RECOMMENDED PRACTICE DNV-RP-E307

DYNAMIC POSITIONING SYSTEMS OPERATION GUIDANCE
JANUARY 2011

DET NORSKE VERITAS

FOREWORD
DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV) is an autonomous and independent foundation with the objectives of safeguarding life, property and the environment, at sea and onshore. DNV undertakes classification, certification, and other verification and consultancy services relating to quality of ships, offshore units and installations, and onshore industries worldwide, and carries out research in relation to these functions. DNV service documents consist of amongst other the following types of documents: — Service Specifications. Procedual requirements. — Standards. Technical requirements. — Recommended Practices. Guidance. The Standards and Recommended Practices are offered within the following areas: A) Qualification, Quality and Safety Methodology B) Materials Technology C) Structures D) Systems E) Special Facilities F) Pipelines and Risers G) Asset Operation H) Marine Operations J) Cleaner Energy

O) Subsea Systems

Acknowledgements
This Recommended Practice (RP) is based on the DP Operation guidance of the Marine Technology Society (MTS) DP Technical Committee. As such it is composed by the input of a variety of industry stakeholders of which DNV was only one. In addition, the recommendations are general and cover wide range of operational situations and conditions. It is therefore underlined that DNV retains the freedom to give recommendations different from those listed in this document for other projects covering specific operations needs, situations and conditions. In addition it is noted that the MTS document and hence the content of this RP, is open for additional input and comments in order to include the latest developments and experiences on DP operations. These inputs and comments shall be reflected in subsequent revisions of these documents.

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Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307, January 2011 Contents – Page 3

CONTENTS
1. 1.1 1.2 1.3 2. 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14 2.15 2.16 3. 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 3.16 3.17 3.18 3.19 3.20 3.21 4. 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16 4.17 General.................................................................................................................................................... 5 Introduction...............................................................................................................................................5 References.................................................................................................................................................6 Definitions and abbreviations ...................................................................................................................8 Management Guidance.......................................................................................................................... 9 DP Related Documentation.......................................................................................................................9 DP Class..................................................................................................................................................11 DP FMEA ...............................................................................................................................................11 DP Capability Plots.................................................................................................................................12 DP Footprint Plots...................................................................................................................................12 Position Reference Systems and Sensors................................................................................................13 Recommended DP Control Modes for DP Activities .............................................................................13 Trials and Checklists...............................................................................................................................14 DP Operations Manuals ..........................................................................................................................15 Activity Operational Planning ................................................................................................................15 Communications .....................................................................................................................................16 DP Planned Maintenance........................................................................................................................16 DP Incidents............................................................................................................................................17 Reporting and Record Keeping...............................................................................................................17 Competence.............................................................................................................................................17 Manning ..................................................................................................................................................17 Operational guidance MODUs ........................................................................................................... 18 Introduction.............................................................................................................................................18 DP Operational Documentation..............................................................................................................18 DP Class..................................................................................................................................................21 DP FMEA ...............................................................................................................................................22 DP Capability Plots.................................................................................................................................24 DP Footprint Plots...................................................................................................................................25 Position Reference Systems and Sensors................................................................................................26 Recommended DP Control Modes for DP Activities .............................................................................31 Trials and Checklists...............................................................................................................................32 DP Operations Manuals ..........................................................................................................................34 Activity Operational Planning ................................................................................................................36 Communications .....................................................................................................................................39 DP Planned Maintenance........................................................................................................................39 DP Incidents............................................................................................................................................40 Reporting and Record Keeping...............................................................................................................41 Competence.............................................................................................................................................41 Manning ..................................................................................................................................................42 Intervention – Role of the DPO and Engineer ........................................................................................43 DP Footprint Plots - Worked Examples .................................................................................................46 Annual DP Trials Test Table Blank – DP MODU .................................................................................48 Example of SMO and WSOG.................................................................................................................48 Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels.......................................................................... 53 Introduction.............................................................................................................................................53 DP Operational Documentation..............................................................................................................53 DP Class..................................................................................................................................................55 DP FMEA ...............................................................................................................................................56 DP Capability Plots.................................................................................................................................58 DP Footprint Plots...................................................................................................................................59 Position Reference Systems and Sensors................................................................................................60 Recommended DP Control Modes for DP Activities .............................................................................64 Trials and Checklists...............................................................................................................................65 DP Operations Manuals ..........................................................................................................................68 Activity Operational Planning ................................................................................................................69 Communications .....................................................................................................................................72 DP Planned Maintenance........................................................................................................................73 DP Incidents............................................................................................................................................73 Reporting and Record Keeping...............................................................................................................74 Competence.............................................................................................................................................75 Manning ..................................................................................................................................................76
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Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307, January 2011 Page 4 – Contents

4.18 4.19 4.20 4.21 5. 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15 5.16 5.17 5.18 5.19

Intervention – Role of the DPO and Engineer ........................................................................................76 DP Footprint Plots - Worked Examples .................................................................................................79 Annual DP Trials Test Table Blank – DP Project / Construction Vessel...............................................81 Example of SMO and ASOG..................................................................................................................81 Operational guidance Logistic Vessels............................................................................................... 86 Introduction.............................................................................................................................................86 DP Operational Documentation..............................................................................................................86 DP Class..................................................................................................................................................89 DP FMEA ...............................................................................................................................................89 DP Footprint Plots...................................................................................................................................92 Position Reference Systems and Sensors................................................................................................93 Trials and Checklists...............................................................................................................................98 DP Operations Manuals ........................................................................................................................100 Activity Operational Planning ..............................................................................................................102 Communications ...................................................................................................................................105 DP Planned Maintenance......................................................................................................................105 DP Incidents..........................................................................................................................................106 Reporting and Record Keeping.............................................................................................................107 Competence...........................................................................................................................................108 Manning ................................................................................................................................................109 Intervention – Role of the DPO and Engineer ......................................................................................109 DP Footprint Plots – Worked Examples...............................................................................................112 Annual DP Trials Test Table Blank – DP Logistics Vessel .................................................................114 Example of SMO and ASOG................................................................................................................114

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Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307, January 2011 1. General – Page 5

1. General
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Introduction This Recommended Practice (RP) is based on the Dynamic Positioning (DP) Operation guidance of the Marine Technology Society's DP Technical Committee. 1.1.2 Objective The objective of this RP is to provide a guidance for the safe and effective conduct and management of DP operations, including the following: — Manage, mitigate and reduce the exposure to, and potential of, DP related incidents. — Identify themes that need to be managed. — Provide a list of reference documents that address themes, whilst acknowledging that existing referenced documents do not identify all elements adequately when viewed in isolation. 1.1.3 Scope The themes that have been identified and addressed in this document are: — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — DP Class FMEA/ FMECA DP Capability Position Reference Systems And Sensors Required Modes Trials And Checklists Operation Manuals Activity and Operational Planning Communications DP Planned Maintenance DP Incidents Reporting And Record Keeping Competency Manning Operator Intervention – DPOs and Engineers.

1.1.4 Application This document is not meant to replace any rules, regulations or owners’ operational manuals. It is a compilation of existing guidance and practices gleaned from various sources in industry. It refers to standards and guidance used within the industry and draws attention to them. It also incorporates additional information gleaned from experience and documents/ standards not in the public domain. This is not intended to be an all encompassing document covering all aspects of DP operations. It focuses on a number of important DP operational themes, which, if effectively managed, will result in safer DP operations and a reduction in exposure to DP related incidents. The guidance provided in this document is not directed at any particular category of DP operation or DP vessel. It is intended to apply to any DP operation undertaken by any type and class of DP vessel operating in support of offshore oil and gas activities, Examples include Mobile Offshore Units (MOUs), ships, construction and logistics vessels where dynamic positioning is used for, or aiding, station keeping. 1.1.5 Document structure This document consists of five chapters of which the first chapter contains general information and the others the relevant guidance on dynamic positioning. This guidance is started with a focus on the general management of DP operations in chapter 2. This chapter is followed by specific operational guidance of DP operations of different vessel types as follows: — Ch. 3 – DP MODUs — Ch. 4 – DP Project/ construction vessels and barges — Ch. 5 – DP Logistics vessels. Note: Examples for the vessels covered in Ch. 4 are pipelay, heavy lift, dive support, ROV and accommodation support vessels. The logistic vessels of Ch. 5 are typically OSVs or crew boats). When logistics vessels are used as platforms to carry out project/ construction activities they should follow the guidelines for project/ construction vessel/ barges. To fully appreciate the context of chapters 3 to 5 without the need to refer back and forth, the specific operational guidance of these chapters is completed with the general information of chapter 2. For distinction,
DET NORSKE VERITAS

Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307, January 2011 Page 6 – 1. General

the general information is printed in regular text, and the specific operational guidance is in italics and/or grouped under Guidance notes.

1.2 References
1.2.1 Reference to MTS documents As stated in the introduction is this recommended practice based on MTS DP Technical Committee’s DP Operation guidance. In detail this concerns the following: — DP Operations Guidance Part 1 Ver. 1.0 Oct 12th 2010 (incl.input DNV Jan 18th 2010) — DP Operations Guidance Part 2 Appendix 2 Project/Construction Vessels, Ver. 1.0 Oct 12th 2010 (incl.input DNV Jan 18th 2010) — DP Operations Guidance Part 2 Appendix 2 Project/Construction Vessels, Ver. 1.0 Oct 12th 2010 (incl.input DNV Jan 18th 2010) — DP Operations Guidance Part 2 Appendix 3 Logistics Vessels, Ver. 1.0 Oct 12th 2010 (incl.input DNV Jan 18th 2010).

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DP FMEA. inc.. January 2011 1. DP section in Issue 6 International Safety Management ISM Code International standard for the safe management (ISM) Code 2002 and operation of ships and for pollution prevention DNV for Certification 3.2. DP capability plots. BV. DP operations manuals. manuals. redundancy. communications. lifting Communications 2010 operations Guidelines for Annual DP Trials for M191 Annual DP trials. 2009 manning. DP training and certification guidance M166 2002 M04/04 2004 M178 2005 M103 Rev 1 2007 DP FMEA/FMECA DP FMEA/FMECA DP FMEA management IMCA IMCA IMCA IMCA IMCA IMCA IMCA IMO IMCA Nautical Institute IMCA IMCA IMCA IMCA IMCA IMCA IMCA IMCA IMO DNV Design philosophies. guidelines for incremental DP Mobile Offshore Drilling Units 2008 annual DP trials Common Marine Inspection Issues Inspection report format and TOC for Document (CMID) 6 and 7 inspection. worst case failure Plots Rev 1. 2004 documentation. Use of Dynamic Positioning (DP) by Offshore Supply Vessels (OSVs) for Oil and Hazmat Transfers Guidance on Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Methods of Establishing the Safety and Reliability of DP Systems FMEA Management Guide Guidelines for the Design and Operation of DP Vessels Revision No. Survey Rules and associated rules.2 Other normative references Source IMO Class USCG Title Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems Classification Society DP Equipment Rules. DNV. Positioning Operators – Stationkeeping DET NORSKE VERITAS . and DP Operations Content Date IMO MSC/Circ 645 Internationally recognized basis for the design.onwards Useful analysis and summary of DP incidents Summary and Analysis – all years submitted to IMCA by member company vessels Specification for DP Capability M140 DP capability plots. DP surveys. planned maintenance International Guidelines for the M182 DP FMEA. etc DP Incident Reports – Annual 1994 . General – Page 7 1. FPSOs.) Station Keeping Incident Form for 2006 Incident report form for DP tankers. etc. trials. experience and certification Key DP Personnel Rev 1. OSVs. onboard Familiarisation for key DP personnel The Nautical Institute Dynamic January 2010 Detailed guidance on the implementation of Positioning Operator’s Certificate Revision NI’s internationally recognized DPO certification scheme Station Keeping Incident Form for 2008 Incident report form for DP vessels (DP DP Vessels construction. checklists. KR. DP certification and DP 2010 class notations USCG D8 Policy DP classification guidance. DP operations. DP equipment. annual DP trials. Safe Operation of DP OSVs Rev 1. DP operating Letter Ltr-01.322 – October 2009 Detailed learning objectives for the training of Competence of Dynamic DPOs in the mentioned subject. incident reporting and investigation. DP Documentation for DP Vessels Rev 1.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. DP GL. 2006 requirements. DP Annual Trials 1997 auditor competency A Guide to DP Related M109 DP operations manual – TOC. vessel operations manual. etc.. D046 General guidelines. 1994 equipment. testing. LRS. risk based approach to DP operations Guidelines for Dynamic IMO MSC/738 Rev Internationally recognized guidance for DPO Positioning (DP) Operator Training 1. verification and operation of DP vessels ABS. diving operations. annual DP trials. training. 2000 Guidance on Simultaneous M203 Simultaneous operations Operations 2010 Guidance on Operational M205. etc. DP Tankers. DP capability plots Standard Report for DP Vessels M139 Reporting format for annual DP trials. checklists. manning. 2006 training and experience The Training and Experience of M117 Training.2003 guidance. FPSO.

thruster system and DP control system. by observation onboard the vessel in real time conditions. wind. Each DP vessel has only one safest mode which is unique to that vessel.e. environmental and equipment performance limits considered necessary for safe DP operations while carrying out a specific activity. validation from personnel knowledgeable about vessel specific information. sensors. Worst Case Failure: The Worst Case Failure (WCF) is the identified single failure mode in the DP system resulting in maximum effect on DP capability as determined through FMEA study. DP Control System: The DP control system consists of all control components and systems. and in Safest Mode. Where DP MODUs are carrying out well activities the nomenclature is changed to WSOG (Well Specific Operating Guidelines). so as to enable correct choices to be made to provide optimum level of redundancy. DP Capability Plots: DP Capability Plots define by theoretical calculation the vessel’s capability to maintain position in various environmental conditions. This mode may be appropriate in situations where it is determined that the risks associated with a loss of position are low and. The SMO table also sets out the operator actions should a required configuration not be met. This usually relates to a number of thrusters and generators that can simultaneously fail. seastate and current) and. Safest Mode Of Operation: The Safest Mode of Operation (SMO) is generally a tabulated presentation of how to configure the vessel’s DP system. (i. Activity Specific Operating Guidelines: Activity Specific Operating Guidelines (ASOG) are generally presented in tabulated format and set out the operational. DP System: The DP system consists of components and systems acting together to achieve reliable position keeping capability. generators and power distribution. usually derived from a review of the FMEA and if necessary. taking account of certain external forces. as a whole. Task Appropriate Mode: Task Appropriate Mode (TAM) is a risk based mode. where appropriate. Example 1: A DP MODU may operate in this mode during times when Time to Terminate is short. Task Appropriate Mode is the configuration that the vessel’s DP system may be set up and operated in. skills and abilities at a level of expertise sufficient to be able to perform in an appropriate work setting. Note: It is acknowledged that DP Footprint Plots for DP MODUs may be less relevant in comparison to DP vessels used for other applications. Example 2: A DP pipelay vessel may operate in this mode when more than 500 m from a surface or mission critical subsea asset. The DP system includes the power system (power generation and power management). Thruster and Generator Operating Strategy (TAGOS): A document that provides informed guidance. on appropriate configurations of thrusters. The objective is that no single failure should result in exceeding the worst case failure. when Time to Terminate is long. The ASOG will vary depending on the activity and are unique to that activity. loss of most effective thruster and after worst case failure. General 1. and in Safest Mode when inside 500 m. so that the DP system.3. such as pipe tension and. DP Footprint Plots: DP Footprint Plots are constructed. including all thrusters running. where the time to terminate is low. including power generation and distribution.3 Definitions and abbreviations 1.1 Definitions Competence: Competence is the acquisition of knowledge. Redundancy Concept: The Redundancy Concept is the means by which the Worst Case Failure Design Intent is assured. Owing to their almost continuous work programs DP MODUs will rarely have the opportunity to record DP Footprint Plots for degraded thruster configurations. position reference systems and associate cabling and routeing. accepting that a single failure could result in exceeding the worst case failure and could result in blackout or loss of position. The DP control system comprises computer systems. hardware and software necessary to dynamically position the vessel. Worst Case Failure Design Intent: The Worst Case Failure Design Intent (WCFDI) is the single failure with the maximum consequences that has been the basis of the design and operational conditions. and associated constraints. in various thruster/ power configurations. delivers the intent of the vessel’s DP class notation. display systems. January 2011 Page 8 – 1. loss of most effective thruster and following worst case failure. seastate and current) and in various thruster/ power configurations. Safest Mode: Safest Mode is the configuration that the vessel’s DP system should be set up and operated in so as to deliver the intent of the vessel’s DP class notation. including all thrusters running. This is a choice that is consciously made. The table also sets out various levels of operator action as these limits are approached or exceeded.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. propulsion and position reference systems. DET NORSKE VERITAS Note: . The plots are of the vessel’s DP station keeping performance and limitations in various environmental conditions (wind.

Automatic Identification System Activity Specific Operating Guidelines Differential Global Navigation Satellite System Differential Global Positioning Satellite system Dynamic Positioning DP Operator Engine Control Room Emergency Shutdown System Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Failure Modes and Effects and Criticality Analysis Global Positioning (satellite) System Hardware in the Loop International Marine Contractors Association International Maritime Organisation Information Technology Long Baseline Mean Time to Repair Motion Reference Unit Simultaneous Operations Safest Mode of Operation Short Base Line Super Short Base Line Thruster and Generator Operating Strategy Task Appropriate Mode Time to Terminate Vertical Reference Unit Well Specific Operating Guidelines 1. at the shore based centers of technical management. Management Guidance – Page 9 Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA): An FMEA is a systematic analysis of systems and sub-systems to a level of detail that identifies all potential failure modes down to the appropriate sub-system level and their consequences.2 Recommended Documentation Current versions of the documents in the list below should be kept on board and. The Time to Terminate is not fixed for the duration of a DP operation but will vary according to the circumstances. Further guidance relating to the listed documents is given in appropriate sections later in this chapter. DET NORSKE VERITAS .1 General It is recommended that DP vessel owners/ operators should maintain the documentation listed in the table below and should develop and implement associated processes for the purposes of: — — — — — — ensuring the safe and effective management of the vessel in DP ensuring the technical suitability of the vessel for each DP activity it is required to carry out determining the configuration for the safest mode of operation and the task appropriate mode understanding the vessel’s station keeping capabilities following the worst case failure ensuring compliance with appropriate standards and guidelines providing training and familiarization material to vessel crews.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. where feasible. Documents that have been superseded should be clearly marked and kept separate from current versions. Management Guidance The themes in this chapter are addressed from a management perspective. A FMECA is an extension of an FMEA that adds a risk assessment of each failure mode to determine its criticality.1.2 Abbreviations AIS ASOG DGNSS DGPS DP DPO ECR ESD FMEA FMECA GPS HIL IMCA IMO IT LBL MTTR MRU SIMOPS SMO SBL SSBL TAGOS TAM TTT VRU WSOG 2.3. 2.1. both. in addition. Documents may be in electronic or. Example: In case of a DP drilling vessel this may be the time needed to release from the wellhead. For a DP diving vessel this may be the time needed for the diver(s) to return to the bell and make a seal so that the vessel can move clear. hard copy format or. They are covered in greater depth and at an operational level in chapters 3 to 5. January 2011 2. 2.1 DP Related Documentation 2. Time to Terminate: Time to Terminate (TTT) is calculated as the amount of time required in an emergency to physically free the DP vessel from its operational activity following a DP abort status and allowing it to be manoeuvred clear and to proceed to safety.

investigation records and close outs. Findings and recommendations to be addressed in accordance with their criticality. DP audits and inspection reports. especially interfaces between equipment from different vendors. All records relating to vessel specific DP familiarisation and competency for DPOs. This is as relevant for equipment whose primary function lies outside the DP system. 1 2 Document DP System FMEA or FMECA DP FMEA Proving Trials 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Annual DP Trials DP Capability Plots DP Footprint Plots Service reports concerning the DP system Details of all DP related modifications and additions Vessel audit reports and DP audits and inspection reports. All records to be kept on board. Hard copy DP Footprint Plots to be taken by DPOs and kept on board. To be conducted annually. such as an Emergency Shutdown Systems (ESD). permanently stored in retrievable archives. Records of all faults related to the DP system to be kept on board permanently in retrievable archives. Records of all DP Location and Watchkeeping Checklists to be kept on board for the period set by the owner/ operator and. To be conducted to prove initial DP FMEA and at other times to prove modifications and additions to the DP system. All records to be kept on board. permanently stored in retrievable archives.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. DP Operations Manual DP Incident Reports DP Mobilization/ DP Field Arrival/ Trials Procedures (Bridge and Engine Room) DP Location and Watchkeeping checklists (Bridge and Engine Room) DP related drills and emergency response drills DP fault log DP data logging Guidance To be kept up to date.. where relating to a DP incident.. Where the vessel has DP data logging facilities electronic records should be kept on board for the period set by the owner/ operator and. where relating to a DP incident permanently stored in retrievable archives. January 2011 Page 10 – 2. Records of all DP station keeping and other DP related incidents to be kept on board. See Note 2 at end of table. inc. Hard copy records of the DP alarm printer readout to be kept on board for the period set by the owner/ operator and. then by other traceable means. records of DP watchkeeping hours to be maintained on board. engineers and electricians to be kept on board permanently in retrievable archives. Complete history of service reports to be kept on board Records of all DP related modifications and additions to be kept on board complete with interface and testing information. Previous trials reports and associated close out documentation to be kept on board. such as propulsion. findings and close outs to be kept on board Vessel Specific DP Operations Manual1). copies of certification and qualifications. where relating to a DP incident. DP FMEA Proving Trials should be repeated every five years. Original DPO certificates and DP Log Books to be held by the DPOs onboard the vessel. Management Guidance No. See Note 1 at end of table. pipe tensioner systems and fire monitor systems as it is for DP equipment. DET NORSKE VERITAS . Owners/ operators should keep adequate records and documentation relating to modifications and additions that could have an effect on the DP system. where relating to a DP incident. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 DP alarm printer readouts DP familiarisation and competency records Résumés and vessel specific work records of all key DP personnel 1) The vessel specific DP Operations Manual is additional to the DP control system manufacturer’s Operator Manual. Findings and recommendations to be addressed in accordance with their criticality. inc. Note 1: Note 2: It is acknowledged that DP Footprint Plots may be less relevant for DP MODUs than for other DP vessel types. Records of DP related drills and emergency response drills to be kept on board in retrievable archives. Records of DP Mobilization Trials and DP Field Arrival Checklists to be kept on board for the period set by the owner/ operator and. Hard copy DP Capability Plots relevant to the vessel’s areas of operations to be readily accessible to DPOs at the DP control location. permanently stored in retrievable archives. Complete history of all audit reports. if not in the document itself. All modifications and additions should be subjected to FMEA type analysis and undergo Proving Trials type testing. incorporating all modifications and additions since original study. Resumes of all key DP personnel. position references and sensors. to be readily accessible at the DP control location and used by the DPOs as a reference for conducting DP operations.

so as to demonstrate full compliance with applicable parts of the guidelines. It is noted that there have been standards developed outside the IMO DP equipment class systematics where an identical (or higher) level of redundancy has been realized based on a different philosophy and system approach. This includes initial and periodic complete survey and testing of all systems and components required to keep position after single failures associated with the vessel’s assigned DP equipment class. and/or specific regulations/ requirements from oil majors may require a higher DP equipment class. The requirement for a DP FMEA has its origins in IMO MSC/Circ 645 (1994) “Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems”. Remarks Note 1: Note 2: Note 3: The vessel’s DP system should normally be set up and operated to deliver the intent of the DP class notation. 2. We underline that these recommendation represent a typical minimum. e.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. 1) Unless expressly stated in this Guidance document a FMECA is interchangeable with an FMEA. The IMO Guidelines do not make clear distinction between vessels of different DP equipment class. Class 2 may be accepted based on considerations of procedures.3 DP FMEA The DP vessel’s DP FMEA is the most important technical document in the list of required documents. In addition to complying with the IMO Guidelines and the relevant DP rules of the vessel’s Classification Society the DP FMEA should achieve the standards of detail and analysis contained in the following industry guidance. Accordingly.outside 500 m zone) Well Stim Logistics Operations Minimum Recommended DP Equipment Class (See Notes below) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 ** 2* 2* ** Class in accordance with contractual requirements * Vessels of lesser Class may be used with the appropriate structured risk identification and mitigation measures in place. Management Guidance – Page 11 2. The IMO Guidelines require all DP vessels to be subjected to survey and testing in accordance with IMO’s specified guidelines. all DP vessels of DP Class 2 or 3 are required to have a Class approved and stamped DP FMEA and DP FMEA Proving Trials. The periodic component in the IMO Guidelines requires the complete survey and testing to be repeated every five years to ensure full compliance with applicable parts of the guidelines. This IMO requirement has been interpreted by the DP community such that the survey requirement is met by a DP FMEA (or FMECA1)) and the testing requirement by DP FMEA Proving Trials.2 DP Class It is recommended that DP vessels with the following DP equipment class notations are used for the following activities. For operations close to another vessel or installation the equipment class should be 3 or equivalent. such as IMCA. — IMCA M166 “Guidance on Failure Modes and Effects Analysis” DET NORSKE VERITAS . January 2011 2.g local conditions. equipment and consequence analysis. regulations and guidance issued by Class and other industry bodies. on occasion and after a proper assessment of the risks. In addition compliance with IMO Guidelines requires survey and testing after defects are discovered and corrected and. the vessel may be set up in accordance with the requirements of the Task Appropriate Mode. after a DP related accident and. Application on DP Drilling Diving Pipelay Umbilical Lay Lifting Accommodation Shuttle Offtake ROV Support (Open Water) ROV Support (Close Proximity Surface/ Subsea) Floating Production Seismic and Survey vessels (Open water. whenever significant repairs or alterations are carried out. However. These benchmarking guidelines provide the foundation for all subsequent DP rules. harsh environments.

The plots are used to gain a better understanding of the vessel’s actual station keeping performance and limitations in intact and. emergency response and planning decisions.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. including the vessel Master. DP Capability Plots should include the following scenarios at current speeds of 0. in various degraded thruster configurations.e. 2. DET NORSKE VERITAS . Note: Particular attention should be paid in the DP FMEA to the interfaces between the DP system and other systems that have the potential to affect the DP system. such as during standby periods. The calculations should use environmental data (seastate. Guidance is provided on DP Capability Plots in IMCA M140 Rev 1.4 DP Capability Plots DP Capability Plots should be calculated for the vessel. — They provide a scatter plot of vessel positions at regular intervals around the required set position (this shows accuracy of station keeping) — They also provide comparison points on the limiting wind speed envelope given in the theoretical DP Capability Plots (this shows wind speeds at which it was seen that the vessel was unable to maintain position. “Specification for DP Capability Plots”. DP Footprint Plots are not theoretical. — Following the worst case failure.g. such as where the vessel is fitted with an Emergency Shut Down (ESD) system. Polar Plot).) DP Footprint Plots serve other purposes. IMCA M04/04 2004 “Methods of Establishing the Safety and Reliability of DP Systems” FMEAs are a requirement to obtain DP Class 2 and 3 notation. January 2011 Page 12 – 2. in particular issues related to the vessel’s worst case failure and significant single point failures. Note: The DP Capability Plots should be provided in a format that is intuitive to the user on board (e. where each point on the envelope represents the wind speed at which it is calculated that the vessel will be unable to maintain position in DP. including worst case failure.5 DP Footprint Plots DP Footprint Plots should also be produced on board. 1 and 2 knots. DP Footprint Plots serve two main purposes. i. weather downtime or on arrival at the field. Note: 2. whilst the vessel is being subjected to real environmental forces. It is acknowledged that DP Footprint plots may be of less relevance to DP MODUs. These theoretical plots are calculated from detailed information of the vessel’s hull and superstructure form and available thruster power. such as in the North Sea. loss of most effective thruster(s) and after worst case failure. fully intact. The results from a DP FMEA. They are actual measurements of the vessel’s DP station keeping performance in the actual environmental conditions and thruster configuration at the time the plot was taken. Theoretical DP Capability Plots and DP Footprint Plots combine together to enhance knowledge and understanding of the vessel’s DP station keeping ability. thus validating or contradicting the theoretical DP Capability Plots for the various thruster configurations. Whilst not stipulated as a class requirement for DP 1 vessels owners/ operators are encouraged to subject their DP 1 vessels to the DP FMEA process. — Loss of most effective thruster(s). Engineers and Electricians should have a detailed knowledge of the DP FMEA and should use the information provided to be fully informed about the capabilities and limitations of the vessel’s DP system. Plots should be taken for the thruster configurations used in the DP Capability Plots. DPOs can also produce DP Footprint Plots by manual methods using a plotting sheet. or at other current speeds that are representative of the location in which the DP vessel is to operate: — Fully intact power generation and thrusters. DPOs. Key DP personnel. These plots should show the limiting wind speed 360 degree envelopes for the scenarios below. Note: DP Footprint Plots originated in harsh weather regions. DP Footprint Plots should be taken whenever opportunities arise. Some DP systems have a software application that produces DP Footprint Plots electronically. should be used in the formulation of operational. Management Guidance — IMCA M178 “FMEA Management Guide”. pipe tensioner system or fire monitor system. wind and current) appropriate to the area in which the DP vessel is to operate. including learning and familiarisation opportunities for DPOs and in providing snapshots of vessel station keeping behaviour for specific locations and activities.

Neither the heading nor the position of the DP vessel is fixed. around the terminal point. An absolute system gives vessel geographical position. DP reference systems sensitive to interferences from the vessels radars. For purposes of this document. January 2011 2. It is generally not recommended to use multiple (>2) satellite based systems in conjunction with other positions reference systems as this may result in skewed weighting in favour of multiple satellite systems. Absolute DGNSS (DGPS and GLONASS) Acoustic (USBL. This mode is used to account for pipe tensions in a pipe layer and hawser tension in a shuttle tanker. Position reference systems comprise absolute and relative systems. Where operational uptime is one of the key success factors the benefit gained by consciously exceeding the minimum requirements are to be evaluated. The following are the most common position reference systems in use. DET NORSKE VERITAS . Cyscan) Radar (e. Management Guidance – Page 13 2. to follow an ROV along a pipeline. These terms should not be confused. And. Caution: It is not uncommon for the term “weathervane” to be used to denote “minimum thrust”. absolute indicates that this position reference sensor is independent of another fixed or floating offshore structure. SBL. called the setpoint circle.6 Position Reference Systems and Sensors The DP vessel should be equipped with suitable position reference and sensors in accordance with the vessel’s DP class notation and operational requirements. The following selected DP control modes are relevant to specific DP activities. Heavy Lift: Takes account of the effects of the load transfer on the mass of the vessel and the additional lateral force. current and waves around a fixed or moving point called the terminal point. RADius. an acoustic absolute system can be used as a relative system if attached to a non-fixed asset. radios etc. RadaScan) DARPS Class rules give minimum requirements for the number of position references. A relative system can be used as an absolute system if installed on a point that is a fixed geographical position. i. Other benefits of exceeding minimum requirements include greater redundancy and improved station keeping performance. normally by reducing gain and relaxing the DP controller. The position of the vessel is controlled to follow a circle. both with regard to restrictions caused by the manner of deployment and expected performance in working situations. should not be used during critical operations such as sub-sea operations.e. LBL) Taut wire (See Note 2) Artemis Laser (e. which is separate from the environment. both with regard to restrictions caused by the activity and performance criteria required to execute the activity safely and successfully. Fire Monitor Compensation: Used to compensate for the varying forces exerted on vessel from the fire monitors. Position reference systems should be selected with due consideration to operational requirements. is included in the DP calculation and treated as a force feed forward. Relative Note 1: Note 2: Caution: Caution: 2. Fanbeam. Weathervane: Enables the DP vessel to rotate with the wind. It could be debated that Taut Wire and Acoustic position reference systems are relative position reference systems. A relative system gives vessel position in relation to a non-fixed reference. The heading of the vessel is controlled to point towards the terminal point.g. External Force Compensation: Where the measured external force acting on the vessel.g.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Additional position reference systems should be based on different principles. where the DP control system allows the vessel’s heading to rotate to minimize external forces acting on the vessel and thruster requirements.7 Recommended DP Control Modes for DP Activities The DP vessel should be equipped with suitable DP modes and features with due consideration to operational requirements. This mode is appropriate for connected shuttle tanker/ FPSO operations. for example. Target Follow: Enables the DP vessel to follow a moving target and is used.

in particular the satisfactory performance of the position reference systems. (new build/ system modifications class requirement): To prove the operation of the DP system under load conditions for at least 4 hours without significant alarms of the DP system. The list below is a typical list for a DP dive support vessel. is operated in accordance with. Main and back up communication tests should be included in this process. These tests should also include the testing of interfaces between different vendor systems and equipment. This is given in IMCA M191. owing to heavy operational demands. additions. A series of checks and tests performed before entering the 500 m zone of an asset in which set up mode and functions are verified and confirmed. Annual DP Trials should be performed at a specific once a year within 3 months of the anniversary of the previous year’s trials.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. DP FMEA Proving Trials: A series of tests used to prove expected effects of failure modes found in the FMEA desktop analysis. Owners/ operators should refer to the following list of trials and checklists when developing an appropriate regime for their own DP vessels. to validate repairs and preventive maintenance. DP drilling units are not usually able to meet the above criteria for conducting Annual DP Trials at a specific time once a year. January 2011 Page 14 – 2. Annual DP Trials also provide the opportunities for training of the vessel’s crew and enhancement of their knowledge of failure modes and their effects. A series of checks and tests performed by the DPOs to verify and confirm the set up of the DP system prior to taking over the DP watch. A series of tests of fault and failure conditions relevant to the DP System. to demonstrate redundancy and functional limitations of the DP system. A series of checks and tests that verify that the vessel’s set up and configuration of systems and equipment meet the requirements of the necessary mode of operation as determined by the Safest Mode of Operation (SMO) and the DP Class or the Task Appropriate Mode (TAM).8 Trials and Checklists A range of trials and checklists is to be provided for each DP vessel and implemented as a verification that the vessel’s DP system complies with and. and test the operation of protection and detection devices and responses so as to demonstrate that the vessel’s DP system remains fit for purpose. Endurance Trials: Annual DP Trials: DP Mobilization Trials: DP Field Arrival Trials: DP Location Set Up Checklist: Pre-Dive Checklist: ECR Checklists: 500 m Checks: Watch Status/ 6 Hour Checklist: DET NORSKE VERITAS . applicable standards and guidelines. These tests should be conducted immediately following launching of a new build vessel and following modifications. as defined in the DP FMEA. Note: Experience has shown that. upgrades repairs. This has been recognized by the industry with publication of specific guidance relating to the conduct of Annual DP Trials for DP MODUs. system and equipment functionality. A series of checks to demonstrate that the vessel is properly set up for the location. Approval is then obtained to operate in close proximity to the asset. “Guidelines for Annual DP Trials for DP Mobile Offshore Drilling Units”. A series of tests to be carried out at the start of a contract. This verification process should confirm the failure modes and their effects on the systems and equipment analysed in the DP FMEA document (to include the Worst Case Failure) and the vessel’s station keeping ability following its Worst Case Failure. The guidance sets out a regime of annual testing that is conducted on an incremental basis throughout the year as opportunities arise but needs to be completed within a twelve month period. subject to client requirements. A series of checks and tests that confirm satisfactory performance of the DP system and verify the set up mode of operation and DP functions. Management Guidance 2. Main and back up communication tests should be included in this process. A series of checks performed prior to commencing diving operations. These may be performed under survey from the class as being part of their scope. The tests should be designed to prove system redundancy. This may differ from the regime as defined by class.

procedures and standing orders. emergency procedures. — Limitations imposed by water depth. — Capabilities of the vessel. annual tests. — Limitations imposed upon operations by residual capability. The manual should specifically address operational interfaces between different vendor systems and equipment to ensure that they are configured and operated properly. The requirement for a manual has its origins in IMO MSC/Circ 645 (1994) “Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems”. responsibilities and roles of key DP personnel. — SIMOPS and marine vessel interaction and consequences arising from change of status (Green to Blue. Hardware in the Loop (HIL) tests: Extensive testing of functionality. the organisation. such as Emergency Disconnect Systems (EDS) on MOUs. In planning and preparing for the activities the following should be considered and. It is recognized that these trials and checklists could be given other titles. January 2011 2. The IMO Guidelines require a series of checklists. DP incident handling and alert systems and vessel specific trials and checklists that apply uniquely to the vessel. DET NORSKE VERITAS . training and competency. Post DP Modification Trials: A series of checks and tests that are used to determine the effects of modifications and/ or additions on the DP system and the vessel’s subsequent station keeping performance. — Consequences of a loss of position and/ or heading. each with different requirements for content. vessel DP capabilities. test procedures and DP operating instructions to be incorporated into one manual. The recommendations set out below address areas that are not necessarily required by class. M109. sea trials. both intact and residual capability. following Worst Case Failure (WCF). where appropriate. the Task Appropriate Mode (TAM). For complicated power systems and/ or thruster configurations. This will include a clear statement on the DP philosophy for the vessel. Each Classification Society has its own specific requirements for a DP Operations Manual. Note: The nomenclature used for the trials and checklists listed above is based on the guideline document. it may be useful provide the operator with a thruster and generator operating strategy (TAGOS) to assist in the decision on what generators and thrusters to use for different circumstances and different equipment availabilities. The manual should contain sufficiently detailed instruction and guidance to enable the vessel to be operated safely in DP and safely execute its intended activities. vessel technical data and layout. This should include interfaces between systems and equipment that are not part of the DP system but which may affect the DP system.9 DP Operations Manuals A vessel specific DP Operations Manual should be prepared for each DP vessel. It can be used in factory acceptance tests.10 Activity Operational Planning In recognizing that exposure to risks manifests itself during vessel operations it is recommended that activities performed by DP vessels should be subject to planning and preparation. the planning and preparation of DP operations. — Preparation of the Activity Specific Operating Guidelines (ASOG). Post DP Incident Trials: 2. failures and performance by using advanced simulation techniques and embedded systems. periodical tests and testing after upgrades. operating modes. IMCA M112: “Guidelines for Auditing Vessels with DP Systems”.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. — Discussion to be included in pre-project execution readiness checklist. The vessel specific DP Operations Manual is the most important operational document in the list of required documents. documented: — Configuration for the Safest Mode of Operation (SMO) or. where appropriate. etc. The vessel specific manual may also contain generic content. Management Guidance – Page 15 Tests performed to ensure that the corrective/ repair measures taken following a DP incident have properly addressed the causes of the incident and that the vessel’s DP system is in a safe and operable condition. including onboard discussion with all relevant stakeholders as part of the pre-project execution/ activity. watchkeeping and manning. operating limits. 2. DP operating procedures. M117 (contingency training) and in class society DP rules. They are based on current industry practices. M103. The manual should represent the way the vessel is operated in DP. such as company policies. Guidance on the contents of vessel specific DP Operations Manuals is provided in the following IMCA guidelines. tensioner systems on Pipelay vessels.

this also involves vendor support as well as the client’s DP consultant. Maintenance should include regular cleaning. Note: The ASOG should be developed by extracting all the relevant information from detailed technical review of the vessel’s DP FMEA. — The activity being performed and the necessary time to terminate to bring vessel to a safe position upon the onset of failure.12 DP Planned Maintenance DP vessels should have a structured planned maintenance system that specifically addresses maintenance of the vessel’s DP system. as well as any unique operations the vessel is called upon to perform. visual (lights/ displays) and audible means (alarms). Effective internal and external communications is a key tool to manage risk. This should include indirect components such as generator circuit breakers. These records should include vendor service records as well as maintenance performed by vessel personnel. Appropriate measures should be in place to clearly identify critical tasks/ operational phases of the activity and to ensure that the vessel is set up in Safest Mode of Operation and operating within post WCF capability. equipment and support systems. Activities should include day to day operations. either hard copy or appropriate electronic format. The ASOG should be validated on board. operational manuals and project specific procedures. In addition. These records should be kept on board for the period specified by the owner/ operator. DET NORSKE VERITAS Note: . System upgrades and changes (hardware and software) are typically subject to class approval. Records of planned and unplanned maintenance should be kept in an auditable format. Typically. any specific operation relevant to the design of the vessel. Maintenance on DP related equipment whilst conducting DP operations should be controlled by a documented permit to work system and should always take into consideration the potential alteration of failure modes and increased criticality of failure consequences on DP capabilities and/ or redundancy. current status of planned as well as unexpected events during the execution of the activity.11 Communications The vessel should be equipped with the appropriate primary and secondary equipment needed to communicate between all parties (stakeholders) whilst carrying out the intended task. This should assist in getting back to normal operating condition after equipment failure or DP incident. calibration. The critical spare inventory should be monitored via a formal inventory program that is closely linked to the planned maintenance system. January 2011 Page 16 – 2. 2. Continuity of communications during foreseeable emergency situations should be taken into account. A minimum number of required critical DP spares should be maintained on board. and testing of equipment as outlined in manufacturer’s recommendations and industry guidelines.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Operational specific visual and voice communications should ensure that the pertinent information flows between the key operating points as well as to and from assets and/ or other vessels that might be affected by the operation being carried out. 2. Some owners refer to it as WSOC (Well Specific Operating Criteria). Note: Note: The client’s due diligence process is usually the main driver in the critical path to return to normal operating condition. Guidance on communications is provided in M103. M182 and M205. etc. Relevant guidance is given in IMCA M109. including AIS and DGNSS. Planned maintenance should address all equipment that has an impact on the vessel’s station keeping capabilities. parts replaced during maintenance may require certification by class. Note: The importance of communication to be emphasized by incorporating into the ASOG. ensuring that a common working language and terminology is used at all times. ASOGs are known as WSOGs. Communications should be taken into account when detailing the roles and responsibilities of key personnel during the planning stages for the intended task. Communications in this context include voice. Means of communication are not limited to the above but include integrated IT systems using wireless network technology that combine communications with other features. bus tie breakers. Management Guidance Yellow or Red). Communication protocols are to be set up to provide pertinent information regarding intent. These operating points may be onboard the vessel as well as on other facilities involved with the activity. Where a decision has been made to operate in a TAM a separate ASOG covering TAM should be produced. On a DP MODU.

Records of these activities including pertinent information from Hazards and Risk Identification (HIRAs) should be made and kept onboard for future reference. — to assist in identifying the root causes of the incident — to verify and validate that measures to address the root cause are effective — to validate that effective measures have not introduced any additional potential to cause failures (both hidden and apparent). allowing the vessel to exceed environmental limits should not be regarded as a DP incident. manning should be in accordance with the following: DET NORSKE VERITAS .1.2. where appropriate. investigation and closing out procedures. The purpose of the investigation and the trials should be. it is suggested that the FMEA provider is involved in the incident investigation.15 Competence Definition: Competence is the acquisition of knowledge. and should be reported. A change of status triggered by prearranged agreement between the Master. DP systems and equipment vendors are also encouraged to do likewise and to share information on unexpected faults. modes and drills. There should be a clear line of reporting DP related items onboard the DP vessel and between each department and this should involve key DP personnel.14 Reporting and Record Keeping Owners or operators of DP vessels should have an effective reporting and record keeping system. IMCA’s station keeping incident reporting scheme provides a suitable channel for disseminating relevant information throughout the DP sector. and senior onboard decision makers. Guidance is provided in M103.2. clients’ processes. TAM and ASOG are used as tools to manage DP operations a suggested approach is that. Owners/ operators of DP vessels are encouraged to share lessons learned from DP incidents with the wider DP community. Where SMO. as a minimum. Note: 2. be demonstrated in the following areas: — — — — — Operational modes DP FMEA familiarization DP Operations Manual familiarization Project/ activity requirements Contingency plans.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. The documents and records contained in Sec. Documented records should be kept and be capable of auditing. M117 (IMO738) Vessel specific competency should. Note: An operator initiated change of status as a result of a conscious decision based on risk analysis of the circumstances where the trigger points have not been reached should not be regarded as a DP incident. carry out activities which may be unique to project requirements. apart from the exceptions in the notes below. if applicable. skills and abilities at a level of expertise sufficient to be able to perform in an appropriate work setting.16 Manning Vessels must comply with the statutory requirements for safe manning. DP related records should be maintained onboard and. Additionally. Management Guidance – Page 17 2. trials are carried out as part of the investigation process. In the event of the occurrence of a DP incident relating to the vessel’s configuration as described in the DP FMEA and other documents. This should be in accordance with vessel owner or operators’ and. where relevant. on occasion. features and failures that are identified in operation. for DP operations.13 DP Incidents DP vessels should be provided with and operate appropriate DP incident reporting. 2. This will facilitate lessons learnt to be implemented into the DP FMEA and proving trials program. It is recommended that reactive YELLOW and RED DP incidents are investigated as soon as practicable after the DP incident and. both for training and familiarisation processes as well as for reference in case of similar project requirements in the future. recorded and investigated. should be accessible to key DP personnel and to other interested parties. 2. There should also be a clear line of reporting between the DP vessel and the company’s shoreside management. DP vessel owners/ operators should operate a structured competence assurance program that is applied to all key DP personnel with special focus on ensuring vessel and task specific competence. at the company’s premises. DP vessels. January 2011 2. any reactive change of DP status from GREEN to YELLOW or RED should be regarded as a DP incident.

