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Introduction It was June 2006 in Kalgoorlie; Mellissa Blackney was sleeping in her Nissan Skyline waiting for her mother’s return, when a rock was thrown at her car damaging the window. She awoke to find three female Aboriginal youths verbally abusing and provoking her in which at one point, one of them called her a ‘white slut’. The attack was unprovoked and Blackney was unharmed. The Aboriginal female teenager was the first at the time to face Western Australia’s newly amended racial vilification laws2. She pleaded guilty to assault and was given a 4 month intense supervision order however the racial vilification charges against her was dismissed as it was deemed not substantial enough by the Magistrate Kate Auty for her to be prosecuted.3 Such event of racial discrimination was to some people, what reached beyond the protective sphere of that which should be protected in a liberal-democratic society.
1 Nigel Lo is the Founding President of the International Magis Society. He is an Associate Director at Red Earth Human Rights Research Department and the Non-Executive Director of Nexus Blackstone Leadership Centre. He was the first Malaysian to be awarded the Long Tan Australian Defence Force Leadership Award by the Australian Department of Defence for his advocacy in social justice and leadership development.
2 Ean Higgins and Alana Buckley-Carr (June 2006) “Aboriginal girl first to face race-hate law”. The Australian at http://www.kooriweb.org/foley/news/2006/june/aust1jun06.html (Retrieved April 2013).
3 David Weber (September 2006) “WA court dismisses charges over racial insult”. ABC Local Radio Transcript found at: http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2006/s1741596.htm
Debate over the extent of free speech is one which has been of particular interest around the globe. The phenomenon of hate speech is a manifestation of such debate. “Hate speech” is any speech, gesture or conduct, writing, or display which is forbidden because it may incite violence or prejudicial action against or by a protected individual or group, or because it disparages or intimidates a protected individual or group. The law may identify a protected individual or a protected group by certain characteristics.4 The freedom of expression (notwithstanding hate speech and expression to incite propaganda and violence) is a human right that has been internationally recognized and is expressly listed in Article 19 and 20 of the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a multilateral treaty adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 16, 1966, and in force from March 23, 1976. It commits its parties to respect the civil and political rights of individuals, including the right to life, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, electoral rights and rights to due process and a fair trial.5 Yet, freedom of expression is not absolute. Both international law and most national constitutions recognise that freedom of expression may be restricted. However, any limitations must remain within strictly defined parameters. Article 19(3) of the ICCPR lays down the conditions which any restriction on freedom of expression must meet. This essay will analyse the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) pertaining to Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR standard to the respective protection standard under Australian law.
4Terry Kinney (2008). "Hate Speech and Ethnophaulisms". The International Encyclopaedia of Communication. Blackwell Reference Online, Retrieved 15 April 2013.
5 UN Treaty Collection: “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights". United Nations. Retrieved 15 April 2013
PART 1(A): Understanding and Interpreting Article 19 of the ICCPR There have been several cases since 2003 that were brought forward to the Human Rights Committee (HRC) in regards to the violation of s19 of the ICCPR. Section 196 of the ICCPR expressly states that: 1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order or of public health or morals. Article 19 of the Covenant protects a broad area of expression, especially in political debate, and limits on this expression should be tightly construed in order to avoid chilling legitimate expression.7 The freedom of expression is the essence of such societies that its citizens must be allowed to inform themselves about alternatives to the political system/parties in power, and that they may criticise or openly and publicly evaluate their Governments without fear of
6 International Covenant of Political and Civil Rights, Article 19.
7 Oberschlik v Austria (No. 2). 20834/1992
interference or punishment".8 In the case of Zeljko Bodrozic v. Serbia and Montenegro9, the Human Rights Committee correctly found a violation of Mr Bodrovic’s right to freedom of expression. Mr Bodrovic had published an article insulting a leader of the former Socialist Party of Serbia. The state Party had convicted him of criminal insult and he was ordered to pay a substantial fee. His allegations and insults were based on true facts and hence were not considered to be slander. Article 19(3) of the ICCPR gives exceptions to the freedom of expression which places a limitation against defamation. The tort of defamation points out that in order for a statement to be one of slander, the allegations must be false10. In this case, Mr Bodrovic’s publication of the Socialist leader contained established facts and the HRC was correct to declare a violation of Article 19 of the ICCPR.
