1. G.R. No.

83589 March 13, 1991 RAMON FAROLAN as ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, and GUILLERMO PARAYNO, as CHIEF OF CUSTOM INTELLIGENCE and INVESTIGATION DIVISION, petitioners, vs. SOLMAC MARKETING CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Dakila F. Castro & Associates for private respondent. SARMIENTO, J.:p This petition for review on certiorari, instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the public officerspetitioners, seek the nullification and setting aside of the Resolution 1 dated May 25, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10509, entitled "Solmac Marketing Corporation vs. Ramon Farolan, Acting Commissioner of Customs, and Guillermo Parayno, Chief of Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division," which adjudged these public officers to pay solidarily and in their private personal capacities respondent Solmac Marketing Corporation temperate damages in the sum of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the sum of P50,000.00, and P25,000.00, as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. This challenged resolution of the respondent court modified its decision 2 of July 27, 1987 by reducing into halves the original awards of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00 for exemplary damages and attorney's fees and litigation expenses, respectively, keeping intact the original grant of P100,000.00 in the concept of temperate damages. (Strangely, the first name of petitioner Farolan stated in the assailed resolution, as well as in the decision, of the respondent court is "Damian" when it should be "Ramon", his correct given name. Strictly speaking, petitioner Ramon Farolan could not be held liable under these decision and resolution for he is not the one adjudged to pay the huge damages but a different person. Nonetheless, that is of no moment now considering the disposition of this ponencia.) The relevant facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: At the time of the commission of the acts complained of by the private respondent, which was the subject of the latter's petition for mandamus and injunction filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 84-23537, petitioner Ramon Farolan was then the Acting Commissioner of Customs while petitioner Guillermo Parayno was then the Acting Chief, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division. They were thus sued in their official capacities as officers in the government as clearly indicated in the title of the case in the lower courts and even here in this Court. Nevertheless, they were both held personally liable for the awarded damages "(s)ince the detention of the goods by the defendants (petitioners herein) was irregular and devoid of legal basis, hence, not done in the regular performance of official duty . . . ." 3 However, as adverted to at the outset, in the dispositive portion of the challenged resolution, the one held personally liable is a "Damian Farolan" and not the petitioner, Ramon Farolan. Also as earlier mentioned, we will ignore that gross error. Private respondent Solmac Marketing Corporation is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It was the assignee, transferee, and owner of an importation of Clojus Recycling Plastic Products of 202,204 kilograms of what is technically known as polypropylene film , valued at US$69,250.05. Polypropylene is a substance resembling polyethelyne which is one of a group of partially crystalline lightweight thermoplastics used chiefly in making fibers, films, and molded and extruded products. 4 Without defect, polypropylene film is sold at a much higher price as prime quality film. Once rejected as defective due to blemishes, discoloration, defective winding, holes, etc., polypropylene film is sold at a relatively cheap price without guarantee or return, and the buyer takes the risk as to whether he can recover an average 30% to 50% usable matter. 5 This latter kind of polypropylene is known as OPP film waste/scrap and this is what respondent SOLMAC claimed the Clojus shipment to be. The subject importation, consisting of seventeen (17) containers, arrived in December, 1981. Upon application for entry, the Bureau of Customs asked respondent SOLMAC for its authority from any government agency to import the goods described in the bill of lading. Respondent SOLMAC presented a Board of Investment (BOI) authority for polypropylene film scrap. However, upon examination of the shipment by the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), it turned out that the fibers of the importation were oriented in such a way that the materials were stronger than OPP film scrap. 6 In other words, the Clojus shipment was not OPP film scrap, as declared by the assignee respondent SOLMAC to the Bureau of Customs and BOI Governor Lilia R. Bautista, but oriented polypropylene the importation of which is restricted, if not prohibited, under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 658-B. Specifically, Sections 1 and 2 of LOI No. 658-B provide that: xxx xxx xxx

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1. The importation of cellophane shall be allowed only for quantities and types of cellophane that cannot be produced by Philippine Cellophane Film Corporation. The Board of Investments shall issue guidelines regulating such importations. 2. The Collector of Customs shall see to the apprehension of all illegal importations of cellophane and oriented polypropylene (OPP) and the dumping of imported stock lots of cellophane and OPP. xxx xxx xxx Considering that the shipment was different from what had been authorized by the BOI and by law, petitioners Parayno and Farolan withheld the release of the subject importation. On June 7, 1982, petitioner Parayno, then Chief of Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division, wrote the BOI asking for the latter's advice on whether or no t the subject importation may be released 7 A series of exchange of correspondence between the BOI and the Bureau of Customs, on one hand, and between the late Dakila Castro, counsel for the private respondent, and the BOI and the Bureau of Customs, on the other, ensued, to wit: xxx xxx xxx 4. In a letter dated August 17, 1982, the BOI agreed that the subject imports may be released but that holes may be drilled on them by the Bureau of Customs prior to their release. 5. On January 20, 1983, (the late) Atty. Dakila Castro, (then) counsel of private respondent wrote to petitioner Commissioner Farolan of Customs asking for the release of the importation. The importation was not released, however, on the ground that holes had to be drilled on them first. 6. Atty. Dakila Castro then wrote a letter dated October 6, 1983, to BOI Governor Hermenigildo Zayco stressing the reasons why the subject importation should be released without drilling of holes. 7. On November 8, 1983, BOI Governor H. Zayco wrote a letter to the Bureau of Customs stating that the subject goods may be released without drilling of holes inasmuch as the goods arrived prior to the endorsement on August 17, 1982 to the drilling of holes on all importations of waste/scrap films. 8. On February 1, 1984, petitioner Commissioner Farolan wrote the BOI requesting for definite guidelines regarding the disposition of importations of Oriented Polypropylene (OPP) and Polypropylene (PP) then being held at the Bureau of Customs. 9. On March 12, 1984, Minister Roberto Ongpin of Trade, the BOI Chairman, wrote his reply to petitioner Farolan . . . . 8 (This reply of Minister Ongpin is copied in full infra.) On March 26, 1984, respondent Solmac filed the action for mandamus and injunction with the RTC as above mentioned. It prayed for the unconditional release of the subject importation. It also prayed for actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. As prayed for, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction. After hearing on the merits, the RTC rendered a decision on February 5, 1985, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants to release the subject importation immediately without drilling of holes, subject only to the normal requirements of the customs processing for such release to be done with utmost dispatch as time is of the essence; and the preliminary injunction hereto issued is hereby made permanent until actual physical release of the merchandise and without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
9

From the decision of the trial court, Solmac, the plaintiff below and the private respondent herein, appealed to the Court of Appeals only insofar as to the denial of the award of damages is concerned. On the other hand, the petitioners did not appeal from this decision. They did not see any need to appeal because as far as they were concerned, they had already complied with their duty. They had already
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ordered the release of the importation "without drilling of holes," as in fact it was so released, in compliance with the advice to effect such immediate release contained in a letter of BOI dated October 9, 1984, to Commissioner Farolan. Thus, to stress, even before the RTC rendered its decision on February 5, 1984, the Clojus shipment of OPP was released 10 to the private respondent in its capacity as assignee of the same. Be that it may, the private respondent filed its appeal demanding that the petitioners be held, in their personal and private capacities, liable for damages despite the finding of lack of bad faith on the part of the public officers. After due proceeding, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision which reads as follows:
11

on July 27, 1987, the dispositive portion

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is modified by ordering the defendants Ramon Farolan and Guillermo Parayno solidarity, in their personal capacity, to pay the plaintiff temperate damages in the sum of P100,000, exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000 and P50,000 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. Costs against the defendants. SO ORDERED. On August 14, 1987, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. On May 25, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution modifying the award of damages, to wit: temperate damages in the sum of P100,000,00, exemplary damages in the sum of P50,000.00, and P25,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. The respondent court explained the reduction of the awards for exemplary damages and attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in this wise: 3. In our decision of July 27, 1987, We awarded to plaintiff-appellant Pl00,000 as temperate damages, Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. Under Art. 2233 of the Civil Code, recovery of exemplary damages is not a matter of right but depends upon the discretion of the court. Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must always be reasonable. In view of these provisions of the law, and since the award of temperate damages is only P100,000.00, the amount of exemplary damages may not be at par as temperate damages. An award of P50,000.00, as exemplary damages may already serve the purpose, i.e., as an example for the public good. Likewise, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation have to be reduced to 25% of the amount of temperate damages, or P25,000.00, if the same have to be reasonable. The reduction in the amount of exemplary damages, and attorney's fees and expenses of litigation would be in accord with justice and fairness. 12 The petitioners now come to this Court, again by the Solicitor General, assigning the following errors allegedly committed by the respondent court: I The Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the finding of the trial court that the defense of good faith of petitioners (defendants) cannot be discredited. II The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging petitioners liable to pay temperate damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. 13 These two issues boil down to a single question, i.e., whether or not the petitioners acted in good faith in not immediately releasing the questioned importation, or, simply, can they be held liable, in their personal and private capacities, for damages to the private respondent. We rule for the petitioners. The respondent court committed a reversible error in overruling the trial court's finding that: . . . with reference to the claim of plaintiff to damages, actual and exemplary, and attorney's fees, the Court finds it difficult to discredit or disregard totally the defendants' defense of good faith premised on the excuse that they were all the time awaiting clarification of the Board of Investments on the matter. 14 We hold that this finding of the trial court is correct for good faith is always presumed and it is upon him who alleges the contrary that the burden of proof lies. 15 In Abando v. Lozada, 16 we defined good faith as
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if not prohibited. ordering the release of the subject importation did not clarify the BOI policy on the matter. he is to use that prudence. which as stated earlier. and Governor Zayco) of the BOI themselves were not in agreement as to what proper course to take on the subject of the various importations of Oriented Polypropylene (OPP) and Polypropylene (PP) withheld by the Bureau of Customs. Consequently. It is the opposite of fraud. The confusion over the disposition of this particular importation obviates bad faith. 17 It was on the strength of this finding that the petitioners withheld the release of the subject importation for being contrary to law. on many occasions. On the contrary. independent of the presumption of good faith. on the subject of various importations of Oriented Polypropylene (OPP) and Polypropylene (PP) withheld by Customs and the confusion over the disposition of such imports. It is supported by substantial evidence on record. In the case at bar. one of the several of such importations. and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. First. 2. the subject importation was not OPP film scraps but oriented polypropylene. the Bureau of Customs sought the advice of the BOI on whether the subject importation might be released. 1984. we have no objection to the drilling of holes to ensure that these are indeed recycled. the record is replete with evidence bolstering the petitioners' claim of good faith. the BOI agreed that holes could be drilled on subject film imports to prevent their use for other purposes. 18 Third. in the discharge of his duties. Vice-Chairman Tordesillas. he binds himself to perform the duties of his office faithfully and to use reasonable skill and diligence. Should your office have any doubts as to the authorized intended use of any imported lots of OPP/PP film scraps that you have confiscated. their importation was restricted. if not prohibited under LOI 658-B. On 22 June 1982. 3. a plastic product of stronger material. hence. These cellophane/film products were competing with locally manufactured polypropylene and oriented polypropylene as raw materials which were then already sufficient to meet local demands. I have discussed the matter with Vice-Chairman Tordesillas and Governor Zayco of the Board of Investments and the following is their explanation: 1. and its absence should be established by convincing evidence. the petitioners can not be 4|LLB IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. under LOI 658-B. as the letters of BOI Governors Tordesillas and Zayco of November 8." We had reviewed the evidence on record carefully and we did not see any clear and convincing proof showing the alleged bad faith of the petitioners. 1982 that. 1983 and September 24. respectively. It consists of the honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Thus. 2012 . for direct packaging use or for recycling/repelletizing into raw material. When a public officer takes his oath of office. He then testified on the letter of the BOI Chairman Roberto Ongpin dated March 12. which states in full: Thank you for your letter of 1 February 1984. The exemption from drilling of holes on Solmac Marketing's importation under Certificates of Authority issued on 1 April 1982 and 5 May 1982 and on Clojus' importation authorized in 1982 were endorsed by the BOI on the premise that these were not intended for recycling/repelletizing. This resulted in the inevitable delay in the release of the Clojus shipment. petitioner Parayno also testified during the trial that up to that time (of the trial) there was no clear-cut policy on the part of the BOI regarding the entry into the Philippines of oriented polypropylene (OPP). and attention which careful men use in the management of their affairs. Thus the trial court's finding that the petitioners acted in good faith in not immediately releasing the Clojus shipment pending a definitive policy of the BOI on this matter is correct. I have requested Governor Zayco to contact your office in order to offer any further assistance which you may require. prudence dictated that petitioners first obtain from the BOI the latter's definite guidelines regarding the disposition of the various importations of oriented polypropylene (OPP) and polypropylene (PP) then being withheld at the Bureau of Customs. was not successfully rebutted. the drilling of holes should depend on purpose for which the importations was approved by the BOI that is. On 17 August l982. the petitioners testified that. caution. 19 It can be seen from all the foregoing that even the highest officers (Chairman Ongpin. the BOI ruled that importation of OPP/PP film scraps intended for recycling or repelletizing did not fall within the purview of LOI 658-B."refer[ring] to a state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. there was the report of the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) dated January 25. contrary to what the respondent claimed. whose importation to the Philippines was restricted. 1982. The conflicting recommendations of the BOI on this score prompted the petitioners to seek final clarification from the former with regard to its policy on these importations. For importations authorized prior to 22 June 1982. Second.

20 contrary to the evidence submitted by the National Institute of Science and Technology that the same was pure oriented OPP. namely. in CA-G. in his capacity as President of the said Bank. Aviado and Aranda for defendants. Whatever damage they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous interpretation. was one of the defendants in civil case No. In view thereof. Singson.: Appeal by plaintiffs. WHEREFORE. M. 22 In the same vein. plaintiffs. After the first check was returned by the bank to the B. Subsequently. 1963 and bearing No. dated May 25. C394996 for the amount of P100 in favor of the Lega Corporation. 10509. had no more control over the balance of his deposits in the said bank. the petition is hereby GRANTED. Philippine Milling Co. M. if any at all.539.. to pay the sum of P105. What happened thereafter is set forth in the decision appealed from. upon reading the name of the plaintiff herein in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants. C-424852. Glass Service further stated in the said letter that they were constrained to close his credit account with them.said to have acted in bad faith in not immediately releasing the import goods without first obtaining the necessary clarificatory guidelines from the BOI. one for the amount of P383 in favor of B. L-24837 June 27. No costs. 1963. Glass Service. became final and executory. defendants. Singson wrote the defendant bank a letter on 5|LLB IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. But even granting that the petitioners committed a mistake in withholding the release of the subject importation because indeed it was composed of OPP film scraps. Manila. i. the checks were dishonored and were refused payment by the said bank. without further reading the body of the said garnishment and informing himself that said garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of defendant VillaAbrille & Co. as against which said judgment. Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that case. the presumption.J.e. Fernando F. 1988. M. (All things are presumed to be correctly and solemnly done. Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta. it is the duty of the Court to see to it that public officers are not hampered in the performance of their duties or in making decisions for fear of personal liability for damages due to honest mistake. SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO. No.. The said B. the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith. 1963. Ramona del Castillo. advising him that his check for P383.) It was private respondent's burden to overcome this juris tantum presumption. plaintiff Julian C. dated April 19. Another letter was also prepared and signed by the said President of the Bank for the Special Sheriff dated April 17. but not Villa-Abrille & Co. from which we quote: Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment. In due course. Julian Singson and his wife. and drawn against the said Bank. vs. the latter wrote plaintiff Julian C. disputable though it may be. the assailed Resolution of the respondent court. C. were deposited by the said drawers with the said bank.56 to the plaintiff therein. Glass Service dated April 16.R. 2012 . It appears that Singson.R. from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing their complaint against defendants herein. Believing that the plaintiff Singson. 1968 JULIAN C. As public officers. accordingly. Valentin Teus. Singson a letter. Gil B. the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Santiago Freixas. SP No. and check No. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and SANTIAGO FREIXAS. LOI 658-B. two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. 21 After all. 2. We are not persuaded that it has been able to do so. in which judgment had been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein. is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria. a writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon the Bank of the Philippine Islands — in which the Singsons had a current account — insofar as Villa-Abrille's credits against the Bank were concerned. Galang for plaintiffs. Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. was faithfully complied with.00 bearing No. prepared a letter for the signature of the President of the Bank informing the plaintiff Julian C. de Villa-Abrille and Joaquin Bona. C-424852 was not honored by the bank for the reason that his account therein had already been garnished. is SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. the petitioners had the duty to see to it that the law they were tasked to implement. G. Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co. nonetheless. 23906 of the Court of First Instance. CONCEPCION. a clerk of the bank in charge of all matters of execution and garnishment.. Singson and Lobregat had seasonably appealed from said judgment. that an official duty has been regularly performed23 applies in favor of the petitioners.. the drawer of the check. "even under the law of public officers.

Province of Rizal. as nominal damages. petitioner. 1963 to the said Special Sheriff was considered cancelled and that they had already removed the Notice of Garnishment from plaintiff Singson's account. parents of the deceased on March 7.5 WHEREFORE. L-48006 July 8. because the relation between the parties is contractual in nature. however. and because plaintiffs have not established the amount of damages allegedly sustained by them. and that the action of garnishment from his account had already been removed. 1936. 2 Indeed. this view has been.000. Fausto Barredo. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 1äwphï1. 1963. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario. suffered injuries from which he died two days later. in Air France vs. despite his first-class ticket. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. The lower court held that plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be based upon a tort or quasi-delict. 2012 .R. in addition to attorney's fees in the sum of P500. brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of 6|LLB IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27.000. At about half past one in the morning of May 3. In view. upon the ground of tort on the latter's part. was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier. although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature . 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia. that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee had committed. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. 1963.. The defendant President Santiago Freixas of the said bank took steps to verify this information and after having confirmed the same. in effect. the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort". because this case does not fall under Article 2219 of our Civil Code. A similar letter was written by the said official of the bank on April 22.. particularly. The carretela was overturned.3 involving an airplane passenger who. vs.April 19. Thus. 1963 to the Special Sheriff informing him that his letter dated April 17. and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. Thus. and one of its passengers. the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment dismissing the complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants upon the basis of a quasidelict. respondents. 3. which was served upon the bank. upon which plaintiffs rely. and considering. would suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights. 1963. however. Santiago Freixas. 1963. It is so ordered. Jose G. xxx xxx xxx On May 8. and P500. the Court finds that an award of nominal damages — the amount of which need not be proven4 — in the sum of P1. requesting him to disregard their letter of April 17. the defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently committed. of the facts obtaining in the case at bar. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner. the circumstance. the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed. and another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands to pay to the plaintiffs said sums of P1. 1939. reiterated in a comparatively recent case. BOCOBO. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO. there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. for. liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla. for damages1 in consequence of said illegal freezing of plaintiffs' account. on the road between Malabon and Navotas. resulting in the temporary freezing of the account of the plaintiff with the said bank for a short time. Celedonio P. J. G. We have repeatedly held. No. had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment. their relation with the defendants being contractual in nature.: This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein.ñët After appropriate proceedings. as attorney's fees. Advincula for respondents. claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment. that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. apart from the costs. 1942 FAUSTO BARREDO. Singson and wrote him a letter dated April 22. the Singsong commenced the present action against the Bank and its president. Carrascoso. apologized to the plaintiff Julian C. a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.

22.. the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2. he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code. xxx xxx xxx ART. The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap.000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted.). As to Barredo's responsibility. appellant's brief. This should be done. ART. we must cut through the tangle that has. and from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes. but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. and at high speed. thus making him primarily and directly. Book IV of the Civil Code. or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. 2012 . as he was driving on the wrong side of the road. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code. and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict or crime. his liability is only subsidiary. in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence.. We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. This fact makes said article to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code.000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II. but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) — violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself. The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus: . There is proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows: CIVIL CODE ART.. Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own. The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo. his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary. The Court of Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. because justice may be lost in a labyrinth.Pedro Fontanilla. Title XVI of this book. 1093. not punishable by law. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal Code. On July 8. the person criminally liable. and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla. according to said Penal code. is applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission not punishable by law. In other words. The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla. unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. To decide the main issue. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1. Fortunately. The petitioner's brief states on page 10: . Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. in the minds of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos.. responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. Title 16. we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain. 1089 Obligations arise from law. The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code. intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II.. (See p. hence. 1092.. the Court of Appeals found: . It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. 7|LLB IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. Therefore. the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored. from contracts and quasi-contracts. 1939.