If used. It is recognized that in practice. See Note 2 below. 3. critical activities on a DP dive support vessel would include those occasions where the Time to Terminate is long. if applicable to the vessel. See Note 3 below Critical activities are those activities where the consequences of equipment failure or loss of position are greater than under normal operating circumstances. For overview and full appreciation. the engineer should be familiar with the general philosophy of redundancy as it relates to split mechanical. For example. at least 6 months of which should have been on the subject or sister vessel. For low risk operations guidance is provided in IMCA M182. familiar with the vessel’s DP FMEA document and the effects of failures of equipment relating to the position keeping of the vessel. Owners/ operators should recognize the associated risk from inexperienced personnel and have plans in place to address them while striving to reach the recommended experience levels. In DP 2 or 3 operations. The Master should not be considered as one of the required unlimited DPOs for meeting the manning requirements since operating as such would negative affect the situational awareness required from his side. 3. specific for MODUs. the electrician/ electrical engineer should have at least 6 months experience on similar equipment and operations.2 DP Operational Documentation 3. January 2011 Page 18 – 3. this information is completed with the general management information as already was given in the previous chapter. such as when the diver is inside a welding habitat or where the diver’s worksite is inside the conductor tubes at a production facility. Minimum Bridge Crew per shift 2 unlimited DPOs on the bridge capable of operating the vessel both in DP and manual control.1 General It is recommended that DP vessel owners/ operators should maintain the documentation listed in the table below and should develop and implement associated processes for the purposes of: — — — — — — ensuring the safe and effective management of the vessel in DP ensuring the technical suitability of the vessel for each DP activity it is required to carry out determining the configuration for the safest mode of operation and the task appropriate mode understanding the vessel’s station keeping capabilities following the worst case failure ensuring compliance with appropriate standards and guidelines providing training and familiarization material to vessel crews. the guidance provided within this document should be validated against the risks. For distinction. the general information is printed in regular text. The electrician should likewise be fully cognisant of DP operations.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Experience level should be documented and auditable. Operational guidance MODUs DP Bridge Crew Operation When undertaking critical activities in proximity to surface or sub surface structures See Note 1 below Minimum Experience Unlimited DPO with a minimum of 3 years experience on a vessel engaged in similar operations. As with vessel engineers. and the specific operational guidance is in italics and/or grouped under Guidance notes. At least one licensed engineer should be available at all times. electrical and ancillary systems. Operational guidance MODUs 3. should be on watch during critical activities and should have at least 6 months experience on similar equipment and operations.1 Introduction This chapter contains DP operational guidance. The engineer should be fully cognisant of DP operations. Note: Where the minimum experience requirements cannot be met a risk based approach should be taken to determine the suitability of personnel and any additional support requirements for intended operations. given the near term market conditions owners/ operators will be challenged to meet the recommended level of experience for DPOs. familiar with the vessel’s DP FMEA document and the effects of failures of equipment relating to the position keeping of the vessel. Note 1 Note 2 Note 3 Engineers There should be sufficient licensed engineers on board for all expected operations.2. an electrician should have appropriate high voltage training/ certification. Electrician/ Electrical Engineer If required on board. DET NORSKE VERITAS .

Documents that have been superseded should be clearly marked and kept separate from current versions. Previous trials reports and associated close out documentation to be kept on board. software for thruster control that additions See Note 2 at end of table. 6 7 8 Service reports concerning the DP Complete history of service reports to There should be a process where the open items are be filed and kept on board highlighted. potential to affect the performance or redundancy of the DP system. in addition. if not in the document itself. to ensure that they are suitable for the environmental conditions where the DP operations are to take place. both. New and modified software should be subjected to a thorough validation process.2 Recommended Documentation Current versions of the documents in the list below should be kept on board and. Operational guidance MODUs – Page 19 3. This will include protective. It is not enough to focus on the functionality of modifications and additions. No.2. Documents may be in electronic or. tracked and closed out. Known instances as Details of all DP modifications and additions to be related kept on board complete with interface examples pipe tensioner software that accepted a sudden increase of pipe tension from 100 t to 300 t modifications and and testing information. DP FMEA Proving Trials DP FMEA Proving should be repeated every five years.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. in particular in respect of current speeds. to test the operation of protection and detection devices and their response so as to demonstrate that the vessel’s DP system remains fit for purpose. especially to avoid the Records of all DP related acceptance of erroneous values. system and equipment performance and functionality. tracked and closed out. (erroneous input). as defined in the DP FMEA. be kept on board DET NORSKE VERITAS . 5 DP Footprints Hard copy DP Footprint Plots to be taken by DPOs. system A structured FMEA and Proving Trials approach should be used to integrate modifications and additions into the existing DP system and its associated equipment. DP Footprint Plots should be taken regularly in various power/ thruster combinations. hard copy format or. or FMECA All records to be kept on board. January 2011 3. detection and monitoring functions. Vessel audit Complete history of all audit reports. It is equally important to fully understand the functional design spec and the dependencies and consequences of fault or failure. Findings and recommendations to be addressed in accordance with their criticality. 1 2 Modifications and additions that should be proven by testing include all those that have direct effect or. to validate repairs and preventive maintenance. Document Operational Guidance Modifications and additions should be covered by a MOC process that triggers updating the FMEA. The tests in the Annual DP Trials should be designed to prove system redundancy. Capability plots to be validated/ recalculated. such as in the case of a pipelay vessel with horizontal loads. Trials Findings and recommendations to be addressed in accordance with their criticality. There should be a process where the open items are reports and DP including findings and close outs to highlighted. where feasible. Management Guidance To be kept up to date. audits and inspection reports. All records to be kept on board. including fully intact and worst case failure and also in various environmental conditions. as required. increased the command to the thruster to match the faulty feedback. The option exists for DP MODUs to carry out Annual DP Trials on an incremental basis in accordance with the IMCA M191. This requirement to validate/ recalculate applies also in cases where DP vessel performance is affected by operational constraints imposed by the activity. DP audits and inspection reports. 3 Annual DP Trials To be conducted annually. 4 DP Capability Plots Hard copy DP Capability Plots relevant to the vessel’s areas of operations to be readily accessible to DPOs at the DP control location. See Note 1 at end of table. See Note 1 at end of table To be conducted to prove initial DP FMEA and at other times to prove modifications and additions to the DP system. incorporating all modifications and additions since DP System FMEA original study. then by other traceable means. at the shore based centers of technical management.

DP data loggers perform an important function in helping to determine root causes of faults or failures. These records may be used in a cycle of continuous improvement. where relating (Bridge and Engine to a DP incident. The drills should also cover extreme events that are outside the scope of the DP FMEA. in retrievable archives. response drills development of DP emergency response procedures and used as training material for DP personnel.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Records of all DP Location and DP Location and Watchkeeping Checklists to be kept Watchkeeping on board for the period set by the As above checklists owner/ operator and. including changes to vessel specific checklists. this to a DP incident. There should be specific procedures for the operation and analysis of output from the DP data logger. i. January 2011 Page 20 – 3. including investigation incident. It is recommended that DP data logging function is included as part of the DP system design spec. 10 11 12 13 14 15 Records of all DP station keeping and All DP incidents should be investigated to an extent other DP related incidents to be kept that reflects the potential consequences of the on board. DP data loggers should be commissioned and Where the vessel has DP data logging operational before DP system Customer Acceptance facilities electronic records should be Trials (CAT) are carried out. BLUE. DP Data Logging kept on board for the period set by the The DP data logger should be incorporated in the owner/ operator and. Records of DP related drills and DP related drills emergency response drills to be kept The outcomes from these drills should be used in the and emergency on board in retrievable archives. Document DP Operations Manual Management Guidance Vessel Specific DP Operations Manual1). and that the vessel’s DP system is set up (Bridge and Engine to a DP incident permanently stored properly and provides the required level of Room) in retrievable archives. where relating vessel performance. They should confirm DP Field Arrival/ kept on board for the period set by the Trials Procedures owner/ operator and. Retention of data logging data should not be limited by time. particularly following worst case failure. Operational guidance MODUs No. DP Incident Reports DET NORSKE VERITAS . permanently stored Room) in retrievable archives. permanently stored should trigger an Advisory condition. records and close outs. This should include clear instructions on how and where the records are kept. redundancy. 9 Operational Guidance It is recommended that owners/ operators develop a standardised table of contents for vessel specific DP Operations Manuals in their fleet. Modifications and amendments to the DP Operations Manual should be subject to MOC processes. appropriate on the vessel’s station keeping ability. DP drills can be developed from fault and single point failure scenarios addressed in the vessel’s DP FMEA.e. If not. to be readily accessible at the DP control location and used by the DPOs as a reference for conducting DP operations. where relating SMO and running at all times when in DP. DP faults should be recorded as soon as possible after Records of all faults related to the DP they are discovered and action/ investigation taken DP fault log system to be kept on board to the potential consequences of the fault permanently in retrievable archives. DP Trials and Checklists should be vessel specific Records of DP Mobilization Trials and be developed from detailed information DP Mobilization/ and DP Field Arrival Checklists to be contained in the DP FMEA.

engineers and electricians DP sector. where relating to a DP incident. such as the Powersim program for records to be kept on board permanently in advanced DPO training of power plant fault retrievable archives. Operational guidance MODUs – Page 21 No. Regulations. pipe tensioner systems and fire monitor systems as it is for DP equipment. Owners/ operators should keep adequate records and documentation relating to modifications and additions that could have an effect on the DP system. unless relating to a DP incident or contractual dispute. 3. where DPOs are given detailed instruction and training in identifying and responding to power system faults. conditions. Examples include DPO intervention averting an underfrequency induced blackout on closed bus system by the DPO taking control of thrusters and biasing to increase load. 17 18 Owners/ operators should implement an in-house DP competency assurance process for key DP personnel which is structured. position references and sensors. This is as relevant for equipment whose primary function lies outside the DP system. January 2011 3. copies of certification and Résumés and qualifications. All records relating to vessel specific Owners/ operators are recommended to make use of DP familiarisation DP familiarisation and competency facilities and training programmes available to the and competency for DPOs. The vessel specific DP Operations Manual is additional to the DP control system manufacturer's Operator Manual 1) Note 1: Note 2: It is acknowledged that DP Footprint Plots may be less relevant for DP MODUs than for other DP vessel types.3 DP Class It is recommended that DP vessels with at least the following DP equipment class notations are used for the following activities. Operational Guidance Owners/ operators frequently require DP alarm printer readouts to be kept for the duration of each well and then destroyed. Document DP alarm printer readouts 16 Management Guidance Hard copy records of the DP alarm printer readout to be kept on board for the period set by the owner/ operator and. contractual specifications and/ or harsh environmental or other local conditions may require a higher class. In addition. DET NORSKE VERITAS . especially interfaces between equipment from different vendors.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. It should be noted that DPO certification is only one element in the competency assurance process. Résumés of all key DP personnel. such as an Emergency Shutdown Systems (ESD). systematic and progressive. such as propulsion. records of DP vessel specific watchkeeping hours to be maintained work records of all on board. permanently stored in retrievable archives. modifications and additions are typically subject to class approval and inspection. All modifications and additions should be subjected to FMEA type analysis and undergo Proving Trials type testing. Original DPO certificates key DP personnel and DP Log Books to be held by the DPOs onboard the vessel.

Class 2 may be accepted based on considerations of procedures. The periodic component in the IMO Guidelines requires the complete survey and testing to be repeated every five years to ensure full compliance with applicable parts of the guidelines. These benchmarking guidelines provide the foundation for all subsequent DP rules. after a DP related accident and. The IMO Guidelines do not make clear distinction between vessels of different DP equipment class. equipment and consequence analysis. This includes initial and periodic complete survey and testing of all systems and components required to keep position after single failures associated with the vessel’s assigned DP equipment class.4 DP FMEA The DP vessel’s DP FMEA is the most important technical document in the list of required documents. Guidance note: A detailed risk analysis will be required if the vessel is to operate in a task appropriate mode (TAM) that provides less redundancy than that provided by the vessel’s DP equipment class notation. the vessel may be set up in accordance with the requirements of the Task Appropriate Mode. Note 1: Note 2: Note 3: The vessel’s DP system should normally be set up and operated to deliver the intent of the DP class notation. such as IMCA. The IMO Guidelines require all DP vessels to be subjected to survey and testing in accordance with IMO’s specified guidelines. on occasion and after a proper assessment of the risks. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 3. regulations and guidance issued by Class and other industry bodies. 1) Unless expressly stated in this Guidance document a FMECA is interchangeable with an FMEA. Accordingly. so as to demonstrate full compliance with applicable parts of the guidelines. However. Operational guidance MODUs Application on DP Drilling Diving Pipelay Umbilical Lay Lifting Accommodation Shuttle Offtake ROV Support (Open Water) ROV Support (Close Proximity .Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. DET NORSKE VERITAS .outside 500 m zone) Well Stim Logistics Operations Minimum Recommended DP Equipment Class (See Note 1 below) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 ** 2* 2* Remarks ** Class in accordance with contractual requirements * Vessels of lesser Class may be used with the appropriate structured risk identification and mitigation measures in place. The detailed risk analysis should consider the consequences of loss of position relevant to the activity.Surface/ Subsea) Floating Production Seismic and Survey vessels (Open water. January 2011 Page 22 – 3. whenever significant repairs or alterations are carried out. all DP vessels of DP Class 2 or 3 are required to have a Class approved and stamped DP FMEA and DP FMEA Proving Trials. It is noted that there have been standards developed outside the IMO DP equipment class systematics where an identical (or higher) level of redundancy has been realized based on a different philosophy and system approach. In addition compliance with IMO Guidelines requires survey and testing after defects are discovered and corrected and. The requirement for a DP FMEA has its origins in IMO MSC/Circ 645 (1994) “Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems”. For operations close to another vessel or installation the equipment class should be 3 or equivalent. This IMO requirement has been interpreted by the DP community such that the survey requirement is met by a DP FMEA (or FMECA1)) and the testing requirement by DP FMEA Proving Trials.

FMEAs are a requirement to obtain DP Class 2 and 3 notation. closed out take account of non DP systems/ auxiliary/ external systems that have interfaces with. Whilst not stipulated as a class requirement for DP 1 vessels owners/ operators are encouraged to subject their DP 1 vessels to the DP FMEA process. The review should take account of new equipment and hardware/ software updates. The results from a DP FMEA. Categories should be clearly defined. etc) and be supported by sketches and drawings for DP Class 3 vessels. B or C. configuration errors. should be consulted to gain a more detailed understanding. A DP FMEA should encompass the following: — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — identify worst case failure design intent (WCFDI) and worse case failure (WCF) identify the equipment or subsystem. Key DP personnel. such as the effects of hydrocarbon gas on engine control and safety systems. analytical processes and the technical content of a DP FMEA. audits and incidents which have been or. B For attention when reasonably convenient. A cost benefit analysis is recommended. including the vessel Master.6 of IMCA M196. pipe tensioner system or fire monitor system. not only from a compartment analysis perspective but also. the reliability and effectiveness of these mechanisms should be proven and fully documented in the DP FMEA. The failure effects equal worst case failure design intent but there is an opportunity to reduce the failure effect as reasonable cost. The failure effect exceeds worst case failure design intent or is non compliant with specified rules and guidelines.g. where significant. at the subsystem level. Improvement is required for class compliance. Relevant IMCA guidance. which can cause diesel engines to accelerate out of control resulting in catastrophic mechanical failure and potential for black out be presented as a narrative analysis of DP related systems and subsystems covering the above points (i. referred to in this section. Note: Particular attention should be paid in the DP FMEA to the interfaces between the DP system and other systems that have the potential to affect the DP system. Comments and observations related to good practice. The DP FMEA should contain an analysis of the DP control system I/Os to verify that it is consistent with the redundancy concept and should be proved at DP FMEA Proving Trials.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Operational guidance MODUs – Page 23 In addition to complying with the IMO Guidelines and the relevant DP rules of the vessel’s Classification Society the DP FMEA should achieve the standards of detail and analysis contained in the following industry guidance. January 2011 3. The findings from a DP FMEA and Proving Trials should be categorised into A. DET NORSKE VERITAS Note: Note: Note: Note: Note: . Annual DP Trials. once every five years. should be used in the formulation of operational. DPOs. Guidance note: These Guidance Notes on DP FMEAs are intentionally brief and gives a cursory overview of the underpinning philosophy. the effects of fire and flood on ESD control lines and push buttons. Where the redundancy concept relies on inter-switching mechanisms. Selection.e. Appropriate guidance is given in section 6. These systems should be subjected to the FMEA and Proving Trials approach for software. emergency response and planning decisions. e. The DP FMEA for a DP MODU should address the ESD function. — IMCA M166 “Guidance on Failure Modes and Effects Analysis” — IMCA M178 “FMEA Management Guide” — IMCA M04/04 2004 “Methods of Establishing the Safety and Reliability of DP Systems”. Installation and Use of UPS onboard Vessels”. such as where the vessel is fitted with an Emergency Shut Down (ESD) system. mode of operation and the equipment Identify all potential failure modes and their causes identify the significant single point failures identify potential hidden failures identify potential configuration errors evaluate the effects on the system of each failure mode Identify measures for eliminating or reducing the risks associated with each failure mode identify trials and testing necessary to prove the conclusions be updated after any major modifications and proving trials have been conducted be subject to review and update as necessary. should consider the effects of fire and flood. new developments in analysis and new knowledge acquired in the intervening period take account of action items from DP FMEA Proving Trials. are in the process of being. Appropriate definitions are as follows. “Guidance on the Design. C For consideration. Engineers and Electricians should have a detailed knowledge of the DP FMEA and should use the information provided to be fully informed about the capabilities and limitations of the vessel’s DP system. Class rules. A For immediate attention. e. in particular the various issues relating to the status of post activation battery power supplies (UPS). redundancy concept.g. hardware and interfaces thus ensuring the integrity of the DP system and proper integration with DP take account of common mode failures that are otherwise liable to be overlooked. and potential impact on DP and station keeping. hidden failures. in particular issues related to the vessel’s worst case failure and significant single point failures.

determine a strategy for dealing with the ranked criticalities so that remedial measures are directed appropriately in accordance with the criticality ranking. ensuring that the single point failures identified in the DP FMEA are covered in the trials and checklists. taking account of the impact of taking systems or equipment out of service — developing the vessel’s DP Operations and Emergency Response manuals and procedures — developing DP trials programs and checklists. “Specification for DP Capability Plots”. A DP FMEA should be referred to at the following times. DP FMEAs that are solely focused on attaining class notation and class approval may not always meet guidance standards stipulated in those IMCA Guidelines.5 DP Capability Plots DP Capability Plots should be calculated for the vessel. when applicable and warranted by the specific DP operations — developing planned maintenance schedules. DP Capability Plots that do not take into account thruster interaction. DP Capability Plots may have to be recalculated from time to time during the lifetime of a DP vessel. thruster-hull). unless specifically instructed to do so. M178. The Criticality Analysis should be presented in tabulated form making using of risk matrices that comply with recognised international standards such as those given in IMCA M166 or IEC 60812. e. M178. such as a crane or an accommodation module on deck will alter the vessel’s outline. M166. Criticality is derived from an assessment of the probability that a particular failure will occur combined with the severity of the failure if it does occur. These theoretical plots are calculated from detailed information of the vessel’s hull and superstructure form and available thruster power. Note: The closing out of action items should be well documented and auditable. Guidance is provided on DP Capability Plots in IMCA M140 Rev 1. where the unavailability of equipment may reduce the vessel’s DP station keeping ability — determining the DP vessel’s Well Specific Operating Guidelines (WSOG). determine and rank the criticality of the identified failure modes from highest to lowest. Polar Plot). M04/04 and Annex. wind and current) appropriate to the area in which the DP vessel is to operate. January 2011 Page 24 – 3. determine the probability of occurrence of each failure mode (using qualitative or reliable MTBF data).Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. For example. e.g. where equipment performance approaches or exceeds predetermined limits — determining the vessel’s Task Appropriate Mode. where each point on the envelope represents the wind speed at which it is calculated that the vessel will be unable to maintain position in DP. — Following the worst case failure. — — — — determine the severity of each failure mode.g. This is particularly relevant where the DP Capability Plots are included in the shipyard’s scope of supply for newbuilds. such as the DP system manufacturers. Note: The DP Capability Plots should be provided in a format that is intuitive to the user on board (e. The calculations should use environmental data (seastate. — conducting task based DP operational risk assessments. Owners/ operators should note that it is important to provide a detailed scope of work to whoever is to generate the DP Capability Plots for the vessel. DP Capability Plots should include the following scenarios at current speeds of 0. DET NORSKE VERITAS . Experience has shown that those who generate the DP Capability Plots. thruster degradation and thruster barred zones are incomplete. — Loss of most effective thruster(s). the installation of new equipment. where key personnel involved should have detailed knowledge of the DP FMEA — determining the DP vessel’s Safest Mode of Operation (SMO). or at other current speeds that are representative of the location in which the DP vessel is to operate: — Fully intact power generation and thrusters. 1 and 2 knots. The following IMCA Guidelines address the above considerations in various levels of detail. may not include the Worst Case Failure. These plots should show the limiting wind speed 360 degree envelopes for the scenarios below. M04/04 and Annex and preferably be carried out by an independent third party DP FMEA practitioner. Note to Owners Cautionary Note In the case of newbuilds. if DP FMEAs are within the shipyard’s scope of supply. in addition. Operational guidance MODUs A FMECA is an extension of an FMEA that adds a risk assessment of each failure mode to determine its criticality. owners are recommended to ensure that there are contractually binding agreements for the FMEA to meet specifications set out in IMCA Guidelines. M166.g. A DP FMECA should encompass all of the listed points in DP FMEA above and. (thruster-thruster. include the following steps. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 3. Guidance note: DP Capability Plots that do not cover Worst Case Failure are incomplete.

e. will alter the wind effect on the vessel. 10 deg/min and 0. They are actual measurements of the vessel’s DP station keeping performance in the actual environmental conditions and thruster configuration at the time the plot was taken. i. one or more thrusters are no longer available. the new loss of most effective thruster(s) and the new worst case failure condition. for loss of most effective thruster and for worst case failure. drawing appropriate vectors. Where not already covered by existing calculations the revised DP Capability Plots should cover the following cases for the new thruster condition. DPOs should consult DP Capability Plots as a matter of course whilst the vessel is conducting DP operations. This is not uncommon on vessels. Guidance note: Manual DP Footprint Plots are generated in the following manner. Some DP systems have a software application that produces DP Footprint Plots electronically. whilst the vessel is being subjected to real environmental forces. Operational guidance MODUs – Page 25 which.19. — They provide a scatter plot of vessel positions at regular intervals around the required set position (this shows accuracy of station keeping) — They also provide comparison points on the limiting wind speed envelope given in the theoretical DP Capability Plots (this shows wind speeds at which it was seen that the vessel was unable to maintain position. DP Capability Plots should be used by DPOs and other key DP personnel as a reference in the planning phases when determining the vessel’s environmental operational limits for the WSOG. due to unforeseen faults or failures or. In these circumstances the DP Capability Plots should be recalculated to take account of the changes. It is suggested that the following values are applied. in turn. It should be remembered that DP Capability Plots are theoretical calculations and that. — The vessel should be in auto DP. such as DP tankers. DP Footprint Plots serve two main purposes. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 3. to prevent misleading results. waves and current on the plotting sheet. DP Footprint Plots should be taken whenever opportunities arise. including worst case failure. Record wind. that have good fore and aft thrust capability but limited thwartship capability. DPOs should be careful when estimating the current force acting on the vessel and relating it to the DP Capability Plots. every 30 seconds. It is acknowledged that DP Footprint Plots may be of less relevance to DP MODUs. DPOs can also produce DP Footprint Plots by manual methods using a plotting sheet. loss of most effective thruster(s) and after worst case failure. — Record the rate of turn and speed of moves. Refer to plotting sheets in Sec. — Record thruster configuration on the plotting sheet. January 2011 3.6 DP Footprint Plots DP Footprint Plots should also be produced on board.3 m/sec. opportunities should be taken to validate the DP Capability Plots by taking DP Footprint Plots. — Use a proforma plotting sheet.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. 3. fully intact. in various degraded thruster configurations.e. if available. DET NORSKE VERITAS Note: .e. such as during standby periods. DP Footprint Plots originated in harsh weather regions. thus validating or contradicting the theoretical DP Capability Plots for the various thruster configurations. the new fully intact condition. Where the DP Capability Plots show an undue level of heading limitations this may restrict the vessel’s operating range. Theoretical DP Capability Plots and DP Footprint Plots combine together to enhance knowledge and understanding of the vessel’s DP station keeping ability. DPOs should be fully familiar with the limits given in the DP Capability Plots for the fully intact thruster configuration. vessel outline with thrusters indicated and space for vessel specific position reference systems and environmental data. including learning and familiarisation opportunities for DPOs and in providing snapshots of vessel station keeping behaviour for specific locations and activities. DPOs should be aware that the current force generated by the DP control system is the residual external force acting on the vessel that cannot be measured. i. When wind speeds are low the attendant vessel. comprising a 360 degree polar plotting diagram. The plots are used to gain a better understanding of the vessel’s actual station keeping performance and limitations in intact and. — Observe position excursions from the intended position by the most appropriate means. DP Capability Plots should be readily available to the DPOs at the DP control console. wherever possible. Plots should be taken for the thruster configurations used in the DP Capability Plots. DP Capability Plots may also have to be recalculated for thruster configurations where. DP Footprint Plots are not theoretical. such as in the North Sea.) DP Footprint Plots serve other purposes. plotting the vessel’s position regularly. respectively. See below.g. due to essential maintenance requirements. weather downtime or on arrival at the field. could be used to estimate current by going into drift mode.

Example 2 shows a DP Footprint Plot for the rig’s worst case failure condition with four thrusters operational. Example 1 shows a DP Footprint Plot for the rig’s fully intact condition with all eight thrusters operational. then it may be necessary to pull in the limiting wind envelope on the DP Capability Plot to the upper wind speed determined by the DP Footprint Plot for these conditions. Cautionary Note: The DP Footprint Plot positions will contain systematic position reference errors.The known circumstances at the time of taking the DP Footprint Plot. A relative system can be used as an absolute system if installed on a point that is a fixed geographical position. Notwithstanding these. of wind. in which the rig failed to maintain position. The plot shows that the rig was unable to maintain position with the wind and sea on the port quarter. An absolute system gives vessel geographical position. absolute indicates that this position reference sensor is independent of another fixed or floating offshore structure. both with regard to restrictions caused by the manner of deployment and expected performance in working situations. Both worked examples are for the same DP semi submersible drilling rig and in the same environmental conditions. radios etc. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 3. It is generally not recommended to install multiple satellite based systems at the expenses of other systems. January 2011 Page 26 – 3. Current was 1 coincident at 1 knot. Fanbeam. A relative system gives vessel position in relation to a non-fixed reference. LBL) Taut wire (See Note 2) Artemis Laser (e. Position reference systems comprise absolute and relative systems. should not be used during critical operations such as sub-sea operations. The following are the most common position reference systems in use: Absolute DGNSS (DGPS and GLONASS) Acoustic (USBL.g.g.7 Position Reference Systems and Sensors The DP vessel should be equipped with suitable position reference and sensors in accordance with the vessel’s DP class notation and operational requirements. Operational guidance MODUs Sec. RADius. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- DET NORSKE VERITAS . SBL. Where operational uptime is one of the key success factors the benefit gained by consciously exceeding the minimum requirements are to be evaluated. For purposes of this document. If there is a significant difference between the two. an acoustic absolute system can be used as a relative system if attached to a non-fixed asset. It could be debated that Taut Wire and Acoustic Position reference systems are relative position reference systems.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Example 2 . DP reference systems sensitive to interferences from the vessels radars.3. And. particularly if the DP Capability Plot shows that the vessel can maintain position in the given condition.19 contains two worked examples. Other benefits of exceeding minimum requirements include greater redundancy and improved station keeping performance. operational guidance on position reference systems and sensors is given in the table on the next page. Additional position reference systems should be based on different principles. The plot shows that the vessel was able to maintain position within +/. wave height and thruster configuration. Wind was 45 to 50 knots from 225 degrees with a corresponding wave height of 6 m. They should be similar in that the DP Capability Plot should also show that vessel will be unable to maintain position in conditions where a 45 to 50 knots wind is on the port quarter. RadaScan) DARPS Class rules give minimum requirements for the number of position references. Relative Note 1: Note 2: Caution: Caution: Guidance note: The reference system may be subject to contract specifications/ oil major requirements. can be compared against the environmental envelope plotted on the theoretical DP Capability Plot for worst case failure. Cyscan) Radar (e.2 meters with the wind and sea on the port quarter. Position reference systems should be selected with due consideration to operational requirements.

Recommended Absolute Position Reference Systems USBL/ SSBL (See Note 1 below) <700 m <700 m N N <700 m <700 m <700 m N <700 m <700 m <700 m <700 m <700 m <700 m <700 m NA <700 m >700 m NA NA <m >700 m <350 m 2 2 1 >700 m <350 m 2 Y Y N N >700 m <350 m 3 Y >700 m <350 m 2 Y Y Y Y Y N N >700 m <350 m 2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N >700 m <350 m 3 N N N >700 m <350 m 2 N N N N N Y N Y Y Y N N N N 3 Y Y Y N >700 m <350 m 3 Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y N N N Y N N >700 m <350 m 3 Y Y Y N N >700 m <350 m 3 Y Y Y N N N N 3 Y Y Y N N N N 3 Y Y Y N N >700 m <350 m 3 Y Y Y N N >700 m <350 m 3 LBL Taut Min (See Wire Number Note 1 (See (See below) Note 12 Note 3 below) below) Application on DP GPS SBL (See Note 1 below) Drilling If in deep open water <700 m Recommended Relative Position References Systems if in close proximity to an offshore Sensors structure Artemis Laser Radar Gangway DARPS Min Fixed TLP/SPAR/ TLP/SPAR/ Gyros. 5 & 6 (See Notes 4. January 2011 3. Sensors below*) 5 & 6 below*) 5 & 6 below*) (See Note 7 below) Y Y Y N N 3 mixed 3 mixed abs & 3 relative only 3 abs & rel rel 3 relative only 3 relative only 3 relative only 3 relative only 3 relative only 3 relative only 3 relative only 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 NA 2 1 2 2 3 NA NA NA * 3 * 2 2 3 * * NA NA * * NA NA 3 3 2 1 or < Diving N DGNSS (DGPS + GLONASS) (See Note 2 below) Redundant one dual frequency Y <700 m Pipelay N Y N Umbilical Lay N Y N Riser Pull in N Y <700 m Lifting N Y <700 m Accommodation N Y <700 m Shuttle Offtake N Y N DET NORSKE VERITAS ROV Support N Y <700 m 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel * 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel * Floating Production Unit Well Stim N Y <700 m *See Note 8 below NA N unless open water N Y <700 m Y <700 m N Y <700 m 2 mixed abs 2 and rel 3 mixed abs & 3 relative only rel N Y <700 m N Y <700 m Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Operational guidance MODUs – Page 27 OSV Snatch Lifts OSV HAZMAT Transfer no quick disconnect OSV HAZMAT Transfer with quick disconnect OSV with shaft gens and single stern thruster Wind Turbine installation Standby Vessels N Y NA Y Y <700 m . (See Notes 4. platform etc < min etc > min VRUs and (See Notes movement movement Wind 4.

In these situations a mix of absolute and relative position reference systems for station keeping is to be used only after validating that movement of the floating structure. where the USBL is typically used to calibrate the LBL system. Care should be taken at all times when using satellite based systems close to platforms.overcome the update rate limitations of speed of sound in water. Although the abbreviations differ they both refer to the same acoustic application although supplied by different vendors. Where multiple DGPS systems are being used. are referred to in the above table. FPSOs/ TLPs/ Spars) – When carrying out DP activities in close proximity to or in conjunction with floating facilities it is strongly recommended that redundant relative position reference systems are used. radio interference and multipath. as the sole source for positioning information and use the relative positioning system. wherever possible. Only where it is impractical to use systems based on different principles may all be of the same type. This can be accomplished by installing the transponder/ beacon onto the submerged part of the TLP or Spar at an appropriate depth. this would require the use of separate and independent hull transceivers. (Satellite Systems) – Satellite based systems that use a combination of signals from DGPS and GLONASS satellites provide enhanced redundancy over systems that use only a single satellite source. This is of particular significance where DGPS is concerned where the satellite constellation provides a source for a common mode failure. Owners/ operators should consider the advantages of hybrid GNSS/ IMU positioning systems. The DPOs must be extremely vigilant when using a mix of absolute and relative position references and must be fully aware of the potential danger of diverging positioning information from both types of system.g.overcome the limitations on satellite based position reference systems brought upon by poor satellite geometry. (Absolute Systems) . this would require the use of different masts for the satellite antennae. does not impact station keeping. (DP at non fixed Assets.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. separate cable routeing. such as the masking of GPS signals. For instance. Good DGPS close to structures should be considered as a bonus. although normally considered as an absolute system. multiple acoustic systems are completely separated and independent in all respects. It is recommended that. Where there is diversity of vendors and software it is recommended that the acceptance/ rejection logic is verified against the DP system manufacturer’s specifications. It is recommended that. It should also be noted that there are non fixed offshore facilities. e. For instance. consideration should be given to set each system with a different elevation mask. wherever possible. such as the Kongsberg Seatex 4D system.When using DGPS/ GLONASS in a mix of absolute and relative position reference systems. multiple satellite based systems are completely separated and independent in all respects. The minimum movement referred to in the table above refers to the actual measured movement of floating facility. such as during times of scintillation and satellite ageing. Owners/ operators should consider the advantages of acoustic positioning systems that have an inertial navigation input. January 2011 Page 28 – 3. if any. This enhancement can fill the “holes” in positioning information in extraordinary and difficult conditions that otherwise might invalidate the satellite based positioning information. e. FPSO/TLP/SPAR. sited on the floating facility to measure the fluctuations in its movement. which highlights potential problems when within 150 m of a platform. Some TLPs and Spars are fitted with suitable subsea brackets or cradles for transponders/ beacons. In these locations DGPS should not be considered as the primary position reference system. where an inertial input is applied to the satellite based system’s position calculation. in particular where there are two satellite based systems in a mix of DET NORSKE VERITAS Note 2: Note 3: Note 4: Note 5: . Guidance is given in IMCA M141.g. .Where multiple absolute systems are used it is recommended that they are based on two different principles. can be used as a relative system. There have been incidents in the past where diversity of vendors and software has resulted in loss of position due to the acceptance of erroneous values within the software. (Absolute and Relative Systems) . USBL and SSBL. Operational guidance MODUs Note 1: (Acoustics) – The acoustic LUSBL system is not included in the above table since it is a combination of USBL and LBL in one system. Standalone USBL systems are not the norm on DP drilling MODUs. “Guidelines on the Use of DGPS as a Position Reference in DP Control Systems”. such as RADius or Fanbeam. such as TLPs and Spars where an acoustic system. such as the Kongsberg HAIN (Hydro Acoustic Inertial Navigation) system or Sonardyne’s AAINS (Acoustically Aided Inertial Navigation System) both of which can: . This is so that any jump in position that may occur when a satellite comes into view will hit one DGPS before the next and will give the DPO some time to take action. different vendors and software. such as DGPS. The abbreviations. masking of differential signals. To measure this movement the DP vessel should use an absolute position reference system.

Some systems use automatic input from GPS for these corrections. The effects of incorrect latitude or. January 2011 3. is deemed acceptable. including ABS and DNV already require three gyro compasses for a DP class 2 notation. that affect these ultrasonic sensors. Examples of this are pseudo Artemis or pseudo acoustics. heavy rain and birds. It is possible for thruster wash to interact with a taut wire. It should be noted that some Classification Societies. This can be avoided by ensuring that the tension control is properly calibrated and operating within specified parameters and that the angle of wire inclination is kept as near to vertical as is possible and should not normally exceed 10 degrees. Note 6: Wherever practical and feasible it is recommended that redundancy requirements are met by diversity of suppliers. users should bear in mind the possibility of the offshore structure blocking the satellite signals and the consequences for station keeping. DPOs should be aware of the potential for this to occur. the DPOs should monitor the weightings closely so as to ensure that no one system or set of systems is ‘hogging” the weighting. acting as a strong current and causing position instability. the consequences for station keeping of common mode failures. The thruster wash could be from own vessel or from another vessel close by. It is therefore recommended to use manual input of latitude and speed. (Sensors) . where an erroneous or invalid input could result in extreme values and distortion of external forces and result in large position excursion (drive off) from the desired set point position. e. which have a potential to affect the DP system and station keeping should there be an erroneous or invalid input from them. An often practiced procedure which should prevent the above problems is to input these values manually and not to rely on the automatic input function. irrespective of the requirements of the applicable Classification Society DP rules. Wind sensors are known to have suffered common mode failures. Gyro compasses are normally fitted with a correction facility which inputs the vessel’s latitude and speed. Taut wire weights should also be placed clear of pipelines. (Taut wires) – Care should be exercised when lowering or repositioning taut wire weights that divers and ROVs are alerted and are a safe distance from the seabed position. DPOs should recognise the potential dangers of using multiple satellite based systems (>2) in the suite of position reference systems and that this could result in skewed ‘weighting” in favor of satellite systems at the expense of other position references. All necessary precautions should be taken to ensure that the vessel’s station keeping is not affected and should be addressed in the FMEA. These include draft sensors and pipelay tension sensors. manifolds or other subsea assets. as is normal. other than heading. There should be means of preventing erroneous values from being accepted by DP. DPOs should be alert to the potential for taut wire weights to “skip” along the seabed and provide inaccurate positioning information. speed could result in a significant error in output heading. Where it is unavoidable. by the ROV. may be prevented by fitting mechanical wind sensors. The practice of connecting survey and DP is not recommended. DP vessels are frequently fitted with sensor systems.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307.g. It is recommended that no more than two satellite based position reference systems be used to provide position solution as inputs into DP. DPOs should have ultimate control over the input. then redundancy in relative position reference sensors should be considered. if any. This practice is not recommended unless accompanied by a detailed risk analysis and the residual risk. New or retrofitted position references are sometimes interfaced into DP through inout designed for other position references because the DP control system has not been designed to accept it. if fitted. Care should also be taken that the taut wires are not fouled by other subsea lines or obstructions. including ultrasonic types. more importantly. This is not recommended since there are a number of system errors that can result in undesired heading changes.Given the impact on heading/ position keeping it is recommended that vessels with an equivalent DP 2 class notation are provided with three gyro compasses. DET NORSKE VERITAS Note 7: Note 8: Note 9: Note 10: Note 11: Note 12: . motion and wind. This applies equally to sensors such as gyro compasses. lightening. It is therefore important to ensure that the latitude and speed corrections are applied. e. isolation between the systems is to be provided. There should also be means of ensuring that erroneous values are prevented from being input manually. Where ultrasonic type wind sensors are fitted.g. All types of wind sensor are vulnerable. Operational guidance MODUs – Page 29 three. multiple position references are in use by DP. VRUs and wind sensors. These subsea assets should be positively identified prior to positioning taut wire weights. satellite based position reference systems from different manufacturers and differential signals from different sources. Where it is anticipated that due to operational requirements the DP vessel will require to be positioned in close proximity to the non fixed facility and where the potential for shadowing of DGPS exists. Where. such as icing in higher latitudes.

