G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979 EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner vs. HON. ABUNDIO Z.

ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR, respondents. Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of the Orders of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing his Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Felino Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar. The facts which spawned the present controversy may be summarized as follows: On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three- way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The race against truck-driver Montoya, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-227, was for causing damage to the jeep owned by Salazar, in the amount of Pl,604.00, by hitting it at the right rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit and bump an oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's Mercedes Benz. The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM 228, was for causing damage to the Mercedes Benz of petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00 At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep-owner- driver Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya, swerved to the left going towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car which was bound for Manila. Petitioner further testified that before the impact, Salazar had jumped from the jeep and that he was not aware that Salazar's jeep was bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Petitioner's version of the accident was adopted by truck driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar, on the other hand, tried to show that, after overtaking the truck driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal indicating his intention to turn left towards the poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the intersection by a policeman who was directing traffic; that while he was at a stop position, his jeep was bumped at the rear by the truck driven by Montova causing him to be thrown out of the jeep, which then swerved to the left and hit petitioner's car, which was coming from the opposite direction. On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta. Maria, rendered judgment, stating in its decretal portion: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of damage to property thru reckless imprudence in Crime. Case No. SM-227, and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P972.50 and to indemnify Rodolfo Salazar in the same amount of P972.50 as actual damages, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, both as to fine and indemnity, with costs.

Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense charged in Crime. Case No. SM-228, with costs de oficio, and his bond is ordered canceled SO ORDERED.

Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar. On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 80803 with the Court of First Instance of Manila against respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by Montoya, for indentification for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision involving their vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truck-owner Timbol were joined as defendants, either in the alternative or in solidum allegedly for the reason that petitioner was uncertain as to whether he was entitled to relief against both on only one of them. On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 80803 on the grounds that the Complaint is barred by a prior judgment in the criminal cases and that it fails to state a cause of action. An Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner. In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Complaint against truck-owner Timbol for reasons stated in the afore- mentioned Motion to Dismiss On September 30, 1970, petitioner sought before this Court the review of that dismissal, to which petition we gave due course. On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar, respondent Judge also dismissed the case as against the former. Respondent Judge reasoned out that "while it is true that an independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of the Civil Code could be prosecuted independently of the criminal action for the offense from which it arose, the New Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, requires an express reservation of the civil action to be made in the criminal action; otherwise, the same would be barred 2 pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111 ... Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied in the order dated February 23, 1971, with respondent Judge suggesting that the 3 issue be raised to a higher Court "for a more decisive interpretation of the rule. On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition before us, also to review the last two mentioned Orders, to which we required jeep-owner-driver Salazar to file an Answer. The Complaint against truck-owner Timbol We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September 12, 1970, dismissing petitioner's Complaint against truck-owner Timbol.

In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent Judge sustained Timbol's allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. SM227 and SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was made by petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against jeep-driver-Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not state a cause of action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted jeep-owner-driver Salazar as the one solely responsible for the damage suffered by his car. Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, Identity of parties, Identity of subject matter and Identity of cause of action. It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present. However, we agree with petitioner that there is no Identity of cause of action between Criminal Case No. SM227 and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted for damage to petitioner's car but for damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial Court had put it "the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar in Criminal Case 4 No. SM-228. And more importantly, in the criminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal negligence under Article l of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is based on quasi-delict under Article 5 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate in. individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the defendantpetitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code. That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint to wit: that while petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his (petitioner's) lane and collided with his car That the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand truck iii the same direction as Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of the collision, petitioner's car suffered extensive damage amounting to P12,248.20 and that he likewise incurred actual and moral damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a

Mercedes Benz, and (2) defendant's delict or wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazar or of Timbol's employee, Montoya, in driving the truck, causing Salazar's jeep to swerve and 6 collide with petitioner's car, were alleged in the Complaint. Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep-owner-driver Salazar) that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an independent civil action bars the institution of such separate civil action, invoking section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, which says: Section 2. — Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shau proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florida said: As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, 'the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso ... .

In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo further observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section 2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, "it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940." We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, Civil Case No. 80803 is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict. The suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in Criminal Case No. SM228, presents a different picture altogether. At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminalunder Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquilianaunder Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the offended 8 party. The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until its termination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No. SM-228. Neither would an independent civil action he. Noteworthy is the basis of the acquittal of jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal case, expounded by the trial Court in this wise: In view of what has been proven and established during the trial, accused Freddie Montoya would be held able for having bumped and hit the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar, Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya, this Court behaves that accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held able for 9 the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car.

Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the facts of the case, jeep-ownerdriver Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages sustained by petitioner's car. In other words, "the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. " Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar isex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been 10 extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides: Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: xxx xxx xxx c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil night arise did not exist. ... And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar were not exdelictu, the end result would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that Salazar's acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code quoted here under: Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence ... If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground. In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned, therefore, we sustain respondent Judge's Order dated January 30, 1971 dismissing the complaint, albeit on different grounds. WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing Civil Case No. 80803 against private respondent Felino Timbol is set aside, and respondent Judge, or his successor, hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing on the merits; 2) but the Orders dated January 30, 1971 and February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 80803 against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988 AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY & McELROY FILM PRODUCTIONS, petitioners, vs. HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents. G.R. No. 82398 April 29, 1988 HAL MCELROY petitioner, vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

First, there's Tony O'Neil, an American television journalist working for major network. Tony reflects the average American attitude to the Phihppinence —once a colony, now the home of crucially important military bases. Although Tony is aware of the corruption and of Marcos' megalomania, for him, there appears to be no alternative to Marcos except the Communists. Next, Angie Fox a fiery Australian photo-journalist. A 'new girl in town,' she is quickly caught up in the events as it becomes dear that the time has come for a change. Through Angle and her relationship with one of the Reform Army Movement Colonels (a fictitious character), we follow the developing discontent in the armed forces. Their dislike for General Ver, their strong loyalty to Defense Minister Enrile, and ultimately their defection from Marcos. The fourth fictitious character is Ben Balano, a middle-aged editor of a Manila newspaper who despises the Marcos regime and is a supporter an promoter of Cory Aquino. Ben has two daughters, Cehea left wing lawyer who is a secret member of the New People's Army, and Eva--a P.R. girl, politically moderate and very much in love with Tony. Ultimately, she must choose between her love and the revolution. Through the interviews and experiences of these central characters, we show the complex nature of Filipino society, and thintertwining series of events and characters that triggered these remarkable changes. Through them also, we meet all of the principal characters and experience directly dramatic recreation of the revolution. The story incorporates actual documentary footage filmed during the period which we hope will capture the unique atmosphere and forces that combined to overthrow President Marcos. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright with some 14 hugely successful plays to his credit(Don's Party,' 'The Club,' Travelling North) and 11 feature films (The Year of Living Dangerously,' Gallipoli,' 'Phar Lap'). Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian with a deep understanding of the Philippines, who has worked on the research for this project for some 18 months. Together with Davi Wilhamgon they have developed a script we believe accurately depicts the complex issues and events that occurred during th period . The six hour series is a McElroy and McElroy co-production with Home Box Office in American, the Australian Broadcast Corporation in Australia and Zenith Productions in the United Kingdom The proposed motion picture would be essentially a re-enact. ment of the events that made possible the EDSA revolution; it is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television

FELICIANO, J.: Petitioner Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, 1 Petitioner Ayer Productions pty Ltd. (Ayer Productions), envisioned, sometime in 1987, the for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the histolic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue). Petitioners discussed this Project with local movie producer Lope V. Juban who suggested th they consult with the appropriate government agencies and also with General Fidel V. Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played major roles in the events proposed to be filmed. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the Movie Television Review and Classification Board as wel as the other government agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. In a letter dated 16 December 1987, petitioner Hal McElroy informed private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture enclosing a synopsis of it, the full text of which is set out below: The Four Day Revolution is a six hour mini-series about People Power—a unique event in modern history that-made possible the Peaceful revolution in the Philippines in 1986. Faced with the task of dramatising these rerkble events, screenwriter David Williamson and history Prof Al McCoy have chosen a "docu-drama" style and created [four] fictitious characters to trace the revolution from the death of Senator Aquino, to the Feb revolution and the fleeing of Marcos from the country. These character stories have been woven through the real events to help our huge international audience understand this ordinary period inFilipino history.

let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. the trial court issued exparte a Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing the application for preliminary injunction. plaintiff in the production and any similar film or photoplay. private respondent Enrile replied that "[he] would not and will not approve of the use.000. or on 23 March 1988. reproduction and/or exhibition of his name. Petitioner Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of cause of action as the mini-series had not yet been completed. the Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order partially enjoining the implementation of the respondent Judge's Order of 16 March 1988 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued therein. and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. respondent court issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners. motion pictures are a univesally utilized vehicle of communication and medium Of expression. Private respondent. or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production. 2 xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied) On 22 March 1988. upon the other hand. much less to any matter purely personal to them. private respondent filed a Complaint with application for Temporary Restraining Order and Wilt of Pretion with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. A day later. in the same Resolution. actresses and members of the production staff and crew as well as all persons and entities acting on defendants' behalf. In our day and age. constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy. and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. It appears that petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of private respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script. On 21 December 1987. Their effect on the perception by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the pre cultural traits is considerable. film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation" and further advised petitioners that 'in the production.R. which petition was docketed as G. to answer for whatever damages defendants may suffer by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that plaintiff was not entitled thereto. petitiioner Hal McElroy also filed separate Petition for certiorari with Urgent Prayer for a Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction. Private respondent seasonably filed his Consolidated Answer on 6 April 1988 invoking in the main a right of privacy. 3 education and entertainment. On 24 February 1988. airing.00. dated 22 March 1988.play. In an Order dated 16 March 1988. The complaint alleged that petitioners' production of the mini-series without private respondent's consent and over his objection. Katigbak. On 9 March 1988. speaking for the Court. until further orders from this Court. I The constitutional and legal issues raised by the present Petitions are sharply drawn. seeking to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution". explained: 1. petitioner Ayer Productions came to this Court by a Petition for certiorari dated 21 March 1988 with an urgent prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order. and all persons and entities employed or under contract with them. Considering first petitioners' claim to freedom of speech and of expression the Court would once more stress that this freedom includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. docketed as G. 88-151 in Branch 134 thereof. Nor as pointed out in Burstyn v. verbal or visual) should not be made to [him] or any member of his family. No. Hal McElroy flied a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Petition for Preliminary Injunction contending that the mini-series fim would not involve the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile nor that of his family and that a preliminary injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their right of free expression. L-82380. appropriation. Petitioners' claim that in producing and "The Four Day Revolution." they are exercising their freedom of speech and of expression protected under our Constitution. Wilson (343 US 495 [19421) is the Importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that .000. By a Resolution dated 24 March 1988. and allowing the petitioners to resume producing and filming those portions of the projected mini-series which do not make any reference to private respondent or his family or to any fictitious character based on or respondent. No. motion pictures constitute a principal medium of mass communication for information. including actors. presented in a "docu-drama" style. creating four (4) fictional characters interwoven with real events. docketed as Civil Case No. no reference whatsoever (whether written. to cease and desist from producing and filming the mini-series entitled 'The Four Day Revolution" and from making any reference whatsoever to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on.R. or bears rent substantial or marked resemblance or similarity to. distribution or exhibition of said or similar film. L-82398. former Chief Justice Fernando. or is otherwise Identifiable with. the petitions were consolidated and private respondent was required to file a consolidated Answer. showing. On 23 February 1988. upon plaintiff's filing of a bond in the amount of P 2. radio and television. or picture. Further. In Gonzales v. Along with the press. the dispositive portion of which reads thus: WHEREFORE. asserts a right of privacy and claims that the production and filming of the projected mini-series would constitute an unlawful intrusion into his privacy which he is entitled to enjoy. ordering defendants.

The right of privacy or "the 6 right to be let alone. Triangle Publications. Commission on Elections. p. is neither well taken. The counter-balancing of private respondent is to a right of privacy.42 NE 31 LRA 286. Supp. Curtis. or for having an illegal cause or consideration. There is no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about 7 him constitute of apublic character.49 Am St Rep 671). Lagunzad the licensee in effect claimed. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from unwarrantedpublicity. 'a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deperson to protect his memory. Governor Rafael Lacson. the right of privacy cannot be invoked 8 resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. It was demonstrated sometime ago by the then Dean Irene R. a member of the Liberal 11 Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted.147 NY 10 434. to deal with contraposed claims to freedom of speech and of expression and to privacy." like the right of free expression.. the Court. however. Lagunzad v. As held in Gonzales v. through Justice Melencio-Herrera. is the "balancing of interest test" (Chief Justice Enrique M. it would be a drab story of torture and brutality. In rejecting the licensee's claim. p. the Court said: Lastly. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person. the Court had need. commercial media constitute the bulk of such facilities available in our country and hence to exclude commercially owned and operated media from the exerciseof constitutionally protected om of speech and of expression can only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in our country. to mark out the precise scope and content of this right in differing types of particular situations. petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because 12 without it. a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon. but the privilege wts for the benefit of the living. This agreement gave the licensee the right to produce a motion Picture Portraying the life of Moises Padilla. Cortes that our law. indeed. in the name of freedom of speech and expression. This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture companies. is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. Vda.. said: Neither do we agree with petitioner's subon that the Licensing Agreement is null and void for lack of. Philippine Blooming Mills Co.. media facilities are owned either by the government or the private sector but the private sector-owned media facilities commonly require to be sustained by being devoted in whole or in pailt to revenue producing activities. television and the movies. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit. In our community as in many other countries. Indeed.they are designed to entertain as well as to inform' (Ibid. 27 SCRA 835. occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. neither do we find merit in petitioners contention that the Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press. a right to produce a motion picture biography at least partly "fictionalized" of Moises Padilla without the consent of and without paying pre-agreed royalties to the widow and family of Padilla. as a citizen and as a newspaperman. In Lagunzad.. from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside 9 the realm of legitimate public concern. while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life Story Of Moises Padilla. Inc. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and the press.' Petitioners averment that private respondent did not have any property right over the life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure. however. Fernando on the Bill of Rights. 899). 1970 ed. without limitations. 51 SCRA 191 [1963]). ([1895]. he had the right to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla without prior restraint. In the judgment of the lower court enforcing the licensing agreement against the licensee who had produced the motion picture and exhibited it but refused to pay the stipulated royalties. . It is left to case law." that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the member of his family. on which private respondent relies heavily. while it is true that petitioner bad pled the rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story.The right freedom of expression. . constitutional and statutory. de Gonzales. supra. recognized a right to privacy in a context which included a claim to freedom of speech and of expression. no matter how public a he or she may be (Garner v. 79). Succinctly put.. is not an absolute right. Lagunzad involved a suit fortion picture producer as licensee and the widow and family of the late Moises Padilla as licensors. to protect their feelings and to preventa violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the deceased. It is not. 5 does include a right of privacy. as we have in the instant case. in that. Commission on Elections. The principle "requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in given situation or type of situation" (Separation Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v. In the case at bar. 501). Negros Occidental during the November 1951 elections and for whose murder. DCNY 97 F. SU 549 [1951]). there is a 4 diminution of the basic right to free expression. As held in Schuyler v. Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. 858 [1960]: xxx xxx xxx The prevailing doctine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. If such a distinction were sustained.

Because of the speech and of expression. was held to arise out of the desire and the right of the public to know what is going on in the world. At all relevant times. anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person. of course. private respondent was what Profs. The respondent Judge should have stayed his hand. which concerned the life story of Moises Padilla necessarily including at least his immediate family. The privilege of giving publicity to news. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a "public figure:" A public figure has been defined as a person who. a celebrity. nor is it focused upon. and the freedom of the press and other agencies of information to tell it. if it is to be historical. with its experience or instinct as to what its readers will want. a pugilist. and sometimes all. for the projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. by his accomplishments. war heroes and even ordinary soldiers. marriages and divorces. and could no longer be regarded as their own private business. in short. and so could not complaint when they received it. be limited in character. as to matters legitimately within the scope of the public interest they had aroused. the Court believes that a different conclusion must here be reached: The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not. has become a 'public personage. we hold thatunder the particular circumstances presented. to inform the public about those who have become legitimate matters of public interest. of international interest. It includes public officers. as this Court understands the synopsis of the proposed film. clearly of public concern. and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner.In the case at bar. The respondent Judge has restrained petitioners from filming and producing the entire proposed motion picture. as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above. the man Juan Ponce Enrile' but it is compelled. Clearly. 2. no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert. however. more or less indiscrimately. Private respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened to depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any part of the private life of private respondent or that of any member of his family. mean that no subsequent liability may lawfully be imposed upon a person claiming to exercise such constitutional freedoms. 4. a death from . Unlike in Lagunzad. it is. It includes homicide and othe crimes. his affairs. to some extent at least. and the trian of events which led up to that denouement. therefore. as in the case of an actor. in the decisions" that they had sought publicity and consented to it. the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached 13 when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern. or any other entertainment. such subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject mater. and that the press had a privilege. 3. of private respondent Ponce Enrile. or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings. Obviously to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public." Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present danger test" be applied in respect of the instant Petitions. what we have here is not a film biography. The list is. in other words. and other matters of public interest. Three reasons were given. in the circumstances of this case. 14 a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates. Such public figures were held to have lost. and no less a personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. has succeeded in making its own definination of news. as a glance at any morning newspaper will sufficiently indicate. petitioners' argue. instead of issuing an ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order one day after filing of a complaint by the private respondent and issuing a Preliminary Injunction twenty (20) days later. there was no prior restrain of any kind imposed upon the movie producer who in fact completed and exhibited the film biography of Moises Padilla. suicides. an infant prodigy. to refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change of government in February 1986. it was held that there was no liability when they were given additional publicity. "The Four Day Revolution" is not principally about. broader than this. does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile. or mode of living. their tight to privacy. and his character. taking into account the interplay of those interests. The extent of the instrusion upon the life of private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile that would be entailed by the production and exhibition of "The Four Day Revolution" would. constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy. a professional baseball player. "News" includes all events and items of information which are out of the ordinary hum-drum routine. It may be observed at the outset that what is involved in the instant case is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the respondent Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. It includes. arrests and police raides. under the Constitution. may be generally described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful historical account. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of this countryand as such. that petitioners propose to film were taking place. during which the momentous events. On one or another of these grounds. There was. the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. that their personalities and their affairs has already public. must be regarded as having passed into the public domain and as an appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by any form of mass media. It is important to note that in Lagunzad. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. and which have 'that indefinable quality of information which arouses public attention." 1. in other words.' To a very great extent the press.' He is. The invalidity of a measure of prior restraint doesnot. The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-bloody change of government that took place at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in February 1986. accidents. Indeed. fame. more or less fictionalized. famous inventors and explorers. The extent of that intrusion.

further. There must. entitled "Gregorio B. having refused to subject himself to the legal processes of the Republic and having become once again in fugitive from justice. the Senate of the Philippines. must be deemed to have forfeited any right the might have had to protect his privacy through court processes. to the dissemination of news in the scene of current events. SO ORDERED. cut out straight grom the complaint of private respondent Ponce Enrile in Civil Case No. with whom counsel for Gregorio Honasan are apparently associated." After a successful political campaign during which his participation in the EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in the press. in a separate Manifestation dated 4 April 1988. Branch 147. films and broadcasts concerning interesting phases of human activity in general. Petitioner alleged that Honasan's complaint was a "scissors and paste" pleading. of his participation as a principal actor in the culminating events of the change of government in February 1986.. In determining where to draw the line." It is. inter alia." Private respondent filed a Counter-Manifestation on 13 April 1988 stating that the "slight similarity" between private respondent's complaint and that on Honasan in the construction of their legal basis of the right to privacy as a component of the cause of action is understandable considering that court pleadings are public records. a film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to make reference to the role played by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical. be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts. by books. Because his participation therein was major in character. hereby REQUIRES Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Branch 147. WHEREFORE. as well as the reproduction of the public scene in newsreels and travelogues. however. deliberately engaged in "forum shopping. the birth of a child to a twelve year old girl. pictures. in the exercise of its plenary and supervisory jurisdiction. 5. the Court. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy. Hal McElroy. important to dispose to the complaint filed by former Colonel Honasan who. brought to the attention of the Court the same information given by petitoner Hal McElroy. 88-413. 88-151. 16 There must. may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. it is not necessary for the Court to deal with the question of whether or not the lawyers of private respondent Ponce Enrile have engaged in "forum shopping. Lope Juban and PMP Motion for Pictures Production" enjoining him and his production company from further filimg any scene of the projected mini-series film." 18 To the extent that "The Four Day Revolution" limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution. The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. Such portrayal may be carried out even without a license from private respondent. For reasons that by now have become clear. articles. and they were 15 understandably liberal in allowing the benefit of the doubt. popular appeal. however. in other words. a woman with a rare disease. and the Order dated 16 March 1988 of respondent trial court granting a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby SET ASIDE. or even entertainment and amusement. No pronouncement as to costs. 88-413 are not identical. Private respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple private citizenship. be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution. Honasan was substantially identical to that filed by private respondent herein and stating that in refusing to join Honasan in Civil Case No. The limited Temporary Restraining Order granted by this Court on 24 March 1988 is hereby MODIFIED by enjoining unqualifiedly the implementation of respondent Judge's Order of 16 March 1988 and made PERMANENT. if more or less deplorable. forthwith to DISMISS Civil Case No. was issued by Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional Trial Court of Makati. 17 The proposed motion picture should not enter into what Mme. radio and television. the intrusion into private respondent's privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. McElroy Film Productions. Justice Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad referred to as "matters of essentially private concern. II In a Manifestation dated 30 March 1988. . and b) Treating the Manifestations of petitioners dated 30 March 1988 and 4 April 1988 as separate Petitions for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order. the cited cases on "forum shopping" were not in point because the parties here and those in Civil Case No. counsel for private respondent.the use of narcotics. the reappearance of one supposed to have been murdered years ago. in Civil Case No. 88-413 and accordingly to SET ASIDE and DISSOLVE his Temporary Restraining Order dated 25 March 1988 and any Preliminary Injunction that may have been issued by him. Petitioner Ayer Productions. that private respondent's cause of action for invasion of privacy is separate and distinct from that of Honasan's although they arose from the same tortious act of petitioners' that the rule on permissive joinder of parties is not mandatory and that. The privilege of enlightening the public was not. and undoubtedly many other similar matters of genuine. the courts were invited to exercise a species of censorship over what the public may be permitted to read. he sits in a very public place. reiterating that the complaint of Gregorio B. It extended also to information or education. limited. Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely because. a) the Petitions for Certiorari are GRANTED DUE COURSE. 88-151. he continues to be a "public figure. Honasan vs. petitioner Hal McElroy informed this Court that a Temporary Restraining Order dated 25 March 1988.