ART. or when the liability also attaches to the Government. 1904. in all events. ART. and by a person under nine years of age. 2012 . teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. in accordance with the civil law. 5. the persons using violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily. indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations. and. those doing the act shall be liable. Third. are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them. The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents. REVISED PENAL CODE ART. or. Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their authority and living with them. or control. 1. the person for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received. or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age.xxx xxx xxx ART 1902. or if such person be insolvent. or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done. imbecile. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from the latter what he may have paid. which shall be enforced to the following rules: First. case of his death or incapacity. in their sound discretion. in which case the provisions of the next preceding article shall be applicable. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible. or on occasion of the performance of their duties. unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part. the mother. if there be no such persons. but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable. excepting property exempt from execution. 8|LLB IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. — The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1. 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by any imbecile or insane person. The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent. Second. 101. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. but not if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed. not only for personal acts and omissions. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. 100. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. ART. Finally. 1903. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11. and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability. saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution. who has acted without discernment shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control. The courts shall determine. In cases of subdivision. The father and in. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12. Should there be no person having such insane. legal guardianship. imbecile or minor under his authority. even approximately. 3. 2. Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed. When the respective shares can not be equitably determined. said insane. or minor shall respond with their own property.

the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act." However. by reckless imprudence." However. of the deposit of such goods within the inn. and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern. nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law. Title 15. or employees in the discharge of their duties. 2012 . 3. persons. apprentices. innkeepers. That crimes affect the public interest. tavern keepers. provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself. if it would have constituted a less serious felony. in Spanish legal terminology. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. That." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV. this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. or the person representing him. in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees. 103. teachers. shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. meaning articles 1902-0910. by means of indemnification. . Any person who. tavern keepers and proprietors of establishment . consequently. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana. porque. . The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code. shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods. pupils. 2. Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasidelito under the Civil Code are: 1. xxx xxx xxx ART. or the person. 365. Imprudence and negligence. include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes. or create an action for cuasidelito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. pero acaescio por su culpa. the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. such as begging in contravention of ordinances. — Any person who. had it been intentional. or for the payment of the value thereof. shall commit any act which. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers. — In default of persons criminally liable. by simple imprudence or negligence. merely repairs the damage. violation of the game laws. The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded. while the Civil Code. Law 6. ART. In fact. one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. infraction of the 9|LLB IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. According to article 1089. while the latter. 102. would constitute a grave felony. it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility. says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda. because the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them." It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case. the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed." The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. — The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers. Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses lodging therein. if it would have constituted a less grave felony." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence. and any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments. for instance.ART. shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony. como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en daño al otro. and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants. a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed. cuasi-delitos. of Partida 7. workmen. one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . This legal institution is of ancient lineage. en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.

p. al Ministerio Fiscal. segun el texto literal. p. causante de daños o perjuicios.) Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. and another which is a necessary consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor. personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o empresas. las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio de los cuales estan los delincuentes. XXVII. y claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos. en defecto de los que sean responsables criminalmente. pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian. 3. a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos. sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Dictamenes. mas o menos severas. y diferentes modos de proceder.rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito. Asi. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo Penal. stating in part (Maura. en terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil. no solo por los actos y omisiones propios. de toda accion u omision. y formando verdadero postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil. existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha. no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito. Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Española" (Vol." The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different persons. sea con ocasion de sus funciones. 511-513): Quedando las cosas asi. Por esto acontece. 414) says: El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a diferentes personas. (See Colin and Capitant. Thus. Vol. which in no case carries with it any criminal responsibility. dice. el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio. y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta. entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o falta. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente. cuyo articulo 1903. en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. que cual la pena misma atañen al orden publico. despues de distribuir a su modo las responsabilidades civiles. que las empresas. sea el cual sea. pero con caracter subsidiario. The employee had been acquitted in the criminal case. had also been exonerated. o sea. una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales. was consulted on the following case: There had been a collision between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. reparaciones o indemnizaciones. an outstanding authority. and the employer. atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo. properly speaking. y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil. por tal motivo vienen encomendadas. pp. de ordinario. Siendo como se ve. sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder ." Vol. 10 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. por alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. in which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. dimanan. . todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales. ante los tribunales civiles. de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos legales." Maura. La obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible. 728. Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal. y se observa en la jurisprudencia. son demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente. La lesion causada por delito o falta en los derechos civiles. pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos. there is a civil responsibility. 6. An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case. sea por actos del servicio. siquiera exista en este. que en ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna. the Ferrocarril del Norte. Estas. requiere restituciones. que no vendrian a cuento y que tiene otro regimen). diverso el titulo de esta obligacion. "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil. despues de intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del delito. cuando se trata de la obligacion. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative. no borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil. El titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento.

parece innegable que la de indemnizacion por los daños y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque. a culpasurrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is demandable. Seeing that the title of this obligation is different. develop and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime. like the penalty itself. for different reasons. . separately from the regime under common law. in default of those who are criminally responsible. referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903. the injured party no longer desires to seek another relief. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the civil courts without the criminal courts interfering therewith. Even if the verdict had not been that of acquittal. mostrose mas arriba. reparations. because there exists in the latter. according to the wording of the Penal Code. are guilty of felony or misdemeanor. of culpa which is known as aquiliana. and the separation between punitive justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system. que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues del proceso. por añadidura. al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. se redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege. it seems undeniable that the action for indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was not sub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado. ni fue sentenciada. y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume. The injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions. The title upon which the action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime. before the civil courts. but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such differences. but because of the declaration of the non-existence of the felony and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from the crime. and it becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata. that the companies or enterprises.habiendose. a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code. It is for this reason that it happens. for this reason. As things are. from every act or omission causing losses and damages in which culpa or negligence intervenes. either for acts during their service or on the occasion of their functions. are sued and sentenced directly and separately with regard to theobligation. or indemnifications which. says. Laurent. according to article 1902 of the Civil Code. Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code. not only for personal acts and omissions. they are ordinarily entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney. in accordance with legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. on which the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code. make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and establishments for which the guilty parties render service. after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime. and it is so observed in judicial decisions. materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores. no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado. abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compañia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico. as well as different modes of procedure. sino que permanecio intacta. but it remained intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered. In this regard. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code. it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately reserved till after the criminal prosecution. ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito." Among the persons enumerated are the subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises. Spanish Civil Code: 11 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived. it seems less tenable that there should beres judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains. but with subsidiary character. there is greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege. so that they have different fundamental norms in different codes. and it is clear that if by this means the losses and damages are repaired. bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code. extraña a la cosa juzgada. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison between the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa. apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts. after distriburing in their own way the civil responsibilities among those who. which was the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del Juradohad jurisdiction. that is to say. but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity. que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones. pero al declararse que no existio delito. affect public order. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad. and inasmuch as the Compaña del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its actions. nor was it the subject of a sentence. whatever each nature.

in the first place. Principles of French Civil Law. but such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are personal. en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. in the case of article 1903. etc.The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another). pero no por causa de ellos. on what the legal provision is based. de la imprudencia o de la negligencia del padre. that court has upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution. because one is liable only for his own faults. por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder. and other persons on the other." That is to say. but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at least. guardian. pues. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of those persons for who one is responsible. sino en la apariencia. the imprudence or negligence of the father. Vol. It is this fault that is condemned by the law. the Penal Code distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand. pero en el orden civil. 429. declarando directa la primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21). del tutor. en que se funda el precepto legal. subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this question it is necessary to know. declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19). employees. guardian. in reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own act. responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno. por lo tanto. but in the scheme of the civil law. 430). The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault. teacher. proprietor or manager of the establishment. que motiva o razona la responsabilidad. el maestro. 12 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. Question No. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law. 4. 743: Es decir. han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir o evitar el daño. 734-735. esto es. porque se responde solo de su propia culpa. completely inadmissible. etc. the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action. according to the tenor of that articles. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. del dueño o director del establecimiento. in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal. of the teacher. etc. en el caso del articulo 1903. Doctrina y Jurisprudencia." says in Vol. pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal. La responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. en primer lugar. sino por causa del causi delito. one is not responsible for the acts of others. segun la que las faltas son personales. etc. dependientes. La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es. primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee. . No hay. 20. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista. It is.) Amandi. subsidiary (articles 20 and 21).. without including the author of the act. by exception. mas por excepcion. la ley presume que el padre. (Laurent. and that an employer is. incapacitados. pp. Is it true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight. and for the latter. the law presumes that the father. but because of the cuasi-delito. 1. for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one should be responsible. and that everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. VII. under article 1903 of the Civil Code. aprendices) causan un daño. incapacitated persons. independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability. no responde de hechos ajenos. se responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo. el Codigo de esta clase distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas. doctrina del articulo 1902. ha de entenderse directa. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee. apprentices) causes any damage. one is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. completamente inadmisible. Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors. therefore. y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. es subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber. but. Oyuelos. Spanish translation. He writes: Cuestion 1. pp. but not because of the same. declares that the responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. Referentes al Codigo Civil Español. that is to say." Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain. therefore. p. in his "Digesto: Principios. that it is subsidiary to the principal action. the responsibility should be understood as direct. Esta responsabilidad. only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another. this being the doctrine of article 1902. el tutor. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad. del maestro.

the managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused by employees under certain conditions. the employer in the case at bar. cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos. el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no califacadas. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take. In so doing. so that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime. because Fontanilla was either in prison. the widow filed a civil action against the street car company. and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that the act in question did not constitute a felony because there was no grave carelessness or negligence. y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves. with greater reason should Barredo. alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. strictly followed the same. y que alcanzan. Thereupon. saying: Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo. Second. In the present case. 1910. has not been sued in a civil action. be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted. and is a source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code. lo que no excluye. under article 1902 of the Civil Code. in sentencing the Compañia Madrileña to the payment of the damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo.) It will be noted. 1910. they were acting within their rights. and this being the only basis of acquittal. a los Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los daños causados por sus dependientes en determinadas condiciones. The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi driver. fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo. en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal. but the Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence. The lower court awarded damages. the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence. appellant herein. and besides." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence. it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company. either alone or with his employer. on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence — which he did not overcome — under article 1903. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal. paying for damages in the amount of 15. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver. In that case. or had just been released. Fontanilla. Fontanilla. sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia. lejos de infringer los mencionados textos. It might be observed in passing. it does no exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence which is not qualified. and they preferred the second remedy. Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by the "compañia Electric Madrileña de Traccion. notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case. either separately or with the street car company. es manifesto que la de lo civil. Thus. so the company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal. and. al condonar a la compañia Electrica Madrileña al pago del daño causado con la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo. disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act. siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio. al conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compañia recurrente a la indemnizacion del daño causado por uno de sus empleados.One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21. segun el 1903. Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the trial court. he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages. se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos. far from violating said legal provisions. as to the case just cited: First. ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa. the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence. on the part of the conductor. in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal Procedure. (Emphasis supplied. among other persons. there were two liabilities of Barredo: first. and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. . Third. and without in any way contradicting the decision in that cause. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21. the employer was held liable civilly. affecting. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case. desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo. to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its employees . in accordance with article 1903. that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief.000 pesetas. Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. without invading attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction. which is not qualified. he was probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages. when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects. because the former was acquitted in 13 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. netre otras perosnas.

toda vez que no se funda en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las partes contendientes. in virtue of the facts which it declares. 362-365 [year 1907]). (2) that when the said merchandise reached their destination. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued. therefore. . because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage by relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy. 1902. as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of the receptacles: Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error. employed by the company. an action was brought against a railroad company for damages because the station agent.º. article 371 of the Code of Commerce. que llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa. refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. in virtue of the next article.º. is not applicable. And yet. their delivery to the consignee was refused by the station agent without justification and with fraudulent intent. 359. In the leading case of Rakes vs. and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of considerable importance. Considering that the sentence. which is similar to the one above quoted. had unjustly andfraudulently. it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. y 3. the defendant company. the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. que la falta de entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daños y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases: Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que integran este recurso.. porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte. In that case. This Court held: 14 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. (Emphasis supplied. en virtud de los hechos que consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1. que las expediciones facturadas por la compañia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes. sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los daños y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas. 2. because the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being transported. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code.) In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain.) The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. but it limits to asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence. Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court. careciendo. because the action was not based on the delay of the goods nor on any contractual relation between the parties litigant and. the court saying: Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. que obliga por el siguiente a la Compañia demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia administrativa. (See also Sentence of February 19. as the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a contract of transportation. dated February 14. in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors. y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil. 1919. and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds. por tanto. in question recognizes. de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio. (7 Phil. on which the decision appealed from is based. a laborer of the defendant.the previous criminal case while the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. segun lo reconoce la sentencia. the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff. en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido.º.

arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private complaint. If the civil action alone was prosecuted. but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal). This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. unless it had been waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer. or in so far as they determine the existence of the criminal act from which liability arises. was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. to adopt a forced construction of these scientific codes. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been instituted. Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law. that would rob some of these articles of effect. subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. the penal action once started. except as expressly provided in the law. . under any conditions. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. such as is proposed by the defendant. According to article 112. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject. But the answer may be a broader one. 1903. not only for personal acts and omissions. the provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action. the penal action thereunder should be extinguished. Under article 111 of this law. "SEC. the civil remedy should be sought therewith. growing our of the accident in question. civil and criminal. and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed. such a construction would be unnecessary. as its first defense to the action that the necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. it is not required that the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right. Even if these articles had always stood alone. the mother.It is contended by the defendant. and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are in process of prosecution. is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with them. Section 1902 of that chapter reads: "A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. though never in actual force in these Islands. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil 15 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. xxx xxx xxx "Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties." As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. but the citation of these articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby. might be prosecuted jointly or separately. but while the penal action was pending the civil was suspended. both classes of action. and on his death or incapacity. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission. xxx xxx xxx "The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. "The father. would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper criminal offender. but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible. An examination of this topic might be carried much further. According to this theory the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing the track. which. We should be reluctant. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable. would shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts.

the deplorable accident which caused the death of the child would not have occurred. the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of the child. it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law. the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. Ltd. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employment. If these precautions had been taken by the defendant. had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street. said in part: If it were true that the defendant. and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the child. Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The trial courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. could have seen the child in the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left. The child died that same night from the burns. "fault or negligence not punished by law. who was slightly ahead of the rest. In Bernal and Enverso vs. House.liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines. the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban.000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment. and allowed the parents P1. in this jurisdiction. however.000 in damages from J. 54 Phil. this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street. Thus. It has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence punished by the law.. in a northward direction. In Manzanares vs. The little girl. whether springing from contract or quasi contract. and the child's body had already been stretched out on the ground. Ltd. More than this. who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. at a high speed without the defendant having blown the horn. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1. he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. On the evening of April 10. and 1104 of the same code. 1925.. when he again started to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way along Solana Street northward. Leyte. V. the parents of the five-year-old child. as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street. brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend the same. this accident could not have occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed. then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101. But this Court held. even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. 327. owned by defendants J. in coming from the southern part of Solana Street. it is to be believed that. within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093." as applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Purificacion Bernal. the automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters. This Court said in part: 16 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. on appeal. that there was no contributory negligence.. . aside from the fact that the defendant. he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. 1103. The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. was so frightened by the automobile that she turned to run. 821 (year 1918). The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093. But where relations already formed give rise to duties. because he had met vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana Street. But. at the moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street.. while that to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant. V. A typical application of this distinction may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the employer. After the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant. Moreta. 38 Phil. after such a conviction. the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized. that to the passengers out of the contract for passage.

It says: "The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy. This Court said: As to selection. Leyte. 18 (year 1930). the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. ... 359).000 as damages to the plaintiff. The latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. he nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined. or in supervision over him after the selection. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother. Medel (33 Phil. of the defective condition of the steering gear. the action was for damages for the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the child. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the International Garage of Manila. In the latter case. and consequently.. may be rebutted. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. 7 Phil. but also provides when the liability shall cease. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge. In Bahia vs. the presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.. does not operate as a bar to recovery. so far as appeared. The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus: Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence. 55 Phil. were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling. the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an automobile. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister 17 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure. in good condition. The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages. nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Norton & Harrison Co. said in part (p. On appeal this Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised the care of a good father of a family. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice. Batangas. 41) that: The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged in his master's employment as such owner. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage. on the evening when the religious procession was held. Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs. this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. V.. or both. and apparently thoroughly competent. which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle. 37 [year 1915]). This Court. It is thus that although J. still rule. if any. It is most significant that in the case just cited. ([1907]). Litonjua and Leynes. either actual or constructive. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1. 624 [year 1915). Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil." From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee. that said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle.

We study first. 526): The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly licensed captain. Manila Electric Co. according to F.788. The Penal Code in easily understandable language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. is predicated on an entirely different theory. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not punishable by law. that this case was governed by the Penal Code. 586 (year 1928). there is no escaping the conclusion that the provisions of the Penal Code govern. on the authority of these cases. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath. an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co. held: The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias. This Court held (p. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff.788.. . therefore. but might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. That would be a good defense to a strictly civil action. of the Civil Code.) In Walter A. 38 Phil. to indemnify the City of Manila for P1. who were working for Ora. claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable.27.. seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by the six cases above set forth. because the Court of Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. in part.. 55 Phil.Marciana. saying: With this preliminary point out of the way. Cadwallader. The main defense was that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Two youths. and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability. is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code. we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal Code. pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly.27. xxx xxx xxx Our deduction. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. therefore. which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his employee. 18 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. The Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. it may be said further that the statements here made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.. Sixto Eustaquio. Smith & Co. This Court. instantly killing him. Manila Railroad Co. In other words. applying articles 1902 and 1903. In other words. the case of City of Manila vs. Cangco vs. the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment. vs.Litonjua and Leynes [1915]. primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903. [1918]. in relation to article 1902.. 768. any different ruling would permit the master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. It is. Indeed. 52 Phil. Accordingly. The truck was damaged in the amount of P1. 1925.. whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. This Court held. (Bahia vs. took place on June 8. City of Manila vs. which had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the cases cited above. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio. C. as pointed out by the trial judge. Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista. We have already seen that this is a proper and independent remedy. supra. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 30 Phil. the civil obligation connected up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf. Manila Electric Co.. authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage. Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. 624. A collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence.. and that the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co. This being so. He is. (By way of parenthesis.) It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition. the motorman.

would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito. Secondly. it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs. and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Firstly. The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. because the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.000. A motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by simple negligence and sentenced. disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. (1) that the exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family. what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. (55 Phil.. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt. which is governed by the Penal Code. authors. and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code. Nor are we. we are of opinion and so hold. the above case destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the principle that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code. Otherwise. Onrubia (46 Phil. because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the motorman. is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code. among other things. . 75). but there is also a more expeditious way. The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. and has likewise failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action. True. or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. while in the case at bar. it 19 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. to find the accused guilty in a criminal case. to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1. to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past. in the interpretation of the laws. is another case invoked by the defendant. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law. there is such a remedy under our laws. which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code. An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the Penal Code. In trying to apply the two cases just referred to. preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective. the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. and that is. Still more concretely. while in a civil case.. it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed. and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. Thirdly. Manila Electric Co. The legal provisions. the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case. according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code. the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. But this Court held: In view of the foregoing considerations. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime. In fact. the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer — in this case the defendant-petitioner — is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In such a state of affairs. proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required. In such cases. 327). Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. That case need not be set forth. which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence — even the slightest — would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. and therefore claimed exemption from civil liability.Arambulo vs. Hence.

747) that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad. with costs against the defendant-petitioner.2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws.000. J.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome. and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana. 20 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. not depending on the issues. SANCHEZ. The case is now before us for review on certiorari. On appeal. 4. because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject. and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles. 622. unnecessary. "they should reproach themselves. Lichauco. 1966 AIR FRANCE. limitations and results of a criminal prosecution. some for their weakness. P10. respondents. and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects".R. No. Thus. and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him. This will. In the present case. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. 2nd Ed. At this juncture. which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed. it is believed. there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime.10.000. forgetting that there is another remedy.20 to P383. then.00 for attorneys' fees." And according to Manresa. p. others for their poor selection and all for their negligence. Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner. and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws. .00 by way of moral damages. L-21438 September 28. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. G. and for the further reason that an independent civil action.000. courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice. make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy. petitioner. por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza. p. 12. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel. it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. with costs against petitioner. 7. at least. and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director. vs. from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. plus P3. these various amounts with interest at the legal rate. should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout. Carrascoso.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents.being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages. P393. which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. In view of the foregoing. and the costs of suit.00 as exemplary damages. it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Why. Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol." (Vol. As Theilhard has said. is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. Fourthly.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent.: The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.

11 This is but a part of the mental process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. but at Bangkok. 7 A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. 12 Indeed. there was a "white man". according to said Ernesto G. 8 The law. solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner.3 1. From Manila to Bangkok. "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. 3. and that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it. 14 At any rate. "There is no law that so requires". 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony of each witness for.. and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane. p. in the words of the witness Ernesto G. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties. when they found out that Mr. 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. had a "better right" to the seat. we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals support its judgment. issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Inc. . and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon". Cuento. the plaintiff. By statute. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat. through its authorized agent. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity. the defeated party." 18 2. "the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution". On March 28. refused. upon the other hand. 1958. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions. Cuento.. however. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it. 15 Findings of fact. who. 12. 1959). was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30. which the Court of Appeals is required to make. they came all across to Mr. Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". and then. would not vitiate the judgment. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised. 1958. "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class. the legal presumptions are that official duty has been regularly performed. maybe defined as "the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court . It is not appropriately the business of this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first 21 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court of Appeals. it is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense". a civil engineer. a commotion ensued. It is open to direct attack. the defendant. it was held that the mere fact that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into consideration or even mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony". Philippine Air Lines. plaintiff travelled in "first class". and. Because as this Court well observed.16 They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts in issue". or each item of evidence presented by. to overturn the appellate court's decision. 17 A question of law. 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it". has been declared as "one which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims? It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28. Hearing of May 26. Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts" which a party "considered as proved". the Manager alleged. 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". are: Plaintiff. as was to be expected. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" (Transcript.. 20 With these guideposts. It is in this setting that in Manigque. may result. if not confusion. it does not mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence. Air France.The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record". Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager].