5% of water depth in 95% of measurements. particularly at points of weakness. two different satellite systems (for example. The adoption of these standards should enable the DP drilling unit to operate anywhere in the world.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. especially in high current areas. Taut wires are quite highly stressed for marine wire ropes and are liable to breakage. Taut wire systems are known to suffer inaccuracies at water depths over 350 m. Note: Inn deepwater applications where weighting adjustments by DPO may be required. DP drillship or DP semi) (for example. — Consideration should be given to using USBL as a top down means of calibrating LBL systems. IALA MF and UHF). transponders should have an acoustic release function. including the taut wire touching the side of own vessel or. Each acoustic system should have redundancy in the input of sensors (gyros and VRUs) and each transducer/ hydrophone should have redundancy in electrical supply. — Acoustic systems operating in a master/ slave relationship or hot standby should be avoided. such as continuous wear at the spot on the main sheave. Note 13: It is important that software. January 2011 Page 30 – 3. They should simultaneously supply the DP controllers as totally independent position reference systems. This should be taken into consideration when planning DP operations. Each system should have double redundancy in the differential signal reception system as follows. Most DP systems will detect this fault. The primary receivers should have GPS dual frequency (L1/L2) in addition to one GLONASS receiver. This will optimise calibration times as well as improving accuracy. Attention is drawn to IMO MSC/Circ 645 where three MRU/VRUs are stipulated when vessel positioning is fully dependent on correct MRU/VRU signals. or by a faulty gimbal sensor. parameters and values used by position reference systems are compatible with the software and acceptance criteria used by the DP control system and that this is verified by analysis and testing. otherwise being restricted in its movement. Hydroacoustic Systems — A minimum of two independent acoustic systems each one with internal redundancy as to transponders/ beacons and transducers/ hydrophones capable of operating in maximum specified water depths with such a configuration that allows a minimum of 0. continuous wear at any guide blocks and kinks or damage caused by poor spooling or where the wire is attached to the weight. there is potential for interference by the use of equipment provided by multiple acoustic vendors. Operational guidance MODUs DPOs should also be aware of the potential for taut wire systems to become a “perfect” reference. — The acoustic systems should have as additional function the primary actuation of the acoustic system driving the back up of BOP (with redundancy) via hull transducers. DPOs should ensure that the warning and alarm limits are properly set and operational. Further. Weights are in the region of 400 kg to 500 kg.e. DP drillship or DP semi) should have a number of transponders/ beacons sufficient to constitute submarine arrays capable of operating in the maximum water depth. including redundancy on the bottom for the configuration of each operational mode and the back ups on the surface. The BOP specific portable acoustic unit should be used only in circumstantial situations. Note: Availability of the local radio system Infrastructure varies by region DET NORSKE VERITAS . Satellite Based Systems — Two independent satellite positioning systems should be in operation. The potential for wire breakage is reduced by regular inspection of the taut wire system and by slipping and cutting (cropping) the taut wire on a regular basis. This can have different causes. detailed procedures are to be provided. The designation of weight or deselection of a faulty position reference system should be performed automatically by the DP controllers without DPO intervention.e. Also at water depths under 350 m severe inaccuracies may occur. such as failure of the primary system or abandonment of the platform. — The unit (i. each with minimum accuracy of three meters. The wires in use in modern taut wire systems are generally 5 mm or 6 mm in diameter. Cautionary Note: where acoustic BOP systems are required. Inmarsat and Spot Beam) and two different radio systems (distinct frequencies and redundant transmitter stations with range covering the whole operational scenario of the Unit (i. Regional Requirements for DP Drilling Units Owners/ operators of DP drilling units should consider adopting the following standards for hydroacoustic and satellite systems for deepwater DP drilling operations.

e. This mode is appropriate for connected shuttle tanker/ FPSO operations. both with regard to restrictions caused by the activity and performance criteria required to execute the activity safely and successfully.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. where the DP control system allows the vessel’s heading to rotate to minimize external forces acting on the vessel and thruster requirements. Guidance note: The following table lists the recommended DP control modes that apply to different DP activities. acting on their own. normally by reducing gain and relaxing the DP controller. The term “weathervane” has a specific meaning in the DP shuttle tanker industry. The following selected DP control modes are relevant to specific DP activities. Neither the heading nor the position of the DP vessel is fixed. These terms should not be confused. DET NORSKE VERITAS . current and waves around a fixed or moving point called the terminal point. around the terminal point. January 2011 3. which is separate from the environment. i. The heading of the vessel is controlled to point towards the terminal point. The vessel specific DP Operations Manual should contain sufficient detail of these operating modes and features. called the setpoint circle. Where the measured external force acting on the vessel. would move the vessel away from the structure. Activity on DP Weather Down Weather Only (See Note 1 below) N N N N N N N N N NA if class 1 if class 1 Y N Needs to head into weather Y if class 1 External Force Comp N N Y N Y N N N N N N N N N N N DP Control Mode Target Weather Vane Follow (See Note 2 below) N N N N N N N N Y N N N Y N Y Y Y N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N N Heavy Lift Mode N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N Drilling Diving Pipelay Umbilical Lay Riser Pull in (See Note 3) Lifting Accommodation Shuttle Offtake ROV Support Floating Production Unit Well Stim OSV Snatch Lifts OSV HAZMAT Transfer no quick disconnect OSV HAZMAT Transfer with quick disconnect OSV with shaft gens and single stern thruster Standby Vessels Note 1: Note 2: Note 3: The term “down weather” means that the vessel is on that side of the offshore structure where the environmental forces. This mode is used to account for pipe tensions in a pipe layer and hawser tension in a shuttle tanker Used to compensate for the varying forces exerted on vessel from the fire monitors. Caution: It is not uncommon for the term “weathervane” to be used to denote “minimum thrust”. Target Follow Heavy Lift External Force Compensation Fire Monitor Compensation Weathervane Enables the DP vessel to follow a moving target and is used. for example.8 Recommended DP Control Modes for DP Activities The DP vessel should be equipped with suitable DP modes and features with due consideration to operational requirements. — The satellite systems should provide the DP controllers with positioning reference information simultaneously and independently. Operational guidance MODUs – Page 31 — Each satellite positioning system should have redundancy in the input of sensors (gyros and VRUs). Enables the DP vessel to rotate with the wind. to follow an ROV along a pipeline Takes account of the effects of the load transfer on the mass of the vessel and the additional lateral force. The position of the vessel is controlled to follow a circle. 3. An alternative term is that the vessel is on the “force off” side of the structure. — Antennae (both primary GPS and differential) should be situated in different places on the Unit spaced apart in order to guarantee redundancy and minimize shadow sectors. is included in the DP calculation and treated as a force feed forward.

additions. The list below is a typical list for a DP dive support vessel. to demonstrate redundancy and functional limitations of the DP system.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. This may be different from the regime as defined by class. Annual DP Trials also provide the opportunities for training of the vessel’s crew and enhancement of their knowledge of failure modes and their effects. such as DP MODUs carrying out subsea construction activities. Being part of their scope. to validate repairs and preventive maintenance. Pre-Dive Checklist: A series of checks performed prior to commencing diving operations. DP Location Set Up Checklist: A series of checks to demonstrate that the vessel is properly set up for the location. The tests should be designed to prove system redundancy. Main and back up communication tests should be included in this process. DP drilling units are not usually able to meet the above criteria for conducting Annual DP Trials at a specific time once a year. “Guidelines for Annual DP Trials for DP Mobile Offshore Drilling Units”. These tests should also include the testing of interfaces between different vendor systems and equipment. Where DP vessels. as defined in the DP FMEA. DP Field Arrival Trials: A series of checks and tests that confirm satisfactory performance of the DP system and verify the set up mode of operation and DP functions. The guidance sets out a regime of annual testing that is conducted on an incremental basis throughout the year as opportunities arise but needs to be completed within a twelve month period. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 3. system performance and equipment functionality. Annual DP Trials should be performed at a specific occasion once a year and within 3 months of the anniversary of the previous year’s trials. is operated in accordance with. upgrades repairs. these trials may be subject to survey and approval by class. applicable standards and guidelines. are engaged in activities outside their normal scope they should do so using the recommended DP control mode. DP Mobilization Trials: A series of tests to be carried out at the start of a contract. ECR Checklists: A series of checks and tests that verify that the vessel’s set up and configuration of systems and equipment meet the requirements of the necessary mode of operation as determined by the Safest Mode of Operation (SMO) and the DP Class or the Task Appropriate Mode (TAM). and test the operation of protection and detection devices and responses so as to demonstrate that the vessel’s DP system remains fit for purpose. subject to client requirements. Annual DP Trials: A series of tests of fault and failure conditions relevant to the DP System. This may mean that the mode has to be installed in the DP control system. January 2011 Page 32 – 3. Owners/ operators should refer to the following list of trials and checklists when developing an appropriate regime for their own DP vessels. in particular the satisfactory performance of the position reference systems. These tests should be conducted immediately following launching of a new build vessel and following modifications. Operational guidance MODUs Note 4: Note 5: Note 6: The DPOs are to familiarize themselves with operational constraints/ requirements of these modes and features. owing to heavy operational demands. Endurance Trials: (new build/ system modifications class requirement): To prove the operation of the DP system under load conditions for at least 4 hours without significant alarms of the DP system. This is given in IMCA M191. Note: Experience has shown that.9 Trials and Checklists A range of trials and checklists is to be provided for each DP vessel and implemented as a verification that the vessel’s DP system complies with and. This verification process should confirm the failure modes and their effects on the systems and equipment analysed in the DP FMEA document (to include the Worst Case Failure) and the vessel’s station keeping ability following its Worst Case Failure. DP FMEA Proving Trials: A series of tests used to prove expected effects of failure modes found in the FMEA desktop analysis. A detailed and documented risk assessment should be carried out when it is planned to perform any of the above activities without the recommended DP control mode. DET NORSKE VERITAS . This has been recognized by the industry with publication of specific guidance relating to the conduct of Annual DP Trials for DP MODUs.

A series of checks and tests that are used to determine the effects of modifications and/ or additions on the DP system and the vessel’s subsequent station keeping performance. Watch Status/ 6 Hour Checklist The purpose of these checks is to record the status of the DP system and configuration. 500 m Checks 500 m checks are not normally applicable to DP MODUs. It is recognized that these trials and checklists could be given other titles. change or upgrade to the DP system is fully tested and that the vessel’s redundancy concept has not been affected. DP Mobilization Trials These trials should be carried out by the vessel’s crew as part of the mobilizing program prior to the start of a new project. “. sea trials. owners/ operators should use the vessel specific DP FMEA and Proving Trials as the principal source for developing the Annual DP Trials program. The checks should verify that the vessel’s station keeping performance at the working location is satisfactory and. Testing should follow on from a detailed FMEA type analysis of the change which should be fully documented. The checks should also ensure that the DP system is set up properly. They should also provide assurance of the integrity of the vessel’s DP system and the vessel’s operational limitations. The tests carried out at these trials are less than are carried out at Annual DP Trials but more than at DP Field Arrival Checks. When faults identified during the year on similar DP MODUs are determined to be feasible on the vessel then additional tests should be incorporated in the trials program. Note: The remainder of this subsection on Annual DP Trials is on hold pending formal publication of IMCA guidance on Annual DP Trials which is under development at the time of preparing this document. Only vessels engaged in support activities to remain within the 500 m zone of the DP MODU.” Using the above quotation as the background... M191 guidance describes a regime of annual testing that is conducted on an incremental basis throughout the year as opportunities arise but needs to be completed within a twelve month period. Note: The nomenclature used for the trials and checklists listed above is based on the guideline document. Operational guidance MODUs – Page 33 500 m Checks: Watch Status/ 6 Hour Checklist: Post DP Incident Trials: Post DP Modification Trials: Hardware in the Loop (HIL) tests A series of checks and tests performed before entering the 500 m zone of an asset in which set up mode and functions are verified and confirmed... Approval is then obtained to operate in close proximity to the asset. IMCA M112: “Guidelines for Auditing Vessels with DP Systems”. periodical tests and testing after upgrades. The 500 m zone is not to be used as a standby location unless required to support a specific activity. It can be used in factory acceptance tests. No testing is carried out. to improve the DP system safety and performance by testing faults and failure conditions important to DP safety to prove the ability of the vessel to keep position after single point failures associated with the IMO equipment class and to verify the FMEA requirements. The tests should confirm the vessel’s redundancy concept and station keeping performance after worst case failure. failures and performance by using advanced simulation techniques and embedded systems. auto DP and all control modes. not during the first few minutes of the watch. The purpose of these checks is to ensure satisfactory operation of the DP system and should include a full functional check of the operation of all thrusters and power generating equipment and systems. Guidance will be provided in a subsequent revision of this document. A series of checks and tests performed by the DPOs to verify and confirm the set up of the DP system prior to taking over the DP watch.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. DP Field Arrival Checks These checks should be carried out on arrival at the field. annual tests. Main and back up communication tests should be included in this process. All OSVs and others vessels should undertake 500 m checks. that the position reference systems are properly set up and operating satisfactorily. M191 gives the purpose of Annual DP Trials as follow. DPOs should complete the checklist prior to taking over the watch. Post Modification/ Upgrade DP Trials It is essential to ensure that any modification.. extensive testing of functionality. DET NORSKE VERITAS . in particular. M191 also recognises the contribution that planned maintenance systems can play in verifying the status and performance of certain DP equipment throughout the year. Tests performed to ensure that the corrective/ repair measures taken following a DP incident have properly addressed the causes of the incident and that the vessel’s DP system is in a safe and operable condition. Guidance note: Annual DP Trials for MODUs The following guidelines apply to the development and the conduct of Annual DP Trials for a DP MODU in accordance with guidance contained in IMCA M191. January 2011 3.

DP incident handling and alert systems and vessel specific trials and checklists that apply uniquely to the vessel. The potential for this adverse situation should be assessed and appropriate preventative measures put in place. such as company policies. January 2011 Page 34 – 3. engineers and electricians. as follows. vessel DP capabilities. operating limits. The manual should be readily accessible to all relevant DP personnel. Guidance on the contents of vessel specific DP Operations Manuals is provided in the following IMCA guidelines. Owners/ operators may wish to refer to the following guidance when developing the vessel/ rig specific DP operations manual. etc. DP operating procedures. appendices should be kept on the DP navigating bridge. the planning and preparation of DP operations. The vessel specific manual may also contain generic content. In this example the installation of a more up to date and faster OS computer resulted in the new computer re-booting too early and failing to “ride through” the brief power interruption that resulted from the activation of a changeover relay. This will include ESD systems installed on DP MOUs. procedures and standing orders. Procedures should highlight criteria for initiation and consequences. This will include a clear statement on the DP philosophy for the vessel. vessel technical data and layout. where relevant. each with different requirements for content. Due consideration should be given to initiating disconnect sequence preceding an ESD resulting in a black out. The manual should contain sufficiently detailed instruction and guidance to enable the vessel to be operated safely in DP and safely execute its intended activities. This resulted in the temporary loss of that operator station. DPOs. including checklists as appropriate.” The manual should be a standalone document in hard copy. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 3. operating modes. it may be useful provide the operator with a thruster and generator operating strategy (TAGOS) to assist in the decision on what generators and thrusters to use for different circumstances and different equipment availabilities. responsibilities and roles of key DP personnel. Each Classification Society has its own specific requirements for a DP Operations Manual. Owners/ operators at their discretion. such as Emergency Disconnect Systems (EDS(disconnect sequence)) on MODUs. training and competency. The recommendations set out below address areas that are not necessarily required by class. M103. emergency procedures.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. M117 (contingency training) and in class society DP rules. the organisation. The manual should address operating issues relating to equipment and systems that are interfaced to the DP system. test procedures and DP operating instructions to be incorporated into one manual. The various tasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel. The vessel specific DP Operations Manual is the most important operational document in the list of required documents. Operational guidance MODUs The following example shows the inherent dangers of failing to take proper account of change. Detailed procedures are to be developed for operating ESD. They are based on current industry practices. Guidance note: The provision and development of the manual is the responsibility of the DP vessel owner or manager and should be incorporated in the company’s SMS and. The manual should represent the way the vessel is operated in DP. watchkeeping and manning. including the master. may provide this in an electronic format. The requirement for a manual has its origins in IMO MSC/Circ 645 (1994) “Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems”. tensioner systems on Pipelay vessels. At least one controlled copy including any updates and. Section 1 Management of DP Operations (company/ rig specific) Company/ rig standing operational policies Basic principles of DP. functional overview of a DP control system Vessel/ rig specific overview of DP system (vessel overview document) DET NORSKE VERITAS . “The Company should establish procedures for the preparation of plans and instructions.10 DP Operations Manuals A vessel specific DP Operations Manual should be prepared for each DP vessel. All relevant DP personnel should be given sufficient opportunity to familiarise themselves fully with the document and should be fully conversant with the sections of the manual that relate to their duties and responsibilities. for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the ship and the prevention of pollution. The IMO Guidelines require a series of checklists. This should include interfaces between systems and equipment that are not part of the DP system but which may affect the DP system. M109. where necessary. where the consequences of an automatic shutdown triggered by an ESD may result in well control problems. developed and managed in accordance with Requirement 7 of the ISM Code. which states. For complicated power systems and/ or thruster configurations. The manual should specifically address operational interfaces between different vendor systems and equipment to ensure that they are configured and operated properly.

transit and field arrival checklists. auto/ manual emergency shutdown systems (ESD). internal and external. DP log keeping and documentation. electrical systems. simultaneous operations. squalls. Section 4 Organisation and Responsibility DP organisation. bridge and engine room. Development of WSOG (well specific operating guidelines). position reference system planning. collision. simultaneous operations Communications. standby time. adverse and heavy weather procedures. loss of redundancy. emergency disconnect systems. close out and record keeping. running and pulling riser. Operational guidance MODUs – Page 35 Vessel/ rig specific DP philosophy.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. including drive off. integration with well planning. (The failure modes of these systems and the potential effects on the vessel’s station keeping ability should be addressed in the DP FMEA). including. examples. beacon log. Section 3 DP Operations Procedures Procedure for planning DP operations. key DP personnel. field arrival checklists. vessel/ rig DP station keeping capabilities Related DP guidance and reference documents. taut wires. operations in strong currents. testing. electrical officers. drillers shack. degraded and emergency conditions. DP system set up. investigation. well planning and pre-departure checklists. disconnecting BOP. rig superintendent. WSOG. landing BOP. including hydrophones. DP incidents and equipment failure reports. TAGOS) Power management. requiring input from riser analysis and drift off study. etc Communications systems. DP computers and operator stations and networks. chief engineer. DP drilling interfaces. operation and recovery. optimum position and heading. DP training. flex joint angles. monthly DP status report. power and propulsion set up. slip joint and tensioner stroke. proven blackout recovery times and EDS (disconnect sequence) times and determination of red and yellow watch circles. DGNSS/ Hydroacoustic/ riser angle monitoring and management. emergency training. etc. position and heading changes. distribution. 500 m safety zone operations. other emergency and alert systems. stabbing in. emergency procedures. operating modes Position reference systems and sensors. gyros. emergency disconnect system (EDS-(disconnect sequence)). mobilisation trials. open/ closed bus-tie configurations. vortex induced vibrations. offset and turn testing. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- DET NORSKE VERITAS . familiarisation and competency assessment. Annual DP Trials. drills and exercises DP reporting and record keeping. watchkeeping duties. engineers. manning levels Duties and responsibilities of key personnel involved in DP operations. DGPS set up and differential corrections. fire and flood DP control system and automation. battery procedures. DPOs. reporting. January 2011 3. wind sensors draft sensors. including onboard organisation. black out. Operator Intervention Appendix. ETOs. WSOG communications and response procedures. driller. blowout/ shallow gas. including running/ pulling BOP. routine and emergency. skills development. master. etc. special operations. severe weather. current sensors. watchhandover checklists. reporting matrix. alert systems. Disconnect systems. DP incident definition. external locations. including voyage. ROV operations. ESD trials. SMO. etc Position reference system deployment. tests and trials reporting. DP technical and operational support onshore and offshore. including environmental criteria. other PRS procedures Normal DP marine operations. including onboard programs and experience levels. VRUs. acoustic arrays. riser management. DP desk procedures. fire and/ or explosion. drifting. auxiliary systems. Section 2 DP System Description and Operation (vessel/ rig specific) Power generation. drift off. environmental envelopes. helicopter operations. DP handover procedures. vendor reports. DP correspondence. including routine internal communications. stress limitations and wellhead bending moments. Emergency DP procedures. Onboard watch routines. worst case failure. location set up checklists. data logging. advisory. DP standing orders. force off. typical communications protocols and messages. loss of well control. thrusters and propulsion (thruster and generator operating strategy. use of DP capability analysis and DP footprints. risk assessment. Development of well specific criteria for normal. loss of DP position references. including daily reporting. including weather log. toolpusher. required levels of redundancy.

— The activity being performed and the necessary time to terminate to bring vessel to a safe position upon the onset of failure. documented: — Configuration for the Safest Mode of Operation (SMO) or. On a DP MOUs. Operational guidance MODUs 3. Every DP vessel/ rig has a unique safest mode of operation which must be determined from a detailed understanding of the vessel’s DP FMEA and its operational characteristics. including DP Class 2 and 3. It is suggested that the results of this review are summarised in a vessel overview document. — SIMOPS and marine vessel interaction and consequences arising from change of status (Green to Blue. Guidance note: Safest Mode of Operation (SMO) Any DP vessel/ rig. TAGOS could be useful tool to onboard new personnel involved in operations. It may be appropriate in situations where it is determined by risk assessment that the consequences of a loss of position are considered to be low enough to permit a lesser standard of DP redundancy. accepting that a single failure could result in exceeding worst case failure and could. where a loss of position will not result in damage to people or hardware. The WSOG performs the same function as Activity Specific Operating Guidelines (ASOG). Yellow or Red). — Consequences of a loss of position and/ or heading. Appropriate measures should be in place to clearly identify critical tasks/ operational phases of the activity and to ensure that the vessel is set up in Safest Mode of Operation and operating within post WCF capability. i. Task Appropriate Mode (TAM) A Task Appropriate Mode is a risk based mode that the DP vessel/ rig may be set up and operated in. and in Safest Example 2: A DP pipelay vessel may operate in this mode when more than 500 m from a surface or mission critical subsea asset. In planning and preparing for the activities the following should be considered and. functionality and operation and so that no single failure will exceed worst case failure. A central component in the WSOG is proven knowledge of black out recovery time. including the vessel/ rig or the environment.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. The SMO sets out the required equipment configurations and operational standards necessary for the vessel to meet its maximum level of redundancy. Note: The WSOG should be developed by extracting all the relevant information from detailed technical review of the vessel’s DP FMEA. can have the redundancy concept defeated if its systems and equipment are not configured or operated in the correct way. A detailed review of the DP FMEA is done with a view to identify safest mode. The WSOG should be accompanied by a single line drawing (SLD) of the power generation. which relate to non drilling activities. both intact and residual capability. such that any other operational mode would be of a lesser standard than the SMO. For diesel electric vessels the TAM may mean operating with closed bus. The WSOG differs from the SMO and TAM in that the WSOG sets the operational. where appropriate. to a specific well operation. January 2011 Page 36 – 3. vessel/ rig movement from the wellhead measured in time after loss of all propulsion power in a number of DET NORSKE VERITAS Mode. when Time to Terminate is long. following Worst Case Failure (WCF). The WSOG should be validated on board. and in Safest Mode when inside 500 m. operational manuals and project specific procedures. This overview document in conjunction with SMO. The SMO should be the default operational mode for a DP vessel/ rig. Well Specific Operating Guidelines (WSOG) The WSOG differs from the SMO and TAM in that it relates specifically to a known location and activity and. — Limitations imposed upon operations by residual capability. Reference should also be made to the drift off study and the riser analysis for the intended location.11 Activity Operational Planning In recognizing that exposure to risks manifests itself during vessel operations it is recommended that activities performed by DP vessels should be subject to planning and preparation. — Activities should include day to day operations. The drift off study will provide. result in blackout or loss of position. — Capabilities of the vessel. including onboard discussion with all relevant stakeholders as part of the pre-project execution/ activity. — Limitations imposed by water depth. — Preparation of the Well Specific Operating Guideline (WSOG). — Discussion to be included in pre-project execution readiness checklist. the Task Appropriate Mode (TAM). in the case of a DP drilling vessel/ rig. A WSOG should be developed for every well and location. environmental and equipment performance limits for the DP vessel/ rig in relation to the specific well that it is operating on. . as well as any unique operations the vessel is called upon to perform. any specific operation relevant to the design of the vessel. WSOG. some owners refer to WSOG as WSOC (Well Specific Operating Criteria). Where a decision has been made to operate in a TAM a separate WSOG covering TAM should be produced. whereas the SMO and TAM may not be well or location specific. distribution and propulsion system. where appropriate.e. whereas SMO may require open bus. A task appropriate mode is consciously entered into following a structured assessment of the risks of the operation to be undertaken by the vessel/ rig. among other things. Example 1: A DP MODU may operate in this mode during times when Time to Terminate is short.

21 for an example of an SMO and WSOG for a DP drilling rig.3. WSOG should always be developed and implemented by a DP drilling vessel/ rig for every well operation that it carries out. including availability. DP verification processes completed and DP set up confirmed. including whether operating open or closed bus Diesel generators. functional testing. Response For DP operations to commence and continue the conditions in the GREEN column must be met. Other conditions may be considered. including one year return and ten year return conditions. including confirm redundancy. is appropriate. if the RED watch circle is reached before restart of the thrusters then an EDS (disconnect sequence) is initiated. A YELLOW may be appropriate. absolute and relative systems. This will give the blackout recovery sequence an opportunity to bring the thrusters back on line. such as where strong currents are likely to be experienced. including confirmation of readiness and testing DP control system. Where the environment is below that condition and a black out occurs it may not be necessary to go straight to a RED. crossovers Compressed air. The one year return condition is typically used as the environmental criteria in the WSOG. BLUE Advisory status – where any of the GREEN conditions are not met. riser tension. standby starts. including confirm redundancy. It also defines operational standards. Summary: Note: A DP drilling vessel/ rig should always be set up in accordance with its SMO unless it is determined by risk assessment that the lesser standard. (YELLOW – REDUCED) and (RED – EMERGENCY). placement of targets for DP OSVs Set speed of rotation and speed of moves. as follows. testing and selection Fuel systems. isolations. respectively Sensors. isolations. isolations. safest compressor operating mode DP and ER manning. including confirmation of power supply. mode availability and selection Position reference systems. The SMO goes beyond equipment set up. mud weight. DET NORSKE VERITAS . as follows. crossovers Sea water cooling. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — Power plant set up. stroke of telescopic joint. black start enabled Uninterruptible power supplies (UPS). including confirmation of 100% output in DP Thrusters. from inception through to implementation. In addition. The vessel owns the SMO and ASOG document and the process that is used to develop it. including confirm redundancy. including watchkeeping rotas.e.3 m/sec. in these circumstances. qualifications and competency of watchkeepers Trials and checklists ESD status The WSOG is presented in a tabulated format and shows four conditions (GREEN – NORMAL). where current and wind are from the same direction. confirmation that auto stop is off. including confirmation of 100% output in DP Power management. January 2011 3. tank levels. including availability. crossovers Fresh water cooling. standby starts. provide the point of disconnect (POD). testing and selection. including consequence analysis. The riser analysis will. where the one year return environmental conditions produces a very tight RED watch circle or. suggest 10 deg/min and 0. This point is the first point reached where mechanical damage to the riser is considered to occur and will depend on water depth. (BLUE – ADVISORY). The SMO is presented in a tabulated format and shows two conditions (GREEN – NORMAL) and (BLUE – ADVISORY) for each item. Typical items contained in the SMO will include the following. then consideration could be given to reducing the environment criteria to 99% or even 95% of the one year return values accepting the potential consequences of increased non productive time. However. i. Refer to Sec. no cross connections Manual controls and independent joystick. TAM. where even a RED watch circle is not possible even after offsetting the vessel/ rig into the environment. including configuration. The WSOG should consider colinearity. Conduct risk assessment to determine whether to continue.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. etc. Operational guidance MODUs – Page 37 environmental conditions. standby starts. SAFEST MODE OF OPERATION – OUTLINE GREEN Normal operations – all systems and equipment fully Definition operational. change position or cease operations. In some cases. among other things. including confirm redundancy.

before all risks have been fully GREEN column assessed to determine whether must be met. it is acceptable to resume operations with compromised redundancy. performance and failures — Non essential DP systems. including mimics. visibility. drift off scenarios — Diesel generators. including one year return conditions. such as by a wave rider buoy (shallow water applications). Where the one year return environmental condition produces a tight RED watch circle or even where a RED watch circle may not be possible even if the rig is offset upstream. flood. component or system failure resulting in loss of control or position. failures — Critical communications. Abandon operations. performance limits and failures (TAGOS) — Diesel generator loads (TAGOS) — Thrusters. Stop operations and initiate contingency procedures with a view to reducing the time to terminate. wave height limits — Rig positioning performance (weather related). including number of enabled systems and performance. operating within whilst risks are being The vessel/ rig maintains acceptable assessed. — Maximum watch circles radius for one year return conditions — Colinearity conditions of wind and current (including one year return conditions) — Weather forecast and environmental conditions. air – performance limits and failures — Uninterruptible power supplies (UPS). operations to Conduct risk assessment The operation should not be commence and to determine whether to resumed before the vessel/ rig continue the continue. including ventilation and a/c – performance and failures — Fire. including onboard systems. No DP operation is to be recommenced until a full investigation has been implemented. In situations where the benchmark environment has been reduced consideration should be given to enhancing weather and seastate monitoring situations If so. failures — DP control system. minimum number required for the activity. requires a more robust weather monitoring.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. limits. performance and criticality to activity. change position has regained redundancy or conditions in the or cease operations. including minimum number required for the activity. ten year winter storm return conditions and where appropriate. Definition Response RED Emergency status – predefined operational or performance limits exceeded. to ensure the safety of people. Note 1: Note 2: Drift off curves and time and distance to point of disconnect (POD) are extracted from the rig’s riser drift-off analysis for a variety of conditions. failures — Sensors. including communications with assets. the operation and the vessel/ rig. system failure resulting in loss functional and Operations may continue of redundancy. A WSOG for a DP drilling rig will typically cover the following items. specific return conditions such as ten year loop current conditions. including operation and redundancy. the benchmark environment could be reduced to a 99% or even 95% of one year return conditions. the environment. performance limits and failures (TAGOS) — Thruster loads (TAGOS) — Phase back conditions (including thruster phase back.OUTLINE GREEN BLUE YELLOW Advisory status – Reduced status Normal approaching Pre-defined performance operations – all performance limits or limits reached. charger output and supply status. January 2011 Page 38 – 3. including operation. including fuel. performance and failures — DP networks. component or systems fully reportable alarm status. failures — Position reference systems. including operation and performance of DP controllers and OS. SW and FW cooling. including position and heading excursions — Drilling offset from wellhead position — Drape hose limitations — Long turn — Riser limitations (UFJ and LFJ) — Drive off. initiate EDS (disconnect sequence). i. failure resolved and fully tested. including number of enabled systems. collision. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- DET NORSKE VERITAS .e. drilling phase back and DP control system power limiting) — Battery and UPS systems — PMS and VMS status and operation — Auxiliary systems. affect DP redundancy. Operational guidance MODUs WELL SPECIFIC OPERATING GUIDELINES . including threat to safety of the DP operation — Simultaneous operations. Prepare to For DP disconnect. including wind speed limits. Take immediate action. current speed limits. The vessel/ rig should be moved to a safe position. A failure has position although the vessel performance occurred that does not has lost its redundancy. failures — DP control system displays.

Communications and alarm systems for all DP related equipment and systems and other equipment and systems not directly related to DP. It should be noted that developments in sensor and communications technologies are underway to relay. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 3. Manual activation of alarms should never be overlooked in design or in operation. bus tie breakers. Note: Note: The client’s due diligence process is usually the main driver in the critical path to return to normal operating condition. equipment and support systems. visual (lights/ displays) and audible means (alarms). Some modern communications and alarm systems rely solely on software activated alarms through the network. change of vessel or unit SMO or WSOG status. but which will have an effect on DP. These records should be kept on board for the period specified by the owner/ operator. Effective internal and external communications is a key tool to manage risk. This should include indirect components such as generator circuit breakers. Communications and alarm systems should be protected against power supply failure. Continuity of communications during foreseeable emergency situations should be taken into account. Records of planned and unplanned maintenance should be kept in an auditable format. It is important that change of status between vessels and units engaged in SIMOPs is communicated speedily and reliably. A minimum number of required critical DP spares should be maintained on board. With these systems any change of status from GREEN to BLUE. At least one of the systems should be hands free. This should include fire zone alarms systems. current status of planned as well as unexpected events during the execution of the activity. calibration. These operating points may be onboard the vessel as well as on other facilities involved with the activity. YELLOW or RED will be instantaneously relayed to all vessels and units engaged in SIMOPs. this also involves vendor support as well as the client’s DP consultant. Means of communication are not limited to the above but include integrated IT systems using wireless network technology that combine communications with other features. Planned maintenance should address all equipment that has an impact on the vessel’s station keeping capabilities. Relevant guidance is given in IMCA M109. The DPO should have a view or CCTV coverage of all important operational areas onboard as well as of important points of interest external to the vessel. and testing of equipment as outlined in manufacturer’s recommendations and industry guidelines. Guidance on communications is provided in M103. Battery/ UPS back up power supplies are recommended. Maintenance on DP related equipment whilst conducting DP operations should be controlled by a documented permit to work system and should always take into consideration the potential alteration of failure modes and increased criticality of failure consequences on DP capabilities and/ or redundancy. This should assist in getting back to normal operating condition after equipment failure or DP incident. The critical spare inventory should be monitored via a formal inventory program that is closely linked to the planned maintenance system. These technologies are expected to deliver and aid in the management of complex SIMOPS. DET NORSKE VERITAS . among other things.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. either hard copy or appropriate electronic format. ensuring that a common working language and terminology is used at all times. including AIS and DGNSS. This sole dependency is not recommended. Simultaneous operations (SIMOPS) depend on effective communications between all vessels and units involved in the operation. These records should include vendor service records as well as maintenance performed by vessel personnel. Typically. etc. M182 and M205. Communications should be taken into account when detailing the roles and responsibilities of key personnel during the planning stages for the intended task. Guidance note: There should be redundant voice communications systems to all key locations on board the DPO vessel.13 DP Planned Maintenance DP vessels should have a structured planned maintenance system that specifically addresses maintenance of the vessel’s DP system. Note: The importance of communication to be emphasized by incorporating into the WSOG. Communications in this context include voice. should be located close to the DP control station. January 2011 3. Operational specific visual and voice communications should ensure that the pertinent information flows between the key operating points as well as to and from assets and/ or other vessels that might be affected by the operation being carried out.12 Communications The vessel should be equipped with the appropriate primary and secondary equipment needed to communicate between all parties (stakeholders) whilst carrying out the intended task. Communication protocols are to be set up to provide pertinent information regarding intent. Maintenance should include regular cleaning. Operational guidance MODUs – Page 39 3.

This should be in accordance with vessel owner or operators’ and. Where additional technical support is required to aid this systematic analysis it should be sought. Owners/ operators are encouraged to draw upon learnings from incidents experienced and avoid recurrence. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 3. if applicable.14 DP Incidents DP vessels should be provided with and operate appropriate DP incident reporting. investigation and closing out procedures. where relevant. In addition. It is recommended that reactive YELLOW and RED DP incidents are investigated as soon as practicable after the DP incident and. January 2011 Page 40 – 3. and senior onboard decision makers. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- Note: DET NORSKE VERITAS . clients’ processes. In preparation for these occasions it is recommended that a thruster and generator operating strategy (TAGOS) is developed to take account of the impact on DP capability and/ or worst case failure. Where thrusters and/ or generators are temporarily taken out of service this is likely to have an impact on the rig’s DP capability and its worst case failure. Owners/ operators of DP vessels are encouraged to share lessons learned from DP incidents with the wider DP community. it is suggested that additional DP capability plots correlated to the TAGOS be provided on the vessel. Industry bodies who provide repositories for incident reporting are encouraged to provide anonymity and positively communicate this to the DP community. Operational guidance MODUs Note: System upgrades and changes (hardware and software) are typically subject to class approval. These annual reports are available to IMCA members and non-members alike. parts replaced during maintenance may require certification by class. Guidance note: It should be recognised that DP MODUs may from time to time require that certain items of equipment are temporarily taken out of service for the purposes of essential planned maintenance. DP systems and equipment vendors are also encouraged to do likewise and to share information on unexpected faults. Guidance note: The IMCA station keeping incident reporting scheme has been in place for many years and annual reports are published each year which summarise each reported incident as well as providing an overview of all the incidents for the year. Documented records should be kept and be capable of auditing. apart from the exceptions in the notes below. features and failures that are identified in operation. In the event of the occurrence of a DP incident relating to the vessel’s configuration as described in the DP FMEA and other documents. recorded and investigated. (Example experienced . and should be reported. allowing the vessel to exceed environmental limits should not be regarded as a DP incident. IMCA’s station keeping incident reporting scheme provides a suitable channel for disseminating relevant information throughout the DP sector.simultaneous failure of three wind sensors of similar type and hours of service (“aging”) accompanied by mechanical stressing (gusts experienced during a hurricane event that was in proximity of the rig). A change of status triggered by prearranged agreement between the Master. The IMCA station keeping incident reporting scheme or other repositories of DP incidents needs the support of the whole DP community to be an effective learning. If the impact on DP capability and/ or worst case failure is significant. sharing and risk mitigating tool. TAM and WSOG are used as tools to manage DP operations a suggested approach is that. trials are carried out as part of the investigation process.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Vessel operational teams are encouraged to systematically evaluate potential for incidents on their own units based on published analysed information. Note: The potential for common mode failures increases where same vendor equipment of same type and age are installed and in operation. any reactive change of DP status from GREEN to YELLOW or RED should be regarded as a DP incident. The purpose of the investigation and the trials should be: — to assist in identifying the root causes of the incident — to verify and validate that measures to address the root cause are effective — to validate that effective measures have not introduced any additional potential to cause failures (both hidden and apparent). It is acknowledged that there could be a reluctance to participate in sharing of incidents for fear of unwanted disclosure of company identification as the source of the DP incident. Owners/ operators are recommended to make these reports available to key DP personnel onboard their vessels so that they can learn from the experience of others. Vessel operational teams are encouraged to incorporate planned maintenance as a guideword in HIRA’s (Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments). This will facilitate lessons learnt to be implemented into the DP FMEA and proving trials program. it is suggested that the FMEA provider is involved in the incident investigation. Where SMO. It is recognised that deferring scheduled planned maintenance due to work activities increases the potential for failures. An operator initiated change of status as a result of a conscious decision based on risk analysis of the Note: circumstances where the trigger points have not been reached should not be regarded as a DP incident.

M117 has been adopted by the IMO and issued as IMO MSC/Circ 738 (1996). M117 (IMO738). — — — — — — — — — — — DP FMEA & FMEA Proving Trials reports Annual DP Trials DP checklists for bridge and engine room DP incident investigations & close out reports (see Note 1 below) DP system faults. at the company’s premises. Guidance note: Key DP personnel include masters. IMCA M117 provides the DP sector with detailed guidance on the training and experience of key DP personnel. on occasion. both for training and familiarisation processes as well as for reference in case of similar project requirements in the future. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 3.16 Competence Definition: Competence is the acquisition of knowledge.2. Records of these activities including pertinent information from Hazards and Risk Identification (HIRAs) should be made and kept onboard for future reference. as a minimum. The documents and records contained in Sec.2 should be accessible to key DP personnel and to other interested parties. Vessel specific competency should. electronic technicians and anyone involved in the safe position keeping capabilities of the vessel and includes those involved in the deployment of PRSs. repairs. Guidance is provided in M103. There should be a clear line of reporting DP related items onboard the DP vessel and between each department and this should involve key DP personnel.3. carry out activities which may be unique to project requirements. SMO and WSOGs.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. DP vessel owners/ operators should operate a structured competence assurance program that is applied to all key DP personnel with special focus on ensuring vessel and task specific competence. Guidance on reporting and record keeping is provided in M109. — — — — assists in identifying best practices demonstrates the vessel’s performance facilitates knowledge capture and transfer assists in identifying or justifying equipment improvements. A reference to M117 is also made in the DET NORSKE VERITAS .15 Reporting and Record Keeping Owners or operators of DP vessels should have an effective reporting and record keeping system. Guidance note: The following records should be kept and made accessible to vessel crew and to other interested parties. DPOs. Documentation relating to modifications and upgrades should be kept and available for reference. Operational guidance MODUs – Page 41 3. M163 Note 1: Note 2: Owners/ operators should recognise the benefits that electronic DP data logging systems offer when carrying out DP incident investigations and establishing root cause. DP vessels. DP vessels. where appropriate. Owners/ operators are encouraged to develop their own competency verification processes for all key DP personnel. January 2011 3. modifications and upgrades (see Note 2 below) Vessel specific familiarisation and training for short service employees involved in DP operations and ongoing training and development programs for experienced DP personnel Operational logs & DP alarm print outs DP data logging records DP system equipment vendor reports DP Footprint Plots Vessel overview documents. on occasion. Effective record keeping of such activities has the following benefits. skills and abilities at a level of expertise sufficient to be able to perform in an appropriate work setting. carry out activities which may be unique to project requirements. be demonstrated in the following areas: — — — — — Operational modes DP FMEA familiarization DP Operations Manual familiarization Project/ activity requirements Contingency plans. electricians. modes and drills. This will include risk analysis of the interfaces and documentation and records of all commissioning and testing. DP related records should be maintained onboard and. engineers. TAGOS. There should also be a clear line of reporting between the DP vessel and the company’s shoreside management.

familiar with the vessel’s DP FMEA document and DET NORSKE VERITAS . manning should be in accordance with the following: DP Bridge Crew Operation When undertaking critical activities in proximity to surface or sub surface structures See Note 1 below Minimum Experience Unlimited DPO with a minimum of 3 years experience in DP operations. such as the Kongsberg initiative in POWERSIM training where DPOs are given training. Note 1: Note 2: Note 3: Engineers There should be sufficient licensed engineers on board for all expected operations. See Note 2 below. Customised training programs have been developed by industry in response to clients requests. Owners/ operators are encouraged to seek information and selectively adopt appropriate programs for their training needs. Owners/ operators are recommended to refer to further formal training programs described in M117. January 2011 Page 42 – 3. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 3. — Unlimited DPO certificate (minimum requirement for DPO on DP Class 2 or DP Class 3 vessels) — Limited DPO certificate (minimum requirement for DPO for DP Class 1 vessels). Minimum Bridge Crew per shift 2 unlimited DPOs on the bridge capable of operating the vessel both in DP and manual control. such as when the diver is inside a welding habitat or where the diver’s worksite is inside the conductor tubes at a production facility. 2003) which provides detailed programs for achieving and assessing the competency of key DP personnel. It is recognized that in practice. There are two levels of DPO certification. familiarisation and exposure to a variety of power generation related faults and conditions that are known to have occurred on DP diesel electric power generation systems. comprising the following main features for electrical and engineering officers. M117 also provides guidance on structured onboard familiarisation programs for key DP personnel. at least 6 months of which should have been on the subject or sister vessel.17 Manning Vessels must comply with the statutory requirements for safe manning. Additionally. Operational guidance MODUs MODU Code. Note: Note: Owners/ operators should also be aware of and recognise the benefits of formal training and competency programs that are currently offered by equipment suppliers. including vessel masters. Experience level should be documented and auditable. Such certification is not to be construed as validation of competency. — — — — High voltage (HV) training Power management system (PMS) training Fire and gas detection and emergency shutdowns (ESD) training DP control system manufacturer’s maintenance training. given the near term market conditions owners/ operators will be challenged to meet the recommended level of experience for DPOs. The Master should not be considered as one of the required unlimited DPOs for meeting the manning requirements since operating as such would negative affect the situational awareness required from his side. M117 provides guidance on formal training courses for DPOs and other key DP personnel. Owners/ operators may consider implementing the IMCA Competence Assurance & Assessment scheme (IMCA C002 Rev 1. DPOs. critical activities on a DP dive support vessel would include those occasions where the Time to Terminate is long. for DP operations. maintain and enhance competency in DP operations. should be on watch during critical activities and should have at least 6 months experience on similar equipment and operations. covering the steps to take to achieve. including watchkeeping marine engineers and electronic maintenance staff.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. where appropriate. The Nautical Institute DPO certificate scheme is made up of a combination of formal DP induction and DP simulator (advanced) and onboard supervised watchkeeping experience. See Note 3 below Critical activities are those activities where the consequences of equipment failure or loss of position are greater than under normal operating circumstances. chief engineers and engineers in charge of a watch. At least one licensed engineer should be available at all times. M117 recognises the formal training and certification scheme for DPOs administered by the Nautical Institute. For example. The Nautical Institute scheme is universally recognised as the industry standard for formal training and certification of DPOs. DPO certification is only one part of the competency assurance process for DPOs. vendors and other bodies that are in excess of established industry standards. The engineer should be fully cognisant of DP operations. Owners/ operators should recognize the associated risk from inexperienced personnel and have plans in place to address them while striving to reach the recommended experience levels.

” “Redundancy shall be based upon running machinery. The former cannot be considered when defining this capability thus DP Class 2 and DP Class 3 vessels should not operate in conditions where they would depend on this equipment to maintain position. the electrician/ electrical engineer should have at least 6 months experience on similar equipment and operations.” DNV rules for the classification of Ships Pt. Examples of the rules and guidelines that have influenced the design of redundancy concepts are given below:IMO MSC 645 Section 3.6 Ch.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Guidance note: Component and system redundancy. A position keeping ability shall be maintained without disruption upon any single failure. If used. Automatic or manual intervention arranged to improve the position keeping ability after a failure will be accepted. The latter is intended to mean that the contribution of this equipment or feature can be considered when defining the vessel’s post WCF DP capability. General: “Redundant components and systems should be immediately available and with such capacity that the DP-operation can be continued for such a period that the work in progress can be terminated safely. Automatic start of equipment may be accepted as contributing to redundancy only if their reliability and simplicity of operation is satisfactory so that they can be brought into operation before position and heading keeping performance is degraded. However. electrical and ancillary systems. DET NORSKE VERITAS Redundancy: . Operational guidance MODUs – Page 43 the effects of failures of equipment relating to the position keeping of the vessel.4 states under the heading of Functional Requirements. in technical design and physical arrangement. As with vessel engineers. The transfer to components or systems designed and arranged to provide redundancy. The transfer should be smooth and within acceptable limitations of the operation. The transfer to redundant components or systems should be automatic as far as possible and operator intervention should be kept to a minimum. the guidance provided within this document should be validated against the risks. General Rules and guidelines on levels of operator intervention in response to a failure in a DP Class 2 or DP Class 3 vessel have changed over the years and different classification societies have chosen to place different levels of emphasis and different interpretations on these rules. Note: The overriding role of the DPO in emergency situations is to stabilise the situation and to take positive action to prevent escalation. the feature can be used to improve capability. The practical effect of this is that vessels of different ages and different class society can vary significantly in terms of the amount of operator intervention expected. specifically addressing operator intervention in terms of the complexities of the regulatory background (operator intervention specifically addressed in Class rules) as well as operational practicalities. should be automatic and operator intervention should be avoided.18 Intervention – Role of the DPO and Engineer Introduction The notes in this section consider the role of the DPO and watchkeeping engineers. For low risk operations guidance is provided in IMCA M182. January 2011 3.2 states: “The DP-system shall be designed with redundancy. an electrician should have appropriate high voltage training/ certification. The electrician should likewise be fully cognisant of DP operations. levels of redundancy and automation are influenced by differences in the main rules for the classification of ships. if applicable to the vessel. Notes: Where the minimum experience requirements cannot be met a risk based approach should be taken to determine the suitability of personnel and any additional support requirements for intended operations. Electrician/ Electrical Engineer If required on board. 3. the engineer should be familiar with the general philosophy of redundancy as it relates to split mechanical. should in principle be immediately available with the capacity required for the DP-system to safely terminate the work in progress. Even in the case of DP Class 1 vessels. Guidance note: The redundancy requirements will not be considered as complied with if based upon start or restart of generators and/ or thrusters.” The distinction between ‘improving station keeping capability after a failure’ and ‘contributing to redundancy’ should be noted. In DP 2 or 3 operations. Full stop of thrusters and subsequent start-up of available thrusters is not considered an acceptable disruption.7 Sec. allowed or required. familiar with the vessel’s DP FMEA document and the effects of failures of equipment relating to the position keeping of the vessel.1.

