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The Perceived Impact of Customary Marine Resource Management on Household and Community Welfare in Northern Sumatra, Indonesia
Adityo Setiawan , Joshua E. Cinner , Stephen G. Sutton & Ahmad Mukminin
a c a b a
School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, James Cook University, Townsville, Queensland, Australia
Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies, James Cook University, Townsville, Queensland, Australia Wildlife Conservation Society, Indonesia Program, Sabang, Indonesia Available online: 11 May 2012
To cite this article: Adityo Setiawan, Joshua E. Cinner, Stephen G. Sutton & Ahmad Mukminin (2012): The Perceived Impact of Customary Marine Resource Management on Household and Community Welfare in Northern Sumatra, Indonesia, Coastal Management, 40:3, 239-249 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08920753.2012.677626
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CINNER. Townsville. including the rights to access resources and how those rights are transferred.au 239 . E-mail: joshua. temporal restrictions. was supported by an AusAID scholarship to attend James Cook University. This research was funded by the Australian Research Council and made possible by ﬁeld support from the Wildlife Conservation Society.1080/08920753. In some cases. Indonesia ADITYO SETIAWAN.Coastal Management. and involvement in community events. Cinner and Aswani (2007) describe customary management as traditions that control resource utilization.edu..2012. Queensland. We found out that a majority of respondents think that this system is beneﬁcial. Australia. Cinner and Aswani 2007). LLC ISSN: 0892-0753 print / 1521-0421 online DOI: 10. Australia 2 Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies.215.677626 The Perceived Impact of Customary Marine Resource Management on Household and Community Welfare in Northern Sumatra. level of trust. James Cook University.1 AND AHMAD MUKMININ3 1 Downloaded by [202. The socioeconomic conditions that are related to the different perceptions are wealth. and gear restrictions (Cinner and Aswani 2007). local participation in resource management. Indonesia. Address correspondence to Joshua E. SUTTON. species restrictions. We test the hypothesis that socioeconomic conditions will differ between ﬁshermen who perceive the system has positive impacts on household and community well-being compared to those with negative or neutral perceptions. Indonesia Program. common property. In principle.72. Thanks to Sarah Keiluhu and Ifa Hanaﬁ for their helpful comments. Australia 3 Wildlife Conservation Society.2 STEPHEN G. such systems are commonly referred to as “customary management” (Dahl 1988. communities use sociocultural norms (e. customary management limits the extraction of marine resources by applying some combination of spatial restrictions. ﬁsheries. Berkes. James Cook University. Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies. 2012 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group. Indonesia This article examines the inﬂuence of socioeconomic factors on the perceived success of customary management systems in Indonesia. Queensland 4811. social– ecological systems Introduction Around the world. Queensland.1 JOSHUA E. Colding. Keywords customary management. Cinner.S.g. many coastal communities rely heavily on marine resources. Sabang.186] at 17:12 04 June 2012 School of Earth and Environmental Sciences. Townsville.cinner@jcu. James Cook University. 40:239–249. A. Townsville. and Folke 2000. taboos) to limit certain aspects of resource use.