L-39999 May 31. Romeo Garrido. the accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla. 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning. to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of P30. and Fourteen Richard Does. John Doe alias Tato. Camarines Norte. JR. moral damages in the amount of P30. Roy Padilla. and all the accessory penalties provided for by law.000. respondent.600. FILOMENO GALDONES.000. JOSE ORTEGA. ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte.000.00 moral damages. Camarines Norte. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of five months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. YOLLY RICO. P10.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages. did then and there wilfully. The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon'.. unlawfully. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings. Jr. Building No. all of Jose Panganiban. appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of coercion was committed.00 each. ROMEO GARRIDO. are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal participation in the crime charged. That in committing the offense.00 as exemplary damages. JR. jointly and severally. by means of threats.000. No. Filomeno Galdones. Filomeno Galdonez. in the municipality of Jose Panganiban.COURT OF APPEALS.00. and another P10. as evidence on record . VILLANIA.00 each. the above. vs. and the costs of the suit. but they are ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainants the amount of P9. Philippines..R. P10. and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments. Yolly Rico. committed as follows: That on or about February 8. Villania. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premises. Villanoac.G. They also challenged the order to pay fines of P500. and acting without any authority of law.named accused. 3.00 actual and compensatory damages. by confederating and mutually helping one another. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10. The petitioners were charged under the following information: The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA. The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states: WHEREFORE. Romeo Garrido.00. and. BEDENIA. wares and merchandise. the dispositive portion of which states that: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. destructing (sic) complainants' properties is unlawful. Jose Panganiban. Ricardo Celestino. except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian. and carrying away the goods. Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion. force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market. REALINGO alias "KAMLON". RICARDO CELESTINO. as actual damages. J. and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9. DAVID BERMUNDO.. FILOMENO GALDONES. Jose Ortega. being the incumbent municipal mayor. According to the petitioners.000. VILLANOAC. GUTIERREZ. as their taking the law into their hands. ROBERTO ROSALES. The Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that: xxx xxx xxx . JOHN DOE alias TATO. Roberto Rosales.000.00 to the complainants as actual damages. Realingo alias Kamlon. P30. David Bermundo. to pay a fine of P500. and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day.000. and that it was committed with evident premeditation. and the rest of the accused being policemen. Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision. 1984 ROY PADILLA.000. and feloniously.00 exemplary damages. the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. province of Camarines Norte. Christopher Villanoac. They contended that the trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence. and further the sum of P20..000. we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. PEPITO BEDENIA.00. David Bermundo.. Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega. not on facts that no unlawful act was committed. Roberto Rosales. Godofredo Villania. petitioners. Pepito Bedenia. the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla.00 for exemplary damages.

457). 3 (c).00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL DAMAGES. (no civil liability arising from the criminal case). But the law does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for either of these offenses for the reason that they were not indicted for. Pantig.R. 13456CR. Although the information mentions that the act was by means of threats'. xxx xxx xxx The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than coercion? From all appearances. 49 O. 97 Phil. Consequently. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil. the demolition of the stall and loss of the properties contained therein. They cite precedents to the effect that the liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People v. the fact from which the civil might arise. 1811). 5 SCRA 1067. People v. In the instant case. The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief. IF NOT PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR.established that complainants suffered actual damages. Rules of Court. JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY. Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act.G. no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him. unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.R.. 51 OG. While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their properties. AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6. and this is not denied by the accused. (Rule 111. In the case before us. 1311.. Sec.600. and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case. IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT. the civil aspect therein is . the imposition of actual damages is correct. 3874. v. NO. they should have been prosecuted either for threats or malicious mischief. NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS COMMITTED. THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT. namely. The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision: For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision. these offenses. it does not allege the particular threat made. III THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY. its demolition with axes and other instruments. contending that: I THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE. exists. People v. IV THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN. People v. APPELLANTS IN CA-G. Rev. the violence must be employed against the person. 623. Laperal v. There is no dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall. Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. The information under which they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of either threats or malicious mischief. the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them. DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES'. 748. TO PAY COMPLAINANTS P9.1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME. not against property as what happened in the case at bar. and the carting away of the merchandize. And since there is no showing that the complainants have reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action. Pueblo contra Abellera. Velez. 44 OG. 496. We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law. An accused person is entitled to be informed of the nature of the acts imputed to him before he can be made to enter into trial upon a valid information. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar. Maniago 69 Phil. Miranda. 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT. following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. THAT IS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS. 69 Phil. the petitioners filed this special civil action. Aliza. . II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 26.

Collector of Internal Revenue. the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations. In other words. theft. The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. for instance. Remedial Law Compendium. — In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil. 3.. where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. v. in fact. Garcia. a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. 120 SCRA 203) There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Virata v. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused. it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground. 4 SCRA 1093. Rev. 81 SCRA 472). Thus. Bello. 77 SCRA 98. Alvizo. where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. his employer. 98 Phil. V-3339 is based does not exist. Ochoa. unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime. 73 Phil.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the commission of the offense charged.. Rules of Court). 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases. Due process has been accorded the accused. supra) as. 1983 ed. where provided by law. (Section 1. (Elcano v. 332. the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. the court shall so declare. Pantig. he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his possession. the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and. If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt. However. Hill.deemed instituted with the criminal action. 623). the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered. Rule III. The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a declaration that the fact upon which Civil Case No. 558. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. There is no implied institution when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. 1. (Rule 111. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. People v. et at. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. For instance. In other cases. Revised Penal Code). Upon motion of the defendant. See Regalado. In the absence of any declaration to that effect. As easily as 1942. (Morte Sr. More recently. but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not authorized nor intended. The constitutional presumption . Sec. (Republic v. Rules of Court. we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution: . Alvia. Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that: When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. p. He was. as in the case at bar.. and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. Jr. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. exonerated of the criminal charged. Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that: Sec. Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides: Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. xxx xxx xxx Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is instituted. 96 Phil.. Other civil actions arising from offenses. in the felonies of estafa. A person may be acquitted of malversation where. 101 SCRA 221). in cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence. Catipon. and. The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the offense charged. the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it.

a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury. and after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein. and a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. then Chief Galdones. forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside the store of Vergara. at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken out. may it render judgment acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt. and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil action. but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are distinct and separate actions. went to the market and.000. 3. using ax. themselves. a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. therefore. the latter refused to do so. may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal action. and therefore....00 Value of goods and equipment taken 8. demolished the store of the Vergaras. with the aid of his policemen. if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to justify a conviction in the criminal action. Cezar Sangco: . the whereabouts of the goods taken out from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not been made known.00 It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants Vergaras and carted away its contents. and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in question. and money on the part of all concerned. But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested. It is. 1964. and after all the goods were taken out from the store. and brought these goods to the municipal building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer. Art. because the said Vergaras had not up to that time complied with the order to vacate. 1964. 29 of the Civil Code should be amended because it clearly and expressly provides that the civil action based on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a separate action. The defense that they did so in order to abate what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable. .. or one based on quasi-delict or other independent civil action. earlier cited. The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that: On the morning of February 8th.of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel.00 Value of furniture and equipment judgment destroyed 300. The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code. As stated by retired Judge J. crowbars and hammers. effort. . farfetched to say that the stall was a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.. they had them brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both the prosecution and the defense: xxx xxx xxx (9) In the morning of February 8." According to some scholars. complying with the instructions contained in said Memorandum No. the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his police force. pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives. do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the complainant's market stall and had its contents carted away. To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution of . The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the government which allowed them to lease the stall. Since then up to the trial of this case. or other independent civil actions. Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and merchandise thus taken away.00 P9. The petitioners. They state: On February 8. The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were: Cost of stall construction P1. made an inventory of the goods found in said store.. this provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity and following the dictates of logic and common sense. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time. or quasi-delict. demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around. and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on delict. that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. piled them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope. This finds no support in law and in fact. and of presenting the same evidence: (b) save the injured party unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to take advantage of the free services of the fiscal.600. ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the passageways of Market Building No. the Vergaras were still in the premises. 32 of the Mayor. so the petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban.300.

Francis Mark and Francis Rafael. choose to file a separate action. This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. and would violate the doctrine that the two actions are distinct and separate. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility. it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed. civil liability cannot be demanded. of course. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial. One affects the social order and the other. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate civil action mandatory and exclusive: The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. would likewise render.R. where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO P. and to determine the logical result of the distinction. vs. The offended party may. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal. unjustifiably. It does not. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist. PARDO. A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case.. all surnamed Dy). SO ORDERED. we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition for lack of merit. G. the vexatious and oppressive effects of a reservation or institution of a separate civil action. 288-289). petitioner. the nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt. We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. a provision which imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the victim of a condemnable. the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. as follows: 1 . A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement. it seems evident that there is much sophistry and no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages against the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt. 45-46). 2000 RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION. private rights. the acquittal on reasonable doubt without any significance. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. No. DY (for herself and on behalf of the minors Maria Luisa. Francis Edward. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the the criminal offense. and review stages. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action.any other civil action.: The case is an appeal via certiorari from the amended decision of the Court of 2 3 Appeals affirming the decision and supplemental decision of the trial court. and that the injured party is entitled to damages not because the act or omission is punishable but because he was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco. when the latter is not proved. 129029 April 3. pp. The two can stand side by side. appellate. We further note the rationale behind Art. act may be accorded the justice which he seeks. In the light of the foregoing exposition. There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. yet non-criminal. respondents. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. J. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party. pp.. Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate character of the two actions. it is just and proper that. These do not exist in this case. With this in mind. why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? (Code Commission. however. for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused. Philippine Law on Torts and Damages. WHEREFORE.

A-8. Branch 19. they had to run over it. 1989 (Exh. 17). Cauayan a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation. Durian of Isabela filed with the Regional Trial Court.00 (Exh.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING. The left lane parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. On November 29. a duly licensed driver. Isabela. and its two passengers. At around 4:00 o'clock that same morning while the truck was descending at a slight downgrade along the national road at Tagaran. it also conducts a rigid examination of all driver applicants before they are hired. 15 and 16. The facts. CABANTAC Third Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Upon arraignment on October 23. 1989. Pampanga loaded with 2.00 a month. N2A-867 registered in the name of Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation.000. @ Pacquing and damages to his Nissan Pick-Up bearing Plate No. In the Articles of The facts are as follows: On October 10. 4 & 5). CONTRARY TO LAW. which appear to be undisputed. with a load of 2. the White Truck driven by Dunca left Tuguegarao. it approached a damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the truck's right lane going south and about six meters in length. his truck helper ("pahinante" in Pilipino).000. He was the President and Chairman of the Board of the Dynamic Wood Products and Development Corporation (DWPC). The Nissan was severely damaged (Exhs. Isabela. are as follows: The defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of transporting beer products for the San Miguel Corporation (SMC for Short) from the latter's San Fernando. reading as follows: That on or about the 20th day of June. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Isabela. they did not withdraw the separate civil action based on quasi delict against petitioner as employer arising from the same act or 7 omission of the accused driver. Philippines. without due regard to traffic laws. 1989. Isabela. Aside from the Corporation's memorandum to all its drivers and helpers to physically inspect their vehicles before each trip (Exh. In the early morning of June 20. Dunca's vehicle rammed the incoming Nissan dragging it to the left shoulder of the road and climbed a ridge above said shoulder where it finally stopped. her widow spent P651. 4 against petitioner. judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the appeals interposed by both accused and Reyes Trucking Corporation and affirming the Decision and Supplemental Decision dated June 6. Jr. D). Provincial Prosecutor Patricio T. the offended parties (Rosario P. 1992 and October 26. However. based onquasi delict. private respondents withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused and manifested that they would prosecute the 6 civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action. The private respondents opted to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed . For the funeral expenses of Francisco Dy. As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo. In addition to a professional driver's license. the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Balcita and minor son Paolo) made a reservation to file a separate civil action against the 5 accused arising from the offense charged. Seated at the front right seat beside him was Ferdinand Domingo. pp.00. open wounds. A-7.. SO ORDERED.000. from which he was receiving an income of P10. willfully.00 and to the death of Francisco Dy. Pampanga plant to its various sales outlets in Luzon. BBG-957 in the total amount of P2. (Sgd. On the same occasion. At the time of his death he was 45 years old. carelessness and imprudence the said trailer truck to hit and bump a Nissan Pick-up bearing Plate No. (Exh. pars. These made the surface of the road uneven because the potholes were about five to six inches deep.360. Jr. A-9 and A-14. as found by the trial court. internal and external hemorrhage and multiple injuries. Jr. Province of Isabela. the offended parties actually filed with the Regional Trial Court. Upon agreement of the parties. the SMC's Traffic Investigator-Inspector certified the roadworthiness of this White Truck trailer prior to June 20. Jr. As a result. he and Dunca saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming from the opposite direction. in said Municipality. (see Exh.. rules and ordinances and without taking the necessary precautions to prevent injuries to persons and damage to property. in the Municipality of Cauayan. careless and imprudent manner. unlawfully and feloniously drove and operated the same while along the National Highway of Barangay Tagaran. abrasions. 9-11 record). A-19) from external and internal hemorrhage and multiple fractures (pp.000 cases of empty beer "Grande" bottles.000 cases of empty bottles of beer grande. 1989. in a negligent.) FAUSTO C. the said accused being the driver and person-in-charge of a Trailer Truck Tractor bearing Plate No. the trial court consolidated both criminal and civil cases and conducted a joint trial of the same. I3). The petitioner settled the claim of the heirs of Feliciano Balcita (the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident). Branch 19. and further causing damages to the heirs of Feliciano Balcita in the amount of P100. because of the incoming vehicle. died instantly (Exh. 8. p. 1989. October 10. They used to evade this damaged road by taking the left lance but at that particular moment.000. Cauayan. Dy and minor children and Angelina M. BBG-957 driven by Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy. Cauayan. before approaching the potholes. 15. A-5. On December 15. 1989. a wood processing establishment. 1992 respectively. record). @ Pacquing. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. 1989. causing by such negligence. record). as employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol. Dunca lost control of the wheels and the truck swerved to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. namely: Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy. Cauayan an amended information charging Romeo Dunca y de Tumol with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to property. 1989. Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the white truck trailer described above driven by Romeo Dunca y Tumol. Cagayan bound to San Fernando. due to irreversible shock.

Cauayan.00. Pampanga. p.000. On the other hand. (Sgd. On November 12. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. K-1 & 10-B). On April 13. petitioner and the accused filed a notice of appeal from the joint 10 decision. 31.000. Babaran. As stated earlier.000.000.s. the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for 17 lack of merit Hence. Finding the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. 1989. past president of the Pasay Jaycees. on December 28. 1992. C). June 6.00 as moral damages.. 19-424 to pay the defendant therein actual damages in the amount of P84.499. 1989. and World Vice-President of Jaycees International in 1979. attached six units of Truck Tractors and trailers of the Corporation at its garage at San Fernando. 20 . On April 21.00 as compensatory damages.000.n. to indemnify the Heirs of Francisco Dy. private respondents moved for amendment of the dispositive portion of the joint decision so as to hold petitioner subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the 11 private respondents in the event of insolvency of the accused. On January 6. 1992.00 awarded to said 12 defendant in the next preceding paragraph. . The defendant's general Manager declared that it lost P21. respectively. Jr. 2. J) the DWPC had a taxable net income of P78.000. However. Under its 1988 Income Tax Returns (Exh. Deputy Sheriff Edgardo Zabat of the RTC at San Fernando. the Court of Appeals rendered an amended decision affirming that of 15 the trial court. the Solicitor General filed his comment. and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same. Jr. the Court 21 granted leave to petitioner to file a reply and noted the reply it filed on March 11. the Court of Appeals dissolved the writ (p.000. Ordering the plaintiff in Civil Case No.00 for their education in 1988 alone (Exh. ALIVIA 9 Regional Trial Judge On September 3. 1992. in the amount of P3. record). and 3. the Court hereby sentences him to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four months and one day of arresto mayor as minimum to three years. P1.00 per day for the non-operation of the six units during their attachment (p. the trial court rendered a joint decision. 30. Jr. H-4). Natividad C.00 as funeral expenses. 31. as set out in the opening paragraph of this decision. 1992. 1998. Act No. the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE. this petition for review. the plaintiffs' procurement of a writ of attachment of the properties of the Corporation was declared illegal by the Court of Appeals. 1994. six months and twenty days as maximum. On June 6. 18 On July 21. 1992. 1998. and . Melita Manapil (Exh. . He was also the recipient of numerous awards as a civic leader (Exh. proceedings on December 10.000. SO ORDERED. It was shown that on December 26. 8 1990). the trial court rendered a supplemental decision amending the dispositive portion by inserting an additional paragraph reading as follows: 2:A — Ordering the defendant Reyes Trucking Corporation subsidiarily liable for all the damages awarded to the heirs of Francisco Dy. 19-424. During the pendency of the appeal. 1997.000. On January 27.00 (Exhs. the accused jumped bail and fled to a foreign country.000. record) and on December 29. Br. J). 1989. No pronouncement as to costs.000. and Rosario Perez Dy appear to be stockholders of 10. petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the amended 16 decision. the spouses Francisco Dy. the Court required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) 19 days from notice. O. 1998. and P1. petitioner filed with the trial court a supplemental notice of appeal 13 from the supplemental decision. 1997.Incorporation of the DWPC. Francisco Dy. in view of the foregoing considerations judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Jr. the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the 14 accused in the criminal case. By resolution dated December 29.000 shares each with par value of P100.030. These vehicles were kept under PC guard by the plaintiffs in said garage thus preventing the Corporation to operate them.. in the event of insolvency of the accused but deducting therefrom the damages of P84.30 (Exh. said Sheriff reported to this Court that the attached vehicles were taken by the defendant's representative. Br. Isabela. 4136). On October 26. Pampanga. 1997. National Treasurer and President of the Philippine Jaycees in 1971 and 1976.00 per share out of its outstanding and subscribed capital stock of 60.) ARTEMIO R. was a La Salle University graduate in Business Administration.000 shares valued at P6. On January 31. His children were all studying in prestigious schools and spent about P180. t. 1997.

