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Rather, history is our inheritance, an ancestor of sorts, and we can effectively steer its continuing course only by embracing our place in the dialectic between history and philosophy. As seen in Friedman’s own work, beyond sensitivity to a dialogue between history and philosophy, he is fully aware of the dialogue we, as contemporary scholars, must continue to share with the science and philosophy that came before us. And thus, the dialectic central to Friedman’s work extends beyond an examination of how the past has contributed to our present; placing us in this dialogue, we now have from him inherited a responsibility to examine how the past can best inform our philosophical future." (Domski & Dixon 2010, 17)

Scope for philosophy (meta-science) to assist: Greek Philosophy-Euclidean geometry; Descartesanalytic geometry; Leibniz-calculus; Frege-predicate logic. If one is not on-board already, that's leaving it rather late to assist with Homotopy Type Theory. Important book appears very shortly, already plenty of exposition, including 6 posts by Mike Shulman. Just search 'nLab homotopy type theory'

Foundationalist filter: “Straight away, from simple inductive considerations, it should strike us as implausible that mathematicians dealing with number, function and space have produced nothing of philosophical significance in the past seventy years in view of their record over the previous three centuries. Implausible, that is, unless by some extraordinary event in the history of philosophy a way had been found to filter, so to speak, the findings of mathematicians working in core areas, so that even the transformations brought about by the development of category theory, which surfaced explicitly in 1940s algebraic topology, or the rise of non-commutative geometry over the past seventy years, are not deemed to merit philosophical attention.”

My Chap.10 on higher-dimensional algebra: different idea of sameness, diagrammatics, new organisational language with relevance to physics. But was it to be thought of as a new foundations? With Homotopy type theory or Univalent Foundations we can now make a clearer case. Set theory and logic can be extracted as projections.

Whewellian consilience Category theory-type theory connection ➔Topos ➔Intensional dependent type theory (Identity types not required to be propositions) ➔Abstract homotopy theory ➔Univalence axiom (yielding (∞, 1)-topos))

➔

“we (for some value of “we”) have long agreed that the language that the world is written in is higher category theory. What is new now is that suddenly we realize that this higher category theory has an equivalent reformulation which, while equivalent, looks more fundamental, even, to some extent.” (Schreiber) Physics: Set theory had drifted so far from applications. Think how far removed is the mathematics for physics. (Cohesive homotopy type theory – Geometry of Physics, http://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/geometry+of+physics)

“ZFC and ETCS are not just theories of sets; they are theories of sets and propositions. The interplay between sets and propositions is most obvious in the axiom schemas such as replacement, which introduce an arbitrary first-order formula. It is also evident when constructing a new model of set theory, in which case one must first specify how all logical formulas are to be interpreted. By contrast, type theory is not built on top of first-order logic; it does not require the imposing superstructure of connectives, quantifiers, and inference to be built up before we start to state axioms. Of course, type theory has first-order logic, which is a necessity for doing mathematics. But first-order logic in type theory is just a special case of the type-forming rules.” (From Set Theory to Type Theory, Mike Shulman)

“...the axioms of ETCS are usually expressed exactly in terms of universal properties in the category of sets. If we’re hoping to free ourselves from sets, this approach is more promising, but it still has a drawback: universal properties are usually expressed in terms of (natural) bijections of hom-sets. ETCS deals with this by shifting the statement of universal properties into the ambient first-order logic. That is, instead of characterizing the product of sets A×B by a natural bijection Hom(−,A×B)≅Hom(−,A)×Hom(−,B), we have instead axioms which say that “for every f:X→A and g:X→B, there exists a unique h:X→A×B such that …”. While this does avoid circularity, it more or less forces the notions like “uniqueness” used in these universal properties to be those of the ambient first-order logic. Thus, if this logic is of the traditional sort, this means that there is still a “setlike” structure hanging around somewhere.”

Type theory internalises universal properties.

If you’re thinking this looks very like the rules for conjunction, then good. If A and B are not just any types, but propositions (subsingletons), and terms are proofs, then yes. “Type formation: dependent products, inductive types, and universes. (One might add coinductive types as a fourth.)” (See my Understanding the Infinite II: Coalgebra.)

Quantifiers as adjoints ➔Intuitionistic logic and topology ➔Sheaves and first-order modal logic? (Kripke frames and forcing) ➔Topos theory ➔Polarity of left/right universal properties ➔Duality between theories and collections of models

➔

Quantifiers as adjoints to pullback of projection: UxU → U

Why dependent types? Consider 'Every team has a player who has been unfit for every day of some month this year.' t:Team ⱶ P(t):Type y:Year ⱶ M(y):Type m:M(y) ⱶ D(m):Type

Dependent sum ∑{t:T} P(t) ↓ T → Type Teams Players

Dependent product ∏{t:T} P(t) as collection of sections, respecting fibration.

P ↓ X → BG Key to modern physics: gauge field, e.g. vector field is section of vector bundle.

If target is Prop, then ∏{t:T} P(t) is a Prop, expressing universal quantification. In this case, existential quantification is projection of ∑{t:T} P(t) to Prop. If T is a Prop too, then ∏{t:T} P(t) is implication, ∑{t:T} P(t) is conjunction. Dependent sum and product are adjoints for base change of slice via pullback.

So we’re catching glimpses of a foundational language much closer to developments in physics, which projects or truncates down to logic. Question Mike Beaney put to me in Jena. If category theory is philosophically important, should we not see something like Russell on definite descriptions? Dependent type theory offers some possibilities. Aarne Ranta, Type-Theoretic Grammar, Oxford Science Publications, 1994.