25 We reached this policy construction because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial court. and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to 22 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. 24 Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the assignments of error and all questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". thus: On the fact that plaintiff paid for. the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus: Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued. "B". We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower court. which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had confirmed reservations for. "first class". Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court.class on any specific flight. "A-l". the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride. although he had tourist class protection. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or riot the tickets it issues are to be honored or not. particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". . (Transcript. "B-l". accordingly. "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said witnesses." "B-2". and was issued a "First class" ticket. 23 We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket. 26 If. Rafael Altonaga. These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error. would be accommodated in the first-class compartment. The court cannot believe that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows: Q. "C" and "C-1". to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket. and defendant's own witness. "B-1. the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. and a right to. first class seats on the "definite" segments of his journey. a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat.K. notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed. and plaintiff's Exhibits "A". p. Confirmed for first class? A. "A-1". That the space is confirmed. then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats. 22 Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. In these tickets there are marks "O. there can be no question. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention. a first class ticket without any reservation whatever. Apart from his testimony. see plaintiff's Exhibits "A". Q. the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". We are not impressed by such a reasoning. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees." From what you know. 169) xxx xxx xxx Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for. for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-class reservation. the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. and paid for. and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued. 21 And. "B". So also. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket. as hereinabove shown. that. Furthermore. Yes. defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. what does this OK mean? A. as petitioner underscores.

was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok.. as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff. . the inference of bad faith is there. First Class passage on defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila. which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight.. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. That . therefore. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier. plaintiff suffered inconveniences. then. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket. embarrassments. wounded feelings. thereby causing plaintiff mental anguish. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke an issue". Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". the Court of Appeals declared: 23 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27.000. serious anxiety. That. social humiliation. unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. resulting in moral damages. as a rule. embarrassments and humiliations.00. wounded feelings and social humiliation. plaintiff was entitled to. as petitioner states. 30 Why. defendant failed to provide First Class passage. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract. That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok. a written document speaks a uniform language. by reason of which he suffered inconvenience. and humiliations. if another had a better right to the seat? 4. the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required.31 and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok. That finally. . that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. That consequently. Carrascoso wasousted by petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man. the plaintiff has been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated. 36 On the question of bad faith. 6. and the like injury. that to authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. That likewise. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are: 3. during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok. 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of the petitioner. the plaintiff. that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already. 4.. serious anxiety. resulting in moral damages in the amount of P30. But. .. 33 xxx xxx xxx The foregoing. as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid. it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. the Bangkok-Teheran leg. seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class. if he had no seat? Or. and Third. . as charged by petitioner..32 xxx xxx xxx 2. The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which the Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion. Deficiency in the complaint. was cured by the evidence. plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a valuable consideration. Such is the case here. desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila. amongst others. That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering.. 34 The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial. 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its position". but instead furnished plaintiff only TouristClass accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca. 5. defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after protestations. thereby causing him mental anguish. It is. in our opinion. Second.fulfill? We have long learned that. arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's employees. adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. if any. substantially aver: First. 29 And this because. under which said contract.

and by the testimony of an eye-witness. using the words of the witness Ernesto G. testified as follows: "Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the passenger has arranged with you? A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation. 247. "white man" have a "better right" to the seat occupied by Mr. surely the plaintiff should not have been picked out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence of others. 69. or yet to secure his disposition. we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point: Why did the. We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened there.n. Rules of Court]. Cuento. he forcibly ejected him from his seat. using the words of witness Ernesto G. when asked to explain the meaning of the letters "O. the Court is constrained to find. 1959) In this connection. that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not give up his "first class" seat because the said Manager wanted to accommodate. The captain of the plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even refused to do so. June 19. and.38 It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did not use the term "bad faith". thus: 24 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. Likewise. he imposed his arbitrary will. has been sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony before the court. Cuento.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff. Ernesto G.s. any right on the part of the "white man" to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was issued a corresponding "first class" ticket. this is bad faith. if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the seats had already been taken. "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose. and that the captain refused to intervene". by the testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who. It could have been easy for defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case. the manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat.just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. who was a co-passenger.That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok. as it does find. and was transferred to the tourist class not only without his consent but against his will. Unless." 39 And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient. worse. who was the chief of the Reservation Office of defendant. 37 The Court of appeals further stated — Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man. but defendant did neither. the defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said Manager by deposition. Carrascoso? The record is silent. there is the express finding of bad faith in the judgment of the Court of First Instance. p. Certainly. Cuento." (t. The defendant airline did not prove "any better". Hence. Zenaida Faustino. Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence committed by defendant's employees. another witness for defendant. the "white man".. nay. But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat. If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok. of course. corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his notebook which notation reads as follows: "First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will. but defendant did not do so. the presumption is that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. under the circumstances. bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. par (e). . It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment . For. said "that the space is confirmed for first class.

is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. could give ground for an action for damages. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct. 7. petitioner. duly paid for. "We will note that you transferred to the tourist class". though the language used was not insulting and she was not ejected. naturally. So one of the flight attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said. and. "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check. because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness. 42 6. with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that he was occupying to." 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.40 5. and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination. It is well settled in law. Q About that purser? A Well. giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection. 44 Thus. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. indignities and abuses from such employees. Article 21 of the Civil Code says: ART. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony. Civil Code. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees. 47 And in another case. it was a breach of contract and a tort. respect. must answer. 21. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said. moral damages are recoverable. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. That is tantamount to accepting my transfer. "Nothing of that kind. So it is. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. courtesy and due consideration. and for which the corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. I said.1awphîl. thus — Q You mentioned about an attendant. there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him.The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith. Cuento. the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg room. and the defendant has not proven that this "white man" had any "better right" to occupy the "first class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying.nèt Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10). although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". Its business is mainly with the travelling public. 43 And this. Q Was she able to note it? A No. his employer. again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. "Where a passenger on a railroad train. I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me. The contract of air carriage. therefore." He read it and translated it to me — because it 25 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. Who is that attendant and purser? A When we left already — that was already in the trip — I could not help it. Damages are proper. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. "I have recorded the incident in my notebook. In parallel circumstances. because. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager. What for? and she said." 46 And this. generates a relation attended with a public duty. a "white man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals." And I also said. injurious language. "You are not going to note anything there because I am protesting to this transfer". that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop. as by calling him a lunatic. we applied the foregoing legal precept. . because I did not give my ticket.

was recorded in French — "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene." Mr. VALTE — I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence would be the notes. Your Honor. COURT — I will allow that as part of his testimony.
49

Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae. At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter. We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence. 8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary damages — in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.54 9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised — as it was here — should not be disturbed. 10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof. 57 On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered. 5. G.R. No. L-14414 April 27, 1960

SEVERINO SALEN and ELENA SALBANERA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. JOSE BALCE, defendant-appellee. Marciano C. Dating, Jr. for appellants. Severino Balce for appellee. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

26 | L L B 2012

IIIB(TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

CASES)

NOVEMBER

27,

On February 5, 1957, plaintiffs brought this action against defendant before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte to recover the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest thereon from July 18, 1952, plus attorney' fees and other incidental expenses. Defendant, in his answer, set up the defense that the law upon which plaintiffs predicate their right to recover does not here apply for the reason that law refers to quasi-delicts and not to criminal cases. After trial, the court sustained the theory of defendant and dismissed the complaint with costs. Hence the present appeal. Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died single from wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of defendant. At the time, Gumersindo Balce was also Single, a minor below 18 years of age, and was living with defendant. As a result of Carlos Salen's death, Gumersindo Balce accused and convicted of homicide and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay the heirs of the deceased an indemnity in the amount of P2,000.00. Upon petition of plaintiff, the only heirs of the deceased, a writ of execution was issued for the payment of the indemnity but it was returned unsatisfied because Gumersindo Balce was insolvent and had no property in his name. Thereupon, plaintiffs demanded upon defendant, father of Gumersindo, the payment of the indemnity the latter has failed to pay, but defendant refused, thus causing plaintiffs to institute the present action. The question for determination is whether appellee can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity of P2,000.00 which his son was sentenced to pay in the criminal case filed against him. In holding that the civil liability of the son of appellee arises from his criminal liability and, therefore, the subsidiary liability of appellee must be determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, and not under Article 2180 of the new Civil Code which only applies to obligations which arise from quasidelicts, the trial court made the following observation: The law provides that a person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable (Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code). But there is no law which holds the father either primarily or subsidiarily liable for the civiliability inccured by the son who is a minor of 8 years. Under Art. 101 of the Penal Code, the father is civilly liable for the acts committed by his son if the latter is an imbecile, or insane, or under 9 years of age or over 9 but under 15, who has acted without discernment. Under Art. 102, only in keepers and tavern-keepers are held subsidiarily liable and under Art. 103 of the same Penal Code, the subsidiary liability established in Art. 102 shall apply only to "employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices or employees in the discharge of their duties." By the principle of exclusio unus exclusio ulterius, the defendant in this case cannot be held subsidiary liable for the civil liability of Gumersindo Balce who has been convicted of homicide for the killing of the plaintiff's son Carlos Salen. Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, relied by the plaintiff's, is not applicable to the case at bar. It applies to obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses. Civil liability arising from criminal negligence or offenses is governed by the provisions of the Penal Code and civil liability arising from civil negligence is governed by the provision of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code expressly refers to obligations which arise from quasi-delicts. And obligations arising from quasi-delict (Commissioner's note). And according to Art. 2177, the 'responsibility for fault of negligence under Art. 2176 is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liabilty arising from negligence under the Penal Code. . . . While we agree with the theory that, as a rule, the civil liability arising from a crime shall be governed by the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, we disagree with the contention that the subsidiary liability of persons for acts of those who are under their custody should likewise be governed by the same Code even in the absence of any provision governing the case, for that would leave the transgression of certain right without any punishment or sanction in the law. Such would be the case if we would uphold the theory of appellee as sustained by the trial court. It is true that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, over 9 but under 15 years of age, who act without discernment, unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the deliquent minor under his legal authority or control. But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code.
27 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27,

The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who lived in their company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void that apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases. A case in point is Exconde vs. Capuno, 101 Phil., 843, the facts of which are as follows: Dante Capuno, a minor of 15 years of age, lives in the company of his father, Delfin Capuno. He is a student of the Balintawak Elementary School in the City of San Pablo and a member of the Boy Scout Organization of his school. On Marcy 31, 1949, on the occasion of a certain parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in the City of San Pablo, Dante Capuno was one of those instructed by the City School Supervisor to join the parade. From the school, Dante Capuno, together with other students, boarded a jeep. When the jeep started to run, Dante Capuno took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amando Ticson and Isidro Caperina died as a consequence. The corresponding criminal action for double homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted against Dante Capuno. During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidro Caperina, reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused. Dante Capuno was found guilty of the criminal offense charged against him. In line with said reservation of Sabina Exconde, the corresponding civil action for damages was filed against Delfin Capuno, Dante Capuno and others. In holding Delfin Capuno jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante Capuno arising from the criminal act committed by the latter, this Court made the following ruling: The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieved themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art. 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code.) This defendants failed to prove. Another case in point is Araneta vs. Arreglado 104 Phil., 524; 55 Off. Gaz. [9] 1961. The facts of this case are as follows: On March 7, 1951, while plaintiff Benjamin Araneta was talking with the other students of the Ateneo de Manila while seated atop a low ruined wall bordering the Ateneo grounds along Dakota Street, in the City of Manila, Dario Arreglado, a former student of the Ateneo, chanced to pass by. Those on the wall called Dario and conversed with him, and in the course of their talk, twitted him on his leaving the Ateneo and enrolling in the De La Salle College. Apparently, Arreglado resented the banter and suddenly pulling from his pocket a Japanese Luger pistol (licensed in the name of his father Juan Arreglado), fired the same at Araneta, hitting him in the lower jaw, causing him to drop backward, bleeding profusely. Helped by his friends, the injured lad was taken first to the school infirmary and later to the Singian Hospital, where he lay hovering between life and death for three days. The vigor of youth came to his rescue; he rallied and after sometime finally recovered, the gunshot would left him with a degenerative injury to the jawbone (mandible) and a scar in the lower portion of the face, where the bullet had plowed through. The behavior of Benjamin was likewise affected, he becoming inhibited and morose after leaving the hospital. Dario Arreglado was indicted for frustrated homicide and pleaded guilty, but in view of his youth, he being only 14 years of age, the court suspended the proceedings as prescribed by Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code. Thereafter, an action was instituted by Araneta and his father against Juan Arreglado, his wife, and their son Dario, to recover material, moral and exemplary damages. The court of first instance, after trial, sentenced the Arreglados to pay P3,943.00 as damages and attorney's fees. From this decision, the Araneta appealed in view of the meager amount of indemnity awarded. This Court affirmed the decision but increased the indemnity to P18,000.00. This is a typical case of parental subsidiary liability arising from the criminal act of a minor son.

28 | L L B 2012

IIIB(TORTS

AND

DAMAGES

CASES)

NOVEMBER

27,

a minor." Actually.: Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29.plaintiffs-appellants. SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE. Quezon City. (P. married at the time of the occurrence.R. Rule 107. G.Wherefore. which is now Rule III. because of "lack of intent to kill. No. deceased. NOW RULE 111. the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal. for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs. the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded. upon motion to dismiss of defendants. vs. 1977 PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO.000. RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE. with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint. 4. named Agapito Elcano. the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill. 29 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27.]) was first denied by the trial court. as father and Natural Guardian of said minor. the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds: 1. 2. this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants. the defendant Marvin Hill. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill. 1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained. BARREDO. Reginald Hill et al. because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.) Hence. dismissing. when criminally prosecuted. defendants-appellees. and the costs. Marvin R. 1965. RULE 107. . Cruz & Avecilla for appellants. 21. Q-8102. the decision appealed from is reversed. 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case. the spouses Elcano.00. 3. January 29. 6. and his father. with whom he was living and getting subsistence. (p. Hill & Associates for appellees. Record on Appeal. reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued: Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14. Record [p. 40. of the Revised Rules of Court. the Order of this Court on December 8. 1965 in Civil Case No. minor. 23. vs. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata. REGINALD HILL. Pedro Elcano et al. Record on Appeal. Record [p. J. coupled with mistake. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial. AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111. are presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT I THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1. Philippines. Judgement is hereby rendered ordering appellee to pay appellants the sum of P2. of which. and MARVIN HILL. OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT. in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano. L-24803 May 26.

the separate individuality of a cuasidelito or culpa aquiliana. 607. on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mereculpa or fault. was not reversed? 2. (page 4. when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father. After due trial. 1 It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. 615-616.) 2 It is most significant that in the case just cited. the opinion holds: The. 73 Phil. And so. though a minor. he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. Hill. (p. 73 Phil. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. V. even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which. 73 Phil." Parenthetically. was already legally married? The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character. 618. 73 Phil. of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs.). above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. the two decisive issues presented for Our resolution are: 1. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE. It is thus that although J. Marvin Hill. and earlier jurisprudence of our own. Garcia. this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. Reginald.) 3 30 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal. under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized. it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability. As We view the foregoing background of this case. coupled with mistake. notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. . this Court postulated. the works of recognized civilians. in this jurisdiction. with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain. (pp. defendant. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty.II THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RESADJUDICTA. And yet. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence. on account of the death of their son. (p. the appellees filed the motion to dismiss abovereferred to. nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. criminal and civil. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued. that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. Thus. Agapito.appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE. In that case. 617. Thus.) It appears that for the killing of the son. of plaintiffs-appellants. III THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS. Atty. the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. and IV THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. In that case. living with and getting subsistenee from his father. after such a conviction. Record.

because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification. forgetting that there is another remedy. which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine. Thus. the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property. but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt.) Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts . "not punishable by law". not punishable by law. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law. rather than the spirit that giveth lift. which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code. because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code. and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana.73 Phil. Article 2177 of the new code provides: 31 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. Indeed. provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence. there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito. 11 not punishable by law. 73 Phil. so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed. in the past.through any degree of negligence .The legal provisions. and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. simply says. not a negligent act. whether voluntary or matter. preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. This will. the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code. it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel. (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws.would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana orquasidelito. not depending on the issues. which is Article 1162. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium. 621. (p. while in a civil case. In such a state of affairs. but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. supra. . intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II." More precisely. Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts. an ancient and additional remedy. in force here at the time of Garcia. 1919. the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. Nor are we. we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. to find the accused guilty in a criminal case. our laws. it is believed.hence. which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code. In the present case. limitations and results of a criminal prosecution. in the interpretation of the laws. it is to be noted that the said Code. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq." thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law. accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code.deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited. which involved a case of fraud or estafa.even the slightest . "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2. and for the further reason that an independent civil action. no longer uses the term.) Fourthly. it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations. Otherwise." (p. In such cases. Secondary. make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. authors. a new provision. Firstly. Title XVII of this Book. what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous." And so. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required. and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel. Although this habitual method is allowed by. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood. Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain. 620. the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth.

mother or guardian. to hold. Therefore. Civil Code). in reiteration of Garcia. The father and. according to Manresa. The father and. The former is a violation of the criminal law. under Sections 2 and 3 (c). in case of his death or incapacity. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted. are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two. Briefly stated. the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence. equity and justice. and. 2177. p. not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence. whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. in case of his death or incapacity.". emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. and under Article 397. the clear implication of Article 399. the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. (e) of Section 3. is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence.rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. Gulf and Pacific Co. It must be borne in mind that. According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling. Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father. Hill. sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents. but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327. while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict. although married.to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law." Now under Article 2180. (See 32 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. it is. therefore. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father. We here hold. an outstanding Spanish jurist. Atlantic. provided that the offended party is not allowed. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld. as We do hold. also clear that pursuant to Article 399. his father. are responsible. In other words. it is not controverted that Reginald. however. 7 Phil. therefore. . Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. 162. refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. 5 On the other hand. Consequently. a situation which is not unusual.ART. Rule 111. But said article forestalls a double recovery. is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. whether on reasonable doubt or not. separate from criminal negligence. if he is actually charged also criminally. Factually. it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. 359. (Report of the Code) Commission. of ancient origin. again. sound and perfectly tenable by Maura. acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.) Although. in a sense. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear. in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not. or guardian. a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act. emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)". contemplate also the same separability. but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother. where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character. it is "more congruent with the spirit of law. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. and more in harmony with modern progress". nevertheless. shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action." In the instant case.4 It results. under the proposed Article 2177. that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict. the mother. Rule 111. . having always had its own foundation and individuality. the Rules of Court. that Article 2176. "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. to recover damages on both scores. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age. the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. the mother. hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

however. The next day. Corporacion de PP. there being fault or negligence. while still a minor. Jur. 1. the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child. 587. WHEREFORE. Separate Opinions AQUINO. together with three other classmates. See article 38. tossed the object at her. to weed the grass in the school premises. 33 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. and the object hit her right eye. and P2. Vol. 13.000. Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am.R. minor represented by her father ULISES P. the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her parents. 1970 MARIA TERESA Y. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. No. In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband. she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. 12. plus the costs of the suit.: This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict.00 as moral damages. Despite the medical efforts. J. for all of which the parents spent the sum of P1. J. 74 Phil. does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent. 600). Such fault or negligence. G. first on July 20 and again on August 4. and Maria Teresa Monfort. as a matter of equity. However. J.) And surely. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. 2176. and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by provisions of this Chapter. which certified the same to us since the facts are not in issue. On July 9. who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. Article 2180 applies to Atty. Otherwise stated. which read: ART. Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye. is obliged to pay for the damage done.75. 776. J. P20. MAKALINTAL. Maria Teresa Cuadra. particularly Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof. At that precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend. the liability of Atty. The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act of his minor child which causes damage to another under the specific facts related above and the applicable provisions of the Civil Code. 39 Phil.Manresa.000. Maria Teresa Monfort's father. 766-767. decided by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental favorably to the plaintiffs and appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeals... 1962 their teacher assigned them. (Art. II. pp. Smarting from the pain. Costs against appellees. if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties. an ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their hair. the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Tiangco. concurring: Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act. She underwent surgical operation twice. Agustinos Recoletos. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society.) Accordingly. . July 10. plaintiffsappellees. killing someone else invites judicial action. Hill has become milling.00 as attorney's fees. which is blameworthy. CUADRA. 812 cited by Bocobo. in Magtibay vs. ALFONSO MONFORT. inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age.703. evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl.. subsidiary to that of his son. Id. 579). ET AL. 1962. defendant-appellant. 399. CUADRA. 576. when judged by accepted legal standards. vs.703. in Our considered view. Manresa. L-24101 September 30. the defendant was ordered to pay P1.00 as actual damages. in Daywalt vs. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and. supra." (Street.

would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. and when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage." it was likely that something would happen to her friend. G. she was hurt. but only the moral compulsion of good conscience. as in Article 2176. especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure applicable." Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense. as in fact. In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care. which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. in case of his death or incapacity are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. J. Separate Opinions BARREDO. tossed the object at her. I prefer to hold that there being no evidence that he had properly advised his daughter to behave properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and playmates. As to the liability of appellant as father. 1968 AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. or the act which caused it. or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage. which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The basis of this vicarious. The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or the omission. or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions.R. liability is. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering.. There is nothing in the record to show that he had done anything at all to even try to minimize the damage caused upon plaintiff child. no doubt. fault or negligence. But what is the exact degree of diligence contemplated. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity. When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible. his child was at school. She was 13 years and should have known that by jokingly saying "aloud that she had found an earthworm and. dissenting: I am afraid I cannot go along with my esteemed colleagues in holding that the act of appellant's daughter does not constitute fault within the contemplation of our law or torts. The decision appealed from is reversed. he can be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180. No. and how does a parent prove it in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor child. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180. 2. On the contrary. it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent. and the complaint is dismissed. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and." it implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. in the different cases enumerated therein. to determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence the damage could have been prevented. the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court. such as that of the father or the mother under the circumstances above quoted. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned. the burden of proof necessarily rests on the defendant. where it was his duty to send her and where she was. IIIB(TORTS . under the care and supervision of the teacher. as he had the right to expect her to be. evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl. without pronouncement as to costs. deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that befell her. xxx xxx xxx The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. however careful. The victim.ART 2180. L-20392 34 | L L B 2012 December 18. although primary.

contains the following disposition: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. defendant Yu Khe Thai. and on the second.000. was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO. CAEDO. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai. Caedo and three daughters.000. taking the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack Wack for his regular round of golf. defendants-appellants. he slackened his speed. as already stated. ROSE ELAINE CAEDO. one on each side. as it must have been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable while.: As a result of a vehicular accident in which plaintiff Marcial Caedo and several members of his family were injured they filed this suit for recovery of damages from the defendants. The counterclaim of the defendants against the plaintiffs is hereby ordered dismissed. It was a risky maneuver either way. instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear. Caedo.70 for actual damages. held his employer solidarily liable with him. but was unsuccessful. Its rear bumper. Bernardo. With them in the car were Mrs. as he claimed later on at the trial. P48. and P5. and the Cadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles (48 to 56 kilometers). rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal on February 26. only eight meters away. the carretela should anyway have been visible to him from afar if he had been careful.00 for moral damages. The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds. tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right. solidarily liable with him? On the first question the trial court found Rafael Bernardo negligent.00 for attorney's fees. and they should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions. decided to take a gamble — beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela.11 in favor of the plaintiffs for the damage sustained by their car in the accident. EPHRAIM CAEDO. In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction. one in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO. de los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village. the court renders a judgment.. and the risk should have been quite obvious. The judgment. Bernardo. considering the condition of the road and the absence of traffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour. 1958 on Highway 54 (now E. On March 12. the sum of P1. The carretela was provided with two lights. with costs against the defendants. which certified the case to us in view of the total amount of the plaintiffs' claim. CAEDO. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. et al. was his employer.00 for exemplary damages. Or. MARCIAL T. And even if he did not notice the lights. jointly and severally. suing through their father. The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24. veered to the left in order to pass.705. since the car was moving at from 30 to 35 miles per hour (or 25 miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it was already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him. This is the first clear indication of his negligence. and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. P10. Yu Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo. Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home in Quezon City to the airport. . 35 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27.MARCIAL T. going in the same direction. the clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was insufficient. judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac would wait behind. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane. for lack of merits. Julian Bautista. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel. Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him. 1960 (Q-2952). where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. Ahead of the Cadillac. plaintiffs-appellants. J. where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. 1960 the judgment was amended so as to include an additional award of P3.929. and the Minors. The photographs taken at the scene show that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of impact. wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane. confronted with the unexpected situation. Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. MAKALINTAL.000. however. as guardian ad litem. There are two principal questions posed for resolution: (1) who was responsible for the accident? and (2) if it was defendant Rafael Bernardo. vs. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son. to pay to plaintiffs Marcial Caedo. As it was. with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel. or else squeeze in between them in any case. caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose. EILEEN CAEDO.

There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The rule is not new. after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom. 2184. makes his driver act his own. as owner of the Cadillac. where this Court held: . and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The same rule applies where the owner is present. he said. both criminally and civilly. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. therefor. prevented the misfortune. if the causative factor was the driver's negligence. Negligence on the part of the latter. if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him. and devoid of traffic that early morning. he could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continually encountered on the road. could have. connotes no absence of that due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune. The road was wide and open. And even when he did see it at that distance. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it. During that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. by the use of due diligence. by his acquiescence. although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so. It was expressed in Chapman vs. the owner of the automobile. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master. the owner is solidarily liable with his driver. becomes himself responsible. either civilly or criminally. necessarily subjective. and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance. In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937. It was a thought that.. injures a person or violates the criminal law. What would be a negligent omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part. for the results produced by the acts of the chauffeur. at a speed of 60 miles an hour. within the meaning of Article 2184. reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. in the same capacity for over ten years. 374. is not responsible. Under the foregoing provision. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. although present therein at the time the act was committed. 27 Phil. the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. . The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. and before that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. as has been stated. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code. but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence. must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident. was not running at an unreasonable speed. becomes himself responsible for such acts. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant. The next question is whether or not Yu Khe Thai. for example. is solidarily liable with the driver. wise or not. in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. for he was not himself at the wheel. An owner who sits in his automobile. On the other hand. if the driver. The thought that entered his mind. to a great degree. The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta. The car.. say. The test of his intelligence. In motor vehicle mishaps. who was in the vehicle. if the former. Underwood (1914). by a sudden act of negligence. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. without any effort to stop him. The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is. that is. unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner. which reads: ART. if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses 36 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. although formulated as law for the first time in the new Civil Code. if any. of an old and infirm person who is not similarly equipped. or other vehicle. was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the situation worse.