— DP control systems employ a range of protective functions designed to reject an errant position reference system. In the case that one of the wind sensors has failed to ‘high wind speed’ it may be necessary to rapidly deselect the faulty wind sensor before it initiates a drive off depending on the type of DP control system. — Some vessels have no automation for starting redundant pumps and engineers must monitor the condition of the plant and intervene following an unexpected stop. reference systems and operator stations in use to determine whether any configuration changes should be made. — A DP operator station may fail. — DPOs should be aware of the thruster and/ or power configuration that is used to activate the Consequence Analysis alarm. is to prevent the unexpected consequences of failure. Note that position and heading should be maintained by the DP controller during this time. Prudent watchkeeping practices will detect the listed events that require operator (DPO/ engineer) intervention. loss of the main DP station will require the DPO to take control at the backup DP station. It should not be assumed that it is Worst Case Failure.This is especially relevant during night time and when inclement weather is being forecast and//or being experienced. January 2011 Page 44 – 3. This provides a large degree of protection against a drive off related to a position calculation error but such incidents do occur and DPOs can be expected to determine which reference systems are responsible and deselect them. — DPOs should use the weather radar or standard radar. for example selecting the other DP controller or OS before the online controller or OS fails. to augment their watch keeping practices to aid in proactive measures to be taken as necessary (eg Squall line observed on radar. A load sharing imbalance alarm may assist in identifying the onset of the fault. which can be found even on some DP Class 2 vessels. it may be necessary to change over a fuel filter or isolate a leak to prevent all generators being affected. — On some vessels with transferable thrusters it may be necessary for the engineers to manually change over auxiliary services for the thruster even if the main supply changes automatically. DET NORSKE VERITAS . Class rules require that three references are in use for DP Class 2 & 3 vessels and two of the three should be based on different principles of measurement. — A faulty thruster may respond poorly to DP commands giving rise to a speed/ torque or azimuth prediction error. set up for weather. Where it is established that it is not WCF then steps should be taken to ensure that WCF is used as the trigger for a Consequence Analysis alarm. In such circumstances the engineers may open the bustie in an attempt to isolate the fault to one side or the other. — Failure of a thruster to full thrust or uncontrolled rotation will require the DPO to shut the thruster down using the emergency stop. The DPO should assess the performance of the thruster and shut it down using the emergency stop if necessary. A faulty gyro may cause a rapid change of heading if not deselected promptly.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. — A heat exchanger in a common freshwater cooling system may become fouled requiring the engineers to change over to another cooler. — Seawater cooling systems operated from a single sea chest may block giving rise to low seawater pressure alarms requiring the engineers to transfer to the other sea chest. Operational guidance MODUs Faults requiring operator intervention — The following list comprises known faults and features in DP systems that have been known to require operator intervention to prevent escalation of the failure effect or loss of position. — On vessels with only two gyro compasses a difference alarm may require the DPO to make an assessment of which gyro to use. — In some diesel electric designs. — A distribution system supplying a DP UPS may fail. — On vessels with two MRUs a difference alarm may require the DPO to make an assessment of which MRU to use. if required.start additional generators/change heading as necessary). The DPO must take control at another operator station. — On a DP Class 2 vessel loss of both DP control systems will require the DPO to take manual control of the vessel at the independent joystick or manual control levers. The process of identifying the faulty thruster may be made more difficult by the fact that all thrusters may be operating at high thrust to counteract the effect of the faulty one. — On some DP vessels with a single stern tunnel thruster and two main propellers which depend on the rudders to provide redundant athwartships thrust it may be necessary to transfer the tunnel thruster to the other power distribution system and restart it in the event that the distribution system supplying one main prop and the stern tunnel thruster fails. — On vessels with a common fuel supply system. The ‘on-batteries’ alarm will indicate to the DPO that certain important DP control system consumers may be lost. Prediction errors may indicate which thruster is faulty. The DPO or ET can review the UPS distribution list against sensors. This condition may be indicated by high freshwater temperature alarms. This changeover. Note that in some circumstances the fault may escalate at a rate which precludes effective operator intervention and blackout may result. — On a DP Class 3 vessel. — On vessels with two wind sensors a difference alarm may require the DPO to make an assessment of which wind sensor to use. failures of fuel control systems or generator excitation systems can destabilise the entire plant if the vessel is operated with a common power system (busties closed).

this will often mean adding additional equipment. greater levels of redundancy. In general terms. Operational guidance MODUs – Page 45 Measures to reduce the incidence of faults requiring operator intervention: The most effective way to avoid the necessity for operators and engineers to intervene in faults is to design the redundancy concept in such a way that the need for operator intervention is minimised or preferably eliminated. There is also a risk that poorly designed protective functions will reduce the reliability and availability of essential equipment such as thrusters and generators. However.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. DET NORSKE VERITAS . January 2011 3. Carefully considering power plant and control system configuration can also reduce the need for operator intervention. This risk should be considered when applying protective functions to deal with very low probability failure modes. Where operator intervention in response to faults is unavoidable then it is extremely important that there are clear and unambiguous alarms and indications to alert the operators to the onset of the fault. it may not be desirable to automatically transfer control location in response to a fault. It is also of vital importance that the required responses to the fault are documented in well-written procedures and practiced so that all DPOs and engineers are familiar with them and can take action in a confident manner. It may be better for the operator to decide where control transfers to by taking control at that station. there may be some aspects of DP system design where operator intervention is preferred to any other form of response. automation and increased system segregation to minimise the impact of any failure. Features such as a third wind sensor or a third DP controller allow voting or other protective functions to be used. For example. DP Class 2 and 3 vessels should always operate in a redundant/ fault tolerant configuration.

Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Operational guidance MODUs 3. January 2011 Page 46 – 3.19 DP Footprint Plots .Worked Examples DET NORSKE VERITAS Figure 3-1 Worked Example 1 .

January 2011 3. Operational guidance MODUs – Page 47 DET NORSKE VERITAS Figure 3-2 Worked Example 2 .Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307.

Rig Superintendant. Guidance will be provided in a subsequent revision of this RP. C-D B-C.20 Annual DP Trials Test Table Blank – DP MODU Guidance note: The blank Annual DP Trials test sheet is on hold pending formal publication of IMCA guidance on Annual DP Trials which is under development at the time of preparing this RP.21 Example of SMO and WSOG Safest Mode of Operation . Operational guidance MODUs 3. Toolpusher and Client Action GREEN NO CONTINUE NORMAL OPERATIONS ADVISORY YES Power Distribution Diesel Generators Diesel Generators Diesel Generator MCC's LVE and LVF (low voltage swbds E & F) HRG earth (high resistance ground) Thrusters Thruster Hydraulic steering pump (critical operations) Thruster Hydraulic steering pumps changeover Thruster Emergency Stops (Bridge) Power Management System Power Management System (Critical Operations) Power Management System Power Management System DP and VMS UPS's. January 2011 Page 48 – 3.Name of DP Drilling Rig This setup applies when the vessel is undertaking DP Drilling Operations. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 3. 24 VDC and 110 VDC systems UPS and 24 VDC and 110 VDC Systems 24 V and 110 VDC systems DP Control System DP Control System INFORMATIVE/ CONSULTATIVE STATUS (RISK ASSESS) 11 kV Bus Interconnectors Any of 11 kV bus A-B. Condition Notify Driller. interconnector A-B. AFI (agreed for implementation) “DATE” Critical operations are when the vessel is having non shearables through the stack. C-D closed. A-D open open or A-D. All 480 V bus Any 480 V bus Interconnectors open interconnector closed tested at 100% within Tested at 100% within the last Not the last 6 months or 6 months problems found Any section running At least one generator on each thrusters without at least bus bar one generator All supplied from respective Any supplied from ESB main 480 V 480 V Auto changeover to 'A' or 'B' Not tested or problems and 'C' or 'D' tested at field found arrival Not tripped and only one or more than one connected per isolated section Trippedconnected of Bus Tested at 100% on field Not tested at 100% on field arrival arrival or problems found All thrusters duty pump set to Any duty pump set to MCC MCC 'A' 'B' Not tested on field arrival Tested on field arrival or problems found Not tested on field arrival Tested on field arrival or problems found Automatic Generator stop Any other set up disabled generator selected to Fixed Load mode not selected Any Fixed load mode Load share in isochronous Load share failed to mange mode droop or pure droop Blackout restart enabled All connected to their respective 480 V supply and back up changeover tested at field arrival Batteries tested on load on field arrival Tested on field arrival to ensure no diode failures Consequence analysis enabled and not in alarm Kalman gains set to 0 (1 if acoustic update > 4 seconds) Blackout restart disabled Any UPS connected to the emergency switchboard. Master. B-C closed.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Chief Engineer. failed or on bypass Not tested on field arrival or problems found Not tested on field arrival or problems found Any other set up Any other Kalman gain DET NORSKE VERITAS .

or both DGPS 1 and 2 selected Acoustics also being used actively by survey or others Any other set up Not planned Both Acoustics using same MAHRS Single targets. RadaScan. Any other set up Electric' SW Cooling Electric' FW Cooling Start air ESD Air Conditioning to all DP critical areas Engine Room Manning Changeover of Duty/ Changeover of Duty/Standby Standby pump not tested on pump tested at field arrival field arrival or problems found Standby start function of Standby start function of pumps not tested at cooling pumps tested at field cooling field arrival or problems arrival. Port and stbd systems common. Fanbeam. or obscured or poorly sited. 2 available or4all receivers on receivers isolated port/ connection stbd cross connection isolated line or cross open Life boat station ESD's Life boat station ESD's disarmed armed All AHU's running & Any AHU off or changeovers tested recently changeover not recently for cooling pumps and tested or any HVAC alarm compressor units ECR Manned by qualified ECR not Manned or Engineer engineer not qualified DET NORSKE VERITAS . Any other set up Any main pump fed from the adjacent sea chest. less than compressors 4 compressors available.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. interfaced to alternative MARHS Redundant targets placed at optimum locations suitable for diverse relative position reference systems on board OSV's (CyScan. found. January 2011 3. DGPS 1 or 2 and DGPS 3 and LBL 1 and LBL 2 Both Acoustics (LBL) dedicated to DP control Systems on different differential systems and elevation masks Frequencies in use planned with other DP vessels in the area If both Acoustics in use. Port and stbd system isolated from each other Valves VELXXX and VELYYY closed. Only one type installed. Operational guidance MODUs – Page 49 Back Up DP DP Reference System Position References Available Position References Available DGPS Acoustics Acoustics Placement of targets for OSV's Fuel Systems Main Engine SW cooling Main Engine SW cooling Electric' SW Cooling Transfer of control tested at field arrival Median Check set up and enabled. Radius) Purifier gravity discs matched Strict anti-contamination procedures in practice Each main pump fed from its own sea chest. with agreed references Four references selected and enabled (2 DGPS and 2 LBL). Valves VELZZZ and VELAAA open Transfer not tested or known problems One of the agreed references unavailable Less than three references available.

10 seconds is to be added for conservatism. top XX s tension cccc kips Maximum Watch Circles Radius (From Well Head position) <1 year condition 39 m (<=Wind 41 knots.5 and current is >0.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307.1%.7 knots 10 Year Winter storm is 50.5 knots and current is Colinearity (loop current) knots and colinearity > knots and colinearity approaching 2 knots than 15 deg within 15 deg and colinear Approaching operating Exceeding operational Weather Forecast Within Operating limits limits limits Difference in vessel Unable to control DRIVE OFF or All systems operating position between Immediately when Drive Off correctly Survey. If the time is measured XXs by a surface test.7 knots. Navigation and recognized by DPO DRIFT OFF DP Drilling offset from well head Position directly over Any offset from ZAP =/>12. Hs 6 ft. Hs 16 feet. Toolpusher and Client GREEN NO ADVISORY YES YELLOW YES HALT OPERATIONS AND INITIATE CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES (Prepare for disconnect) RED YES Action CONTINUE NORMAL OPERATIONS INFORMATIVE/ CONSULTATIVE STATUS (RISK ASSESS) INITIATE EDS (disconnect sequence) Water Depth XXXX m Emergency Disconnect Time The Emergency Disconnect time is to be established from field trials. blackout restart time was established at around 1 minute 30 seconds from blackout to recovery of all thrusters 1 Year Winter storm is 41 POD 4.5 knots and current is (1 year winter storm) knots and colinearity > knots and colinearity approaching 0. Operational guidance MODUs Well Specific Operating Guidelines .86 knots 10 year Loop current is 19 POD 10%. reach POD 352 s current is 2.5 knots of wind Hs21. Chief Engineer.m position wellhead If heading Alarm limit No Heading Alarms or If heading warning limit reached (>5 degrees) or Heading excursion warning reached (>3 degrees) Heading instability with frequent alarms If Alarm position Vessel Footprint/Weather No position alarms or If warning position reached (>5 m) or related excursion warning limits reach (>3 m) Position instability with (From Set point) frequent alarms Drape Hose Heading > -200 ° > -240 ° To be established at +/-200 to 240° Limitation < +200 ° < +240 ° Field Trials Long Turn Being considered Under execution DET NORSKE VERITAS . From FMEA proving trials. If environmental conditions are in excess of the 1 year environment and a blackout occurs. Surface current is 0. Hs 16 ft) Maximum Watch Circles Radius (From Well Head Immediately if position). defined Point of Disconnect (POD) and the measured EDS (disconnect sequence) time. Master.> 41 knots.7 knots Hs 16 ft and colinear If wind < 30 knots and If Wind is >30 knots If wind approaching 41 Colinearity current is less than 0. The Red watch circle below is to be established from calculated drift off curves at 1 year environment.Name of DP Drilling Rig Condition Notify Driller. Rig Superintendant.5 and current is >1. January 2011 Page 50 – 3.7 knots than 15 deg within 15 deg and colinear If wind < 15 knots and If Wind is >15 knots If wind approaching 19 current is less than 1.2 knots For Total EDS (disconnect Red watch circle Based on mud weight sequence) and unlatch time at 39 m aa ppg. POD 142 s Surface current is 0.7 ft. a Red status is to be issued immediately. Time to knots of wind. Time to knots of wind. current blackout occurs 0. current 0.

Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307, January 2011 3. Operational guidance MODUs – Page 51

Riser Limitation (UFJ) Riser Limitation (LFJ) 'Power Trains'/Thrusters in use

0 - 2° 0 - 2°

>2 ° >2 °

>4 ° >4 ° Less than two diagonally opposite thruster pairs running and selected to DP All > values given in generator configurations and limits document

Thruster loading (thrust) Any change in thrusters/ propulsion in or out of use Diesel Generator Loads Any change in generators in or out of use Thruster phase back, drilling phase back or DP control system power limiting DP UPS's and 24 VDC Systems

At least two diagonally opposite pairs of thruster in thrusters running and Any selected alarm selected to DP (1 thruster in each corner) any approaching values all <values given in given in generator generator configurations configurations and and limits document limits document Advisory All < values given in generator configurations and limits document Any generator approaching values given in generator configurations and limits document Advisory No Alarm Main and back up supply available no UPS in by pass. No UPS alarms Approaching operating limits Any UPS in bypass or in alarm

All available generators > values given in generator configurations and limits document

Alarms and or phasing back or limiting

-

Main supply cannot be reinstated or total UPS failure Critical information Power mimic DP Control System Any wrong information wrong or DP is in information correct power limit Any 1 CC Controller Any 2 CC Controllers DP Control System Triplex failed failed Any alarms or poor DP Network Dual 1 network lost performance Any alarms or poor VMS/PMS Controllers Dual 1 Controller failed performance Four references selected Only two references and enabled (2 DGPS Three references available or One Position References Available and 2 LBL). DGPS 1 or 2 available, or both system (no redundancy and DGPS 3 and LBL 1 DGPS 1 and 2 selected in system - i.e. DGPS and LBL 2 only or Acoustics only) Motion sensors (MRU/VRU) 1 MAHR/MRU or loss of all MAHR/ 3 or 2 MAHR/MRU into DP difference alarm MRU Heading Sensors (Gyro) Wind Sensors Loss or problem with any essential Communications (DP / ECR / Driller / ROV) Engine Room(s) Ventilation Air Conditioning to Critical Equipment 3 Gyros 3 or 2 wind sensors Redundant Communications Full ventilation 2 Gyros 1 wind sensor One system remaining 1 remaining Gyro No sensor and Gusty conditions No comms

Complete loss of networks

-

Starting Air Fire - E/R or elsewhere Flood Collision

Complete loss of Any reduced ventilation ventilation resulting in power reduction Any reduced Air Reduced Air Conditioning or Full Air Conditioning Conditioning affecting frequent alarms critical equipment (initiated from ECR) Any compressor in 4 compressors available alarm Any loss of start air or not available No fire, no fire alarms No bilge alarms active, no flooding No collision imminent / minimum approach >500 m Any fire alarm Multiple bilge alarms Minimum approach will be < 500 m Fire Confirmed Flood Confirmed If collision possible Collision Imminent

DET NORSKE VERITAS

Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307, January 2011 Page 52 – 3. Operational guidance MODUs

SIMOPS - Well Specific Operating Guidelines - Name of DP Drilling Rig Condition Notify Other vessels in the field, Driller, Master, Chief Engineer, Rig Manager, Toolpusher and Client Action Change from Green DP Status of any other vessel in the field Comms/interaction with other vessels Notes: 1. This document shall be followed as closely as possible during DP Operations. 2. Escape Route to be established. On behalf of Owner/ Operator Printed name Signed: GREEN NO ADVISORY YES INFORMATIVE/ CONSULTATIVE STATUS (RISK ASSESS) Advisory Comms problem or possible position conflict YELLOW YES RED YES

CONTINUE NORMAL OPERATIONS Green Vessels operating normally with no known problems

HALT OPERATIONS AND INITIATE EDS INITIATE (disconnect sequence) CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES Advisory No comms or definite position conflict Advisory

On behalf of Client

Printed name

DET NORSKE VERITAS

Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307, January 2011 4. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels – Page

4. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels
4.1 Introduction
This chapter contains DP operational guidance, specific for Project and Construction Vessels. For overview and full appreciation, this information is completed with the general management information as already was given in chapter 2. For distinction, the general information is printed in regular text, and the specific operational guidance is in italics and/or grouped under Guidance notes.

4.2 DP Operational Documentation
4.2.1 General It is recommended that DP vessel owners/ operators should maintain the documentation listed in the table below and should develop and implement associated processes for the purposes of: — — — — — — ensuring the safe and effective management of the vessel in DP ensuring the technical suitability of the vessel for each DP activity it is required to carry out determining the configuration for the safest mode of operation and the task appropriate mode understanding the vessel’s station keeping capabilities following the worst case failure ensuring compliance with appropriate standards and guidelines providing training and familiarization material to vessel crews.

4.2.2 Recommended Documentation Current versions of the documents in the list below should be kept on board and, in addition, where feasible, at the shore based centers of technical management. Documents that have been superseded should be clearly marked and kept separate from current versions. Documents may be in electronic or, hard copy format or, both.
No. Document Management Guidance 1 DP System FMEA To be kept up to date, or FMECA incorporating all modifications and additions since original study, if not in the document itself, then by other traceable means. All records to be kept on board. 2 DP FMEA Proving To be conducted to prove initial Trials DP FMEA and at other times to prove modifications and additions to the DP system. DP FMEA Proving Trials should be repeated every five years. Findings and recommendations to be addressed in accordance with their criticality. All records to be kept on board. 3 Annual DP Trials To be conducted annually. Findings and recommendations to be addressed in accordance with their criticality. Previous trials reports and associated close out documentation to be kept on board. 4 DP Capability Hard copy DP Capability Plots Plots relevant to the vessel’s areas of operations to be readily accessible to DPOs at the DP control location. Operational Guidance Modifications and additions should be covered by a MOC process that triggers updating the FMEA.

Modifications and additions that should be proven by testing include all those that have directly effect or, potential to affect the performance or redundancy of the DP system. This will include protective, detection and monitoring functions.

5

6

The tests in the Annual DP Trials should be designed to prove system redundancy, as defined in the DP FMEA, system and equipment performance and functionality, to validate repairs and preventive maintenance, to test the operation of protection and detection devices and responses so as to demonstrate that the vessel’s DP system remains fit for purpose. Capability plots to be validated/ recalculated, as required, to ensure that they are suitable for the environmental conditions where the DP operations are to take place, in particular in respect of current speeds. This requirement to validate/ recalculate applies also in cases where DP vessel performance is affected by operational constraints imposed by the activity, such as in the case of a pipelay vessel with horizontal loads. DP Footprints Hard copy DP Footprint Plots to DP Footprint Plots should be taken regularly in various be taken by DPOs. See Note 1 at power/ thruster combinations, including fully intact and end of table. worst case failure and also in various environmental conditions. Service reports Complete history of service There should be a process where the open items are concerning the DP reports to be filed and kept on highlighted, tracked and closed out. system board DET NORSKE VERITAS

The drills should also cover extreme events that are outside the scope of the DP FMEA. DP related drills Records of DP related drills and and emergency emergency response drills to be response drills kept on board in retrievable archives. Known instances as examples pipe tensioner software that accepted a sudden increase of pipe tension from 100 t to 300 t (erroneous input). Modifications and amendments to the DP Operations Manual should be subject to MOC processes. They should confirm vessel performance. particularly following worst case failure.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. especially to avoid the acceptance of erroneous values. The outcomes from these drills should be used in the development of DP emergency response procedures and used as training material for DP personnel. and that the vessel’s DP system is set up properly and provides the required level of redundancy. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels No. These records may be used in a cycle of continuous improvement. Document 7 Details of all DP related modifications and additions Management Guidance Records of all DP related modifications and additions to be kept on board complete with interface and testing information. DP Operations Manual 9 Complete history of all audit reports. There should be a process where the open items are highlighted. DP faults should be recorded as soon as possible after they are discovered and action/ investigation taken appropriate to the potential consequences of the fault on the vessel’s station keeping ability. All DP incidents should be investigated to an extent that reflects the potential consequences of the incident. DP Incident Reports It is recommended that owners/ operators develop a standardised table of contents for vessel specific DP Operations Manuals in their fleet. See Note 2 at end of table. New and modified software should be subjected to a thorough validation process. DP Trials and Checklists should be vessel specific and be developed from detailed information contained in the DP FMEA. including findings and close outs to be kept on board Vessel Specific DP Operations Manual 1). including investigation records and close outs. Records of all DP Location and DP Location and Watchkeeping Checklists to be Watchkeeping kept on board for the period set checklists (Bridge and Engine by the owner/ operator and. Room) permanently stored in retrievable archives. January 2011 Page 54 – 4. tracked and closed out. Operational Guidance A structured FMEA and Proving Trials approach should be used to integrate modifications and additions into the existing DP system and its associated equipment. DP drills can be developed from fault and single point failure scenarios addressed in the vessel’s DP FMEA. DP Mobilization/ Records of DP Mobilization DP Field Arrival/ Trials and DP Field Arrival Trials Procedures Checklists to be kept on board (Bridge and Engine for the period set by the owner/ operator and. It is equally important to fully understand the functional design spec and the dependencies and consequences of fault or failure. As above 14 DP fault log Records of all faults related to the DP system to be kept on board permanently in retrievable archives. where relating to a Room) DP incident permanently stored in retrievable archives. where relating to a DP incident. including changes to vessel specific checklists. DP audits and inspection reports. 10 11 12 13 Records of all DP station keeping and other DP related incidents to be kept on board. to be readily accessible at the DP control location and used by the DPOs as a reference for conducting DP operations. DET NORSKE VERITAS . 8 Vessel audit reports and DP audits and inspection reports. It is not enough to focus on the functionality of modifications and additions. software for thruster control that increased the command to the thruster to match the faulty feedback.

Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels – Page No. Retention of data logging data should not be limited by time. There should be specific procedures for the operation and analysis of output from the DP data logger. pipe tensioner systems and fire monitor systems as it is for DP equipment. DET NORSKE VERITAS . Owners/ operators should keep adequate records and documentation relating to modifications and additions that could have an effect on the DP system. It should be noted competency for DPOs. relating to a DP incident. such as the Powersim program for advanced DPO training of power plant fault conditions. especially interfaces between equipment from different vendors. Owners/ operators should implement an in-house DP DP familiarisation All records relating to vessel specific DP familiarisation and competency assurance process for key DP personnel which and competency is structured. records engineers and electricians to be that DPO certification is only one element in the competency assurance process. January 2011 4. The DP data logger should be incorporated in the SMO and running at all times when in DP. i. where DPOs are given detailed instruction and training in identifying and responding to power system faults. DP data loggers should be commissioned and operational before DP system Customer Acceptance Trials (CAT) are carried out. 1) The vessel specific DP Operations Manual is additional to the DP control system manufacturer’s Operator Manual Note 1: Note 2: It is acknowledged that DP Footprint Plots may be less relevant for DP MODUs than for other DP vessel types. This is as relevant for equipment whose primary function lies outside the DP system. Original DPO certificates and DP Log Books to be held by the DPOs onboard the vessel. Résumés and Résumés of all key DP vessel specific personnel. If not. Document 15 DP Data Logging 16 17 18 Operational Guidance DP data loggers perform an important function in helping to determine root causes of faults or failures. This should include clear instructions on how and where the records are kept. unless relating to a DP incident or contractual on board for the period set by the owner/ operator and. permanently stored in retrievable archives.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Management Guidance Where the vessel has DP data logging facilities electronic records should be kept on board for the period set by the owner/ operator and. kept on board permanently in retrievable archives.3 DP Class It is recommended that DP vessels with at least the following DP equipment class notations are used for the following activities. modifications and additions are typically subject to class approval and inspection. contractual specifications and/ or harsh environmental or other local conditions may require a higher class. Examples include DPO intervention averting an underfrequency induced blackout on closed bus system by the DPO taking control of thrusters and biasing to increase load. BLUE. such as an Emergency Shutdown Systems (ESD). Owners/ operators frequently require DP alarm printer DP alarm printer Hard copy records of the DP readouts alarm printer readout to be kept readouts to be kept for the duration of each project and then destroyed. this should trigger an Advisory condition. where dispute. Owners/ operators are recommended to make use of facilities and training programmes available to the DP sector. In addition. All modifications and additions should be subjected to FMEA type analysis and undergo Proving Trials type testing. where relating to a DP incident. It is recommended that DP data logging function is included as part of the DP system design spec. copies of work records of all certification and qualifications. 4. key DP personnel records of DP watchkeeping hours to be maintained on board. systematic and progressive. permanently stored in retrievable archives. Regulations. such as propulsion. position references and sensors.e.

In addition to complying with the IMO Guidelines and the relevant DP rules of the vessel’s Classification DET NORSKE VERITAS . The detailed risk analysis should consider the consequences of loss of position relevant to the activity. This includes initial and periodic complete survey and testing of all systems and components required to keep position after single failures associated with the vessel’s assigned DP equipment class. Class 2 may be accepted based on considerations of procedures. These benchmarking guidelines provide the foundation for all subsequent DP rules. The IMO Guidelines require all DP vessels to be subjected to survey and testing in accordance with IMO’s specified guidelines. regulations and guidance issued by Class and other industry bodies. so as to demonstrate full compliance with applicable parts of the guidelines. such as IMCA. Guidance note: A detailed risk analysis will be required if the vessel is to operate in a task appropriate mode (TAM) that provides less redundancy than that provided by the vessel’s DP equipment class notation. Accordingly. The periodic component in the IMO Guidelines requires the complete survey and testing to be repeated every five years to ensure full compliance with applicable parts of the guidelines. the vessel may be set up in accordance with the requirements of the Task Appropriate Mode. Note 1: Note 2: Note 3: The vessel’s DP system should normally be set up and operated to deliver the intent of the DP class notation. In addition compliance with IMO Guidelines requires survey and testing after defects are discovered and corrected and. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels Application on DP Drilling Diving Pipelay Umbilical Lay Lifting Accommodation Shuttle Offtake ROV Support (Open Water) ROV Support (Close Proximity Surface/ Subsea) Floating Production Seismic and Survey vessels (Open water. whenever significant repairs or alterations are carried out. This IMO requirement has been interpreted by the DP community such that the survey requirement is met by a DP FMEA (or FMECA 1)) and the testing requirement by DP FMEA Proving Trials. The IMO Guidelines do not make clear distinction between vessels of different DP equipment class. It is noted that there have been standards developed outside the IMO DP equipment class systematics where an identical (or higher) level of redundancy has been realized based on a different philosophy and system approach. For operations close to another vessel or installation the equipment class should be 3 or equivalent. equipment and consequence analysis.outside 500 m zone) Well Stim Logistics Operations Minimum Recommended DP Equipment Class (See Note 1 below) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 ** 2* 2* Remarks ** Class in accordance with contractual requirements * Vessels of lesser Class may be used with the appropriate structured risk identification and mitigation measures in place. on occasion and after a proper assessment of the risks. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 4.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. The requirement for a DP FMEA has its origins in IMO MSC/Circ 645 (1994) “Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems”. all DP vessels of DP Class 2 or 3 are required to have a Class approved and stamped DP FMEA and DP FMEA Proving Trials. 1) Unless expressly stated in this Guidance document a FMECA is interchangeable with an FMEA.4 DP FMEA The DP vessel’s DP FMEA is the most important technical document in the list of required documents. January 2011 Page 56 – 4. after a DP related accident and. However.

Appropriate definitions are as follows. evaluate the effects on the system of each failure mode. The findings from a DP FMEA and Proving Trials should be categorised into A. B or C. Particular attention should be paid in the DP FMEA to the interfaces between the DP system and Note: other systems that have the potential to affect the DP system. the reliability and effectiveness of these mechanisms should be proven and fully documented in the DP FMEA. hardware and interfaces thus ensuring the integrity of the DP system and proper integration with DP. be updated after any major modifications and proving trials have been conducted. identify the equipment or subsystem. Key DP personnel. The DP FMEA should address the ESD function (if fitted). hidden failures. A cost benefit analysis is recommended. DET NORSKE VERITAS Note: Note: Note: Note: Note: . B: For attention when reasonably convenient The failure effects equal worst case failure design intent but there is an opportunity to reduce the failure effect as reasonable cost. should be consulted to gain a more detailed understanding.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. for DP Class 3 vessels. identify potential configuration errors. These systems should be subjected to the FMEA and Proving Trials approach for software.) and be supported by sketches and drawings. etc. January 2011 4. and potential impact on DP and station keeping. The results from a DP FMEA. Guidance note: These Guidance Notes on DP FMEAs are intentionally brief. emergency response and planning decisions. such as the effects of hydrocarbon gas on engine control and safety systems. which can cause diesel engines to accelerate out of control resulting in catastrophic mechanical failure and potential for black out. in particular the various issues relating to the status of post activation battery power supplies (UPS). take account of action items from DP FMEA Proving Trials. audits and incidents which have been or. Annual DP Trials. should be used in the formulation of operational. The review should take account of new equipment and hardware/ software updates.g. A: For immediate attention The failure effect exceeds worst case failure design intent or is non compliant with specified rules and guidelines. referred to in this section. Identify all potential failure modes and their causes. — IMCA M166 “Guidance on Failure Modes and Effects Analysis” — IMCA M178 “FMEA Management Guide” — IMCA M04/04 2004 “Methods of Establishing the Safety and Reliability of DP Systems” FMEAs are a requirement to obtain DP Class 2 and 3 notation. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels – Page Society the DP FMEA should achieve the standards of detail and analysis contained in the following industry guidance. such as where the vessel is fitted with an Emergency Shut Down (ESD) system. be presented as a narrative analysis of DP related systems and subsystems covering the above points (i. They give a concise overview of the underpinning philosophy. “Guidance on the Design. analytical processes and the technical content of a DP FMEA. Relevant IMCA guidance. including the vessel Master. Whilst not stipulated as a class requirement for DP 1 vessels owners/ operators are encouraged to subject their DP 1 vessels to the DP FMEA process. take account of common mode failures that are otherwise liable to be overlooked. Appropriate guidance is given in section 6. Where the redundancy concept relies on inter-switching mechanisms. where significant. in particular issues related to the vessel’s worst case failure and significant single point failures. pipe tensioner system or fire monitor system.g. are in the process of being. closed out. not only from a compartment analysis perspective but also. identify the significant single point failures. new developments in analysis and new knowledge acquired in the intervening period. redundancy concept.e. A DP FMEA should encompass the following: — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — identify worst case failure design intent (WCFDI) and worse case failure (WCF). should consider the effects of fire and flood. DPOs. take account of non DP systems/ auxiliary/ external systems that have interfaces with. identify potential hidden failures. once every five years.6 of IMCA M196. the effects of fire and flood on ESD control lines and push buttons. at the subsystem level. Engineers and Electricians should have a detailed knowledge of the DP FMEA and should use the information provided to be fully informed about the capabilities and limitations of the vessel’s DP system. configuration errors. Selection. identify trials and testing necessary to prove the conclusions. The DP FMEA should contain an analysis of the DP control system I/Os to verify that it is consistent with the redundancy concept and should be proved at DP FMEA Proving Trials. e. mode of operation and the equipment. C: For consideration Comments and observations related to good practice. Identify measures for eliminating or reducing the risks associated with each failure mode. Categories should be clearly defined. Class rules. be subject to review and update as necessary. e. Improvement is required for class compliance. Installation and Use of UPS onboard Vessels”.

include the following steps. Cautionary Note: DP FMEAs that are solely focused on attaining class notation and class approval may not always meet guidance standards stipulated in those IMCA Guidelines. — determining the vessel’s Task Appropriate Mode. These theoretical plots are calculated from detailed information of the vessel’s hull and superstructure form and available thruster power. This is particularly relevant where the DP Capability Plots are included in the shipyard’s scope of supply for newbuilds. M166. DP Capability Plots that do not take into account thruster interaction.g. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 4. — Loss of most effective thruster(s). determine a strategy for dealing with the ranked criticalities so that remedial measures are directed appropriately in accordance with the criticality ranking. where the unavailability of equipment may reduce the vessel’s DP station keeping ability. determine the probability of occurrence of each failure mode (using qualitative or reliable MTBF data). — determining the DP vessel’s Activity Specific Operating Guidelines (ASOG). the installation of new equipment. Guidance is provided on DP Capability Plots in IMCA M140 Rev 1. such as the DP system manufacturers. — determining the DP vessel’s Safest Mode of Operation (SMO). A DP FMECA should encompass all of the listed points in DP FMEA above and.5 DP Capability Plots DP Capability Plots should be calculated for the vessel. thruster-hull). M178. — developing the vessel’s DP Operations and Emergency Response manuals and procedures. unless specifically instructed to do so. Note: The DP Capability Plots should be provided in a format that is intuitive to the user on board (e. The following IMCA Guidelines address the above considerations in various levels of detail. — DP Capability Plots should include the following scenarios at current speeds of 0. owners are recommended to ensure that there are contractually binding agreements for the FMEA to meet specifications set out in IMCA Guidelines. Note to Owners: In the case of newbuilds. — — — — determine the severity of each failure mode. For example. in addition. if DP FMEAs are within the shipyard’s scope of supply. e. Criticality is derived from an assessment of the probability that a particular failure will occur combined with the severity of the failure if it does occur. such as a crane or an accommodation module on deck will alter the vessel’s outline. thruster degradation and thruster barred zones are incomplete. may not include the Worst Case Failure. Owners/ operators should note that it is important to provide a detailed scope of work to whoever is to generate the DP Capability Plots for the vessel. DP Capability Plots may have to be recalculated from time to time during the lifetime of a DP vessel. taking account of the impact of taking systems or equipment out of service. where each point on the envelope represents the wind speed at which it is calculated that the vessel will be unable to maintain position in DP. DET NORSKE VERITAS . M04/04 and Annex. The calculations should use environmental data (seastate. Guidance note: DP Capability Plots that do not cover Worst Case Failure are incomplete.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. or at other current speeds that are representative of the location in which the DP vessel is to operate: — Fully intact power generation and thrusters. e. January 2011 Page 58 – 4. “Specification for DP Capability Plots”. wind and current) appropriate to the area in which the DP vessel is to operate. M178.g. 1 and 2 knots. Note: The closing out of action items should be well documented and auditable. A DP FMEA should be referred to at the following times. The Criticality Analysis should be presented in tabulated form making use of risk matrices that comply with recognised international standards such as those given in IMCA M166 or IEC 60812. M04/04 and Annex and preferably be carried out by an independent third party DP FMEA practitioner. — conducting task based DP operational risk assessments. ensuring that the single point failures identified in the DP FMEA are covered in the trials and checklists.g. — developing planned maintenance schedules. These plots should show the limiting wind speed 360 degree envelopes for the scenarios below. where key personnel involved should have detailed knowledge of the DP FMEA. where equipment performance approaches or exceeds predetermined limits. determine and rank the criticality of the identified failure modes from highest to lowest. when applicable and warranted by the specific DP operations. (thruster-thruster. — Following the worst case failure. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels A FMECA is an extension of an FMEA that adds a risk assessment of each failure mode to determine its criticality. Experience has shown that those who generate the DP Capability Plots. — developing DP trials programs and checklists. M166. Polar Plot).

whilst the vessel is being subjected to real environmental forces.3 m/sec. i. Record wind. in various degraded thruster configurations. e. if available. Where not already covered by existing calculations the revised DP Capability Plots should cover the following cases for the new thruster condition.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. DPOs should be fully familiar with the limits given in the DP Capability Plots for the fully intact thruster configuration.3. DP Capability Plots should be used by DPOs and other key DP personnel as a reference in the planning phases when determining the vessel’s environmental operational limits for the ASOG. the new loss of most effective thruster(s) and the new worst case failure condition. weather downtime or on arrival at the field. fully intact. thus validating or contradicting the theoretical DP Capability Plots for the various thruster configurations. in turn. opportunities should be taken to validate the DP Capability Plots by taking DP Footprint Plots. including worst case failure.6 DP Footprint Plots DP Footprint Plots should also be produced on board. one or more thrusters are no longer available. DPOs should be aware that the current force generated by the DP control system is the residual external force acting on the vessel that cannot be measured. due to unforeseen faults or failures or. Refer to plotting sheets in Sec. will alter the wind effect on the vessel. DP Capability Plots may also have to be recalculated for thruster configurations where. Some DP systems have a software application that produces DP Footprint Plots electronically.) DP Footprint Plots serve other purposes. 4) Record the rate of turn and speed of moves. It is suggested that the following values are applied. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 4. that have good fore and aft thrust capability but limited thwartship capability. DP Footprint Plots serve two main purposes. This is not uncommon on vessels. to prevent misleading results. Theoretical DP Capability Plots and DP Footprint Plots combine together to enhance knowledge and understanding of the vessel’s DP station keeping ability. In these circumstances the DP Capability Plots should be recalculated to take account of the changes. the new fully intact condition. The plots are used to gain a better understanding of the vessel’s actual station keeping performance and limitations in intact and. It should be remembered that DP Capability Plots are theoretical calculations and that. vessel outline with thrusters indicated and space for vessel specific position reference systems and environmental data. wherever possible. DPOs should be careful when estimating the current force acting on the vessel and relating it to the DP Capability Plots. i.6. 1) Use a proforma plotting sheet. 10 deg/min and 0. Note: DP Footprint Plots originated in harsh weather regions. every 30 seconds. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels – Page which. They are actual measurements of the vessel’s DP station keeping performance in the actual environmental conditions and thruster configuration at the time the plot was taken. respectively. 3) Record thruster configuration on the plotting sheet. DP Footprint Plots should be taken whenever opportunities arise.e. Where the DP Capability Plots show an undue level of heading limitations this may restrict the vessel’s operating range. comprising a 360 degree polar plotting diagram. Plots should be taken for the thruster configurations used in the DP Capability Plots. such as DP tankers. plotting the vessel’s position regularly. DPOs can also produce DP Footprint Plots by manual methods using a plotting sheet. 5) Observe position excursions from the intended position by the most appropriate means. DP Capability Plots should be readily available to the DPOs at the DP control console. for loss of most effective thruster and for worst case failure. January 2011 4.e. waves and current on the plotting sheet.4. could be used to estimate current by going into drift mode. When wind speeds are low an attendant vessel. It is acknowledged that DP Footprint Plots may be of less relevance to DP MODUs. including learning and familiarisation opportunities for DPOs and in providing snapshots of vessel station keeping behaviour for specific locations and activities. DPOs should consult DP Capability Plots as a matter of course whilst the vessel is conducting DP operations. loss of most effective thruster(s) and after worst case failure. 2) The vessel should be in auto DP. DET NORSKE VERITAS . DP Footprint Plots are not theoretical.19. such as in the North Sea. drawing appropriate vectors. due to essential maintenance requirements. See Sec.g. such as during standby periods. Guidance note: Manual DP Footprint Plots are generated in the following manner. — They provide a scatter plot of vessel positions at regular intervals around the required set position (this shows accuracy of station keeping) — They also provide comparison points on the limiting wind speed envelope given in the theoretical DP Capability Plots (this shows wind speeds at which it was seen that the vessel was unable to maintain position.