the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. as complainants in the criminal action. paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure specifically provides: A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. civil liability ex delicto. the answer is in the negative. Here. Petitioner raises three (3) grounds for allowance of the petition. any of said civil actions separately waives the others. In view of the reservation to file. Section 1. they waived other available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission of the accused-driver. to be vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter. the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not 23 recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the accused. however. In such a case. reserved the right to file the separate civil action. which would allow an action predicated on quasi-delict to be instituted by the injured party against the employer for an act or omission of the employee and would necessitate only a preponderance of evidence to prevail.We now resolve to give due course to the petition and decide the case. The second. and in amounts exceeding that alleged in the information for reckless imprudence 22 resulting in homicide and damage to property? We grant the petition. and damages under Articles 32. In negligence cases. Section 1. This liability attaches when the employee is convicted of a crime done in the performance of his work and is found 26 to be insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability adjudged. May petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident be held subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the offended parties in the criminal action against the truck driver despite the filing of a separate civil action by the offended parties against the employer of the truck driver? 2. and one of which is the civil indemnity under the Revised Penal Code. The restrictive phraseology of the . the same was not instituted with the criminal action. Once the choice is made. provides that an employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his employee in the discharge of his duty. and civil liability quasi delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the culprit. Under the law. and the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability. predicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. the withdrawal is ineffective to reverse the effect of the reservation earlier made because private respondents did not withdraw the civil action against petitioner based on quasi delict. The institution of. the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against petitioner as employer of the accused. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of 27 the Civil Code. May the Court award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case despite the filing of a civil action against the employer of the truck driver.1âwphi1. Section 1. that is. Rule 111. and 34 of the 28 Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary. or the reservation of the right to file. under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. as employer of the accused who has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the offender. subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is clear that the reservation to file or the filing of a separate civil action results in a waiver of other available civil actions arising from the same act or omission of the accused. the two being 25 statutorily considered joint tortfeasors. Private respondents sued petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation. However. paragraph 2 enumerated what are the civil actions deemed waived upon such reservation or filing. "the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender. This is the rule against double recovery. The intention of private respondents to proceed primarily and directly against petitioner as employer of accused truck driver became clearer when they did not ask for the dismissal of the civil action against the latter based onquasi delict. and petitioner-employer of the accused subsidiarily liable for damages arising from crime (ex delicto) in the criminal action as the offended parties in fact filed a separate civil action against the employer based on quasi delict resulting in the waiver of the civil action ex delicto. Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code.nêt In other words. resolving under the circumstances pro hac vice to remand the cases to the trial court for determination of the civil liability of petitioner as employer of the accused driver in the civil action quasi ex delictore-opened for the purpose. Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111. as the employer of the accused. boil down to two (2) basic issues. 33. and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. can not be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. namely: 1. It might be argued that private respondents as complainants in the criminal case withdrew the reservation to file a civil action against the driver (accused) and manifested that they would pursue the civil liability of the driver in the criminal action. subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code 24 that the offended party can not recover damages under both types of liability. which. The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. when private respondents." In the instant case. this vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions of law. the provision of Rule 111. arising from the same act or omission of the accused. the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in holding the accused civilly liable. Consequently. Rule 111. The enforcement of the judgment against the employer in an action based on Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of the employee. based on quasi delict. is solidary. Section 1. As regards the first issue. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation.

but only insofar as the penalty in the criminal action is concerned. therefore. or series of crimes. as minimum. dated June 6. the issue is de minimis. and the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court. Thus. Cauayan. The Court. the Court orders the case re-opened to determine the liability of the defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation to plaintiffs and that of plaintiffs on defendant's counterclaim. WHEREFORE. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. we can no longer correct this judgment even if erroneous. No. accused-driver jumped bail pending his appeal from his conviction." This is erroneous because in reckless imprudence cases. Isabela. The action for recovery of civil liability is not included therein. lack of care or foresight. we rule that the trial court erred in awarding civil damages in the criminal case and in dismissing the civil action. Unfortunately private respondents did not appeal from such dismissal and 30 could not be granted affirmative relief. private respondent did not appeal from the dismissal of the civil case. In intentional crimes. without indemnity. when the strict technical sense is. However. as it is. the trial court found the accused "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. may be held liable thereon. There is no such nomenclature of an offense under the Revised Penal Code. "there would be no possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be 35 no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused. the dangerous recklessness. with violation of the automobile law (R. the trial court erred in awarding damages in the criminal case because by virtue of the reservation of the right to bring a separate civil action or the filing thereof. to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing the imposed penalty for the guidance of bench and bar in strict adherence to precedent. criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi offense. In this case. paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. provided that the action has for its basis the same act or omission of the 29 offender. however.R. the Court declares the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. 1997. or "simple imprudence causing damages to 39 property"." There is need. 19-424. "civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for the crime committed. in negligence or imprudence. the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willfull crime or crimes committed. we reiterate that "the policy against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is brought against the 36 employee or against his employer. as amended). And the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision. and sentences him to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor. Br. petitioner did appeal.A. With respect to the issue that the award of damages in the criminal action exceeded the amount of damages alleged in the amended information. The pronouncement was void because the action for recovery of the civil liability arising from the crime has been waived in said criminal action. Unfortunately. 4136)". six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional. the trial court was misled to sentence the accused "to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor. more accurately. Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrase as "homicide through reckless imprudence". 19-424. Br. and the like. However. Thus. With regard to the second issue. No costs in this instance. SO ORDERED. The damages awarded in the criminal action was invalid because of its effective waiver. 19-311 and Civil Case No. the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the amended decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. As enunciated in Ramos 34 vs. Hence. to three (3) years. the Court renders judgment as follows: (1) In Criminal Case No. but is set in 38 relation to a whole class. and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a question of classification or terminology. Parenthetically. as minimum. 4136. but is covered by the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver. Branch 19. Apparently satisfied with such award. based on quasi delict. speedy. . CR No. Br. six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional. 19-311. "reckless imprudence resulting in homicide". and (2) In Civil Case No. the judgment convicting the accused became final and executory. IN LIEU THEREOF. regardless of their source in law. petitioner as defendant in the separate civil action for damages filed against it. promulgated on January 6. the trial court grievously erred in dismissing plaintiff's civil complaint. the act itself is punished. what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act. in exceptional cases has relaxed the rules "in order to promote their objectives and assist the parties in obtaining just. and to pay the costs." The only issue brought before the trial court in the criminal action is whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. as maximum. because it has become final and executory." Invoking this principle. The injured party must choose which of the available 37 causes of action for damages he will bring. defined and penalized under Article 365. Thus. Act No. this case should be remanded to the trial court so that it may render decision 33 in the civil case awarding damages as may be warranted by the evidence. the award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against the employer. Br. At any rate.section under consideration is meant to cover all kinds of civil actions. to three (3) years. 1992. in Criminal Case No. as 40 maximum. the imprudencia punible. and inexpensive determination of 31 every action or proceeding" or exempted "a particular case from the operation of the 32 rules. As a final note. Gonong. 14448.

Before this Court the sole question raised is whether an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question in a prosecution for bigamy. A motion to reconsider the second order of the court having been denied. judicial declaration of nullity of a second and bigamous marriage is not necessary. that the defendant wrote him on October 29.000 as moral damages for the deceit. The record disclose the following proceedings in the court a quo: On January 30. also pending in same court. Clementino V. but he refused to go for fear he may be forced into living with the defendant.000. 1958 the Assistant City Fiscal filed Criminal Case No. the court granted the motion.. Philippines. hence. that he was again forced. L-15315 August 26. that sometime in April. However. which last order is the one sough herein to be annulled. 95 Phil. there is no need in this case to decide the nullity of the second marriage. R-5387. petitioner. Elizabeth Ceasar filed her answer to the complaint. The complaint alleges that defendant Elizabeth Ceasar and her relatives forced. 1957 before Municipal Judge Medardo A. respondents. 94 Phil. committed as follows: That on or about the 21st day of August. LABRADOR. On February 19. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. for the annulment of the marriage of petitioner Abundio Merced with Elizabeth Ceasar. (Annex "2". after had filed Civil Case No. and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved did then and there wilfully unlawfully. Aragon. vs.. V-6520. Gaz. but that her mother advised him to finish his studies first. On April 7. she denies the material allegations of the complaint and avers as affirmative defenses that neither she nor her relatives know of plaintiff's previous marriage to Eufrocina Tan. the resolution of which (question) is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case. 4767. but plaintiff. fraud and insidious machinations committed upon her by plaintiff. When the petition for certiorari with prohibition was filed. (People vs. es 3o 3 la que surge en un pleito o causa cuya resolucion sean antecedente logico de la cuestion-objeto del pleito o causa y cuyo conocimiento corresponda a los Tribunales de otro orden o jurisdiccion. ET AL. petition herein was filed. that this affidavit was used by defendant in securing their marriage of exceptional character. Mendoza. Hon. that sometime in July. Abundio Merced filed a complaint for annulment of his second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar.R. The information reads. Diez. without the need for marriage license. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court. the petitioner secured from this Court a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin respondent judge from proceeding further in the criminal case. Reason alleged for the motion is that the Civil Action involves facts which if proved will determine the innocence of the accused. which is not true. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal. ETC. if the accused claims that the first marriage is null and void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another tribunal. 10. in the City of Cebu.) Abundio Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said criminal case in abeyance until final termination of Civil Case No. . the said accused Abundio Merced. the validity of the first marriage is a prejudicial question.. this is its first element. 357. threatened and intimated by defendant and her relatives into entering the marriage with her on August 21. Contrary to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. [10]. charging Merced with bigamy for the second marriage. — Enciclopedia Juridica Española. In an action for bigamy for example. 4863). p. the civil action for nullity must be first decided before the action for bigamy can proceed. Conde. 1958. HON. No. but that said grounds should be used as a defense in the criminal action. and the cognizance of which pertains to another Tribunal (Cuestion prejudicial. R-5387. The undersigned Assistant Fiscal of City of Cebu accuses Abundio Merced of the crime of bigamy. Abundio Merced until after final termination of Civil Case No. 1958. Gaz. V-6520. The court held in its last order that inasmuch as by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. The complaint is docketed as Civil Case No. being previously united in lawful marriage with Eufrocina Tan. showed her a letter which he wrote breaking off his engagement with Tan. 1957. 1957. 228). In her answer. J. from proceeding further in the Criminal Case No. admitting that he was forced into the marriage and asking him to go to Cebu to have the marriage annulled. 50 Off. entitled People of the Philippines vs. upon being confronted with such discovery. 1960 ABUNDIO MERCED. 1957.: This is a petition for a writ of certiorari with prohibition to prohibit the judge presiding the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental. the order was set aside and another entered denying the motion of accused for suspension of the criminal proceedings. No.5387. 1957. The definition and the elements of a prejudicial question have been set forth by us as follows: Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case. CLEMENTINO V. Merced prays for annulment of the marriage and for moral damages in the amount of P2. upon motion for reconsideration filed by the fiscal. feloniously contract a second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar. On March 3. threatened and intimated him into signing an affidavit to the effect that he and defendant had been living together as husband and wife for over five years.. R. After an opposition thereto was filed by the assistant provincial fiscal. R-5387 defendant Elizabeth Ceasar filed a criminal complaint for bigamy 39 3 against plaintiff Abundio Merced with the office of the City Fiscal of Cebu.G. As a counterclaim defendant asks P50. 50 Off. that immediately after the celebration of the marriage plaintiff left defendant and never lived with her. DIEZ. plaintiff asked her mother to intercede on their behalf to secure her father's consent to their marriage as plaintiff could not concentrate on his studies without marrying Elizabeth. or to determine and declare the existence of the grounds for annulling the same. this is the second element. 1958. defendant learned that plaintiff was engaged to marry Eufrocina Tan.

62 Phil. es deber de los tribunales llamarle la atencion y obligarle que suspenda toda accion criminal hasta que la cuestion prejudicial administrativa se haya decidido finalmente. On February 2. The majority decision in said case of De Leon vs. 246). cuando versa sonbre un hecho distinto y separado del delito. before the criminal action can proceed. Por ejemplo. the impediment of the second marriage did not exist. Hence the appellant was acquitted of bigamy for the 1949 marriage because his previous marriage with Lema in 1941. This civil action must be decided before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed. upon which the trial court and the respondents rely. the fiscal may not prosecute the person who allegedly executed the false document because the issue of the validity of the instrument is sub judice and the prosecuting officer should be ordered to suspend the criminal action until the prejudicial question has been finally determined. Thus the Court said" Hablando en terminos generales la facultad del Fiscal y su deber perseguir los delitos no deben ser controlados ni coartados por los tribunales. is supported by Mr. where our courts are vested with both civil and criminal jurisdiction. the principle of prejudicial question is to be applied even if there is only one court before which the civil action and the criminal action are to be litigated. V- . Justice Moran in his dissenting opinion in De Leon vs. Mendoza. can not be considered as such. her former marriage with Hassan being undissolved. held that the second marriage of the appellant Mendoza with Lema was operation of law null and void. by operation of law. in the case at bar. But its validity has been questioned in the civil action. Cuando un miembro del Ministerio Fiscal se desvia de la ley y entorpece la recta administracion de justicia procesando a una persona por hechos constituvos de delito que se encuentran sub-judice y de los cuales se propone una cuestion prejudicial administrativa. Spanish jurisprudence. cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the elements of the second marriage appear to exist. Since the validity of the second marriage. The court citing the provisions of Article 29 of the marriage law. from which the principle of prejudicial question has been taken. 207. criminal case no. a prejudicial question. So is the ruling therein as contained in the syllabus.) But the question of invalidity can not ordinarily be decided in the criminal action for bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. sin embargo. For the foregoing considerations. This requirement of a different court is demanded in Spanish jurisprudence because Spanish courts are divided according to their jurisdictions. la segunda debe verse antes que la primera. The question of the validity of the second marriage is. the petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted. We have. insofar as the criminal action for bigamy is concerned. pero tan intimamente ligado a el que determina la culpabilidad o inocencia del acusado. Mendoza was married for the first time in 1946 with Josefa de Asis. Mabanag. Dumpo.. In the Philippines. therefore. in which a validity of a document claimed to be false and fictitious is in issue. appellant's former wife Josefa de Asis was still living. 246. 207 thus: La regla general es que cuando hay una cuestion civil y otra criminal sobre un mismo delito u ofensa.. y no las de un juicio civil. contracted in August. and then married for the third time to Panlilio in 1949. must first be declared valid. Mabanag also sustains the theory that when a civil action is pending in court. 1949. Mendoza was charged with and convicted of bigamy for a marriage with one Carmencita Panlilio. subject of the action for bigamy. 62 Phil. the issue of the validity of the second marriage. But in this case the court when exercising its jurisdiction over the civil action for the annulment of marriage is considered as a court distinct and different from itself when trying the criminal action for bigamy. where we said: It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second marriage. Dumpo. supra. the second and subsequent marriage must have all the essential elements of a valid marriage. 70 Phil. therefore. some courts being exclusively of civil jurisdiction. others of criminal jurisdiction. in order that the petitioner be held guilty of the crime of bigamy. Esta regla tiene.. 70 Phil. according to Mohameddan rites. it is necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect that the second marriage contains all the essentials of a marriage must first be secured. 3613. Without the element of consent a marriage would be illegal and void.In order that a person may be held guilty of the crime of bigamy. In the case of People vs. It appearing that the marriage alleged to have been contracted by the accused with Sabdapal. We have a situation where the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must be determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. otherwise known as the Marriage Law. there is no justification to hold her guilty of the crime charged in the information. would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. 1943. having all the essential requisites. por la razon de que las formas de un juicio criminal son las mas a proposito para la averiguacion de un delito. una accion criminal por bigamia. Act No. requires that the essential element determinative of the criminal action must be cognizable by another court. (De Leon vs. the marriage which she contracted for the second time with Elizabeth Ceasar. In the case at bar.) The case of People vs. One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the contracting parties must be freely and voluntarily given. The order of the court denying the petition of the herein petitioner to prohibit the Fiscal from prosecuting the case for bigamy. Josefa de Asis died. Mendoza. then married for the second time with Olga Lema. Una cuestion civil es de caracter prejudicial y debe resolverse antes que una cuestion criminal. (Section 29. Mabanag. Our conclusion that the determination of the validity of the marriage in the civil action for annulment is a prejudicial question. were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. because at the time of the second marriage in 1941. because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy. una excepcion. y es la que se refiere a una cueston civil prejudicial. pero no hay duda que esa facultad puede ser regulada para que no se abuse de ella. was void ab initio. (People vs. presents a different sets of facts from the case at bar. which must be determined before hand in the civil action. This was the ruling of this Court in People vs. This marriage of appellant with Lema being null and void at the time the appellant contracted the said marriage.

of bigamy. . The question of the validity of the second marriage is. Then on March 15. 1963. . 1963. Judge Relova answered in the negative. for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void. as defendant in the civil action." The situation in this case is markedly different. with a preliminary injunction being issued to restrain him from further proceeding with the prosecution of the bigamy case. Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that. when petitioner. filed on March 13." This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in authoritative decisions of 3 this Court. on October 7. The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow. FERNANDO. vs. according to Viada. We sustain him. As explained in the opinion of Justice Dizon: "We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case. 1968 ROLANDO LANDICHO. On February 27. did then and there wilfully. The prejudicial question — we further said — must be determinative of the case before the court. It alleged as one of its special and affirmative defenses that the mere fact that "there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial questions are automatically raised in said civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the 1 criminal case for bigamy. the question before the Court is whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife against petitioner. J. Thus the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. Abundio Merced. and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. 1964. force and intimidation. which was likewise denied on March 2. respondents. what was in issue was the validity of the second marriage. 1964. Thereafter. according to the evidence. the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. petitioner as defendant in said case. he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage incurs the penalty 2 provided for in this Article. on the ground that by means of threats. which marriage has not been legally dissolved. 1963.6520. there must be a decision in such a case "before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed. it was the second spouse. on June 15. Respondent Judge on November 19. . against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay. referring to Viada. in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas. . petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending the decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit. that "parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity.: In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. a prejudicial question because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy. with the qualifications that the bigamy charge was filed upon the complaint of the first spouse Elvira Makatangay." To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v. 1963. an action was filed before the Court of First Instance ofBatangas. It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay. LORENZO RELOVA. . G. the fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. "which must be determined before hand in the civil action before the criminal action can proceed. filed a third-party complaint. Mendoza." The answer stressed that even on the assumption that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner. . At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27. and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court. . unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia. seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force. 1964. petitioner." On March 15. 1963. Then came a motion for reconsideration to set aside the above order. L-22579 February 23. petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas. force and intimidation. HON. Rizal. therefore.R. Branch I. the second marriage which he contracted "must first be declared valid. On June 15." Its validity having been questioned in the civil action. to be precise. In Merced v. constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against him. Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of that year where the statement of facts as above detailed was admitted. and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. is hereby set aside and the preliminary injunction issued by this court to that effect is hereby made permanent. with the offense. . 1964. not petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force. before the answer was filed there was an amended petition for certiorari. 1963. the first spouse. No. respondent Judge was required to answer within ten (10) days. presided over by respondent Judge. with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of the first marriage. . 1963 denied the motion for lack of merit. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. So Ordered. filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage 4 . . the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. . Branch I. Diez." It was the conclusion of this Court then that for petitioner Merced to be found guilty of bigamy. the amendment consisting solely in the inclusion of the People of the Philippines as another respondent. threats and intimidation. This Court admitted such amended petition in a resolution of April 3. she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati. 1963. it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Respondent. In a resolution of this Court of March 17. entitled People vs. threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. . petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress. likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia. Hence this petition. It continued. praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void. These requisites are present in the case at bar. Therefore. In the meanwhile." According to the opinion of Justice Labrador: "We have a situation where the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must first be determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. It was sometime later.