000 by way of moral damages is itemized as follows: 1. B. left with displacement. Ephraim Caedo 4. not actual. big toe. Defendants.000. (2) left frontal. multiple: (1) upper and lower lids.000. Concussion. (3) upper eyelid. multiple: (1)frontal region. proximal phalanx right. base. Subparietoplaural hematoma. And as far as perception is concerned. 37 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. left. Pseudotosis. F. right.000. and constitute a proper ground for granting moral. Multiple fractures. Eileen Caedo 5. Marcial Caedo 2. Wound. simple. . anterior. absent a minimum level imposed by law. anterior.00 3. frontal. Abrasions. chest wall. Rose Elaine Caedo 6. base. as provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code. proximal phalanx middle finger. 2nd rib posterior. C. base. is an error. for the injuries they sustained. on the other hand maintain that the amounts awarded as moral damages are excessive and should be reduced. We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai. has not been shown by the evidence.000. Juana S. claiming that the Court should have granted them also actual or compensatory damages. right. Abrasions. Pain and suffering are not capable of pecuniary estimation. Contusion. lower third. damages. lst to 5th inclusive.00 4. left.00 15.000. Fracture. Basal disc atelectasis. Actual damages. simple. lung. simple. (2) left temporal. abrasions. Fracture. Fracture. right lower lobe. The award of P48. C. irregular. scalp. frontal left. Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness. bilateral.00 3. have real need of drivers' services. a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO: A. D. deep. Abrasions. E. The next question refers to the sums adjudged by the trial court as damages. We find no justification for either side. anterior. would be effectively proscribed. Third rib has a double fracture. (4) leg. Merilyn Caedo P 20. (1) left temporal area. other than expenses for medical treatment. (2) Knee. skull.00 Plaintiffs appealed from the award. lacerated.000. (2) apex of nose. (3) nasolabial region. 5th finger.000. aggregating P225. (V-shaped). must be proven. metatarsals III and V right. with hematoma. ribs. B. EPHRAIM CAEDO: A. lower 1/3. secondary. The amount of actual damages suffered by the individual plaintiffs by reason of their injuries. (3) left supraorbital multiple: EILEEN CAEDO: A. Lacerated wound ROSE ELAINE CAEDO: A. lateral aspect. multiple: (1) dorsum. Caedo 3. B.tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. secondary to probable basal fracture. cerebral. employment of professional drivers by car owners who. (3) shin. CAEDO: A. Abrasions. (4) knees. left.00 3. solidarily with Rafael Bernardo. to be compensable. The injuries sustained by plaintiffs are the following: MARCIAL T. by their very inadequacies.

right. Dean Gilberto G. lower third C. immediately created a committee headed by him to investigate the complaint. and D. HON. Mercado in his capacity as Dean of the Institute of Technology. 3 However. The case was dismissed as against private respondent Wilfredo Patawaran but an information for slight physical injuries was filed against private respondent Edgardo Picar in the City Court of Manila.: This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Branch VIII. represented by his father WENCESLAO PATAWARAN. stating among others. lower 1/3 right. D-1. on July 8. Gilberto G. both students in mechanical engineering in the said institute at the Oak Barrel Restaurant located at P. the Secretary of the Institute of Technology of FEU. They contend that the Dean's authority to investigate under the Code of Conduct of FEU (as amended) from where he derives that power. So ordered. represented by his father. considering the nature and extent of the above-mentioned injuries. lower 1/3. SISON. by filing a complaint 2 against the private respondents Edgardo Picar and Wilfredo Patawaran for alleged breach of the university's rules and regulations. is limited to acts done or committed within the premises of the compound of the University. with costs against the latter. Far Eastern University. In the said complaint. Contusion with hematoma. . petitioner Gilberto Mercado. the petition prayed for by the plaintiffs is hereby GRANTED. 3.R. Jose Angeles. dated December 29. Quiapo. 1976 in Civil Case No. Branch XXVII. was assaulted by Edgardo Picar and Wilfredo Patawaran. J. Mercado.MARILYN CAEDO: A. shin. Manila on the occasion of the birthday party of Professor Alfonso Bernabe. (See Exhibits D. WHEREFORE. anterior aspect. D-3. MERCADO. a professor in the Institute of Technology of Far Eastern University (FEU). 1977. D-2. ANGELES and GILBERTO G. that the subject incident was only "a result of a misunderstanding and nobody is to be blamed. Plaintiffs. and the defendants are hereby perpetually enjoined from further proceeding with the administrative investigation against the plaintiffs." Acting on the administrative complaint filed before his Office by the petitioner Jose Angeles. Abrasions. "Edgardo Picar and Wilfredo Patawaran. in his capacity as Dean of Institute of Technology. multiple: (1)shin. EDGARDO PICAR and WILFREDO PATAWARAN. it is alleged that on October 20. Later. initiated an administrative case before the Office of the Dean. the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability. versus Jose S. FEU. 1982 JOSE S. respondents. L-45551 February 16. the criminal case for slight physical injuries against Edgardo Picar was dismissed on the basis of an affidavit of desistance 4 submitted by petitioner Jose Angeles before the City Court of Manila." the dispositive part of which reads: WHEREFORE. 1975. the amounts of moral damages granted by the trial court are not excessive. D-4. vs. Jose Angeles. as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila. No. 101222 entitled. G. Gomez Street. the Dean of the Institute. The 38 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. petitioners. of the Institute of Technology. FERNANDEZ.5) It is our opinion that. 1 The records disclose that sometime in November 1975 the petitioner. (2) arm. Wenceslao Patawaran. the complaint was ammended to assault and/or physical injuries. RAFAEL S. and is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo. The private respondents Picar and Patawaran questioned the authority of the Dean and his committee to conduct the administrative investigation because the act complained of — the alleged assault of Professor Angeles at the Oak Barrel Restaurant — is not within his authority to investigate. during the pendency of this case. Angeles. The same incident became also the subject of a criminal complaint for assault against a person in authority instituted by the petitioner Jose Angeles in the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila against the private respondents Picar and Patawaran. Defendants.

that "since the issue before this Court is one of law and not of fact. FOR BREVITY). Forthwith.Dean proceeded to conduct the challenged administrative investigation. On March 10. 7 Over the opposition of the petitioners. a motion for summary judgment stating. OUTSIDE THE PREMISES OF THE SCHOOL IS NOT PRESCRIBED BY THE RULES AND REGULATIONS CONTAINED IN THE SERVICE MANUAL FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS . the petitioners interposed an appeal to this Court. filed on February 13. FOR THEIR CONDUCT OUTSIDE OF SCHOOL HOURS AND NOT WITHIN THE SCHOOL PREMISES WHICH DIRECTLY AFFECTS THE GOOD ORDER AND WELFARE OF THE SCHOOL. 9 The private respondents opposed the said motion for reconsideration on August 10. 1976. the respondent Judge issued an Order 8 on June 7. Wenceslao Patawaran. Thus the private respondents. February 13. perpetually enjoining the petitioners from further proceeding with the administrative investigation against the private respondents. 1976 granting the writ of preliminary injunction and enjoining the petitioners from proceeding with the administrative investigation of private respondents until further orders from the Court. the respondent judge rendered the decision under review. 1976. WHO ARE STUDENTS OF SAID UNIVERSITY. UPON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A PRIVATE SCHOOL AND A PUBLIC SCHOOL. II THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SERVICE MANUAL FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS APPLIES TO. summary judgment will lie to effectuate the prompt disposition of this case. 11 Consequently. 1976. On July 13. among others. IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO INVESTIGATE AND DISCIPLINE THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. THROUGH PETITIONER GILBERTO G. the latter being then a minor. the petitioners filed on November 17. AND OVERRIDES THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF FEU A PRIVATE SCHOOL. 10 On October 11. III THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CONDUCT OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN MAULING PETITIONER JOSE S. and therefore." 12 Finding no objection to the rendition of a summary judgment. an Order 6 temporarily restraining the petitioners from further proceeding with the administrative investigation against the private respondents. IV 39 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. MERCADO WHO IS THE DEAN OF THE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. the respondent Judge issued an order denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. assigning the following as errors: I THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING THAT FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY ("FEU". and setting the motion for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for hearing. On December 29. there exists no genuine controversy as to any material fact. 1976. 1976. the petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order of the respondent judge and to lift the order granting plaintiffs' petition for preliminary injunction. 1976. ANGELES. Picar and Patawaran. From this decision. A FACULTY MEMBER OF FEU. the respondent judge issued on the same day. was represented by his father. the petitioners filed their answer to the complaint and an opposition to the petition for injunction. 1976. . 1976. 1976 in the Court of First Instance of Manila a complaint 5 with petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from proceeding with the administrative investigation against the private respondents. the private respondents filed to that effect a manifestation 13 on December 8.

1971. or which in any manner may cause or tend to cause molestation or injury to other members of the university community. Suspension — a school may suspend an erring student during the school year or term for a maximum period not exceeding 20% of the prescribed school days. or indecent. drunkenness. commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violation of school rules and regulations committed. subject matter of this case. The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions therefor must be clearly specified and defined in writing and made known to the students and/or their parents or guardians. or securing or using such forged transfer credentials. The student who is dropped should be issued immediately his transfer credentials. In accordance with the above-quoted provision. Section IX: The three categories of disciplinary administrative sanctions which may be imposed upon erring students. vulgar. Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to promulgate such rules and regulations as they may deem necessary from time to time effective as of the promulgation unless otherwise specified. immorality. or his agent or student. preventing or threatening students or faculty members or school authorities from discharging their duties. . To be valid and effective the penalty of expulsion requires the approval of the Secretary of Education. (2) Paragraph l46. Section IX: Every private school is required to maintain good school discipline. Dropping — a school may drop from its rolls during the school year or term a student who is considered undesirable. b. except for cause as defined in this Manual and/or in the school's rules and regulations duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted. or from attending classes or entering the school premises. The petitioners contend that the mauling incident.THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING THAT FEU. MERCADO. c. vandalism. forging or tampering (with) school records or transfer forms. The pertinent articles provide: Article 1 — General Behavior Section 2. Expulsion — the penalty of expulsion is an extreme form of administrative sanction which debars the student from all public and private schools. was sought to be investigated under and pursuant to the following rules and regulations of the Manual of Registration for Private Schools. 15 (1) Paragraph l45. the Code of Conduct 16 for all students to observe. leading or participating in concerted activities leading to a stoppage of classes. Suspension which will involve the loss of the entire year or term shall not be effective unless approved by the Director of Private Schools. carrying deadly weapons. No penalty shall be imposed upon any student. instigating. No cruel or physically harmful punishment shall be imposed nor shall corporal punishment be countenanced. Students shall not use language or commit acts which are disrespectful. xxx xxx xxx 40 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. 14 The main legal issue presented in this petition is whether a school through its duly authorized representative has the jurisdiction to investigate its student or students for an alleged misconduct committed outside the school premises and beyond school hours. IS LEGALLY INHIBITED FROM INVESTIGATING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR CONDUCT PRESCRIBED BY ITS RULES AND REGULATIONS BECAUSE OF THE PENDENCY OF CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST SAID RESPONDENTS. the Advisory Council of FEU approved on December 2. Expulsion is usually considered proper punishment for gross misconduct or dishonesty and/or such offenses as hazing. are: a. THROUGH PETITIONER GILBERTO G. hooliganism. assaulting a teacher or any other school authority.

xxx xxx xxx Article VI — Enforcement Section 1. malicious. We must consider the fact that FEU as an institution can exercise only such powers expressly conferred. he is charged under Sections 1 and 4 of Article VI of the Code of Conduct of FEU with the duty of conducting a hearing in cases involving a student and a faculty member in furtherance of the university's legally recognized right to discipline its students. the President may appoint a Committee to investigate the same which shall submit its findings and recommendations to the President for decision. If the rules and regulations provided by school authorities shall be deemed to extend outside of school premises and activities. composed of two faculty members and one student. such as the pertinent and applicable mitigating and aggravating circumstances found in the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand. Section 4. 19 His basis is Section 9. . and e) other related circumstances. all appointed by the Dean or Principal." 18 The respondent judge opined that the instant case falls under the general rule that the power of the school ends at the border of its campus. suspension or expulsion in accordance with the Manual of Regulation for Private Schools taking into account the following factors: a) previous record of the student. the Dean or the Principal concerned shall conduct the hearing. There shall be created in each Institute and School a committee on Discipline. Thus. arbitrary or a clear abuse of discretion" 17 and that "any investigation by the school of the said incident will be violative of the private respondents' right to privacy and peace of mind. the categories of disciplinary administrative sanctions contained in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools shall apply upon the ground provided in said Manual. The objective for the promulgation of rules and regulations with respect to both institutions are one and the same. b) inherent gravity of the offense committed. after due investigation by reprimand. so that any authority not so given shall be deemed to be withheld. among others. dropping. Section 2. Where the case involves a student and an administrative personnel. the private respondents submit that to apply the above-quoted rules to the instant case would be "capricious. Violation of any of the provisions of this Code of Conduct shall be punished. In cases not covered by this Code. palpably unreasonable. In cases involving a student and a faculty member. In the absence of an express provision on this matter. Manners and Morals. the petitioner Mercado contends that in his capacity as Dean of the Institute of Technology. paragraph 145 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools the opening paragraph of which states: "Every private school is required to maintain good school discipline." He explains thus: What other interpretation could be placed on the phrase "school discipline" except that it is a norm of action that must be observed within a school. this Court could not see any reason why paragraph 155 of the Service Manual relative to public schools should not be applied by way of analogy considering that there is actually no difference between a private and a public school. c) position of the aggrieved person d) established precedents. states: 41 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27.Article V — Penalties Section 1. as the case may be. Section 155. to investigate cases of violations of this Code of Conduct referred to it by the corresponding Dean or Principal. The Deans and Principals shall enforce the provision of this Code of Conduct. the term "school discipline" would be a misnomer.

It is the better view that there are instances when the school might be called upon to exercise its power over its student or students for acts committed outside the school and beyond school hours in the following: a) In cases of violations of school policies or regulations occurring in connection with a school sponsored activity off-campus. which are also provided in the same Section 155. so that any action taken for acts committed outside the school premises should. Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students. There are certain borderline cases. is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of such rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. there are certain exceptions as correctly pointed out by the defendants.. 20 Implicit in Paragraph 155 of the Service Manual. literary contests. is the recognition of the school's authority and power to expel a pupil who has committed an immoral act outside of the school premises since the latter would be a "source of danger to other pupils in the school building. and the family concerned. etc. an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel." If the power to expel or to punish an immoral act committed outside the school premises is recognized in this provision. there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning. under ordinary circumstances. why is the power to investigate the act of a student in mauling a faculty member outside the school premises not be accorded the same recognition? It is thus error for respondent judge to state that there is nothing in the authorities relied upon by the defendants. has a dual responsibility to its students. in general.School authorities are not. such as school athletic affairs and trips. . and such pupil might with reason be excluded from the school. the courts of justice and the family concerned.. faculty. or its school grounds. the courts of justice. and for which no definite rules can be laid down. Fourth Revision quoted by the respondent judge and reproduced as follows: A pupil who has committed an immoral act outside of the school jurisdiction would be a source of danger to other pupils in the school building. be left to the police authorities. The power of school officials to investigate. are considered under the jurisdiction of the school. but then. As a rule . The respondent judge correctly stated that the general rule is that the authority of the school is co-extensive with its territorial jurisdiction. One is to provide opportunities for learning and the other is to help them grow and develop into mature.. such action might well be taken as having a direct and vital effect on the school and therefore as coming under school discipline. petitioners herein. the Court has no other alternative except to apply the general rule. Discipline is one of the means to carry out the second responsibility.. responsible. A college or any school for that matter. 21 However. however. this rule is not rigid or one without exceptions.. Of course. Should pupils in a concerted effort attempt to run a teacher out of town or try to make life outside of school unbearable for him. effective and worthy citizens of the community. or 22 b) In cases where the misconduct of the student involves his status as a student or affects the good name or reputation of the school. and property. 42 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. Thus. the authority and responsibility of the school stop at the border of the school grounds. Pupils engaged in school matters elsewhere than on the school grounds. parades. which are hard to decide. which compels any school authority to administratively discipline students for incidents committed outside the school compound on an occasion which is not school-sponsored or connected with any activity of the school. considering that defendants moved for a summary judgment without presenting any evidence to prove that the case of the plaintiffs fall under any of the aforequoted exceptions. warranted in applying school punishment of pupils for acts committed outside of the jurisdiction of the school building and grounds . and any action taken for acts committed without these boundaries should in general be left to the Police authorities.

The pendency or the dismissal of the criminal action does not abate the administrative proceeding which involves the same cause of action. while in the latter. the administrative investigation in question is proper in order that the duly authorized school officials can determine whether the continued presence of private respondents. the conduct complained of directly affects the suitability of the alleged violators as students. from the facts of record. there is no reason why the school can not impose the same disciplinary action as when the act took place inside the campus. inter alia: 4. and that conduct outside of school hours may subject a student to school discipline if it directly affects the good order and welfare of the school or has a direct and immediate effect on the discipline or general welfare of the school. The sworn statement 23 of the petitioner Jose Angeles submitted to the petitioner Dean Gilberto Mercado. These statements clearly establish the necessity for an Administrative investigation of the alleged mauling incident because it cannot be denied that the same is a violation of the norms of decency and good taste which is antithetical to one of the school's duties vis-a-vis the family. 7. the true test of a school's right to investigate. the administrative investigation should proceed. Eduardo Picar under the influence of liquor accosted me along the corridor of the Institute building and asked for an explanation why Mr. is adverse to the school's good order welfare and the advancement of its students. Garcia gave him a failing grade in Shop 302. Hence. what is at stake is his being a citizen who is subject to the penal statutes and is the primary concern of the State. the private respondent's suitability or propriety as a student which is the paramount concern and interest of the school is involved. Manila can be regarded as a continuation or the climax of the alleged display of animosities by private respondents Picar and Patawaran towards Angeles which began at the corridors of the FEU Institute of Technology building. as Head of the Investigating Committee states. 6. I told him I had no Idea. in fact. 5. Furthermore. Likewise the power of the school over its students does not cease absolutely when they leave the school premises. That from this time on. within the university premises is detrimental to the maintenance of a moral climate conducive to learning.Common sense dictates that the school retains its power to compel its students in or off-campus to a norm of conduct compatible with their standing as members of the academic community. That from this time on. Precisely. There is a showing from the records of this case that the proximate cause of the alleged mauling incident. Wilfredo Patawaran accosted me along the corridors of the Technology building and asked me to enroll him in my class. In the former. said Picar stopped being cordial to me and sometimes would look daggers at me whenever we meet on the campus. by facial expressions. 26 The administrative action before the school authorities can proceed independently of the criminal action because these two actions are based on different considerations. whenever we met on the corridors of the Technology building or in the campus. this Patawaran avoided me and together with Picar they would show their contempt of me. or otherwise. there being no withdrawal of the complaint filed by petitioner Jose Angeles before the petitioner Dean Gilberto Mercado. . Hence. suspend or expel a student for a misconduct committed outside the school premises and beyond school hours is not the time or place of the offense. the alleged mauling of petitioner Jose Angeles at the Oak Barrel Restaurant in Quiapo. But I told him that I had already enough students for one section. 43 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. but its effect upon the morale and efficiency of the school and whether it. that of developing the moral character of the youth. That also sometime last July 1975. when as in the case at bar. as students of FEU and/or petitioner. Jose Angeles. Picar and Patawaran. as faculty member. The private respondent's averment that the dismissal of the criminal case against private respondent Picar upon the filing of the affidavit of desistance of petitioner Jose Angeles has the effect of rendering this instant petition moot and academic 25 is unmeritorious. 24 Moreover. That sometime after the end of this first semester mentioned earlier. subject of the administrative investigation in question. is attributable to the professor-student relationship of the parties concerned.

On our part. however. he contracted with the LVN pictures. August 1948. held on September 17 and 18. appellant. was usually attended by a great many people. It claimed that since there was no obligation on its part to carry the film in question on any specified time.. delivered to the defendant Philippine Airlines (PAL) whose planes carried passengers and cargo and made regular trips from Manila to the Pili Air Port near Naga. dismissed the complaint. A month before the holiday. The posters and advertisement stated that the film would be shown in the Cita theater on the 17th and 18th of September. the former on September 17th. vs. In pursuance of the agreement between the LVN Pictures Inc. a movie producer in Manila for him to show during the town fiesta the Tagalog film entitled "Himala ng Birhen" or Miracle of the Virgin. the lower court found that because of his failure to exhibit the film "Himala ng Birhen" during the town fiesta. but finding the PAL not liable for said damages.. He made extensive preparations.R. he had two thousand posters printed and later distributed not only in the City of Naga but also in the neighboring towns.Therefore. After trial. the film was finally located the following day. Camarines Sur. found and 44 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. mostly from the Bicol region. that is to say. The fiesta or town holiday of the City of Naga. L-3678 February 29. taking advantage of these circumstances. After investigation and search in the Manila office. this can of film was not unloaded at Pili Air Port and it was brought ba to Manila. defendant-appellee. to exploit the presence of the big crowd that came to attend the town fiesta.00. September 17th. He also advertised in a weekly of general circulation in the province. This can of films was loaded on flight 113 of the defendant. and then shipped to the Pili Air Port on September 20th. the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the respondent judge is hereby dissolved. public or private. As a good businessman. 317133 marked Exhibit "1". The trial court. without pronouncement as to costs. has come directly to this Tribunal for the reason that both parties. called the attention of the trial court to the terms and conditions of paragraph 6 of the Way Bill printed on the back thereof which paragraph reads as follows: 6. No. Mendoza brought this action against the PAL. Mendoza suffered damages or rather failed to earn profits in the amount of P3. Inc. G. the plane arriving at the Air Port at Pili a little after four o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. . September 18th. J. Camarines Sur.000. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES. it could not be held accountable for the delay of about three days. Mendoza who had completed all arrangements for the exhibition of the film beginning in the evening of September 17th. accepted the findings of fact made by the trial court and here raise only questions of law. but which would appear to be the fault of its employees or agents. For this shipment the defendant issued its Air Way Bill No. MONTEMAYOR. To recoup his losses. where he used to exhibit movie pictures booked from movie producers or film owners in Manila. as aptly stated by the petitioners 27 to affirm the decision of the respondent Judge would give nothing less than a license to students of a school. corresponding to the eve and day of the fiesta itself.: The present appeal by plaintiff Jose Mendoza from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. appellant Jose Mendoza was the owner of the Cita Theater located in the City of Naga. to assault and maul their teachers or professors without fear of being subjected to discipline by the school as long as the assault takes place offcampus or beyond school hours. Mendoza received it and exhibited the film but he had missed his opportunity to realize a large profit as he expected for the people after the fiesta had already left for their towns. defendant-appellee. In the year 1948. 1952 JOSE MENDOZA. we must also accept said findings of fact of the lower court. and Mendoza. Said Carrier being hereby authorized to deviate from the route of the shipment without any liability therefor. decided to exhibit a film which would fit the occasion and have a special attraction and significance to the people attending said fiesta. To avoid liability. INC. The Carrier does not obligate itself to carry the Goods by any specified aircraft or on a specified time. appellant and appellee. plaintiff-appellant. 1. Said station master could not explain why the film was not unloaded and sent several radiograms to his principal in Manila making inquiries and asking that the film be sent to Naga immediately. 1948. went to the Air Port and inquired from the defendant's station master there about the can of film. WHEREFORE. a can containing the film "Himala ng Birhen" consigned to the Cita Theater. For reasons not explained by the defendant. yearly. especially since the Patron Saint Virgin of Peña Francia was believed by many to be miraculous.