The following are the most common position reference systems in use. RADius.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. The plot shows that the rig was unable to maintain position with the wind and sea on the port quarter. An absolute system gives vessel geographical position. January 2011 Page 60 – 4. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- DET NORSKE VERITAS . absolute indicates that this position reference sensor is independent of another fixed or floating offshore structure. Example 3: The known circumstances at the time of taking the DP Footprint Plot. Fanbeam. A relative system gives vessel position in relation to a non-fixed reference. Notwithstanding these. Both worked examples are for the same DP semi submersible drilling rig 1) and in the same environmental conditions. radios etc. And. SBL. Additional position reference systems should be based on different principles. 4. Position reference systems should be selected with due consideration to operational requirements. an acoustic absolute system can be used as a relative system if attached to a non-fixed asset. Cyscan) Radar (e. of wind. Position reference systems comprise absolute and relative systems. The plot shows that the vessel was able to maintain position within +/. Example 2: shows a DP Footprint Plot for the rig’s worst case failure condition with four thrusters operational. It is generally not recommended to use multiple (>2) satellite based systems in conjunction with other position reference systems as this may result in skewed weighting in favor of multiple satellite systems. Wind was 45 to 50 knots from 225 degrees with a corresponding wave height of 6 m. both with regard to restrictions caused by the manner of deployment and expected performance in working situations. can be compared against the environmental envelope plotted on the theoretical DP Capability Plot for worst case failure. They should be similar in that the DP Capability Plot should also show that vessel will be unable to maintain position in conditions where a 45 to 50 knots wind is on the port quarter.3. wave height and thruster configuration. Current was 1 coincident at 1 knot. RadaScan) DARPS Class rules give minimum requirements for the number of position references.19 contains two worked examples. LBL) Taut wire (See Note 2) Artemis Laser (e. It could be debated that Taut Wire and Acoustic Position reference systems are relative position reference systems. should not be used during critical operations such as sub-sea operations. Example 1: shows a DP Footprint Plot for the rig’s fully intact condition with all eight thrusters operational.g. particularly if the DP Capability Plot shows that the vessel can maintain position in the given condition. Where operational uptime is one of the key success factors the benefit gained by consciously exceeding the minimum requirements are to be evaluated. Cautionary Note: The DP Footprint Plot positions will contain systematic position reference errors. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels Sec. A relative system can be used as an absolute system if installed on a point that is a fixed geographical position. For purposes of this document.7 Position Reference Systems and Sensors The DP vessel should be equipped with suitable position reference and sensors in accordance with the vessel’s DP class notation and operational requirements. operational guidance on position reference systems and sensors is given in the table on the next page. in which the rig failed to maintain position. DP reference systems sensitive to interferences from the vessels radars.g. then it may be necessary to pull in the limiting wind envelope on the DP Capability Plot to the upper wind speed determined by the DP Footprint Plot for these conditions. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--1) The example DP Footprint Plots for a DP semi submersible drilling rig are equally applicable to many project/ construction vessels.2 meters with the wind and sea on the port quarter. Other benefits of exceeding minimum requirements include greater redundancy and improved station keeping performance. Relative Note 1: Note 2: Caution: Caution: Guidance note: The reference system may be subject to contract specifications/ oil major requirements. Absolute DGNSS (DGPS and GLONASS) Acoustic (USBL. If there is a significant difference between the two.

January 2011 4.Application on DP GPS DET NORSKE VERITAS Recommended Absolute Position Reference Systems Recommended Relative Position References Systems if in close proximity to an offshore structure Sensors SBL USBL/ LBL Taut Min Artemis Laser Radar Gangway DARPS Min Fixed TLP/SPAR/etc TLP/SPAR/etc Gyros. 5 Sensors (See Note 2 below) below) &6 & 6 below*) & 6 below*) (See Note below) below*) 7 below) Drilling If in deep Redundant .<700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m 3 Y Y Y N N 3 mixed 3 mixed abs & 3 relative only 3 open one dual abs & rel rel water frequency Diving N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m 3 Y Y Y N N 3 mixed 3 mixed abs & 3 relative only 3 abs & rel rel Pipelay N Y N N N N 3 Y Y Y N N 3 mixed 3 mixed abs & 3 relative only 3 abs & rel rel Umbilical Lay N Y N N N N 3 Y Y Y N N 3 mixed 3 mixed abs & 3 relative only 3 abs & rel rel Riser Pull in N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m 3 Y Y Y N N 3 mixed 3 mixed abs & 3 relative only 3 abs & rel rel Lifting N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m 3 Y Y Y N N 3 mixed 3 mixed abs & 3 relative only 3 abs & rel rel Accommodation N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m 3 Y Y Y Y N 3 mixed 3 mixed abs & 3 relative only 3 abs & rel rel Shuttle Offtake N Y N N N N 3 Y Y Y N Y 3 mixed 3 mixed abs & 3 relative only 3 abs & rel rel ROV Support N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m 2 N N N N N * * * See Note 8 2 below Floating N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m 3 N N N N N NA NA NA 3 Production Unit Well Stim N unless Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m 2 Y Y Y Y Y 2 * * 2 open water OSV Snatch N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m 2 Y Y Y N N 1 2 mixed abs 2 2 Lifts and rel OSV HAZMAT N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m 3 Y Y Y Y N 2 3 mixed abs & 3 relative only 3 Transfer no rel quick disconnect OSV HAZMAT N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m 2 Y Y Y Y N 2 * * 3 Transfer with quick disconnect OSV with shaft N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m 2 Y Y Y Y Y 3 * * 3 gens and single stern thruster Wind Turbine N Y NA NA NA NA 2 N N N N N NA NA NA 2 installation Standby Vessels Y Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <m 1 N N N N N NA NA NA 1 or < Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. DGNSS (See SSBL (See Wire Number platform < min > min VRUs and (DGPS + Note 1 (See Note 1 (See (See Note (See movement movement Wind GLONASS) below) Note 1 below) Note 12 3 below) Notes 4. 5 (See Notes 4. 5 (See Notes 4. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels – Page 61 .

Good DGPS close to structures should be considered as a bonus. FPSOs/ TLPs/ Spars) – When carrying out DP activities in close proximity to or in conjunction with floating facilities it is strongly recommended that redundant relative position reference systems are used. Construction vessels intending to use DARPS as a position reference should assess consequences of freeze in a risk analysis and evaluate the potential to use other effective relative position reference sensors. e. Special care should be taken where there is a potential for multi path of DARPS signals. consideration should be given to set each system with a different elevation mask. (Absolute Systems) . such as the Kongsberg HAIN (Hydro Acoustic Inertial Navigation) system or Sonardyne’s AAINS (Acoustically Aided Inertial Navigation System) both of which can. This can be accomplished by installing the transponder/ beacon onto the submerged part of the TLP or Spar at an appropriate depth. DET NORSKE VERITAS . USBL and SSBL. There have been incidents in the past where diversity of vendors and software has resulted in loss of position due to the acceptance of erroneous values within the software. this would require the use of separate and independent hull transceivers. Some TLPs and Spars are fitted with suitable subsea brackets or cradles for transponders/ beacons. e. masking of differential signals. It is recommended that. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels Note 1: Note 2: Note 3: Note 4: (Acoustics) – The acoustic LUSBL system is not included in the above table since it is a combination of USBL and LBL in one system. where an inertial input is applied to the satellite based system’s position calculation. wherever possible. “Guidelines on the Use of DGPS as a Position Reference in DP Control Systems”.: . FPSO/TLP/SPAR. such as TLPs and Spars where an acoustic system. It should also be noted that there are non fixed offshore facilities. It is recommended that. Guidance is given in IMCA M141. Only where it is impractical to use systems based on different principles may all be of the same type. such as during times of scintillation and satellite ageing. This is so that any jump in position that may occur when a satellite comes into view will hit one DGPS before the next and will give the DPO some time to take action. are referred to in the above table. this would require the use of different masts for the satellite antennae. such as the Kongsberg Seatex 4D system. such as the masking of GPS signals. The minimum movement referred to in the table above refers to the actual measured movement of floating facility. separate cable routeing. sited on the floating facility to measure the fluctuations in its movement. Care should be taken at all times when using satellite based systems close to platforms. In these locations DGPS should not be considered as the primary position reference system. radio interference and multipath. if any. such as RADius. which highlights potential problems when within 150 m of a platform.g. (Satellite Systems) – Satellite based systems that use a combination of signals from DGPS and GLONASS satellites provide enhanced redundancy over systems that use only a single satellite source.g. RADASCAN or Fanbeam. This enhancement can fill the “holes” in positioning information in extraordinary and difficult conditions that otherwise might invalidate the satellite based positioning information. different vendors and software.Where multiple absolute systems are used it is recommended that they are based on two different principles.overcome the update rate limitations of speed of sound in water. For instance. Where there is diversity of vendors and software it is recommended that the acceptance/ rejection logic is verified against the DP system manufacturer’s specifications. Experience has shown that this may result in computer freeze and the need for re-boot. such as with construction vessels at non fixed assets.overcome the limitations on satellite based position reference systems brought upon by poor satellite geometry. Although the abbreviations differ they both refer to the same acoustic application although supplied by different vendors. Owners/ operators should consider the advantages of acoustic positioning systems that have an inertial navigation input. can be used as a relative system. To measure this movement the DP vessel should use an absolute position reference system. This is of particular significance where DGPS is concerned where the satellite constellation provides a source for a common mode failure. (DP at non fixed Assets. Owners/ operators should consider the advantages of hybrid GNSS/ IMU positioning systems. does not impact station keeping. such as DGPS. The DPOs must be extremely vigilant when using a mix of absolute and relative position references and must be fully aware of the potential danger of diverging positioning information from both types of system. although normally considered as an absolute system. where the USBL is typically used to calibrate the LBL system.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. as the sole source for positioning information and use the relative positioning system. In these situations a mix of absolute and relative position reference systems for station keeping is to be used only after validating that movement of the floating structure. Where multiple DGPS systems are being used. multiple acoustic systems are completely separated and independent in all respects. multiple satellite based systems are completely separated and independent in all respects. For instance. The abbreviations. . January 2011 Page 62 – 4. wherever possible.

It should be noted that some Classification Societies. There should also be means of ensuring that erroneous values are prevented from being input manually. including ABS and DNV already require three gyro compasses for a DP class 2 notation. New or retrofitted position references are sometimes interfaced into DP as another position reference because the DP control system has not been designed to accept them. manifolds or other subsea assets.g. There should be means of preventing erroneous values from being accepted by DP. Gyro compasses are normally fitted with a correction facility which inputs the vessel’s latitude and speed. It is becoming more prevalent for gangway access systems to use sensors such as VRUs to provide heave/ motion compensation. irrespective of the requirements of the applicable Classification Society DP rules. Where. which have a potential to affect the DP system and station keeping should there be an erroneous or invalid input from them. These include draft sensors and pipelay tension sensors. motion and wind. if any. e. the DPOs should monitor the weightings closely so as to ensure that no one system or set of systems is ‘hogging” the weighting. This applies equally to sensors such as gyro compasses. DP vessels are frequently fitted with sensor systems. This is not recommended since there are a number of system errors that can result in undesired heading changes. The effects of incorrect latitude or. satellite based position reference systems from different manufacturers and differential signals from different sources. other than heading.When using DGPS/ GLONASS in a mix of absolute and relative position reference systems. All types of wind sensor are vulnerable. more importantly.g. including ultrasonic types. It is possible for thruster wash to interact with a taut wire. Where it is unavoidable. e. DPOs should have ultimate control over the input. It is recommended that no more than two satellite based position reference systems be used to provide position solution as inputs into DP. (Taut wires) – Care should be exercised when lowering or repositioning taut wire weights that divers and ROVs are alerted and are a safe distance from the seabed position.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. DPOs should recognise the potential dangers of using multiple satellite based systems (>2) in the suite of position reference systems and that this could result in skewed ‘weighting” in favor of satellite systems at the expense of other position references. Where these sensors are interfaced to DP it is essential that an FMEA systems engineering approach is used at the design stage and in validation commissioning and that particular attention is paid to interfacing and testing. It is therefore important to ensure that the latitude and speed corrections are applied. if fitted. VRUs and wind sensors. the consequences for station keeping of common mode failures. Where it is anticipated that due to operational requirements the DP vessel will require to be positioned in close proximity to the non fixed facility and where the potential for shadowing of DGPS exists. January 2011 4. (Sensors) . heavy rain and birds. These subsea assets should be positively identified prior to positioning taut wire weights. speed could result in a significant error in output heading. DPOs should be aware of the potential for this to occur.Given the impact on heading/ position keeping it is recommended that vessels with an equivalent DP 2 class notation are provided with three gyro compasses. may be prevented by fitting mechanical wind sensors. This practice is not recommended unless accompanied by a detailed risk analysis and the residual risk. Wherever practical and feasible it is recommended that redundancy requirements are met by diversity of suppliers. Taut wire weights should also be placed clear of pipelines. multiple position references are in use by DP. users should bear in mind the possibility of the offshore structure blocking the satellite signals and the consequences for station keeping. The practice of connecting survey and DP is not recommended. as is normal. Some systems use automatic input from GPS for these corrections. acting as a strong current and causing position instability. is deemed acceptable. then redundancy in relative position reference sensors should be considered. Where ultrasonic type wind sensors are fitted. It is therefore recommended to use manual input of latitude and speed. Wind sensors are known to have suffered common mode failures. Care should also be taken that the taut wires are not fouled by other subsea lines or obstructions. such as icing in higher latitudes. in particular where there are two satellite based systems in a mix of three. Examples of this are pseudo Artemis or pseudo acoustics. isolation between the systems is to be provided. that affect these ultrasonic sensors. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels – Page Note 5: Note 6: Note 7: Note 8: Note 9: Note 10: Note 11: Note 12: (Absolute and Relative Systems) . The thruster wash could be from own vessel or from another vessel close by. DPOs should be alert to the potential for taut wire weights to “skip” along the seabed and provide DET NORSKE VERITAS . lightning. by the ROV. where an erroneous or invalid input could result in extreme values and distortion of external forces and result in large position excursion (drive off) from the desired set point position. An often practiced procedure which should prevent the above problems is to input these values manually and not to rely on the automatic input function. All necessary precautions should be taken to ensure that the vessel’s station keeping is not affected and should be addressed in the FMEA.

DPOs should also be aware of the potential for taut wire systems to become a “perfect” reference. Neither the heading nor the position of the DP vessel is fixed. This should be taken into consideration when planning DP operations. particularly at points of weakness. parameters and values used by position reference systems are compatible with the software and acceptance criteria used by the DP control system and that this is verified by analysis and testing. Taut wire systems are known to suffer inaccuracies at water depths over 350 m. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels inaccurate positioning information. where the DP control system allows the vessel’s heading to rotate to minimize external forces acting on the vessel and thruster requirements. around the terminal point. Taut wires are quite highly stressed for marine wire ropes and are liable to breakage. called the setpoint circle. normally by reducing gain and relaxing the DP controller. DPOs should ensure that the warning and alarm limits are properly set and operational. Weights are in the region of 400 kg to 500 kg. This mode is appropriate for connected shuttle tanker/ FPSO operations. or by a faulty gimbal sensor. for example. continuous wear at any guide blocks and kinks or damage caused by poor spooling or where the wire is attached to the weight. which is separate from the environment. otherwise being restricted in its movement. January 2011 Page 64 – 4. such as continuous wear at the spot on the main sheave. current and waves around a fixed or moving point called the terminal point. Most DP systems will detect this fault.8 Recommended DP Control Modes for DP Activities The DP vessel should be equipped with suitable DP modes and features with due consideration to operational requirements. The potential for wire breakage is reduced by regular inspection of the taut wire system and by cropping the taut wire on a regular basis. is included in the DP calculation and treated as a force feed forward. External Force Compensation Where the measured external force acting on the vessel. The heading of the vessel is controlled to point towards the terminal point. Target Follow DET NORSKE VERITAS . Attention is drawn to IMO MSC/Circ 645 where three MRU/VRUs are stipulated when vessel positioning is fully dependent on correct MRU/VRU signals. This can be avoided by ensuring that the tension control is properly calibrated and operating within specified parameters and that the angle of wire inclination is kept as near to vertical as is possible and should not normally exceed 10 degrees. The wires in use in modern taut wire systems are generally 5 mm or 6 mm in diameter. i. including the taut wire touching the side of own vessel or.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Caution: It is not uncommon for the term “weathervane” to be used to denote “minimum thrust”. The following selected DP control modes are relevant to specific DP activities. The position of the vessel is controlled to follow a circle. Fire Monitor Compensation Used to compensate for the varying forces exerted on vessel from the fire monitors. This mode is used to account for pipe tensions in a pipe layer and hawser tension in a shuttle tanker.e. Note 13: It is important that software. both with regard to restrictions caused by the activity and performance criteria required to execute the activity safely and successfully. especially in high current areas. 4. This can have different causes. to follow an ROV along a pipeline. These terms should not be confused. Enables the DP vessel to follow a moving target and is used. Weathervane Enables the DP vessel to rotate with the wind. Heavy Lift Takes account of the effects of the load transfer on the mass of the vessel and the additional lateral force. Also at water depths under 350 m severe inaccuracies may occur.

Where DP vessels. would move the vessel away from the structure. The term “weathervane” has a specific meaning in the DP shuttle tanker industry. The vessel specific DP Operations Manual should contain sufficient detail of these operating modes and features. This may mean that the mode has to be installed in the DP control system. DP FMEA Proving Trials: A series of tests used to prove expected effects of failure modes found in the FMEA desktop analysis. Problems associated with carrying out riser pull in operations with flooded pipe in relatively shallow water should be evaluated. These tests should be conducted immediately following launching of a new build vessel and following modifications. these trials may be subject to survey and approval by class. DET NORSKE VERITAS .Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 4. These tests should also include the testing of interfaces between different vendor systems and equipment. Activity on DP Weather Down Weather Only (See Note 1 below) Drilling Diving Pipelay Umbilical Lay Riser Pull in (See Note 3) Lifting Accommodation Shuttle Offtake ROV Support Floating Production Unit Well Stim OSV Snatch Lifts OSV HAZMAT Transfer no quick disconnect OSV HAZMAT Transfer with quick disconnect OSV with shaft gens and single stern thruster Standby Vessels Note 1: Note 2: Note 3: Note 4: Note 5: Note 6: Note 7: DP Control Mode External Force Comp N N Y N Y N N N N N N N N N N N Target Follow N N N N Y N Y Y Y N N N N N N N Weather Vane (See Note 2 below) N N N N N N N Y N Y N N N N N N Heavy Lift Mode N N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N NA if class 1 if class 1 Y N Needs to head into weather Y if class 1 The term “down weather” means that the vessel is on that side of the offshore structure where the environmental forces. additions. applicable standards and guidelines. This may be different from the regime as defined by class. Being part of their scope. January 2011 4. An alternative term is that the vessel is on the “force off” side of the structure. Owners/ operators should refer to the following list of trials and checklists when developing an appropriate regime for their own DP vessels. It may be necessary to carry out operations in heavy lift mode. upgrades repairs.9 Trials and Checklists A range of trials and checklists is to be provided for each DP vessel and implemented as a verification that the vessel’s DP system complies with and. is operated in accordance with. The list below is a typical list for a DP dive support vessel. are engaged in activities outside their normal scope they should do so using the recommended DP control mode. acting on their own. such as DP MODUs carrying out subsea construction activities. This verification process should confirm the failure modes and their effects on the systems and equipment analysed in the DP FMEA document (to include the Worst Case Failure) and the vessel’s station keeping ability following its Worst Case Failure. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels – Page Guidance note: The following table lists the recommended DP control modes that apply to different DP activities. A detailed and documented risk assessment should be carried out when it is planned to perform any of the above activities without the recommended DP control mode. The DPOs are to familiarize themselves with operational constraints/ requirements of these modes and features.

DP Mobilization Trials: A series of tests to be carried out at the start of a contract. Note: Experience has shown that. to demonstrate redundancy and functional limitations of the DP system. as defined in the DP FMEA. It can be used in factory acceptance tests. Watch Status/ 6 Hour Checklist: A series of checks and tests performed by the DPOs to verify and confirm the set up of the DP system prior to taking over the DP watch. which addresses Annual DP Trials is applicable to MODUs and not to all vessels. Approval is then obtained to operate in close proximity to the asset. Endurance Trials: DET NORSKE VERITAS . The guidance sets out a regime of annual testing that is conducted on an incremental basis throughout the year as opportunities arise but needs to be completed within a twelve month period. ECR Checklists: A series of checks and tests that verify that the vessel’s set up and configuration of systems and equipment meet the requirements of the necessary mode of operation as determined by the Safest Mode of Operation (SMO) and the DP Class or the Task Appropriate Mode (TAM). Annual DP Trials also provide the opportunities for training of the vessel’s crew and enhancement of their knowledge of failure modes and their effects. This is given in IMCA M191. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels (new build/ system modifications class requirement): To prove the operation of the DP system under load conditions for at least 4 hours without significant alarms of the DP system. sea trials. periodical tests and testing after upgrades. DP Location Set Up Checklist: A series of checks to demonstrate that the vessel is properly set up for the location. Main and back up communication tests should be included in this process. Pre-Dive Checklist: A series of checks performed prior to commencing diving operations. This has been recognized by the industry with publication of specific guidance relating to the conduct of Annual DP Trials for DP MODUs. Annual DP Trials: A series of tests of fault and failure conditions relevant to the DP System.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. “Guidelines for Annual DP Trials for DP Mobile Offshore Drilling Units”. Hardware in the Loop (HIL) Extensive testing of functionality. subject to client requirements. The tests should be designed to prove system redundancy. Post DP Incident Trials: Tests performed to ensure that the corrective/ repair measures taken following a DP incident have properly addressed the causes of the incident and that the vessel’s DP system is in a safe and operable condition. Main and back up communication tests should be included in this process. 500 m Checks: A series of checks and tests performed before entering the 500 m zone of an asset in which set up mode and functions are verified and confirmed. It is recognized that these trials and checklists could be given other titles. Guidance note: Annual DP Trials It is to be noted that M191. and test the operation of protection and detection devices and responses so as to demonstrate that the vessel’s DP system remains fit for purpose. in particular the satisfactory performance of the position reference systems. annual tests. Annual DP Trials should be performed at a specific occasion once a year and within 3 months of the anniversary of the previous year’s trials. DP Field Arrival Trials: A series of checks and tests that confirm satisfactory performance of the DP system and verify the set up mode of operation and DP functions. to validate repairs and preventive maintenance. owing to heavy operational demands. system performance and equipment functionality. DP drilling units are not usually able to meet the above criteria for conducting Annual DP Trials at a specific time once a year. Post DP Modification Trials: A series of checks and tests that are used to determine the effects of modifications and/ or additions on the DP system and the vessel’s subsequent station keeping performance. failures and performance by using tests advanced simulation techniques and embedded systems. Text from M191 is included in this section to draw attention to the purpose of Annual DP Trials. IMCA M112: “Guidelines for Auditing Vessels with DP Systems”. January 2011 Page 66 – 4. Note: The nomenclature used for the trials and checklists listed above is based on the guideline document.

They should also provide assurance of the integrity of the vessel’s DP system and the vessel’s operational limitations. for example. 500 m Checks All vessels should undertake 500 m checks. Only vessels engaged in support activities to remain within the 500 m zone. Vessel heading to be tested at 500 m checks to ensure that thruster loads are acceptable (i. When faults identified during the year on similar DP MOUs are determined to be feasible on the vessel then additional tests should be incorporated in the trials program. that the position reference systems are properly set up and operating satisfactorily. auto DP and all control modes. No testing is carried out. of any abnormalities in relevant systems or equipment that may affect DP operations. to improve the DP system safety and performance by testing faults and failure conditions important to DP safety to prove the ability of the vessel to keep position after single point failures associated with the IMO equipment class and to verify the FMEA requirements. the vessel heading checks may have to be repeated at an intermediate step between the 500 m line and the working location at. January 2011 4. The 500 m zone is not to be used as a standby location unless required to support a specific activity. 100 m from the working location. ECR Checklists These checks should be carried out by the ER staff and reported to the DPOs prior to start of operations and at fixed periods during DP operations These checks should be developed from the vessel’s DP FMEA and should confirm that the vessel’s systems and equipment are set up and configured for the appropriate operating mode. The tests carried out at these trials are less than are carried out at Annual DP Trials but more than at DP Field Arrival Checks. at any time. Post Modification/ Upgrade DP Trials It is essential to ensure that any modification. not during the first few minutes of the watch. owners/ operators should use the vessel specific DP FMEA and Proving Trials as the principal source for developing the Annual DP Trials program. change or upgrade to the DP system is fully tested and that the vessel’s redundancy concept has not been affected.e. The tests should confirm the vessel’s redundancy concept and station keeping performance after worst case failure. DP Location Set Up Checklist These checks should confirm that the vessel is properly set up for the working location and that the performance of the position reference systems is satisfactory for that location. It is the responsibility of engine room watch personnel to advise the DPOs. in particular. Depending on the performance and distance limitations of the position reference system(s) in use (e.. The checks should also ensure that the DP system is set up properly. The purpose of these checks is to ensure satisfactory operation of the DP system and should include a full functional check of the operation of all thrusters and power generating equipment and systems. Guidance will be provided in a subsequent revision of this RP. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- DET NORSKE VERITAS . Note The remainder of this subsection on Annual DP Trials is on hold pending formal publication of IMCA guidance on Annual DP Trials which is under development at the time of preparing this RP. “. M191 guidance describes a regime of annual testing that is conducted on an incremental basis throughout the year as opportunities arise but needs to be completed within a twelve month period. M191 also recognises the contribution that planned maintenance systems can play in verifying the status and performance of certain DP equipment throughout the year.. This resulted in the temporary loss of that operator station.. The checks should verify that the vessel’s station keeping performance at the working location is satisfactory and. Fanbeam). Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels – Page The following guidelines apply to the development and the conduct of Annual DP Trials for a DP MODU in accordance with guidance contained in IMCA M191. DPOs should complete the checklist prior to taking over the watch. These checks should take account of any limitations of the position reference systems for that location. prior to commencing work activity. It is important that the vessel carries out its checks on the same heading as at the final working location. M191 gives the purpose of Annual DP Trials as follow. In this example the installation of a more up to date and faster OS computer resulted in the new computer re-booting too early and failing to “ride through” the brief power interruption that resulted from the activation of a changeover relay. Testing should follow on from a detailed FMEA type analysis of the change which should be fully documented.g. The following example shows the inherent dangers of failing to take proper account of change. DP Mobilization Trials These trials should be carried out by the vessel’s crew as part of the mobilizing program prior to the start of a new project. These checks should be repeated for each change of location. DP Field Arrival Checks These checks should be carried out on arrival at the field.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Watch Status/ 6 Hour Checklist The purpose of these checks is to record the status of the DP system and configuration.” Using the above quotation as the background... determine whether thruster loads are within the load limits for ASOG).

training and competency. All relevant DP personnel should be given sufficient opportunity to familiarise themselves fully with the document and should be fully conversant with the sections of the manual that relate to their duties and responsibilities. DET NORSKE VERITAS . emergency procedures. tensioner systems on Pipelay vessels. such as company policies. it may be useful provide the operator with a thruster and generator operating strategy (TAGOS) to assist in the decision on what generators and thrusters to use for different circumstances and different equipment availabilities. vessel technical data and layout. etc. the planning and preparation of DP operations. vessel DP station keeping capabilities. watchkeeping and manning. Basic principles of DP. Owners/ operators at their discretion. The manual should address operating issues relating to equipment and systems that are interfaced to the DP system. M109. ASOG. This should include interfaces between systems and equipment that are not part of the DP system but which may affect the DP system.10 DP Operations Manuals A vessel specific DP Operations Manual should be prepared for each DP vessel. which states. such as Emergency Disconnect Systems (EDS) on MOUs. DPOs. Vessel specific DP philosophy. M117 (contingency training) and in class society DP rules. operating limits. including checklists as appropriate. Due consideration should be given to initiating disconnect sequence preceding an ESD resulting in a black out. Related DP guidance and reference documents. The various tasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel. For complicated power systems and/ or thruster configurations. Section 1: Management of DP Operations (company/ vessel specific) Company/ vessel standing operational policies. engineers and electricians. The manual should specifically address operational interfaces between different vendor systems and equipment to ensure that they are configured and operated properly.” The manual should be a standalone document in hard copy. developed and managed in accordance with Requirement 7 of the ISM Code. DP operating procedures. January 2011 Page 68 – 4. open/ closed bus-tie configurations. test procedures and DP operating instructions to be incorporated into one manual. The requirement for a manual has its origins in IMO MSC/Circ 645 (1994) “Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems”. Guidance on the contents of vessel specific DP Operations Manuals is provided in the following IMCA guidelines. including the master. The potential for this adverse situation should be assessed and appropriate preventative measures put in place. procedures and standing orders. SMO. DP incident handling and alert systems and vessel specific trials and checklists that apply uniquely to the vessel. for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the ship and the prevention of pollution. operating modes. Vessel specific overview of DP system (vessel overview document). The manual should represent the way the vessel is operated in DP. worst case failure. The vessel specific DP Operations Manual is the most important operational document in the list of required documents. where necessary. environmental envelopes. The vessel specific manual may also contain generic content. responsibilities and roles of key DP personnel. as follows. This will include ESD systems (if installed) where the consequences of an automatic shutdown triggered by an ESD may result in undesirable consequences. Detailed procedures are to be developed for operating ESD. The manual should contain sufficiently detailed instruction and guidance to enable the vessel to be operated safely in DP and safely execute its intended activities. appendices should be kept on the DP navigating bridge. The recommendations set out below address areas that are not necessarily required by class. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels 4. The IMO Guidelines require a series of checklists. may provide this in an electronic format. Each Classification Society has its own specific requirements for a DP Operations Manual.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Procedures should highlight criteria for initiation and consequences. vessel DP capabilities. Owners/ operators may wish to refer to the following guidance when developing the vessel specific DP operations manual. M103. This will include a clear statement on the DP philosophy for the vessel. At least one controlled copy including any updates and. where relevant. Guidance note: The provision and development of the manual is the responsibility of the DP vessel owner or manager and should be incorporated in the company’s SMS and. “The Company should establish procedures for the preparation of plans and instructions. functional overview of a DP control system. They are based on current industry practices. the organisation. The manual should be readily accessible to all relevant DP personnel. each with different requirements for content.

including voyage. Annual DP Trials. where appropriate. bridge and engine room. electrical officers. (The failure modes of these systems and the potential effects on the vessel’s station keeping ability should be addressed in the DP FMEA). alert systems. required levels of redundancy. typical communications protocols and messages. Power management. reporting matrix. emergency disconnect system (EDS). where appropriate. chief engineer. electrical systems. DGPS set up and differential corrections. DET NORSKE VERITAS . close out and record keeping. DP standing orders. DP incident definition. work/ activity control rooms. vendor reports. integration with activity planning. optimum position and heading. DP handover procedures. fire and/ or explosion. loss of DP position references. special operations. Operator Intervention Appendix. DPOs. operating modes. thrusters and propulsion (thruster and generator operating strategy. black out. mobilization trials. severe weather. watchhandover checklists. tensioner systems. other PRS procedures. auto/ manual emergency shutdown systems (ESD). familiarisation and competency assessment. DP correspondence. simultaneous operations. distribution. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels – Page Section 2: DP System Description and Operation (vessel specific) Power generation. DP log keeping and documentation. field arrival checklists. construction superintendent. auxiliary systems. force off.g. drift off. following Worst Case Failure (WCF). etc. DP reporting and record keeping. manning levels. engineers. degraded and emergency conditions. January 2011 4. collision. proven blackout recovery times and EDS times (if applicable) and determination of red and yellow watch circles. acoustic arrays. helicopter operations. power and propulsion set up. simulation studies study. activity planning and pre-departure checklists. including weather log. reporting. including drive off. 500 m safety zone operations. testing. Position reference systems and sensors. transit and field arrival checklists. including onboard programs and experience levels. ASOG communications and response procedures. including hydrophones. emergency training. etc. taut wires. DP system set up. use of DP capability analysis and DP footprints. watchkeeping duties. gyros. TAGOS). Position reference system deployment. loss of redundancy. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- Section 3: Section 4: 4. VRUs. DP incidents and equipment failure reports. key DP personnel. emergency DP procedures. current sensors. documented: — Configuration for the Safest Mode of Operation (SMO) or. Normal DP marine operations. ESD/ EDS trials (where appropriate). etc. position reference system planning. risk assessment. emergency procedures. investigation. routine and emergency. operations in strong currents. including routine internal communications. monthly DP status report. In planning and preparing for the activities the following should be considered and. tests and trials reporting. DP training. drills and exercises. adverse and heavy weather procedures. offset and turn testing. the Task Appropriate Mode (TAM). Organisation and Responsibility DP organisation. advisory. including daily reporting. DP Operations Procedures Procedure for planning DP operations. etc. — Preparation of the Activity Specific Operating Guideline (ASOG). loss of control. DP technical and operational support onshore and offshore. external locations. DP computers and operator stations and networks. requiring input from analysis. both intact and residual capability. interfaces with other vendors equipment (e. including onboard discussion with all relevant stakeholders as part of the pre-project execution/ activity. Communications. beacon log. including onboard organisation. location set up checklists.11 Activity Operational Planning In recognizing that exposure to risks manifests itself during vessel operations it is recommended that activities performed by DP vessels should be subject to planning and preparation. external force input). battery procedures. DP desk procedures. fire and flood. including. wind sensors draft sensors. — Limitations imposed by water depth. Communications systems. operation and recovery. internal and external.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. DGNSS/ Hydroacoustic/. squalls. Development of activity specific criteria for normal. data logging. Onboard watch routines. — Discussion to be included in pre-project execution readiness checklist. skills development. standby time. — Capabilities of the vessel. Duties and responsibilities of key personnel involved in DP operations. other emergency and alert systems. master. ETOs. including environmental criteria. ROV operations. DP control system and automation. examples. position and heading changes. Development of ASOG (Activity Specific Operating Guidelines). Disconnect systems.

from inception through to implementation.(e. Task Appropriate Mode (TAM) A Task Appropriate Mode is a risk based mode that the DP vessel may be set up and operated in. On a DP MOU. including DP Class 2 and 3. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels — Consequences of a loss of position and/ or heading. This overview document in conjunction with SMO. A central component in the ASOG is proven knowledge of black out recovery time. It may be appropriate in situations where it is determined by risk assessment that the consequences of a loss of position are considered to be low enough to permit a lesser standard of DP redundancy. including the vessel or the environment. TAGOS could be a useful tool to onboard new personnel involved in operations. Guidance note: Safest Mode of Operation (SMO) Any DP vessel. functionality and operation and so that no single failure will exceed worst case failure. The vessel owns the SMO and ASOG document and the process that is used to develop it. In addition. ASOG should be developed and implemented by a DP vessel for every activity (location specific) that it carries out.21 for an example of an SMO and ASOG for a DP Project/ Construction Vessel. January 2011 Page 70 – 4. Note: The ASOG should be developed by extracting all the relevant information from detailed technical review of the vessel’s DP FMEA. heavy lift operations. Where a decision has been made to operate in a TAM a separate ASOG covering TAM should be produced. — Limitations imposed upon operations by residual capability. whereas SMO may require open bus. such that any other operational mode would be of a lesser standard than the SMO. An ASOG should be developed for every activity and location. is appropriate. It is suggested that the results of this review are summarised in a vessel overview document. The ASOG should be validated on board. Reference should also be made to relevant studies/ analyses (if applicable) for an activity being undertaken. and in Safest Mode when inside 500 m. can have the redundancy concept defeated if its systems and equipment are not configured or operated in the correct way. Activities should include day to day operations. and in Safest Mode. DET NORSKE VERITAS . when Time to Terminate is long. accepting that a single failure could result in exceeding worst case failure and could. The ASOG performs the same function as Well Specific Operating Guidelines (WSOG). Example 1: A DP MOU may operate in this mode (TAM) during times when Time to Terminate is short.g. TAM. whereas the SMO and TAM may not be location specific. Some owners refer to it as WSOC (Well Specific Operating Criteria). Refer to Sec. ASOG. distribution and propulsion system. Every DP vessel has a unique safest mode of operation which must be determined from a detailed understanding of the vessel’s DP FMEA and its operational characteristics. analysis related to riser transfer operations. Example 2: A DP pipelay vessel may operate in this mode (TAM) when more than 500 m from a surface or mission critical subsea asset.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. environmental and equipment performance limits for the DP vessel in relation to the specific activity that it is undertaking.e. A task appropriate mode is consciously entered into following a structured assessment of the risks of the operation to be undertaken by the vessel. Activity Specific Operating Guidelines (ASOG) The ASOG differs from the SMO and TAM in that it relates specifically to a known location and activity. A detailed review of the DP FMEA is done with a view to identify safest mode. In addition the ASOG differs from the SMO and TAM in that the ASOG sets the operational. operational manuals and project specific procedures. Yellow or Red). result in blackout or loss of position. — The activity being performed and the necessary time to terminate to bring vessel to a safe position upon the onset of failure. For diesel electric vessels the TAM may mean operating with closed bus. The SMO should be the default operational mode for a DP vessel i. permanent mooring connection operations). The SMO sets out the required equipment configurations and operational standards necessary for the vessel to meet its maximum level of redundancy. which relate to drilling activities.4. ASOGs are known as WSOGs. any specific operation relevant to the design of the vessel. The ASOG should be accompanied by a single line drawing (SLD) of the power generation. Appropriate measures should be in place to clearly identify critical tasks/ operational phases of the activity and to ensure that the vessel is set up in Safest Mode of Operation and operating within post WCF capability. as well as any unique operations the vessel is called upon to perform. Summary: Note: A DP vessel should be set up in accordance with its SMO unless it is determined by risk assessment that the lesser standard. — SIMOPS and marine vessel interaction and consequences arising from change of status (Green to Blue. where a loss of position will not result in damage to people or hardware.

i. all risks have been fully assessed must be met. Prepare to Conduct risk operations to disconnect. including wind speed limits. including consequence analysis. standby starts. including confirmation of 100% output in DP Thrusters. Response For DP operations to commence and continue the conditions in the GREEN column must be met. assessment to commence and determine whether to The operation should not be continue the continue. An ASOG for a DP Project/ Construction vessel will typically cover the following items. limits. to determine whether it is acceptable to resume operations with compromised redundancy. January 2011 4. including watchkeeping rotas.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. isolations. wave height limits Vessel positioning performance (weather related). The SMO goes beyond equipment set up. including confirmation of 100% output in DP Power management. — — — — — — Maximum watch circles radius (If applicable) for max metocean conditions that activity will be carried out. SAFEST MODE OF OPERATION – OUTLINE GREEN Definition Normal operations – all systems and equipment fully operational.3 m/sec. operating within continue whilst risks are being assessed.OUTLINE GREEN BLUE YELLOW Advisory status – Reduced status approaching Normal operations – all performance limits or Pre-defined performance limits reached. including configuration. including position and heading excursions Maximum offsets permissible from the set point position. to avoid side loading on rigging) Limitations (if any) imposed by rigging/ design constraints (e. Colinearity conditions of wind and current Weather forecast and environmental conditions. (BLUE – ADVISORY). (e. mode availability and selection Position reference systems. ACTIVITY SPECIFIC OPERATING GUIDELINES . Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels – Page The SMO is presented in a tabulated format and shows two conditions (GREEN – NORMAL) and (BLUE – ADVISORY) for each item. isolations. suggest 10 deg/min and 0. Stop operations and initiate contingency procedures with a view to reducing the time to For DP terminate. no cross connections Manual controls and independent joystick. including confirm redundancy.piling operations. the environment. as follows. confirmation that auto stop is off. to ensure the safety of people. crossovers Sea water cooling. max allowable stress. including confirm redundancy.e. including confirmation of power supply. change position or cease operations. redundancy. Abandon operations. A The vessel maintains position acceptable failure has occurred performance although the vessel has lost its that does not affect DP redundancy. (YELLOW – REDUCED) and (RED – EMERGENCY). isolations. No DP operation is to be recommenced until a full investigation has been implemented. black start enabled Uninterruptible power supplies (UPS). — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — Power plant set up. including availability. functional testing.g. failure resolved and fully tested. crossovers Compressed air. absolute and relative systems. current speed limits. Definition Response RED Emergency status – pre-defined operational or performance limits exceeded. testing and selection. tank levels. the operation and the vessel. qualifications and competency of watchkeepers Trials and checklists ESD status (if applicable) The ASOG is presented in a tabulated format and shows four conditions (GREEN – NORMAL). respectively Sensors. crossovers Fresh water cooling. as follows. DP verification processes completed and DP set up confirmed. placement of targets for DP OSVs Set speed of rotation and speed of moves. including confirm redundancy. testing and selection Fuel systems. Conduct risk assessment to determine whether to continue. Typical items contained in the SMO will include the following. standby starts. BLUE Advisory status – where any of the GREEN conditions are not met. safest compressor operating mode DP and ER manning. initiate EDS (disconnect sequence). component or system failure resulting in loss of control or position. including confirm redundancy.g. including availability. Operations may failure resulting in loss of functional and redundancy. including whether operating open or closed bus Diesel generators. standby starts. It also defines operational standards. The vessel should be moved to a safe position. component or system reportable alarm systems fully status. limiting footprint enevelopes to avoid side loading of rigging) DET NORSKE VERITAS . including confirmation of readiness and testing DP control system. change resumed before the vessel has conditions in the position or cease regained redundancy or before GREEN column operations. Take immediate action.