1909. and to reopen the trial for the introduction of evidence in behalf of the said defendant with respect to his capacity at the time of the execution of the bond in question.305. for which reason he neither appeared nor defended himself in the said litigation. to the corporation. together with the interest thereon at the rate of 1 per cent per month from the 15th of December. and the costs. he understood perfectly well the nature and consequences of the act performed by him and that the consent that was given by him for the purpose was entirely voluntary and. the latter was declared to be insane by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila.76. that the bond executed by the defendant Villanueva was the result of such monomania. when taken. on October 11. Such was the situation of petitioner. parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity. his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner. On August 28.R.ñët G. VICENTE SIXTO VILLANUEVA. No. with interest at P1 per month. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force. a bill of exceptions was presented in support of the appeal submitted to this court and which is based on a single assignment of error as follows: Because the lower court found that the monomania of great wealth. in conclusion. and not the effect of any other cause. and Alipio Locso. she petitioned the court to relieve the said defendant Villanueva from compliance with the aforestated judgment rendered against him in the suit before mentioned. as sureties. suffered by the defendant Villanueva. the record showing that summons was served on Vicente Sixto Villanueva on April 17. among them that concerned in the present cause. 1909. Siy Ho. C. This court has not found the proof of the error attributed to the judgment of the lower court. 1909.305. the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila sentenced all the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff company the sum of P3. The court granted the petition and the trial was reopened for the introduction of evidence.1äwphï1. the guardian. to institute the proper legal proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by her husband while in a state of insanity. and. 76. vs. Villanueva" and. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK. On May 12. As a result of such findings the court ruled that the petition for an indefinite stay of execution of the judgment rendered in the case be denied and that the said execution be carried out. appellant. 1911 While the judgment was in the course of execution. (2) that she was appointed his guardian by the same court. valid and efficacious.J. 1908. jointly and severally. The above judicial decisions as well as the opinion of Viada preclude a finding that respondent Judge abused. JUAN CODINA ARENAS AND OTHERS. and that the monomania existed on the date when the bond in question was executed. that is. was in that state when summoned and still continued so. (5) that when Vicente S. (4) that she. at three months from date.: On December 15. the latter on the 14th and the former on the 15th of May. ARELLANO. 1909. a new hearing was requested "with reference to the defendant Vicente S. does not imply incapacity to execute a bond such as the one herein concerned.76. Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the Chinaman. 1909. Elisa Torres de Villanueva. on the 15th of December. assumed the obligation to pay. Vicente Sixto Villanueva and Siy Ho were declared to be in default and were so notified. . threats and intimidation. together with the interest thereon at 1 per cent per month from December 15. On April 5. after due consideration of which. 1908. which evidence could not be presented in due season on account of the then existing incapacity of the defendant. the court decided that when Vicente Villanueva. The defendants were summoned. Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino. following. that there was not. the subject of this suit. 1909. the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of preliminary injunction issued dissolved. the wife of Vicente Sixto Villanueva. defendants. As was correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judge relying on Viada. There is no occasion to indulge in the probability that the third-party complaint against the first wife brought almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy was started could have been inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based on an alleged prejudicial question. consequently. until complete payment should have been made of the principal. After the filing of an exception to the above ruling. Villanueva gave the bond. plaintiff-appellee. appeared and alleged: (1) That on July 24. much less gravely abused. the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. executed the bond in question. he was already permanently insane. as guardian. and to pay the costs. upon its denial. Certainly the trial court founded its judgment on the basis of the medico-legal doctrine which supports the conclusion that such monomania of wealth does not necessarily imply the result that the defendant Villanueva was not a person capable of executing a contract of bond like the one here in question.305. issued in behalf of The Standard Oil Company of New York. Prior to such declaration of nullity. With costs. only competent courts having such authority. The Standard Oil Company of New York. as principals. The Standard Oil Company of New York sued the said five debtors for payment of the P3. 1908. L-5921 July 25. was not aware of the proceedings had against her husband and was only by chance informed thereof. 1908. she was authorized by the court. nor could there have been any other cause for the contract than an ostentation of wealth and this purely an effect of monomania of wealth. the sum of P3. It would have been necessary to show that such monomania was habitual and constituted a veritable mental perturbation in the patient. (3) that. WHEREFORE.

As to understanding it. V.With regard to the first point: "All alienists and those writers who have treated of this branch of medical science distinguish numerous degrees of insanity and imbecility. 1277. as aforesaid. Is he not a man of considerable intelligence. Q. With regard to the second point. it is probable that he can. witnesses for the defendant. only once. drunkenness. and witness did not notice any particular disorder or perturbation of his mental faculties. but that. Hence. the case concerning the estate of the Chinaman Go-Cho-Co. But if you should present to him a document which in no wise concerns his houses and if you should direct him to read it. in a judicial decision. believing himself to be very wealthy when he is not. Villanueva had given any other previous bond. as mere monomania." (Manresa. not only insanity and imbecility. can he not? A. in the opinion of this court. although it conceded as a fact that the defendant had for several years suffered from such monomania. stated its value. that he therefore approved the bond. p. to decide upon the question involved. (Civil Code. Villanueva in the said Go-Cho-Co case. but even those other chronic diseases or complaints that momentarily perturb or cloud the intelligence. that he who suffers the monomania of wealth. his answers being precisely relevant to the matter treated. and that the defendant was quiet and composed and spoke in an ordinary way without giving cause fir any suspicion that there was anything abnormal. Yes. it might be that he could not do that. he had no objection to accepting the one offered by Mr. epilepsy. the following facts were brought out in the testimony given by the physicians. as he customarily did. Do you say that he is intelligent with respect to things other than those concerning greatness? A. has not been proved in this case. crazy. and Mr. specified the place where it was situated. insane. Dr. there being some who consider as a sufficient cause for such incapacity. This witness having been asked. even though it should not be expressed in the contract. Q. for the purpose of providing a guardian for him. Villanueva having been proposed as a surety therein. does he not? Yes. with regard to whether Mr. and the discovered that he had in fact previously given bond in a criminal case. and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved. and whether it appeared strange to witness that Mr. he reasons in matters which do not refer to the question of greatness and wealth. in reference to this case. however. I have made no trial. or out his mind: which.) In our present knowledge of the state of mental alienation such certainly has not yet been reached as to warrant the conclusion. in 1908. sir I believe that he does. in the absence of a judicial declaration. Honorable Judge Araullo testified as a witness for the plaintiff that while trying in the Court of First Instance. that the defendant's mental condition appeared to the witness to be normal and regular and that he observed nothing to indicate the contrary. subsequent to the date mentioned. do you believe that he would understand the contents of the document? A. that a person's believing himself to be what he is not or his taking a mere illusion for a reality is not necessarily a positive proof of insanity or incapacity to bind himself in a contract. anger. 1908. whether Mr. that he answered the questions concerning the property that he held.) In the contract of bond the consideration. it is very obvious that in every contract there must be a consideration to substantiate the obligation. the confusion and the doubt in the minds of the majority of the authors of treatises on the subject in determining the limits of sane judgment and the point of beginning of this incapacity. that he explained to Mr. somnambulism. that at the moment of his acting he was incapable. in this I see nothing particularly remarkable. that he acts under the influence of a perturbed mind. Villanueva. it depends upon what the question was. others had done. the first of whom had visited him some eight times during the years 1902 and 1903. so much so that. Commentaries on the Civil Code. Mr. Q. Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable. going so far into a wealth of classification and details as to admit the existence of 60 to 80 distinct states. Cuervo: Q. Of not much intelligence. Villanueva on December 15. Ingersoll. 1908. was executed by Vicente S. is really insane and it is to be presumed. replied that it was in that same case relative to the estate of the Chinaman Go-Cho-Co that he endeavored to investigate. yes. only with the exception of this monomania of greatness and wealth? A. Specifically. as Casper. Vol. He can take a written paper and read it and understand it. Villanueva its contents and when the witness asked the latter whether he wished to sign it he replied that he was willing and did in fact do so. over which he presided. and the latter. decided. 342.B. A. . The trial court. and the divers passional states which more or less violently deprive the human will of necessary liberty. art. Dr. it is presumed that it exists and that it is lawful. an enumeration of which is unnecessary. had again been surety in any other case. it is possible that he might. Don Rudesino Cuervo and Don Gervasio de Ocampo. testified that as a notary he had prepared the instrument of bond and received the statements of the signers. as it had already been cancelled. and his incapacity. an ordinary intelligence. guided by the medico-legal doctrine above cited. 1909. suggestion. was not declared until July 24. Ocampo: Q. the witness asked him some questions about his property. and that Villanueva testified the same as many. a witness for the plaintiff. Read it. some of them. and that all this took place between July and September. or that his mind is deranged when he executes an onerous contract . Villanueva should engage in giving bonds and whether for that reason he rejected this new bond. he can read it and understand it.The bond. that is. in order to ascertain whether he was solvent and would be adequate surety. F. but afterwards. on cross-examination. unless the debtor proves the contrary. He knows how to read and write.

to have her husband confined in the Hospicio de San Jose and cared for therein. in the garden and on the benches which are in front of the Delmonico Hotel. and with direct reference to the point under discussion. according to your opinion? A. she replied that. as soon as he shouted and disturbed them in their sleep he would have to be locked up in the insane ward. as in onerous and remuneratory contracts. (Id. up to the date of his signing this bond. nor that. that is. testifying as a witness in this case. It is not clear as to the reason why Villanueva gave the bond in favor of the two members of the firm of Arenas & Co. 1908." This same lady. according to the agreement and the free stipulation of the parties and may be. a note by the latter addressed to his friend. when he went to the market. two days before Villanueva was declared to be in default. in other words. He went where he pleased. Finally. It is not true that. but neither can it be sustained that there was no other cause for the giving of the bond in question than the mental disorder that dominated the intellect of the person obligated. the date of the execution of the bond sought to be invalidated. with the costs of this instance against the appellant. on the part of the beneficiary of the bond. . there are many people who can testify in regard to this particular. he had never squandered any large sum of money. as in all contract of pure beneficence. all this being done by her. if Villanueva boasted of wealth in giving several bonds. he used to go out of the house and was on the streets nearly every day? to which she replied: A. and Juan Arenas. and that. voluntary. before mentioned. he does this even now. on Calle Palacio. He goes to the markets. wherein Arenas invited him to a rendezvous on the benches in front of the Delmonico Hotel. So ordered.) Out of the ordinary. The only incorrectness mentioned by this lady is that her husband. it was the product of his lands. but none to December 15. that is. Mr. that she did not know whether he had engaged in the business of signing bonds. 1909. 1908.But he added that Arenas & Co. he was dominated by that malady when he executed the bond now under discussion. the latter was insane or demented. than the liberality of the benefactor. he was influenced only by the monomania of boasting of being wealthy." It can not be affirmed with certainty (the trial court considers it probable) that Villanueva engaged in the business of giving bonds for a certain consideration or remuneration. inviting him to a conference "for the purpose of treating of a matter of great importance of much interest to Villanueva. whether Arenas gave the money for the signature of the bond or simply in order that the agent might find sureties. There is no proof that the said bond was merely the product of an insensate ostentation of wealth. in the performance of that act. did he show any indication of not being sane when he was on the street. on the 13th of May. obtained an agent to look for sureties for them. Neither is there any proof whatever with respect to the third point. and buys provisions and other things. to whom Arenas paid a certain sum of money. to a time prior to 1903. Francisco Lara. when Villanueva subscribed the obligation now contested. Half of Manila knows him and are informed of this fact and it is very strange that this should have occurred. that her husband had property of his own and was not deprived of its management. it is a rule of constant application that is not enough that there be more or less probability that a person was in a state of dementia at a given time.. to which Villanueva's wife replied "that her husband was not exactly insane enough to be placed among the insane. In fact I don't know where he goes go. Villanueva. that he went out every morning without her knowing where he went. Therefore. lunacy or insanity. she was asked: Q. among them that herein concerned. that she had not endeavored legally to deprive him of the management of his own real estate which had been inherited by him. that he had never been engaged in business. on December 15. she had learned of it only by finding to note. Lara testified that he had never had dealings with Villanueva. granting that he was a monomaniac. a bond may be given for some other consideration. that he could not. from which it is inferred that the latter could hardly have been moved to favor the former by the benefit of an assumed obligation to pay him some three thousand pesos. Such is a summary of the facts relating to the debated incapacity of the appellant. that. to wit. and another of them to the year 1908. that he supported himself on what she gave him. From his actions toward others. The witness did not know. and that if he had something to count on for his living. 1274. as proof that Villanueva concealed from his family his dealings with Arenas. would return to the house with his pockets full of tomatoes and onions. when he was not. objection was made by the director of the institution who advised her that if he entered in that way and lodged in the ward for old men. to the extent of his believing himself so oversupplied with money as to be able to risk it in behalf of any person whatever. he did not possess the necessary capacity to give efficient consent with respect to the bond which he freely executed. the judgment appealed from is affirmed. and when she was asked by the judge whether he was a man of frugal habits. at the date of the performance of the act which it is endeavored to invalidate for want of capacity on the part of the executor. as far as she knew. and if rained. in 1908. the testimony of one of these witnesses shows that when Villanueva's wife endeavored. referred. although he did not attend to the collection of the rents and the payment of the land tax. two of them.general. in the bar on the corner. something remunerative stipulated as an equivalent. deliberate and intentional consent. The fact is that the sureties came with the agent and signed the bond. with reference to the one now concerned. is no other. give his conscious. If you need witnesses to prove it. and it is very evident that it can not be concluded therefrom that. The witness who as physicians testified as to extravagancies observed in Villanueva's conduct. The appellant presented. between 5 and 6 of that same day. with monthly interest . if there is not direct proof that. however. free. Q. stated: that no restrictions had ever been placed upon her husband's liberty to go wherever he wished and do what he liked. and she also it was who attended to the subsistence of the family and to all their needs. corner of Calle Victoria. In the interpretative jurisprudence on this kind of incapacity.

alleging themselves to be of legal age. husband of Margarita Espiritu. No. the plaintiffs' father. and to pay the costs of the suit. and to pay the costs of the suit. and in special defense alleged that the land. that the part of the land belonging to the two plaintiffs could produce 180 cavanes of rice per annum. besides. as the latter died soon thereafter.50 per cavan. notwithstanding the fact that said land. the notarial instrument inserted integrally in the 5th paragraph of the answer. to the plaintiffs. was equivalent to P450 per annum.1910.600. Said counsel therefore asked that judgment be rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to be null and void the sale they made of their respective shares of their land. and the proper bill of exceptions having been presented. which hereditary portion had since then been held by the plaintiffs and their sisters. Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz. defendantappellee. but. but that later. after the execution of the deed and within legal period.: This is an appeal by bill of exceptions. onefourth of said land . arts. in accordance with the law (Civ. was valued at P3. an area covered by six cavanes of seed to meet the expenses of the maintenance of his (Wenceslao's) children. 1894. in the partition of said decedent's estate. TORRES. P450 per annum. to pay said intestate estate P1. his said lands passed by inheritance to his four children named Victoria. in the sitio of Panducot of the pueblo of Calumpit. and Luis. This motion was overruled. Bulacan. The records shows it to have been fully proven that in 1891 Lucas Espiritu obtained title by composition with the State. vs. a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu. effected by their father Wenceslao Mercado in favor of Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2. or their equivalent. the questions submitted to the decision of this court consist in determining whether it is true that the plaintiffs were then minors and therefore incapable of selling their property on the date borne by the instrument Exhibit 3. and one-half of this share. J. notwithstanding. Ines. to wit. that is. denying each and all of the allegations therein contained. 1263 and 1300). that subsequently. After trial and the introduction of evidence by both parties. uncollected since 1901. 1913. had an area of only 21 cavanes of seed rice. ratifying said sale under pacto de retro of the land that had belonged to their mother Margarita Espiritu. As the plaintiffs assailed the validity of the deed of sale. to which the plaintiffs excepted and in writing moved for a reopening of the case and a new trial. filed by the counsel for the plaintiffs from the judgment of September 22. about the year 1910. its owner. in which the judge of the Seventh Judicial District dismissed the complaint filed by the plaintiffs and ordered them to keep perpetual silence in regard to the litigated land. and bounded as described in paragraph 4 of the amended complaint. They therefore asked that they be absolved from the defendant's cross-complaint.000 had been caused to the intestate estate of the said Luis Espiritu. In this crosscomplaint the defendant alleged that the complaint filed by the plaintiffs was unfounded and malicious. the property that had belonged to their deceased mother and which they acknowledged having received from the aforementioned purchaser.000 for losses and damages. Bulacan. to wit. that. because of some defect that invalidates the contract. were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu. and that.000 a portion of said land. and this amount being still insufficient the successively borrowed from said Luis Espiritu other sums of money aggregating a total of P600. that. on May 17. all surnamed Mercado. on the ground that they were minors when they executed it. together with the products thereof. Margarita. and that since they reached their majority the four years fixed by law for the annulment of said contract had not yet elapsed.795. and the other one-fourth. the subject-matter of the complaint. an area such as is usually required for fifteen cavanes of seed. 1917 DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO. the same was approved and transmitted to the clerk of this court. In reply to the cross-complaint. and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their mother. 25 ares. by which instrument. with the due authorization of her husband Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2. that. adjoining each other. induced. the plaintiffs. the parcel of land described in the complaint as containing forty-seven and odd hectares was allotted to the . the plaintiffs denied each and all of the facts therein set forth. 1910. JOSE ESPIRITU. through their father Wenceslao Mercado. and in special defense alleged that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale inserted in the cross-complaint the plaintiffs were still minors. exception was taken by the petitioners. and that Luis Espiritu had received said products from 1901 until the time of his death. containing altogether an area of 75 hectares. He therefore asked that judgment be rendered by ordering the plaintiffs to keep perpetual silence with respect to the land in litigation and. administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu. 1914. the plaintiffs' mother. to wit. on May 25. whether a person who is really and truly a minor and. with their sisters Maria del Consejo and Maria dela Paz. ask for the annulment of the instrument executed by him. they sold absolutely and perpetually to said Luis Espiritu. executed. executed by them on May 17. on May 14. upon Luis Espiritu's death. according to its assessment. municipality of Calumpit. The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz.G. leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares in area situated in the barrio of Panducot. the court rendered the judgment aforementioned. the deceased Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc.R. which amount was divided among the two plaintiffs and their sisters Concepcion and Paz. in his capacity as administrator of the property of his children sold under pacto de retro to the same Luis Espiritu at the price of P375 the remainder of the said land. so that he may obtain the restitution of the land sold. against Luis Espiritu. for the sum of P400. that one-half of the land in question belonged to Margarita Espiritu. in consideration of P400. Code. In due season the defendant administrator answered the aforementioned complaint. and in case they then were such. L-11872 December 1. to their two sisters Concepcion and Paz. said Luis Espiritu. which facts appear in the title Exhibit D. at P2. 1901. attests that he is of legal age. By a complaint dated April 9. counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. can. to three parcels of land. Exhibit 3. and that the costs of the trial be charged against them. and that the defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the shares of the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their deceased mother Margarita Espiritu. the complaint was amended by being directed against Jose Espiritu in his capacity of his administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu. to Luis Espiritu. and 59 centares. by means of cajolery. and that thereby losses and damages in the sum of P1. plaintiffs-appellants. that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897.

