Definition of 'pantheism'

The D.E.D. defines 'pantheism' thus:
1. The religious belief or philosophical theory that God and the universe are identical (implying a denial of the personality and transcendence of God); the doctrine that God is everything and everything is God. 2. The heathen worship of all the gods.

The second meaning can be ignored here, l so I shall take the first definition as canonical, with the parenthesis deleted. Although it is true that most positions naturally described as pantheistic deny that God is personal, there are positions which identify God and the Universe, and hold that this one thing is a person (of which all finite persons are parts). Josiah Royce, for example, held this view. As for transcendence, this is so essentially contested a concept that it will be simpler to let the implications for this fall where they will in our discussion. This is verbally a little different from the meaning which Michael Levine, in his major study, selects from a variety of definitions as the most canonical, for which Pantheism is the view "that everything that exists constitutes a unity [in some sense] and ... this all-inclusive unity is divine [in some sense]" (adapted from Alasdair Macintyre).2 However, the actually held theories covered by the term will mostly be the same whichever meaning is chosen.
§2. Types of pantheism

So pantheism, in the sense in which I am taking it, identifies God and the Universe. We can take this specification a little further, and somewhat closer to Levine's favoured definition, if we say that, for the pantheist, "God is the unified totality of all things." This avoids the charge that pantheism consists merely in a cognitively vacuous renaming of the universe by a differently emotive word, for not everyone agrees that the
"Pantheism" by T. L. S. Sprigge, The Monist, vol. 80. no. 2, pp. 191-217. Copyright © 1997, THE MONIST, La Salle, Illinois 61301.



universe is unified, in any sense likely to be intended; indeed some hold that there is really no such thing as the universe, just lots and lots of things. What is meant by the claim that the totality of things is unified? It means, I suggest, that the totality is at least as much of a genuine individual as the most individual part of it. In fact, it is more likely than not that anyone who believes that the universe is a unified totality will believe that it is more of a genuine individual than anything within it. As to what being more or less of a genuine individual amounts to, it is a matter of how full a conception of it may be formed which does not depend on or carry information about how it is related to things outside it.
It is not merely the aggregate of all things that we worship as God ... A sand

heap is an aggregate, but it has no unity except to perception which figures it as contained within certain bounding surfaces, and perhaps-where reflection goes beyond that-as kept together by dead weight. But the bird alighting on it has a very different and relatively a more real unity. For the bird is not a mere aggregate .... Now ... it is often dangerous and always inconclusive to attempt any analogy between the finite and the infinite. Still, in this case the reasons for rejecting the suggestion that the Universe may be a mere aggregate appear to be irresistible. 3

To the notion of God as the unified totality of all things pantheism often, indeed typically, adds the notion of God as the inner life or being of every individual thing. Somehow, for most pantheists, the whole is present in each of its parts. This means, I suggest, first that there is an identical essence present in each (for some this would be consciousness) and that the way in which it is present in each reflects the way in which it is present both in each finite other and in the infinite Whole. 4 So God, for the paradigm pantheist, is both the universe as unified totality and something one and the same, appropriately regarded as divine, existing as the inner core of everything. And this whole and this shared essence are said to be somehow identical. So much for one side of the equation, but what of the other,-God? I suggest that something is appropriately called "God" if and only if (a) he, she or it satisfies at least one of the fourteen conditions below (understood in some not too far-fetched sense), (b) he, she or it satisfies more of them than does anything else. 1. He, she or it is creator of the universe (the totality of everything not himself). (No pantheist will believe in a God answering to this description.)

He. 7. she or it is the one thing through appropriate relation to which a human being can be "saved". A. 3. (Many pantheisms answer to more than one of these descriptions. she or it is the one proper object of worship. all-controlling person. He. He. in particular.) 4. 9. God is the total physical universe (conceived as highly unified) and a universal mind (including the minds of all true individuals in that universe) these being the same thing differently conceived. she or it is uniquely all-knowing. God (or the somehow divine reality which takes his place for the pantheist) is the animating spirit of nature. As such. she or it is uniquely all-experiencing (that is. 13. He. (This and the previous condition are not sharply distinct. God is the appropriate object of religious emotion. she or it is uniquely perfect in some possibly non-moral sense. is an all-knowing and so far as He or She wants to be. He. He. she or it is omni-present. 14. the right kind of .•) is both the world mind and the world body. God (or . or even actually advocated. 6. He. 8. 5.) B. God is the mind or animating spirit of physical nature as a whole. she or it is uniquely all-powerful. 12. (Wordsworth.PANTHEISM 193 2. He satisfies at least conditions (3).) The parenthesis after "God" is so that we can count as pantheists some thinkers for whom something to which they deny this name largely plays the role of God in their thought and feeling. He. related to it qua consciousness somewhat as each of us is related qua consciousness to our body or our brain. or rather He or She.. she or it is morally perfect to a degree which nothing else is. she or it is either uniquely real or real to a degree which nothing else is. He. she or it. He. it feels the experiences of all beings). He. but I shall briefly formulate what seem to me the eleven most important. We cannot sample all the possible. she or it is the one proper object towards which certain specifically religious emotions should be felt. 10. 11. she or it exists with a unique kind of necessity. He. (7) and (12) and probably several of the others. He. types of pantheism allowed by our lax definitions. she or it is the explanation of the existence of all other things.

This may be the position of qualified Advaita Vedanta as expounded by Ramanuja. satisfies most of the other conditions. are an illusion which one ultimate spiritual reality gives itself. or few. L. This is the position of Advaita Vedanta as elaborated by Sankara. C. both physical nature and all its conscious inhabitants. It is unified in the sense that it depends for its existence on nothing but itself. and most of the others. On many variants of this position it. Our salvation consists in our grasping the illusory nature of our world and of our separate existence and experiencing our identity with the One from which we were never really separate. or at least a mere presentation.)6 D. God is the total natural universe. Nothing exists except souls and their states and wholes made out of souls. God (or •••) is simply the natural universe conceived as an appropriate object for religious feeling. of course. 3. Salvation consists in consciously realizing one's identity with this Absolute. but one might also cite the pantheistic idealism of Gustav Fechner. and this is the most appropriate object of such religious emotions as reverence and awe. SPRIGGE love and it is through such love alone or best that human beings can be 'saved'. Such pantheism has been called rather aptly 'materialism gone sentimental'. given to itself by a single Absolute which may be called 'God' or at least plays something of the role of God for this point of view. If none. 1. 7. The world of daily life. (Conditions 2. and it alone. moreover. It satisfies at least conditions (3) and (8).5 (Richard Jeffries and Robinson Jeffers may be examples. It is also the view of Erwin Schrodinger7 . thus contrasting with everything within it. S. God (or •••) is a single Absolute Mind or Consciousness composed of souls and nothing else exists but Him and Them. more or less as scientifically conceived. of the other fourteen conditions are met we have a rather weak form of nature pantheism.194 T. The natural world and the mUltiplicity of conscious beings is an illusion. God is a soul composed of all other souls.) Spinozism is the chief example of this. E. excepted. humans can only find real peace by feeling thus about it.