Simultaneous operations (SIMOPS) depend on effective communications between all vessels and units involved in the operation. It is important that change of status between vessels and units engaged in SIMOPs is communicated speedily and reliably. including threat to safety of the DP operation Simultaneous operations. charger output and supply status. including operation and performance of DP controllers and OS. collision. performance limits and failures (TAGOS) Thruster loads (TAGOS) Phase back conditions (e. These technologies are expected to deliver and aid in the management of complex SIMOPS. performance limits and failures (TAGOS) Diesel generator loads (TAGOS) Thrusters. failures Critical communications. Communications in this context include voice. failures DP control system displays. including number of enabled systems and performance.g. including minimum number required for the activity. Effective internal and external communications is a key tool to manage risk. Guidance on communications is provided in M103. M182 and M205. including ventilation and a/c – performance and failures Fire. including AIS and DGNSS. including fuel. Battery/ UPS back up power supplies are recommended. performance and failures Non essential DP systems. riser/ umbilical hand off operations) Drive off. failures Position reference systems. These operating points may be onboard the vessel as well as on other facilities involved with the activity. among other things. minimum number required for the activity. Communications and alarm systems should be protected against power supply failure. by providing more robust weather monitoring. failures DP control system. thruster phase back. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- DET NORSKE VERITAS . but which will have an effect on DP. At least one of the systems should be hands free. failures Sensors. drift off scenarios Diesel generators. including mimics. Manual activation of alarms should never be overlooked in design or in operation. if required. Note: The importance of communication to be emphasized by incorporating into the ASOG.g. Communications should be taken into account when detailing the roles and responsibilities of key personnel during the planning stages for the intended task. Means of communication are not limited to the above but include integrated IT systems using wireless network technology that combine communications with other features. including operation. Communications and alarm systems for all DP related equipment and systems and other equipment and systems not directly related to DP. air – performance limits and failures Uninterruptible power supplies (UPS). should be located close to the DP control station. January 2011 Page 72 – 4. Guidance note: There should be redundant voice communications systems to all key locations on board the DPO vessel. With these systems any change of status from GREEN to BLUE. Operational specific visual and voice communications should ensure that the pertinent information flows between the key operating points as well as to and from assets and/ or other vessels that might be affected by the operation being carried out. flood. Some modern communications and alarm systems rely solely on software activated alarms through the network. Consideration should be given to enhancing weather and seastate monitoring. including number of enabled systems. including communications with assets. visibility. Communication protocols are to be set up to provide pertinent information regarding intent. YELLOW or RED will be instantaneously relayed to all vessels and units engaged in SIMOPs. SW and FW cooling. change of vessel or unit SMO or ASOG status. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — Long turn (e.12 Communications The vessel should be equipped with the appropriate primary and secondary equipment needed to communicate between all parties (stakeholders) whilst carrying out the intended task. The DPO should have a view or CCTV coverage of all important operational areas onboard as well as of important points of interest external to the vessel. ensuring that a common working language and terminology is used at all times. including operation and redundancy. It should be noted that developments in sensor and communications technologies are underway to relay. including onboard systems. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- Note 1: 4. Continuity of communications during foreseeable emergency situations should be taken into account.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. visual (lights/ displays) and audible means (alarms). current status of planned as well as unexpected events during the execution of the activity. DP control system power limiting) Battery and UPS systems PMS and VMS status and operation Auxiliary systems. performance and criticality to activity. This should include fire zone alarms systems. such as by a wave rider buoy.(“shallow water” applications). performance and failures DP networks. This sole dependency is not recommended.

this also involves vendor support as well as the client’s DP consultant. parts replaced during maintenance may require certification by class. allowing the vessel to exceed environmental limits should not be regarded as a DP incident. calibration. equipment and support systems.simultaneous failure of three wind sensors of similar type and hours of service (“ageing”) accompanied by mechanical stressing (gusts experienced during a hurricane event that was in proximity of the rig). TAM and ASOG are used as tools to manage DP operations a suggested approach is that. Note: The potential for common mode failures increases where same vendor equipment of same type and age are installed and in operation. January 2011 4. In preparation for these occasions it is recommended that a thruster and generator operating strategy (TAGOS) is developed to take account of the impact on DP capability and/ or worst case failure. if applicable. It is recognised that deferring scheduled planned maintenance due to work activities increases the potential for failures. Maintenance should include regular cleaning. A minimum number of required critical DP spares should be maintained on board. This should include indirect components such as generator circuit breakers. and testing of equipment as outlined in manufacturer’s recommendations and industry guidelines. trials are carried out as part of the investigation process. DET NORSKE VERITAS Note: . (Example experienced . Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels – Page 4. where relevant. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 4. etc. Relevant guidance is given in IMCA M109. This should assist in getting back to normal operating condition after equipment failure or DP incident. clients’ processes.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Documented records should be kept and be capable of auditing. apart from the exceptions in the notes below. These records should include vendor service records as well as maintenance performed by vessel personnel. This should be in accordance with vessel owner or operators’ and.g. Vessel operational teams are encouraged to incorporate planned maintenance as a guideword in HIRAs (Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments). Note: Guidance note: It should be recognised that DP vessels may from time to time require that certain items of equipment are temporarily taken out of service for the purposes of essential planned maintenance. any reactive change of DP status from GREEN to YELLOW or RED should be regarded as a DP incident. and should be reported.14 DP Incidents DP vessels should be provided with and operate appropriate DP incident reporting. It is recommended that reactive YELLOW and RED DP incidents are investigated as soon as practicable after the DP incident and. Maintenance on DP related equipment whilst conducting DP operations should be controlled by a documented permit to work system and should always take into consideration the potential alteration of failure modes and increased criticality of failure consequences on DP capabilities and/ or redundancy. Planned maintenance should address all equipment that has an impact on the vessel’s station keeping capabilities. For project/ construction vessels where preventive maintenance is to be carried out whilst carrying out project activities due consideration is to be given to methods that will permit the vessel to continue the operation in the identified safest mode. and senior onboard decision makers. pipelayer with potential to exceed pre-agreed thrust/ power limits if prime mover/ propulsor is out of service for maintenance. The critical spare inventory should be monitored via a formal inventory program that is closely linked to the planned maintenance system. The purpose of the investigation and the trials should be. either hard copy or appropriate electronic format. System upgrades and changes (hardware and software) are typically subject to class approval. Records of planned and unplanned maintenance should be kept in an auditable format. Typically. e. A change of status triggered by prearranged agreement between the Master. Where SMO. If the impact on DP capability and/ or worst case failure is significant. In addition. Note: An operator initiated change of status as a result of a conscious decision based on risk analysis of the circumstances where the trigger points have not been reached should not be regarded as a DP incident. Note: Note: The client’s due diligence process is usually the main driver in the critical path to return to normal operating condition. recorded and investigated. These records should be kept on board for the period specified by the owner/ operator. investigation and closing out procedures. bus tie breakers.13 DP Planned Maintenance DP vessels should have a structured planned maintenance system that specifically addresses maintenance of the vessel’s DP system. Reduction in pull speed during the maintenance activity would still enable vessel to operate in safest mode. it is suggested that additional DP capability plots correlated to the TAGOS be provided on the vessel. Where thrusters and/ or generators are temporarily taken out of service this is likely to have an impact on the vessel’s DP capability and its worst case failure.

it is suggested that the FMEA provider is involved in the incident investigation. There should be a clear line of reporting DP related items onboard the DP vessel and between each department and this should involve key DP personnel. SMO and ASOGs. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 4. on occasion. Industry bodies who provide repositories for incident reporting are encouraged to provide anonymity and positively communicate this to the DP community. The documents and records contained in Sec. Owners/ operators of DP vessels are encouraged to share lessons learned from DP incidents with the wider DP community. TAGOS. Effective record keeping of such activities has the following benefits. M163 DET NORSKE VERITAS . This will facilitate lessons learnt to be implemented into the DP FMEA and proving trials program. DP systems and equipment vendors are also encouraged to do likewise and to share information on unexpected faults. There should also be a clear line of reporting between the DP vessel and the company’s shoreside management. at the company’s premises. where appropriate.2. Where additional technical support is required to aid this systematic analysis it should be sought. on occasion. DP vessels. features and failures that are identified in operation. DP related records should be maintained onboard and. In the event of the occurrence of a DP incident relating to the vessel’s configuration as described in the DP FMEA and other documents. These annual reports are available to IMCA members and non-members alike.15 Reporting and Record Keeping Owners or operators of DP vessels should have an effective reporting and record keeping system. carry out activities which may be unique to project requirements. Owners/ operators are encouraged to draw upon learnings from incidents experienced and avoid recurrence. Owners/ operators are recommended to make these reports available to key DP personnel onboard their vessels so that they can learn from the experience of others. Vessel operational teams are encouraged to systematically evaluate potential for incidents on their own units based on published analysed information. carry out activities which may be unique to project requirements. Records of these activities including pertinent information from Hazards and Risk Identification (HIRAs) should be made and kept onboard for future reference. January 2011 Page 74 – 4. sharing and risk mitigating tool. IMCA’s station keeping incident reporting scheme provides a suitable channel for disseminating relevant information throughout the DP sector. repairs.4. — — — — assists in identifying best practices demonstrates the vessel’s performance facilitates knowledge capture and transfer assists in identifying or justifying equipment improvements. DP vessels. should be accessible to key DP personnel and to other interested parties.2. The IMCA station keeping incident reporting scheme or other repositories of DP incidents needs the support of the whole DP community to be an effective learning. modifications and upgrades (see Note 2 below) Vessel specific familiarisation and training for short service employees involved in DP operations and ongoing training and development programs for experienced DP personnel Operational logs & DP alarm print outs DP data logging records DP system equipment vendor reports DP Footprint Plots Vessel overview documents. Guidance note: The IMCA station keeping incident reporting scheme has been in place for many years and annual reports are published each year which summarise each reported incident as well as providing an overview of all the incidents for the year. — — — — — — — — — — — DP FMEA & FMEA Proving Trials reports Annual DP Trials DP checklists for bridge and engine room DP incident investigations & close out reports (see Note 1 below) DP system faults. It is acknowledged that there could be a reluctance to participate in sharing of incidents for fear of unwanted disclosure of company identification as the source of the DP incident.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Guidance note: The following records should be kept and made accessible to vessel crew and to other interested parties. Guidance on reporting and record keeping is provided in M109. both for training and familiarisation processes as well as for reference in case of similar project requirements in the future. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels — to assist in identifying the root causes of the incident — to verify and validate that measures to address the root cause are effective — to validate that effective measures have not introduced any additional potential to cause failures (both hidden and apparent).

familiarisation and exposure to a variety of power generation related faults and conditions that are known to have occurred on DP diesel electric power generation systems. comprising the following main features for electrical and engineering officers. modes and drills. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 4. This will include risk analysis of the interfaces and documentation and records of all commissioning and testing. Guidance note: Key DP personnel include masters. M117 has been adopted by the IMO and issued as IMO MSC/Circ 738 (1996). 2003) which provides detailed programs for achieving and assessing the competency of key DP personnel. Customised training programs have been developed by industry in response to clients requests. such as the Kongsberg initiative in POWERSIM training where DPOs are given training. electricians. Such certification is not to be construed as validation of competency. DPOs. M117 provides guidance on formal training courses for DPOs and other key DP personnel. be demonstrated in the following areas: — — — — — Operational modes DP FMEA familiarization DP Operations Manual familiarization Project/ activity requirements Contingency plans. Guidance is provided in M103. including vessel masters. DPOs. electronic technicians and anyone involved in the safe position keeping capabilities of the vessel and includes those involved in the deployment of PRSs. Note: Note: Owners/ operators should also be aware of and recognise the benefits of formal training and competency programs that are currently offered by equipment suppliers. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- DET NORSKE VERITAS .16 Competence Definition: Competence is the acquisition of knowledge. A reference to M117 is also made in the MODU Code. chief engineers and engineers in charge of a watch. The Nautical Institute scheme is universally recognised as the industry standard for formal training and certification of DPOs. The Nautical Institute DPO certificate scheme is made up of a combination of formal DP induction and DP simulator (advanced) and onboard supervised watchkeeping experience. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels – Page Note 1: Note 2: Owners/ operators should recognise the benefits that electronic DP data logging systems offer when carrying out DP incident investigations and establishing root cause. covering the steps to take to achieve.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. — Unlimited DPO certificate (minimum requirement for DPO on DP Class 2 or DP Class 3 vessels) — Limited DPO certificate (minimum requirement for DPO for DP Class 1 vessels) DPO certification is only one part of the competency assurance process for DPOs. M117 recognises the formal training and certification scheme for DPOs administered by the Nautical Institute. where appropriate. Owners/ operators are encouraged to seek information and selectively adopt appropriate programs for their training needs. maintain and enhance competency in DP operations. M117 (IMO738) Vessel specific competency should. skills and abilities at a level of expertise sufficient to be able to perform in an appropriate work setting. Owners/ operators are recommended to refer to further formal training programs described in M117. engineers. Documentation relating to modifications and upgrades should be kept and available for reference. January 2011 4. M117 also provides guidance on structured onboard familiarisation programs for key DP personnel. IMCA M117 provides the DP sector with detailed guidance on the training and experience of key DP personnel. DP vessel owners/ operators should operate a structured competence assurance program that is applied to all key DP personnel with special focus on ensuring vessel and task specific competence. as a minimum. vendors and other bodies that are in excess of established industry standards. There are two levels of DPO certification. including watchkeeping marine engineers and electronic maintenance staff. Owners/ operators may consider implementing the IMCA Competence Assurance & Assessment scheme (IMCA C002 Rev 1. — — — — High voltage (HV) training Power management system (PMS) training Fire and gas detection and emergency shutdowns (ESD) training DP control system manufacturer’s maintenance training. Owners/ operators are encouraged to develop their own competency verification processes for all key DP personnel.

If used. Note 2: Note 3: Engineers There should be sufficient licensed engineers on board for all expected operations. an electrician should have appropriate high voltage training/ certification. It is recognized that in practice. Experience level should be documented and auditable. the engineer should be familiar with the general philosophy of redundancy as it relates to split mechanical. Even in the case of DP Class 1 vessels. For example. DET NORSKE VERITAS . See Note 2 below.17 Manning Vessels must comply with the statutory requirements for safe manning. such as when the diver is inside a welding habitat or where the diver’s worksite is inside the conductor tubes at a production facility. electrical and ancillary systems. if applicable to the vessel. General Rules and guidelines on levels of operator intervention in response to a failure in a DP Class 2 or DP Class 3 vessel have changed over the years and different classification societies have chosen to place different levels of emphasis and different interpretations on these rules. Additionally. Note: The overriding role of the DPO in emergency situations is to stabilise the situation and to take positive action to prevent escalation. should be on watch during critical activities and should have at least 6 months experience on similar equipment and operations. In DP 2 or 3 operations. The electrician should likewise be fully cognisant of DP operations. The Master should not be considered as one of the required unlimited DPOs for meeting the manning requirements since operating as such would negative affect the situational awareness required from his side. critical activities on a DP dive support vessel would include those occasions where the Time to Terminate is long. Owners/ operators should recognize the associated risk from inexperienced personnel and have plans in place to address them while striving to reach the recommended experience levels. levels of redundancy and automation are influenced by differences in the main rules for the classification of ships. familiar with the vessel’s DP FMEA document and the effects of failures of equipment relating to the position keeping of the vessel. manning should be in accordance with the following: DP Bridge Crew Operation When undertaking critical activities in proximity to surface or sub surface structures See Note 1 below Note 1: Minimum Experience Unlimited DPO with a minimum of 3 years experience in DP operations at least 6 months of which should have been on the subject or sister vessel. specifically addressing operator intervention in terms of the complexities of the regulatory background (operator intervention specifically addressed in Class rules) as well as operational practicalities. The engineer should be fully cognisant of DP operations.18 Intervention – Role of the DPO and Engineer Introduction The notes in this section consider the role of the DPO and watchkeeping engineers. See Note 3 below Critical activities are those activities where the consequences of equipment failure or loss of position are greater than under normal operating circumstances. the guidance provided within this document should be validated against the risks. Minimum Bridge Crew per shift 2 unlimited DPOs on the bridge capable of operating the vessel both in DP and manual control. familiar with the vessel’s DP FMEA document and the effects of failures of equipment relating to the position keeping of the vessel. the electrician/ electrical engineer should have at least 6 months experience on similar equipment and operations. January 2011 Page 76 – 4. As with vessel engineers. For low risk operations guidance is provided in IMCA M182. for DP operations.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Notes: Where the minimum experience requirements cannot be met a risk based approach should be taken to determine the suitability of personnel and any additional support requirements for intended operations. At least one licensed engineer should be available at all times. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels 4. The practical effect of this is that vessels of different ages and different class society can vary significantly in terms of the amount of operator intervention expected. allowed or required. given the near term market conditions owners/ operators will be challenged to meet the recommended level of experience for DPOs. Electrician/ Electrical Engineer If required on board. 4.

— In some diesel electric designs. The DPO or ET can review the UPS distribution list against sensors. — A heat exchanger in a common freshwater cooling system may become fouled requiring the engineers to change over to another cooler.” The distinction between ‘improving station keeping capability after a failure’ and ‘contributing to redundancy’ should be noted. Note that position and heading should be maintained by the DP controller during this time. Component and system redundancy. — Some vessels have no automation for starting redundant pumps and engineers must monitor the condition of the plant and intervene following an unexpected stop. failures of fuel control systems or generator excitation systems can destabilise the entire plant if the vessel is operated with a common power system (busties closed). This condition may be indicated by high freshwater temperature alarms. The transfer should be smooth and within acceptable limitations of the operation. A position keeping ability shall be maintained without disruption upon any single failure. The DPO must take control at another operator station. — Seawater cooling systems operated from a single sea chest may block giving rise to low seawater pressure alarms requiring the engineers to transfer to the other sea chest. should be automatic and operator intervention should be avoided.4 states under the heading of Functional Requirements. — A faulty thruster may respond poorly to DP commands giving rise to a speed/ torque or azimuth prediction error. Automatic or manual intervention arranged to improve the position keeping ability after a failure will be accepted. the feature can be used to improve capability. Faults requiring operator intervention The following list comprises known faults and features in DP systems that have been known to require operator intervention to prevent escalation of the failure effect or loss of position. Full stop of thrusters and subsequent start-up of available thrusters is not considered an acceptable disruption. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels – Page Examples of the rules and guidelines that have influenced the design of redundancy concepts are given below:IMO MSC 645 Section 3. A load sharing imbalance alarm may assist in identifying the onset of the fault. Guidance note: The redundancy requirements will not be considered as complied with if based upon start or restart of generators and/ or thrusters. The transfer to components or systems designed and arranged to provide redundancy. General: “Redundant components and systems should be immediately available and with such capacity that the DP-operation can be continued for such a period that the work in progress can be terminated safely.2 states: “The DP-system shall be designed with redundancy. Prediction errors may indicate which thruster is faulty. — On some DP vessels with a single stern tunnel thruster and two main propellers which depend on the rudders to provide redundant athwartships thrust it may be necessary to transfer the tunnel thruster to the DET NORSKE VERITAS Redundancy: . January 2011 4.6 Ch.” DNV rules for the classification of Ships Pt. The process of identifying the faulty thruster may be made more difficult by the fact that all thrusters may be operating at high thrust to counteract the effect of the faulty one.7 Sec. Note that in some circumstances the fault may escalate at a rate which precludes effective operator intervention and blackout may result. in technical design and physical arrangement. The latter is intended to mean that the contribution of this equipment or feature can be considered when defining the vessel’s post WCF DP capability. Prudent watchkeeping practices will detect the listed events that require operator (DPO/ engineer) intervention. — A DP operator station may fail. The former cannot be considered when defining this capability thus DP Class 2 and DP Class 3 vessels should not operate in conditions where they would depend on this equipment to maintain position.1. However. should in principle be immediately available with the capacity required for the DP-system to safely terminate the work in progress.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. The ‘on-batteries’ alarm will indicate to the DPO that certain important DP control system consumers may be lost. The transfer to redundant components or systems should be automatic as far as possible and operator intervention should be kept to a minimum. — Failure of a thruster to full thrust or uncontrolled rotation will require the DPO to shut the thruster down using the emergency stop. Automatic start of equipment may be accepted as contributing to redundancy only if their reliability and simplicity of operation is satisfactory so that they can be brought into operation before position and heading keeping performance is degraded.” “Redundancy shall be based upon running machinery. In such circumstances the engineers may open the bustie in an attempt to isolate the fault to one side or the other. — A distribution system supplying a DP UPS may fail. reference systems and operator stations in use to determine whether any configuration changes should be made. The DPO should assess the performance of the thruster and shut it down using the emergency stop if necessary. for example selecting the other DP controller or OS before the online controller or OS fails.

It is also of vital importance that the required responses to the fault are documented in well-written procedures and practiced so that all DPOs and engineers are familiar with them and can take action in a confident manner. This changeover. this will often mean adding additional equipment. This risk should be considered when applying protective functions to deal with very low probability failure modes. It should not be assumed that it is Worst Case Failure. On a DP Class 2 vessel loss of both DP control systems will require the DPO to take manual control of the vessel at the independent joystick or manual control levers. greater levels of redundancy. DP Class 2 and 3 vessels should always operate in a redundant/ fault tolerant configuration. There is also a risk that poorly designed protective functions will reduce the reliability and availability of essential equipment such as thrusters and generators. there may be some aspects of DP system design where operator intervention is preferred to any other form of response. it may not be desirable to automatically transfer control location in response to a fault. Measures to reduce the incidence of faults requiring operator intervention The most effective way to avoid the necessity for operators and engineers to intervene in faults is to design the redundancy concept in such a way that the need for operator intervention is minimised or preferably eliminated. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels — — — — — — — — — other power distribution system and restart it in the event that the distribution system supplying one main prop and the stern tunnel thruster fails. In general terms.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. automation and increased system segregation to minimise the impact of any failure. It may be better for the operator to decide where control transfers to by taking control at that station. On a DP Class 3 vessel. Carefully considering power plant and control system configuration can also reduce the need for operator intervention. On vessels with two wind sensors a difference alarm may require the DPO to make an assessment of which wind sensor to use. On vessels with a common fuel supply system. Where operator intervention in response to faults is unavoidable then it is extremely important that there are clear and unambiguous alarms and indications to alert the operators to the onset of the fault. DET NORSKE VERITAS . However. In the case that one of the wind sensors has failed to ‘high wind speed’ it may be necessary to rapidly deselect the faulty wind sensor before it initiates a drive off depending on the type of DP control system. On some vessels with transferable thrusters it may be necessary for the engineers to manually change over auxiliary services for the thruster even if the main supply changes automatically. loss of the main DP station will require the DPO to take control at the backup DP station. Features such as a third wind sensor or a third DP controller allow voting or other protective functions to be used. For example. Where it is established that it is not WCF then steps should be taken to ensure that WCF is used as the trigger for a Consequence Analysis alarm. Class rules require that three references are in use for DP Class 2 & 3 vessels and two of the three should be based on different principles of measurement. it may be necessary to change over a fuel filter or isolate a leak to prevent all generators being affected. is to prevent the unexpected consequences of failure. DPOs should be aware of the thruster and/ or power configuration that is used to activate the Consequence Analysis alarm. which can be found even on some DP Class 2 vessels. On vessels with only two gyro compasses a difference alarm may require the DPO to make an assessment of which gyro to use. January 2011 Page 78 – 4. A faulty gyro may cause a rapid change of heading if not deselected promptly. if required. This provides a large degree of protection against a drive off related to a position calculation error but such incidents do occur and DPOs can be expected to determine which reference systems are responsible and deselect them. DP control systems employ a range of protective functions designed to reject an errant position reference system. On vessels with two MRUs a difference alarm may require the DPO to make an assessment of which MRU to use.

Worked Examples DET NORSKE VERITAS Figure 4-1 Worked Example 1 . Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels – Page 79 4.19 DP Footprint Plots .Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. January 2011 4.

Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels DET NORSKE VERITAS Figure 4-2 Worked Example 2 .Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. January 2011 Page 80 – 4.

<= 0.Stbd assymmetric or known deficiencies Any other configuration or known deficiencies Any other configuration or known deficiencies Any other configuration or known deficiencies Powered from Stbd side CEASE OPERATIONS INITIATE CONTINGENCY PLAN Date RED YES CEASE OPERATIONS PREPARE TO JETTISON UMBILICAL ON DIRECT ORDER ONLY Action CONTINUE NORMAL OPERATIONS Bus Ties and Bus Links Main generators LLC phase shift transformer All Generators Emergency Generator Bow Thruster 1 VSD Bow Thruster 1 Servo Pump Bow Thruster 1 Bow Thruster 3 Thrusters 2.21 Example of SMO and ASOG Safest Mode of Operation . Winch Control. speed and pitch controls tested for functionality across entire Any known deficiencies.Name of DP Project/ Construction Vessel This setup applies when the vessel is undertaking umbilical wet store at Nonsuch Offshore Facility .20 Annual DP Trials Test Table Blank – DP Project / Construction Vessel Guidance note: The blank Annual DP Trials test sheet is on hold pending formal publication of IMCA guidance on Annual DP Trials which is under development at the time of preparing this RP.5 m/sec From 200 m to Any other setting work location <=0. January 2011 4.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. 3.Stbd symmetric (2 or 4 generators running) Both connected and functioning correctly Tested at 100% at field arrival or in the past 6 months Set to auto start and connect. Offshore NO YES YES Facility and Clients Representative INFORMATIVE / CONSULTATIVE STATUS (RISK ASSESS) Any other configuration Port . Guidance will be provided in a subsequent revision of this RP.AFI (agreed for implementation) Condition GREEN DVISORY YELLOW Notify Master. available for immediate use VSD powered from Port side only Powered from HP1 and changeover to HP2 tested at field arrival Powered from HP2 or changeover not tested or problems found Powered from Stbd side or Tested at 50% on each of opposite to cooling or Port and Stbd side at field operation on Stbd side not arrival tested Deployed as azimuth Operating as tunnel thruster thruster Tested at 100% at field Any known deficiencies arrival Pitch and lube oil pumps Not tested or problems changeover tested at field found arrival Both Steering motors/ Single steering motor/VFD VFD's running running Emergency Stops tested at Any known deficiencies field arrival Azimuth.3 m/sec <=10 deg/min Any other setting DET NORSKE VERITAS . All fully operational as Any not operating or not above and selected to DP selected to DP From 500 m to 200 m. Chief Engineer. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 4. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels – Page 4. 4 & 5 Thrusters 4 & 5 Thrusters 4 & 5 Thrusters Thrusters Thrusters Speed of moves inside 500 m zone or carrying out critical activities Rate of change of Heading (Within 500 m zone) or carrying out critical activities All bus ties open Port . range at field arrival.

no alarms active Tested and fully operational All UPS units fully functional. Any known deficiencies. Three position reference sensors. MRS. None less than 30 min. Sea water and fresh water Standby pumps available Any other configuration or cooling pumps and set to auto start known deficiencies. selected and accepted by the DP system If two DGPS units in use DGPS DP Position set to different correction Any other configuration or reference sensors sources and on different known deficiencies. DGPS DP Position No possibility of masking Possibility of masking by reference sensors by cranes / structure cranes / structure Relative Pos Reference Any Alarms or poor Operating and available Systems (Fan Beam) performance Any Alarms. Any known deficiencies. physically checked.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. poor Redundant Relative Pos Two systems (working on performance or non Reference Systems different principles) availability of redundant during umbilical transfer operational and available relative position reference operations sensors Any Alarms or poor HiPAP Operating and available performance Frequencies in use planned Frequencies with other DP vessels in Not planned the area Fully tested on DP Radius alongside TLP prior to pick Not tested prior up and pull in of umbilical Note: For this operation. System DET NORSKE VERITAS . using two Any other configuration or different technologies. it has been accepted that a mix of absolute and relative position reference systems may be permitted provided movement of TLP has been ascertained to be not excessive. January 2011 Page 82 – 4. Any other configuration or known deficiencies. Any known deficiencies. known deficiencies. Cooled from Port FW only cooled from Stbd side or Bow thruster T1 and changeover to stbd changeover not checked checked at field arrival Power Management Fully operational. Any known deficiencies. elevation masks. If unexpected movement of TLP is detected.500 m <50% or minimum to pull away outside the 500 m zone Tested and fully operational Tested and fully operational Consequence analysis enabled. autonomy Any known deficiencies. absolute systems to be deselected immediately. Any other configuration. Relative Position Reference System (Fanbeam/Radius) Operating and available Any mix of relative and absolute systems TLP MOVEMENT (Check at 100 m off and continuously during operations) Fuel system Footprint not preventing use of DGPS Movement of TLP such that DGPS cannot be used in conjunction with Fanbeam/Radius Set up as split system (all cross connecting valves Any other configuration or closed). wind sensors) DP Position Reference Sensors DP Position Reference Sensors Work location to 200 m < 25% or minimum to safely pull away from vessel 200 m . Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels Thrust Values when exiting 500 m zone on Joystick or manual Thruster manual levers Independent Joystick DP System DP System DP power supply DP Environmental sensors (Gyro. Valve positions known deficiencies. none operating on bypass Tested and fully operational All fully operational Approaching 25% or 50% Any known deficiencies. given that the observed TLP movement has been minimal under the weather criteria that umbilical transfer can be conducted.

RED YES Activity Specific Operating Guidelines . Loss of one main diesel unexpected or generator. January 2011 4. Auto generator stop function enabled Blackout restart disabled Any known deficiencies. All < 45% No UPS on bypass. no alarms or known deficiencies. Direction to go ……. both compressors available Operational in all DP critical areas Fans running in all DP critical areas All closed All vessels hardwired and portable communications equipment operational. Navigation and recognized by DPO under control DP If Alarm position No position alarms or If warning position reached warning limits reach (>3 m) (>5 m) No Heading Alarms or warning If heading warning limit reached (>3 degrees) If heading Alarm limit reached (>5 degrees) Change exceeding maximum step change Step 5 degrees being 5 degrees contemplated. Any open Loss of a principal item of communications equipment. All < 45% All < 45% Operational with no alarms All diesel generators online. Winch NO YES YES Control. Batteries in good condition and fully charged. Loss of any one thruster unexpected or unexplained event Any alarm. Any other configuration or known deficiencies. ER Not manned Escape route compromised or the possibility of the escape route being compromised during time span of planned operation.Name of DP Project/ Construction Vessel Condition GREEN ADVISORY YELLOW Notify Master.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels – Page Power Management System Power Management System DC Power systems Start Air Air Conditioning Ventilation Watertight doors Communications Engine Room Manning Escape route Auto generator stop function disabled Blackout restart enabled All fully functional. poor performance. Port and Stbd ER systems common or either compressor not available Any other configuration or known deficiencies. No active alarms Any approaching 50% Any > 50% Any approaching 50% Any > 50% Any alarm. unexplained event Any approaching 50% Any > 50% UPS supply failure or Any UPS in bypass or loss of output for any in alarm UPS Any DC system in alarm Main charger supply failure Diesel Generator – Engines Diesel Generator Loads DP UPS's 24 VDC Systems DET NORSKE VERITAS . No active alarms Available. Deg true. ER manned Escape route identified and agreed with field operations.Offshore Faciliry and Clients Representative Action Current and predicted weather conditions DRIVE OFF CONTINUE NORMAL OPERATIONS INFORMATIVE / CONSULTATIVE STATUS (RISK ASSESS) DRIFT OFF Vessel Footprint/Weather related excursion Heading excursion Maximum Heading change within 500 m zone or carrying out critical activities Bow Thruster Loads Aft Thruster Loads All thrusters OPERATIONS CEASE OPERATIONS CEASE PREPARE TO INITIATE JETTISON UMBILICAL CONTINGENCY ON DIRECT ORDER PLAN ONLY Approaching operating Exceeding operational Within Operating limits limits limits Difference in vessel All systems operating position between Immediately when Unable to bring vessel correctly Visual. Chief Engineer. poor performance. Port and Stbd ER systems isolated. Navigation and recognized by DPO under control DP Difference in vessel All systems operating position between Immediately when Unable to bring vessel correctly Visual.

Two systems (working on different principles) operational and available All operating normally. unexpected or unexplained event Any alarm. using two different technologies. or fire reported No bilge alarms active. One remaining operational position reference system Total loss of networks / DP control DP Position reference sensors Any alarm. One system remaining Any fire alarm/report Multiple bilge alarms Minimum approach will be < 500 m No comms Fire confirmed Flood confirmed If collision possible Collision Imminent DET NORSKE VERITAS . poor performance. January 2011 Page 84 – 4. no alarms. unexpected or unexplained event Redundant Relative Pos Reference Systems during umbilical transfer operations Single relative pos ref PMS/IAS Control systems Machinery space ventilation. no alarms. Both operating normally. unexpected or unexplained event Any Alarms. Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels DP Operator Control Station Dynamic positioning controllers PMS/IAS Field Termination Cabinets Both operating normally. poor performance or non availability of redundant relative position reference sensors Any alarm. Redundant Communications No fire alarms. Any MRU Alarm Loss of wind sensor Loss of one operator station Loss of one DPC Loss of one PLC Loss of one network One operational gyro remaining One operational MRU remaining Loss of both wind sensors in high wind/ gusting wind conditions. unexpected or unexplained event Any alarm. All operating normally. unexpected or unexplained event Any gyro alarm. poor performance.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. poor performance. no alarms. poor performance. Both operating normally. unexpected or unexplained event Any alarm. no reported flooding. no alarms 3 gyros selected and accepted by DP 2 MRUs selected and accepted by DP Operational with no alarms Three position reference sensors. DP critical space Air Conditioning Loss or problem with any essential Communications (DP / ECR / Winch CONTROL/ROV/TLP) Fire Flood Collision (errant vessels) Loss of one major system component Imminent loss of due to Loss or reduced temperature of any capacity of any system overDP equipment. poor performance. No collision imminent / minimum approach >500 m DP Networks Gyros MRUs Wind sensors Any alarm. poor performance. Fully operational. accepted by the DP system and in use. no alarms.

undertaking umbilical wet store at Nonsuch TLP Condition GREEN ADVISORY YELLOW Notify Master.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Offshore Facility NO YES YES and Clients Representative CONTINUE NORMAL OPERATIONS INFORMATIVE / CONSULTATIVE STATUS (RISK ASSESS) Advisory Major deviation from procedure Comms problem or Possible position conflict Comms problem Comms problem CEASE TYING IN OPERATIONS INITIATE CONTINGENCY PLAN Advisory Situation arises where the risk of personnel injury or a pollution event can be envisaged.Name of DP Project/ Construction Vessel . Operations guidance Project/Construction Vessels – Page SIMOPS . January 2011 4. Pipe lay control. No comms or Definite position conflict One comms system remaining One comms system remaining RED YES CEASE OPERATIONS PREPARE TO JETTISON UMBILICAL ON DIRECT ORDER ONLY Advisory Action Change from Green DP Status of any other vessel in the field Green Briefings complete. Comms/interaction with other vessels Comms between DP Desk. Deck Forman. Chief Engineer. Procedure agreed and understood Operation continues by all involved. TLP Platform rigger foreman. from planned procedure. Winch Control. Comms with Field Control Room Vessels operating normally with no known problems Redundant comms Redundant comms Completed by Printed name On behalf of Client Printed name DET NORSKE VERITAS . Toolbox talks and without major deviation safety briefings complete.

DET NORSKE VERITAS .1 General It is recommended that DP vessel owners/ operators should maintain the documentation listed in the table below and should develop and implement associated processes for the purposes of: — — — — — — ensuring the safe and effective management of the vessel in DP ensuring the technical suitability of the vessel for each DP activity it is required to carry out determining the configuration for the safest mode of operation and the task appropriate mode understanding the vessel’s station keeping capabilities following the worst case failure ensuring compliance with appropriate standards and guidelines providing training and familiarization material to vessel crews. in addition. This has been consciously done with a view to enhance awareness of issues related to DP operations and cover a broader DP community.1 Introduction This chapter contains DP operational guidance. are to take place. 5. in particular in respect of current speeds. at the shore based centers of technical management. Document Management Guidance 1 DP System FMEA To be kept up to date. Previous trials reports and associated close out documentation to be kept on board. as defined in the DP FMEA. This will include protective. including table. This requirement to validate/ recalculate applies also in cases where DP vessel performance is affected by operational constraints imposed by the activity. See Note 1 at end of various power/ thruster combinations. the general information is printed in regular text. logistics vessels retrofitted with additional accommodation modules (temporary or permanent). as to the vessel’s areas of operations to be required. specific for Project and Construction Vessels. if not in the document itself.2. and the specific operational guidance is in italics and/or grouped under Guidance notes. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels 5. detection and monitoring functions. such as in the case of a pipelay vessel with horizontal loads. system and equipment performance and functionality. fully intact and worst case failure and also in various environmental conditions. Hard copy DP Capability Plots relevant Capability plots to be validated/ recalculated. January 2011 Page 86 – 5. Documents that have been superseded should be clearly marked and kept separate from current versions. 4 DP Capability Plots Operational Guidance Modifications and additions should be covered by a MOC process that triggers updating the FMEA. 2 DP FMEA Proving To be conducted to prove initial DP Trials FMEA and at other times to prove modifications and additions to the DP system. both. hard copy format or. 3 Annual DP Trials To be conducted annually. potential to affect the performance or redundancy of the DP system. Findings and recommendations to be addressed in accordance with their criticality. 5 DP Footprints The tests in the Annual DP Trials should be designed to prove system redundancy. For overview and full appreciation. Documents may be in electronic or. No.2. Hard copy DP Footprint Plots to be DP Footprint Plots should be taken regularly in taken by DPOs. Findings and recommendations to be addressed in accordance with their criticality.2 DP Operational Documentation 5. DP FMEA Proving Trials should be repeated every five years. to test the operation of protection and detection devices and responses so as to demonstrate that the vessel’s DP system remains fit for purpose. Modifications and additions that should be proven by testing include all those that have directly effect or.2 Recommended Documentation Current versions of the documents in the list below should be kept on board and. to ensure that they are suitable for the readily accessible to DPOs at the DP environmental conditions where the DP operations control location. All records to be kept on board. For distinction. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels 5. It is acknowledged that the guidance provided on the themes in this chapter may be to a greater level of detail than what is required for logistics vessels. All records to be kept on board. this information is completed with the general management information as already was given in chapter 2. 5. to validate repairs and preventive maintenance.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. where feasible. incorporating all or FMECA modifications and additions since original study. then by other traceable means.

to be readily accessible at the standardised table of contents for vessel specific DP Operations Manuals in their fleet.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Known instances as examples pipe tensioner software that accepted a sudden increase of pipe tension from 100 t to 300 t (erroneous input). including changes to vessel specific checklists. DP Incident Records of all DP station keeping and All DP incidents should be investigated to an extent Reports other DP related incidents to be kept on that reflects the potential consequences of the board. It is equally important to fully understand the functional design spec and the dependencies and consequences of fault or failure. The drills should also cover extreme events that are outside the scope of the DP FMEA. including investigation records incident. Complete history of all audit reports. January 2011 5. permanently stored in Room) retrievable archives. DP fault log Records of all faults related to the DP DP faults should be recorded as soon as possible system to be kept on board permanently after they are discovered and action/ investigation in retrievable archives. DP There should be a process where the open items are Vessel audit audits and inspection reports. New and modified software should be subjected to a thorough validation process. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 A structured FMEA and Proving Trials approach should be used to integrate modifications and additions into the existing DP system and its associated equipment. reports and DP findings and close outs to be kept on audits and inspection reports. tracked and closed out. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels – Page 87 No. DP control location and used by the DPOs as a reference for conducting DP Modifications and amendments to the DP Operations Manual should be subject to MOC operations. Operational Guidance There should be a process where the open items are highlighted. board DP Operations Vessel Specific DP Operations It is recommended that owners/ operators develop a Manual Manual 1). and that the vessel’s DP system is set incident permanently stored in Room) up properly and provides the required level of retrievable archives. FMEA. DET NORSKE VERITAS . taken appropriate to the potential consequences of the fault on the vessel’s station keeping ability. These records may be used in a cycle of continuous improvement. and close outs. where relating to a DP incident. They should confirm vessel performance. DP related drills Records of DP related drills and DP drills can be developed from fault and single and emergency emergency response drills to be kept on point failure scenarios addressed in the vessel’s DP response drills board in retrievable archives. processes. including highlighted. software for thruster control that increased the command to the thruster to match the faulty feedback. particularly following worst (Bridge and Engine operator and. where relating to a DP case failure. especially to avoid the acceptance of erroneous values. The outcomes from these drills should be used in the development of DP emergency response procedures and used as training material for DP personnel. tracked and closed out. As above Records of all DP Location and DP Location and Watchkeeping Checklists to be kept on Watchkeeping board for the period set by the owner/ checklists (Bridge and Engine operator and. It is not enough to focus on the functionality of modifications and additions. Document 6 Service reports concerning the DP system 7 Details of all DP related modifications and additions Management Guidance Complete history of service reports to be filed and kept on board Records of all DP related modifications and additions to be kept on board complete with interface and testing information. See Note 2 at end of table. redundancy. DP Mobilization/ Records of DP Mobilization Trials and DP Trials and Checklists should be vessel specific DP Field Arrival/ DP Field Arrival Checklists to be kept and be developed from detailed information Trials Procedures on board for the period set by the owner/ contained in the DP FMEA.

Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Owners/ operators should keep adequate records and documentation relating to modifications and additions that could have an effect on the DP system. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels No. Examples include DPO intervention averting an underfrequency induced blackout on closed bus system by the DPO taking control of thrusters and biasing to increase load. systematic and progressive. this should trigger an Advisory condition. Owners/ operators are recommended to make use of facilities and training programmes available to the DP sector. where relating to a DP incident. records of DP key DP personnel watchkeeping hours to be maintained on board. Alarm printouts relating to a DP permanently stored in retrievable incident or contractual dispute are to be archives. permanently stored in retrievable archives. i. Document 15 DP Data Logging 16 17 18 Operational Guidance DP data loggers perform an important function in helping to determine root causes of faults or failures. It is recommended that DP data logging function is included as part of the DP system design spec. such as propulsion. It should be noted that DPO kept on board permanently in certification is only one element in the competency retrievable archives. Management Guidance Where the vessel has DP data logging facilities electronic records should be kept on board for the period set by the owner/ operator and. especially interfaces between equipment from different vendors. Original DPO certificates and DP Log Books to be held by the DPOs onboard the vessel. 1) The vessel specific DP Operations Manual is additional to the DP control system manufacturer’s Operator Manual Note 1: Note 2: It is acknowledged that DP Footprint Plots may be less relevant for DP MODUs than for other DP vessel types. vessel specific copies of certification and work records of all qualifications. such as an Emergency Shutdown Systems (ESD). pipe tensioner systems and fire monitor systems as it is for DP equipment. Résumés and Résumés of all key DP personnel. BLUE. If not. All modifications and additions should be subjected to FMEA type analysis and undergo Proving Trials type testing. In addition. retention times.It is acknowledged that DP data loggers are not the norm on Logistics vessels. permanently stored in retrievable archives. This is as relevant for equipment whose primary function lies outside the DP system. engineers and electricians to be personnel which is structured. where relating to a DP incident. assurance process. Retention of data logging data should not be limited by time.e. Where this is not the period set by the owner/ operator specified. Owners/ operators frequently require DP alarm DP alarm printer Hard copy records of the DP alarm readouts printer readout to be kept on board for printer readouts to be kept for a duration indicated in their Management Systems. There should be specific procedures for the operation and analysis of output from the DP data logger. position references and sensors. The DP data logger should be incorporated in the SMO and running at all times when in DP. where DPOs are given detailed instruction and training in identifying and responding to power system faults. Owners are encouraged to consider the benefits to be derived by installing DP data loggers on their vessels. DET NORSKE VERITAS . owners are encouraged to specify and. This should include clear instructions on how and where the records are kept. Note:. DP data loggers should be commissioned and operational before DP system Customer Acceptance Trials (CAT) are carried out. such as the Powersim program for advanced DPO training of power plant fault conditions. modifications and additions are typically subject to class approval and inspection. January 2011 Page 88 – 5. Owners/ operators should implement an in-house DP familiarisation All records relating to vessel specific and competency DP familiarisation and competency for DP competency assurance process for key DP records DPOs.

Class 2 may be accepted based on considerations of procedures. after a DP related accident and. The IMO Guidelines do not make clear distinction between vessels of different DP equipment class. DET NORSKE VERITAS . The requirement for a DP FMEA has its origins in IMO MSC/Circ 645 (1994) “Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems”.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Regulations. However. Note 1: Note 2: Note 3: The vessel’s DP system should normally be set up and operated to deliver the intent of the DP class notation. These benchmarking guidelines provide the foundation for all subsequent DP rules. Guidance note: A detailed risk analysis will be required if the vessel is to operate in a task appropriate mode (TAM) that provides less redundancy than that provided by the vessel’s DP equipment class notation. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels – Page 89 5. whenever significant repairs or alterations are carried out. For operations close to another vessel or installation the equipment class should be 3 or equivalent. The IMO Guidelines require all DP vessels to be subjected to survey and testing in accordance with IMO’s specified guidelines. on occasion and after a proper assessment of the risks.4 DP FMEA The DP vessel’s DP FMEA is the most important technical document in the list of required documents. the vessel may be set up in accordance with the requirements of the Task Appropriate Mode. contractual specifications and/ or harsh environmental or other local conditions may require a higher class. January 2011 5.outside 500 m zone) Well Stim Logistics Operations Minimum Recommended DP Equipment Class (See Note 1 below) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 ** 2* 2* Remarks ** Class in accordance with contractual requirements * Vessels of lesser Class may be used with the appropriate structured risk identification and mitigation measures in place. 1) Unless expressly stated in this Guidance document a FMECA is interchangeable with an FMEA. This includes initial and periodic complete survey and testing of all systems and components required to keep position after single failures associated with the vessel’s assigned DP equipment class. such as IMCA. regulations and guidance issued by Class and other industry bodies. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 5. The detailed risk analysis should consider the consequences of loss of position relevant to the activity. The periodic component in the IMO Guidelines requires the complete survey and testing to be repeated every five years to ensure full compliance with applicable parts of the guidelines. Application on DP Drilling Diving Pipelay Umbilical Lay Lifting Accommodation Shuttle Offtake ROV Support (Open Water) ROV Support (Close Proximity Surface/ Subsea) Floating Production Seismic and Survey vessels (Open water. so as to demonstrate full compliance with applicable parts of the guidelines. This IMO requirement has been interpreted by the DP community such that the survey requirement is met by a DP FMEA (or FMECA1)) and the testing requirement by DP FMEA Proving Trials. equipment and consequence analysis It is noted that there have been standards developed outside the IMO DP equipment class systematics where an identical (or higher) level of redundancy has been realized based on a different philosophy and system approach.3 DP Class It is recommended that DP vessels with at least the following DP equipment class notations are used for the following activities. In addition compliance with IMO Guidelines requires survey and testing after defects are discovered and corrected and.

be updated after any major modifications and proving trials have been conducted. where significant. take account of non DP systems/ auxiliary/ external systems that have interfaces with. redundancy concept. B or C. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels Accordingly. be presented as a narrative analysis of DP related systems and subsystems covering the above points (i. including the vessel Master. Appropriate definitions are as follows. Appropriate guidance is given in section 6. The failure effect exceeds worst case failure design intent or is non DET NORSKE VERITAS Note: Note: Note: Note: Note: . analytical processes and the technical content of a DP FMEA.6 of IMCA M196. Key DP personnel. configuration errors. etc. and potential impact on DP and station keeping. referred to in this section.e. Identify measures for eliminating or reducing the risks associated with each failure mode. identify potential hidden failures. the effects of fire and flood on ESD control lines and push buttons. new developments in analysis and new knowledge acquired in the intervening period.g. The results from a DP FMEA. A DP FMEA should encompass the following:— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — identify worst case failure design intent (WCFDI) and worse case failure (WCF). Note: Particular attention should be paid in the DP FMEA to the interfaces between the DP system and other systems that have the potential to affect the DP system. The DP FMEA should address the ESD function (if fitted). pipe tensioner system or fire monitor system. in particular the various issues relating to the status of post activation battery power supplies (UPS). in particular issues related to the vessel’s worst case failure and significant single point failures. identify the significant single point failures. — IMCA M166 “Guidance on Failure Modes and Effects Analysis” — IMCA M178 “FMEA Management Guide” — IMCA M04/04 2004 “Methods of Establishing the Safety and Reliability of DP Systems” FMEAs are a requirement to obtain DP Class 2 and 3 notation. identify trials and testing necessary to prove the conclusions. at the subsystem level. be subject to review and update as necessary. Identify all potential failure modes and their causes. identify potential configuration errors. Selection. Relevant IMCA guidance.) and be supported by sketches and drawings.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. The DP FMEA should contain an analysis of the DP control system I/Os to verify that it is consistent with the redundancy concept and should be proved at DP FMEA Proving Trials. Guidance note: These Guidance Notes on DP FMEAs are intentionally brief. such as where the vessel is fitted with an Emergency Shut Down (ESD) system. take account of action items from DP FMEA Proving Trials. These systems should be subjected to the FMEA and Proving Trials approach for software. not only from a compartment analysis perspective but also. for DP Class 3 vessels. mode of operation and the equipment. should consider the effects of fire and flood. Engineers and Electricians should have a detailed knowledge of the DP FMEA and should use the information provided to be fully informed about the capabilities and limitations of the vessel’s DP system. A For immediate attention. audits and incidents which have been or. “Guidance on the Design. the reliability and effectiveness of these mechanisms should be proven and fully documented in the DP FMEA. closed out. such as the effects of hydrocarbon gas on engine control and safety systems. take account of common mode failures that are otherwise liable to be overlooked. evaluate the effects on the system of each failure mode. hidden failures. should be consulted to gain a more detailed understanding. should be used in the formulation of operational. all DP vessels of DP Class 2 or 3 are required to have a Class approved and stamped DP FMEA and DP FMEA Proving Trials. Annual DP Trials. identify the equipment or subsystem. In addition to complying with the IMO Guidelines and the relevant DP rules of the vessel’s Classification Society the DP FMEA should achieve the standards of detail and analysis contained in the following industry guidance. Definitions: An FMEA is a systematic analysis of systems and sub-systems to a level of detail that identifies all potential failure modes down to the appropriate sub-system level and their consequences. are in the process of being. Where the redundancy concept relies on inter-switching mechanisms. The review should take account of new equipment and hardware/ software updates. hardware and interfaces thus ensuring the integrity of the DP system and proper integration with DP. Installation and Use of UPS onboard Vessels”. e. emergency response and planning decisions. A FMECA is an extension of an FMEA that adds a risk assessment of each failure mode to determine its criticality. January 2011 Page 90 – 5. Whilst not stipulated as a class requirement for DP 1 vessels owners/ operators are encouraged to subject their DP 1 vessels to the DP FMEA process. They give a concise overview of the underpinning philosophy. once every five years. which can cause diesel engines to accelerate out of control resulting in catastrophic mechanical failure and potential for black out. Categories should be clearly defined. DPOs. The findings from a DP FMEA and Proving Trials should be categorised into A.