to the said Luis Espiritu and which now forms a part of the land in question — a transaction which Mercado was obliged to make in order to obtain funds with which "to cover his children's needs. were lost or burned. Maria Consejo. 1890. to her brother Luis Espiritu a portion of the land now on litigation. the land described in said instrument and situated in Panducot. in which referring to the previous sale of the land. then deceased. was executed. and that her father Wenceslao Mercado. 1901. Exhibit C. as compared with the land in dispute. about the year 1904. they stated. To this claim the defendant excepted. Roque Galang. and Josefa Mercado.600 and with her husband's permission and authorization. 1914. and on the west by those of Hermogenes Tan-Toco and by the Sapang-Maitu stream. during the revolution. the witness Maria Consejo Mercado recognized and identified the book Exhibit A. the widower Wenceslao Mercado. by a notarial instrument of May 25. the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado. executed. executed and subscribed before a notary the document Exhibit 3. Bulacan. 1910. that it was her uncle Luis who got for her brother Domingo the other cedula. after it had been read to them and had been translated into the Pampangan dialect for those of them who did not understand Spanish. This testimony was corroborated by her sister Victoria Espiritu. that the grantors of the instrument assured him that they were all of legal age. testified that Espiritu's land contained an area of 84 cavanes. prior to his death had pledged the land to her uncle Luis Espiritu. The witness Maria Consejo Mercado also testified that after her father's death her brother and sisters removed to Manila to live there.brother and sister Luis and Margarita. or an area such as is usually covered by about 15 cavanes of seed. on account of the loss of the original of said instrument. and therefore. on July 14. a part. However. witness added that ever since he was 18 years of age and began to court. and after its owner's death. and which had an area of about 8 hectares less than that of the land allotted to the aforementioned Luis and Margarita produced for his wife and his sister-in-law Victoria a net and minimum yield of 507 cavanes in 1907. effected by their deceased mother for the sum of P2. 1910.] 34 years of age. declaring themselves to be of legal age and in possession of the required legal status to contract. It was also duly proven that. although her brother Domingo used to reside with his uncle Luis Espiritu. the protocols or registers of public documents of the Province of Bulacan were burned. He testified that this deed was drawn up by him at the request of the plaintiff Josefa Mercado. and which. to Luis Espiritu in 1894. which was on the possession of the purchaser Luis Espiritu. that she and her brother and sisters merely signed the deed of May 17. 60 years of age." Wenceslao Mercado. who was then a young maiden. pledged or mortgaged to the same man. the plaintiff Domingo. according to the private document Exhibit 2. for the sum of P400 "as an increase" of the previous purchase price. 86 ares and 37 centares. in his own name and those of his minor children Maria Consejo. the widower of the vendor and father of the plaintiffs. stated that the land that fell to his wife and to his sister-in-law Victoria. on May 14th of the same year. one-half of the land described in the complaint. even prior to said date. of the land that had belonged to this vendor's deceased wife. together with their sisters Consejo and Paz. of the date of May 20. Exhibit 3. Patricio Tanjucto. amounts to 11 hectares. married to a sister of Luis Espiritu. pueblo of Calumpit. The witness Ines Espiritu testified that after the death of the plaintiffs' father. having died. he had known the plaintiff Josefa Mercado. she did not know just how long. under the control of Luis Espiritu. pages 396 and 397 of which bear the attestation that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado was born on August 4. or an area covered by six cavanes of seed. for witness said that he was then [at the time of his testimony. Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz. whereby it would also be appear that Josefa Mercado was 22 years of age in 1910. although she had not yet commenced to attend social gatherings.1910. Domingo. and that. on the south by those of Luis Espiritu. and Amalia. had lived for some time. Maria de la Paz.000. the plaintiffs' mother conveyed by actual and absolute sale for the sum of P2. in equal shares. who. in spite of its being high land and of inferior quality. of one-fourth of all the land described in the complaint. when the said two sisters' share was 764 cavanes. they sold absolutely and in perpetuity to Luis Espiritu. that said document was signed by the plaintiffs and the other contracting parties. On cross-examination. was under witness' administration during to harvest two harvest seasons. to wit. which she testified had been kept and taken care of by her deceased father Wenceslao Mercado. The plaintiffs' petition for annulment of the sale and the consequent restitution to them of two-fourths of the land left by their mother. 1891. Domingo. on the east by those of Victoria Espiritu and Ines Espiritu. had by this husband five children. pertaining to the year 1910. at the death of their mother in 1896 inherited. by the personal registration certificate of said Domingo Mercado. Luis Espiritu. all surnamed Mercado y Espiritu. and that its yield was still larger in 1914. by operation of law. that the . alleging that the land in question comprised only an area such as is customarily covered by 21 cavanes of seed. and for the further reason that the deceased purchaser Luis Espiritu availed himself of deceit and fraud in obtaining their consent for the execution of said deed. who took charge of the administration of the property left by his predecessors in interest. and Amalia. Margarita Espiritu. Antonio Espiritu. on May 17. 1894. on May 17. the plaintiffs must have been. 19 and 18 years of age. was a witness for the defendant. and therein set forth that it was true that the sale of said portion of land had been made by his aforementioned wife. of an area equal to that usually sown with 21 cavanes of seed bounded on the north by the lands of Flaviano Abreu and the heirs of Pedro Espiritu. respectively. for P375. and furthermore because. Exhibit B. on the ground that on the date of its execution they were minors without legal capacity to contract. this witness corroborated the averment of the plaintiffs' minority. at the instance of the interested party Luis Espiritu. the plaintiffs' father. As it was proven by the testimony of the clerk of the parochial church of Apalit (plaintiffs were born in Apalit) that the baptismal register books of that parish pertaining to the years 1890-1891. and that all this took place about the year 1898. Maria de la Paz. that is. by which it appears that in 1910 he was only 23 years old. it was Luis Espiritu who directed the cultivation of the land in litigation. Josefa. the notary before whom the deed Exhibit 3 was ratified. of the year 1914. who knew Lucas Espiritu and the properties owned by the latter. where in it appears that the latter was then already 23 years of age. the notarial instrument Exhibit 1. In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the deed Exhibit 3. Josefa. who added that her nephew. Furthermore. when the instrument of purchase and sale. 1901. that she did not know why her uncle did so. married to Wenceslao Mercado y Ardeno Cruz.

and that he held same until 1901. and taking into the account the relationship between the contracting parties. an area such as is sown by about 15 cavanes of seed. or an area containing 6 cavanes of seed. consisting of an area containing 21 cavanes of seed rice. about the year 1909 or 1910. or intimidation. the sum of P400. had made in behalf of said purchaser Luis Espiritu. and now. Paz and. that the purchaser Luis Espiritu. the vendors receiving in exchange P400 more. since 1894. by virtue of the title of conveyance of ownership of the land measuring 15 cavanes. recognized the validity of the previous contracts. the creditor Luis Espiritu definitely acquired the ownership of said parcel of 6 cavanes. 1901 (Exhibit 2). son of the deceased Luis Espiritu. or the mortgage or pledge of the other parcel of 6 cavanes. an area of six cavanes. his testate or intestate estate is in lawful possession of the parcel of land situated in Panducot that contains 21 cavanes of seed. attested the certainty of the previous sale which their mother. after Margarita Espiritu's death. the parcel of 6 cavanes. for the purpose of giving her consent to the execution of any deed in behalf of her brother. So that said document Exhibit 3 is virtually an acknowledgment of the contract of sale of the parcel or portion of land that would contain 15 cavanes of seed rice made by the vendors' mother in favor of the purchaser Luis Espiritu. Josefa surnamed Mercado y Espiritu. in order to effect the sale mentioned in the document Exhibit 3. they could have redeemed it before May 17. in consequence of the contract of pledge or mortgage in security for the sum of P600.000. was sold absolutely and in perpetuity. fraud. according to the deed of May 25. but he did not do so. testified that he mediate in several transactions in connection with a piece of land belonging to Margarita Espiritu. and.net The defendant-administrator. on which occasion and while said document was being signed said notary was not present. 1894. This same witness also testified that he mediated in a transaction had between Wenceslao Mercado and Luis Espiritu (he did not remember the year). and also the general custom that prevails in many provinces of these Islands for the vendor or debtor to obtain an increase in the price of the sale or of the pledge. had any need to forge or simulate the document Exhibit 3 inasmuch as. in 1901. that the purchaser Luis Espiritu employed fraud. collected during her lifetime. He stated that as he was a witness of the deed of sale he could identify this instrument were it exhibited to him. and as to the other portion of 6 cavanes of seed. and likewise an acknowledgment of the contract of pledge or mortgage of the remainder of said land. attested in Exhibit 1. Bulacan. 1901. collected by the plaintiffs. according to the contract of mortgage or pledge. 1894. to wit. or an increase in the amount loaned. deceit. her brother with the consent of her husband Wenceslao Mercado. violence. and the said increase of P400. by the vendors' father. but. containing an area of six cavanes of seed and which had been left by this deceased. and used to go back and forth between his father's house and those of his other relatives. now deceased. their uncle. 1910.600. by virtue of the contract made with him. by reason of his having acquired the land. as an increase. father of the vendors of the portion of land situated in the barrio of Panducot. It is therefore a rash venture to attempt to recover this latter parcel by means of the contract of final and absolute sale. He denied that his father had at any time administered the property belonging to the Mercado brother and sisters. the parcel of land of 15 cavanes of seed. utilized by Luis Espiritu. inasmuch as said sum constitutes the just price of the property. intimidation. Luis Espiritu in company with the plaintiffs. as may be seen by the private document Exhibit 2. pueblo of Calumpit. Victoria Espiritu denied ever having been in the house of her brother. Antonio Mercado. upon the payment or the return of the sum which their deceased father Wenceslao Mercado had. they declare having sold to him absolutely and in perpetuity said parcel of the land. Luis Espiritu. In rebuttal. and that she went to her said uncle's house. he has held in the capacity of owner by virtue of a prior acquisition. nor were the witnesses thereto whose names appear therein. 1901. had been. executed on May 17. and that. it would be improper and illegal to hold. Exhibits 1 and 2. So that Luis Espiritu was. Maria del Consejo. The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel of land. and in consideration of the fact that the said vendor Luis Espiritu paid them. received as a loan under security of the pledged property. the plaintiff Josefa Mercado denied having gone to the house of the notary Tanjutco for the purpose of requesting him to draw up any document whatever.000. which was assailed by the plaintiffs. Jose Espiritu. The transaction mentioned must have concerned either the ratification of the sale of the land of 15 cavanes. given on May 14. since May. without proof to the contrary. and likewise. since May. When shown the deed of purchase and sale Exhibit 1. In this document the vendors.products yielded by a portion of this land. when he conveyed it to Luis Espiritu. as its ownership was conveyed to the purchaser by means of a singular title of purchase and sale. a cousin of Wenceslao. The evidence adduced at the trial does not show. Margarita Espiritu conveyed to her brother Luis the parcel of 15 cavanes of seed. In rebuttal. testified that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado used to live off and on in the house of his deceased father. making an aggregate sum of P3. and after her death the plaintiffs' widowed father mortgaged or pledged the remaining parcel or portion of 6 cavanes of seed to her brother-in-law. or the remainder of the total area of 21 cavanes. father of the plaintiffs. Considering the relation that exists between the document Exhibit 3 and those of previous dates. She stated that she saw the document Exhibit 3 for the first time in the house of her uncle Luis Espiritu on the day she signed it. during his lifetime. lawphi1. in which the former sold to the latter a parcel of land situated in Panducot. decomposed as follows: P2. during her lifetime. as well as her brother and sisters. after the execution of the document Exhibit 3. or deceit. . at an increase of P400 over the price of P2. after his death. made with the same purchaser. by Wenceslao Mercado to Luis Espiritu. and there is no conclusive proof in the record that this last document was false and simulated on account of the employment of any violence. because he had sent for her. Exhibit 1. set forth in the deed Exhibit 3. is likewise in lawful possession of the remainder of the land. waive and thenceforth any and all rights they may have. in view of the facts hereinabove set forth. he stated that he was not acquainted with its contents. and the totality of the land. even circumstantially. the brother and the sisters Domingo. her husband Wenceslao Mercado took possession of another portion of the land. So it is that the notarial instrument Exhibit 3. In the aforementioned sale. for no instrument whatever was presented to him for identification. during his lifetime. in the procuring of the consent of the vendors who executed it. 1910. in May. sending a carromata to fetch them.

of an area of about "15 cavanes of seed. 1914. 1860. have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate. and it does not appear to have been assailed as such. pledged by the deceased father of the plaintiffs in security for P600 received by him as a loan from his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu. the true value of said land. and. affirm the same. the plaintiffs' mother. even against a third person and his predecessors in interest such as are the plaintiffs. to judge from the statements made by their father himself. whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have been refuted. the plaintiffs received and divided between themselves the sum of P400. no supplemental proof of their true ages was introduced. Exhibit A. and as it was signed by the plaintiffs' father.000 received by Margarita Espiritu. does not constitute sufficient proof of the dates of births of the said Domingo and Josefa. Wenceslao Mercado. they were already of legal age. The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the document Exhibit 3 consists in that. 1875. So ordered. inasmuch as he had personal knowledge of said sale. 1868. and deeming said judgment to be in accordance with law and the evidence of record. would also allow it to be supposed. art. Consejo Mercado. for no certified copies were presented of their baptismal certificates. It was therefore properly admitted as evidence of the certainty of the facts therein set forth. nor did the plaintiffs adduce any supplemental evidence whatever to prove that Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of age when they signed the document Exhibit 3. that the cedula Exhibit C was taken out on February 14. The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2 were identified as authentic by one of the plaintiffs. the amount paid by the purchaser as the price of all the land containing 21 cavanes of seed. that is. in exchange for the land of 6 cavanes of seed.000. and." to her brother Luis Espiritu. and in so doing he acted as the plaintiffs' legitimate father in the exercise of his parental authority. inasmuch as their father stated in the document Exhibit 2 that he was obliged to mortgage or pledge said remaining portion of the land in order to secure the loan of the P375 furnished by Luis Espiritu and which was subsequently increased to P600 so as to provide for certain engagements or perhaps to meet the needs of his children.Moreover. and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them. at the request of his brother-inlaw Luis Espiritu he had no objection to give the testimony recorded in said notarial instrument. the plaintiff. 1894. made by minors who pretend to be of legal age. and March 1. with costs against the appellants. Code. of the greater part of the land of 21 cavanes of seed. finally. recognizing it to be perfectly true that his wife Margarita Espiritu sold said parcel of land which she inherited from her father. for the reason that the parcel of 15 cavanes had been lawfully sold by its original owner. However. and therefore. on the date when they executed it. inasmuch as the sale effected by the plaintiffs' mother. and the judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property. which passed into the possession of the creditor Luis Espiritu. makes all together the sum of P3. he himself being the husband who authorized said conveyance. in May. 1910. we should. and compensatory for. and do hereby. Margarita Espiritu. added to that P2. they had not yet attained the age of 21 years fixed by Act No. should be considered as equivalent to. where in it is recorded that Domingo Mercado was on that date 23 years of age. it cannot be concluded that the plaintiffs. widower of the latter and father of the plaintiffs. they were minors. 1910. when in fact they are not. on the date of May 17. notwithstanding that his testimony affected his children's interest and prejudiced his own.1894 — an instrument that disappeared or was burned — and likewise recognizing that the protocols and register books belonging to the Province of Bulacan were destroyed as a result of the past revolution. and on that account the sale mentioned in said notarial deed Exhibit 3 is perfectly valid — a sale that is considered as limited solely to the parcel of land of 6 cavanes of seed. besides the annotation contained in the copybook Exhibit A. have suffered positive and actual losses and damages in their rights and interests as a result of the execution of said document. on May 17. when it was executed that they signed it. Aside from the foregoing. who claim to have minors when they executed the notarial instrument Exhibit 3. inasmuch as the copybook. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain. and to that of the P600 collected by Wenceslao Mercado. and is the just price of the property. as it was the truth regarding what had occurred. there is no legal ground or well-founded reason why it should be rejected. it cannot be gainsaid that in the document Exhibit 3 they stated that they were of legal age at the time they executed and signed it. of the 6th Partida. did not occasion any damage or prejudice to the plaintiffs. though no evidence appears in the record that the plaintiffs Josefa and Domingo Mercado were in fact minors. the notarial document Exhibit 1. as the owner of any fruits that might be produced by said real property. which sum. on the execution of the impugned document Exhibit 3. and. notwithstanding the testimony of the plaintiff Consejo Mercado. title 19. is valid. nor the juridical rules established in consonance therewith. the benefit which must have accrued to them from the sums of money received as loans. 1891. for both these facts are not proved. For the foregoing reasons. even in the doubt whether they certainly were of legal age on the date referred to. was not impugned. (Civ. are regards the statements made therein.) itc@alf With respect to the true age of the plaintiffs. and as the record shows no evidence whatever that this document is false. they received through him. The courts. . of April 27. and the supposition that he did. in order to show the propriety of the claim. is of the nature of a public document and is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and of the date of the latter. in their interpretation of the law. consequently. July 11. no proof was adduced of the fact that it was Luis Espiritu who took out Domingo Mercado's personal registration certificate on April 13. by means of an instrument executed by her on May 25. 1910. or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6. from a careful examination of the record in this case. 1218. neither was any proof adduced against the statement made by the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa in the notarial instrument Exhibit 3. that.) The plaintiffs' father. causing the age of 23 years to be entered therein in order to corroborate the date of the notarial instrument of May 17th of the same year.

not sufficient data in the record to award the damages claimed by the plaintiff. said court rendered judgment. Therefore. wherein the minor was held to be estopped from contesting the contract executed by him pretending to be age.. was a minor. or P75 a year for seven years up to July 31. which the appellate court affirmed. ET AL. They also averred that Guillermo and Rodolfo were minors when they signed the promissory note Exhibit A.R.000 "in legal currency of the P. as a loan. Villa Abrille sued them in March 1949. This being so. While the evidence on this particular point does not decisively support the plaintiff's allegation. Braganza because the minority of her consigners note release her from liability. 1148. 1922. is arrived at. petitioners. according to Exhibit 3. the dispositive part of the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. having received a certain sum of money by way of a loan from Genoveva Muerong in 1915 which.: The defendants admit in their amended answer those paragraphs of the complaint wherein it is alleged that Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura was the owner. 1959 ROSARIO L. embodies all of the requisites prescribed by law for its efficacy. received from Villa Abrille. Because payment had not been made. However. DE BRAGANZA. J. (Art. but that the sum of P663. L-12471 April 13. yet he did so by intimidation made upon his mother Paula Prado by the defendant Genoveva Muerong. de Villa Abrille the sum of P10.000 as plaintiff asserted. I. it appears. for the reason that the latter. had a Torrens title issued in favor of the plaintiff's father. vs. So ordered. inasmuch as it is the registration that gives validity to the transfer. What is deduced from the record is. according to the provisions of section 50 of Act No. DE VILLA ABRILLE. however. did not acquire any right to the property sold as much less. the defendants. approximately. Rosario L. the defendant.: Rosario L. therefore. ROMUALDEZ. if it is taken into consideration. GERMAN MARAMBA and GENOVEVA MUERONG. Exhibit 1. It is not denied that at the time of signing . J. even supposing that the document in question.000 plus 2 % interest from October 30. in the terms above described. by virtue of the document Exhibit 1 alone. 1944. dated July 17. In the case now before us the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age. Espiritu (37 Phil. who threatened the former with imprisonment.. two years after the cessation of the present hostilities or as soon as International Exchange has been established in the Philippines". then agreed upon.40. defendants claimed to have received P40. 496. of which the latter is the only heir and caused the plaintiff to sign a conveyance of the land. the preponderance of evidence shows that no amount was given by the defendants to the alleged vendors in said year. At any rate. at the time he signed it. this document. whose testimony was contradicted by that of the defendant Genoveva Muerong who. which is clearly shown by the record and it does not appear that it was his real intention to sell the land in question. of the land here in question and that the plaintiff is the sole and universal heir of the said deceased Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura. As regards this minority. 1928 ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO. In view of the foregoing. defendants-appellants. with Torrens title. the sate of Exhibit 1. the fundamental question to be resolved in this case is whether or not the plaintiff sold the land in question to the defendants. The above petitioners. yet it does not. promised in writing (Exhibit A) to pay him P10. The defendants affirm they did and as proof of such transfer present document Exhibit 1. vs. In their answer before the Manila court of first Instance. 215). asserts that she possesses about half of the land in question. the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs. without any express findings as to the costs in this instance. by taking the P150 received by Paula Prado and her husband in 1915 and adding thereto interest at the rate of 50 per cent annum. is not applicable herein.G. is vitiated to the extent of being void as regards the said plaintiff. the vendor Isidro Bambalan y Prado. was a minor. There are. No. was P200 and according to the testimony of Paula Prado. on October 30.R. respondent.000 only — instead of P70. G. the herein plaintiff. that his mother Paula Prado and the latter's second husband Vicente Lagera. FERNANDO F. The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been sufficiently proven. 1944 P70. because the witness Paula Prado was the only one who testified thereto. plaintiff-appellant. de Braganza and her sons Rodolfo and Guillermo petition for review of the Court of Appeal's decision whereby they were required solidarily to pay Fernando F. bind the land and would only be a valid contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the register of deeds to make the proper registration. who was the one who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula used in the acknowledgment of the document. Civil Code).000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof. After hearing the parties and their evidence. There can be no question about the responsibility of Mrs. as regards the said land. 1922. since it is a personal defense of the minors. such defense will benefit her to the extent of the shares for which such minors may be responsible. moreover. plus 2 % per annum. In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to have given the plaintiff and her son in 1992 as the price of the land. his minority was well known to the purchaser. was P150. BENGZON. and Genoveva Muerong having learned later that the land within which was included that described in said Exhibit 3. which appears in the document Exhibit 1. The plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he signed said document. No. L-27710 January 30.