The Obstacles Brought By Article 2 of the First Optional Protocol One of the considerations that the Human Rights Committee must sought to analyse when determining if there has been a violation of an individual civil right is the First Optional Protocol (1-OP). The 1-OP contains 14 articles that assist the HRC in determining whether there is a violation of a right under the ICCPR for each individual complaint. One obstacle that individuals face when bringing forth a complaint is Article 2 of the 1-OP which expressly states that “subject to the provisions of article 1, individuals who claim that any of their rights enumerated in the Covenant have been violated and who have exhausted all available
8 Aduayom et al. v Togo Case Nos. 422-424/1990
9 Zeljko Bodrozic v. Serbia and Montenegro Case No: 1180/2003
10 The Manila Times (30 January 2012) Libel law violates freedom of expression – UN rights panel.
domestic remedies may submit a written communication to the Committee for consideration”. The HRC must look at each and every individual case and determine whether the author bringing forth the complaint was in the position to seek all the domestic remedies available to them before submitting a written claim.11
In the case of Titiahonjo v Cameroon, Mrs Dorothy Titiahonjo claimed a violation of Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 19, 22 and 27 of the ICCPR. Articles 19, 22 and 27 were considered inadmissible by the HRC because she had not exhausted all domestic remedies. The facts point out that Titiahonjo was subjected to physical, emotional and moral abuse at the hands of the police because of his membership to Southern Cameroon National Council ("SCNC"), which the police qualified as a "secessionist organization". There was no law against being a member of the SCNC.12 Subsequently, the ill treatment led to his death13. During that time, Mrs Titiahonjo gave birth to twins prematurely. She claimed that she did not exhaust all domestic remedies by bringing a law suit against the government because of the high costs involved.14 This argument of Mrs Titiahonjo is highly relevant and should have been given better interpretation, however the HRC remained in view that the evidence of her
11 Dorothy Kakem Titiahonjo on behalf of her husband, Mathew Titiahonjo (deceased) v. Cameroon (1186/2003).
12 Ibid, paragraph 3.5
13 Ibid, paragraph 2.7
14 Ibid, paragraph 3.6
domestic pursuit for remedies was still too insubstantial15. Fortunately, her other claims of physical abuse to her and her late husband were considered admissible under the 1-OP. The case above is an example of how Article 2 of the 1-OP may bring about inconsistencies in relation to the HRC in applying the ICCPR to an individual case. In the case of Mohamed Musa Gbondo Sama v. Germany16, the HRC declared that the matter is not sufficiently substantiated and it therefore declares this part of the communication inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. However, the decision by the committee was not unanimous. Ms Ruth Wedgwood wrote in her partially dissenting judgement17 that if it were true that a racial epithet was used in direct address by a public officer, the type of reply attributed to the author might not constitute actionable libel.
Article 19 in ensuring consistency in Article 14 (Administrative Law) The HRC have been successful in highlighting what may seem unjust in federal constitutions in violating an individual’s right to Article 19 of the ICCPR.18 Article 105(3) in the Sri Lankan constitution declares that: "The Supreme Court of the Republic of Sri Lanka and the Court of Appeal of the Republic of Sri Lanka shall each be a superior court of record and shall have all the powers of such court including the power to punish for contempt of itself,
15 Ibid, paragraph 5.4
16 Mohamed Musa Gbondo Sama v. Germany (1771/2008)
17 Ibid. See section on Individual Opinion
18 Anthony Michael Emmanuel Fernando v. Sri Lanka (1189/2003)
whether committed in the court itself or elsewhere, with imprisonment or fine or both as the court may deem fit. The power of the Court of Appeal shall include the power to punish for contempt of any other court, tribunal or institution referred to in paragraph (1) (c) of this article, whether committed in the presence of such court or elsewhere: Provided that the preceding provisions of this Article shall not prejudice or affect the rights now or hereafter vested by any law in such other court, tribunal or institution or punishment for contempt of itself."19
The Constitution of Sri Lanka in the above extract have expressly bestowed administrative power to the judges presiding a court case to take any remedial action they see fit to punish an offender who allegedly participates in a contempt of court. Such discretion afforded to judicial officers may give way to committing procedural ultra vires.20 Such is the case of Anthony Michael Emmanuel Fernando v. Sri Lanka, in which the author of the complaint was sentenced to one year of rigorous imprisonment for allegedly being in contempt of court, when the author voiced out that the same judges consolidating and considering the first 2 motions should not preside over the next21. The HRC found that it was a violation of both Article 14 and 19 of the ICCPR and the State party is under an obligation to provide the
19 The Constitution of the Republic of Sri Lanka, s 105(3)
20 Hon. Justice M. I. Edokpayi (2011) “Is it Contempt of Court or Abuse of Judicial Power?” A brief paper in honour of Hon. Justice S.M.A. Belgore.