2005). Syarif 2003). Nurasa. making them easier to spear when temporary restrictions are lifted (Feary et al. Garces et al. and Basuki 1993.186] at 17:12 04 June 2012 . Siregar 2002. Cinner et al. 2006. Garces et al. 2006). PL refers to both an individual leader of ﬁshermen in ﬁsheries communities (Kurien 2009. Sutton. More than 18. The individual PL leaders function as leaders of the local ﬁshing community. Hashim 2007. Likewise. Witanto 2007). and community heterogeneity. including population size. these customary systems create a foundation for contemporary conservation efforts (Johannes 2002). and conserve coastal resources (Garces et al. but rather the level of economic stratiﬁcation that inﬂuenced the breakdown of customary systems. and Basuki 1993. commercialization of natural resources that had no former value. Ruddle (1994) provides a comprehensive review of the external socioeconomic forces that can inﬂuence whether communities can employ customary management institutions. In 1990.000 ﬁshermen were killed as the tsunami hit Aceh and destroyed 9. Kurien 2009. 2001. and Basuki 1993. Kurien 2009. 2006. Abdullah and Mutaqin 2010). the government of Aceh Province legalized the PL institution by issuing local government decree (Perda) number 2. and as liaisons between government and the ﬁshing community (Abdullah and Mutaqin 2010. Kurien 2009. critical questions remain as to whether and how customary management systems can conserve resources and provide beneﬁts to coastal communities. However. 2011). Johannes 1978). Naamin. Witanto 2007. customary management systems appear to break down under certain socioeconomic transformations (Cinner. For example. especially the coastal and ﬁshing community who were the ﬁrst victims hit by the massive waves. Novaczek et al.240 A. 1990. manage the existence of all sea customary laws as well traditional values. Bartlett et al. 2011. The burden of evidence suggests that customary management systems have ecological impacts by maintaining levels of ﬁsh biomass (Bartlett et al. The PL system is generally considered to be a customary institution that has authority to manage everything that is related to ﬁshing and coastal activities. Syarif 2003. Stobutzki and Hall 2005). The PL institution also became a liaison body with aid and donor foundations (Abdullah and Mutaqin 2010. A number of scholars have approached this topic anecdotally (Foale and Manele 2004. Siregar 2002) and the system of governance itself (Kurien 2009. level of economic development and stratiﬁcation. in some cases coral cover (Baird et al. which ofﬁcially recognizes the PL as the leader who maintains customs in ﬁshing activities (Nurasa.500 vessels (Stobutzki and Hall 2005). Hashim 2007) is known as the Panglima Laot (PL) system in Aceh. Dahl (1988) notes that aspects of monetization can weaken customary management systems because monetization can create greater demand for access to natural resource utilization and trade thereby encouraging people to break the rules to gain more resources to trade. Nurasa. Hashim 2007. and there are increasing efforts to do so empirically (McClanahan et al. Indonesia. Yet. In some parts of the world. resolve conﬂict as well as disputes among ﬁshermen. Kurien 2009. 2006). Ruddle 1994). Naamin. 2006. The 2004 tsunami brought devastation for people in Aceh. and Bond (2007) found that it was not the overall level of wealth in a community. Januchowski-Hartley et al. Aswani and Sabetian 2010). Sutton. The task of the PL leader is to implement and maintain marine customary law and practice which controls ﬁshing activities and resources exploration from the coastal area to offshore (Umar 2006. During the post-tsunami recovery. Naamin. Hashim 2007). 2009. and Bond 2007.72. 2006. One customary management system that gained international recognition because of its substantial role in the post-tsunami recovery process (Abdullah and Mutaqin 2010.215. the PL institution took a leading role in helping the ﬁshing. 2009. Cinner. 2006. McClanahan et al. or by inﬂuencing the behaviour of ﬁshes. as well the broader coastal communities (Pomeroy et al. Setiawan et al. Polunin 1984. Sarma 2009. Downloaded by [202.