. Wherefore. vs.66. that they will not be permitted thereafter to assert it. they have not filed in 2 this case an action for annulment. Their liability. in fact they were not. on the theory that such misrepresentation is not a part of. on this point. 1953 RAMON JOAQUIN. For one thing. pretended to be of legal age. he was 18 years old. They merely interposed an excuse from liability. Espiritu. But. From the minors' failure to disclose their minority in the same promissory note they signed.: This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila in the summary settlement of states of Joaquin Navarro. and if the former. G. the contract. as already stated. in the Mercado case. Other authorities hold that such misrepresentation may be the basis of such an action. We hold. Perhaps defendants in their desire to acquire much needed money. which we doubt it is of passive (or constructive) misrepresentation. (Exhibit A) can not be enforced. No. four years had not yet completely elapsed from October 1947. These two appellants did not make it appears in the promissory note that they were not yet of legal age. They had no juridical duty to disclose their inability. The provisions of Article 1301 of the Civil Code are quoted to the effect that "an action to annul a contract by reason of majority must be filed within 4 years" after the minor has reached majority age. Upon the other hand. In other words. and in October 1951. P40. the Court of Appeals found them liable pursuant to the following reasoning: . without disclosing the legal impediment with respect to Guillermo and Rodolfo. Furthermore.67 plus 6% interest beginning March 7. there is reason to doubt the pertinency of the 4-years period fixed by Article 1301 of the Civil Code where minority is set up only as a defense to an action. . whereas in this case. So that when this defense was interposed in June 1951. even if their written contact is unenforceable because of non-age.166. P3. No costs in this instance. In accordance with the provisions of Civil Code. . he was 25 years old. as the share of these minors was 2/3 of P70. they shall make restitution to the extent that they have profited by the money they received. Indeed. without the minors asking for any positive relief from the contract. the appealed decision should be modified in the sense that Rosario Braganza 4 shall pay 1/3 of P10. parted with his money. and Rodolfo 5 and Guillermo Braganza shall pay jointly to the same creditor the total amount of P1.00 Japanese notes were equivalent to P1 of current Philippine money.] We cannot agree to above conclusion. he was 21 years old. and inasmuch as Rodolfo reached the age of majority in 1947.. The parties do not specify the exact date of Rodolfo's birth. according to Corpuz Juris Secundum. . J. (Art.000 in Philippine currency.000 of P46. (Mercado.) The Mecado case cited in the decision under review is different because the document signed therein by the minor specifically stated he was of age. p.000 i. vs. but solely in pursuance of Article 1304 of the Civil Code. In fact. they should have appraised him on their incapacity. it is but fair to hold that they had profited to the extent of the value of such money. ANTONIO C. and does not grow out of. . (Emphasis Ours. by respondent that inasmuch as this defense was interposed only in 1951.R. (27 American Jurisprudence. L-5426 May 29.333. Such being the case. TUASON. Joaquin . there is a growing sentiment in favor of limiting the scope of the application of the Mercado ruling. Their promise to pay P10. If they were really to their creditor.) [Emphasis Ours. 1340) There is testimony that the funds delivered to them by Villa Abrille were used for their support during the Japanese occupation. 1 It is argued. and mere failure of the infant to disclose his age is not sufficient. nevertheless. Sr. et al. 819.. In order to hold infant liable.e. 1949. . what with the consideration that the very minority which incapacitated from contracting should likewise exempt them from the results of misrepresentation. Accordingly. .67. respondent. which value has been authoritatively established in the so-called Ballantine Schedule: in October 1944. it does not follow as a legal proposition.) The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one who contracts with him in the belief that he is of full age must be actual not constructive. they should now 3 return P1. it was too late to invoke it because more than 4 years had elapsed after he had become emancipated upon reaching the age of majority. his wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro.33 plus 2% interest from October 1944. It is undenied. Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza could not be legally bound by their signatures in Exhibit A. then he should be contended with the consequence of his act. that was not the case. however. . here Exhibit A contained no such statement. the fraud must be actual and not constructure. When minor. It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract as to age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of decit. if the minors were guilty at all. or that the enforcement of liability for such misrepresentation as tort does not constitute an indirect of enforcing liability on the contract. since they were minors incapable of binding themselves. that in October 1944. when the complaint was filed.Exhibit A.166. petitioner. like in the instant case. 43 p. 206. 37 Phil. Guillermo and Rodolfo Braganza were minors-16 and 18 respectively. that being minors. the minor was guilty of active misrepresentation. Some authorities consider that a false representation as to age including a contract as part of the contract and accordingly hold that it cannot be the basis of an action in tort. however. it should be held that in October 1947. NAVARRO. On the basis of such datum. they readily and willingly signed the promissory note.666. is presently declared without regard of said Exhibit A. 215. in spite of the information relative to their age. they will not later on be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligation contracted by them or to have it annulled. these minors may not be entirely absolved from monetary responsibility. to repeat. However.

Clearly. from a variety of causes. and their son Joaquin Navarro. and Pilar Navarro. Rules of Court). "The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the question whether she and her deceased children perished in the same calamity.. and days later (of which there is no doubt).. Navarro. During their stay. "We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the members of the Navarro-Joaquin family met their end is as follows: first. As they came out. Jr. by first marriage. and the latter's wife. in turn was elevated to the Supreme Court for review. Joaquin Navarro. were between 23 and 25. and son Joaquin Navarro. lies in the fact that it radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin. son of Joaquin Navarro. his son. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. dashed out of the burning edifice. and Angela Joaquin. All we can decide is that no one saw her alive after her son left her aside. Judge Rafael Amparo handed down a single decision which was appealed to the Court of Appeals. (ii). The importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before Joaquin Navarro. the building was packed with refugees. in declaring that those fallen in the same battle are to be regarded as perishing in the same calamity. Jr. "Joaquin Navarro. and a friend and former neighbor. A second reason is that the law. his wife Angela Joaquin was about 67 years old. but unfortunately met Japanese Patrols. fire. Sr. and their children. The three daughters were hit and fell of the ground near the entrance. with regard to Angela Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro. Joaquin Navarro. Sr. "At the time of the masaccre. but there is not a scintilla of evidence.. who fired at the refugees. 1915. at the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City. which is identical for all of them. She might have been shot by the Japanese. presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr. to dash out to the Club.. was aged 70." The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez. Sr. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street. Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin. then the son Joaquin Navarro. but that there must be adequate proof that one was alive when the other had already died. Sr. the three daughters Pilar. trapping many people inside. All of them having been heard jointly. There being no evidence to the contrary. overcome by the fumes. Angela Conde. During the same battle. Jr. Sr.. until he died.. Simultaneously. this circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she died latter than her son. the evidence of the survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory presumption must be applied. like her daughters. Angela Joaquin. killing Joaquin Navarro. Concepcion. aged 30. the father Joaquin Navarro.. the only guide is the occasion of the deaths. and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby. from which we may infer the condition of the mother. Concepcion and Natividad. Sr. "as between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro. Francisco Lopez. or vice versa. The appellate Court's reasoning for its conclusion is thus stated: "It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be established by proof of the death of only one of the parties. whose decision.. Sr. until February 10. The main question represented in the first two courts related to the sequence of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro. It is clear that the law disregards episodic details. and the Club was set on fire. The Navarro girls. All we can glean from the evidence is that Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son left her to escape from the German Club. 2nd. his wife. It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested by the petitioner.. and the latter's wife. Jr. Angela Joaquin. Minutes later. and his daughter-in-law." .. Jr. Joaquin Navarro. Sr.. deceased. modifying that the Court of First Instance. or drowning. named Pilar. all of whom were killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese troops in Manila in February 1945. who was admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123. Adela Conde. and that the burning edified entirely collapsed minutes after the shooting of the son. the spouses Joaquin Navarro. Jr. No evidence is available on the point. and Joaquin Navarro. and that there is no proof when she died. the present petitioner who was an acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased spouses. about 30. and Natividad. when they were forced to leave the shelter be. sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club.cause the shelling tore it open. the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the building. 1945. and treats the battle as an overall cause of death in applying the presumption of survivorship. then the mother Angela Joaquin. Joaquin Navarro. Jr. We cannot say for certain. it could be said that the purpose of the presumption of survivorship would be precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties like these. and Natividad. while the other sisters. Joaquin Navarro. 69. killed by falling beams from the burning edifice. and we are thus compelled to fall back upon the statutory presumption. Pilar. direct or circumstantial. was shot and died shortly after the living the German Club in the company of his father and the witness. sec. The trial court found the deaths of this persons to have accurred in this order: 1st. and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer heaven. the stayed there about three days. while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging. but she could have died almost immediately after. who miraculously survived the holocaust. collapsed. Angela Joaquin de Navarro. They could not convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them.. especially those who were trying to escape. the testimony of the sole witness Lopez is to the effect that Joaquin Navarro. Jr. Concepcion. Jr. Jr. during the appreciable interval from the instant his son turned his back to her..Navarro. which is not disputed. and upon them the Court of Appeals opined that. other from gages. 3rd. Joaquin Navarro... Joaquin Navarro. already on fire. could not overlooked that a variety of cause of death can ( and usually do) operate in the source of combats. Pilar Navarro was two or three years older than her brother. and Antonio C. are outlined in the statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows: "On February 6. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court except that. and 4th. the German Club. Jr. some may die from wounds. Jr. The facts. Sr. together with their three daughters. Mrs. In deed. subsec. Jr. that battle for the liberation of Manila. They flied toward the St. the latter was declared to have survived his mother. must be deemed to have survived his mother. respondent. shells were exploding around. Now in this case before us. or fatally struck by splinters from the exploding shells.

. The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open for the consideration when obsolute necessity there for arises." the Supreme Court of California said: When the statue speaks of "particular circumstances from which it can be inferred" that one died before the other it means that there are circumstances from which the fact of death by one before the other may be inferred as a relation conclusion from the facts proven. sir. Jr. Jr. in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time. sir. The statue does not mean circumstances which would shown. sir. Miller. . By hypothesis. there is no specific evidence as to the time of death . are intended as a substitute for lacks and so are not to be available when there are facts. and that on the assumption that there is total lack of evidence. should. you know. section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court.A. Yes.W. 8 Cal. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between the two events. or which would tend to show. the presumption does not step in. Occasions like that. that is the shooting of Joaquin Navarro. Miller. it may be indirect. "if the matter is left to probably. Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor: Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more persons who would inherent one from the other. Q. about 40 minutes. the law may apply the law of fairness appropriate to the different legal situation that arises. xxx xxx xxx Q. Jr. Where there are facts. .Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of whether section 334(37) of Act No.vs. and the collapse of the German Club? — A. the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of evidence in civil cases. xxx xxx xxx ." Lopez testified: Q. battle or conflagration.? A. I fell down. and there are no (2) particular circumstances from when it can be inferred. pointing out that "our rule is taken from the Fourth Division of sec.) In In re Wallace's Estate. Q. and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls. Grand Lodge A. Yes. sir.. such as wreck. has repealed article 33 of the civil code of 1889." (IX Wigmore on Evidence. as their language plainly implies. I could not say exactly. Rule 123. It is the contention of the petitioner that it did not. then Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro. Yes.O. supra. then the statue of the presumption. 1940 ed. it is assumed that no evidence can be produced. You said you were also heat at that time as you leave the German Club with Joaquin Navarro. Most provisions. which was described by the trial court as "disinterested and trustworthy" and by the Court of Appeals as "entitled to credence. . As was said in Grand Lodge vs. and it is not (1) shown who died first. circumstantial. and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place. probably that one died before the Q. Possible. Q. or inferential. "the situation which it present is one in which the facts are not only unknown but unknowable. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro.W. 683. the survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and ages of the sexes. and the latter's wife?. Are there particular circumstances on record from which reasonable inference of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' testimony competent and sufficient for this purpose? For a better appreciation of this issue. be held to have died at the same time. 1936 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Since the facts are unknown and unknowable. Q. according to the following rules: xxx xxx xxx other. 28. a party seeks to prove a survivorship contrary to the statutory presumption. With particular reference to section 69 ( ii) of Rule 123. now section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. The inference of survivorship cannot rest upon mere surmise. 22. now article 43 of the New Civil Code. 96 Pac. 129. you are confused. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of fifteen minutes? — A. App. Did you fall? — A." It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing decision that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct. the persons who alleges the prior death of either must prove the allegation. When the German Club collapsed where were you? — A. Could it have been 40 minutes? — A. but not probable. We were out 15 meters away from the building but I could see what was going on. it is convenient and necessary to detail the testimony. . . Joaquin Navarro. When by circumstantial evidence alone. Sr. as the Court of Appeals said." . 220 Pac. . from which a rational conclusion can be made. Jr. which the Court of Appeals cited the applied with the respect to the deaths of the Navarro girls. speculation. . 483. We say irrelevant because our opinion is that neither of the two provisions is applicable for the reasons to be presently set forth. . known or knowable. reads: When two person perish in the same calamity. Yes. under article 33. or conjecture.

Sr. Because the Japanese had set fire to the Club and they were shooting people outside. It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro. a few minutes after we have dashed out. with his father and wife started to flee from the clubhouse. True. long enough to warrant the inference that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro Jr. Even so. the German Club. by which Mrs. and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. and Natividad. and Mr. and daughter-in-law left her. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? — A. Joaquin Navarro. in front of. were mostly refugees who had tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. That is what I think. more likely than not. namely: that Joaquin Navarro. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to have been killed by falling beams because the building was made of concrete and its collapse. Pilar. 30. And it lends credence to Mr. xxx xxx xxx Q. Jr. All these are speculative . xxx xxx xxx Q. and the latter's wife? — A. as the situation looked to her. you can not give the same positive evidence to the fact that Angela Joaquin also died? — A. sir. sir. Navarro could have been killed. the building had been set on fire trap the refugees inside. Were they lying on the ground or not? — A. according to Lopez. it must be noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around. is that what you mean? A — . she could not have kept away form protective walls. and 15 meters from. so we thought of running away rather than be roasted.Q. Angela Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes. Yes. This determination of Mrs. Jr. Yes. They were trying to escape probably. Q. and the probabilities. They were wounded? — A. xxx xxx xxx . in the sense that I did not see her actually die. xxx xxx xxx Q. Concepcion. it will be recalled. xxx xxx xxx Q. On the ground near the entrance. Joaquin Navarro. a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at. Jr. Sr. It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Now. Well. to my knowledge. sir. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin die? — A. at the same time. She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband and son from leaving the place and exposing themselves to gun fire. Jr. yes. people in the building were also killed but these. of a condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the moment her husband. which was burning. Sr. How come that these girls were shot when they were inside the building. It was not very likely that Mrs. Dreading Japanese sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her refusal to follow the only remaining living members of her family. While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out. these do not cause instantaneous death. Concepcion and Natividad Navarro. you. It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez. Joaquin Navarro. certainly not within the brief space of five seconds between her son's departure and his death. so much so that the Navarro father and son tried hard to have her come along. Angela Navarro. and Joaquin Navarro. And none of them was not except the girls. Section 69( ii) of Rule 123 does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein Q. Joaquin Navarro. Lopez' statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the head and dropped dead. and there was no necessity for the Japanese to was their ammunition except upon those who tried to leave the premises. There were many people shot because they were trying to escape. were already wounded? — A. Besides. was sudden. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club. the perils of death from staying were not so imminent. while running. the German Club. but the probabilities that she did seem very remote. son. It strongly tends to prove that. died before his mother. xxx xxx xxx Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German Club all the Navarro girls. as stated. was killed. he must have negotiated that distance in five seconds or less. Q. are against them. The Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes". died. and so died within that interval from the time he dashed out of the building. Still in the prime of life. the old lady was alive and unhurt. because most of the people who were shot by the Japanese were those who were trying to escape. can you explain that? — A. collapsed over them. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. She could have perished within those five or fewer seconds. made an attempt to escape. Mr. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give positive evidence to the fact that Pilar. when Joaquin Navarro. Yes. including Mrs. Jr. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an idea. As to fumes. besides the collapse of the building. because those Japanese soldiers were shooting the people inside especially those trying to escape. in the light of the known facts. and as far as I can remember they were among those killed.. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese a few minutes before you left the place? — A. but when the building collapsed over her I saw and I am positive and I did not see her come out of that building so I presumed she died there. Q. it was much longer than five seconds.

It is the "particular circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. "bordering on the ridiculous. Kulas Bati suddenly arrived. and hold that the distribution of the decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the decision of the trial court. involves findings of fact which can not be disturbed. Branch III. 857. 468. rec with multiple murder and double frustrated murder by the Matalam Chief of Police.). citing Wilkinson vs. "according to probabilities. Findings grounded entirely on speculations. 80 N. 1969. to which he consented. 29. and Bonifacio Bautista [later amended to Bonifacio Tirol p. and Julian Casian He asked them what they came for. resulting in the death of his wife. who were afl armed with bladed weapons and firearms. For the death of Kosains wife and his six children. Ruperto Diosma Pablo Diosma Lorenzo Canio Durico Sugang Teofilo Baldesco. The particular circumstances from which the parties and the Court of Appeals drew conclusions are. They were Beatingco. as above seen. while Kosain Manibpol was sleeping with his family in their house at Kabalangasan Matalam. L-30538 January 31. In the evening of December 4. but that the bird might have died in consequence of the fright. dated March 31. Kadidia Kalangtongan and his six children. It can not be defeated as in an instance. Julian Casiag Nick Bunque a certain Miestizo Sofring Romualdo. 4 T. PER CURIAM: Review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato.Y. and these were: Nicolas Bate. only Ciriaco Baldesco and Bonifacio Tirol were apprehended. After he gave his consent. No.) It is said that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which the appellant impugns. The point is not. We are constrained to reverse the decision under review. The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence refers to decisions supported by substantial evidence. is the existence of the primary fact if certain secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by. How likely.) As the California courts have said. his wife and his seven children. Undang Kosain who was about six years old. citing Tortora vs. he saw two persons outside their house who had already come up. By substantial evidence is meant real evidence or at least evidence about which reasonable men may disagree. the rest of his assailant's companions. drawing an inference that the main fact in issue existed from collateral facts not directly proving.Y. Vol. numbering more than ten. which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look into. 3. namely. This result precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs.Y." says one author. in Criminal Case No. its existence. but rational. Daduman Malaguianon Locaydal Pinangcong. or conjectures come within the exception to the general rule. "Undisputed evidence is one thing.S. the opposite theory — that the mother outlived her son — is deduced from established facts which.. 63. and which has been discussed. while the rest remain at large. in our judgment. They were able to run to the houses of their neighbors. The vital question in such cases is the cogency of the proof afforded by the secondary facts. 44. The following facts appear uncontroverted. not of fact. fourteen (14) persons were charged (p. vs. or where a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts. When he got up to investigate. Sec. or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom. Ciriaco Baldesco. 4 N. surmises. and they answered that they wanted to borrow part of his land." (1 Moore on Facts. 1965.R. 622. imposing on Bonifacio Tirol and Ciriaco Baldesco the death penalty for each of the seven (7) murders and an indeterminate sentence for each of the two (2) frustrated murders. which civil cases are decided. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of her son. Hart vs. 3rd Ed. but strongly tending to prove." (In re Wallace's Estate. survived although wounded. Hudson River Bridge Co." That conclusion was not airtight. and were later brought to the municipal building where they reported to the police and were given medical attention. Payne. but if may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact. R. Beatingco Junior. speculations. undisputed. 11.) The same author tells us of a case where "a jury was justified in drawing the inference that the person who was caught firing a shot at an animal trespassing on his land was the person who fired a shot about an hour before at the same animal also trespassing. In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is based purely on surmises. 596. 427. engender the inference as a very strong probability. well considered. this inference ought to prevail. 856. Without costs. for "inference is never certainty. An incredible witness does not cease to be such because he is not impeached or contradicted. flashed his flashlight on his face and boxed him.E. In fact. As was said in 1 Moran Commentaries on the Rules of ?Court. 2nd. where in an action on the game laws it was suggested that the gun with which the defendant fired was not charged with shot. II. Jr. the correctness or incorrectness of those conclusions raises a question of law. the circumstances in the illustration leave greater room for another possibility than do the facts of the case at hand.) "Juries must often reason. according to experience. and contradicted evidence is another. record of the fourteen. he was awakened by the barking of their dogs. BONIFACIO TIROL and CIRIACO BALDESCO. State of New York. 1981 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES." The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory presumption is to be invoked is a question of law. it is enough that "the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of evidence in civil cases. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt. and this being the case. . G. supra. But when the evidence is purely documentary. plaintiff-appellee. Cotabato. also came and hacked or boloed him. 199 N. When he fell to the floor. defendants-appellants. 360. Vol. as well as for the wounding of himself and his daughter Undang." (In re Bohenko's Estate. Baingkong and Abdul Rakman all surnamed Kusain He and one of his daughters. 269 N. the authenticity of which is not questioned and the only issue is the construction to be placed thereon. the question is one of law which may be reviewed by the Supreme Court. cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon.provided be certain. weighed by common experience.