H. The explanation of all things lies in the way in which this concrete universal actualises itself in finite things as a way towards its own complete fullness of being. This is another way of interpreting Hegelianism. The explanation of all things lies in the way in which this concrete universal actualises itself in finite things as a way towards its own complete fullness of being (conditions 7 and 9). Levine. holds that no respectable form of .PANTHEISM 195 and in effect with that of the almost forgotten. and things which exist only as objects of their awareness. S F. This is one way of interpreting Hegelianism. God is an essence of which all finite minds are specifications and nothing exists except this essence and those minds. This satisfies condition (6) and most versions will satisfy several of the others. So far as proposition (H) or (I) is the dominant principle in a pantheistic philosophy it is more the view that every individual thing is God than that God is the totality. God (or . Croce's philosophy is along these lines. God (or . such as Erwin Schrodinger.. indeed. I.•. God is an essence of which all finite things are specifications. G. Different versions of this will be committed to different ones of the other conditions. God (or .) is the identical essence present in all finite things.. including finite minds or conscious individuals. but highly interesting.) is the sole ultimate concrete universal of which all finite things are the instances. God (or •••) is the identical essence present in all minds. This is similar to (G) but need not involve the full panoply of the Hegelian concrete universal. finite minds. This is much the same as (F) but includes those who would not employ the notion of a concrete universal. God is a concrete universal whose instances are the various ordinary things of the natural world. Christian evolutionary pantheist Allanson Picton..• ) is the ultimate concrete universal of which minds like ours are the sole genuine instances God is a concrete universal whose instances are finite minds and nothing exists except this concrete universal.

. K.11 Concealed in the heart of all beings is the Atman. L. surely.. Bradleyl3 tended towards it but he also had some leanings towards position K below. IO ) The implication is.14 and it is one to which Bradley had some inclination. God (or . greater than the vast spaces. SPRIGGE pantheism allows the former doctrine and refers to. Green. Hegel's denial that any religion or philosophy has included the claim with reference to each thing that it is God. just as the Christian finds Jesus more approachable than God the Father or the ultimate Three-in-One. Josiah Royce is an interesting exponent of this view. 9 I disagree with both of them. IS . Consider the famous "Thou art that" of the Upanishads. S.) is the unified totality of all those finite experiences which are the stuff of the world and the only such experiences are those which for our everyday ontology pertain to humans and animals. God (or . without endorsing.) is the unified totality of all those finite experiences which are the stuff of the world and these experiences include many which constitute the inner essence of what are ordinarily regarded as non-sentient things. and so perhaps is T. 12 If each thing is God. H. J. This is likewise the meaning of the claim that 'the Atman is both the infinitely small within us and the infinitely great outside of US'. the Self. smaller than the smallest atom. then.. so many pantheists may relate more easily to the divine essence as present in individual things than aspire to intimacy with the dizzying totality of which they are such vanishingly small fragments. Indeed. not just that the whole is God but that everything within it is so too.196 T. (See especially 'The Education of Svetaketu' in the Chandogya Upanishad dialogue. of course. the Spirit. This is the position of Friedrich Paulsen.. the totality is God (except perhaps for some who deny that there is such a thing as the totality) but a pantheist may put the emphasis more on formulation (H) or (I) than on the other more totalistic formulations. Bosanquet would seem to be an example of this position. Bradley was also committed to something like (H) or (I).

he must insist that God's being contains the human soul along with every finite entity in the universe. First. But are there any interesting features in common to all. and how we should seek to relate ourselves to it. including the human soul. Such a view. and a created world. for all moral action would issue directly from God who would be the one moral agent in the universe. very differently. But as to the nature of this totality.. if persistently developed. Is there anything much to be said about pantheism in general? Thus the forms pantheism can take are very many on this definition. On the face of it. and that its object is the totality of what is. 17 . that every finite entity. The first encourages us to feel that we are likely to be closest to God when we wander in the woods and fields (or perhaps as space travellers through the wonders of the solar system and beyond) while the other suggests either that we are closest to God when we act as agents in the advance of human culture (Hegel and Croce) or. is no more than an idea in the unity of God's mind .. such a theory would invoke the statement . thus a denial of the free will often thought to be a necessary presupposition of morality.. or almost all. a creator God.PANTHEISM 197 §3.. They also share the view that the rejection of the notion of a Creator still leaves room for some kind of religious or quasi-religious attitude to the world. would clearly pulverize ethical theory.. for example. it is often thought that pantheism is bound to include a deterministic or fatalistic aspect.I 6 What pantheists do have in common (by the very definition of 'pantheism') is that the totality of all that is does not divide into two great components. usually as bad marks for pantheism. If one adheres without compromise to an extreme form of pantheism. between those views which equate God with the total natural universe and those which deny that there is such a universe. the differences between pantheists are greater than those which relate some of them to theism on the one hand and to atheism on the other. but only a spiritual One which gives itself the illusion of such a thing. In its idealist form. there is not much in common. forms of pantheism other than those which follow analytically from its definition? Two such features have been proposed. that we are so when we retire within ourselves and exclude all outward impressions (Sankara).