Sec. customarily engaged in transportation for the public. The trial court. 58. There can be no doubt. A flying service company which. Without making a definite ruling on the civil or commercial nature of transportation by air. time of leaving. If however found that fraud was not involved and that the defendant was a debtor in good faith. especially in view of the second paragraph of Art. 6 Am.held that although the defendant was not obligated to load the film on any specified plane or on any particular day. should be considered as included. Aviation. and that although the contract of transportation was not by land or waterways as defined in said Art. for hire. or which might have been foreseen. Aviation. that is to say. an airline company engaged in the transportation business is regarded as a common carrier. 38. advertise schedules for routes. 1107 of the Civil Code which provides that losses and those foreseen. and rates of fare. 349 of the Code of Commerce because it only involves merchandise or an object of commerce but also the transportation company.00 due to the negligence of the defendant. the defendant herein. under the general law of common carriers. 587. to carry all persons who apply for passage indiscriminately as long as there is room and no legal excuse for refusing. The test of whether one is a common carrier by air is whether he holds out that he will carry for hire.S.. The trial court presided over by Judge Jose N. as will be explained later. Jur. Applying provisions of Art. Sec. Jur. Aerial Navigation. 99. that the contract of transportation in this case should be considered commercial under Art. p. according to its printed advertising. The rules governing the business of a common carrier by airship or flying machine may be readily assimilated to those applied to other common carriers. 349. govern carriers by aircraft. the status and the liability as a common carrier may exist notwithstanding the passenger's ticket issued by an airplane carrier of passengers for hire contains a statement that it is not a common carrier. it being unnecessary.J. we are inclined to believe and to hold that a contract of transportation by air may be regarded as commercial. 39 Phil.000. But an airplane owner cannot be classed as a common carrier of passengers unless he undertakes. particularly the case of Daywalt vs. but on the operating cost of the plane per mile. and make the usual stipulation as to baggage. who solicit the patronage of the traveling public. held that not because plaintiff failed to realize profits in the sum of P3. such as by railroad or motor bus. . 56. or a stipulation that it is to be held only for its proven negligence. nor the consignee Mendoza had called its attention to the special circumstances attending the shipment and the showing of the film during the town fiesta of Naga. etc. Counsel for appellant insists that the articles of the Code of Commerce rather than those of the Civil Code should have been applied in deciding this case for the reason that the shipment of the can of film is an act of commerce. the trial court held that inasmuch as these damages suffered by Mendoza were not foreseen or could not have been foreseen at the time that the defendant accepted the can of film for shipment. transportation by air on a commercial basis was not yet known. has been held to be a common carrier. . Sec. The principles which govern carriers by other means. 349. The obvious reason for its non-inclusion in the Code of Commerce was that at the time of its promulgation. will take anyone anywhere at any time. and basing its charges not on the number of passengers. at the time of constituting the obligation. Leuterio in a well-considered decision citing authorities. was a common carrier. and its unexplained failure to comply with this duty constituted negligence. It is not necessary. air transportation being analogous to land and water transportation. When Aircraft Operator is Common Carrier. Agustinos Recoletos . plaintiff may not recover the damages sought. We believe that whether or not transportation by air should be regarded as a commercial contract under Art. p. pp. disagreed to this contention and opined that air transportation not being expressly covered by the Code of Commerce. however.. 1951. goods for everyone bringing goods to him for carriage. then it assumed the obligation to unload it at its point of destination and deliver it to the consignee. cannot be governed by its provisions. not whether 45 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. once said can film was loaded and shipped on one of its planes making trip to Camarines. and which are a necessary consequence of the failure to perform it. . would be immaterial in the present case. for the reason that neither the shipper LVN Pictures Inc. 6 Am. that those air lines and aircraft owners engaged in the passenger service on regular schedules on definite routes. nevertheless. 34-35. should the latter be made to reimburse him said sum.. . 2 C. Cumulative Pocket Part. The reason is that at least in the present case the transportation company (PAL) is a common carrier. 33. though not operating on regular routes or schedules. so long as he has room.. — That aircraft and the industry of carriage by aircraft are new is no reason why one in fact employing aircraft as common-carrier vehicles should not be classified as a common carrier and charged with liability as such. air transportation is clearly similar or analogous to land and water transportation. Corporacion de PP. In the United Sates where air transportation has reached its highest development. in order to make one carrying passengers by aircraft a common carrier of passengers that the passengers can be carried from one point to another. besides. are common carriers by air. 2 of the same Code which says that transactions covered by the Code of Commerce and all others of analogous character shall be deemed acts of commerce.

unless such common carriers previously assume the obligation. an express company. Said rights and obligations are created by a specific contract entered into by the parties. such unusual or extraordinary damages must have been brought within the contemplation of the parties as the probable result of a breach at the time of or prior to contracting. a debtor in good faith like the defendant herein.. We are a little perplexed as to this new theory of the appellant. (Ibid. At the time of the shipment the attention of the express company was called to the fact that the shipment involved motion picture films to be exhibited in Utica. he insists that the articles of the Code of Commerce should be applied. it must have appeared that he had notice at the time of delivery to him of the particular circumstances attending the shipment. 1107 of the Civil Code. In our research for authorities we have found a case very similar to the one under consideration. His right to prompt delivery of the can of film at the Pili Air Port stems and is derived from the contract of carriage under which contract. but in the absence of applicable provisions. . L. Sec. the carrier shall be bound to forward them in the first shipment of the same or similar merchandise which he may make to the point of delivery. One interpretation of said finding is that the LVN Pictures Inc. by those of the Civil Law. and Jose Mendoza on one side. First. as already said. Take away or ignore that contract and the obligation to carry and to deliver and the right to prompt delivery disappear. Or. and in default of both. the damages caused by the delay should be suffered by the carrier. arising from a breach of contract. such as the present alleged loss of profits on account of delay or failure of delivery. the findings of the trial court which as already stated. The trial court correctly found that the defendant company could not have foreseen the damages that would be suffered by Mendoza upon failure to deliver the can of film on the 17th of September. that he invokes the provisions of said Code governing the obligations of a common carrier to make prompt delivery of goods given to it under a contract of transportation. and that they should be sent to their destination. (p.R. Rec. were not called to the defendant's attention..e. But the highest court in the State of New York refused to award him special damages. and the desire to rush the shipment. 99. as already stated. New York. Common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and to deliver merchandise. 1101 thereof. 29. and the defendant company on the other.) Appellant contends that Art. and that upon failure to do so. as the rule has been stated in another form. the PAL undertook to carry the can of film safely and to deliver it to him promptly. consigned and to be delivered to him in Utica. If he does not invoke the contract of carriage entered into with the defendant company. So that assuming that the present case involved a commercial transaction. Article 2 of the Code of Commerce provides that commercial transactions are to be governed by the provisions of the Code of Commerce. then he would hardly have any leg to stand on. the rules of the civil law would have to come into play. There was delay in their delivery and it was found that the plaintiff because of his failure to exhibit the film in Utica due to the delay suffered damages or loss of profits. through previous agreement with Mendoza acted as the latter's agent. in the ordinary course of things. providing for the payment of damages caused by the negligence or delay in the fulfillment of one's obligation. Later. that New York case is a stronger one than the present case for the reason that the attention of the common carrier in said case was called to the nature of the articles shipped. circumstances and facts absent in the present case. may be held liable only for damages that were foreseen or might have been foreseen at the time the contract of the transportation was entered into. delivered picture films to the defendant Fargo. and persons are not vested with the right of prompt delivery.A. This is a general provision for ordinary damages and is no different from the provisions of the Civil Code. neither has it been shown that there are any commercial usages applicable thereto. particularly Art. In the present case. Fargo. Said appellate court observed: But before defendant could be held to special damages. 1948 for the reason that the plans of Mendoza to exhibit that film during the town fiesta and his preparations. But appellants now contends that he is not suing on a breach of contract but on a tort as provided for in Art. he says that he was never a party to the contract of transportation and was a complete stranger to it. Even applying the provisions of the Code of Commerce. 1049. and which probably would lead to such special loss if he defaulted. still inasmuch as the special damages herein claimed finds no applicable provision in the Code of Commerce.he is carrying as a public employment or whether he carries to a fixed place. on Appeal). Under Art. are accepted by the parties and which we must accept are to the effect that the LVN Pictures Inc. not special damages like those suffered by the plaintiff herein. When he 46 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. in order to impose on the defaulting party further liability than for damages naturally and directly. then in the last analysis. the pertinent provisions regarding damages only treats of ordinary damages or damages in general. 39. rush. they will be governed by the usages of commerce generally observed in each place. (1918 F) p. and that he is now suing on a tort or violation of his rights as a stranger (culpa aquiliana). Said article provides that if there is no period fixed for the delivery of the goods. As may be seen. i. 1902 of the Civil Code. the purpose of shipment. Generally. the plaintiff in Troy. entered into a contract of transportation. specially the announcement of said exhibition by posters and advertisement in the newspaper. p. notice then of any special circumstances which will show that the damages to be anticipated from a breach would be enhanced has been held sufficient for this effect. In the case of Chapman vs. 358 of the Code of Commerce should govern the award of the damages in his favor.

met immediately upon the entering of this decree and made a new contract with a view to carrying their original agreement into effect. His demand for the delivery of the can of film to him at the Pili Air Port may be regarded as a notice of his acceptance of the stipulation of the delivery in his favor contained in the contract of carriage. appeared at the Pili Air Port armed with the copy of the Air Way Bill (Exh. J. such demand being one of the fulfillment of the contract of carriage and delivery. to rent the film "Himala ng Birhen" and show it during the Naga town fiesta.000. STREET. the same is hereby affirmed. nevertheless when he. In situations like the present where failure to exhibit films on a certain day would spell substantial damages or considerable loss of profits. and acting independently of Mendoza for the time being. His cause of action must necessarily be founded on its breach. in said province. The very citation made by appellant in his memorandum supports this view. or at least has come to court to enforce it. calling the attention of the carrier to the circumstances surrounding the case and the approximate amount of damages to be suffered in case of delay. as consignor of its own initiative. the parties entered into still another 47 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. he most probably authorized and enjoined the Picture Company to ship the film for him on the PAL on September 17th. LA CORPORACION DE LOS PADRES AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS. Here. 1257. however. resident in the Province of Mindoro.: In the year 1902. The stipulated price was fixed at P4. paragraph 2. Daywalt.R. and the defendant carrier contains the stipulations of the delivery to Mendoza as consignee. made Mendoza as consignee. 209. or else enter into a special contract or make a suitable arrangement with the common carrier for the prompt delivery of the films. 1) demanding the delivery of the shipment to him. vs. L-13505 February 4. for their security. p. upon October 3. No pronouncement as to costs. The second contract was not immediately carried into effect for the reason that the Torrens certificate was not yet obtainable and in fact said certificate was not issued until the period of performance contemplated in the contract had expired. In this case he also made himself a party to the contract. This new contract was executed in the form of a deed of conveyance and bears date of August 16. including waste of efforts on preparations and expenses incurred in advertisements. A decree recognizing the right of Teodorica as owner was entered in said court in August 1906. Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from. It was agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as the title to the land should be perfected by proceedings in the Court of Land Registration and a Torrens certificate should be produced therefore in the name of Teodorica Endencia. he may demand its fulfillment.negotiated with the LVN Pictures Inc. . I. plaintiff-appellant. provided he has given notice of his acceptance to the person bound before the stipulation has been revoked. Vol. 1919 GEO. as when the shipper orders the shipping company to return or retain the goods shipped while the consignee demands their delivery. citing a decision of Argentina Court of Appeals on commercial matters. So ordered. municipality of Bulalacao. defendants-appellees. The parties. Speaking of the possibility of a conflict between the order of the shipper on the one hand and the order of the consignee on the other. W. W. Teodorica Endencia. he thereby made himself a party to the contract of the transportation. says that the right of the shipper to countermand the shipment terminates when the consignee or legitimate holder of the bill of lading appears with such bill of lading before the carrier and makes himself a party to the contract. DAYWALT. Still another view of this phase of the case is that contemplated in Art. and the area of the land enclosed in the boundaries defined in the contract was stated to be 452 hectares and a fraction. but the Torrens certificate was not issued until later. 1906. II of his book entitled "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the Philippines" p. a tract of land situated in the barrio of Mangarin. Accordingly. 1908.. One can readily sympathize with the appellant herein for his loss of profits which he expected to realize. 400. executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo. Mendoza. But he overlooked the legal angle. he is stranger to the contract. G. may either get hold of the films well ahead of the time of exhibition in order to make allowance for any hitch in the delivery. the contract of carriage between the LVN Pictures Inc. cited by Tolentino in Vol. No. Prior to that time. a stranger to the contract if that is possible. now San Jose. of the old Civil Code which reads thus: Should the contract contain any stipulation in favor of a third person. an unmarried woman. 2. ET AL. Malagarriga in his book Codigo de Comercio Comentado. exhibitors. Another interpretation is that even if the LVN Pictures Inc.

368 head were removed to the estate of the corporation immediately adjacent to the property which the plaintiff had purchased from Teodorica Endencia. superseding the old. The Torrens certificate was in time issued to Teodorica Endencia. W. and it was then taken to Manila where it remained in the custody and under the control of P. the property of allowing damages for the use and occupation of the land to the extent o P2. to deliver the same to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in Manila. In view of this development Teodorica Endencia became reluctant to transfer the whole tract to the purchaser. Their representative. Juan Labarga the procurador and chief official of the defendant corporation. was father Isidoro Sanz. This decree appears to have become finally effective in the early part of the year 1914. 1908. which contract was declared to be in full force and effect. but in the course of the proceedings relative to the registration of the land. Father Sanz had long been well acquainted with Teodorica Endencia and exerted over her an influence and ascendency due to his religious character as well as to the personal friendship which existed between them. in obtaining a decree for specific performance. and for many years the Recoletos Fathers had maintained large herds of cattle on the farms referred to. is a religious corporation. The same corporation was at this time also the owner of another estate on the same island immediately adjacent to the land which Teodorica Endencia had sold to Geo. by which Teodorica Endencia agreed upon receiving the Torrens title to the land in question. and as the defendant corporation had notice of the rights of the plaintiff under this contract of purchase.100. Teodorica appears to be a woman of little personal force. easily subject to influence. is not now in question an the only thing here to be considered. As Teodorica still retained possession of said property Father Sanz entered into an arrangement with her whereby large numbers of cattle belonging to the defendant corporation were pastured upon said land during a period extending from June 1. inasmuch as the final decree of this court in the action for specific performance is conclusive against her right. asserting that she never intended to sell so large an amount of land and that she had been misinformed as to its area. This attitude of hers led to litigation in which Daywalt finally succeeded. Said corporation was formerly the owner of a large tract of land. it can not be permitted that the corporation should escape liability in this action by proving payment of rent to a person other than the true owner. and. charged with management of these farms. When the Torrens certificate was finally issued in 1909 in favor of Teodorica Endencia. the amount claimed in the complaint. known as the San Jose Estate. where it was to be delivered to the plaintiff upon payment of a balance of P3. knew of the existence of the contract of October 3. which was sold to the Government of the Philippine Islands in the year 1909. 1908. 48 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. it was necessary to bring the cattle off of that property. and Teodorica Endencia was ordered to convey the entire tract of land to Daywalt pursuant to the contract of October 3.000. and in particular Father Sanz. When the defendant corporation sold the San Jose Estate. which.248 hectares of 452 hectares as stated in the contract. Daywalt. upon appeal to the Supreme Court. and upon all the important matters of business was accustomed to seek. is whether the damages allowed under this head should be increased.000. she delivered it for safekeeping to the defendant corporation. insisting that damages should have been awarded in a much larger sum and at least to the full extent of P24. the advice of father Sanz and other members of his order with whom she came in contact. with its domicile in the city of Manila.1 The defendant. as damages for the use and occupation of the land in question by reason of the pasturing of cattle thereon during the period stated. in the first half of 1909. Under the first cause stated in the complaint in the present action the plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendant corporation the sum of P24. As the defendant did not appeal. on the island of Mindoro. The trial court came to the conclusion that the defendant corporation was liable for damages by reason of the use and occupation of the premises in the manner stated. as we have already seen finally fixed the rights of the parties to the property in question. The plaintiff appealed and has assigned error to this part of the judgment of the court below. to May 1. as well as other members of the defendant corporation. 1909. 1914.497. . in connection with this branch of the case. Father Sanz was fully aware of the existence of the contract of 1902 by which Teodorica Endencia agreed to sell her land to the plaintiff as well as of the later important developments connected with the history of that contract and the contract substituted successively for it. and was given. himself a members of the order. and fixed the amount to be recovered at P2. some 2. to be forwarded to the Crocker National Bank in San Francisco. The trial court rightly ignored the fact that the defendant corporation had paid Teodorica Endencia of ruse and occupation of the same land during the period in question at the rate of P425 per annum. it was found by official survey that the area of the tract inclosed in the boundaries stated in the contract was about 1. the amount awarded.497.agreement. La Corporacion de los Padres Recoletos. until the deliver thereof to the plaintiff was made compulsory by reason of the decree of the Supreme Court in 1914.

the plaintiff. Teodorica Endencia seems to have yielded her consent to the consummation of her contract.000. 1. with the result that the plaintiff was kept out of possession until the Wakefield project for the establishment of a large sugar growing and milling enterprise fell through.. on the ground that said corporation. . In the second cause of action stated in the complaint the plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendant corporation the sum of P500.000 a year. There is no reason to suppose that the land was worth more for grazing purposes during the period from 1909 to 1913. Notwithstanding this circumstance. 1914. there seems some ground for the contention made in the appellant's first assignment of error that the court's computation was erroneous. plus the taxes. The second is 49 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. and this appears to be a reasonable rent. for its own selfish purposes. and. or a period of four years and eleven months. even accepting the rule upon which the damages were assessed.With reference to the rate of which compensation should be estimated the trial court came to the following conclusion: As to the rate of the compensation. the damages for four years and eleven months would be P3. The cause of action here stated is based on liability derived from the wrongful interference of the defendant in the performance of the contract between the plaintiff and Teodorica Endencia. B. incurred as a result of a combination of circumstances of the following nature: In 1911. for substituting our guess for the estimate made by the trial court. The court can not accept this view. The determination of the issue presented in this second cause of action requires a consideration of two points.497. the rate of forty centavos per head monthly seems too high. if carried into effect. There is evidence in the record strongly tending to show that the wrongful use of the land by the defendant was not continuous throughout the year but was confined mostly to the reason when the forage obtainable on the land of the defendant corporation was not sufficient to maintain its cattle. the successful launching of which depended on the ability of Daywalt to get possession of the land and the Torrens certificate of title. than it was at the later period. In the light of what has happened in recent years in the sugar industry. In order to accomplish this end. communicated his arrangement to the defendant. for the whole tract. Upon this basis the plaintiff is entitled to damages in the sum of p2. and the large damages laid in the complaint were. as damages. From this it will be seen that the trial court estimated the rental value of the land for grazing purposes at 50 centavos per hectare per annum. who refused to deliver the document. we are of the opinion that the damages assessed are sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for the use and occupation of the land during the whole time it was used. maintained her in her defense to the action of specific performance which was finally decided in favor of the plaintiff in this court. for the sale and disposal of said lands to a sugar growing and milling enterprise. considering the locality. or P4. 1909. to May 1. The evidence shows that after having recovered possession of the land the plaintiff rented it to the defendant corporation for fifty centavos per hectares annually. beyond the value of the use and occupation. for which reason it became necessary to allow them to go over to pasture on the land in question.090. the tenant to pay the taxes on the land. It is rather improbable that 1. as it is manifest that at the rate of 50 centavos per hectare per annum. the plaintiff returned to the Philippine Islands.800 annually. and is under no obligation to reimburse the defendants for the land taxes paid by either of them during the period the land was occupied by the defendant corporation. and made repeated efforts to secure the registered title for delivery in compliance with said agreement with Wakefield. we see no sufficient reason. maliciously and without reasonable cause. we feel justified in saying that the project above referred to. according to the proof submitted by the plaintiff. of San Francisco.248 hectares of wild Mindoro land would furnish sufficient pasturage for one thousand head of cattle during the entire year. Teodorica also was in the end contract with the plaintiff. As the court had already found that the defendant was liable for these damages from June. as the owner of the land which he had bought from Teodorica Endencia entered into a contract (Exhibit C) with S. and it is not clear that the whole of the land was used for pasturage at any time. and roughly adopted the period of four years as the time for which compensation at that rate should be made. It may be mentioned in this connection that the Lontok tract adjoining the land in question and containing over three thousand hectares appears to have been leased for only P1. by colluding with the vendor and maintaining him in the effort to resist an action for specific performance. But whether this was advertently done or not. The first is whether a person who is not a party to a contract for the sale of land makes himself liable for damages to the vendee. the plaintiff contends that the defendant corporation maintained at leas one thousand head of cattle on the land and that the pasturage was of the value of forty centavos per head monthly. must inevitably have proved a great success. but the Torrens title was then in the possession of Padre Juan Labarga in Manila. and further. Considerations of this character probably led the trial court to adopt four years as roughly being the period during which compensation should be allowed. Wakefield. in the uncertainty of the record with reference to the number of the cattle grazed and the period when the land was used. it appears. unlawfully induced Teodorica Endencia to refrain from the performance of her contract for the sale of the land in question and to withhold delivery to the plaintiff of the Torrens title.