21 Ibid 15 paragraph 2.2
author with an adequate remedy, including compensation, and to make such legislative changes as are necessary to avoid similar violations in the future.22
Freedom of Political Expression The Human Rights Committee have been vigilant in upholding the right to freedom of expression in regards to political expression. Such vigilance can be found in quite recent cases Sanjar Giyasovich Umarov v. Uzbekistan23 and Philip Afuson Njaru v. Cameroon.24
In Sanjar, the Committee, however, observes that the author Mr Umarov was one of the leaders of the Sunshine Coalition, a political opposition group that had emerged in Uzbekistan, that he was arrested during a police search of the offices of the Coalition, and that the State party has failed to explain the purpose of the above search. The Committee also observes that, according to the information submitted by the author, other leaders of the Coalition were arrested on similar charges around the same time and that a number of companies belonging to members of the Coalition were subjected to investigation by different branches of the State party's authorities immediately following the establishment of the Sunshine Coalition. The Committee further notes, that the State party has not addressed the allegation that Mr Umarov was arrested and imprisoned in order to prevent him, as a member of a political formation, from expressing his political views. The Committee considers that
22 Ibid 15 paragraph 11
23 Sanjar Giyasovich Umarov v. Uzbekistan (1449/2006)
24 Philip Afuson Njaru v. Cameroon (1353/2005)
the arrest, trial and conviction of Mr Umarov resulted in effectively preventing him from expressing his political views. Accordingly the Committee finds that the State party violated Mr Umarov's rights under article 19.
In Philip the Committee notes that under article 19, everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression. Any restriction of the freedom of expression pursuant to paragraph 3 of article 19 must cumulatively meet the following conditions: it must be provided for by law, it must address one of the aims enumerated in paragraphs 3 (a) and (b) of article 19 and it must be necessary to achieve the legitimate purpose. The Committee considers that there can be no legitimate restriction under article 19, paragraph 3, which would justify the arbitrary arrest, torture, and threats to life of the author and thus, the question of deciding which measures might meet the "necessity" test in such situations does not arise25. In the circumstances of the author's case, the Committee concludes that the author has demonstrated the relationship between the treatment against him and his activities as journalist and therefore that there has been a violation of article 1926.
PART 1(B) Understanding and Analysing Article 20 of the ICCPR The ICCPR places an obligation on States Parties to prohibit hate speech. Article 20(2) provides that: “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
25 Mukong v Cameroon (458/1991)
26 Ibid 21 paragraph 6.4
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law”. This provision employs a double-barrelled formulation, whereby what is to be prohibited is advocacy of hatred that “constitutes” incitement rather than simply incitement27. The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), the body of experts tasked with interpreting the ICCPR, has specifically stated that Article 20(2) is compatible with Article 1928.
The prohibition under paragraph 1 of Article 20 extends to all forms of propaganda threatening or resulting in an act of aggression or breach of the peace contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, while paragraph 2 is directed against any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, whether such propaganda or advocacy has aims which are internal or external to the State concerned. The provisions of article 20, paragraph 1 do not prohibit advocacy of the sovereign right of self-defence or the right of peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Charter.29
For article 20 to become fully effective there ought to be a law making it clear that propaganda and advocacy as described therein are contrary to public policy and providing for an appropriate sanction in case of violation. The Committee, therefore, believes that States
27 General Comment 11: Prohibition of propaganda for war and inciting national, racial or religious hatred (Art. 20), 29 July 1983.