.. 19 Apparently from Aberdeen. Nearly all writers on the subject admit that it is the native home of Pantheism. so far as I can judge. It has been described as 'radically pantheistic. has been.2o Urquhart was Senior Professor of Philosophy in the Scottish Churches College. S.198 T. so he thought. 'He is Himself the very universe. As for the second point I think it only applies to inadequate forms of pantheism. even if possible. SPRIGGE Second. Pantheism in Indian Thought. as most fully exhibited. and shall be. He is whatever is.. Epics. I am inclined to agree that pantheism tends to be deterministic. and that from its cradle onwards. In the Rig-Veda (x. largely pointless. but I deny that this is ethically harmful. Pantheism and the Value of Life (with Special Reference to Indian Philosophy) by W. 18 This is from a little known book. S. Such a combination of circumstances we find in India. L. 90) we read. Calcutta. in Indian thought and religion. §4. and Puranas--down to the thought of the late nineteenth and even twentieth century writers who confess themselves of the same faith as their forefathers . there is some reason in the following observation of an early twentieth-century Scottish critic of pantheism.' In Vedic thought we may trace the pantheistic tendency back almost to its emergence in the religious consciousness. and appears to have made an intensive study of Hindu philosophy. India has been said to be 'the native home of pantheism'.21 Although one of the book's four parts is on Western pantheism the main focus is on its Indian forms. If so. Urquhart published in 1919.' Through the intervening centuries we can trace an unbroken line of development through the Brahmanas. If our object is to discover the effect of Pantheism upon practical life-values. The work provides an informative account of some of the different schools of Hindu thought (which. is substantially . pantheism is often charged with levelling all things up or down to a single plane so far as value goes. One wishes that it said something more personal about his life in India. and thereby making choice. we must find a set of circumstances in which Pantheism appears in its purity in an intellectual doctrine which for a lengthened period has formed a basis for a philosophy of religion and morals.

since this world spirit is eternal and unchanging. and. a pessimism about the human condition. a denial of free will. thus the world remains essentially the . But Urquhart was no mere cultural imperialist and in fact has much to say still worth attending to. their exponents correctly infer from them some essentially identical conclusions. Now although these seem very different. so far as there can be said to be agency in the world at all. it consists entirely of modifications of the one universal spirit. We. and a solution to this pessimism which. and God is everything which is. The determinism or fatalism of Advaita follows from the fact that. although the ordinary world is more than a mere illusion. that part must be negated. For. from Urquhart's point of view. 25) The first of these says that nothing really exists except the ineffably unitary Brahman and that the ordinary world with all its variety and multiplicity is an illusion. The second says that. the only agent is Brahman. are but phases of His Being. combine to constitute a conservative view of the world for which "whatever is. Here at once we see the possibility of the emergence of two closely related phases of Pantheism. and the rest of the universe. This conclusion also follows from the idea of qualified Vedanta that we are simply aspects or modes of the single world spirit. only makes things more gloomy. which might be described as negative and positive. Urquhart contends that there are basically two forms of pantheism: The fundamental formula of Pantheism would seem to be a double oneNothing is which is not God. in particular. It provides a fascinating insight into how a British representative of Christianity reacted to Indian philosophy and religion at that time and. There can be no other source of being than God. is right". These. the second is the qualified Vedanta classically formulated by Ramanuja.PANTHEISM 199 accurate) and subjects them to vigorous criticism. indeed. God and the universe must be identified. expresses a perspective on Hindu thought which may well continue to be the dominant one of Christians. we cannot expect its expression to change from age to age. if any part of the universe cannot be identified with Him. (p. The first is the Advaita Vedanta of which Sankara is the great classic exponent. Nothing can be conceived as having even temporary separation from Him. -Urquhart. and no other power than His. he says.

that escape is only a very negative blessing. From my limited knowledge. Rather. since our finally becoming submerged in Brahman (as in truth we always really were) seems indistinguishable from ceasing to exist (that is. or adopt a more altruistic style of life. the more ineffable it is seen to be. while the escape it offers. says Urquhart. ceasing even to seem to exist). if we are all the same being. the less can it hold any genuine attraction for us. and working solely for "selfish" ends. and the whole Vedanta tradition. so that we have no motivation for seeking its improvement. even qualified Vedanta only holds out to us the hope of a kind of peaceful nonactive contemplation of our particular place in the One. Urquhart allows that the Vedas are optimistic and positive about the things of this world. through union with God. than the question whether Indian pantheism is optimistic or pessimistic is the judgement that it levels all values. All are . Urquhart also sees little good in the often claimed sublimity and ethical richness of the Hindu idea that the one divine being is present in us all. Urquhart is able to make out his case more easily in the case of Advaita. L. indeed.200 T. and will act nobly to all others. SPRIGGE same throughout time and cannot get better. But. it seems to me that something like this is truer of Buddhism than of Hinduism (whether of the Vedanta type or otherwise). is. that so far as we sense that others are essentially identical with us. Nor is the bliss which is supposed to be the life of the One anything like happiness in any ordinary sense. More important. not so dissimilarly. Nothing in the world is really better than anything else. It is claimed. nothing in it is genuinely better or worse than anything else. What is more. we will no longer feel in competition with them. our salvation must consist in seeing through the illusion of variety and of ourselves as individual beings. And. is conceived so thinly and negatively that it can only appeal to those who have despaired of any more positive good. Since all there really is is the undifferentiated One. there can be no harm in my having more of the advantages of the world than another. but the more influential and credally more definite Upanishads. he thinks. since everything in the ordinary world is an illusion. since the beneficiary is the same whether I take the line of least resistance and think just of myself. In doing so we simply become one with the One and lose our apparent separateness from it. for our purposes. For it depicts the ordinary phenomenal world as unsatisfying and unimprovable. deeply pessimistic. And although each of these positions claims to offer us a way of release from our miseries. But the subject is too vast and daunting to be pursued here. S.

22 What is more. if less obviously. Bradley as though he were a fellow opponent of pantheism. This he finds a gloomy view in comparison with the progressive Christian view that. optimistic rather than pessimistic. This is why pantheism of the Vedanta type. still. or contemplation. However. In somewhat similar fashion. and the only relevant criterion is the subjective satisfaction it offers. suffer from the prejudices of those times. Thus he contends that. and with similar injustice.PANTHEISM 201 equally illusions. Urquhart says a good deal which is worth considering not only about Hindu pantheism but about pantheism in general. is simply to understand intellectually that they are necessary. as it seems to me. his only real reason for saying this is the supposed inadequacy of Spinoza's philosophy as a preparation for dealing with the evils of life. he tries to show that Hegel and Hegelianism (which he rightly regards as a form of pantheism) is pessimistic despite itself. Thus any object whatever is intrinsically as suitable an object for worship. surely. and that there was never any real alternative to their occurrence. for he certainly thought that life in the here and now could be made worth while and this is. distressed at the difficulty of westernising India. from one Vedanta perspective. the only difference being that having remained the province of philosophers its impact has not been so great. as any other. 23 Doubtless the judgements of a nineteenth-century Scottish Christian missionary. according to Urquhart. Urquhart's charge that pantheism levels all values helps us understand . is ready to justify polytheism. and he says the same about other pantheistic systems from the Stoics till his own time. he was ready on occasion to call himself a pantheist. for Spinoza. we can hope to improve things both in this world and the next so that misery is not the essential feature of the world which it must be for a naturalistic determinist. through meeting them manfully. In fact. since it is simply a matter of which conceived divinity produces the deeper subjective feelings. H. the notion of the equal value and divinity of everything makes all attempts at progress futile because everything is equally good and equally bad. For Urquhart attempts to show that these baleful consequences follow equally. However. That seems to me a feeble ground for calling Spinoza a pessimist. Rather oddly Urquhart several times quotes from F. from pantheism in its various Western guises. he says. The remedy. although Bradley did insist that the Absolute should not be identified with the God of religion. or manifestations of Brahman from another. although Spinoza is often called an optimist the real upshot of his thought is pessimistic.