Two hundred and forty-four ﬁshing households were systematically surveyed in eighteen villages (ﬁfteen villages in Weh Island. Rudi et al. Because of its important post-tsunami role. An empirical study of the PL system found that sites where this system has been well enforced have a higher percentage of coral cover because of effective exclusion of destructive ﬁshing practices (Baird et al. few studies have evaluated the success of this system in terms of meeting either social or conservation goals. Katon.72. and Harkes 2001). The success of the PL institution during the post-tsunami development is due to the deep and enduring embeddedness of this institution in the social life of Aceh society (Syarif 2003. If the respondents’ answers indicated that he or she did not know. participation in resource management decision-making) (Table 1). However. which comprised from very negative. we examine several key socioeconomic factors that are expected to inﬂuence the attitudes of rural communities toward resource management (Pomeroy et al. Surveys targeted the head of the household and asked questions about respondents’ perceptions of the PL system and about their social-economic conditions (including education. This response was then converted to a score from 1 to 5 for further analysis (Pollnac and Crawford 2000). we also explore aspects of the political ecology of the PL system by testing the hypothesis that there are differences in key socioeconomic characteristics between those who perceive beneﬁts from the PL system and those who do not. the PL system has been widely recognized by the international community as well as the Indonesian government. Campbell et al. Although the PL system has existed since the 17th century.186] at 17:12 04 June 2012 Kurien 2009). We examine the socioeconomic conditions and perception toward management of coastal ﬁshermen in eighteen villages where the PL system exists and determine how ﬁshermen perceived the impact of the PL system on their livelihood and community. Umar 2006.215. rather than the community-scale. In order to examine aspects of success of the PL system. Their answers were grouped into ﬁve degrees of agreement categories. 2005. responses to the questions about how the respondents perceived the impact of the PL system on the community were recorded and scored in the same manner. Witanto 2007). wealth. one village in Nasi Island. and two villages in Aceh Island). 1996. this was given score 0 and excluded from the analysis. Based on theoretical and empirical work in customary management systems and common property more broadly. neutral. Pomeroy. To complement existing studies on how socioeconomic conditions may inﬂuence the ability of communities to employ customary management. Indonesia from October 2008 until March 2009. respondents were asked questions about the perceived impact of the system on their livelihood. fortnightly expenditure. respondents were grouped into two categories based on whether they responded positively or not. Likewise. the social dimensions of success for this system have been largely unexplored. This means that ﬁshermen who responded with answers of . 2009). Villages were selected because they had active Panglima Laot systems (Baird et al.Customary Marine Resource Management 241 Downloaded by [202. different types of jobs the household engaged in. we examine peoples’ perceptions of the PL system in terms of its beneﬁts to their livelihoods and the broader community. to slightly negative. 2005). 2010. Methods Research was conducted in Aceh Province. slightly positive and very positive. level of trust in people. This novel exploration differs from many previous studies by examining the success of customary management at the scale of the household. Then. In this article.
and toilet inside the house. Degree of respondent’s involvement in resource management.72. and other. the total score was then counted so that the highest score for respondents who trusted all of the 5 stakeholders was 30.242 A. . it is the total number of community events that respondents were involved in. and Harkes 2001. Table 1 Description of indicators of socioeconomic indicator variables Variables Occupational diversity Description Number of type of jobs done by the household earning income. we describe data reduction techniques for two independent variables: Material Style of Life (MSL) and trust.215. fan. Sectors include ﬁshing. motorbike. in one year. the years of formal education obtained by the respondent Presence or absence of TV. but below. tourism. We examined the correlation among independent variables to ensure that they were all independent. Pollnac and Crawford 2000). cement ﬂoors. Like the MSL analysis. mobile phone. people in the village. 0 if don’t know. farming. informal sector.” Hereinafter. government. police. ﬁshermen were asked a question regarding how much they trusted different types of people and institutions in the community. salaried employment. community leaders. Setiawan et al. and 2 if actively participated Continuous. The independent variables are described in Table 1 and distributions presented in Table 2. Respondents were asked to describe their level of conﬁdence in these groups using a ﬁve point Likert scale ranging from “do not know” scoring as 0 to “trust all of the stakeholders” scoring as 5. These were.186] at 17:12 04 June 2012 Resource management participation Number of community events attended annually Age Years of education Material style of life (MSL) Trust slightly positive and very positive were grouped into “Positive.” Moreover. TV. 3 if half trust. See Cinner and Bodin (2010) for description of categories. and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). and 5 if very trusted. 1 if born in another village. Continuous Continuous. 2 if feel more distrust than trust. 1 if no trust at all. 1 if passively involved. the rest were grouped as “Non Positive. cash crops. To examine levels of trust.g. We used a nine-indicator additive index to measure MSL for our respondent households. ﬁsh trading. 0 if originated from the surveyed village. satellite disk. these two variables are called dependent variables. Bi-weekly expenditure Migrant Downloaded by [202. 0 if not involved. Pomeroy. VCR. Average expenditures over two weeks (Recorded in Indonesian Rupiah) The places where the respondents were born. 4 if feel more trust than distrust. Measure of respondent’s self-scale of trust of other people and institutions among the community. MSL is based on the presence or absence of household possessions (e. motorbike) and the type of material used in house construction (Pollnac. cement walls.. people they worked with.
