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# Test 5 1. Use standard expression for MTTF = 1.83 yrs 2.

Use binomial expression for obtaining R(t) and hence MTTF = 1.67 yrs 3. a = 3 yrs; Prob. = 0.17 4. A(t2 t1 ) =

2

## 5. The Laplacian matrix for obtaining the solution is:

Test 6
1.

For 15 min exposure to chlorine leak, 50% fatality obtains at ~ 354ppm ~ 1x10-6 kg/m3. Hence at D4 the distance of concern ~ 267m The corresponding event frequency is f1 = (3x103 / yr )(520 / 3600 ) = 433x106 / yr

2.

The concentration of concern for propane gas leak is 0.5 LFL (50% fatality): ~ 10000ppm ~ 1.8x10-6 kg/m3. Hence at D4 the distance of concern ~ 46m The corresponding event frequency f 2 = (3x103 / yr )(0.3)(150 / 3600 ) = 37.5 x106 / yr For 50% fatality from fireball, the intensity of radiation (Ie) for the duration of the 30T fireball is given by using the corresponding probit equation and is ~ 53kW/m2 The distance at which this intensity obtains ~ 190m The corresponding event frequency f3 = (1x104 / yr )(0.25) = 25 x106 / yr
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3.

4.

For 50 % fatality from UVCE, ie 5 psi overpressure obtains at ~ 175m The corresponding event frequency f 4 = (1x104 / yr )(0.25) = 25 x106 / yr
100% fatality impact distance (m) 267 46 Event frequency x106 (/yr) 433 37.5

Incident

Description

1 2 3 4

Continuous Liquid Cl2 leak Continuous Propane gas discharge (Flash fire) Instantaneous Liquid Propane discharge (Fireball) Instantaneous Liquid Propane discharge (UVCE)

190 175

25 25

Incident 1 3 4 2

## IR (x 106) /person/yr 433 458 483 520.5

The last table suggests that at 100m from the plant the IR > 100 /106 /person/yr. hence it is not advisable to set up a residential facility at 100m. On a conservative extrapolation, the safe distance where one may permit such a residential locality is ~ 0.5km.
Test 7

1. Construct the Markov Chain diagram, and derive the expressions for dPi (t ) / dt and put them to zero to derive the relevant algebraic equations and eliminate P1. 2.
f (t ) = e t ; = t f (t )dt = 1/ ; 2 = (t ) 2 f (t )dt = 1/ 2 ; hence, COV = 1 ;
0 0

## Large LPG Leakage A

Immediate Ignition B

## Wind to Populated area C

Delayed Ignition D

## Frequency ( / year ) 2.8 x 10-6

Yes ( 0.1 ) Local Thermal hazard No ( 0.8 ) Yes ( 0.5 ) Yes ( 0.9 ) 8.5 x 10-6 1.1 x 10-5

UVCE

Yes ( 0.15 )

8.5 x 10-6

2.5 x 10-6

1.07 x 10-5

Test 8

## 6. (i) 0.12; (ii) 0.04 7. (i ) DL = 11.1 yrs

(ii) R(t T0 ) = conditional probability that a component survives till time t given that it has already survived T0. Hence, in this case R (t DL + 0.5 yrs) / R(0.5 yrs) = 0.9 DL = 15.8 yrs 8. The fault tree may be drawn by considering that for a top event Incipient Runaway the two contributory events (joined by OR gate) are: (i) loss of cooling, (ii) loss of stirring. The loss of cooling may be due to (a) Control valve failing closed (b) Plugged cooling coils (c) Cooling water service failure (d) Controller failing and closing cooling water valve (e) Air pressure failing and closing cooling water valve (pneumatically driven). All events (a) (e) are again connected by OR gate. Thus is follows that ( Incipient runaway ) = i = 0.4 / yr The event tree is next drawn as follows by considering the five safety systems. Please note that the tree shown below is identical to the one required by the problem 3; though the values of initiating event (A=incipient runaway) frequency and the probability of failure / demand of the safety systems (here B-F) are different in the fig.

For the present problem, overall frequency of runaway = 158.8 x106 / yr a. Monetary risk = Rs (100 x106 )(158.8 x106 / yr ) Rs16000 / yr b. Average Individual Risk = (0.5 fatality / person)(158.8 x106 / yr ) 80 x106 / person / yr