.com LOPEZ, CONSTABLE BRUCE ELFANT, DAVID GONZALEZ, EDDIE ALLISON JEAN RIGGS ANITA SUE EARLS RODRIGUEZ, ELIZA ALVARADO, Southern Coalition for Social Justice JOSEY MARTINEZ, JUANITA 1415 West Highway 54, Ste. 101 VALDEZ-COX, LIONOR SOROLADurham, NC 27707 POHLMAN, MILTON GERARD WASHINGTON, NINA JO BAKER, and 919-323-3380/919-323-3942 (facsimile) anita@southerncoalition.org SANDRA SERNA CHAD W. DUNN chad@brazilanddunn.com K. SCOTT BRAZIL scott@brazilanddunn.com Brazil & Dunn 4201 FM 1960 West, Suite 530 Houston, TX 77068 281-580-6310/281-580-6362 (facsimile) ATTORNEYS FOR TEXAS STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP BRANCHES, EARLS, LAWSON, WALLACE, and JEFFERSON

DONNA GARCIA DAVIDSON PO Box 12131 Austin, TX 78711 512-775-7625/877-200-6001 (facsimile) donna@dgdlawfirm.com ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENORDEFENDANTS TEXAS DEMOCRATIC FRANK M. REILLY Potts & Reilly, L.L.P. PARTY and BOYD RICHIE P.O. Box 4037 Horseshoe Bay, TX 78657 512-469-7474/512-469-7480 (facsimile) reilly@pottsreilly.com ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT STEVE MUNISTERI 16

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Via Email JOAQUIN G. AVILA P.O. Box 33687 Seattle, WA 98133 206-724-3731/206-398-4261 (facsimile) jgavotingrights@gmail.com ATTORNEYS FOR MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS KAREN M. KENNARD 2803 Clearview Drive Austin, TX 78703 (512) 974-2177/512-974-2894 (facsimile) karen.kennard@ci.austin.tx.us ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF CITY OF AUSTIN DAVID ESCAMILLA Travis County Asst. Attorney P.O. Box 1748 Austin, TX 78767 (512) 854-9416 david.escamilla@co.travis.tx.us ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF TRAVIS COUNTY /s/ David C. Mattax DAVID C. MATTAX

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SAN ANTONIO DIVISION SHANNON PEREZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF TEXAS, et al., Defendants. ____________________________________ MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS, TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (MALC), Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF TEXAS, et al., Defendants. ____________________________________ TEXAS LATINO REDISTRICTING TASK FORCE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RICK PERRY, Defendant. ____________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11-CV-360-OLG-JES-XR [Lead case]

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11-CV-361-OLG-JES-XR [Consolidated case]

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11-CV-490-OLG-JES-XR [Consolidated case]

Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 768-2 Filed 06/28/13 Page 2 of 3

MARGARITA V. QUESADA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RICK PERRY, et al., Defendants. ____________________________________ JOHN T. MORRIS, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF TEXAS, et al., Defendants. ____________________________________ EDDIE RODRIGUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RICK PERRY, et al., Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11-CV-592-OLG-JES-XR [Consolidated case]

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11-CV-615-OLG-JES-XR [Consolidated case]

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11-CV-635-OLG-JES-XR [Consolidated case]

ORDER

Now before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. After considering the motion, the Court is of the opinion that, for the reasons stated therein, it should be GRANTED.

Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 768-2 Filed 06/28/13 Page 3 of 3

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is hereby GRANTED. SIGNED on this _______ day of ____________, 2013.

_________________________________ JERRY E. SMITH UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

_________________________________ ORLANDO L. GARCIA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

_________________________________ XAVIER RODRIGUEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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