. we used the Chi-Squared test to examine the distributions of positive versus non-positive responses. Minimum = 1. Minimum = 20. we employed the Mann Whitney U test to examine differences between the mean rank of socioeconomic indicators among respondents with positive compared to non-positive perceptions about PL.400. For independent variables that were not normally distributed. Minimum = 0.215. ﬁnished high school = 17.9 ± 13. Minimum = Rp100.976 ± 773.9%. 44% actively involved Mean ± SD = (16. Maximum = 80 Mean ± SD = (7.51). ﬁnished elementary = 24.9%.1. 35% passively involved.2%.61). where appropriate. dropped out of elementary school (less than 6 years) = 17. For ordinal or nominal independent variables (participation in decision-making and migration. Maximum = 9 Mean ± SD = (20.08).5 ± 2. Maximum = Rp8.5 ± 3.60) no education = 4.72. Maximum = 69 Mean ± SD = (42. respectively). Minimum = 0. We tested for normality and where it could be assumed. we also report differences with a statistical signiﬁcance level of p = . we also report the Cohen effect size (d) to measure the strength of differences (Vaske 2002).186] at 17:12 04 June 2012 Resource management participation Number of community events attended annually Age Years of education Material style of life (MSL) Trust Mean ± SD = (2. To complement the statistical signiﬁcance of differences. we used a T -test to compare mean socioeconomic characteristics between respondents with positive versus non-positive views about PL. dropped out of secondary school (less than 9 years) = 5. Maximum = 5 Mean ± SD = (Rp868.9 ± 4. ﬁnished secondary school = 23.7% Mean ± SD = (5.055).85).000. Due to the exploratory nature of the article. The effect size is the difference between the means of two groups divided by the standard deviation (Cohen 1988).24). dropped out of high school = 3.9%.1 ± 11. higher education = 2. 33% come from other parts of Aceh. Minimum = 6.Customary Marine Resource Management Table 2 Statistic summary of socioeconomic indicator variables Variables Occupational diversity Bi-weekly expenditure Migrant Statistic summary (n = 224) 243 Downloaded by [202.4%.6%.1 ± 0. each of the mean values of description indicators were compared. Maximum = 30 To examine difference between socioeconomic indicators of respondents who perceived positive impacts of the PL system and those who perceived negatively.4% originally come from surveyed village.5%. 3.6% originally come from another province in Indonesia 21% not involved.000 63.
a majority of respondents believe that the PL system had a very positive (56%) or a slightly positive (20%) impact on their community.2 0.28 0.04∗∗ d 0 0. n = 209 respondents.186] at 17:12 04 June 2012 Table 3 Socioeconomic differences between respondents that had positive versus non-positive perceptions of Panglima Laot for their livelihood and the broader community Impact on livelihooda Non-positive/positive Variable Occupational diversity Bi-weekly expenditure Origin Resource management participation Number of community events attended annually Age Years of education Material style of life (MSL) Trust a b Impact on communityb Non-positive/positive d Test statisticc −0. marginal statistical signiﬁcance and Downloaded by [202.1.8e −0. 0. ∗∗ signiﬁcance at level p = .89d 0.73 0.84 0 0.3 0.37d −3.79 0.07∗ 0.32e 3.18 0.0d Sig. 0.244 A.35 −0. .41d −1.12 0.06∗ 0. Respondents that had positive views of PL on their livelihoods had signiﬁcantly higher levels of trust.68 0.2 0.55d Sig.3 NA NA 0. minimal effect size and marginal statistical signiﬁcance also suggest that users with positive views of PL are slightly wealthier (in terms of fortnightly expenditures) and have less diverse livelihoods (Table 3). whereas 23% believed that the PL system had no impact on their community. Additionally.62 NA 0.005∗∗ 0.23e 8.019∗∗ 0.40 0.85 −1.73d −1.1 0.05 −1.20 −2d −1.4 Test statisticc 1.16 0. Likewise. Only 1% of respondents considered that the PL system impacted negatively on their community. d t-statistic.012∗∗ NA 0. Additionally.2 0. c z-statistic unless otherwise noted. Respondents that had positive views of PL for the community had signiﬁcantly higher MSL and were more involved in community events.05.72.215.08 −2.57 0. Descriptive statistics for the independent variables are presented in Table 2.34 −0. ∗ signiﬁcance at level p = . material wellbeing and were more involved in decision-making about resource management (Table 3). e 2 χ statistic. grouped as “positive” impact).1 0.3 0.4 0.05∗∗ 0.3 0. grouped as “non-positive” impact).6e −2.07 0. Thirty one percent of respondents reported that the PL system had a negative impact or no impact on their livelihood (from here. Setiawan et al. Results The majority of ﬁshermen believed that the PL system had a very positive (55%) or a slightly positive (14%) impact on their livelihood (from here.3 n = 214 respondents.