1965. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.. Teofilo Baldesco. Matalam. When he asked why they were there. Among their more than ten assailants. Contrary to law. rec. which appear to have scars of stiches. so he stated that it may be Bautista. He later fled to the house of Angcogan who ran away because of fear. to which he consented. Sopring immediately hacked him. at the back of his right wrist and on his forehead. after her mother. Her elder sisters were hacked by Baldesco. Province of Cotabato. He actually saw Ciriaco Baldesco hacking his wife with a bolo. Bonifacio Bautista and Bonifacio Tirol are one and the same person. Kosain testified that when he was investigated by the police.s. entered his house in Kabalangasan Matalam. armed with bladed weapons and firearms did then and there wilfully. rec. Vol. On cross-examination. Kosain Manibpol 33 years old. II. sustained mortal wounds which directly caused their death and Kosain Manibpol and Undang Kosain sustained serious wounds which ordinarily would have caused their death. and the "bungi" harelipped Bonifacio Tirol hacking his eldest daughter. n Vol. she knows only three. Cotabato. namely. more than ten (10) persons. corroborated the testimony of her father. She herself was hacked at her back by Kulas Bati She showed in court her scar at the back of her left shoulder going diagonally to the spinal column and measuring about 6 inches long and 3/4 of an inch wide. namely Ciriaco Baldesco and the "bungi" Bonifacio Tirol She Identified them by touching the shoulders of Baldesco and Tirol (p. 1966. Afterwards. on December 4. but she was also hacked and hit at the abdomen. rec. Julian Casiag Nick Bunque Miestizo Sopring Romualdo and Bonifacio Bautista who are still at large." She did not see who hacked her mother. pp.). Suddenly. Cotabato. t. Ruperto Diosma Florencio Cafio Dorico whose family name he forgot. resident of Kabalangasan Matalam. Cotabato.). On questioning by the court.n. the acting Provincial Fiscal of Cotabato filed the following information (p. in Kobalangasan Barrio Lampayan. he was not sure of the surname of accused Bonifacio. the rest of the armed men came and hacked or boloed not only him but also Ws wife and seven children. attack. Vol. Vol. Undang declared that she had three older sisters. but he survived because he was able to run to the house of a neighbor named Angcogan (t. 29. Kulas Bate arrived. Beatingco Junior and Julian Casian came ahead.. Her younger sisters were Inangkong (Penangkong) and Bayangkong (Benangkong). were Bonifacio Tirol. but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused. He further declared that after he had fallen down as a result of the blow by Kulas Bate. rec. Undang Kosain about 6 years old. a certain mestizo and Sopring Romualdo. t s. after the second stage of prehn iinary investigation was waived by accused Ciriaco Baldesco and Bonifacio Tirol.) against the two: INFORMATION The undersigned Acting Provincial Fiscal accuses Bonifacio Tirol and Ciriaco Baldisco of the crime of multiple murder with double frustrated murder. because his assailants must have thought him dead. but she saw "bungi" hack his younger brother and sister.). immediately after he got up from his sleep to check what was causing the barking of their dogs which awakened him. that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Kosain Manibpol and Undang Kosain which prevented their death. 65. t. It was after he fell that he was able to observe the stabbing and slashing of his family. 10-24.s. conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another. His wife and six of his children died as a result of the sudden attack. the two answered that they wanted to borrow his land. the said accused. especially Articles 248 and 6 of the Revised Penal Code. widower and resident of Kabalangasan Matalam. When he fell to the floor. His eldest daughter. 1-10. committed as follows: That on or about December 4. in company with Nicolas Bate. The only other witness presented by the prosecution was the municipal health officer who issued the death certificates of the deceased and the medical certificate of Kosain. Kosain Manibpol and his daughter Undang Kosain to prove the guilt of the accused. unlawfully and feloniously. When he was attacked he was not able to shout for help because he was caught unaware. sisters and brother had been killed by more than ten armed men who entered their house and attacked their family.. Her elder sisters were Danonang (Daduman). but returned afterwards with companions and went to their house to verify what happened (pp. 1965. Ciriaco Baldesco and another person whom she remembers only as "bungi" (harelipped). all armed. He himself was wounded at the outer part of his right arm. Maguianon (Malaguianan) and Lakaida (Locayda). declared on direct examination that at about 8:00 P. and her younger brother was Abdul Rakman They all died when more than ten men went inside their house wle they were lying down on . Kosain Manibpol that she and her father are the only two in the family now.On February 17. Two persons. III. He learned later that the surname was Tirol He admitted that he was confused when he stated earlier that he had known Bonifacio Bautista for one year and Bonifacio Tirol for two years. flashed his flashlight on his face and boxed him. She remembers Tirol distinctly because of his appearance as "bungi.n. Ciriaco Baldesco. she went to the house of a neighbor named Antalig. Kosain testified that on the night of December 4. Philippines. with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kilt taking advantage of the cover of the night. rec.n. At this stage he interchanged the assailants of his wife and children by saying that Bonifacio Tirol hacked his wife and Ciriaco Baldesco hacked his eldest child (p. Beatingco Junior. III. Danonan (Daduman) was the one who pleaded with their assailants not to hack them as they had no fault. In answer to the court's questions. III. thus performing all acts of execution which should have produced the crime of double murder as a consequence thereof. 37.). Of the three she knows only two were in court. Among the assailants he recognized aside from the three above-named. III. He had known Bonifacio Tirol for two years before the incident and Ciriaco Baldesco for a longer period. stab and shoot Kadidia Kalangtogan Duaduman Kosain Malaguianon Kosain Locayda Kosain Penangcong Ko Biacong Kosain and Abdul Rakman Kosain who as a result thereof. Kulas Bati. Vol.s. and his chest was badly beaten. two younger sisters and one younger brother. The prosecution relied mainly on the testimonies of the two survivors. Ruperto Diosma Pablo Diosma Lorenzo Canio Durico Sugang Teofilo Baldesco. 1965 he slept with a petroleum fight burning in their house as in fact they always slept with their house righted because their youngest child would cry if there was no light.M.

M. Cotabato..n. Before the night of the hacking incident. aside from the fact that it was bright because of the round moon. 1965. There was light inside their house at that time. He did not wake up till the following morning (t.. Her younger brother was hacked by Bonifacio Tirol Their house was lighted at that time. III. 1965. . Vol. 6-28. seeking employment as a laborer in the logging firm of Felipe Tan. Vol. married. rec.. who declared that he took his supper with the latter at his house at about 6:00 P. She has not seen Ciriaco Baldesco before (t. He took his supper at 6:00 P.000. 1965. His wife Nicolasa Tirol. Abdul Kalatogan Kosain [also written in the transcript as Abdul Rakman Kadidia Kalantongan Malaguianon Kosain Locayda Kosain [also written Lokaidal Pinangkong Kosain [also written Maningdongi and Binangkong and of the crime of Frustrated Murder of Kosain Manibpol [also written as Kusain Manedpoll and Undang Kosain and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the supreme penalty of death for each of the seven murders of the seven deceased. 1969. rec. 115-117. pp. where he found his family. of the crime of murder of seven (.) dated March 31. and the Police Department of Matalam..). from December 2 to 7. and sister took supper in their house after 6. and pay the costs. In order to go to Salat froni Kabalangasan one has to take a ride on a truck (t. III.000. the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE. likewise corroborated Baldesco's testimony that family. guilty beyond reasonable doubt. (t. likewise corroborated Tirol's testimony that he was in Salat from December 2 to 7. 31 years old. III. Kidapawan. pp. or FORTYTWO THOUSAND PESOS (P42. She does not know of any trouble between Ciriaco Baldesco or Bonifacio Tirol and her father (t. the trial court rendered its decision (pp. They went to sleep at 9:00 P. 48 years old. She sometimes went with them to school. To bolster his alibi.).). In Malamaing they stayed in the house of a Cebuano named Kulas.the mat.s. rec.M.s. and Ciriaco Baldesco hacking his younger brother.). rec.00) for each of the seven deceased. rec.00) in all.. The other men were also armed with boloes. but she saw Bonifacio Tirol hacking her three elder sisters. III.. he went home at about 6:00 P. because of the massacre of the fimily of Kosain He went to Malamaing another barrio of Matalam. Vol. a part of Kabacan Cotabato. Besides. The accused Baldesco and Tirol were dressed in white and dark clothes. Her two other elder sisters were likewise hacked by Baldesco at the abdomen. A friend from the logging company. 131-142.. 125. He declared that he was in Salat. Cotabato. Vol.s. Vol.. 1965 while he was looking for a job in Salat. of the logging firm until December 6.. They never went back to Kabalangasan because they were afraid that Kosains family might take revenge on them (t. married and residing at Kabalangasan Matalam. he went to sleep (t. The defense of both accused is alibi.). they each should be credited one-half (1/2) of their preventive imprisonment in the cases of two frustrated murders. and listened to the radio up to 9:00 P. and to an imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS for each of the two Frustra Murders of the two wounded persons and to indenuiify jointly and severally the heirs of each of the seven deceased with the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6. so that they may exert efforts to apprehend the other culprits who committed the crimes herein dealt with. Cotabato. housekeeper and residing at Lampayan.M. on December 4. 145-151. Thereafter.n. pp. The penalty herein imposed for each of the seven murders being the maximum — death — the records of this case are hereby automatically elevated to the Supreme Court.).. The said accused stayed with him in the camp he is occupying while he was at Salat for seven (7) days. III. After trial. Vol. 1965.n. he stayed in the camp where his friend Rufino Duan was staying. Felipe Tan. Let copy of this Judgment be furnished the Philippine Constabulary and the NBI at Cotabato City. and so he was able to return to Kabalangasan only on December 7. He did not see the manager. He left Kabalangasan at 10:00 A. fifty-fifty. On cross-examination. confirmed Tirol's absence from Matalam from December 2 to 7. mother.130. Then he went to sleep at 7:00 P. single and residing at Paco.).s. pp. rec. 1965.n.M. They used kalsido or bolo. It appearing that the accused have been detained. Rufino Duan 23 years old. Matalam. Teofista Baldesco.00 P. it was moonlight night.s. namely: Daduman Klantongan Kosain [also written in the transcript of steno-type notes as Danonan and Dananong Baingkong Kosain [also written in the transcript as Bai Ingkong]. pp. testifying on his own behalf. Undang testified that she used to see Ciriaco Baldesco at their store where her family buys things. rec. and neither of them disputed the facts established by the prosecution except to deny involvement in the crimes alluded to them..n. she used to see Bonifacio Tirol passing by their house in going to the house of Kulas Bati which is near their house. 96-112. looking for work. She also stated that she evacuated her family because she was warned that the family of Kosain might take revenge on them (t. Bonifacio Tirol and Ciriaco Baldesco.M. She did not see who hacked their father. and one of them. Vol. A daughter of Baldesco. Kidapawan.M.M. The color of the dark clothes was black. III. Her oldest sister was hacked by Baldesco at the abdomen.). Accused Ciriaco Baldesco. rec.M. Vol.n. Cotabato. III. When he returned to Kabalangasan his family had already evacuated out of fear for revenge. single. Kulas Bati was with a firearm.s. 1965. PP79-85. 1 18122. Accused Bonifacio Tirol.. pp. likewise testified on his own behalf.. Cotabato.s. 69-75.n.n. Ill. Baldesco presented Demetrio Riparip 25 years old. I. took a motorboat and arrived in Salat at 5:00 P. consisting of her father. 30 years old and residing at Paco.7) persons. declared that on December 4.M. brother. 21 years old. the court hereby finds the herein accused. a former teacher at Kabalangasan Elementary School and boarder in the house of Baldesco. after pasturing his carabao. Vol.s. Cotabato. married and residing at Kabalangasan Matalam.M. The house of Baldesco is near the schools of her elder sisters. then listened to the radio up to 9:00 P. While in Salat. pp. rec.

570. for it is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused (People vs. The credibility of these two prosecution witnesses was never successfully assailed. specially with a grave offense that could bring death by execution on the culprit" (People vs. in relation to Exhibits "I" and "2".). the scene of the crime. People vs. about the length of time he had had known one of the two persons who first came up to his residence on the pretext of borrowing his lot — pp. Vol. Sendaydiego (81 SCRA 124.). 1965 to the following day — is only about one kilometer from the house of the victims. without personally examining the bodies of the victims. 192. FOURTH ASSIGNED ERROR: The evidence failed to establish conspiracy among the accused. Castafieda. III. Appellants would likewise have the Court give credence to their defense of alibi.SO ORDERED. We resolved to dismiss this case insofar as the criminal liability of the said appellant is concerned. "Alibi is unavailing once the accused is positively Identified by one without motive to charge falsely said accused. The weakness of appellant Baldesco's defense lies in the fact that his house where he purportedly stayed from 6:00 P. According to him. I. that he was not in his house when the incident occurred but in another town looking for a job in . 1978. 92 SCRA 433). 1965. appellant Baldesco died in the New Bilibid Prison Hospital (p. 1977. rec. alleging that they have presented convincingly strong evidence showing that they were not at the scene of the crime on December 4. The two survivors. rec. On appeal. I. WE find no error in the admission of said exhibits "as part of the testimony of the witnesses" (p. 1965 and participated in the hacking and boloing of their family. 116. however. 5 & 17. it would be unnatural if the witnesses who were themselves victims of the horrible deed were not confused during that terrifying massacre committed together by more than ten persons (p. which is easy to concoct.. As noted by the trial court. this appeal will bd resolved insofar as Baldesco is concerned only for the purpose of determining his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate may be liable. Estante. Vol. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that the victims died because of stab wounds inflicted by the armed men who entered their residence on the night of December 4.) so that on January 28. pp. but whose findings therein were based upon the sketch prepared by the police. Kosain and his 6-year old daughter positively Identified both accused as two of the more than ten persons who entered their house on December 4. as to who among the armed men hacked or attacked which victim is likewise insufficient to destroy their credibility. to the point of being trite that the defense of alibi. I. 98. Cortez. it still does not belie the fact that he could easily go there if he wanted to. Vol. FIFTH ASSIGNED ERROR: The decision is contrary to law. 93 SCRA 58. 95. III. Vol. 69. Angeles. rec. The fact of death of the victims is not in issue. 57 SCRA 208). The rule is well settled.).. of December 4. 1965 remain uncontroverted. What is important is the positive Identification of the two accused appellants as having been in that group and who participated in the concerted attack on the hapless victims. contend in their joint brief: FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR: The lower court erred in admitting in the death certificates issued by the doctor who did not personally view and examine the victims. Appellants would like the court to reject the death certificates of the victims on the ground that they are hearsay evidence. Vol. Vol. which do not affect his credibility. 92 SCRA 122). SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR: The lower court erred in disregarding the testimony of both accused despite the convincingly strong evidence showing that they were not at the scene of the crime on 4 December 1965. (p. Moreover. And although Baldesco himself testified that the victims' house is more than three (3) kilometers from his.e. and therefore their nonparticipation in the crime charged. 93 SCRA 566. rec.) During the pendency of this appeal. II. Their death certificates therefore are only corroborative of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. So also is the house of Tirol located in the same barrio. He wants to impress upon this Court. 27. III. since the doctor who issued them did so on the strength of the sketch furnished by the police. rec. or on October 23.). Vol. I and p. considering that both residences are within the same barrio of Kabalangasan. 134). That death came to the deceased by foul means is a moral and legal certainty. Accused Tirol was even more distinctly and positively recognized as the "bungi" harelipped who hacked some of the victims. rec. his house is about 11/2 kilometers from that of the victim. the alibi of both appellants cannot prevail over the positive Identification of the prosecution witnesses Identifying and pointing to the accused as among the group of armed men which massacred the victims (People vs. considering that the presence of a number of armed men simultaneously participating in the unlawful aggression could really be confusing. Teofista Baldesco (p. The inconsistencies attributed to Kosain Manibpol refer to minor details (i. Tabion. rec. accused Baldesco and Tirol. according to his own daughter and witness.M. Following the doctrine in People vs. 15-16. THIRD ASSIGNED ERROR: The lower court erred in not granting new trial even as the complaining witness himself made a voluntary extra-judicial admission by means of a sworn statement (affidavit) that he merely involved accused Baldesco for a consideration. must be received with utmost caution. Vol. This contention is devoid of merit. The apparent inconsistency in his testimony as well as that of 6-year old Undang Kosain whose credibility was never questioned. 9. People vs.

and went to sleep afterwards. t. rec. to 10:00 A. The third assigned error is likewise bereft of merit. Of course. 116. 92-94. but it was too late to tell the court because the case was already submitted for decision. referring to a sworn statement (p. 1967 to persuade him to give a carabao to Kosain but Codoy refused. on the other hand. 63 SCRA 421). had confided to him that he was only interested in commercializing or making money out of his case. The testimony of Duan that he saw Bonifacio of the 4th in the evening cannot be believed because of his interest and its improbability. Counsel for appellants contends that the trial court erred in not granting a new trial even as the complaining witness himself made a voluntary extrajudicial admission by means of sworn statement (affidavit) that he merely involved accused Baldesco for a consideration. Vol.. But even granting that the said motion were filed on time. Bocar. mother. rec. he said. The ground relied on is an alleged newly-discovered evidence. II. the affiant declared that he was shocked to learn that the accused were sentenced to death. April 30. by testifying that from his house in Kabalangasan to the log pond where he took the speedboat. and went home to Kabalangasan by banca. and that it was a common knowledge in their barrio that Baldesco was not among the band that killed Kosains family. 398). that Kosain Manibpol also personally demanded from Codoy one carabao so that he Will not testify against Baldesco. G. the testimonies of his witnesses do not at all bolster his alibi. The trial court rejected the motion for new trial on the -round that it was filed out of time (p. Cotabato. rec. if that were so. rec.M. However.R. L-30912.a logging company.1980. fixing the time from his home to Salat at 10 hours. Baldesco's daughter. Vol. 2425. As enunciated in People vs. but Bonifacio Tirol declared that he started at Kabalangasan by motorboat at 10:00 A. Vol. rec. that he (affiant) even went with Kosain to see Codoy in November. Bocar. when questioned by the Court about it. supra. without mentioning the presence of Riparip in their house.39511-13.s. 1969 was granted to the lower court within which to forward the record of this case (p. xxx xxx xxx But even granting that Bonifacio really went to Salat on the 2nd to look for work. 94. grant a new trial.M. L. or 6 hours. which is why he implicated the accused Baldesco. 90.. therefore not a work day? (pp. the -game does not merit a favorable action. Bonifacio Tirol further testified that when he went home to Kabalangasan he took a banca at Salat at 3:00 dawn and arrived in his house at Kabalangasan at 9:00 in the morning. Vol. Rule 122 of the Rules of Court requires that in all cases in which the death penalty is impo the records should be forwarded to this Court within twenty (20) days but not less than fifteen (15) days from rendition of judgment. and not to lengthen the minimum period within which trial courts may modify or alter their decision. His witness Rufino Duan testified that from Kabalangasan where Bonifacio Tirol lived to Salat where Bonifacio was supposed to be on December 4. Vol. Vol. and the paddled banca in going to Kabalangasan was going downstream. In the said affidavit. or seven hours only. 1969 by a certain Romualdo Diosma barrio captain of barrio Lampayan. people would take a truck ride of the PTC but Bonifacio Tirol declared that he went to Salat by speedboat. the reason for the 15-day minimum requirement is such that within that period. 97 Phil. Teofista. it must be shown that the place where the accused was alleged to when the offense was committed must be located at such a distance that it is well nigh impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime (People vs. and did not wake up until the next morning (p.). on December 4. He testified he did not know where the log pond was located.) or twenty-eight days after rendition of the judgment on March 31. III.s. People vs.n. in the cross-examination. . and may be shortened or extended (People vs. Vol. Vol. April 28. People vs. 109.n. the trial court may on its own motion with the consent of the defendant. or even set it aside altogether and acquit the accused.M. mother. and arrived at Salat at 5:00 P. Said the trial court: The alibi of Bonifacio Tirol is unbelievable. brother and sister up to 9:00 P. the extension of period is for the purpose of enabling the lower court to comply with the mandatory requirement of elevating the records for review. As to appellant Baldesco. Even.) executed on April 17.M. In the case at bar.. or for 3 hours. 1969 (p. was willing to tell the truth regarding the non-involvement and nonparticipation of Baldesco in the crime charged. 1980. He modified this afterwards. with her father. Demetrio Riparip stated that he took supper with Baldesco at 6:00 P. 1965. Mercado. that was the first time he went there. Section 9. These testimonies do not rule out the possibility that he could have left the house that same evening while the rest of his family were sound asleep and returned late that night or early the following morning. a son-inlaw of Baldesco. then she listended to the radio with her father. No. Within that period the trial court may modify its judgment by reducing the penalty or fine.M. testified that she took supper at 6:00 P.). the difference cannot be three or four hours. It is a well-settled doctrine that for alibi to be acceptable. the motion for new trial was filed on April 28. there was no physical impossibility for him to be in Kabalangasan on the evening of the 4th which was a Saturday. III. that Kosain Manibpol had persuaded him to convince Feliciano Codoy. after which he slept at 7:00 P. brother and sister (p. Matalam. t. When asked by the Court why the difference in the period of time of travel he reasoned out that the motorboat in going to Salat was going upstream. 1965. He changed the time of arrival to 10:00 A. II. et al.). Although a 15-day extension from April 21. How he located a long pond at a place he did not know is certainly beyond belief. rec. 30.). to give him Kosain one carabao so that he wili drop the case. II. rec.).M. but that was a long time ago. 97. and that Kosain realizing the wrong he had done. Why should Bonifacio wait for the manager on a Saturday evening when the next day was a Sunday. that Kosain Manibpol the principal witness. But this testimony about the log pond cannot be believed.1969 (pp. dela Cruz. Malibay.M.M. Rufino told him where to pass. The trial court correctly rejected this theory because of the inconsistencies noted in Tirol's evidence. Duan testified that Salat is very far from Kabalangasan because it takes one day to reach it from there. This 20-day period is not rigid or absolute nor jurisdictional. that extension did not affect the 15-day period for filing a motion for new trial.M. I.). he had to walk from 6:00 A. II rec.. I.