§5. The Reality is viewed perhaps as immanent in all its appearances. and many Hindus would reject Urquhart'S charge that their religion is pessimistic. up if the world is seen as through and through equally divine. not being the Reality. Appearance and Reality p. that nothing can be viler or can be more sublime than anything else. in the case of thinkers like Bradley. that it keeps state by itself and does not descend into phenomena. although it is the sole genuine reality. It is against both sides of this mistake. in the kind of truth sought in metaphysics. there is nothing except consciousness or sentient experience (I use these expressions synonymously) and its elements. that the Real sits apart. For the one type the Absolute. that is. indeed. it is against this empty transcendence and this shallow Pantheism.. that our pages must be called one sustained polemic. It may be summed up briefly as follows: (1) In literal truth. is. The positive relation of every appearance as an adjective to Reality. and the presence of Reality among its appearances in different degrees and with diverse values-this double truth we have found to be the centre of philosophy. down if the world is seen as an illusion to be transcended in our quest for unity with the undifferentiated One of Sankara's vision. again. is something quite apart from the illusory world revealed to our senses or to conventional thought. My own pantheism The view of reality to which my personal philosophical quest has led me answers to the description of pantheism of type (K). in such a way that it is. Thus in the following passage Bradley rejects two types of pantheism. It is easy to perceive that any appearance. so divine on the other.. It is because the Absolute is no sundered abstraction but has a positive character. Each in is own way levels all things either up or down to the same value. S. SPRIGGE why thinkers of that period whose position seems obviously pantheistic were often reluctant to accept this classification of their positions. Everything is so worthless on one hand. L. 488 So whatever may be true of Indian thought. perhaps. It costs little to find that in the end Reality is inscrutable. that appearances themselves can possess true differences of value. it is more plausible to regard it as tending to an excess of optimism. . it is because this Absolute itself is positively present in all appearance. pantheism in the West. Or it is as cheap. surely. in a sense is fallacious .202 T. not pessimistic in tone. to take up another side of the same error. For the other type the Absolute is the whole of things somehow equally present in each of its parts. It is a simple matter to conclude further.. alike and equally present in all.

functioning according to partly fresh laws. 24 (1) Nothing exists except experiences. (6) Finite centres of experience are each qualified by characteristics which they could only have as just the components they are in just that "place" within the absolute Whole. another in the same "biography" (a "first" and "last" such experience perhaps excepted) so that the series seems a temporal one. but each experience feels itself as emerging from. and does not depend upon being observed by humans or animals to do so. I infer it from the following premisses. an active aspect which rightly feels itself to be acting either upon the not-self aspect or on what the not-self aspect symbolises. or at least something exists which is what seems to be the physical world. These experiences are all just eternally there in the Absolute. and experiences are either total units of the type which constitute the "what it is like to be it" of some phenomenal individual. (3) All finite centres of experience are elements in one single cosmic consciousness. best called "the Absolute". There must be some way in which the relatively high level centres of experience which constitute our consciousness fit into the system. or components in such total units. (5) In at least the most familiar cases the experiences which constitute the biography of a centre each have two aspects. (4) The existence of these centres is no different from the fact that there is a series of total momentary states of experience which constitute their "biographies". (2) The physical world exists. I cannot give more than a vague gesture to my reasons for holding this view. but whether they do so by constituting an extra to it. this being essentially a compulsory construction through which high level centres like ourselves relate themselves usefully thereto. The self aspect is the ego of that centre of experience in its then state. There is a system of mostly low level such centres which is the reality behind the physical world. for each of which I have a battery of arguments which I cannot deploy here. (3) Things can only be related to each other in virtue of the fact that they help together to constitute some individual which is more of a genuine individual than any of its parts. like a human being or an animal. Exception: when the relation is the part/whole relation it is required instead that either the whole is more of a genuine individual than any of its parts or that it contains that part in . or whether they are simply standard elements within it is problematic.PANTHEISM 203 (2) In literal truth the world consists of innumerable finite centres of experience. and passing into.

204 T. I shall put "Y" or "N" or "0" after each condition to indicate either that the universe. does not satisfy it. It is through (4) that I reach the conclusion that each centre of experience is qualified by its precise role in constituting the absolute experience. 1. a system of innumerable mutually influencing streams of experience such as constitute the biographies of sentient individuals of various degrees of mental clarity. just "pantheism". He. S. So let us see how many of the fourteen conditions which favour calling something "God" apply to the universe for what I shall verbally beg the question by calling "our pantheism" or rather. satisfies it. for simplicity. N . (5) There is a truth about the past to which the so-called law of bivalence applies and this can only be so if past. present and future are all eternally just there. 25 (4) The inherent character of a part of a whole which is more of a genuine individual than it is reflects the character of that whole. Thus we have arrived at a pantheism which is both of type (B) and of type (K). L. It is through (3) that I reach the view that all these experiences pertain to one total individual which experiences them as ingredients in its own being. as I conceive it. in the sense that nothing could be just like that without being just such a part of just such a whole. Or at least have done so to whatever extent the world thus conceived is appropriately called "God". It is through (5) that I reach the view that this total individual is not subject to change but eternally includes the experiences of all individuals at all times. she or it is creator of the universe (the totality of everything not himself). or is the appearance of. or that this must be left as an open question. SPRIGGE virtue of itself being part of a whole which is more of a genuine individual than any of its parts. It is through (1) and (2) that I reach the panpsychist view that physical reality either consists in. These conclusions imply the somewhat Spinozistic view that the world is both a single spatio-temporal physical system (or at least what appears as such) and a single consciousness of which all finite consciousnesses are components.