and because they are engaged in management decisions they are more likely to be supportive of those Downloaded by [202. which has been shown to be an important factor in the success of customary management and other commons institutions (Cinner. and Harkes (2001) suggests. Witanto 2007). Syarif 2003. We found that resource users had overwhelmingly positive perceptions of the PL system at both household and community scales. and Wilson 1998). whether they comply with ﬁsheries rules (Tobey and Torell 2006). Discussion This research is the ﬁrst to quantitatively examine social dimensions of success in the PL customary management system. Sarma 2009. Poverty can play a critical role in how people perceive natural resources (Cinner and Pollnac 2004). and their capacity to engage in resource management. Panglima Laot Aceh. We found that households that perceived a positive impact of PL both on livelihood have higher levels of participation in managing the ﬁsheries through the PL system. Yet. Jentoft. Syarif 2003. Trust is a key component of social capital. 2006. and McClanahan 2009). This ﬁnding is consistent with a study in the Philippines (Pomeroy et al. Naamin. and Basuki 1993. Naamin. not all views were positive and we found that ﬁshers’ socioeconomic characteristics were related to these heterogeneous perceptions. 1996) that found the involvement of users in resource management can nurture a sense of empowerment. Witanto 2007). and Basuki 1993. Naamin. McCay. The reason for this is the strong attachment of the Aceh people to customary law and their acquaintance with the PL institution that has been practiced by coastal societies in Aceh for a long time (Nurasa.org 2010. Umar 2006. As Pomeroy. However. most ﬁshermen in Aceh still have faith in both the PL institution and in community elders (Hashim 2007. whether they engage in destructive ﬁshing or resource extraction techniques (Cinner 2010).215. Kurien 2009.72. these results suggest that the wealthy are more likely to perceive beneﬁts from this type of management. level of trust is one major key success factor in arranging co-management. Because ﬁshery management is a complex system that involves multi-stakeholders. McClanahan. gaining trust from constituents involved is crucial (Adger 2003). Witanto 2007) and facilitating disaster relief after the 2004 tsunami (Pomeroy et al. The positive perception is also likely related in part to the high level of familiarity that local people have with this system that has existed for hundreds of years (Nurasa. Ross 2005). Respondents with positive views of PL for both their own livelihoods and for the community had higher MSL scores and also marginally higher fortnightly expenditures. despite the lack of trust in government and law enforcement ofﬁcers.186] at 17:12 04 June 2012 . whether they feel trapped in a declining ﬁshery (Cinner. Katon. Stobutzki and Hall 2005). and Wamukota 2009. respondents with positive perceptions of PL for the community were also involved in more community events (another potential indicators of social capital). Hashim 2007. Syarif 2003. Indeed. Panglima Laot Aceh. Hashim 2007. Daw. Thus.org 2010. This positive perception may stem in part from the critical role the PL plays in managing the ﬁshery (Abdullah and Mutaqin 2010. However. Respondents who perceived that the PL system had a positive impact on their livelihood also had higher levels of trust in people and organizations. Umar 2006. Syarif 2003). and Basuki 1993. ﬁshermen are more aware of how the resources they depend on are managed. Nurasa. the civil conﬂict that occurred from 1976–2005 has weakened the trust of Aceh’s people in government authorities in Aceh and in the police force that used to be part of the military (McCulloch 2003.Customary Marine Resource Management 245 effect size suggest that users with positive views about PL for the community have slightly higher fortnightly expenditures. Sarma 2009. Together.