otherwise. corroborative or impeaching. as was allegedly "public knowledge in our barrio. Cabiling. conspiracy may be inferred although no actual meeting between them to conspire is proved. rec. fear of reprisal or retaliation could only haunt one who is aware of his wrong doing (p. The civil liability of both appellants for each of the seven victims of the seven murders is hereby raised to P12. only his civil liability remains to be determined which can be recovered from his estate. the crime having been committed in the dwelling place of the victims who had not given any provocation. . 141-142. The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was not proven. for the prosecution need not establish that all the parties thereto agreed to every detail in the execution of the crime or that they were actually together at all stages of the conspiracy" (see also People vs. Vol. In the rase of People vs. The purported extrajudicial admission is a last-minute concoction. Since the penal liability of appellant Ciriaco Baldesco had been extinguished by his death on October 23. For how could he have offered not to testify against Baldesco if the trial was already concluded? Codoy should have been presented as a defense witness if such was the fact. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed. Thus. 70 SCRA 258].000. employing means to weaken the defense. together with some other barrio residents who had knowledge. (p. Treachery has absorbed the circumstance of nighttime. it has been clearly established that the appellants and their cohorts acted in unison when they went up the house of Kosain Manibpol and attacked their victims in a manner showing singleness of purpose — the massacre of the entire family of Kosain The fact that two survived is of no moment. The civil liability arising from the crime of 2 or more accused is solidary.00) PESOS FOR EACH OF THE SEVEN MURDER VICTIMS. if admitted [Jose vs. indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiments.This so-called "extra-judicial admission. WHEREFORE APPELLANTS BONIFACIO TIROL AND CIRIACO BALDESCO ARE HEREBY SENTENCED TO (1) INDEMNIFY JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY KOSAIN MANIBPOL AND UNDANG KOSAIN AS THE ONLY SURVIVING HEIRS OF THE SEVEN MURDER VICTIMS IN THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND (P12. Considering that there is no mitigating circumstance. 26. 330). the trial court did not err in imposing the maximum penalty provided for in Article 248.000. THE JUDGMENT IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS.). In addition. Well-settled is the rule that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newlydiscovered evidence. hence it may not be appreciated. Madai Santalani (93 SCRA 316. The intention to kill all of them was most patent. As the trial court pointed out. not merely cumulative. for the reason that the members of his family were afraid of some vendetta because of the massacre of Ko Manibpols family (pp. I. Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. taking advantage of superior strength.e. rec. The very affidavit of Diosma indicates that the so-called extra-judicial admission of Kosain was already available during the trial. were in fact connected and cooperative. and (d) it must be to the merits as ought to produce a different result. The trial court had taken judicial notice of the escape of accused Baldesco from police custody on December 15.00) PESOS AND UNDANG KOSAIN ALSO IN THE SUM OF EIGHT THOUSAND (P8. II. it must be shown that: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial.000." that Baldesco was not involved in the crime. SO ORDERED.000. Vol. There was treachery because the accused and their companions made a deliberate surprise attack on the victims. 27. since by its very nature it is planned in utmost secrecy (People vs. 1965. (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence. by their acts. II. AND (2) INDEMNIFY JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY KOSAIN MANIBPOL IN THE SUM OF EIGHT THOUSAND (P8. and his subsequent re-arrest while en route to Davao (p. though apparently independent. qualified by treachery. rec. he left his house and never returned. 1977. and that the crime was committed by a band. need not be considered separately. The trial court noted that this fear was entertained even before the chief of police could ffle a complaint and before a warrant of arrest could be issued. They perpetrated the killings in such a manner that there was no risk to themselves. direct proof is not essential to show it. In this case under review. 74 SCRA 285). Appellants also point out as error that the evidence failed to establish conspiracy. II. the fifth assigned error. 25 SCRA 760). there are more incriminating evidence that emanate from the appellants themselves. accused Tirol himself had testified that after coming from Salat. rec. at the accomplishment of some unlawful object each doing a part so that their acts. Vol.00 and their civil liability for each of the two victims of the two frustrated murders is hereby increased to P8.).. The aggravating circumstance of dwelling. CA. The prosecution evidence has clearly established the guilt of the accused appellants. (c) the evidence is material. THUS MODIFIED. Vol. These actuations could only indicate a sense of guilt. that the decision is contrary to law." referring to Diosmas sworn statement is not the kind of newly-discovered evidence contemplated in Section 2. While it has been held that conspiracy must be established by positive evidence. 28. i.).00) PESOS AS THE TWO VICTIMS OF THE TWO FRUSTRATED MURDERS. We held: "Conspiracy implies concert of design and not participation in every detail of the execution.00. and of two frustrated murders. likewise can be appreciated. On the other hand.000.). he would not have demanded from Feliciano Codoy personally one carabao so that he will not testify against accused Baldesco. Peralta. The trial court did not err in finding the accused guilty of murder of seven (7) persons.

Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. Furthermore. she noted that: When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte. No. 8: RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months. 1995. Leyte. KAPUNAN. 1995 deadline. therefore. seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District. He also filed a bill. filed a "Petition for 5 Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). In said Answer. peaceful. orderly. 1995. 1995." In an accompanying affidavit. and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately 2 preceding the election. 8 of the amended 8 certificate. Dealing with two primary issues. the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy. along with other Leyte Congressmen. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District. Consequently. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same day.G." Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 4 8. respondents. petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros.R. However. 1995 IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS. petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court. Tolosa. petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot. On the same day. namely. 1995." The mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the 3 latter. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations 6 made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. private respondent contended that Mrs. 1995. petitioner. petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy. his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District. 1995. came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious. vs. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on 9 or before the March 20. 1995. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO. 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31.: A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress 1 the mischief at which it is aimed. she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City. J. to which she could have responded "since childhood. such bill did not pass the Senate. the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20. free and clean elections 12 on May 8. petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective. Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification. On March 23. Having failed on such moves. in . On April 24." On March 29. to achieve his purpose. as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest. private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo. petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest 10 misinterpretation" which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained 11 Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. an amendment should subsequently be allowed. Manila on March 31. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and 7 canceling the certificate of candidacy. the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position. to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. 3349772 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected. the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that: [T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time. from an elective office to serve that community. In his petition. 1995. 119976 September 18. and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement. the Second Division held: Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and. providing the following information in item no. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence therein. and 3) canceling her original Certificate of 14 Candidacy. by a vote 13 of 2 to 1. a component of the First District.

starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8. it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. item no. 96 Phil 294. Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa. the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive. this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. Metro Manila. or for like reasons. Leyte. To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made. although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place. This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate. she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City. From the foregoing. The Commission. In election cases. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District. Tolosa. Since on the basis of her Answer. The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election. Petition). Romualdez vs. The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy. is devoid of merit. the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation. Olot. 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. she continuously lived in Manila. the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Metro Manila." Besides. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28. she lived and resided in San Juan. In 1959. she cited the case ofAlialy v. Tolosa. of the detriment of the integrity of the election. therefore. Along this point. 1994. Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot. or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections. Thus. she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood." Thus. However. she lived in San Miguel. Manila where she was again a registered . Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City. 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. a component of the First District. Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. after her husband was elected Senator. xxx xxx xxx Anent the second issue. requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be reregistered or transferred to Brgy. her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). it is clear that respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.her memorandum. dated August 24. specially those intended to suppress. therefore. cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error. Moreover. the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan. In 1965. and based on the foregoing discussion. Tolosa. 226 SCRA 408). respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa. it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa. Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time. In fact. xxx xxx xxx Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission. Olot. But in the instant case. In respondent's case. one intends to return. This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. accurate material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer." The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. when she returned to the Philippines in 1991. RTC-Tacloban. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election. Eliseo Quirino. The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced.

The Jurisdictional Issue a) Prior to the elections . 18-A of Olot. Leyte. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality. she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City. 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of 17 Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. The Resolution tersely stated: After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration. Metro Manila. petitioner comes to this court for relief. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa. In this case." To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one year. She could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications Whether or not petitioner was a resident. II. is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Furthermore. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70. In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8. no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition 18 for disqualification. the COMELEC en 16 banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the April 24. 1995 elections.471 votes compared to the 36.833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. (2) intention to remain there. In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995. On the same day. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa. showed intention to reside in Tacloban.voter. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct. In doing so. she had been a resident of Manila. 1995. Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. Tolosa. she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood. Tolosa. what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa. one year prior the election. petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28. and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she 15 had been a resident of the district for six months only. where she spent her childhood and school days. as her place of domicile. she claimed to be a resident of San Juan. respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it. The principal issues may be classified into two general areas: I. Leyte. Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot. she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In other words there must basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. for election purposes. without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention. These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places. petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8. the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of 19 petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan. In 1978. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban. Leyte. On May 11. She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Leyte. On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation. 1995. Worse. It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood. there must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention. 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14. Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient. 1994. of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9. she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition. In the case of Romualdez vs. As a matter of fact on August 24. when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992. coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place. she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. 1995 elections. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila. including Metro Manila. however.

"and a resident thereof". However. 24 . quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. As these concepts have evolved in our election law. but he may have numerous places of residence. among others. residence is synonymous with domicile. what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is 22 established it is residence. has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction. residence. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area. community or country. held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected 28 does not constitute loss of residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode. one intends to return. for various reasons. for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position." In Ong 20 vs. If a person's intent be to remain. when absent. Faypon vs. whether permanent or temporary. b) After the Elections Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8. is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place.Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code. In Nuval vs. 1995 elections. domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi. that is. . Davide: Madame President. Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure. one has the intention of returning. we laid this distinction quite clearly: There is a difference between domicile and residence. Quirino. Guray." Larena 26 vs. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence. but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Petitioner's qualification A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. the proposed section merely provides. For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. a person can only have a single domicile. whenever absent for business or for pleasure. coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which. in its ordinary conception. Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home". "a place to which. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. it becomes his domicile. So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases. or health. and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose 21 intent. Teves reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete. I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention. it actually means only "domicile" to wit: Mr. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence? Mr. he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another 23 domicile of choice. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5. . there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. page 2. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7. I. unless. business. Republic. or the intention of returning there permanently. As it were. xxx xxx xxx Mrs. but also personal 25 presence in that place. the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence. Residence is not domicile. the interpretation given 29 to it was domicile. insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned. the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence. a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. It is thus. this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile. in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. the Court held that "the term residence. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law." Based on the foregoing. Residence. Negros 27 Oriental. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time. In Uytengsu vs.

be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper. has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI. Leyte. has his residence in the former municipality. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months. to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not. De los Reyes: Domicile. Olot. have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila. according to the Resolution. So.1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City. supra. she lived in San Miguel. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa. regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. Here is where the confusion lies. In Co vs. Sec." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban. Residence. So. Olot. in 1965. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus: 7. it bears repeating. Leyte POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Tolosa. misinform. Thus. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. . First. following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency. or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.Mr. implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession. Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district. Teves. that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. and without having lived either alone or with his family in another municipality. For instance. Ms. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution. In 1978 and thereafter. Manila where she as a voter. that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions. albeit with a different interpretation. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification. It stands to reason therefore. In Larena 33 vs. in its assailed Resolution of April 24. when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District. however. we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not 30 physical residence. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. petitioner. Leyte. it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. Then. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead. not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. the Second Division of the COMELEC. we stressed: [T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. in 1959." the COMELEC stressed. a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months? It is the fact of residence. Tolosa. In the light of the principles just discussed. stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality. many times in the past. which was "since childhood" in the space provided. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District. This honest mistake should not. Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile. Rosario Braid: Yes. Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. private respondent Montejo opposed the same. would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside? Mr. she continuously lived in Manila. We have stated. claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa. which is Tolosa. resided in San Juan. not Tacloban City. this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term 32 residence in election law. Leyte 31 8. In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte.

the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions. which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed 36 Resolution: In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old. Thereafter. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952. he may not absent himself from his professional or business activities. she married ex-President Ferdinand E. when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines. Hawaii. celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province. and 3. of course includes study in other places. Paul's College. 34 We explained that: A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures. to improve his lot. however. Moreover. In November 1991. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. From the foregoing. In 1954. minor follows the domicile of his parents. once acquired is retained until a new one is gained. one 37 must demonstrate: 1. the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence. [I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu.P. Second. it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila. Rizal where she registered as a voter. practice of his avocation. Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria. the late speaker Daniel Z. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin. where she earned her degree in Education. . she established her domicile in Tacloban. Even during her husband's presidency. still in Tacloban City. What is undeniable. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another. Manila. not her domicile." as the saying goes. she came home to Manila. To successfully effect a change of domicile.More significantly." We do not agree. it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. In 1992. instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown. Quirino. are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile. what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. First. respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan. . Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted. Metro Manila. she taught in the Leyte Chinese School. contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. When an election is to be held. or for any other reason. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959. 2. (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again. She pursued her college studies in St. she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . always with either her influence or consent. and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile. as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. and that. she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel. now Divine Word University in Tacloban. petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban. Leyte. Despite such registration. the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers. Tacloban. while petitioner was born in Manila. so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Acts which correspond with the purpose. She grew up in Tacloban. 881). This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. Private respondent in his Comment. Leyte. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban. she and her husband lived together in San Juan. in Faypon vs. As domicile. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments. it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the 35 provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B. Leyte (Tacloban City). to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. or engaging in business. In 1965. In doing so. the animus revertendi to his home. for a change of . domicile of origin is not easily lost. Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC.

" Otherwise. the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together. Los Tribunales. the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or 40 juridical. The important thing for domicile is that. In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of . stays in one of their (various) residences. In fact. we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. independent of the necessity of physical presence. domicile can exist without actually living in the place." referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual residence." Hence. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. Marcos in 1952. for professional or other reasons. A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing ( domicilium voluntarium). Both terms imply relations between a person and a place. Sometimes they are used synonymously. thus: Art. Tolentino further explains: Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty. once residence has been established in one place. recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence. and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used. for the sake of family unity. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of 39 "domicile" and "residence. 110. which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article. The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family. 109. even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle. writing on this specific area explains: In the Civil Code. fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only once. Article 110 of the Civil Code provides: Art. but in residence. such as a country residence and a city residence. As Dr. This difference could. In the case at bench. there be an intention to stay there permanently. Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment. on the other hand. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed. but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family. observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support. xxx xxx xxx Residence in the civil law is a material fact. "when the husband shall transfer his residence. If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences. In this connection. The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence. sin embargo. A person can have two or more residences. the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together. Very significantly. even if residence is also established in some other 41 place. and one cannot have two legal 38 residences at the same time. it is illogical to conclude that Art. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Residence is acquired by living in place. at other times they are distinguished from one another. Arturo Tolentino. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic." The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means. podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero. referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states: La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together. Moreover. a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.

the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. Villareal this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of 44 the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce. and render conjugal rights to. 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property." Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. in 1954. Mr. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded. . Thus in England. The decision referred to (Bahn v. the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence. In De la Vina vs. pp. she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home.. Civ. among which were San Juan. Darby. and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband. 45 In Arroyo vs. and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. The problem here is that at that time. and in Weldon v. the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment. Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos.. as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950. Rizal and Batac. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other.under the Civil Code.a common matrimonial residence. 52). revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt 43 for a new one). expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland. enforcible ( sic) by process of contempt. In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States. 1909.D. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. Marcos had several places of residence. Sir James Hannen. But assuming that Mr. It was decided many years ago. 1. and if the facts were found to warrant it. all income. to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin. so far as we can discover. as administrator of the ganancial property. in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice. is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954. and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony. She did not lose her domicile of origin. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders. In instances where the wife actually opts. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters. into the New Family Code. but could not be enforced by imprisonment. enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience. requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. not a domicilium necessarium. and in the alternative. only one court. . Ilocos Norte. rents. (113 Jur.. we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with. the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated. upon her failure to do so. our jurisprudence has recognized certain 42 situations where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or. Accordingly. President in the Probate. and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order. Weldon (9 P. decided in 1883. 36 La. and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. In a decision of January 2. 1148). where a decree of adherence. petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England. On the other hand. There is no showing which of these places Mr. that court would make a mandatory decree. for obviously practical reasons. Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice. the other. Ann. and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of 46 domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife. Without as much belaboring the point. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence. though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof. the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. Vasques de Arroyo the Court held that: Upon examination of the authorities. (21 Cyc. could be obtained by the injured spouse. to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore. an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law.

are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act. The jurisdictional issue Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24. in said case. It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time 49 is generally construed to be merely directory.A. and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a 47 home in our homeland. it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband. 1995. Cruz held that: The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency. Leyte. as it was in a state of disrepair. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences. in doing so. In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point. Moreover. having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte. without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of 52 B. In Trapp v. many established principles of law. having been previously looted by vandals. Adopting the same view held by several American 51 authorities. with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R. . returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member 53 of the House of Representatives. May 7. Leyte. . It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. 881 even after the elections.P. 17 of the Constitution. this court in Marcelino vs. while living in her brother's house." The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte. II. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives. May 11. it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B." Furthermore. the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law. petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban.P." not domicile." Thus. . petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot.Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died. including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly deserves in law. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan. This is untenable. lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. Mc Cormick. suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections. the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24. SO ORDERED. fourteen (14) days before the 48 election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. We renege on these sacred ideals. Moreover. "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would 50 have clearly indicated it. we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte. The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction. WHEREFORE. 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel. we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past. In any event. and May 25. 881. the statute under examination was construed merely to be directory. 1995 elections. As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8. Surely. even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. Moreover. it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity. it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

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