had entered into a contract with Miss Johanna Wagner. in bad faith sets about to break it up. was fully aware of the existence of the contract (Exhibit C) which the plaintiff had made with S. to be denied that Teodorica would have surrendered the documents of title and given possession of the land but for the influence and promptings of members of the defendants corporation. long familiar to the courts of the common law. As preliminary to a consideration of the first of these questions. apprentices. Gye [supra] it had been supposed that the liability here under consideration was limited to the cases of the enticement of menial servants. the question now arose whether it is illegal for one person to interfere with any contract relation subsisting between others.. Any advice or assistance which they may have given was. it is insisted that the defendant corporation is liable for the loss consequent upon the failure of the project outlined in said contract. & Bl. Whether his motive is to benefit himself or gratify his spite by working mischief to the employer is immaterial. Juan Labarga. It there appeared that the plaintiff. as exhibited in the conduct of its procurador. The attorney for the plaintiff maintains that.. The master's interest in the service rendered by his employee is here considered as a distinct subject of juridical right. to the effect that any person who entices a servant from his employment is liable in damages to the master. by interfering in the performance of the contract in question and obstructing the plaintiff in his efforts to secure the certificate of tittle to the land. Div. "maliciously intending to injure the plaintiff. Hall ([1881]. But we do not credit the idea that they were in any degree influenced to the giving of such advice by the desire to secure to themselves the paltry privilege of grazing their cattle upon the land in question to the prejudice of the just rights of the plaintiff. render himself liable for the damages consequent upon non-performance. therefore. The right which was here recognized had its origin in a rule. B. To our mind a fair conclusion on this feature of the case is that father Juan Labarga and his associates believed in good faith that the contract cold not be enforced and that Teodorica would be wronged if it should be carried into effect. and others to whom the English Statutes of Laborers were applicable. Russell ([1893]. Somewhat more than half a century ago the English Court of the Queen's Bench saw its way clear to permit an action for damages to be maintained against a stranger to a contract wrongfully interfering in its performance.. Q. but extends to contracts in general. In this connection reliance is placed by the plaintiff upon certain American and English decisions in which it is held that a person who is a stranger to contract may. 2 El. the fact that its officials may have advised her not to carry the contract into effect would not constitute actionable interference with such contract. Upon the question as to what constitutes legal justification. It is not. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages. Malice in some form is generally supposed to be an essential ingredient in cases of interference with contract relations. having knowledge of the existence of the contract relations. and inasmuch as father Juan Labarga. and other members of the order of the Recollect Fathers..whether the damages which the plaintiff seeks to recover under this head are too remote and speculative to be the subject of recovery. It is said that the doctrine of these cases was recognized by this court in Gilchrist vs. an opera singer. 715). 216). Malice in the sense of ill-will or spite is not essential. at the time of said unlawful intervention between the contracting parties. But in the case cited the majority of the judges concurred in the opinion that the principle extended to all cases of hiring. It may be added that when one considers the hardship that the ultimate performance of that contract entailed on the vendor. and. as the declaration alleged. as manager of a theatre.. observing that while it was true that the circumstances pointed to an entire sympathy on the part of the defendant corporation with the efforts of Teodorica Endencia to defeat the plaintiff's claim to the land. But upon the authorities it is enough if the wrong-doer. The defendant. If a party enters into contract to go for another upon a journey to a remote and unhealthful climate. This doctrine was followed by the Court of Appeal in Bowen vs. is not difficult to understand. The trial court found that this contention was not sustained.. and in Temperton vs. 333). knowing of the existence of this contract. Wakefield. It being thus accepted that it is a legal wrong to break up a relation of personal service. Rep. the defendant corporation made itself a co-participant with Teodorica Endencia in the breach of said contract. in advising and prompting Teodorica Endencia not to comply with the contract of sale. and we have been earnestly pressed to extend the rule there enunciated to the situation here presente. prompted by no mean or improper motive. by an unjustifiable interference in the performance thereof. 6 Q. of San Francisco. B. Gye ([1853]. Cuddy (29 Phil. The leading case on this subject is Lumley vs. we deem it well it dispose of the contention that the members of the defendants corporation. whereby she bound herself for a period to sing in the plaintiff's theatre and nowhere else. were actuated by improper and malicious motives. . In that case the contract which the defendant had procured to be breached was a contract for the supply of building material. B. it was held that the right of action for maliciously procuring a breach of contract is not confined to contracts for personal services." enticed and produced Miss Wagner to leave the plaintiff's employment. and the doubt in which the issue was involved — to the extent that the decision of the Court of the First Instance was unfavorable to the plaintiff and the Supreme Court itself was divided — the attitude of the defendant corporation. Prior to the decision of Lumley vs. a good illustration was put in the leading case. 542). in our opinion. and a 50 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27.

intimidation. if accepted at all. But it will be observed that in order to sustain this liability it is not necessary to resort to any subtle exegesis relative to the liability of a stranger to a contract for unlawful interference in the performance thereof. An illustration of the application of the doctrine in question in a case of this kind is found in South Wales Miners Federation vs. 439. C. Baldwin 91 Ky. In violation of the terms of this agreement. Thorn. 138 Mo. It was also said arguendo. In the United States.) This brings us to the decision made by this court in Gilchrist vs. causes damage to another shall be liable for the damage so done. Cuddy (29 Phil. Taking the decision upon the point which was rally decided. Ignoring so much of this article as relates to liability for negligence. let it under a rental contract to the plaintiff Gilchrist for a specified period of time. somewhat weakened by the criticism contain in the concurring opinion. a factor which affected the miner's wage scale. we think. Hudson Bros. That the defendant corporation is also liable in this action for the damage resulting to the plaintiff from the wrongful use and occupation of the property has also been already determined. Translated into terms applicable to the case at bar. Glencoe Land & Gravel Co. vs. 121.. It was held that no sufficient justification was shown and that the federation was liable. it cannot be said that the doctrine of Lumley vs. Cuddy proceeded to turn over the film also under a rental contract. It there appeared that one Cuddy. Gye [supra] and related cases is repugnant to the principles of the civil law. Cuddy (29 Phil.. as a means of restraining the activities of labor unions and industrial societies when improperly engaged in the promotion of strikes. might have been enjoined by the latter from using the property for grazing its cattle thereon. Upon appeal to this court it was in effect held that the injunction was not improperly granted. acting under the order of the executive council of the defendant federation. Gye [supra] is rejected. and the only object of the order in question was that the price of coal might thereby be kept up. Com. or by false or defamatory statements.. Rep. And in jurisdictions where the doctrine of Lumley vs. . The force of the opinion is. Rep. to the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga." the intermedler is liable if his advice is taken and the contract broken.) It should be observed in this connection that. under all the authorities. (See cases last above cited. 98 Cal. characterized by fault or negligence. according to the English and American authorities. that the defendants would have been liable in damages under article 1902 of the Civil Code. 578. Thus considered. The federation and council acted without any actual malice or ill-will towards the plaintiff. Gye [supra] and subsequent cases is commonly accepted. It there appeared that certain miners employed in the plaintiff's collieries. if the action had been brought by the plaintiff to recover damages. having notice of the sale of the land in question to Daywalt. A. But if the advice is not disinterested and the persuasion is used for "the indirect purpose of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff. the owner of a cinematographic film. 51 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. can be denominated an unlawful means... Gilchrist thereupon restored to the Court of First Instance and produced an injunction restraining the defendants from exhibiting the film in question in their theater during the period specified in the contract of Cuddy with Gilchrist. the person using such unlawful means is. coercion. indicates that the defendant corporation. and in these jurisdictions the doctrine. where it is said that the question of breach of contract by inducement was not really involved in the case. 542). Article 1902 of the Civil Code declares that any person who by an act or omission.third person. Chambers & Marshall vs. no liability can arise from a meddlesome and malicious interference with a contract relation unless some such unlawful means as those just indicated are used. Macauley. though in a few of the States the broad idea that a stranger to a contract can be held liable upon its is rejected. or threats.. is limited to the situation where the contract is strictly for personal service. (Boyson vs.. under known legal cannons. or by nuisance or riot. although the defendants did not. The idea thus expressed is undoubtedly broad enough to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society. Glamorgan Coal Co. 91 Ky. Co. 135. it is authority for the proposition that one who buys something which he knows has been sold to some other person can be restrained from using that thing to the prejudice of the person having the prior and better right. no action will lie. It is enough that defendant use the property with notice that the plaintiff had a prior and better right. we take the rule to be that a person is liable for damage done to another by any culpable act. dissuades him from the step. in the complicated relations of modern industry. no question can be made as to the liability to one who interferes with a contract existing between others by means which. at the time their contract was made. violated their contract with the plaintiff by abstaining from work on certain days. Thus. 239). the decision in Gilchrist vs. the rule established in England by Lumley vs. if performance is prevented by force. ([1905]). and by "culpable act" we mean any act which is blameworthy when judged by accepted legal standards. know the identity of the plaintiff as the person holding the prior contract but did know of the existence of a contract in favor of someone. with a bona fide purpose of benefiting the one who is under contract to go. liable for the damage which ensues. Bourlier vs.. The doctrine embodied in the cases just cited has sometimes been found useful. 542).

. As to Teodorica Endencia. we proceed to consider the question of the liability of Teodorica Endencia for damages without refernce to this point. as the rule that the measure of damages for the wrongful detention of money is to be found in the interest. one of the things that may be considered certain in the law (39 cyc. it is obvious that the liability of the defendant corporation. a deduction may be made in respect to the interest on the money which constitutes the purchase price. G. where this has not been paid. and such defense could not in any event be of any avail to it. However. Gye [supra] nor the application made of it by this court in Gilchristvs. However. even admitting that it has made itself coparticipant in the breach of the contract. determines not only the character and extent of the liability of the contracting parties but also the person or entity by whom the obligation is exigible. In the case at bar. and its is clear that if damages are not sought or recovered in the action to enforce performance they cannot be recovered in an independent action. we do not propose here to pursue the matter further. Rep. And of course where the purchaser has not paid the purchaser money. . a contract. indeed. it should be considered that the right of action to recover damages for the breach of the contract in question was exhausted in the prior suit. 52 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. 1124. he cannot consistently be held liable upon it. for it is evident that there must be a certain mutuality in the obligation. there is one proposition upon which all must agree. Whatever may be the character of the liability which a stranger to a contract may incur by advising or assisting one of the parties to evade performance. and if the stranger to a contract is not permitted to sue to enforce it. 11318 (38 Phil. The rule that the measure of damages for the wrongful detention of land is normally to be found in the value of use and occupation is. If the two antagonistic ideas which we have just brought into juxtaposition are capable of reconciliation. 185. Compañia Transatlantica. affords any basis for the recovery of the damages which the plaintiff is supposed to have suffered by reason of his inability to comply with the terms of the Wakefield contract.) — almost as wellsettled. Rep. 542). therefore. It should in the first place be noted that the liability of Teodorica Endencia for damages resulting from the breach of her contract with Daywalt was a proper subject for adjudication in the action for specific performance which Daywalt instituted against her in 1909 and which was litigated by him to a successful conclusion in this court.. 24 Cyc. 1630. 30 Phil. Now. Civil Code). The result was that the plaintiff was prevented during a period of several years from exerting that control over the property which he was entitled to exert and was meanwhile unable to dispose of the property advantageously. considered as an independent act generate of civil liability. R. and as the defendant corporation was not a party to that action. 875). Ninth ed. it must be admitted that the codes and jurisprudence of the civil law furnish a somewhat uncongenial field in which to propagate the idea that a stranger to a contract may sued for the breach thereof. we believe. This is. her attorneys have not seen fit to interpose the defense of res judicata in her behalf. for reasons presently to be stated... To hold the stranger liable for damages in excess of those that could be recovered against the immediate party to the contract would lead to results at once grotesque and unjust. vs. In conformity with this it has been held that a stranger to a contract has no right of action for the nonfulfillment of the contract except in the case especially contemplated in the second paragraph of the same article. sec. inasmuch as. when effectually entered into between certain parties. No. The same idea should apparently be applicable with respect to the person against whom the obligation of the contract may be enforced. Leonard. This leads us to consider at this point the extent of the liability of Teodorica Endencia to the plaintiff by reason of her failure to surrender the certificate of title and to place the plaintiff in possession.Nevertheless. as Teodorica Endencia was the party directly bound by the contract. Cuddy (29 Phil. but without obtaining any special adjudication with reference to damages. or use and occupation. what is the measure of damages for the wrongful detention of real property by the vender after the time has come for him to place the purchaser in possession? The damages ordinarily and normally recoverable against a vendor for failure to deliver land which he has contracted to deliver is the value of the use and occupation of the land for the time during which it is wrongfully withheld. (Uy Tam and Uy Yet vs. Indemnification for damages resulting from the breach of a contract is a right inseparably annexed to every action for the fulfillment of the obligation (art.) As observed by this court in Manila Railroad Co. Article 1257 of the Civil Code declares that contracts are binding only between the parties and their privies. 1052 Sedgewick on Damages. Substantially the same rule holds with respect to the liability of a landlord who fails to put his tenant in possession pursuant to contract of lease. The measure of damages is the value of the leasehold interest. that the stranger cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of the contract than the party in whose behalf he intermeddles.. we are of the opinion that neither the doctrine of Lumley vs.. can in no even exceed hers. and the right of action ex contractu against a party to the contract resulting from the breach thereof. the process must be accomplished by distinguishing clearly between the right of action arising from the improper interference with the contract by a stranger thereto. less the stipulated rent. Rep. The most that can be said with refernce to the conduct of Teodorica Endencia is that she refused to carry out a contract for the sale of certain land and resisted to the last an action for specific performance in court. 471.

is such as follows less directly from the breach than ordinary damage. .. to serve as a model for casting or manufacturing another that would fit into the machinery. The broken shaft could be delivered at Greenwich on the second day after its receipts by the carrier it. Ordinary damage is assumed as a matter of law to be within the contemplation of the parties. and which was engaged in grinding and supplying meal and flour to customers. damages have been held to be recoverable by the purchaser in excess of the normal value of use and occupation. the vendor. or lessor. This is conclusively presumed from the immediateness and inevitableness of the damage. The case before us is not this character. and who had told plaintiffs it would be delivered at Greenwich on the second day after its delivery to them. natural. namely. if delivered at a given hour. They were not told the mill would remain idle until the new shaft would be returned. the most fundamental conceptions of the law relative to the assessment of damages are inconsistent with such idea. on the other hand. decided in the English Court of Exchequer in 1854. The discussion contained in the opinion of the court in that case leads to the conclusion that the damages recoverable in case of the breach of a contract are two sorts. The decision in that case is considered a leading authority in the jurisprudence of the common law.Baxendale (1854) [supra] lays down the definite and just rule that before such damage can be recovered the plaintiff must show that the particular condition which made the damage a possible and likely consequence of the breach was known to the defendant at the time the contract was made. Ordinary damages is found in all breaches of contract where the are no special circumstances to distinguish the case specially from other contracts. In all such cases the damages recoverable are such as naturally and generally would result from such a breach. and a corresponding delay in starting the mill. could not reasonably be expected to foresee. is aware of the use to which the purchaser or lessee desires to put the property which is the subject of the contract. The carriers were informed that the mill was stopped. The suit was brought to recover damages for the lost profits of the mill. and a few words relative to the principles governing will here be found instructive. he should cause to be inserted in the contract a clause providing for stipulated amount to the paid upon failure of the vendor to give possession. in the absence of such a stipulation. and it became necessarily that the broken shaft be sent to an engineer or foundry man at Greenwich. The principles governing this branch of the law were profoundly considered in the case Hadley vs. It was delivered to the defendants. To bring damages which would ordinarily be treated as remote within the category of recoverable special damages. The shaft of the engine got broken. Baxendale (9 Exch. No explanation of the delay was offered by the carriers. Where the purchaser desires to protect himself. Concerning this sort of damage. 341). it is necessary that 53 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. and (2) special damages. from the possibility of incurring other damages than such as the incident to the normal value of the use and occupation. as it were. nothing was known to any to them about the San Francisco capitalist who would be willing to back the project portrayed in Exhibit C. apart from the actual terms to the contract exists or intervenes. but were not informed of the special purpose for which the broken shaft was desired to forwarded. and in a sense necessary damage." In case involving only ordinary damage no discussion is ever indulged as to whether that damage was contemplated or not. (1) the ordinary. The statement that special damages may be recovered where the likelihood of such damages flowing from the breach of the contract is contemplated and foreseen by the parties needs to be supplemented by a proposition which. This is that where the damage which a plaintiff seeks to recover as special damage is so far speculative as to be in contemplation of law remote.We recognize the possibility that more extensive damages may be recovered where. is yet clearly to be drawn from subsequent cases. though not enunciated in Hadley vs. and not case has been called to our attention where. and the contract is made with the eyes of the vendor or lessor open to the possibility of the damage which may result to the other party from his own failure to give possession. It was held that the plaintiff could not recover. Baxendale. Hadley vs. without actual notice of that external condition. to give a turn to affairs and to increase damage in a way that the promisor. in the contingency of the failure of the vendor promptly to give possession. inasmuch as at the time when the rights of the parties under the contract were determined. or that the new shaft could not be manufactured at Greenwich until the broken one arrived to serve as a model. cause by the delay in delivering the broken shaft. The extent of the liability for the breach of a contract must be determined in the light of the situation in existence at the time the contract is made. The consideration paid for an unperformed promise is an instance of this sort of damage. and the recovery of such damage follows as a necessary legal consequence of the breach. and the damages ordinarily recoverable are in all events limited to such as might be reasonable are in all events limited to such as might be reasonably foreseen in the light of the facts then known to the contracting parties. The plaintiffs in that case were proprietors of a mill in Gloucester. On the contrary. It is only found in case where some external condition. notification of the special conditions which make that damage possible cannot render the defendant liable therefor. There was delay beyond the two days in delivering the broken shaft at Greenwich. Special damage. which was propelled by steam. "according to the usual course of things. at the time of the creation of the contractual obligation. who were common carriers engaged in that business between these points.

but was informed by the clerk. Plaintiff. PADILLA. Decision unfavorable to the plaintiff was received by Atty. for. entitled Oscar Ventanilla vs. Atty. Centeno on July 25. did not leave with Atty. Centeno 54 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. The plaintiff Ventanilla. because said damages are too remote to be the subject of recovery. and stating that he was not conformable to the decision and had not hesitated to file the notice of appeal. ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P200 as nominal damages and the costs. This conclusion is also necessarily fatal to the right of the plaintiff to recover such damages from the defendant corporation. Gregorio Centeno on July 21. attorney's fees and costs (civil No. said corporation could in no event render itself more extensively liable than the principle in the contract. first. Plaintiff then issued the check Exhibit 1. shoe manufacturers at K. and a notice of appeal was filed by Atty. and some of the judges rightly places the disallowance of the damage on the ground that to make such damage recoverable. Leonardo Sanchez had informed the plaintiff that Atty.the condition should be made the subject of contract in such sense as to become an express or implied term of the engagement. defendant-appellee. The Court does not believe plaintiff's testimony that Sanchez had contacted Atty. 1955. (L. The sale was therefore lost. Leonardo Sanchez. 18833 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.. were under contract to supply by a certain day shoes to a firm in London for the French government. as already suggested. Horne vs. the plaintiffs had to sell at a loss. The facts in that case were as follows: The plaintiffs. Our conclusion is that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 18833. The defendant did not appeal. Sanchez could not have known the whereabouts of Atty. plaintiff retained the service of Atty. J. which certified the case to this Court on the ground that only questions of law are raised. R. Gregorio Centeno to represent him and prosecute the case.00 together with damages. first. L-14333 January 28. 1955. vs. On August 17. 1955. that Atty. with costs against the appellant. and secondly. Civil Case No. 131) is a case where the damage which was sought to be recovered as special damage was really remote. it must so far have been within the contemplation of the parties as to form at least an implied term of the contract. Edilberto Alejandrino and Aida G. After trial. plaintiff-appellant. Centeno wrote a letter to the plaintiff enclosing therein forms for an appeal bond. for P60. The facts. Centeno informed him that he intended to appeal and plaintiff agreed. On July 30. because the damages in question are special damages which were not within contemplation of the parties when the contract was made. 1955. the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. About the middle of Aug. Centeno in his office in Manila about August 5. Atty. 1955. as found by the trial court. Centeno that afternoon.00 as appeal bond and delivered the same to Leonardo Sanchez with instruction to give the same to Atty. decided to file a cash appeal bond of P60. No. Centeno wrote to the plaintiff the letter. . He went to the office of Atty. But others proceeded on the idea that the notice given to the defendant was not sufficiently full and definite. 1961 OSCAR VENTANILLA. Centeno was in Laguna.: This is an action to recover damages claimed to have been suffered by the plaintiff due to the defendant's neglect in perfecting within the reglementary period his appeal from an adverse judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in civil case No. and if he were in Manila. GREGORIO CENTENO. however. It was therefore improbable that he could contact Atty. 3. Atty. 2063. They delivered the shoes to a carrier in sufficient time for the goods to reach London at the time stipulated in the contract and informed the railroad agent that the shoes would be thrown back upon their hands if they did not reach the destination in time. Centeno. The defendants negligently failed to forward the good in due season. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. Centeno was in Laguna campaigning for his candidacy as member of the Provincial Board. enclosing copies of the decision and that notice of appeal. by advising Teodorica not to perform the contract.1955. Plaintiff Oscar Ventanilla after receiving the letter and copy of the decision went to see Atty. Centeno at about 4 o'clock on August 18. Atty.. 19833 was an action for the recovery of P4.00. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija).R. Centeno upon his arrival. G. Centeno at that time the amount for the appeal bond. In the preceding discussion we have considered the plaintiff's right chiefly against Teodorica Endencia. Centeno by telephone and that he issued the cheek upon instruction of Atty. Exhibit A. and it is so ordered.000. Alejandrino. Midland R. 8 C. Centeno. P. and the market having fallen. and because use of his reluctance to pay the premium on the appeal bond. instead of executing an appeal bond. The result was the same in either view. however. because the damages laid under the second cause of action in the complaint could not be recovered from her. Co. are: In Civil Case No. and what has been said suffices in our opinion to demonstrate that the damages laid under the second cause of action in the complaint could not be recovered from her.

or other lascivious acts.prepared the motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal.1 The appellant's bare allegation that by reason of the appellee's indifference. According to Atty. 1955. mental anguish. moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. and exemplary or corrective damages. 2219. The court does not likewise believe the testimony of Atty. slander or any other form of defamation. Centeno. and wounded feelings for the appellee's failure to remain faithful to his client and worthy of his trust and confidence. . moral. The provisions of the new Civil Code on moral damages state: Art. . serious anxiety. which he could have recovered if the appeal had duly been perfected. The fact that the record on appeal was admitted for filing is the best evidence that Atty. 18833. (8) Malicious prosecution . on app. or any of the employees had the right to refuse an appeal bond that is being filed. Though incapable of pecuniary computation. and that it was only at that time he came to know that the period of appeal had expired. Centeno it was not accepted because the period of appeal had already expired. and in not ordering the appellee to pay the appellant the sum of P500 as attorney's fee. .000 as nominal damages. social humiliation.) The appellant claims that the trial court erred in not ordering the appellee to pay him actual or compensatory. The record on appeal was disapproved because it was filed out of time and no appeal bond had been filed by the plaintiff. (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest. (pp. Hence he is not entitled to such damages. in ordering the appellee to pay the appellant only the sum of P200. (9) Acts mentioned in article 309. Atty. serious anxiety upon learning that his adversary had won by a mere technicality. (4) Adultery or concubinage. He who claims actual or compensatory damages must establish and prove by competent evidence actual pecuniary loss. 18833. with the Marvel Building Corporation and then went to the office of the Clerk of Court to file the appeal bond. 33-36. Centeno returned to Manila and went to his office at about 10 o'clock in the morning of August 22. 55 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27.000 and damages from the defendants in civil No. moral shocks. . besmirched reputation. wounded feelings. 1955. Centeno. . for it is not in his power to determine whether or not the appeal bond has been filed within the time prescribed by law. one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Centeno had not in fact filed any appeal bond. besmirched reputation for losing the opportunity to substantiate his claim made while testifying in open court that he was entitled to collect the sum of P4. and similar injury. negligence and failure to perfect within the reglementary period his appeal from an adverse judgment rendered in civil case No. Exhibit D. by not paying the appeal bond of P60. and not P2. . rec. temperate or moderate. He cash the check. . Moral damages include physical suffering. fright. but no appeal bond has been filed by Atty. which was filed only on August 20. he lost his chance to recover from the defendants therein the sum of P4. (3) Seduction. In fact the record on appeal was accepted and filed on September 5. Exhibit 1. 2217. (7) Libel.000 and moral and actual damages. indicates that his claim for actual or compensatory damages is highly speculative. rape. The appellant claims that he suffered mental anguish upon learning that his appeal had not been perfected within the reglementary period due to the appellee's negligence. abduction. (6) Illegal search. . Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. . Article 2199 of the new Civil Code provides: Except as provided by law or by stipulation. Art. Neither the Clerk of Court.