29 General Comment 11(19): Prohibition of propaganda for war and inciting national, racial or religious hatred (Art.20) 29 July 1983.
parties which have not yet done so should take the measures necessary to fulfil the obligations contained in article 20, and should themselves refrain from any such propaganda or advocacy.
Many forms of “hate speech” that, although a matter of concern, do not meet the level of seriousness set out in article 20. It also takes account of the many other forms of discriminatory, derogatory and demeaning discourse.30
There may also be circumstances in which the right of a person to be free from incitement to discrimination on grounds of race, religion or national origins cannot be fully protected by a narrow, explicit law on incitement that falls precisely within the boundaries of article 20, paragraph 2.31 This is the case where, in a particular social and historical context, statements that do not meet the strict legal criteria of incitement can be shown to constitute part of a pattern of incitement against a given racial, religious or national group, or where those interested in spreading hostility and hatred adopt sophisticated forms of speech that are not punishable under the law against racial incitement, even though their effect may be as pernicious as explicit incitement, if not more so32.
The Jurisprudence of Article 20 of the ICCPR
30 General Comment No 34 on Article 19 of the ICCPR.
31 Robert Faurisson v. France (550/1993)
32Ibid. Individual Opinions by Elizabeth Evatt and David Kretzmer. Paragraph 4
The case law in relation to Article 20 is limited compared that of its counterpart Article 19. Notable cases including J.R.T. and the W.G. party v. Canada33, Malcolm Ross v. Canada34 and Maria Vassilari et al. v. Greece35will be brought into discussion here.
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has upheld section 13(1) of The Canadian Human Rights Act which states that it is a discriminatory practice for a group of persons or individuals acting to communicate telephonically to cause or expose people to hatred on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination.36
It is also considered by the HRC that publishing derogatory commentary in scholarly articles about a race is also considered to be a breach of Article 20.37 In this case, the author, who is a teacher - Mr Malcolm Ross published and appeared on the media alleging a conspiracy that the Christian faith and way of life are under attack by an international conspiracy in which the leaders of Jewry are prominent.38Mr Ross’ claims that his right to freedom of expression
33 J.R.T. and the W.G. party v. Canada (104/1981)
34 Malcolm Ross v. Canada (736/1997)
35 Maria Vassilari et al. v. Greece (1570/2007)
36 Ibid 32
37 Ibid 33
was breached were dismissed because his publications were derogatory in nature and incited hatred towards a racial group which in turn breached Article 20.
Lastly, the HRC considered and decided that it was not a breach of Article 20 for a group of citizens to rally and sign a petition in bid to remove a minority group of race (the Roma) from the township that has consistently been accused of theft, arson, battery and assault.39 The HRC without determining whether article 20 may be invoked under the Optional Protocol considered that the authors have insufficiently substantiated the facts for the purposes of admissibility. This decision was not unanimous40 and dissenting judgements were written by not one but three members of the committee. They concurred that individuals who feel they have been wronged seek logical protection that underlies the entire Covenant in hopes that the Covenant will afford protection to individuals and groups. They correctly argued that is hence necessary to consider the applicability of Article 20. Such ignorance of the legal issues in the facts would pave a way for uncertainty in this area of law to continue. PART 2(A): Freedom of Expression in the Australian Perspective
38 Ibid 33 paragraph 4.2
39 Ibid 34
40 Ibid 34. See the individual opinion of Mr Abdelfattah Amor
Australia does not have an express guarantee to the freedom of expression, with the exception of political communication.41 The High Court of Australia first recognised an implied guarantee of communication on political matters in Australian Capital Television and Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills42.
The court in Australian Capital Television decided that a right to freedom of political communication was essential to the system of representative government provided for in the Constitution. The court expressed the view that the reason why Australia does not have a bill of rights is because the framers of the Constitution believed that since Australia had a system of representative government, which gave all voters an equal share in political power, laws to protect rights were simply not necessary. To undermine the system of representative government was contrary to this trust which the people gave to the Parliaments, and was not permitted by the Constitution. Although this right is not an absolute one, it is still a right which allows for free and public political discussion.43
41 Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106
42 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1
The case Theophanous v Herald Weekly Times Ltd44 is important in tracing the development of implied freedom of political communication. It was held there was a defence against defamation through a direct right to free speech.