Operational guidance Logistic Vessels – Page 91 compliant with specified rules and guidelines. M178. The following IMCA Guidelines address the above considerations in various levels of detail.g. These theoretical plots are calculated from detailed information of the vessel’s hull and superstructure form and available thruster power. where equipment performance approaches or exceeds predetermined limits. A cost benefit analysis is recommended. where each point on the envelope represents the wind speed at which it is calculated that the vessel will be unable to maintain position in DP.g. in addition. B For attention when reasonably convenient. wind and current) appropriate to the area in which the DP vessel is to operate. — Loss of most effective thruster(s). owners are recommended to ensure that there are contractually binding agreements for the FMEA to meet specifications set out in IMCA Guidelines. DP Capability Plots that do not take into DET NORSKE VERITAS . DP Capability Plots should include the following scenarios at current speeds of 0. C For consideration. Polar Plot). — developing planned maintenance schedules. January 2011 5. e. — — — — determine the severity of each failure mode. taking account of the impact of taking systems or equipment out of service — developing the vessel’s DP Operations and Emergency Response manuals and procedures. Improvement is required for compliance with class. or at other current speeds that are representative of the location in which the DP vessel is to operate: — Fully intact power generation and thrusters.g. Cautionary Note: DP FMEAs that are solely focused on attaining class notation and class approval may not always meet guidance standards stipulated in those IMCA Guidelines. include the following steps. The calculations should use environmental data (seastate. Class rules. — conducting task based DP operational risk assessments. — determining the vessel’s Task Appropriate Mode. A DP FMECA should encompass all of the listed points in DP FMEA above and. Note to Owners: In the case of newbuilds. M178. where the unavailability of equipment may reduce the vessel’s DP station keeping ability. M04/04 and Annex. The Criticality Analysis should be presented in tabulated form making using of risk matrices that comply with recognised international standards such as those given in IMCA M166 or IEC 60812. These plots should show the limiting wind speed 360 degree envelopes for the scenarios below. determine and rank the criticality of the identified failure modes from highest to lowest. M04/04 and Annex and preferably be carried out by an independent third party DP FMEA practitioner. e. The failure effects equal worst case failure design intent but there is an opportunity to reduce the failure effect as reasonable cost. — developing DP trials programs and checklists. determine a strategy for dealing with the ranked criticalities so that remedial measures are directed appropriately in accordance with the criticality ranking. M166. when applicable and warranted by the specific DP operations.g. ensuring that the single point failures identified in the DP FMEA are covered in the trials and checklists. A FMECA is an extension of an FMEA that adds a risk assessment of each failure mode to determine its criticality. Guidance is provided on DP Capability Plots in IMCA M140 Rev 1. Comments and observations related to good practice.1 DP Capability Plots DP Capability Plots should be calculated for the vessel. if DP FMEAs are within the shipyard’s scope of supply. — determining the DP vessel’s Activity Specific Operating Guidelines (ASOG). where key personnel involved should have detailed knowledge of the DP FMEA. A DP FMEA should be referred to at the following times. Note: The closing out of action items should be well documented and auditable. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 5. — Following the worst case failure. M166. “Specification for DP Capability Plots”.4. Note: The DP Capability Plots should be provided in a format that is intuitive to the user on board (e. determine the probability of occurrence of each failure mode (using qualitative or reliable MTBF data). Guidance note: DP Capability Plots that do not cover Worst Case Failure are incomplete. Criticality is derived from an assessment of the probability that a particular failure will occur combined with the severity of the failure if it does occur.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. 1 and 2 knots. e. — determining the DP vessel’s Safest Mode of Operation (SMO).

DPOs should be careful when estimating the current force acting on the vessel and relating it to the DP Capability Plots. DPOs should be aware that the current force generated by the DP control system is the residual external force acting on the vessel that cannot be measured. thruster-hull). Note: DP Footprint Plots originated in harsh weather regions. DPOs should consult DP Capability Plots as a matter of course whilst the vessel is conducting DP operations. Refer to plotting sheets in Sec. When wind speeds are low an attendant vessel. DP Footprint Plots serve two main purposes. due to unforeseen faults or failures or. DP Capability Plots may also have to be recalculated for thruster configurations where. for loss of most effective thruster and for worst case failure. DPOs can also produce DP Footprint Plots by manual methods using a plotting sheet.) DP Footprint Plots serve other purposes. weather downtime or on arrival at the field. DET NORSKE VERITAS . DP Capability Plots may have to be recalculated from time to time during the lifetime of a DP vessel. such as in the North Sea. in turn. Plots should be taken for the thruster configurations used in the DP Capability Plots. such as the DP system manufacturers. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 5.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Theoretical DP Capability Plots and DP Footprint Plots combine together to enhance knowledge and understanding of the vessel’s DP station keeping ability. which. Owners/ operators should note that it is important to provide a detailed scope of work to whoever is to generate the DP Capability Plots for the vessel. It is acknowledged that DP Footprint Plots may be of less relevance to DP MODUs. vessel outline with thrusters indicated and space for vessel specific position reference systems and environmental data. due to essential maintenance requirements. Experience has shown that those who generate the DP Capability Plots. the new fully intact condition. Guidance note: Manual DP Footprint Plots are generated in the following manner. such as during standby periods. i. if available. thus validating or contradicting the theoretical DP Capability Plots for the various thruster configurations. may not include the Worst Case Failure. DP Capability Plots should be readily available to the DPOs at the DP control console. fully intact. They are actual measurements of the vessel’s DP station keeping performance in the actual environmental conditions and thruster configuration at the time the plot was taken. that have good fore and aft thrust capability but limited thwartship capability. will alter the wind effect on the vessel. — They provide a scatter plot of vessel positions at regular intervals around the required set position (this shows accuracy of station keeping) — They also provide comparison points on the limiting wind speed envelope given in the theoretical DP Capability Plots (this shows wind speeds at which it was seen that the vessel was unable to maintain position.5 DP Footprint Plots DP Footprint Plots should also be produced on board.e. loss of most effective thruster(s) and after worst case failure. including worst case failure. It should be remembered that DP Capability Plots are theoretical calculations and that. the installation of new equipment. including learning and familiarisation opportunities for DPOs and in providing snapshots of vessel station keeping behaviour for specific locations and activities. i. The plots are used to gain a better understanding of the vessel’s actual station keeping performance and limitations in intact and. (thruster-thruster. DP Capability Plots should be used by DPOs and other key DP personnel as a reference in the planning phases when determining the vessel’s environmental operational limits for the ASOG. DP Footprint Plots should be taken whenever opportunities arise. wherever possible.19. opportunities should be taken to validate the DP Capability Plots by taking DP Footprint Plots. January 2011 Page 92 – 5. 5. such as DP tankers. the new loss of most effective thruster(s) and the new worst case failure condition. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels account thruster interaction. DPOs should be fully familiar with the limits given in the DP Capability Plots for the fully intact thruster configuration. comprising a 360 degree polar plotting diagram. could be used to estimate current by going into drift mode. See below. DP Footprint Plots are not theoretical.e. In these circumstances the DP Capability Plots should be recalculated to take account of the changes. in various degraded thruster configurations. one or more thrusters are no longer available. whilst the vessel is being subjected to real environmental forces. — Use a proforma plotting sheet. This is not uncommon on vessels. Some DP systems have a software application that produces DP Footprint Plots electronically. Where not already covered by existing calculations the revised DP Capability Plots should cover the following cases for the new thruster condition. For example. thruster degradation and thruster barred zones are incomplete. This is particularly relevant where the DP Capability Plots are included in the shipyard’s scope of supply for newbuilds. unless specifically instructed to do so. Where the DP Capability Plots show an undue level of heading limitations this may restrict the vessel’s operating range. such as a crane or an accommodation module on deck will alter the vessel’s outline.

of wind. e. can be compared against the environmental envelope plotted on the theoretical DP Capability Plot for worst case failure. It is suggested that the following values are applied. should not be used during critical operations such as sub-sea operations. plotting the vessel’s position regularly. both with regard to restrictions caused by the manner of deployment and expected performance in working situations. in which the vessel failed to maintain position. Absolute DGNSS (DGPS and GLONASS) Acoustic (USBL. Cyscan) Radar (e. then it may be necessary to pull in the limiting wind envelope on the DP Capability Plot to the upper wind speed determined by the DP Footprint Plot for these conditions. drawing appropriate vectors. absolute indicates that this position reference sensor is independent of another fixed or floating offshore structure. Additional position reference systems should be based on different principles. particularly if the DP Capability Plot shows that the vessel can maintain position in the given condition. Record wind.g. wave height and thruster configuration. January 2011 5. SBL. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 5. — Observe position excursions from the intended position by the most appropriate means. Sec.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Cautionary Note: The DP Footprint Plot positions will contain systematic position reference errors.19 contains two worked examples. Example 2 . Other benefits of exceeding minimum requirements include greater redundancy and improved station keeping performance. The following are the most common position reference systems in use. For purposes of this document. And. — Record thruster configuration on the plotting sheet. Position reference systems should be selected with due consideration to operational requirements. The plot shows that the vessel was unable to maintain position with the wind and sea on the port quarter.g. Example 1 shows a DP Footprint Plot for the vessel’s fully intact condition with all four thrusters operational. DP reference systems sensitive to interferences from the vessels radars. It could be debated that Taut Wire and Acoustic Position reference systems are relative position reference systems. an acoustic absolute system can be used as a relative system if attached to a non-fixed asset. LBL) Taut wire (see Note 2) Artemis Laser (e. A relative system gives vessel position in relation to a non-fixed reference. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels – Page 93 — The vessel should be in auto DP. Both worked examples are for the same DP vessel and in the same environmental conditions. operational guidance on position reference systems and sensors is given in the table on the next page. Relative Note 1: Note 2: Caution: Caution: Guidance note: The reference system may be subject to contract specifications/ oil major requirements. It is generally not recommended to use multiple (>2) satellite based systems in conjunction with other position reference systems as this may result in skewed weighting in favour of multiple satellite systems. Fanbeam. The plot shows that the vessel was able to maintain position within +/. Position reference systems comprise absolute and relative systems. 10 deg/min and 0. respectively. DET NORSKE VERITAS . to prevent misleading results. If there is a significant difference between the two. waves and current on the plotting sheet.3 m/sec.5.The known circumstances at the time of taking the DP Footprint Plot. Where operational uptime is one of the key success factors the benefit gained by consciously exceeding the minimum requirements are to be evaluated.6 Position Reference Systems and Sensors The DP vessel should be equipped with suitable position reference and sensors in accordance with the vessel’s DP class notation and operational requirements. Example 2 shows a DP Footprint Plot for the vessel’s worst case failure condition with only two thrusters operational.g. They should be similar in that the DP Capability Plot should also show that vessel will be unable to maintain position in conditions where a 45 to 50 knots wind is on the port quarter. Notwithstanding these. RADius. RadaScan) DARPS Class rules give minimum requirements for the number of position references.2 meters with the wind and sea on the port quarter. A relative system can be used as an absolute system if installed on a point that is a fixed geographical position. Wind was 45 to 50 knots from 225 degrees with a corresponding wave height of 6 m. — Record the rate of turn and speed of moves. Current was 1 coincident at 1 knot. An absolute system gives vessel geographical position. every 30 seconds. radios etc.

Note 7 below) below*) 5 & 6 below*) 5 & 6 below*) Drilling If in deep open water Redundant one dual <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m frequency Diving N N N N N N N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m Pipelay N Y N Umbilical Lay N Y N Riser Pull in N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. January 2011 Page 94 – 5.Recommended Absolute Position Reference Systems Application on DP GPS DGNSS SBL USBL/ LBL (DGPS + SSBL (See (See GLONASS) Note (See 1 Note 1 Note 1 (See Note 2 below) below) below) below) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 1 Y Y N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N N N N Y N Y Y Y N N N N N N Y Y Y N Y N N Y N N N Y N N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N N 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & 3 relative only rel 3 relative only 3 relative only 3 relative only 3 relative only 3 relative only 3 relative only 3 relative only * NA 2 1 2 2 3 NA NA * NA * 2 mixed abs and rel * See Note 8 below NA * 2 3 mixed abs & 3 relative only rel * * NA NA * * NA NA 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 Taut Min Wire Number (See (See Note 12 Note 3 below) below) Recommended Relative Position References Systems if in close proximity to an Sensors offshore structure Min Fixed TLP/SPAR/ TLP/SPAR/ Gyros. 5 & 6 (See Notes 4. (See Notes 4. VRUs platform etc < min etc > min and Wind Artemis Laser Radar Gangway DARPS (See Notes movement movement Sensors (See 4. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels Lifting N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m Accommodation N N N N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m Shuttle Offtake N Y N 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel 3 mixed abs & rel DET NORSKE VERITAS NA <m NA NA ROV Support N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m Floating Production Unit N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m Well Stim N unless open water Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m N Y <700 m <700 m >700 m <350 m OSV Snatch Lifts OSV HAZMAT Transfer no quick disconnect OSV HAZMAT Transfer with quick disconnect OSV with shaft gens and single stern thruster Wind Turbine installation Standby Vessels N Y NA Y Y <700 m <700 m >700 m 1 or < .

e. Where there is diversity of vendors and software it is recommended that the acceptance/ rejection logic is verified against the DP system manufacturer’s specifications. (DP at non fixed Assets. wherever possible. Only where it is impractical to use systems based on different principles may all be of the same type. this would require the use of different masts for the satellite antennae. In these locations DGPS should not be considered as the primary position reference system. . This enhancement can fill the “holes” in positioning information in extraordinary and difficult conditions that otherwise might invalidate the satellite based positioning information. For instance.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. this would require the use of separate and independent hull transceivers. (Absolute and Relative Systems) . It is recommended that. are referred to in the above table. RADASCAN. where the USBL is typically used to calibrate the LBL system. such as TLPs and Spars where an acoustic system. The minimum movement referred to in the table above refers to the actual measured movement of floating facility. The abbreviations. This is so that any jump in position that may occur when a satellite comes into view will hit one DGPS before the next and will give the DPO some time to take action. Care should be taken at all times when using satellite based systems close to platforms. Special care should taken where there is a potential for multi path of DARPS signals. sited on the floating facility to measure the fluctuations in its movement. To measure this movement the DP vessel should use an absolute position reference system. wherever possible. There have been incidents in the past where diversity of vendors and software has resulted in loss of position due to the acceptance of erroneous values within the software. radio interference and multipath. does not impact station keeping. It is recommended that. such as DGPS. Some TLPs and Spars are fitted with suitable subsea brackets or cradles for transponders/ beacons. use of DARPS as a position reference should assess consequences of freeze. in a risk analysis. multiple acoustic systems are completely separated and independent in all respects. separate cable routeing. FPSOs/ TLPs/ Spars) – When carrying out DP activities in close proximity to or in conjunction with floating facilities it is strongly recommended that redundant relative position reference systems are used. (Absolute Systems) . where an inertial input is applied to the satellite based system’s position calculation. users should bear in mind the possibility of the offshore structure blocking the satellite signals and the DET NORSKE VERITAS Note 2: Note 3: Note 4: Note 5: . in particular where there are two satellite based systems in a mix of three. such as the Kongsberg HAIN (Hydro Acoustic Inertial Navigation) system or Sonardyne’s AAINS (Acoustically Aided Inertial Navigation System) both of which can. can be used as a relative system. such as the Kongsberg Seatex 4D system. masking of differential signals. different vendors and software.Where multiple absolute systems are used it is recommended that they are based on two different principles. Where multiple DGPS systems are being used. “Guidelines on the Use of DGPS as a Position Reference in DP Control Systems”. It should also be noted that there are non fixed offshore facilities.When using DGPS/ GLONASS in a mix of absolute and relative position reference systems. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels – Page 95 Note 1: (Acoustics) – The acoustic LUSBL system is not included in the above table since it is a combination of USBL and LBL in one system. or Fanbeam. (Satellite Systems) – Satellite based systems that use a combination of signals from DGPS and GLONASS satellites provide enhanced redundancy over systems that use only a single satellite source. For instance. if any.g. This can be accomplished by installing the transponder/ beacon onto the submerged part of the TLP or Spar at an appropriate depth. as the sole source for positioning information and use the relative positioning system. This is of particular significance where DGPS is concerned where the satellite constellation provides a source for a common mode failure. USBL and SSBL. consideration should be given to set each system with a different elevation mask. e. such as RADius. such as the masking of GPS signals. Good DGPS close to structures should be considered as a bonus. . FPSO/TLP/SPAR. In these situations a mix of absolute and relative position reference systems for station keeping is to be used only after validating that movement of the floating structure. multiple satellite based systems are completely separated and independent in all respects. Where Logistics vessels are being used as a Construction vessel.overcome the update rate limitations of speed of sound in water. The DPOs must be extremely vigilant when using a mix of absolute and relative position references and must be fully aware of the potential danger of diverging positioning information from both types of system. January 2011 5. which highlights potential problems when within 150 m of a platform.g. Owners/ operators should consider the advantages of acoustic positioning systems that have an inertial navigation input. such as with construction vessels at non fixed assets. Experience has shown that this may result in computer freeze and the need for re-boot. and evaluate the potential to use other effective relative position reference sensors. although normally considered as an absolute system. such as during times of scintillation and satellite ageing. Although the abbreviations differ they both refer to the same acoustic application although supplied by different vendors. Owners/ operators should consider the advantages of hybrid GNSS/ IMU positioning systems. Guidance Note: It is acknowledged that LBL capability and inertial navigation enhancements are less likely to be relevant for logistics vessels but is mentioned here for informational purposes. Guidance is given in IMCA M141.overcome the limitations on satellite based position reference systems brought upon by poor satellite geometry.

speed could result in a significant error in output heading. DPOs should recognise the potential dangers of using multiple satellite based systems (>2) in the suite of position reference systems and that this could result in skewed ‘weighting” in favor of satellite systems at the expense of other position references.Given the impact on heading/ position keeping it is recommended that vessels with an equivalent DP 2 class notation are provided with three gyro compasses. that affect these ultrasonic sensors. DPOs should be alert to the potential for taut wire weights to “skip” along the seabed and provide inaccurate positioning information. It is therefore recommended to use manual input of latitude and speed. e. manifolds or other subsea assets. There should be means of preventing erroneous values from being accepted by DP.g. then redundancy in relative position reference sensors should be considered. Taut wires are quite highly stressed for marine wire ropes and are liable to breakage. Where it is unavoidable DPOs should have ultimate control over the input. Where ultrasonic type wind sensors are fitted.g. It is possible for thruster wash to interact with a taut wire. VRUs and wind sensors. such as icing in higher latitudes. It is recommended that no more than two satellite based position reference systems be used to provide position solution as inputs into DP. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels consequences for station keeping. The practice of inputting survey data to DP is not recommended. DPOs should ensure that the warning and alarm limits are properly set and operational. acting as a strong current and causing position instability. Where it is anticipated that due to operational requirements the DP vessel will require to be positioned in close proximity to the non fixed facility and where the potential for shadowing of DGPS exists. New or retrofitted position references are sometimes interfaced into DP as another position reference because the DP control system has not been designed to accept them. DPOs should be aware of the potential for this to occur. more importantly. The effects of incorrect latitude or. DPOs should also be aware of the potential for taut wire systems to become a “perfect” reference. including the taut wire touching the side of own vessel or. including ultrasonic types. An often practiced procedure which should prevent the above problems is to input these values manually and not to rely on the automatic input function. by the ROV.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. if any. continuous wear at any guide blocks and kinks or damage caused by poor spooling or where the wire is attached to the weight. otherwise being restricted in its movement. The wires in use in modern taut wire systems are generally 5 mm or 6 mm in diameter. Note 6: Wherever practical and feasible it is recommended that redundancy requirements are met by diversity of suppliers. if fitted. which have a potential to affect the DP system and station keeping should there be an erroneous or invalid input from them. the consequences for station keeping of common mode failures. It is therefore important to ensure that the latitude and speed corrections are applied. e. the DPOs should monitor the weightings closely so as to ensure that no one system or set of systems is ‘hogging” the weighting. motion and wind. The potential for wire breakage is reduced by regular inspection of the taut DET NORSKE VERITAS Note 7: Note 8: Note 9: Note 10: Note 11: Note 12: . These subsea assets should be positively identified prior to positioning taut wire weights. January 2011 Page 96 – 5. (Taut wires) – Care should be exercised when lowering or repositioning taut wire weights that divers and ROVs are alerted and are a safe distance from the seabed position. is deemed acceptable. It should be noted that some Classification Societies. Taut wire weights should also be placed clear of pipelines. heavy rain and birds. This practice is not recommended unless accompanied by a detailed risk analysis and the residual risk. irrespective of the requirements of the applicable Classification Society DP rules. Care should also be taken that the taut wires are not fouled by other subsea lines or obstructions. particularly at points of weakness. multiple position references are in use by DP. All necessary precautions should be taken to ensure that the vessel’s station keeping is not affected and should be addressed in the FMEA. The thruster wash could be from own vessel or from another vessel close by. All types of wind sensor are vulnerable. or by a faulty gimbal sensor. Where. Gyro compasses are normally fitted with a correction facility which inputs the vessel’s latitude and speed. where an erroneous or invalid input could result in extreme values and distortion of external forces and result in large position excursion (drive off) from the desired set point position. This is not recommended since there are a number of system errors that can result in undesired heading changes. Weights are in the region of 400 kg to 500 kg. (Sensors) . as is normal. lightning. This can have different causes. Most DP systems will detect this fault. Some systems use automatic input from GPS for these corrections. other than heading. DP vessels are frequently fitted with sensor systems. This can be avoided by ensuring that the tension control is properly calibrated and operating within specified parameters and that the angle of wire inclination is kept as near to vertical as is possible and should not normally exceed 10 degrees. may be prevented by fitting mechanical wind sensors. Examples of this are pseudo Artemis or pseudo acoustics. Wind sensors are known to have suffered common mode failures. These include draft sensors and pipelay tension sensors. There should also be means of ensuring that erroneous values are prevented from being input manually. satellite based position reference systems from different manufacturers and differential signals from different sources. including ABS and DNV already require three gyro compasses for a DP class 2 notation. This applies equally to sensors such as gyro compasses. such as continuous wear at the spot on the main sheave.

This mode is used to account for pipe tensions in a pipe layer and hawser tension in a shuttle tanker. parameters and values used by position reference systems are compatible with the software and acceptance criteria used by the DP control system and that this is verified by analysis and testing. The following selected DP control modes are relevant to specific DP activities. Fire Monitor Compensation Used to compensate for the varying forces exerted on vessel from the fire monitors. around the terminal point.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. January 2011 5. current and waves around a fixed or moving point called the terminal point. called the setpoint circle. The heading of the vessel is controlled to point towards the terminal point. External Force Where the measured external force acting on the vessel. both with regard to restrictions caused by the activity and performance criteria required to execute the activity safely and successfully. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels – Page 97 wire system and by cropping the taut wire on a regular basis. Also at water depths under 350 m severe inaccuracies may occur. where the DP control system allows the vessel’s heading to rotate to minimize external forces acting on the vessel and thruster requirements.6. Weathervane Enables the DP vessel to rotate with the wind. is included in the DP calculation and treated as a force feed forward. Taut wire systems are known to suffer inaccuracies at water depths over 350 m. especially in high current areas. It is not uncommon for the term “weathervane” to be used to denote Caution: “minimum thrust”. This should be taken into consideration when planning DP operations. It is important that software. Activity on DP Weather Down Weather Only (See Note 1 below) N N N N N N N N N NA if class 1 if class 1 External Force Comp N N Y N Y N N N N N N N DP Control Mode Target Weather Vane Follow (See Note 2 below) N N N N N N N N Y N N N Y N Y Y Y N N Y N N N N Heavy Lift Mode N N N N N Y N N N N N N Target Follow Drilling Diving Pipelay Umbilical Lay Riser Pull in (See Note 3) Lifting Accommodation Shuttle Offtake ROV Support Floating Production Unit Well Stim OSV Snatch Lifts DET NORSKE VERITAS . The position of the vessel is controlled to follow a circle. i. for example. These terms should not be confused. Heavy Lift Takes account of the effects of the load transfer on the mass of the vessel and the additional lateral force. Attention is drawn to IMO MSC/Circ 645 where three MRU/VRUs are stipulated when vessel positioning is fully dependent on correct MRU/VRU signals. normally by reducing gain and relaxing the DP controller.e. which is separate from Compensation the environment. Enables the DP vessel to follow a moving target and is used. to follow an ROV along a pipeline. Guidance note: The following table lists the recommended DP control modes that apply to different DP activities. Note 13 ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 5. This mode is appropriate for connected shuttle tanker/ FPSO operations.1 Recommended DP Control Modes for DP Activities The DP vessel should be equipped with suitable DP modes and features with due consideration to operational requirements. Neither the heading nor the position of the DP vessel is fixed.

as defined in the DP FMEA. An alternative term is that the vessel is on the “force off” side of the structure.. These tests should be conducted immediately following launching of a new build vessel and following modifications.A frame when used off a logistics type vessel on DP where stiffness “created” during set down operations resulted in instability causing buckling of A Frame. Heavy lift type issues have been experienced on vessels provided with A frames which have been used in installation type activities. The term “weathervane” has a specific meaning in the DP shuttle tanker industry. The vessel specific DP Operations Manual should contain sufficient detail of these operating modes and features. are carrying project/ construction activities. is operated in accordance with. upgrades repairs. applicable standards and guidelines.g. Owners/ operators should refer to the following list of trials and checklists when developing an appropriate regime for their own DP vessels.7 Trials and Checklists A range of trials and checklists is to be provided for each DP vessel and implemented as a verification that the vessel’s DP system complies with and. January 2011 Page 98 – 5. would move the vessel away from the structure. This may mean that the mode has to be installed in the DP control system. Annual DP Trials should be performed at a specific occasion once a year and within 3 months of the anniversary of the previous year’s trials. A detailed and documented risk assessment should be carried out when it is planned to perform any of the above activities without the recommended DP control mode. A series of tests of fault and failure conditions relevant to the DP System. to validate repairs and preventive maintenance. (new build/ system modifications class requirement): To prove the operation of the DP system under load conditions for at least 4 hours without significant alarms of the DP system. DP FMEA Proving Trials: A series of tests used to prove expected effects of failure modes found in the FMEA desktop analysis. These tests should also include the testing of interfaces between different vendor systems and equipment.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. or engaged in activities outside their normal scope they should do so using the recommended DP control mode. The tests should be designed to prove system redundancy. additions. Endurance Trials: Annual DP Trials: DET NORSKE VERITAS . The list below is a typical list for a DP dive support vessel. Where DP Logistics vessels. acting on their own. system performance and equipment functionality. (e.) The potential for such instability should be assessed if A Frame is being contemplated for use while vessel is on DP. The DPOs are to familiarize themselves with operational constraints/ requirements of these modes and features. and test the operation of protection and detection devices and responses so as to demonstrate that the vessel’s DP system remains fit for purpose. Annual DP Trials also provide the opportunities for training of the vessel’s crew and enhancement of their knowledge of failure modes and their effects. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 5. This verification process should confirm the failure modes and their effects on the systems and equipment analysed in the DP FMEA document (to include the Worst Case Failure) and the vessel’s station keeping ability following its Worst Case Failure. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels Activity on DP Weather Down Weather Only (See Note 1 below) Y N Needs to head into weather Y if class 1 External Force Comp N N N N DP Control Mode Target Weather Vane Follow (See Note 2 below) N N N N N N N N Heavy Lift Mode N N N N OSV HAZMAT Transfer no quick disconnect OSV HAZMAT Transfer with quick disconnect OSV with shaft gens and single stern thruster Standby Vessels Note 1: Note 2: Note 3: Note 4: Note 5: Note 6: Note 7: The term “down weather” means that the vessel is on that side of the offshore structure where the environmental forces.

Post DP Modification A series of checks and tests that are used to determine the effects of modifications Trials: and/ or additions on the DP system and the vessel’s subsequent station keeping performance. “. ECR Checklists: A series of checks and tests that verify that the vessel’s set up and configuration of systems and equipment meet the requirements of the necessary mode of operation as determined by the Safest Mode of Operation (SMO) and the DP Class or the Task Appropriate Mode (TAM). DP Mobilization Trials: A series of tests to be carried out at the start of a contract. Note: DET NORSKE VERITAS . It is recognized that these trials and checklists could be given other titles. to demonstrate redundancy and functional limitations of the DP system. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels – Page 99 Experience has shown that. periodical tests and testing after upgrades.. This has been recognized by the industry with publication of specific guidance relating to the conduct of Annual DP Trials for DP MODUs. 500 m Checks: A series of checks and tests performed before entering the 500 m zone of an asset in which set up mode and functions are verified and confirmed. owing to heavy operational demands. owners/ operators should use the vessel specific DP FMEA and Proving Trials as the principal source for developing the Annual DP Trials program.” Using the above quotation as the background. DP Field Arrival Trials: A series of checks and tests that confirm satisfactory performance of the DP system and verify the set up mode of operation and DP functions. DP drilling units are not usually able to meet the above criteria for conducting Annual DP Trials at a specific time once a year. Hardware in the Loop (HIL) Extensive testing of functionality. M191 guidance describes a regime of annual testing that is conducted on an incremental basis throughout the year as opportunities arise but needs to be completed within a twelve month period. Post DP Incident Trials: Tests performed to ensure that the corrective/ repair measures taken following a DP incident have properly addressed the causes of the incident and that the vessel’s DP system is in a safe and operable condition. When faults identified during the year on similar DP MOUs are determined to be feasible on the vessel then additional tests should be incorporated in the trials program. to improve the DP system safety and performance by testing faults and failure conditions important to DP safety to prove the ability of the vessel to keep position after single point failures associated with the IMO equipment class and to verify the FMEA requirements. Text from M191 is included in this section to draw attention to the purpose of Annual DP Trials. Main and back up communication tests should be included in this process. which addresses Annual DP Trials is applicable to MODUs and not all vessels. DP Location Set Up A series of checks to demonstrate that the vessel is properly set up for the Checklist: location. This is given in IMCA M191. The guidance sets out a regime of annual testing that is conducted on an incremental basis throughout the year as opportunities arise but needs to be completed within a twelve month period. Note: The nomenclature used for the trials and checklists listed above is based on the guideline document. The following guidelines apply to the development and the conduct of Annual DP Trials for a DP MODU in accordance with guidance contained in IMCA M191. subject to client requirements. Approval is then obtained to operate in close proximity to the asset. Pre-Dive Checklist: A series of checks performed prior to commencing diving operations.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Guidance note: Annual DP Trials It is to be noted that M191. M191 gives the purpose of Annual DP Trials as follow. Main and back up communication tests should be included in this process... IMCA M112: “Guidelines for Auditing Vessels with DP Systems”. in particular the satisfactory performance of the position reference systems. January 2011 5.. “Guidelines for Annual DP Trials for DP Mobile Offshore Drilling Units”. Watch Status/ 6 Hour A series of checks and tests performed by the DPOs to verify and confirm the set Checklist: up of the DP system prior to taking over the DP watch. M191 also recognises the contribution that planned maintenance systems can play in verifying the status and performance of certain DP equipment throughout the year. sea trials. annual tests.. It can be used in factory acceptance tests. failures and performance by using advanced tests: simulation techniques and embedded systems.

e. auto DP and all control modes.g. each with different requirements for content. They should also provide assurance of the integrity of the vessel’s DP system and the vessel’s operational limitations. The requirement for a manual has its origins in IMO MSC/Circ 645 (1994) “Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems”. DP Location Set Up Checklist These checks should confirm that the vessel is properly set up for the working location and that the performance of the position reference systems is satisfactory for that location. test procedures and DP operating instructions to be incorporated into one manual. Guidance will be provided in a subsequent revision of this RP. DET NORSKE VERITAS . Each Classification Society has its own specific requirements for a DP Operations Manual. The tests should confirm the vessel’s redundancy concept and station keeping performance after worst case failure. DP Mobilization Trials These trials should be carried out by the vessel’s crew as part of the mobilizing program prior to the start of a new project. DP Field Arrival Checks These checks should be carried out on arrival at the field. determine whether thruster loads are within the load limits for ASOG). in particular. The following example shows the inherent dangers of failing to take proper account of change. the vessel heading checks may have to be repeated at an intermediate step between the 500 m line and the working location at. Only vessels engaged in support activities to remain within the 500 m zone. The vessel specific DP Operations Manual is the most important operational document in the list of required documents. Fanbeam). These checks should take account of any limitations of the position reference systems for that location.8 DP Operations Manuals A vessel specific DP Operations Manual should be prepared for each DP vessel. No testing is carried out. of any abnormalities in relevant systems or equipment that may affect DP operations. The IMO Guidelines require a series of checklists. not during the first few minutes of the watch. January 2011 Page 100 – 5. Depending on the performance and distance limitations of the position reference system(s) in use (e. Watch Status/ 6 Hour Checklist The purpose of these checks is to record the status of the DP system and configuration. It is important that the vessel carries out its checks on the same heading as at the final working location. The 500 m zone is not to be used as a standby location unless required to support a specific activity. prior to commencing work activity. for example. The recommendations set out below address areas that are not necessarily required by class. ECR Checklists These checks should be carried out by the ER staff and reported to the DPOs prior to start of operations and at fixed periods during DP operations These checks should be developed from the vessel’s DP FMEA and should confirm that the vessel’s systems and equipment are set up and configured for the appropriate operating mode. Post Modification/ Upgrade DP Trials It is essential to ensure that any modification. This resulted in the temporary loss of that operator station. Testing should follow on from a detailed FMEA type analysis of the change which should be fully documented. change or upgrade to the DP system is fully tested and that the vessel’s redundancy concept has not been affected. at any time. 100 m from the working location. In this example the installation of a more up to date and faster OS computer resulted in the new computer re-booting too early and failing to “ride through” the brief power interruption that resulted from the activation of a changeover relay. Vessel heading to be tested at 500 m checks to ensure that thruster loads are acceptable (i. They are based on current industry practices. 500 m Checks All vessels should undertake 500 m checks. The checks should verify that the vessel’s station keeping performance at the working location is satisfactory and. DPOs should complete the checklist prior to taking over the watch. It is the responsibility of engine room watch personnel to advise the DPOs. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 5. The tests carried out at these trials are less than are carried out at Annual DP Trials but more than at DP Field Arrival Checks. The checks should also ensure that the DP system is set up properly. that the position reference systems are properly set up and operating satisfactorily. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels Note: The remainder of this subsection on Annual DP Trials is on hold pending formal publication of IMCA guidance on Annual DP Trials which is under development at the time of preparing this RP. The purpose of these checks is to ensure satisfactory operation of the DP system and should include a full functional check of the operation of all thrusters and power generating equipment and systems. These checks should be repeated for each change of location.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307.

The manual should represent the way the vessel is operated in DP. Vessel specific DP philosophy. etc. open/ closed bus-tie configurations. Owners/ operators may wish to refer to the following guidance when developing the vessel specific DP operations manual. which states. Section 1 Management of DP Operations (company/ vessel specific) Company/ vessel standing operational policies. Due consideration should be given to initiating disconnect sequence preceding an ESD resulting in a black out. tensioner systems. “The Company should establish procedures for the preparation of plans and instructions. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels – Page 101 The manual should contain sufficiently detailed instruction and guidance to enable the vessel to be operated safely in DP and safely execute its intended activities. vessel DP capabilities. for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the ship and the prevention of pollution. internal and external. VRUs. This should include interfaces between systems and equipment that are not part of the DP system but which may affect the DP system. such as Emergency Disconnect Systems (EDS) on MOUs. including. auto/ manual emergency shutdown systems (ESD). it may be useful provide the operator with a thruster and generator operating strategy (TAGOS) to assist in the decision on what generators and thrusters to use for different circumstances and different equipment availabilities. vessel technical data and layout. vessel DP station keeping capabilities. Vessel specific overview of DP system (vessel overview document). fire and flood. etc. the planning and preparation of DP operations. ASOG. Basic principles of DP. tensioner systems on Pipelay vessels. DPOs. TAGOS). routine and emergency. wind sensors draft sensors. Procedures should highlight criteria for initiation and consequences. Guidance note: The provision and development of the manual is the responsibility of the DP vessel owner or manager and should be incorporated in the company’s SMS and. Guidance on the contents of vessel specific DP Operations Manuals is provided in the following IMCA guidelines. At least one controlled copy including any updates and. DP computers and operator stations and networks.” The manual should be a standalone document in hard copy. auxiliary systems. emergency procedures. where necessary. Section 2 DET NORSKE VERITAS . interfaces with other vendors equipment (e. gyros. SMO. Power management. external force input). DGNSS/ Hydroacoustic management. current sensors. watchkeeping and manning. may provide this in an electronic format The manual should be readily accessible to all relevant DP personnel. The various tasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel. For complicated power systems and/ or thruster configurations. DP operating procedures. The vessel specific manual may also contain generic content. distribution. functional overview of a DP control system. such as company policies. If applicable. the organisation. DP incident handling and alert systems and vessel specific trials and checklists that apply uniquely to the vessel. where relevant. operating modes. DP System Description and Operation (vessel specific) Power generation. other emergency and alert systems. environmental envelopes. M103. worst case failure. taut wires. Related DP guidance and reference documents. (The failure modes of these systems and the potential effects on the vessel’s station keeping ability should be addressed in the DP FMEA). disconnect systems.g. This will include a clear statement on the DP philosophy for the vessel. January 2011 5. The manual should address operating issues relating to equipment and systems that are interfaced to the DP system. The potential for this adverse situation should be assessed and appropriate preventative measures put in place. developed and managed in accordance with Requirement 7 of the ISM Code. Communications systems. electrical systems. Position reference systems and sensors. operating modes. Owners/ operators at their discretion. thrusters and propulsion (thruster and generator operating strategy. responsibilities and roles of key DP personnel. appendices should be kept on the DP navigating bridge. procedures and standing orders. M109. operating limits. M117 (contingency training) and in class society DP rules. All relevant DP personnel should be given sufficient opportunity to familiarise themselves fully with the document and should be fully conversant with the sections of the manual that relate to their duties and responsibilities. emergency disconnect system (EDS). training and competency. Detailed procedures are to be developed for operating ESD.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. as follows. DP control system and automation. including checklists as appropriate. engineers and electricians. This will include ESD systems (if installed) where the consequences of an automatic shutdown triggered by an ESD may result in undesirable consequences. including the master. The manual should specifically address operational interfaces between different vendor systems and equipment to ensure that they are configured and operated properly.

use of DP capability analysis and DP footprints. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels Section 3 DP Operations Procedures Procedure for planning DP operations. collision. leeside only [if applicable]) — ASOGs for logistics vessels may have requirements for DPOs and Master to practice manual control prior to executing activity as part of field arrival checks. DP training. integration with activity planning. including weather log. optimum position and heading. testing. investigation. Operator Intervention Appendix. acoustic arrays.g. where appropriate.g. location set up checklists. degraded and emergency conditions. etc. battery procedures. following Worst Case Failure (WCF). Development of activity specific criteria for normal. key DP personnel. etc. black out. Development of ASOG (Activity specific operating guidelines). both intact and residual capability. offset and turn testing. Duties and responsibilities of key personnel involved in DP operations. Annual DP Trials. lifting operations restricted to snatch lifts only and no HAZMAT transfer when supporting floating facilities. DP technical and operational support onshore and offshore. January 2011 Page 102 – 5. — Consequences of a loss of position and/ or heading. force off. bridge and engine room. including daily reporting. — Preparation of the Activity Specific Operating Guideline (ASOG). close out and record keeping. position reference system planning. 500 m safety zone operations. mobilisation trials. emergency procedures. construction superintendent (If applicable). external locations. DGPS set up and differential corrections. ESD/ EDS trials (where appropriate). work/ activity control rooms. Communications. chief engineer. where structured risk assessments have deemed it necessary to impose this restriction). Normal DP marine operations. DP log keeping and documentation. drift off. Yellow or Red). engineers. DP correspondence. DP system set up. standby time. master. — Limitations imposed by water depth. field arrival checklists. single stern thrusters and where rudder is used to provide transverse thrusters. loss of control. simulation studies study. including voyage. ( e. including onboard programs and experience levels. electrical officers. squalls. fire and/ or explosion. DET NORSKE VERITAS . watchhandover checklists. single stern thruster configurations where WCF could result in loss of stern thrusters) — SIMOPS and marine vessel interaction and consequences arising from change of status (Green to Blue. advisory. required levels of redundancy.(e. — Discussion to be included in pre-project execution readiness checklist. alert systems. transit and field arrival checklists. familiarisation and competency assessment. simultaneous operations.g. the Task Appropriate Mode (TAM). beacon log. operation and recovery. including routine internal communications. emergency training. other PRS procedures. position and heading changes. Onboard watch routines. activity planning and pre-departure checklists. documented: — Configuration for the Safest Mode of Operation (SMO) or. including onboard organisation. loss of DP position references. drills and exercises DP reporting and record keeping. DP incidents and equipment failure reports. reporting matrix. proven blackout recovery times and EDS times (if applicable) and determination of red and yellow watch circles. — Limitations in activities to be undertaken due to lack of redundancy or unreliability in relative position reference sensors.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. watchkeeping duties. DP desk procedures. severe weather. Position reference system deployment.9 Activity Operational Planning In recognizing that exposure to risks manifests itself during vessel operations it is recommended that activities performed by DP vessels should be subject to planning and preparation. Organisation and Responsibility DP organisation. special operations. requiring input from analysis. skills development. vendor reports. manning levels. Guidance note: — Limitations imposed by orientation of weather relative to vessel (e. including environmental criteria. — ASOGs for Class 1 vessels should state limitations (e. DP incident definition. typical communications protocols and messages. helicopter operations. ASOG communications and response procedures. DPOs. where appropriate. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- Section 4 5. emergency DP procedures. loss of redundancy. reporting. ROV operations. adverse and heavy weather procedures. DP standing orders. power and propulsion set up. including onboard discussion with all relevant stakeholders as part of the pre-project execution/ activity. ETOs.g. DP handover procedures. examples. — Capabilities of the vessel. data logging.head in to weather). tests and trials reporting. monthly DP status report. etc. — Limitations imposed upon operations by residual capability. risk assessment. including drive off. including hydrophones. In planning and preparing for the activities the following should be considered and. operations in strong currents.

accepting that a single failure could result in exceeding worst case failure and could. ASOG should be developed and implemented by a DP vessel for every activity (location specific) that it carries out. TAM. It may be appropriate in situations where it is determined by risk assessment that the consequences of a loss of position are considered to be low enough to permit a lesser standard of DP redundancy. The SMO sets out the required equipment configurations and operational standards necessary for the vessel to meet its maximum level of redundancy.5. any specific operation relevant to the design of the vessel. For diesel electric vessels the TAM may mean operating with closed bus.e. where a loss of position will not result in damage to people or hardware. functionality and operation and so that no single failure will exceed worst case failure. whereas the SMO and TAM may not be location specific. Summary: Note: A DP vessel should be set up in accordance with its SMO unless it is determined by risk assessment that the lesser standard. such that any other operational mode would be of a lesser standard than the SMO. This overview document in conjunction with SMO. A detailed review of the DP FMEA is done with a view to identify safest mode. Every DP vessel has a unique safest mode of operation which must be determined from a detailed understanding of the vessel’s DP FMEA and its operational characteristics. The vessel owns the SMO and ASOG document and the process that is used to develop it. as well as any unique operations the vessel is called upon to perform. In addition. Logistics vessels. Refer to Sec. On a DP MOU. Guidance note: Safest Mode of Operation (SMO) Any DP vessel. Some owners refer to it as WSOC (Well Specific Operating Criteria). The SMO should be the default operational mode for a DP vessel i. TAGOS could be useful tool to onboard new personnel involved in operations. ASOG. January 2011 5. Activity Specific Operating Guidelines (ASOG) The ASOG differs from the SMO and TAM in that it relates specifically to a known location and activity. Example 1: A DP MOU may operate in this mode during times when Time to Terminate is short. including DP Class 2 and 3. including the vessel or the environment. It is suggested that the results of this review are summarised in a vessel overview document. The ASOG performs the same function as Well Specific Operating Guidelines (WSOG). Note: The ASOG should be developed by extracting all the relevant information from detailed technical review of the vessel’s DP FMEA. result in blackout or loss of position. ASOGs are known as WSOGs. A task appropriate mode is consciously entered into following a structured assessment of the risks of the operation to be undertaken by the vessel. environmental and equipment performance limits for the DP vessel in relation to the specific activity that it is undertaking. The ASOG should be accompanied by a single line drawing (SLD) of the power generation. The SMO is presented in a tabulated format and shows two conditions (GREEN – NORMAL) and (BLUE – DET NORSKE VERITAS . whereas SMO may require open bus. Example 2: A DP pipelay vessel may operate in this mode when more than 500 m from a surface or mission critical Caution: subsea asset. An ASOG should be developed for every activity and location. from inception through to implementation. Appropriate measures should be in place to clearly identify critical tasks/ operational phases of the activity and to ensure that the vessel is set up in Safest Mode of Operation and operating within post WCF capability. which relate to drilling activities. The ASOG should be validated on board. should operate in the SMO when within the 500 m zone. Logistics vessels should not operate in TAM when within the 500 m zone. and in Safest Mode. operational manuals and project specific procedures. is appropriate (not recommended within the 500 m zone). Where a decision has been made to operate in a TAM a separate ASOG covering TAM should be produced.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Task Appropriate Mode (TAM) A Task Appropriate Mode is a risk based mode that the DP vessel may be set up and operated in. can have the redundancy concept defeated if its systems and equipment are not configured or operated in the correct way. distribution and propulsion system. and in Safest Mode when inside 500 m.21 for an example of an SMO and ASOG for a DP Logistics Vessel. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels – Page 103 — The activity being performed and the necessary time to terminate to bring vessel to a safe position upon the onset of failure. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- Activities should include day to day operations. In addition the ASOG differs from the SMO and TAM in that the ASOG sets the operational. when Time to Terminate is long.