These results provide crucial information about which segments of society are receiving beneﬁts from management and how beneﬁts could be more equitably distributed. Aceh. Naamin. The ﬁshermen in Sabang spend an average of 7. Downloaded by [202. users’ active involvement will allow them to share the knowledge and information that they need. Syarif 2003. migration.2 years) and people in Tumbak. 1996). Conclusion and Management Implications Overall.215.e. Lise 2000). With respect to years of education. and satisfy their curiosity about processes undertaken (Sesabo et al. have a better formal education compared to other empirical studies from other coastal communities in Asia and Africa. (2) it functions as a conﬂict resolution mechanism (Syarif 2003.4 years) (Cinner. 2006) and may help to create livelihood options outside of ﬁsheries (Turner et al. Despite the result that education was not related to people’s attitude toward the PL system. This ﬁgure is higher than the average for ﬁshermen in Madagascar (3. This ﬁnding is broadly consistent with common property studies ﬁnding positive relationships between dependence on resources and the strength of commons institutions (Lise 2000. .246 A. those whose livelihoods depend on the success of the commons institution are more likely to perceive beneﬁts from it). However. Agrawal 2002).72. 2006). These generally positive perceptions were possibly because: (1) the main goals of PL are creating social harmony by ensuring that everyone has the same the opportunities to extract marine resources (as opposed to regulating resources for conservation). a large proportion of ﬁshermen’s households perceived a positive impact of the PL system on their own livelihood and on their community more broadly. Umar 2006. Witanto 2007). Pollnac and Crawford 2000). Indonesia (6. Fuentes. and Basuki 1993. Fishers with fewer different types of occupations may have more incentives to engage in and beneﬁt from local commons institutions (Cinner 2005. and Randriamahazo 2009. In addition. For example. so local leaders and managers need to ﬁnd ways ensure that livelihood beneﬁts are delivered to the poorer ﬁshers. Occupations diversity had a marginal relationship with respondents’ perceptions about PL. Ostrom 1990. not all users had positive perceptions about the PL system and we found several socioeconomic factors that differentiate ﬁshermen with positive perceptions of the impact of the Panglima Laot system from those with neutral or negative perceptions.186] at 17:12 04 June 2012 decisions and they systems in which those decisions are made (Pomeroy et al. formal education complementary to environmental education can raise rural households’ awareness of the need for conservation (Sesabo et al. Witanto 2007). South Sulawesi.org 2010. Panglima Laot Aceh. This ﬁnding is similar to studies in South West Madagascar and Mexico that also found that these factors did not inﬂuence the perspectives of ﬁshers toward resource management (Davies and Beanjara 2009. ﬁshermen in Sabang. a majority of ﬁshermen’s households in Sabang engage in several different occupations to earn money. Setiawan et al. 2007). Zanetell and Knuth 2004. However. and educational background.. Cinner and Pollnac 2004).5 years in school. and (3) it has existed in Aceh society for several centuries (Nurasa. Consistent with local studies (Witanto 2007) and many coastal areas around the world (Allison and Ellis 2001. poorer respondents felt like they did not beneﬁt from PL. Cinner and Bodin 2010). Findings from this research show that ﬁshermen’s perceptions of the PL system were not related to demographic factors such as age. our results show that ﬁshermen with positive perceptions of the PL system had slightly fewer alternative sources of income (i.
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