A) Contexts of type declarations and term formations, “Have you left off beating your wife?” Have you a wife? Were you ever in the habit of beating her? Do you intend to manage in the future without doing so? Have you begun carrying out that intention? (Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, p. 38)

Punch has stopped beating his wife: Prop Person:Type, Punch:Person, Punch: Man x: Man ⊢ wife(x): Type hw : wife(Punch)

x: Person, y: Action ⊢ habit(x, y): Prop z: Person ⊢ beating(z): Action y:Action ⊢ stop(y):Action x:Person,y:Action ⊢ intend(x,y):Type

Important aspect of inference to work out presuppositions, Collingwood tells us. (Cogito?) B) ‘The’ in dependent type theory. The present king of France is bald. Term ‘the king of France’. Already have France: Country, and x: Country ⱶ King (x): Type (x:C),(kp:IsProp(K(x)),(t:K(x)) ⱶ (the(x,kp,t):K(x)) Generalised ‘the’. (A:Type),(t:IsContr(A)) ⱶ (the(A,t):A) ‘The product’. Universal properties of product.

C) Term formation relies on conditions, e.g., ‘This proposition is false’ Now, what rules of type formation would allow such a proposition-as-type, IdProp(This proposition,⊥)? Well, section 4.14 of Aarne Rante’s book TypeTheoretical Grammar discusses indexicals: A:Type a:A this(A,a):A. So to say ‘this proposition’ we had better already have established a type of propositions, Prop, as well as a term of that type which we intend to refer to as ‘this proposition’.

The idea of the paradox is that we have such a term. ‘This proposition is false’ is supposed to be the term of type Prop: IdProp(This proposition,⊥):Prop But we can’t form this term without forming ‘this proposition’. We seem to need this(Prop, this proposition): Prop, but we can’t form this since we haven’t formed ‘this proposition’. Is it as simple as that – incorrect term formation? Inductive types?

D) Modal logic. UF suggests we apply modalities to all types. Converse Barcan is a projection from a condition on slices.

E) Homotopy relating to equivalence (paths, gauge equivalence) The intensional, space of meaning,...

Polarity (Shulman) The division into “left” and “right” universal properties is referred to by type theorists as the division into “positive types” and “negative types”, and called generically “polarity”. In type-theoretic language, we say: A negative type is characterized by giving the basic ways to use an element of it. For instance, the ways to use an element of A×B are to extract its first or second component. The way to use an element of the function type BA is to apply it to an element of A and obtain an element of B.

Polarity (Shulman) cont. Given these, it follows that the way to construct an element of such a type is to specify what happens when we use our putative element in all possible ways. For instance, the way to construct an element of A×B is to specify its two components. And the way to construct an element of BA is to give a way to make an element of B under the assumption of an element of A, i.e. to give an expression of type B containing a (new) free variable of type A.

Polarity (Shulman) cont. A positive type is characterized by giving the basic ways to construct parts of it. For instance, the ways to construct parts of the coproduct A+B are to inject an element of A, or to inject an element of B. And the ways to construct a natural number are either to take 0, or to take the successor of some other natural number (this an example of a “properly recursive” inductive type, for which some of the ways to construct new elements involve having other elements of the same type).

Polarity (Shulman) cont. Given these, it follows that the way to use an element of such a type is to specify what is to be done in all possible cases, depending on the ways that such an element might have been constructed. For instance, the way to use an element of A+B is to divide into two cases, according to whether that element came from A or from B. And the way to use a natural number is to do a proof by induction, or a definition by recursion: we divide into two cases according to whether we have 0 or a successor, and in the latter case we can assume we’ve already dealt with the predecessor natural number.

But, dependent sum x: A ⱶ B(x): Type, where B(x) = B is A x B, so positive polarity. One way to see cartesian products as a positive type categorically, which avoids the unsatisfying feeling of having to “put them in” in advance before you can get them out, is to start with a cartesian multicategory instead of an ordinary category. In some sense this is a more accurate representation of type-theoretic semantics, because in practice (in most programming languages) we define functions which take “multiple arguments” and regard them as different both from functions which take a single tupled argument, and from “curried” functions which take one argument and return another function.

In a cartesian multicategory, the cartesian product has a “mapping out” universal property like you would expect for a positive type: Hom(A x B ; C) = Hom(A,B ; C). The fact that such an object is equivalent to a categorical cartesian product (with usual its negative “mapping in” universal property) depends on cartesianness of the multicategory, which in turn encodes the structural rules of weakening and contraction in type theory. Thus the category theory exactly mirrors the typetheoretic fact that in linear type theory, the positive and negative products are different.

“As ever, enduring principles emerge from the interplay between proof theory, category theory, and type theory. Such concepts are found in nature, and do not depend on cults of personality or the fads of the computer industry for their existence or importance.” (Harper)

Antiformalism: Heidegger, later Wittgenstein ('curse of the invasion', 'completely distorted the thinking') – ignore Proformalism: Formalism as a tool for philosophy, Russell, Carnap, Quine – assist/interpret/apply if deemed important, ignore otherwise (might need some serious persuading that new theory is important). Historical/dialectical philosophy: Cassirer, Collingwood, Lautman, Polanyi, Lakatos, Shapere, MacIntyre, Friedman – observe and contextualise as the emergence of new mathematics

Opportunities for everyone Historical/dialectical philosophy: If it lives up to its promise, then homotopy type theory is just the kind of development that needs to be written up. Plenty to learn from the development. Role of logician-philosopher Martin-Lof, constructive type theory, category theory, homotopic mathematics, influence of physics, computer science. Proformalism: plenty of opportunities. Look closely at intensionality, modality, polarity. Dependent type theorylanguage relation. Philosophy of physics.

Good timing as their book is about to appear, but already 6 posts by Mike Shulman, just search 'nLab homotopy type theory'

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