26. illegal search. descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger are entitled to demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the passenger's death. violation of specific provisions of the Civil Code on human relations. malicious prosecution. 29. descendants. under the circumstances. 2219). such award precludes the recovery of temperate or moderate damages.2 In Malonzo vs. seduction. according to the circumstances of the case. or abused. new Civil Code. abduction. adultery or concubinage. After weighing carefully all the considerations. 30. Art. reckless. the spouse.(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21. G. may also recover moral damages. Nevertheless.7 Considering the circumstances. considering that nominal damages are not for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded. since the appellant's claim does not fall under any of those enumerated in article 2208. The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the court. 34. . Concerning temperate or moderate damages claimed by the appellant. As regards exemplary or corrective damages also claimed by the appellant. of course. and that even if the appeal in civil case No. 3 Since the appellant's cause of action for recovery of moral damages is not predicated upon any of those specifically enumerated. Moral damages are recoverable only when physical suffering. 28. 18833 had been duly perfected. ascendants. 6 the trial court has judiciously. the amount awarded to the appellant for nominal damages should not be disturbed. 9. wounded feelings. this Court categorically stated that — . 34 and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. a lawyer. thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded (Strebel vs. The spouse. 27. 5 if the defendant acted in a wanton. L-4722. 28. as found by the trial court. 30. To this we may add that where a mishap occurs resulting in the death of a passenger being transported by a common carrier. which has been violated or invaded by the defendant. the trial court did not err in declining to award moral damages to him. referred to in No. libel. and similar injury are the proximate result of a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. in not depositing on time the appeal bond and filing the record on appeal within the extension period granted by the court. disrespect for the dead or wrongful interference with funerals. 26. which brought about the refusal by the trial court to allow the record on appeal. 27. supra. considering that he is not entitled to actual or compensatory damages but has been awarded nominal damages by the trial court. The parents of the female seduced. serious anxiety. 2219) and in Arts. 9 of this article. the special torts referred to in Art. As regards attorney's fees. raped. 2219 specifically mentions "quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. 1954). 10. Figueras. article 2221 of the new Civil Code provides: Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff. since it cannot be recovered as a matter of right and the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. and brothers and sister may bring action mentioned in No. 2220. 21. fright. Relative to the sufficiency of the sum of P200 as nominal damages awarded by the trial court to the appellant. and willful injury to property. and 35. . excepting. besmirched reputation. mental anguish. the amount of P200 awarded by the trial court to the appellant as nominal damages may seem exiguous. wisely and correctly exercised its discretion in not awarding them to the appellant. in the order named. the amount of P2. oppressive or malevolent manner. without special pronouncement as to costs. and the degree of negligence committed by the appellee. may be vindicated or recognized. it was not an assurance that the appellant would succeed in recovering the amount he had claimed in his complaint. such damages are justly due. the appellee may not be compelled to satisfy it. 309 (par. illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest. Dec. Art. Willful injury to property may be legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that.000 the appellant seeks to recover as nominal damages is excessive. 56 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. 32. Art. 32. fraudulent. . rape or other lascivious acts. quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. 4 and so the trial court did not err in refusing to award temperate or moderate damages to the appellant . 29. moral shocks.Art. 29. The judgment appealed from is affirmed. social humiliation. 3 of this article.R. abducted. Galang. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith." as an instance when moral damages may be allowed. slander or any other form of defamation.

75112 October 16. Branch 14 in Civil Case No.000. Kapunan. the employer whose liability is primary and direct. (2) to pay TWO HUNDRED FORTY ONE PESOS (P241. Sr. the director and president of Filamer Christian Institute.00) as Court litigation expenses. Roxas City and the late POTENCIANO KAPUNAN. instituted a criminal case against Funtecha alone in the City Court of Roxas City for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.00) as doctor's fee (Exh. Sr. (4) to pay FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4. 1983. SR. The two fled from the scene after the incident. CICERO KAPUNAN. Rhodora G. suffered multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized for a total of twenty (20) days. 2 Pursuant to his reservation. "C"). Kapunan. 4 On December 14. Named defendants in the complaint were petitioner Filamer and Funtecha. 1977..950. As a result of the accident.00) as additional expenses incurred for thirty-nine days at P10.50) as medical expenses (Exh. his conviction was affirmed by the then Court of First Instance of Capiz. Allan Masa. Brotarlo for petitioner. a non-party. as Kapunan. SUSA KAPUNAN GENUINO and ERLINDA KAPUNAN TESORO. V-4222 which found petitioner Filamer Christian Institute and Daniel Funtecha negligent and therefore answerable for the resulting injuries caused to private respondent Potenciano Kapunan. A tricycle driver brought the unconscious victim to the hospital. POTENCIANO KAPUNAN.. namely: Daniel Funtecha and Filamer Christian Institute. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. finding the averments in the complaint as supported by preponderance of evidence to be reasonable and justified. PAZ KAPUNAN PUBLICO. who was with Funtecha at the time of the accident. Sr. an eighty-two-year old retired schoolteacher (now deceased). G.00 a day. . to drive the vehicle in question despite his knowledge and awareness that the latter did not have the necessary license or permit to drive said vehicle.. and that defendants Daniel Funtecha. The inferior court found Funtecha guilty as charged and on appeal. JR. to pay plaintiff the following: (1) to pay the sum of TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P2. Thereafter. FERNAN. was walking along Roxas Avenue. in his personal capacity in that he personally authorized and allowed said Daniel Funtecha who was his houseboy at the time of the incident. Funtecha. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged employee. vs. the trial court rendered judgment finding not only petitioner Filamer and Funtecha to be at fault but also Allan Masa. Thus: WHEREFORE. 1990 FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE. Sr. JESUS KAPUNAN. in his capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court. SUPLICO. Sr. Also included was Agustin Masa. only one headlight of the jeep was functioning. was not impleaded as a co-defendant. respondents. Branch XIV. No. Evidence showed that at the precise time of the vehicular accident. jointly and severally. Kapunan for the Substituted Heirs of the late respondent.: This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City. Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan. Sr. for remuneration of plaintiff's helper while recuperating. as substituted by his heirs. namely: LEONA KAPUNAN TIANGCO. who only had a student driver's permit. HONORABLE ENRIQUE P. Kapunan. Kapunan. reserved his right to file an independent civil action. Sr. petitioner. 57 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. commenced a civil case for damages 3 before the RTC of Roxas City. was driving after having persuaded Allan Masa. Filamer Christian Institute and Allan Masa are at fault and negligent of the acts complained of which causes (sic) injury to plaintiff.R. C. Funtecha. the authorized driver. "A"). (3) to pay THREE HUNDRED NINETY PESOS (P390. Aquilina B.J. Roxas City at 6:30 in the evening of October 20. His son. SANTIAGO KAPUNAN.1. to turn over the wheels to him..

"1" and accompanied by Allan Masa who is the authorized driver of said vehicle with a professional drivers license as shown by Exh.00) pesos as moral damages.6 Hence the present recourse by petitioner Filamer. as against the herein plaintiff. cause he was not in the vehicle during the alleged incident.(5) to pay THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3. The Zenith Insurance Corporation as third party defendant is hereby ordered to pay in favor of the defendant and third party plaintiff. This Court finds that defendant Daniel Funtecha while driving the said vehicle is considered as authorized driver in accordance with the policy in question marked Exh.000. and without prejudice to the right of defendant Filamer Christian Institute to demand from codefendant Daniel Funtecha part-time employee and/or Allan Masa a full time employee reimbursement of the damages paid to herein plaintiff. the following: (1) to pay TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20. On December 17. Filamer Christian Institute. the Appellate Court rendered the assailed judgment affirming the trial court's decision in toto. its appeal was dismissed on September 18.00) as loss of earnings capacity. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the said defendant and third party plaintiff Filamer Christian Institute as against third party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation. (4) to pay THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3. and Filamer Christian Institute. The defendants Daniel Funtecha.000.00)as insurance indemnity on the policy contract. said lower court's decision became final as to Funtecha. "3". "2-Masa and FCI". the court absolved defendant Agustin Masa from any personal liability with respect to the complaint filed against him in his personal and private capacity. (7) to pay FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4. 5 Only petitioner Filamer and third-party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation appealed the lower court's judgment to the Court of Appeals and as a consequence. Finding the averments in the third party complaint filed by defendant Filamer Christian Institute as supported by preponderance of evidence as shown by their exhibits to be reasonable and justified.000.000. Filamer Christian Institute and third party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation are hereby ordered jointly and severally. Dr. to pay the costs of the suit. The defendant Agustin Masa as director of defendant Filamer Christian Institute has also failed to exercise the diligence required of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employee Allan Masa. . 1984. The Zenith Insurance Corporation as third party defendant has failed to prove that there was a policy violation made by the defendant Filamer Christian Institute which absolves them from liability under the aforesaid insurance policy.00) as Court litigation and actual expenses. same are hereby dismissed. However. (8) to pay TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20. being his son. For failure to prove their respective counterclaims filed by the defendant Daniel Funtecha.00)as moral damages.00) as attorney's fees.00) as third party liability as provided in the Zenith Insurance Corporation policy (Exh. Agustin Masa.00) as attorney's fees. It is petitioner Filamer's basic contention that it cannot be held responsible for the tortious act of Funtecha on the ground that there is no existing employer-employee relationship between them. The Civil Code provides: 58 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. (6) to pay TWENTY THOUSAND (P20. The record shows that the defendant Daniel Funtecha while driving the said vehicle was having a student drivers license marked Exh.000. "2"). We agree.500. For failure of the insurance firm to pay the docket fees. (2) to pay TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10.000. 1985. (3) to pay FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4.000.

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear the full brunt of his tortious negligence. — There is no employer-employee relationship between students on the one hand.m. In disclaiming liability. Rule X of Book III which reads: Sec. petitioner Filamer cannot be considered as Funtecha's employer.m. Funtecha was not included in the company payroll. As admitted by Agustin Masa in open court. Such fault or negligence. is to read into the law something that was not legislated there in the first place. but for some purpose of his own. even if the trial court did find Allan guilty of negligence. 9 59 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. . even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. as espoused by private respondents. such conclusion would not be binding on Allan. It is axiomatic that no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger. Petitioner Filamer cannot be made liable for the damages he had caused. classes. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening and then driving the vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries to a third person were certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. To dismiss the implementing rule as one which governs only the "personal relationship" between the school and its students and not where there is already a third person involved. still the primary responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner Filamer for the plain reason that at the time of the accident. with sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a. (Emphasis supplied). petitioner Filamer has invoked the provisions of the Labor Code. But under the present set of circumstances. the authorized driver of the Pinoy jeep and undisputably an employee of petitioner. at the time of the injury. 2176. necessary to finish their chosen court under such arrangement. there being fault or negligence. 2180. is obliged to pay for the damage done. It is manifest that under the just-quoted provision of law. The provision of Section 14 is obviously intended to eliminate an erstwhile gray area in labor relations and seeks to define in categorical terms the precise status of working scholars in relation to the learning institutions in which they work for the privilege of a free education. In other words. 7 specifically Section 14. It was Allan's irresponsible act of entrusting the wheels of the vehicle to the inexperienced Funtecha which set into motion the chain of events leading to the accident resulting in injuries to Kapunan. (Emphasis supplied). provided the students are given real opportunity. xxx xxx xxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Sr. 14. where students work for the latter in exchange for the privilege to study free of charge.m. Funtecha was not engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for which he was employed. It must be recalled that Allan was never impleaded in the complaint for damages and should be considered as a stranger as far as the trial court's judgment is concerned. Private respondents' attempt to hold petitioner Filamer directly and primarily answerable to the injured party under Article 2180 of the Civil Code would have prospered had they proceeded against Allan Masa. Working scholars. He was assigned to clean the school passageways from 4:00 a. and schools. Art. 8 The wording of Section 14 is clear and explicit and leaves no room for equivocation. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. to 6:00 a.Art. colleges or universities on the other. But even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha. it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his supposed employment. including such facilities as may be reasonable. if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties. The legal issue in this appeal is whether or not the term "employer" as used in Article 2180 is applicable to petitioner Filamer with reference to Funtecha. Funtecha belongs to that special category of students who render service to the school in exchange for free tuition Funtecha worked for petitioner for two hours daily for five days a week. His duty was to sweep the school passages for two hours every morning before his regular classes.

ENRIQUE P. and viewing that the road was clear. in his capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court. Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is not considered an employee of the petitioner.00 moral damages. GUTIERREZ. the decision under review of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. the appellate court affirmed the trial court decision which ordered the payment of the P20. The Court ruled that the petitioner is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable. 78-79) According to Allan's testimony. HON. the school president. SUPLICO. April 4. Jr.00 litigation and actual expenses. After a re-examination of the laws relevant to the facts found by the trial court and the appellate court. JR. The complaint for damages 10 is ordered DISMISSED as against petitioner Filamer Christian Institute for lack of cause of action. Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to the right. Branch XIV.WHEREFORE. Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic.) in Roxas City. It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student. at the time of the incident. but they did not stop to check. 60 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. J. . Roxas City and POTENCIANO KAPUNAN. He was. in relation to the school. Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road. No costs. Campos. p. petitioner. He further said that there was no specific time for him to be off-duty and that after driving the students home at 5:00 in the afternoon. It is significant to note that the place where Allan lives is also the house of his father. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT. P4. Upon swerving. Funtecha requested the driver. they heard a sound as if something had bumped against the vehicle.000. heirs of the late Potenciano Kapunan.R. the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian. No.. under Section 14. Having a student driver's license.00 liability in the Zenith Insurance Corporation policy. (TSN.00 attorney's fees. an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day. Applying Civil Code provisions. in view of the foregoing. Moreover. 1990 (Filamer Christian Institute v. the jeep had only one functioning headlight. respondents. Actually. 1983. SR.000. seek reconsideration of the decision rendered by this Court on October 16. 1992 FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE. a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision.000.000. 1. Kapunan for private respondents. the Court reconsiders its decision.. vs. The private respondents maintain that under Article 2180 an injured party shall have recourse against the servant as well as the petitioner for whom.1 G. it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed free board while he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute. Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of the petitioner-school. Funtecha allegedly did not steal the school jeep nor use it for a joy ride without the knowledge of the school authorities. Allan Masa. 75112 August 17. being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. and that Funtecha was merely a working scholar who. Agustin Masa. HON. P10. he still had to go back to school and then drive home using the same vehicle. Rhodora G. and hit him. We reinstate the Court of Appeals' decision penned by the late Justice Desiderio Jurado and concurred in by Justices Jose C. Camilon. (Ibid. 79) At the time of the incident (6:30 P. to take over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon. 190 SCRA 477) reviewing the appellate court's conclusion that there exists an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and its co-defendant Funtecha.: The private respondents. the servant was performing an act in furtherance of the interest and for the benefit of the petitioner. Rule X. and P3. pp. Bedona & Bedona Law Office for petitioner. and was allowed.. and Serafin E. negotiating a sharp dangerous curb. The private respondents assert that the circumstances obtaining in the present case call for the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since Funtecha is no doubt an employee of the petitioner. Court of Appeals.M.

190 Va 906. Rule X. Battistoni v. it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over (him). v. in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage.Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. 30 Phil. Inc. Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Intermediate Appellate Court. 1 D. Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the school itself. Jameson v. Fieldmen's Insurance Co. 50 ALR 1437 [1926]. on payroll. 628. Hence. the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. at p. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer. the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. Litonjua and Leynes. 61 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. The Court. is concerned. Hence. There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contractual obligation arising from the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are imputable. thus.. Litonjua and Leynes. In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house. 59 SE 2d 47 [1950]) Even if somehow. . (Manuel Casada. Gavett. (Bahia v. rest periods. The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer." (Bahia v. Thomas. (Kohlman v. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code. Inc. for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. and inclusion of resident physicians in the employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor provisions on working conditions. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately. against both doer-employee and his employer. Therefore. 210 NW 643. 80 ALR 722 [1932]. (See L. was promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employment only for the purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. makes the distinction and so holds that Section 14. on which the petitioner anchors its defense. 624 [1915]) Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer.R. Hyland. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person. maintained and preserved. or in the supervision over him. Moreover. supra. Particularly.L. v. Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code. It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose. Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. by a legal fiction. 148 SCRA 353 [1987]) An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the performance of any act indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer. and on the exclusion of working scholars from. Allan's job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day. Phoenix Construction. includes any act done by an employee. on what records should be kept. the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's business. it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms. the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee. the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act. 71 P 2d 937 [1937]) Section 14. In other words. 577. The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of its employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his employees. Rule X. Rule X of Book III provides guidelines on the manner by which the powers of the Labor Secretary shall be exercised. and wages. See also Association of Baptists for World Evangelism. Can SC 144. 124 SCRA 618 [1983]). He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act.

Isidro L. the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle. Coronado. 2282 of the Municipal Law as embodied in the Revised Administrative Code is a governmental or a corporate or proprietary function of the municipality. 176 SCRA 792 [1989]. thus. 178 SCRA 331 [1989]. A position of responsibility on the part of the petitioner has thus been satisfactorily demonstrated. MELCHOR VIRAY. The decision of the respondent appellate court affirming the trial court decision is REINSTATED. A resolution of that issue will lead to another. was concerned. L-29993 October 23. For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing circumstances.: These Petitions for review present the issue of whether or not the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council under Sec. Franco v. Padilla for respondents.respondents. . primary and solidary. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. 2. MAXIMO MANANGAN. MAGSANOC. (Cangco v. In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees. Malasiqui. Pangasinan.R. Pantranco North Express. REMEDIOS and ROBERTO. MANUEL DE GUZMAN. This is quite understandable considering that as far as the injured pedestrian. Bacani. LEONARDO. Allan Masa. the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff. Poblete v. REMEDIOS and ROBERTO. ANITA. under Article 2180. Assistant Provincial Fiscal for petitioners. Furthermore. The petitioner. Baesa. JESUS MACARANAS. Inc. No. G. the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees. viz the civil liability for damages of the Municipality of Malasiqui. Julian M. all surnamed FONTANILLA. EDUARDO. plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan. NORMA. vs. 772 [1918]). SO ORDERED. v. LEONARDO.respondents. it was Funtecha who was the one driving the vehicle and presumably was one authorized by the school to drive. the motion for reconsideration of the decision dated October 16. 179 SCRA 384 [1989]) The liability of the employer is. (Umali v. However.In the present case. ERNESTO. 1978 MUNICIPALITY OF MALASIQUI. ANITA. has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. GUILLERMO EVANGELISTA. it is enough that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were able to establish the existence of employer-employee relationship between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the fact that Funtecha was engaged in an act not for an independent purpose of his own but in furtherance of the business of his employer. 69 SCRA 263 [1976]. Fabros. VIRGINIA. 93 SCRA 200 [1979]. WHEREFORE. and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. ERNESTO. MUÑOZ PALMA. 768. province of Pangasinan. Kapalaran Bus Liner v. L-30183 October 23. all Members of the Municipal Council of Malasiqui in 1959. petitioners. ALFONSO R. FIDEL MONTEMAYOR. No. J. Manila Railroad Co. all surnamed FONTANILLA. ROSALINA. ROSALINA. EDUARDO. ARTEMIO. ANGELINA. Armas. ARTEMIO.. was not made a party defendant in the civil case for damages. The plaintiff and his heirs should not now be left to suffer without simultaneous recourse against the petitioner for the consequent injury caused by a janitor doing a driving chore for the petitioner even for a short while. for a death which occurred 62 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. VIRGINIA. It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the school jeep. and the Honorable COURT OF APPEALS. RAMON TULAGAN. ANGELITA. and the members of the Municipal Council of Malasiqui.R. NORMA. the petitioner has failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver. 38 Phil. ANGELITA. 1978 LAUDENCIO TORIO. ANGELINA. 1990 is hereby GRANTED. G. petitioner.