and we can hardly enter into that issue here. But whether this is the best approach must depend heavily on the general view taken of such "abstract" truths. for there are no matters of fact other than such facts about the character. It is either uniquely real or real to a degree which nothing else is. It (he or she) is uniquely all-experiencing (that is. But what of abstract truths. Y 3. for it experiences the total experience of every individual centre of consciousness and how they relate to each other. say about each natural number and how it relates to each of the others? There must be such truths. and thus as possessing the first two characteristics in our family resemblance type analysis of the concept of "God". is certainly all-experiencing. that is.) Y The universe or Absolute. yet as the cosmic all-container its knowledge can hardly be cognitively deficient. (except in so far as these are matters thought of within finite centres) the point is arguable. never entertained in any finite mind. it feels the experiences of all beings). 4. The general tenor of our thought is certainly to regard the Absolute as all-knowing and all-experiencing.PANTHEISM 205 This is denied by our pantheism as it is by definition by pantheism in general. ultimately how they are arranged to constitute the one cosmic experience which it is. It seems to follow that the Absolute knows every matter of fact. 2. Are we to suppose that the Absolute knows all such truths? One approach is to make a distinction like that which Whitehead made between the primordial nature of God. Y . one may think that a lizard experiences all its experiences without knowing any facts about it. surely. filling and arrangement within itself of all finite centres of consciousness. (This and the previous condition are not sharply distinct. It (he or she) is uniquely all-knowing. which is the home of eternal objects and their relations one to another. and the consequent nature of God which concerns how some of the eternal objects have entered into history or into finite thought. Or may it experience all this and yet not know all or any such facts? After all. qua consciousness including all other consciousnesses as its parts or aspects. If this means that the Absolute may not know things primarily in a propositional way.

But granted that there is a reality. In either case Reality must somehow be there. the arguments just so briefly sketched show that it must be an absolute consciousness which includes all such finite consciousnesses as there are as its components. S. be in a way in which the Absolute comes out as the maximally real being. However. perhaps in every detail?26 Is it. surely. when we come to such questions as whether the physical universe exists or not we are asking whether Reality is partly or wholly physical in character. or at least is there. depends heavily on the assumption that at any moment there are all sorts of things . The initially obvious answer is affirmative. However. According to this view. if we are to attach sense to this expression at all. does it have to be an Absolute like ours in greater detail. By calling something an abstraction here is meant that the proper way of conceiving it is as an element in the nature of something else. for to ask whether it does is to ask whether Reality includes or is Reality and this is either meaningless or a question whose answer must be affirmative.206 T. It exists with a unique kind of necessity. not contingent rather than necessary that the absolute consciousness contains you and me behaving just as we have done and will do. Thus the big existential questions are questions about the character of Reality. whatever it is. which is as much as to say that it must answer to our description of the Absolute. There can thus be no question of Reality not existing. the idea that things might have been different. So it is necessarily true that something answering to our description of the Absolute exists. as we ordinarily entertain it. the question of whether Yettis exist or not is a question about what roams the Himalayas. for example. SPRIGGE It is a matter of debate whether reality can have degrees. the question whether unicorns exist or not is either a question about what roams the earth or what roams somewhere in our physical universe. Thus the question whether the Loch Ness monster exists is a question about the filling of Loch Ness. Y It seems to me (to speak boldly on a point of such traditional contention) that the question whether something exists or not always concerns the character or filling of something whose existence is presupposed. saying that one thing is more real than another may mean that it is less of an abstraction than the other. it must. But granted that there must be such an Absolute. For example. S. L.

It may . moreover. the explanation of all things. and good to a degree that nothing else is or can be? Well. Y However. as we have contended that it does.PANTHEISM 207 about the future which are open. indeed. It is not an individual who makes choices which can be regarded as good or bad. Y The Absolute for which I have argued is a uniquely genuine whole whose character is reflected in each of its parts. Y in the sense that an adequate grasp of it (such as only itself can have) would show that there was no alternative to things being as they are. there can be no such openness for it. since on our view there was never any real possibility of an alternative there is no alternative possible universe than which it can think itself worse. For how can there be unhappiness without an urge to move to a different state of mind? Yet the Absolute includes all time. Thus it can hardly be regarded as morally perfect. 0 This seems to me an unhelpful description but so equally is its negation. 7. It seems fairly obvious from all this that the Absolute is 6. in a significant sense possess this traditional feature of God.27 As a unifying consciousness including all things it must presumably have some over-all hedonic state. So if the Absolute contains all times. all-powerful. But does it have to regard itself as absolutely good. N The pantheist of our type will not regard God or the Absolute as a person. he may well think that there is some non-moral sense in which it is perfect. It is omni-present. In some sense it must be aware of itself as good. It is morally perfect to a degree which nothing else is. Thus it does. and cannot feel urges to move beyond what it is. It is uniquely perfect in some non-moral sense. and that does suggest that there is at least one sense in which things could not have been otherwise. 9. and it is hard to regard that as an unhappy one. 10. each part shares in the same generic character or essence of consciousness. As for being 8.

upon the whole the notion of worship seems more at home in ceremonial contexts than in rapturous communion with Nature and it is this formalised worship (and ceremonial prayer) so essential to most of what is called "religion". the world certainly contains a vast amount of the horrible. and not merely through their contingent failure to unite in a church. S. This may seem horribly optimistic in the fashion of Leibniz or of Pope. Wordsworth described himself as having been at one stage a 'worshipper of Nature' . On the other hand. are the appearance. emerging from traditional Christianity. I cannot accept that the Nazi concentration camps were 'partial Evil. indeed. on balance. It is the one proper object of worship.30 Since my own pantheism is not so far from Picton's. or. the whole necessary thing is worth while. I have some doubts as to whether worship of. but that only takes away from its perfection if its over-all state is bad rather than good. as opposed to the search for felt participation in. universal Good' . and I cannot believe that much of this is somehow redeemed by its contribution to some greater good. including ourselves. a suitable object of worship or even the only suitable object of worship? It has been though that it is not so. The only compensation for this is that. As such. Such a view was challenged by Allanson Picton who actually envisaged the development of a pantheistic church. It would include procedures for inducing experiences of just the kind Wordsworth describes at his most pantheistic. I see no other solution to this pantheistic version of the problem of evil than that the whole thing is both necessary in every detail and in its totality good. 11. even to . as we have characterised it.208 T. 0 Is the Absolute. 28 True. is the proper attitude to our pantheistic God or Absolute. Well. I regard this so far unfulfilled hope (unless we regard some intellectually wild "new age" practices as such) with respect. That is true.29 However. it includes. SPRIGGE be said that if there could have been nothing better equally there could have been nothing worse. since worship implies an I-thou relationship not open to pantheists of whatever stripe. and which for him was the non-superstitious replacement of the traditional creator God. much evil which does not in any way contribute to its goodness. which has seemed unavailable to pantheists. in which there would be ceremonies which would assist the sense of union with the intellectually unknowable one substance of which all phenomena. of necessity. L.