Similarly, the case of Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd45 related the freedom of communication defence to members of State Parliaments. In this case, Thomas Stephens and five other members of the Legislative Council of Western Australia, who were members of the Standing Committee on Government agencies, took an action in defamation against West Australian Newspapers Ltd for publishing assertions made by another member of the Council that the members had gone on an overseas trip without the knowledge of Parliament and that the trip was a "junket of mammoth proportions"46
The decisions in Theophanous and Stephens were later reversed in Lange v Australian Broad Casting Corporation47 where the High Court sought to clarify the interaction
44 Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104
45 Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 211
46 Ibid at 212-3.
47 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520
between the implied freedom of political communication and defamation laws, and the applicability of the implied freedom to state as well as commonwealth matters.
The High Court developed a two-part test in Lange: 1. Does the law effectively burden freedom of communication about government or political matters? The scope of political communication was narrowed from Theophanous, to mean matters that could affect their choice at elections, or the affairs of federal ministers and the executive.
2. If the law does burden that freedom, is the law reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end which is compatible with the maintenance of representative and responsible government?
Since Lange, there has been a clear trend towards narrowing the coverage of the freedom of political communication defence in Australia. This can be seen in Levy v State of Victoria48 where the High Court departed from an earlier majority position that the defence would generally cover discussion of State political matters. PART 2(B): The Australian Perspective in Applying Article 20 of the ICCPR. There are several express laws prohibiting racial hate such as The Racial Hatred Act 1995 (Cth). It introduced a provision into the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), which prohibits an act that is ‘reasonably likely’ to ‘offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate’ a
48 Levy v State of Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579
person or group, where the act is a public act that is done on the ground of the race, colour, or national or ethnic origin of the person.49
Clearly, the media has the capacity to engage in hate speech50. In Australia, a case arose with the finding by a NSW tribunal in December 2009 that Sydney radio personality Alan Jones had engaged in racial vilification against Lebanese Muslims.51
In a slightly recent case in 2003, Melbourne columnist Andrew Bolt was found to have breached the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 by writing two columns which “offended, insulted, humiliated and intimidated” others on the basis of their race.52 That finding fell short of a finding of racial vilification, and thus fell outside the scope of Article 20 ICCPR. Monash University’s Castan Centre of Human Rights director Sarah Joseph has
49 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), s18C
50 Jones v Toben (2002) FCA 1150
51 “Court rules Alan Jones “racially vilified” Muslim youths”, Sydney Morning Herald, 22 December 2009.
52 Herald & Weekly Times Ltd & Bolt v Popovic (2003) VSCA 161
suggested that the relevant provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act53 go too far in inhibiting freedom of expression in its prohibition of “offensive and insulting” speech.54
Quite recently, there have been reports of increased incidences of expressions of hatred on the ground of religion in Australian society. These have been included in a report by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission in 2004 into national consultations on eliminating prejudice against Arab and Muslim Australians, which reported frequent and regular vilification amongst these groups in the community.55 The Australian Human Rights Commission recently conducted an inquiry into ‘Freedom of Religion and Belief in 21st Century Australia’.56 The report of this inquiry noted a great
53 Racial Discrimination Act (1975)
54 Sarah Joseph, “Andrew Bolt, Free Speech and Racial Intolerance”, 29 September 2011 at http://castancentre.wordpress.com/2011/09/29/andrew-bolt-free-speech-and-racial-intolerance/
55 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Isma – عListen: National Consultations on Eliminating Prejudice against Arab and Muslim Australians, HREOC, Sydney, 2004, Chapter 2,esp. pp. 51-52, available http://www.hreoc.gov.au/racial_discrimination/isma/report/index.html, Retrieved 22 April 2013.
56 Gary Bouma; Desmond Cahill; Hass Dellal & Athalia Zwarta, Freedom of Religion and Belief in
the 21st Century, Australian Human Rights Commission, Sydney, March 2011, p. 32, available
http://www.humanrights.gov.au/frb/Report_2011.pdf, Retrieved 22 April 2013.
deal of concern among both secular and religious voices in Australia at the development of anti-vilification legislation on the ground of religion, believing that in the arena of religion great care needed to be taken when drafting punitive legislation.