159 whereby "it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21. Answering the complaint defendant municipality invoked inter alia the principal defense that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. governmental or political on the one hand. and which was attributed to the negligence of the municipality and its council members.00 for the construction of 2 stages." Resolution No. From his findings he arrived at the conclusion that the Executive Committee appointed by the municipal council had exercised due diligence and care like a good father of the family in selecting a competent man to construct a stage strong enough for the occasion and that if it collapsed that was due to forces beyond the control of the committee on entertainment. or proprietary on the other. and in their proper corporate name. the Municipal Council of Malasiqui. 1962. 22. and contract and be contracted with. consequently. furthermore. they may inter alia sue and be sued. Nicasio A. Hon. Lantin narrowed the issue to whether or not the defendants exercised due diligence 'm the construction of the stage. .000. had a wooden floor high at the rear and was supported by 24 bamboo posts — 4 in a row in front. Esguerra. passed Resolution No. 1959. 1959. private. Pangasinan. Yatco and Eulogio S. 1958. In a decision Promulgated on October 31." 1 The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravaganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan. the Municipal Council of Malasiqui and all the individual members of the Municipal Council in 1959. Gregorio T. Named party-defendants were the Municipality of Malasiqui. the Presiding Judge. with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. and the costs. they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance. Rizal. the stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath. Governmental powers are those exercised by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative.00 its attorney's fees. and 23. Fontanilia was taken to tile San Carlos General Hospital where he died in the afternoon of the following day. The complaint was accordingly dismissed in a decision dated July 10. and many persons went up the stage. The following facts are not in dispute: On October 21.during the celebration of the town fiesta on January 22.5 The powers of a municipality are twofold in character public. The troupe arrived in the evening of January 22 for the performance and one of the members of the group was Vicente Fontanilla. The heirs of Vicente Fontanilia filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 11. 182 was also passed creating the "1959 Malasiqui 'Town Fiesta Executive Committee" which in turn organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage. The program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with some speeches. the Court of Appeals through its Fourth Division composed at the time of Justices Salvador V. 1959 to recover damages. 4 The case is now before Us on various assignments of errors all of which center on the proposition stated at the sentence of this Opinion and which We repeat: Is the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the excercise of a municipality's governmental or public function or is it or a private or proprietary character? 1. judicial 63 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. Serrano reversed the trial court's decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla the sums of P12. one for the "zarzuela" and another for the cancionan Jose Macaraeg supervised the construction of the stage and as constructed the stage for the "zarzuela" was "5-½ meters by 8 meters in size. and corporate. the council appropriated the amount of P100.00 by way of moral and actual damages: P1200. 2 After trial. 1968. Under Philippine laws municipalities are political bodies corporate and as such ag endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through their respective municipal governments in conformity with law. The "zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached. The defendant councilors inturn maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town fiesta celebration and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for profit. the defendants were not liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. 4 in the rear and 5 on each side — with bamboo braces. 3 The Fontanillas appealed to the Court of Appeals.

disease.. a truck driver employed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte ran over Proceto Palafox in the course of his work at the construction of a road. cemeteries and airports among others. 8 Maintenance of parks. Coming to the cam before Us.. thus: Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity. Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code provides: 64 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. and servants of the state. . de Leon 1916. the death of Palafox imposed on the province no duty to pay monetary consideration. golf courses. fall within the operation of this rule of law. is injured. E 994-995) In the early Philippine case of Mendoza v. maintenance of municipal prisons. 6 As to when a certain activity is governmental and when proprietary or private. de Leon. and applying the general tests given above.. arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. xxx xxx xxx The rule of law is a general one. etc. establishment of schools. 11 InPalafox. and fisheries. the rule is stated thus: "A municipal corporation proper has . Loy. and are liable. e. are also recognized as municipal or city activities of a proprietary character. Trent. while the following are corporate or proprietary in character. . bathing establishments. that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or fine of his employment. Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or in. 514) 3. so that each case will have to be determined on the basis of attending circumstances. individual capacity.. supra.. . post-offices. 1610.1647. their acts are political and governmental Their officers and agents in such capacity. none of the tests which have evolved and are stated in textbooks have set down a conclusive principle or rule. who is free from contributory fault.. preservation of public peace. We hold that the ho of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality. as a rule. though elected or appointed by the are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service. slaughter houses. markets. 12 With respect to proprietary functions.. Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated. The Supreme Court in affirming the trial court's dismissal of the complaint for damages held that the province could not be made liable because its employee was in the performance of a governmental function — the construction and maintenance of roads — and however tragic and deplorable it may be. et al. et al. that is generally a difficult matter to determine. If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty no recovery. decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana in 1916. This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons.: regulations against fire. Sec. (112 N. agents. wharves.g. 5th ed. viz: municipal waterwork. so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously. to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability co-exist. v. and not for the state or sovereign power. through Justice Grant T. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty. relying mainly on American Jurisprudence classified certain activities of the municipality as governmental. cited in Mendoza v. and their functions are two fold. and private (so-called) insofar as it is to promote local necessities and conveniences for its own community. a public character as regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent in government. accordingly. can be. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private. 14 Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort. the Supreme Court. (Dillon on Municipal Corporations. In McQuillin on Municipal Corporations. 10 nor from its officers. for instance. Province of Ilocos Norte. 9 2. proprietary or corporate right. the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contract 13 or ex delicto.. The evolution of the municipal law in American Jurisprudence. 1958. had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter. by which another. has shown that. ferries. 7 Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo v. and political Municipal powers on the other hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial private and corporate. and as such they are officers. stables.public. and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto.

and that when many people went up the stage the latter collapsed. employees. According to said defendants.Section 2282. and 5 on each side. Having filed to take the necessary steps to maintain the safety of the stage for the use of the participants in the stage presentation prepared in connection with the celebration of the town fiesta. . 2180. . This provision simply gives authority to the municipality to accelebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. and rightly so. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Angel Novado. The stage was only five and a half meters wide. Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. the function becomes private or proprietary in character. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. Easily. At any rate. if that did happen. it. epidemics. and the like which are for public service. 4 at the rear. Where were the rest? The Court of Appeals thus concluded The court a quo itself attributed the collapse of the stage to the great number of onlookers who mounted the stage. there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality. Art. otherwise. there being fault or negligence. 15 4. the Court of Appeals found and held that there was negligence.00 was appropriate for the construction of two stages and while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of wooden planks. the guitarist who was pointed to by Novado as the person who removed the two bamboo braces denied having done go. no overnmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta. as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omission. . 17 The appellate court also found that the stage was not strong enough considering that only P100. The Court of Appeals said "Amor by himself alone could not have removed the two braces which must be about ten meters long and fastened them on top of the stags for the curtain. petitioner-municipality is to be held liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilia if that was at. nevertheless there were only 4 in front. earthquakes. a witness of the defendants (now petitioners). 2176. however beneficial to the public the undertaking may be. particularly. 16 That being the case. by resolution of the council. For instance. Surely. would be impractical and unwieldy to use a ten meter bamboo pole. the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive. is that it is governmental in essence. On this point. the fiesta cannot be hold in the date fixed in which case it may be held at a later date in the same year. Art. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent superior. is obliged to pay for the damage done. . such as typhoons.tributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers. foundations. The mere fact that the celebration. except when. . Celebration of fiesta. The basic element. This testimony was not believed however by respondent appellate court. or agents. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. much more two poles for the stage curtain. there was indeed negligence as there was lack of suspension over the use of the stage to prevent such an occurrence. in preventing non participants or spectators from mounting and accumulating on the stage which was not constructed to meet the 65 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. the Post and braces used were of bamboo material We likewise observe that although the stage was described by the Petitioners as being supported by "24" posts. As stated earlier. — fiesta may be held in each municipality not oftener than once a year upon a date fixed by the municipal council A fiesta s not be held upon any other date than that lawfully fixed therefor. The municipality and/or its agents had the necessary means within its command to prevent such an occurrence. that a member of the "extravaganza troupe removed two principal braces located on the front portion of the stage and u them to hang the screen or "telon". for weighty reasons. those two braces were "mother" or "principal" braces located semi-diagonally from the front ends of the stage to the front posts of the ticket booth located at the rear of the stage and were fastened with a bamboo twine. it becomes incredible that any person in his right mind would remove those principal braces and leave the front portion of the stage practically unsuported Moreover. the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools. jails. or other public ties.

24 66 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. and plaintiff was entitled to assume that she would not be exposed to a danger (which in this case consisted of lack of sufficient illumination of the premises) that would come to her through a violation of defendant duty. they may justly be regarded as its agents or servants.. 23 In their Petition for review the municipal councilors allege that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the holding of a town fiesta is not a governmental function and that there was negligence on their part for not maintaining and supervising the safe use of the stage. the participants in the stage show had the right to expect that the Municipality through its "Committee on entertainment and stage" would build or put up a stage or platform strong enough to sustain the weight or burden of the performance and take the necessary measures to insure the personal safety of the participants. 2879) 5. rollo. in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code against them and in not holding Jose Macaraeg liable for the collapse of the stage and the consequent death of Vicente Fontanilla. 5th Ed. 30-31. heldinter alia that the "Know your City Week" was a "proprietary activity" and not a "governmental one" of the city. it created a committee in charge of the entertainment and stage. The remaining question to be resolved centers on the liability of the municipal councilors who enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta committee. 20 We agree. 1942. petitioner or appellant Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the c that it was Jose Macaraeg who constructed the stage. whether they are the servants or agents of the corporation. Under the doctrine of respondent superior mentioned earlier. California. L-29993) The findings of the respondent appellate court that the facts as presented to it establish negligence as a matter of law and that the Municipality failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family..additional weight. Vicente Fontanilla was one of the participants who like Sanders had the right to expect that he would be exposed to danger on that occasion. a cardinal inquiry is. when it is sought to render a municipal corporation liable for the act of servants or agents. an invitee the duty of exercising ordinary care for her safety.the defendant-appellees were negligent and are liable for the death of Vicente Fontanilla . that defendant owed to plaintiff. The Court of Appeals held the councilors jointly and solidarity liable with the municipality for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code which provides that d any person suffering ing material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects. City of Long Beach. p.. in Caloocan. 21 We can say that the deceased Vicente Fontanilla was similarly situated as Sander The Municipality of Malasiqui resolved to celebrate the town fiesta in January of 1959. Quite relevant to that argument is the American case of Sanders v. the District Court of Appeal. which was an action against the city for injuries sustained from a fall when plaintiff was descending the steps of the city auditorium. and if those duties relate to the exercise of corporate powers. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. and the maxim of respondent superior applies. 22 . (Dillon on Municipal Corporations. can control them in the discharge of their duties.." . (pp. The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage. The city was conducting a "Know your City Week" and one of the features was the showing of a motion picture in the city auditorium to which the general public was invited and plaintiff Sanders was one of those who attended. Lastly." 19 Thus." 18 Liability rests on negligence which is "the want of such care as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under the circumstances of the case. private respondents argue that the "Midas Extravaganza" which was to be performed during the town fiesta was a "donation" offered by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Co. .. will not disturbed by Us in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion or a gross misapprehension of facts. without just cause to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief at the latter. Second district. and are for the benefit of the corporation in its local or special interest. can continue or remove the can hold them responsible for the manner in which they discharge their trust. In sustaining the award for Damages in favor of plaintiff. petitioner is responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks. Vol IV. If the corporation appoints or elects them. an association of Malasiqui residents responded to the call for the festivities and volunteered to present a stage show. and that when the Municipality of Malasiqui accepted the donation of services and constructed precisely a "zarzuela stage" for the purpose.

If We are led to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as these petitioners are concerned. Rule 51 of the Rules of Court. p. 27 xxx xxx xxx The ordinary doctrine is that a director. 207-208. The amount of P1. SO ORDERED.) On these people We absolve Use municipal councilors from any liability for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. merely by reason of his office. he Must be shown to have personally voted for or otherwise participated in them . separate and distinct from its officers. 25 We believe that this pronouncement can well be applied in the instant case. now Chief Justice. (p. but because of some wrongful or negligent act by such officer amounting to a breach of duty which resulted in an injury . the injury. In this case of Vicente Fontanilla. or helped to bring about. Vol 3A Chapt 11. 6. et al.. The Court of appeal. 207) Officers of a corporation 'are not held liable for the negligence of the corporation merely because of their official relation to it. In Miguel v. it does not apply to a case of negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an official duty. held that the Supreme Court is vested with ample authority to review matters not assigned as errors in an appeal if it finds that their consideration and resolution are indispensable or necessary in arriving at a just decision in a given case. through Justice.. We upheld that ruling. To make an officer of a corporation liable for the negligence of the corporation there must have been upon his part such a breach of duty as contributed to. it is because of a plain error committed by respondent court which however is not invoked in petitioners' brief. the Court. Fred Ruiz Castro. The Court of Appeals in its decision now under review held that the celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. and that tills is author under Sec. 7. 211.We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code against the for this particular article covers a case of nonfeasance or non-performance by a public officer of his official duty. We AFFIRM in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as the Municipality of Malasiqui is concerned (L-30183)...00 is fair and reasonable. or persons composing it 26 and the latter are not as a rule coresponsible in an action for damages for tort or negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part.. Under paragraph 11. . that is to say. 28 We hold. to secure an extrajudicial compensation from the municipality: that the latter gave prorases and assurances of assistance but failed to comply. (pp. 67 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. PREMISES CONSIDERED.200. Petitionermunicipality assails the award. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a personality. 2208 of the Civil Code attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be granted when the court deems it just and equitable. Ibid. now private respondents. therefore. is not personally Stable for the torts of his corporation..) xxx xxx xxx Directors who merely employ one to give a fireworks Ambition on the corporate are not personally liable for the negligent acts of the exhibitor.. Ibid. and it was only eight month after the incident that the bereaved family of Vicente Fontanilla was compelled to seek relief from the courts to ventilate what was believed to be a just cause. that there is no error committed in the grant of attorney's fees which after all is a matter of judicial discretion. he must be a participant in the wrongful act. One last point We have to resolve is on the award of attorney's fees by respondent court. The legal consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation with the municipal council acting as its board of directors. the records show however that attempts were made by plaintiffs. The records do not show that said petitioners directly participated in the defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted spectators to go up the platform. Fletcher Encyclopedia Corporations. although respondent appellate court failed to state the grounds for awarding attorney's fees. . Without pronouncement as to costs. and We absolve the municipal councilors from liability and SET ASIDE the judgment against them (L-9993). Art. directors.

765. March 3. nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. J. 3 Fed. Rule 9 “Where the Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint. as a result of which a criminal action was instituted against Ramos charging him with having driven his car in a reckless and imprudent manner. Rules Service. In other words. It was also held that “Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of fact. accordingly. DECISION BAUTISTA ANGELO. Krise.. When the case was called for hearing.40 based on the latter‟s subsidiary liability under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Defendant has in its employ a driver by the name of Quirino Ramos y Codier. it tendered an issue of fact which takes this case out of the rule relative to summary judgment. and this shall have the effect of a denial”. From this decision. the writ of execution and the sheriff‟s return of the writ. Loew‟s Inc.40. he shall so state.: Plaintiff is the owner of a Studebaker car with Plate No. Sometime in 1947 a collision took place between the taxicab driven by Ramos and the car belonging to the Plaintiff. To allow an employer to dispute the civil liability filed in the criminal case would be to amend. 1947 and to pay the costs. over the objection of Defendant. and the court after considering the motion and the opposition thereto. L-8943. July 31. The question that now arise is:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Is the issue tendered by Defendant in its answer a genuine one? We do not believe so for it merely refers to the amount of damages the Defendant is made subsidiarily liable by the Revised Penal Code which already appears in the decision rendered against its employee in the criminal case. That decision is binding and conclusive uponDefendant not only with regard to its civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee. on the ground that it had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof. Revised Penal Code). 1940). Defendant. INC. Evening Newspaper Co.. G. issued an order denying the same. Defendant filed a written opposition contending that its answer was sufficient in form to raise issues of material facts. This cannot be done as may be implied from the following comment of this Court: “The important question is whether a judgment of conviction sentencing the Defendant to pay an indemnity is conclusive in an action against his employer for the enforcement of the latter‟s subsidiary liability under ar ticles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code. 1943). in its answer. 1956. The court. Defendant has appealed. summary judgment may be granted as a matter of law” (Fletcher vs. 539. declared the case submitted for decision and rendered judgment ordering Defendant to pay to Plaintiff the sum of P2. Plaintiff commenced the present action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Defendant seeking to collect the amount of P2. Ramos entered a plea of guilty and.318. Considering that this answer does not categorically deny the principal allegations of the complaint. As such operator. A writ of execution was issued for the satisfaction of the indemnity but it was returned unsatisfied for lack of property belonging to Ramos which could be levied upon.) And that “Where all the facts are within the judicial knowledge of the court. No. Rules Service.318. MALATE GARAGE & TAXICAB. but “mere denials. Plaintiff-Appellee. 786. (Italics supplied.40. The appealed decision makes reference to two earlier decisions of 68 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. admitted that Quirino Ramos y Codier was in its employ as a taxicab driver but denied all other allegations.Defendant-Appellant. The main issue raised by Defendant is that the lower court erred in allowing the case to be submitted for decision without giving said Defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the Plaintiff regarding his claim for damages because such claim was never admitted as in fact it was denied when in its answer it stated that it did not have sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth thereof. was sentenced to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P2. 4 Fed. Rules Service. particularly with regard to the indemnity. are not sufficient to raise genuine issue of fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment” (Piantadosi vs. . Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment supported by an affidavit attaching thereto certified copies of the decision rendered in the criminal case. That is why the law says that his liability is subsidiary (Article 103. vs. Plaintiff again raised the point that the case could be submitted for decision without the necessity of cross-examination of the Plaintiff by Defendant regarding his claim for damages. Defendant contends that in so alleging that it did not have sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the claim for damages. 7 Fed. Having been unable to recover the indemnity awarded in his favor.R. 3414 while Defendant is an operator of a fleet of taxicabs.3. June 28.318. with legal interest thereon from November. even though an issue may be raised formally by the pleadings” (Fletcher vs. It is true that under section 7. June 2. 1941). unaccompanied by any facts which would be admissable in evidence at a hearing. JOSE MIRANDA.

Manila Electric Co. should not be nullified in a subsequent civil action requiring only preponderance of evidence to support a judgment. in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the employee‟s primary civil liability but also his employer‟s subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence. 586. and at the same time could be free from any blame when said indemnity is sought to be collected from his employer. Jekyll and Mr. FELICIANO. Adelberto Bundoc. could be guilty of reckless negligence in so far as his obligation to pay indemnity is concerned. And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee is convicted and damages are awarded against him. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. It was not without purpose that this Court sounded the following stern warning:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care in selecting his employees. was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without discernment. Gaz. “The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court. Ilocos Sur. G. Vigan. 55 Phil. HON. Ilocos Sur.) Wherefore. petitioners. in the absence of any collusion between the Defendant and the offended party should bind the person subsidiarily liable. Branch 20. to see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking virtual participation in the defense of his employee.R. If these be done. with costs against Appellant.. He cannot leave him to his own fate because his failure is also his. No. and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo. 1992 MACARIO TAMARGO.. Accordingly.this Court. we have arrived at the opinion that the judgment of conviction. No. It is his concern. In addition to this case for damages.” (Martinez vs. “After very careful reflection.) It is true that an employer. RUBIO. unless those who support the contrary rule should also hold that an absolution in a civil case will operate to automatically set aside the verdict against the Defendant in the criminal case. It is anomalous. to suppose that the driver. because the situation before us is not one wherein the employer is sued for a primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. 4 922. ARISTON L. Adelberto. the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his driver‟s conviction and upon proof of the latter‟s insolvency. although the right to the indemnity arose from and was based on one and the same act of the driver. taking real and deep interest in their welfare. and CLARA BUNDOC. excelling „Dr. Branch 20. Vigan. Barredo. a civil complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court. holding that such judgment of conviction is not admissible. Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc. he cannot later be heard to complain. in effect holding that it is merely prima facie evidence. to say the least. Hyde‟. the American rule requiring notice on the part of the employer shall have been satisfied. RTC Judge. Manila Electric Co.. 85044 June 3. In other words.: On 20 October 1982. . respondents. THE HON. Common sense dictates that a finding of guilt in a criminal case in which proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary. then a minor of 10 years of age. Jennifer's adopting parent. CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO. and that otherwise such judgment is only prima facie evidence. The stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses in effect and implications mere civil liability. supra. Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident.. 3457-V. COURT OF APPEALS. as well as of his employee. by petitioner Macario Tamargo. is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his employee but in substance and in effect he is considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. however. J. that he was not given his day in court. 69 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. vs. docketed as Civil Case No. 52 Phil. if brought to court for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability. and to the prevailing view in the United States to the effect that the person subsidiarily liable is bound by the judgment if the former had notice of the criminal case and could have defended it had he seen fit to do so. namely. chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand consequently doing away with the practices of leaving them to their fates. if only in the way of giving them the benefit of counsel. 45 Off. 11. chan roblesvirtualawlibraryintervening in any criminal action brought against them by reason of or as a result of the performance of their duties. but one in which enforcement is sought of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his driver‟s criminal negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action. 4. and Arambulo vs. strictly speaking. 75.. the decision appealed from is affirmed. VICTOR BUNDOC.” (Martinez vs. Barredo. shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. City of Manila vs.

after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Within the 15-day reglementary period. that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court — that notice of the motion shall be given to all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing of said motion. 18 November 1982. insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child. that is. Rule 15. On 28 April 1988. if d technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made their aim would be defeated. Rule 41. were considered pro forma and hence did not interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held that the motions. and the motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. conversely. Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December 1987. namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura. or on 10 December 1981. The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint. 1. Adelberto's natural parents. and in order that substantial justice may be served. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether or not petitioners. not having complied with the requirements of Section 13. may still file the instant Petition. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. 2 In view. Adelberto Bundoc. for acts committed by the latter. Petition. however. the Court. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides: 70 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. respondent spouses Bundoc.Prior to the incident. petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed before the trial court. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January 1988. notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988. of the nature of the issue raised in the instant. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals: 3 Dismissal of appeal. of the Revised Rules of Court. This petition for adoption was grunted on. reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption. 1 As in fact repeatedly held by this Court. the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents. ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. or on 14 December 1987. and Section 4. 4 2. . whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time. this time ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period ending 22 December 1987. Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents. claimed that not they. ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal. petitioners once again contend that respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child. were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. the trial court dismissed the notice at appeal. parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption. In the present Petition for Review. Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988. The rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid technical sense. not having contained a notice of time and place of hearing. and (2) whether or not the effects of adoption. substantial justice. had become useless pieces of paper which did not interrupt the reglementary period. 0373-T before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. In their Answer. It appearing. purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. petitioners filed a notice of appeal. elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been seasonably filed before the trial court. but rather the adopting parents. what is mandatory is the service of the motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time and place of hearing. invoking its right to suspend the application of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice. and that said notice shall state the time and place of hearing — both motions were denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. however. It will be recalled that.

In the instant case. only presumed and the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable. for reasons of public policy. the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious acts. controlling and disciplining of the child. the mother. the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses. the mother. is obliged to pay for the damage done. in case of his death or incapacity. The parental dereliction is. . the law imposes civil liability upon the father and. are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. The Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in one's own acts. 7 (Emphasis Supplied) The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them. Thus. The natural parents of Adelberto. or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law. to extend that liability. to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The father and. parental authority was vested in the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the petition for adoption that is. Such fault or negligence. before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. Manila Railroad Co. Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows: 71 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto. parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority — which includes the instructing. for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agent or servants. there being fault or negligence. in other words. . it is competent for the legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected — to limit such liability to cases in which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or. occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct. by reasons of their status. xxx xxx xxx The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied) This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. stoutly maintain that because a decree of adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses. in case of his death or incapacity. are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. is called a quasi-delict . 5 The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v. where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself. by a legal fiction. without regard to the lack of moral culpability. . Parental liability is. 6 in the following terms: With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence. whether of act or omission. of course. or in the control of persons who. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. however. on the contrary. Upon the other hand.

. would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. except where the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent. the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom. Put a little differently. 35. During the period of trial custody. (Emphasis supplied) We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents. the law presumes. after considering the report of the Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and the evidence submitted before it. Such a result. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. In the instant case. the Rapisura spouses. 39. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their companyand under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (Emphasis supplied) Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child. doer of the tortious act. however. re-enacted this rule: Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil Code. 36. — If. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. that the trial custody period has been completed. Decree of Adoption. the parents exercise supervision and control. moreover. As earlier noted. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied) and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption was filed. and educate the child.Art. Effect of Adoption. shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage: Art. — The adoption shall: xxx xxx xxx (2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents. parental authority shall be vested in the adopting parents. 221. which shall be effective he date the original petition was filed. under the Civil Code. the court is satisfied that the petitioner is qualified to maintain. to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. the Rapisura spouses. The Court is not persuaded. — No petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless and until the adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody period of at least six months to assess their adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal union. and that the best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption. The decree shall state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known. a decree of adoption shall be entered. Article 35 provides as follows: Art. (Emphasis supplied) 72 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. care for. at the time the air rifle shooting happened. Trial Custody. no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied) The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code: Art. could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed. Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.

. 73 | L L B 2012 IIIB(TORTS AND DAMAGES CASES) NOVEMBER 27. we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses. In the instant case. Accordingly.R. not the adopting parents.e. No. in C. in any case. precisely because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period.-G. the trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting. This Decision is immediately executory. WHEREFORE. before the issuance of a decree of adoption. actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents. premises considered. Adelberto's natural parents. parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody.A.Under the above Article 35. the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988. i. and that the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint. SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.. the indispensable parties being already before the court. were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further proceedings consistent with this Decision. constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

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