and to one's particular place in it. For worship reeks too much of the propitiation of a dangerous cosmic egotist (a "jealous God") who is a glutton for praise. Instead. I finish with the suggestion that religious institutions and formal worship should be seen as cultural phenomena to be judged by their moral and spiritual fruits rather than for the intellectual satisfactoriness of the associated theology or metaphysics. and more profoundly. the pantheist may believe that religious emotion may appropriately be felt towards various supposed divine beings. or perhaps false personalisations of the natural world. which cannot be regarded as the All. On the other hand. rather than in Hell? Yes. as Bradley for example emphasised. It seems that this must consist in a sense of oneness with the universe. a phenomenon of the possibility of which our pantheism may provide the best intellectual explanation. as much as here. If the pantheist does not believe in a life after death this seems a good a way of understanding "salvation".PANTHEISM 209 a more traditional creator God. Y To live a fulfilled life requires that one somehow adapts to the universe. 0 This being so. but even if there is a life after death it can only be heavenly there. 13. But does not salvation traditionally consist in winning a place after one's death in Heaven. 12. either induced by the mere belief in the truth of pantheism or. It would indeed be rather odd if the pantheist did not think pantheistic belief and sentiment among the world's goods. by the real partial breaking down of barriers between one's own consciousness and consciousness beyond. Why should God not be happier expressing himself in loving human relationships or in the creativity of the artist than in being worshipped by cringing fawners upon his favours? A fuller discussion would need to consider the Vedantist view of Bhakti Yoga as the prime way in which the less sophisticated may reach union with the divine. but. he is likely to feel that there is an appropriate religious emotion of a pantheistic type. It is the one proper object towards which certain specifically religious emotions should be felt. if one is adapted to the universe and one's particular place in it. It is the one thing through appropriate relation to which a human being can be "saved". So salvation taken . he need not think that the metaphysics he holds for true is everywhere and every when the best basis for a satisfactory human life.

N If a person has to be an agent living in time and coping with an external world. It is worth remarking. does not. is not a person. or the Universe as we conceive it to be. It hardly requires much argument to show that our pantheism will not acknowledge that there is anything else with a higher score than this. As for the question of life after death. that some philosophers properly described as pantheists have shown no particular love of nature. Actually. 14. Spinoza certainly does not do this. then the Absolute. II spirito. through. No pantheism or idealism to which I could subscribe would play down the vastness of the non-human (or non-animal) cosmos. I agree with Santayana that those absolute idealist pantheists who seem to think that the world spirit fulfills itself almost exclusively in human life are guilty of "cosmic impiety" towards the great natural scheme of things. our pantheism. It. S. seems to be expressed almost exclusively in man and his works. Nature Mysticism It is often supposed that the main inspiration for pantheism lies in mystical or quasi-mystical experiences of "nature" and that the pantheist believes that these experiences provide our best clue to how Reality really is. if pantheism is true. settle the matter one way or the other.210 T. satisfies eight of them. So it seems appropriate to call the Absolute. fails to satisfy three. the universe or Absolute. On the other hand he was clearly of the opinion that God was expressing . therefore. as such. This seems to be true of Croce. or rather He or She. for example. while there are three on which I have not adjudicated. person. is an all-knowing and so far as He or She wants to be. qua universal consciousness. he had little chance to see mountains which are among the main evokers of a spiritual sense of oneness with nature. SPRIGGE in this sense will come. §6. or pantheistic God. an appropriate relation to God. so not a person of this description)! Count of the indicators Thus out of fourteen conditions which favour calling something God. particularly cultural works. "God" and thus describe our position as genuinely pantheistic. like most others. for him. L. though he enjoyed a pleasant walk). and only through. all-controlling. as our pantheism conceives it. though there is no evidence of his having had any great enthusiasm for the great outdoors (after all.

The mountain. and the deep and gloomy wood. though by no means the only. For nature then . And I personally think that the pantheist should regard nature mysticism as a significant. (1797-1800) conceived of a power which rolls through all things and with which one communicates when entranced by natural beauty and that this is both a tranquillising and a moralising experience. yet animal life seems the most obvious.. Its great statement is in 1intern Abbey.-I cannot paint What then I was. . Does nature really have the almost deliberately moralising power which Wordsworth seems to ascribe to it? One impulse from a vernal wood May teach you more of man.3 4 In this connection it is significant that Wordsworth's nature descriptions mostly concern mountains. Wordsworth's ideas on this matter cause me some worries. 32 Wordsworth's pantheism. Their colours and their forms.. the one interior life That lives in all things . place in which to look for what a spirit rolling through all things might be like. and in some ways the most alarming... excepted). In which all beings live with God.. To me was all in all.. shrieked against his creed. not animal life (birds. . themselves are God . IfI may be so prosaic about great poetry. were then to me An appetite . .3 3 But is not nature just as much as Tennyson so fearfully saw it?: [Man] trusted God was love indeed And love Creation's final lawTho' nature red in tooth and claw With ravine. Pantheism founded in nature mysticism finds its fullest expression in the poetry of Wordsworth (though in later life he moved to a more orthodox Christianity than that expressed in his earlier work) . at its height.. For if there is a divine mind . to some extent.PANTHEISM 211 himself as truly in the non-human as in the human. Or moral evil and of good Than all the sages can. . The sounding cataract Haunted me like a passion: the tall rock. support for his view of things. 35 No mention of animals here. . plants and the sky.