Conclusion The Human Rights Committee have done well in implementing the core content of the ICCPR to its decisions as can be seen in the discussion above. Needless to say, there are shortcomings that clearly need to be overcome. The legal system will never be perfect and such flaws will need addressing as the jurisprudence of human rights continues to evolve. The Australian government has not comprehensively implemented the terms of the ICCPR. Australia does not have an explicit protection for freedom of speech, which would implement article 19, in either constitutional or statutory law. However, protection is afforded free speech from a common law tradition, combined with a limited and implied constitutional doctrine of freedom of political communication. All the anti-hatred provisions discussed in this essay appear to be compatible with both article 19 and these domestic mechanisms for free speech protection. Religion is only covered explicitly in some jurisdictions. Although some of the regional jurisdictions do possess criminal racial hatred provisions, the emphasis in implementation has been on the civil mechanisms.
REFERENCES Primary Sources of Research International Legislation and Case Law UN Treaty Collection: “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights". United Nations. Retrieved 15 April 2013.
International Covenant of Political and Civil Rights, Article 19.
The Constitution of the Republic of Sri Lanka, s 105(3)
Racial Discrimination Act (Cth) 1975 (Australia)
Oberschlik v Austria (20834/1992)
Aduayom et al. v Togo (422-424/1990)
Zeljko Bodrozic v Serbia and Montenegro (1180/2003)
Dorothy Kakem Titiahonjo on behalf of her husband, Mathew Titiahonjo (deceased) v Cameroon (1186/2003).
Mohamed Musa Gbondo Sama v Germany (1771/2008)
Anthony Michael Emmanuel Fernando v Sri Lanka (1189/2003)
Sanjar Giyasovich Umarov v Uzbekistan (1449/2006)
Philip Afuson Njaru v Cameroon (1353/2005)
Mukong v Cameroon (458/1991)
Robert Faurisson v France (550/1993)
R.T. and the W.G. party v Canada (104/1981)
Malcolm Ross v Canada (736/1997)
Maria Vassilari et al. v Greece (1570/2007)
Australian Case Law Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106
Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1
Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104
Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 211
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520
Levy v State of Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579
Jones v Toben (2002) FCA 1150
Herald & Weekly Times Ltd & Bolt v Popovic (2003) VSCA 161
Secondary Sources of Research (Journal Articles, Books and Commentary)
Ean Higgins and Alana Buckley-Carr (June 2006) “Aboriginal girl first to face race-hate law”. The Australian: http://www.kooriweb.org/foley/news/2006/june/aust1jun06.html (Retrieved April 2013).
David Weber (September 2006) “WA court dismisses charges over racial insult”. ABC Local Radio Transcript found at: http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2006/s1741596.htm
Terry Kinney (2008). "Hate Speech and Ethnophaulisms". The International Encyclopaedia of Communication. Blackwell Reference Online, Retrieved 15 April 2013.
UN Rights Panel (30 January 2012) Libel law violates freedom of expression – The Manila Times.
Hon. Justice M. I. Edokpayi (2011) “Is it Contempt of Court or Abuse of Judicial Power?” A brief paper in honour of Hon. Justice S.M.A. Belgore.
General Comment 11: Prohibition of propaganda for war and inciting national, racial or religious hatred (Art. 20), 29 July 1983.
General Comment No 34 on Article 19 of the ICCPR.
“Court rules Alan Jones “racially vilified” Muslim youths”, Sydney Morning Herald, 22 December 2009.
Sarah Joseph, “Andrew Bolt, Free Speech and Racial Intolerance”, 29 September 2011 at http://castancentre.wordpress.com/2011/09/29/andrew-bolt-free-speech-and-racialintolerance/
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Isma – عListen: National Consultations on Eliminating Prejudice against Arab and Muslim Australians, HREOC, Sydney, 2004, Chapter 2,esp. pp. 51-52, available http://www.hreoc.gov.au/racial_discrimination/isma/report/index.html, Retrieved 22 April 2013.
Gary Bouma; Desmond Cahill; Hass Dellal & Athalia Zwarta, Freedom of Religion and Belief in the 21st Century, Australian Human Rights Commission, Sydney, March 2011, p. 32, available http://www.humanrights.gov.au/frb/Report_2011.pdf, Retrieved 22 April 2013.