January 2011 Page 104 – 5. Response For DP operations to commence and continue the conditions in the GREEN column must be met. including confirmation of 100% output in DP Thrusters. including position and heading excursions — Drive off. — Weather forecast and environmental conditions. the environment. isolations. component or performance limits or systems fully reportable alarm status. component or system failure resulting in loss of control or position. change position view to reducing the time to commence and or cease operations. isolations. suggest 10 deg/min and 0. (YELLOW – REDUCED) and (RED – EMERGENCY). including confirm redundancy. including consequence analysis. drift off scenarios — Diesel generators. respectively Sensors. including watchkeeping rotas. terminate. No DP operation is to be recommenced until a full investigation has been implemented. conditions in the The operation should not be GREEN column resumed before the vessel has must be met. BLUE Advisory status – where any of the GREEN conditions are not met. i. safest compressor operating mode DP and ER manning. including confirm redundancy. testing and selection Fuel systems. black start enabled Uninterruptible power supplies (UPS). The SMO goes beyond equipment set up. current speed limits. including availability. placement of targets for DP OSVs Set speed of rotation and speed of moves. The vessel maintains position whilst risks are being acceptable although the vessel has lost its assessed. testing and selection. the operation and the vessel. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — Power plant set up. Typical items contained in the SMO will include the following. tank levels.e. It also defines operational standards. wave height limits — Vessel positioning performance (weather related). crossovers Compressed air. including confirmation of 100% output in DP Power management. isolations. Abandon operations. crossovers Sea water cooling. change position or cease operations. (BLUE – ADVISORY). including confirmation of power supply. including confirm redundancy. including wind speed limits. Conduct risk assessment Stop operations and initiate For DP to determine whether to contingency procedures with a operations to continue. as follows. including whether operating open or closed bus Diesel generators. standby starts. . failure resolved and fully tested. including confirmation of readiness and testing DP control system. performance limits and failures (TAGOS) — Diesel generator loads (TAGOS) DET NORSKE VERITAS Definition Response RED Emergency status – pre-defined operational or performance limits exceeded. including confirm redundancy. including availability. Prepare to continue the disconnect. ACTIVITY SPECIFIC OPERATING GUIDELINES – OUTLINE GREEN BLUE YELLOW Reduced status – Advisory status – Normal Pre-defined performance approaching operations – all limits reached. SAFEST MODE OF OPERATION – OUTLINE GREEN Definition Normal operations – all systems and equipment fully operational.3 m/sec. mode availability and selection Position reference systems. initiate EDS (disconnect sequence) to ensure the safety of people. qualifications and competency of watchkeepers Trials and checklists ESD status (if applicable) The ASOG is presented in a tabulated format and shows four conditions (GREEN – NORMAL). regained redundancy or before all risks have been fully assessed to determine whether it is acceptable to resume operations with compromised redundancy. system failure resulting in loss functional and operating within Operations may continue of redundancy. A failure has performance redundancy. DP verification processes completed and DP set up confirmed. confirmation that auto stop is off. functional testing.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. crossovers Fresh water cooling. absolute and relative systems. occurred that does not limits. no cross connections Manual controls and independent joystick. as follows. The vessel should be moved to a safe position. affect DP redundancy. An ASOG for a DP logistics vessel will typically cover the following items. including configuration. including minimum number required for the activity. Conduct risk assessment to determine whether to continue. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels ADVISORY) for each item. standby starts. standby starts. Take immediate action.

---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 5. including operation and performance of DP controllers and OS. performance limits and failures (TAGOS) Thruster loads (TAGOS) Phase back conditions (eg. visual (lights/ displays) and audible means (alarms). failures Critical communications. charger output and supply status. including onboard systems. Guidance on communications is provided in M103. should be located close to the DP control station. ensuring that a common working language and terminology is used at all times. including mimics. failures DP control system. At least one of the systems should be hands free. including fuel. YELLOW or RED will be instantaneously relayed to all vessels and units engaged in SIMOPs. M182 and M205. Guidance note: There should be redundant voice communications systems to all key locations on board the DPO vessel. minimum number required for the activity.10 Communications The vessel should be equipped with the appropriate primary and secondary equipment needed to communicate between all parties (stakeholders) whilst carrying out the intended task. collision. failures DP control system displays. Communications and alarm systems should be protected against power supply failure. including number of enabled systems. equipment and support systems. It should be noted that developments in sensor and communications technologies are underway to relay. among other things. performance and failures Non essential DP systems. SW and FW cooling. including ventilation and a/c – performance and failures Fire. Means of communication are not limited to the above but include integrated IT systems using wireless network technology that combine communications with other features. January 2011 5. thruster phase back. These technologies are expected to deliver and aid in the management of complex SIMOPS.11 DP Planned Maintenance DP vessels should have a structured planned maintenance system that specifically addresses maintenance of the vessel’s DP system. performance and failures DP networks. Battery/ UPS back up power supplies are recommended. Planned maintenance should address all equipment that has an impact on the vessel’s station keeping DET NORSKE VERITAS . including threat to safety of the DP operation Simultaneous operations. failures Position reference systems. This should include fire zone alarms systems. including number of enabled systems and performance. Manual activation of alarms should never be overlooked in design or in operation. air – performance limits and failures Uninterruptible power supplies (UPS). Continuity of communications during foreseeable emergency situations should be taken into account. including operation. This sole dependency is not recommended. Communications should be taken into account when detailing the roles and responsibilities of key personnel during the planning stages for the intended task. Effective internal and external communications is a key tool to manage risk. but which will have an effect on DP. Note: The importance of communication to be emphasized by incorporating into the ASOG. DP control system power limiting) Battery and UPS systems PMS and VMS status and operation Auxiliary systems. Communications in this context include voice. Relevant guidance is given in IMCA M109. performance and criticality to activity. Some modern communications and alarm systems rely solely on software activated alarms through the network. flood. Operational specific visual and voice communications should ensure that the pertinent information flows between the key operating points as well as to and from assets and/ or other vessels that might be affected by the operation being carried out. change of vessel or unit SMO or ASOG status. It is important that change of status between vessels and units engaged in SIMOPs is communicated speedily and reliably. Simultaneous operations (SIMOPS) depend on effective communications between all vessels and units involved in the operation.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Communications and alarm systems for all DP related equipment and systems and other equipment and systems not directly related to DP. including AIS and DGNSS. With these systems any change of status from GREEN to BLUE. including operation and redundancy. The DPO should have a view or CCTV coverage of all important operational areas onboard as well as of important points of interest external to the vessel. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels – Page 105 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — Thrusters. failures Sensors. current status of planned as well as unexpected events during the execution of the activity. visibility. Communication protocols are to be set up to provide pertinent information regarding intent. These operating points may be onboard the vessel as well as on other facilities involved with the activity. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 5. including communications with assets.

Maintenance should include regular cleaning. etc. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels capabilities. recorded and investigated. Note: The potential for common mode failures increases where same vendor equipment of same type and age are installed and in operation. TAM and ASOG are used as tools to manage DP operations a suggested approach is that. January 2011 Page 106 – 5. These records should be kept on board for the period specified by the owner/ operator. Note: Guidance note: It should be recognised that DP vessels. The purpose of the investigation and the trials should be. calibration. This should assist in getting back to normal operating condition after equipment failure or DP incident. Where SMO. and senior onboard decision makers. apart from the exceptions in the notes below. This should be in accordance with vessel owner or operators’ and. In the event of the occurrence of a DP incident relating to the vessel’s configuration as described in the DP FMEA and other documents. These records should include vendor service records as well as maintenance performed by vessel personnel. either hard copy or appropriate electronic format. (Example experienced . investigation and closing out procedures. and should be reported. Vessel operational teams are encouraged to incorporate planned maintenance as a guideword in HIRAs (Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments). may from time to time require that certain items of equipment are temporarily taken out of service for the purposes of essential planned maintenance. it is suggested that additional DP capability plots correlated to the TAGOS be provided on the vessel.12 DP Incidents DP vessels should be provided with and operate appropriate DP incident reporting.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Documented records should be kept and be capable of auditing. any reactive change of DP status from GREEN to YELLOW or RED should be regarded as a DP incident. this also involves vendor support as well as the client’s DP consultant. If the impact on DP capability and/ or worst case failure is significant. Owners/ operators of DP vessels are encouraged to share lessons learned from DP incidents with the wider DP DET NORSKE VERITAS Note: . allowing the vessel to exceed environmental limits should not be regarded as a DP incident. Note: Note: The client’s due diligence process is usually the main driver in the critical path to return to normal operating condition. Typically. It is recognised that deferring scheduled planned maintenance due to work activities increases the potential for failures. bus tie breakers. Maintenance on DP related equipment whilst conducting DP operations should be controlled by a documented permit to work system and should always take into consideration the potential alteration of failure modes and increased criticality of failure consequences on DP capabilities and/ or redundancy. clients’ processes. In preparation for these occasions it is recommended that a thruster and generator operating strategy (TAGOS) is developed to take account of the impact on DP capability and/ or worst case failure. System upgrades and changes (hardware and software) are typically subject to class approval. and testing of equipment as outlined in manufacturer’s recommendations and industry guidelines. it is suggested that the FMEA provider is involved in the incident investigation. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 5. An operator initiated change of status as a result of a conscious decision based on risk analysis of the Note: circumstances where the trigger points have not been reached should not be regarded as a DP incident. trials are carried out as part of the investigation process. This should include indirect components such as generator circuit breakers. Where thrusters and/ or generators are temporarily taken out of service this is likely to have an impact on the vessel’s DP capability and its worst case failure. A minimum number of required critical DP spares should be maintained on board. parts replaced during maintenance may require certification by class. A change of status triggered by prearranged agreement between the Master. — to assist in identifying the root causes of the incident — to verify and validate that measures to address the root cause are effective — to validate that effective measures have not introduced any additional potential to cause failures (both hidden and apparent). Records of planned and unplanned maintenance should be kept in an auditable format. The critical spare inventory should be monitored via a formal inventory program that is closely linked to the planned maintenance system. This will facilitate lessons learnt to be implemented into the DP FMEA and proving trials program. It is recommended that reactive YELLOW and RED DP incidents are investigated as soon as practicable after the DP incident and. where relevant.simultaneous failure of three wind sensors of similar type and hours of service (“ageing”) accompanied by mechanical stressing (gusts experienced during a hurricane event that was in proximity of the rig). Making DP critical equipment unavailable while within the 500 m zone in order to carry out preventive maintenance should be avoided. if applicable. In addition.

Industry bodies who provide repositories for incident reporting are encouraged to provide anonymity and positively communicate this to the DP community. Effective record keeping of such activities has the following benefits: — — — — assists in identifying best practices demonstrates the vessel’s performance facilitates knowledge capture and transfer assists in identifying or justifying equipment improvements. features and failures that are identified in operation. IMCA’s station keeping incident reporting scheme provides a suitable channel for disseminating relevant information throughout the DP sector. Vessel operational teams are encouraged to systematically evaluate potential for incidents on their own units based on published analysed information. Where additional technical support is required to aid this systematic analysis it should be sought. DP vessels. These annual reports are available to IMCA members and non-members alike. carry out activities which may be unique to project requirements.13 Reporting and Record Keeping Owners or operators of DP vessels should have an effective reporting and record keeping system. There should also be a clear line of reporting between the DP vessel and the company’s shoreside management. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels – Page 107 community. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 5. Guidance note: The following records should be kept and made accessible to vessel crew and to other interested parties: — — — — — — — — — — — DP FMEA & FMEA Proving Trials reports Annual DP Trials DP checklists for bridge and engine room DP incident investigations & close out reports (see Note 1 below) DP system faults. at the company’s premises. repairs. DP vessels. modifications and upgrades (see Note 2 below) Vessel specific familiarisation and training for short service employees involved in DP operations and ongoing training and development programs for experienced DP personnel Operational logs & DP alarm print outs DP data logging records (if applicable) DP system equipment vendor reports DP Footprint Plots Vessel overview documents. DP systems and equipment vendors are also encouraged to do likewise and to share information on unexpected faults. The documents and records contained in Sec.2. carry out activities which may be unique to project requirements. Guidance on reporting and record keeping is provided in M109. on occasion. SMO and ASOGs. M163 Note 1: Note 2: Owners/ operators should recognise the benefits that electronic DP data logging systems offer when carrying out DP incident investigations and establishing root cause. It is acknowledged that there could be a reluctance to participate in sharing of incidents for fear of unwanted disclosure of company identification as the source of the DP incident. The IMCA station keeping incident reporting scheme or other repositories of DP incidents needs the support of the whole DP community to be an effective learning. Guidance note: The IMCA station keeping incident reporting scheme has been in place for many years and annual reports are published each year which summarise each reported incident as well as providing an overview of all the incidents for the year.5. Documentation relating to modifications and upgrades should be kept and available for reference. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- DET NORSKE VERITAS . on occasion. where appropriate. both for training and familiarisation processes as well as for reference in case of similar project requirements in the future. DP related records should be maintained onboard and. Owners/ operators are encouraged to draw upon learnings from incidents experienced and avoid recurrence. Owners/ operators are recommended to make these reports available to key DP personnel onboard their vessels so that they can learn from the experience of others. There should be a clear line of reporting DP related items onboard the DP vessel and between each department and this should involve key DP personnel.2.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. sharing and risk mitigating tool. Records of these activities including pertinent information from Hazards and Risk Identification (HIRAs) should be made and kept onboard for future reference. This will include risk analysis of the interfaces and documentation and records of all commissioning and testing. should be accessible to key DP personnel and to other interested parties. January 2011 5. TAGOS.

Guidance is provided in M103. M117 recognises the formal training and certification scheme for DPOs administered by the Nautical Institute. including vessel masters. M117 also provides guidance on structured onboard familiarisation programs for key DP personnel. be demonstrated in the following areas: — — — — — Operational modes DP FMEA familiarization DP Operations Manual familiarization Project/ activity requirements Contingency plans. Customised training programs have been developed by industry in response to clients requests. DP vessel owners/ operators should operate a structured competence assurance program that is applied to all key DP personnel with special focus on ensuring vessel and task specific competence. DPO certification is only one part of the competency assurance process for DPOs. engineers. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels 5. as a minimum. Such certification is not to be construed as validation of competency. 2003) which provides detailed programs for achieving and assessing the competency of key DP personnel. DPOs. — Unlimited DPO certificate (minimum requirement for DPO on DP Class 2 or DP Class 3 vessels) — Limited DPO certificate (minimum requirement for DPO for DP Class 1 vessels). Owners/ operators are encouraged to develop their own competency verification processes for all key DP personnel.14 Competence Definition: Competence is the acquisition of knowledge. M117 provides guidance on formal training courses for DPOs and other key DP personnel. modes and drills. Owners/ operators may consider implementing the IMCA Competence Assurance & Assessment scheme (IMCA C002 Rev 1. Guidance note: Key DP personnel include masters. skills and abilities at a level of expertise sufficient to be able to perform in an appropriate work setting. There are two levels of DPO certification. IMCA M117 provides the DP sector with detailed guidance on the training and experience of key DP personnel. Owners/ operators are encouraged to seek information and selectively adopt appropriate programs for their training needs. electricians. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- DET NORSKE VERITAS . M117 has been adopted by the IMO and issued as IMO MSC/Circ 738 (1996). familiarisation and exposure to a variety of power generation related faults and conditions that are known to have occurred on DP diesel electric power generation systems. vendors and other bodies that are in excess of established industry standards. electronic technicians and anyone involved in the safe position keeping capabilities of the vessel and includes those involved in the deployment of PRSs. January 2011 Page 108 – 5. maintain and enhance competency in DP operations. such as the Kongsberg initiative in POWERSIM training where DPOs are given training.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. M117 (IMO738) Vessel specific competency should. A reference to M117 is also made in the MODU Code. including watchkeeping marine engineers and electronic maintenance staff. DPOs. Owners/ operators are recommended to refer to further formal training programs described in M117. The Nautical Institute scheme is universally recognised as the industry standard for formal training and certification of DPOs. chief engineers and engineers in charge of a watch. where appropriate. covering the steps to take to achieve. — — — — High voltage (HV) training Power management system (PMS) training Fire and gas detection and emergency shutdowns (ESD) training DP control system manufacturer’s maintenance training. Note: Note: Owners/ operators should also be aware of and recognise the benefits of formal training and competency programs that are currently offered by equipment suppliers. comprising the following main features for electrical and engineering officers. The Nautical Institute DPO certificate scheme is made up of a combination of formal DP induction and DP simulator (advanced) and onboard supervised watchkeeping experience.

The Master should not be considered as one of the required unlimited DPOs for meeting the manning requirements since operating as such would negative affect the situational awareness required from his side. electrical and ancillary systems. the guidance provided within this document should be validated against the risks. See Note 3 below Critical activities are those activities where the consequences of equipment failure or loss of position are greater than under normal operating circumstances. If used. should be on watch during critical activities and should have at least 6 months experience on similar equipment and operations. See Note 2 below. The engineer should be fully cognisant of DP operations. allowed or required.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. General Rules and guidelines on levels of operator intervention in response to a failure in a DP Class 2 or DP Class 3 vessel have changed over the years and different classification societies have chosen to place different levels of emphasis and different interpretations on these rules. critical activities on a DP dive support vessel would include those occasions where the Time to Terminate is long. For example. familiar with the vessel’s DP FMEA document and the effects of failures of equipment relating to the position keeping of the vessel. Minimum Bridge Crew per shift 2 unlimited DPOs on the bridge capable of operating the vessel both in DP and manual control. at least 6 months of which should have been on the subject or sister vessel. Electrician/ Electrical Engineer If required on board. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels – Page 109 5.16 Intervention – Role of the DPO and Engineer Introduction The notes in this section consider the role of the DPO and watchkeeping engineers. if applicable to the vessel. January 2011 5. DET NORSKE VERITAS . Notes: Where the minimum experience requirements cannot be met a risk based approach should be taken to determine the suitability of personnel and any additional support requirements for intended operations. familiar with the vessel’s DP FMEA document and the effects of failures of equipment relating to the position keeping of the vessel.15 Manning Vessels should comply with the statutory requirements for safe manning. Note 2: Note 3: Engineers There should be sufficient licensed engineers on board for all expected operations. As with vessel engineers. At least one licensed engineer should be available at all times. manning should be in accordance with the following: DP Bridge Crew Operation When undertaking critical activities in proximity to surface or sub surface structures See Note 1 below Note 1: Minimum Experience Unlimited DPO with a minimum of 3 years experience in DP operations. Additionally. the engineer should be familiar with the general philosophy of redundancy as it relates to split mechanical. for DP operations. specifically addressing operator intervention in terms of the complexities of the regulatory background (operator intervention specifically addressed in Class rules) as well as operational practicalities. 5. Even in the case of DP Class 1 vessels. For low risk operations guidance is provided in IMCA M182. levels of redundancy and automation are influenced by differences in the main rules for the classification of ships. given the near term market conditions owners/ operators will be challenged to meet the recommended level of experience for DPOs. Owners/ operators should recognize the associated risk from inexperienced personnel and have plans in place to address them while striving. The practical effect of this is that vessels of different ages and different class society can vary significantly in terms of the amount of operator intervention expected. the electrician/ electrical engineer should have at least 6 months experience on similar equipment and operations. such as when the diver is inside a welding habitat or where the diver’s worksite is inside the conductor tubes at a production facility. Note: The overriding role of the DPO in emergency situations is to stabilise the situation and to take positive action to prevent escalation. It is recognized that in practice. In DP 2 or 3 operations. an electrician should have appropriate high voltage training/ certification. Experience level should be documented and auditable. The electrician should likewise be fully cognisant of DP operations.

This condition may be indicated by high freshwater temperature alarms. The transfer to components or systems designed and arranged to provide redundancy. A position keeping ability shall be maintained without disruption upon any single failure. Full stop of thrusters and subsequent start-up of available thrusters is not considered an acceptable disruption. Prediction errors may indicate which thruster is faulty.” DNV rules for the classification of Ships Pt. In such circumstances the engineers may open the bustie in an attempt to isolate the fault to one side or the other. January 2011 Page 110 – 5. — Seawater cooling systems operated from a single sea chest may block giving rise to low seawater pressure alarms requiring the engineers to transfer to the other sea chest. The latter is intended to mean that the contribution of this equipment or feature can be considered when defining the vessel’s post WCF DP capability. Note that in some circumstances the fault may escalate at a rate which precludes effective operator intervention and blackout may result. Component and system redundancy. Automatic or manual intervention arranged to improve the position keeping ability after a failure will be accepted. Automatic start of equipment may be accepted as contributing to redundancy only if their reliability and simplicity of operation is satisfactory so that they can be brought into operation before position and heading keeping performance is degraded. — Some vessels have no automation for starting redundant pumps and engineers must monitor the condition of the plant and intervene following an unexpected stop. for example selecting the other DP controller or OS before the online controller or OS fails.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. The transfer to redundant components or systems should be automatic as far as possible and operator intervention should be kept to a minimum. reference systems and operator stations in use to determine whether any configuration changes should be made. Note that position and heading should be maintained by the DP controller during this time. The former cannot be considered when defining this capability thus DP Class 2 and DP Class 3 vessels should not operate in conditions where they would depend on this equipment to maintain position. The DPO must take control at another operator station. the feature can be used to improve capability. — On some DP vessels with a single stern tunnel thruster and two main propellers which depend on the rudders to provide redundant athwartships thrust it may be necessary to transfer the tunnel thruster to the other power distribution system and restart it in the event that the distribution system supplying one main prop and the stern tunnel thruster fails. — Failure of a thruster to full thrust or uncontrolled rotation will require the DPO to shut the thruster down using the emergency stop. The ‘on-batteries’ alarm will indicate to the DPO that certain important DP control system consumers may be lost.1. — A faulty thruster may respond poorly to DP commands giving rise to a speed/ torque or azimuth prediction error.7 Sec. — A distribution system supplying a DP UPS may fail. However. The DPO should assess the performance of the thruster and shut it down using the emergency stop if necessary. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels Examples of the rules and guidelines that have influenced the design of redundancy concepts are given below: Functional Requirements IMO MSC 645 Section 3. — A DP operator station may fail. — A heat exchanger in a common freshwater cooling system may become fouled requiring the engineers to change over to another cooler.” “Redundancy shall be based upon running machinery.” The distinction between ‘improving station keeping capability after a failure’ and ‘contributing to redundancy’ should be noted. The transfer should be smooth and within acceptable limitations of the operation.6 Ch. The redundancy requirements will not be considered as complied with if based upon start or restart of generators and/ or thrusters. Prudent watchkeeping practices will detect the listed events that require operator (DPO/ engineer) intervention. A load sharing imbalance alarm may assist in identifying the onset of the fault.2 states: Redundancy: “The DP-system shall be designed with redundancy. in technical design and physical arrangement. — In some diesel electric designs. DET NORSKE VERITAS . Faults requiring operator intervention The following list comprises known faults and features in DP systems that have been known to require operator intervention to prevent escalation of the failure effect or loss of position. failures of fuel control systems or generator excitation systems can destabilise the entire plant if the vessel is operated with a common power system (busties closed). The process of identifying the faulty thruster may be made more difficult by the fact that all thrusters may be operating at high thrust to counteract the effect of the faulty one.4 states: General: “Redundant components and systems should be immediately available and with such capacity that the DP-operation can be continued for such a period that the work in progress can be terminated safely. should in principle be immediately available with the capacity required for the DP-system to safely terminate the work in progress. should be automatic and operator intervention should be avoided. The DPO or ET can review the UPS distribution list against sensors.

loss of the main DP station will require the DPO to take control at the backup DP station. there may be some aspects of DP system design where operator intervention is preferred to any other form of response. There is also a risk that poorly designed protective functions will reduce the reliability and availability of essential equipment such as thrusters and generators. Class rules require that three references are in use for DP Class 2 & 3 vessels and two of the three should be based on different principles of measurement. it may be necessary to change over a fuel filter or isolate a leak to prevent all generators being affected. — DP control systems employ a range of protective functions designed to reject an errant position reference system. However. — On some vessels with transferable thrusters it may be necessary for the engineers to manually change over auxiliary services for the thruster even if the main supply changes automatically. automation and increased system segregation to minimise the impact of any failure. In the case that one of the wind sensors has failed to ‘high wind speed’ it may be necessary to rapidly deselect the faulty wind sensor before it initiates a drive off depending on the type of DP control system. — On vessels with only two gyro compasses a difference alarm may require the DPO to make an assessment of which gyro to use. Carefully considering power plant and control system configuration can also reduce the need for operator intervention. is to prevent the unexpected consequences of failure. A faulty gyro may cause a rapid change of heading if not deselected promptly. On a DP Class 1 vessel loss of DP control system will require the DPO to take manual control of the vessel at the independent joystick or manual control levers — On vessels with two wind sensors a difference alarm may require the DPO to make an assessment of which wind sensor to use. — DPOs should be aware of the thruster and/ or power configuration that is used to activate the Consequence Analysis alarm. This provides a large degree of protection against a drive off related to a position calculation error but such incidents do occur and DPOs can be expected to determine which reference systems are responsible and deselect them. if required. Where it is established that it is not WCF then steps should be taken to ensure that WCF is used as the trigger for a Consequence Analysis alarm. DP Class 2 and 3 vessels should always operate in a redundant/ fault tolerant configuration. Measures to reduce the incidence of faults requiring operator intervention The most effective way to avoid the necessity for operators and engineers to intervene in faults is to design the redundancy concept in such a way that the need for operator intervention is minimised or preferably eliminated. In general terms. — On vessels with two MRUs a difference alarm may require the DPO to make an assessment of which MRU to use. this will often mean adding additional equipment. — On a DP Class 2 vessel loss of both DP control systems will require the DPO to take manual control of the vessel at the independent joystick or manual control levers. Features such as a third wind sensor or a third DP controller allow voting or other protective functions to be used. This risk should be considered when applying protective functions to deal with very low probability failure modes. it may not be desirable to automatically transfer control location in response to a fault. DET NORSKE VERITAS . Where operator intervention in response to faults is unavoidable then it is extremely important that there are clear and unambiguous alarms and indications to alert the operators to the onset of the fault. which can be found even on some DP Class 2 vessels. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels – Page 111 — On a DP Class 3 vessel. It should not be assumed that it is Worst Case Failure. It is also of vital importance that the required responses to the fault are documented in well-written procedures and practiced so that all DPOs and engineers are familiar with them and can take action in a confident manner. It may be better for the operator to decide where control transfers to by taking control at that station. greater levels of redundancy. This changeover.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. — On vessels with a common fuel supply system. For example. January 2011 5.

17 DP Footprint Plots – Worked Examples DET NORSKE VERITAS Figure 5-1 Supply Vessel – Worked Example 1 . January 2011 Page 112 – 5.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels 5.

Operational guidance Logistic Vessels – Page 113 DET NORSKE VERITAS Figure 5-2 Supply Vessel – Worked Example 2 .Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. January 2011 5.

manual or DP.19 Example of SMO and ASOG Safest Mode of Operation . recovery drill in last 6 procedures in place months All UPS units fully functional. SG2. AG1 & AG2(Set SG1 and SG2 online. not Any other configuration operating on bypass and or known deficiencies tested onload 24 hrs reducing redundancy or DP Power Supply prior to field arrival endurance. ---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e--- 5. or up) AG1 and AG2 standby.Name of Logistics Vessel This setup applies when the vessel is carrying out DP Operations within the 500 m zone of an offshore facility AFI (agreed for implementation) Date Vessel to be set up and stabilized on DP before entering the 500 m zone. Any DPOs on watch or Blackout drill Engineers not Blackout Drill conducted for all DPOs performed blackout (Single Fuel System) and Engineers onboard. AG1 & AG2 (Testing) Tested at 100% on field Not tested to 100% arrival or within the last within 6 months or 6 months problems found SG1. Chief Engineer. January 2011 Page 114 – 5. Auto Any Emergency Generator known deficiencies start/connect and load or tested prior to arrival on reducing redundancy field. Not tested (NOTE: Batteries must for 30 minute be at optimum charge endurance prior to field level before entering arrival 500 m). problems found Selected to auto start and available for other configuration immediate use. Condition Notify Master. DET NORSKE VERITAS . Any other setup. Guidance will be provided in a subsequent revision of this RP. DC30. Client Rep (if on board) and Rig/Platform GREEN NO ADVISORY YES INFORMATIVE / CONSULTATIVE STATUS (RISK ASSESSMENT) Any other configuration YELLOW YES RED YES Action CONTINUE NORMAL OPERATIONS All bus-ties OPEN CEASE OPERATIONS AND BE READY TO MOVE OFF.LEAVE 500 m Zone Joystick or Manual if Applicable Switchboard Set Up SG1. arrival DC50 24 hrs prior to field arrival (NOTE: Batteries must be at optimum charge level before entering 500 m). Operational guidance Logistic Vessels 5. DC40. Exiting the 500 m zone may be done on joystick. SG2.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. endurance prior to field DC20.18 Annual DP Trials Test Table Blank – DP Logistics Vessel Guidance note: The blank Annual DP Trials test sheet is on hold pending formal publication of IMCA guidance on Annual DP Trials which is under development at the time of preparing this RP. Not tested (Load test) battery endurance test for 30 minute carried out on DC10. 30 min endurance. Vessel to CEASE OPERATIONS safe position and on . All fully functional with DC10 & DC20 cross connect breakers open (breaker F3 open in both panels) plus DC30 and DC40 cross Any other configuration connect breakers open or known deficiencies (breaker F3 open in reducing redundancy or 24 Vdc Power Systems both panels).

no alarms active Not being carried out Median Check setup and enabled. DGPS 2 on WAAS Field of operation is clear of possible obstruction by cranes. Alignment less than 1 degree Auto Speed and Latitude Not enabled Any other setup Requested by permit to work Less than three references online. Steering Pumps) with standby pumps ready for operation. January 2011 5. Thrusters tested to 100% command in both directions on manual (Fwd&Aft) and DP at Field arrival. main propellers and rudders DP Control System DP related maintenance DP Reference System DGPS DGPS (Configuration) DGPS (Line of sight) Relative Pos ref (Cyscan) RIG MOVEMENT (check at 100 m off and during operation) Wind Sensors Within Operating limits Above operating limits Stops tested from the Stops not tested or bridge on Field Arrival function not operational Any known All on line and selected deficiencies.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. with three references online Both units operational and available DGPS 1 on IALA. or problems found Engine not capable of 100% command or problems found Any other setup or loss of any rudder. Propellers and Rudders (Configuration) Bow Thrusters 1&2 Thrusters not capable of 100% command or problems found Thrusters not capable of 100% command or problems found Any known deficiencies Any known deficiencies or not tested at Field arrival Not completed Stern Thrusters 1&2 Thruster/Main Propellers/ Rudders manual levers Independent Joystick Manual Control Thrust levels checked to within ASOG level outside the 500 m zone at operational heading Emergency Stops Thrusters. Gyros Gyros (North Speed Correction) Any other setup Any other setup DET NORSKE VERITAS . position reference deviation >3 m Any other set up Any alarms or other setup Possibility of masking by cranes/structures Not operational or faulty Movement or Shading of Rig such that DGPS cannot be used in conjunction with relative systems Any other setup NOTE: Only snatch lifts permitted (no hose transfers or heavy lifts). Operational Footprint or shading not preventing use of DGPS Both Available All three units operational and visual heading reference available. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels – Page 115 24 Vdc Power Systems (Battery Chargers) Main Engines (Drive) All on main feed to charger Operational and tested to 100% at Field Arrival One pump running on each (SWC. in DP system or issues Consequence analysis enabled. etc. Any other setup. Tested and fully operational on Field arrival Tested and fully operational on Field arrival Within 24 hours the Captain and each DPO practice holding vessel on position for 10 minutes. FWC. Thrusters tested to 100% command in both directions on manual (Fwd&Aft) and DP at Field arrival. problems. superstructure.

Any sign or potential threat of fuel oil contamination. Standby pump tested prior to arrival on field. Standby pump tested prior to arrival on field. Speed of moves inside 500 <= 0. Position Any other condition warning and alarm set at 3 & 5 meters. January 2011 Page 116 – 5. Supply and return cross connects closed. 200 m . Any open ER not Manned Not checked Any other set up or level alarm for day tanks. Heading warning and alarm set at 3 & 5 degrees. VRUs Watertight doors Engine Room Manning Bow Thruster Room All closed ER Manned Checked regularly every watch for machinery function. Both port and starboard supply and return lines open. Day tanks sludged regularly during watch. Reviewed and found Wind. & no Radar & Traffic Any other situation traffic with conflicting CPA All vessel's hardwired Loss of any principal Communications (Internal and portable item of communications & External) communications equipment equipment operational.500 m Approaching 25% or 500 m zone on <50% (minimum to 50% respectively Joystick or manual safely pull away out of 500 m zone) All fans Running in E/R Any Problems found Ventilation and Thruster rooms Adequate cooling of DP computer area on Air Conditioning Any known deficiencies Bridge and Switchboard room. Day tanks filled via purifier prior to entering 500 m Both air compressors fully operational. Any other setup Fuel Systems Air System Fresh Water Cooling System Any other configuration or known deficiencies reducing redundancy Seawater temperature alarm Sea water-cooling system DET NORSKE VERITAS .3 m/sec 200 m < 25% to safely pull Thrust Values when exiting (minimum away). Existing Weather & within DP Capability Any other condition Forecast and DP Footprint plots. blockage or supply failure. All system 100% Operational.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Escape route Escape route identified compromised or that Escape route (in Degrees and agreed with field possibility during time TRUE) operations span of planned operation From 500 m to 200 m. flooding.5 m/sec From 200 Any other setting m zone m to work location <=0. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels Both VRUs online. Environment: Current. Position & Heading Alarms respectively. no alarms. (10&15 ft) respectively. alignment less Any other setup than 1 degree Both Radars on & 100% operational. Tested OK. etc. auto start function tested and reservoirs full All fresh water cooling systems operational.

Client Rep (if on board) and Rig/ Platform GREEN NO ADVISORY YES YELLOW YES CEASE OPERATIONS AND BE READY TO MOVE OFF. or any other supply failure Any incorrect information Any alarms or poor performance Any alarms or poor performance Either > 50%. Chief Engineer. any alarms or poor control Any other set up. no Bow Thrusters available alarms Both enabled. reflective clothing. any alarms or poor control Any other set up. Complete loss of networks Position References Any alarms or poor performance Only one remaining DET NORSKE VERITAS . January 2011 5. Condition Notify Master. Vessel to safe position and on Joystick or Manual if Applicable Exceeding operational limits RED YES CEASE OPERATIONS LEAVE 500 m ZONE IMMEDIATELY Action CONTINUE NORMAL OPERATIONS Within Operating limits INFORMATIVE / CONSULTATIVE STATUS (RISK ASSESS) Approaching operating limits Not completed or Checklists: 6H.Name of Logistics Vessel This setup applies when the vessel is carrying out DP Supply Operations within 500 m zone of an offshore facility. supply line blockage. Any other setup or Shaft Generators SG1-2 AG1 and AG2 Any generator failure Alarms standby. No alarms Weather Forecast Shaft Generator Loads Both Generators <45% No UPS in Bypass. no alarms All fully operational and verified there is no conflict between relative and absolute position reference systems due to movement of reflector. no DP UPSs alarm All 24 Vdc active and 24 Vdc System fully charged No alarms Main propulsion (drive engines & Both enabled. on the platform. no rudders) alarms Both enabled. or failure of a generator Loss of one DP UPS Loss of a 24 Vdc system or charger failure Loss of either Port or Stbd Loss of any bow thruster Loss of any stern thruster Loss of any generator due to fuel oil contamination. or any other supply failure Incorrect information that affects DP operation Loss of one controller or OS Loss of one network Unable to bring vessel under control Unable to bring vessel under control DP Control System (Power Mimics) DP Control System (Controllers/ OS) DP Network All displays check and up to date All Controllers and Operator Stations online Both Networks available. etc. 500 m Completed abnormalities noted All systems operating Immediately when DRIVE OFF correctly recognized by DPO All systems operating Immediately when DRIFT OFF correctly recognized by DPO Vessel Footprint/Weather related Position limits reach 3 m Approaching 5 m On position excursion (10 ft) (15 ft) Heading limit reached 3 Heading excursion On heading Approaching 5 degrees degrees Heading & position Heading & position control control achieved with Approaching 50% More than 50% (Thruster load/DP Feedback) <45% SG1 & SG2 online. Watch. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels – Page 117 Activity Specific Operating Guidelines . no Stern Thrusters available alarms Fuel Systems No Alarms Any SG approaching 50% Any UPS in Bypass or alarm Any alarms Any other set up. any alarms or poor control Any sign or potential threat of fuel oil contamination. line blockage.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307.

Vessel to OPERATIONS safe position and on LEAVE 500 m ZONE Joystick or Manual if IMMEDIATELY Applicable Advisory No communications or Definite position conflict One communications system remaining Advisory Change from Green DP Status of any other vessel in the field Comms/interaction with other vessels Comms with rig DPO Name Captain Name Signature Engineer Name Signature Chief Engineer Name Signature Client Name Signature DET NORSKE VERITAS . January 2011 Page 118 – 5. One system remaining Any reduced ventilation or Air Condition Any alarm Failure of two Gyros Both wind sensors failed and gusty conditions Loss of two units. loss of one gyro Mismatch alarm or loss of either wind sensor Mismatch alarm or Loss of one unit. Chief Engineer.Recommended Practice DNV-RP-E307. Operational guidance Logistic Vessels Heading Sensors (Gyro) Wind Sensors VRUs/MRUs Loss or problem with any essential Communications (ECR/ Deck/Platform) Machinery ventilation and Air Conditioning Starting Air Fire Flood Visibility Collision (errant vessels) All three Gyros enabled Both available Both units available Redundant Communications Operational ventilation and Air Conditioning No Alarm Gyro alarms. Client Rep (if on board) and Rig/Platform GREEN NO ADVISORY YES INFORMATIVE / CONSULTATIVE STATUS (RISK ASSESS) Advisory Communications problem or Possible position conflict Communications problem Signature YELLOW YES RED YES Action CONTINUE NORMAL OPERATIONS Green Vessels operating normally with no known problems Redundant communications CEASE OPERATIONS AND BE READY TO CEASE MOVE OFF.Name of Logistics Vessel This setup applies when the vessel is undertaking operations in conjunction with an offshore facility Condition Notify Master. no flooding Daylight with good Any other condition visibility No collision approach will imminent / minimum Minimum be < 500 m approach >500 m Fire Confirmed Flood Confirmed If collision possible Collision Imminent SIMOPS – Activity Specific Operating Guidelines . No communications Reduced ventilation or Air Conditioning resulting in Power reduction No fire or active Any fire alarm alarms No bilge alarms Multiple bilge alarms active.

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