or at least merely human. creation . . then Deem that our puny boundaries are things. it somewhat dashes quasi-mystical responses to nature to conceive it to any extent as a solipsistic. and that this provides a joyful sense ofrelieffrom one's usual egotism and a sense of belonging to something greater than oneself. weaken the barriers which divide our consciousness from that consciousness which is the in-itself of what surrounds us.. However. but one's barriers are kept up in the one as they are not in the other. Thou art no slave Of that false secondary power. 37 This is particularly problematic where one is responding to a panorama whose apparent unity can hardly reflect any especial togetherness of its components. Indeed we find Wordsworth himself congratulating Coleridge on his awareness of this fact. be most clearly present where the fact of sentience forces itself upon us in what we observe.: . 38 . surely.. or even the countryside. we create distinctions. The moment of final fright and pain before an animal is seized by a predator are only a small part of that animal's life. so far as animals are concerned. is that certain scenes. . of the essence of Wordsworth's pantheistic view that what the nature lover experiences is the joint product of his own activity and the power working in objective nature. But perhaps the sense that the jungle. by which In weakness. indeed. we receive but what we give And in our life alone does Nature live . as for example with a beautiful sunset. is. Another worry is that the sensory panorama to which the nature lover of the more mystical kind responds does not seem to be a very genuine unit. One does not have to think that the surrounding environment is in itself more sublime than that in many less beautiful places. primarily a scene of horror is misconceived. and the general searching for food and mating which is the dominant theme in animal life (out of the laboratory) may be cheerful enough and may even have its pauses in which there is a certain joy in the mere fact of sentient being. All the same.. a possible answer. Perhaps not only every plant. 'enjoys the air it breathes'. .36 It is.212 T.. but every animal. L. it must.. especially when experienced in solitude. SPRIGGE present everywhere. suggested above. S.

I am inclined to regard them not as mere illusions but as a genuine experience of what Spinoza called 'the union of our mind with the whole of nature'. . If aspects of Schopenhauer's thought were not evidently expressions of such a flawed personality. present and identical in all of them. make better sense of his ethics. he might well be chosen as the great Western exponent of the pantheistic and Vedantic account of the basis of ethics as residing in the intuitive realization that . 40 Nonetheless. pantheism need not be associated with any special feeling for what we loosely call "nature" in this kind of context. there is yet manifested only one and the same truly existing essence. however infinite the number in which they exhibit themselves successively and simultaneously. to agree with Schopenhauer that the phenomenal world is the way in which a single world Will presents itself to itself. Pantheism. §7.. then. What makes this inappropriate is that it is so nasty and futile in Schopenhauer's opinion.. however. casting no further light on its nature. This would. 41 What is strange in Schopenhauer is that he bases ethics upon the fundamental identity of every subject of experience while thinking of that . Ethics and Pessimism Does pantheism have anything much to say about ethics? I believe that it does. And I do not accept Urquhart's claim that such an ethics makes unselfishness pointless. since clearly benefiting the One by always putting oneself first will not conduce to general satisfaction. is certainly one form of pantheism. but as the examples of Hegel and Croce show. Schopenhauer scorned pantheism on two grounds. all plurality is only apparent. In short. as the recognition of the other as in essence oneself again. in all the individuals of this world. First.. and to take a more positive view of this world Will and of its manifestations than he does.. much of Schopenhauer's metaphysics could be made the basis of a less pessimistic view of the world.PANTHEISM 213 So since these experiences can be so strong. It is not impossible. Second. This. which upon the whole represents for me the ethics to which pantheism points. shabby world" as this "God" was absurd. it risks amounting to no more than the use of "God" as another name for the universe. his one cosmic Will meets many of the indicators for being called "God". in fact. and our own metaphysics can make some sense of them. he thought that to call "such a mean. 39 However.

as it does in similar Hindu treatments of ethics. It is not merely unrealistic. such points cannot be argued here. must be balanced by an ethics of self-realization. I rather doubt his more general claim about pantheism. (This is associated with his denial that metaphysical monism is essential to or even typical of pantheism. as the doctrine that the same world essence is identically present in each of us. gives its own special cognitive grounding to this. Levine several times denies that pantheism holds that the universe is perfect. So the precepts of pantheism here are not especially different from those to which we almost all give at least notional assent. However. However. What you see when you look into another person's eyes. to which I am closest in outlook. and thus its own particular answer to ethical scepticism. Thus it does not rest upon any reverence for this universal shared essence.214 T. and that therefore we should love our neighbour as ourself. Such an ethics of compassion. something Levine denies. 197 and 207-218). We saw above that W. pp. something hardly possible if one regards one's own happiness as of no account. Levine. unfortunately. that is the Atman. immortal. Urquhart claims that pantheism is necessarily deeply pessimistic. To do so is to risk being the curmudgeon which. that is Brahman. Concern for others arises most healthily from the realization that their happiness matters as much as one's own. S. in my opinion. but undesirable. to attempt such complete selflessness that one has no concern for one's own flourishing. SPRIGGE identical essence (the world Will) which is present in each as pretty loathsome. Apart from the fact that the pantheism of Spinoza and Bradley. S. in contrast to Spinoza. merged with the Absolute (for Vedanta or as monadic . is certainly monistic. pantheism. accounts of Schopenhauer (one hopes unfairly) tend to represent him as having been. But the only better world to which intellectual Hinduism beckons us is one in which. beyond fear. Put in pantheistic terms the divine spark must be recognized in oneself if it is to be recognized in others. In its Hindu form it regards the world of everyday life as an unfortunate illusion. -Chandogya Upanishad42 The ethics implied by this is nothing more novel than that of the ethics based primarily upon compassion of all the great religions at their best. L. and life in it as bound to be a wretched thing. Similarly I believe that pantheism tends to be deterministic. who saw concern for others as an outgrowth of concern for oneself.

If pantheism is deterministic. 23. too. 43 T. as implicitly pessimistic. see below at n. Sprigge The University of Edinburgh NOTES 1. between determination by rational or intuitive insight and determination by irrational impulses.PANTHEISM 215 individuals for Samkbya Yoga) we experience a blank dim sense of selfidentity. and if greater optimism than that is required of a faith. or as Wordsworth put not so different a point from a full imagination of the effects of action. W. cannot be a great good. 25. 3. 2. S. The Religion of the Universe (London: Macmillan. 152-53. 1919). it can make the distinction Spinoza made so well. 1904). I do not have the space to say much about how our views of pantheism relate. I conceive pantheism as more intimately related to metaphysical monism (individual substance. Spinoza. Nor need it regard everything in the world as of equal value. Whether we agree or not with Urquhart that Indian pantheism is pessimistic (something Hindus today usually contest) I do not think pantheism need be so. But there is nothing in pantheism which suggests that life. In particular. rather the opposite seems true. Wordsworth (in his pantheistic days). not in the mathematical sense. the wish should not be in vain. there is much agreement and some disagreement. 5. since to wish to be determined in the first more positive way is to be on the path to being so. Urquhart. J. It by no means implies that there is nothing really worth while in existence and that all is vanity or worse. not so much blissful as hardly distinguishable from unconsciousness. but to contrast the concrete whole of concrete things and its parts or part-like aspects. Pantheism: A Non-Theistic Concept of Deity (London and New York: Routledge. monism) than does Levine. Levine. At that period the extension of 'mate- . p. Moreover. Allanson Picton. pp. the requirement is absurd. Allanson Picton and Bradley all thought that life at its best is wonderful. not type of substance. and as flattening all values. but that unless societies organize themselves well. it tends to the dreadful. Michael P. 4. However. In spite of Urquhart's attempt to depict all forms of Western pantheism. S. and individuals live in the light of a clear grasp of their own needs and those of others. L. p. 614. if lived nobly. Throughout this article 'infinite' and 'finite' will be used. 1994). Pantheism and the Value of Life with Special Reference to Indian Philosophy (London: Epworth Press.

From the Katha Upanishad in Mascaro. surely. p. 1945). or its being necessary or contingent that our one is completely or partially just as it is. L. 342-47 for an excellent discussion of the matter. 1899 and 1901) and other works. L. [First German edition was 1892. says: 'We may all be perfectly sure that it [the world] will go on beautifully without us. thesis from Aberdeen University on which the book is based. Strange Seas of Thought: Studies in William Wordsworth's Philosophy of Man and Nature (Durham. Josiah Royce. 264-76. Sprigge. in the end. 24. 11. James and Bradley: American Truth and British Reality.. 1964). 125 n. Urquhart. 1930). 6. 5. for many other pantheists. However. Levine (cited in n. pp.). 58. Friedrich Paulsen (trans!. the divine unity) is not understood to be a perfect being' (Levine. NC: Duke University Press. 91. See T. p. SPRIGGE rialism' included naturalistic theories for which the mental was the product of the physical. 13. (Chicago: Open Court. I shall avoid the tricky and. The Absolute could still be proved to exist if these italicised words were replaced by "is more of a genuine than.' by Swami Vivikenanda. unlike. 1993) pp. for example. The Upanishads (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books). 12. See Josiah Royce The World and the Individual. . See Richard Jeffries. Thus Vivikenanda. Frank Thilly. 7. 9. But he did describe himself as a pantheist. "Spinoza and Jeffers on Man in Nature". 58. L.216 T. 8. discussed in Levine p. and. 35. 35. See n. or as much of a genuine individual as" and premiss (5) were dropped. p. I find it a little surprising that Levine says that 'in pantheism God (i. 25. 159-60). 119. Newton P. 26. The Story of my Heart and George Sessions. 27. 659 et passim. S. See Levine pp. even if not strictly physical itself. 313-28. and certainly in some respects the Absolute plays the role of God for him. (New York: Dover. 22.). The book's reference to its sources is (like others of that time) not very full.. p. Karma-Yoga (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama). 1959. See the work cited at n. 17. above). It is true that Bradley. (Inquiry 201977). and indeed not bother our heads wishing to help it. 143. pp. for details. above. though it would seem that he did. Stallknecht. My View of the World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. first pub!. Urquhart. the turn-of-the-last-century Vedantist. If it is true that Indian Hinduism is in essence pantheistic then some qualification is required of Levine's remark that pantheism has never functioned as a communal religion with 'an established body of religious teaching' . p. 20. 3.] 15. 10. 2 vols. Sprigge. Or at any rate with a Ph. Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt. Urquhart. 3. 16. 44 and p. p. The Vindication ofAbsolute Idealism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. See Erwin SchrOdinger. It is so for both Spinoza and Bradley. S. the proof would establish less about the nature of the Absolute. 425-40.D. 18. refused to identify the Absolute with God. 23. 21. 14. 2. 19.e. p. Juan Mascaro (trans. 28. S. rather pointless distinction some would make between its being necessary or contingent that the Absolute which does exist is our one. p. it is not clear even whether he read the relevant texts in Sanskrit. 1983). above. T. Urquhart.

33. For a discussion of Wordsworth's philosophical development during the years of his greatness see Alan Grob. "A Few Words on Pantheism" in Arthur Schopenhauer (selected and trans. 39. From The Prelude. Mascaro translation. 1980). This is because I have discovered that some Unitarian churches answer very successfully to this description without any of the crankiness of New Age religions. The Philosophical Mind: A Study of Wordsworths Poetry and Thought. Cf. From "Lines Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey". However. 1965). J. E. 36. 319ff. 10. Levine. iv. Payne). 35. OH: Ohio State University. In "Lines Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey". 37. 1973). 41. (cited in n. Allanson Picton discussed the possibility of a church with institutionalised pantheistic nature worship calculated to produce an experience of nature akin to that described in Wordsworth's poetry. and the required respect for otherness is satisfied by enjoyment of the fresh variation or sense that some hidden one is there. Postscript: Since writing this article I have found cause to modify my remarks about the possibility of a pantheistic church. the same theme with variations. transl. 1797-1805 (Columbus. 40. B.PANTHEISM 217 29. 357. 31. From The Prelude. Saunders). vol. It is sometimes objected that this ethics of identity misses the significance of absolute otherness for ethics. 34. p. F. from Parerga and Paralipomena by T. p. Religion and Other Essays (London: Sonnenschein. 1966). 42. From Coleridge's "Dejection: An Ode". 8-11. above). Cf. 1n memoriam LV. 207. . the identity with oneself of what looks out at one from another's eyes is an 'identity-in-difference'. From 'The Tables Turned". J. See also Stallknecht. p. IN: Bobbs-Merrill. Payne (Indianapolis. Levine pp. 30. 32. 43. See Picton. E. L and elsewhere in this work as indexed. II ch. see also Arthur Schopenhauer (transl. The World as Will and Representation (New York: Dover. F. On the Basis of Morality by Arthur Schopenhauer. 122. p. 38. The original work was first published in 1841.

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