You are on page 1of 22

Forskarseminarium i filosofi Filosofiska institutionen bo Akademi


Draft based on plenary paper presented at the Popular Imagination Seminar, bo Akademi University, Finland, 16-17 October 1999, to be published in Sven-Erik Klinkmann (ed.), Popular Imagination (working-title), bo/Turku, Finland: Nordic Network for Folkloristics, 2000.

( Bo Pettersson Department of English University of Helsinki

1. Introduction Imagination is one of the central and most intriguing notions in a number of academic disciplines, such as philosophy, psychology, pedagogy, anthropology, comparative literature and popular culture studies. One reason for the elusiveness of the very notion is the vague or strictly specified and often conflicting usage of imagination and its cognates image, imagery, imagine, imaginative, imaging in and between various disciplines. Another is that even within a particular discipline, most notably in philosophy, the definitions and approaches vary considerably in the course of its history. A third reason is linguistic divergence: in Greek we have phantasia (phantasma) and eikasia; in Latin phantasia and the more prevalent imaginat io; in English fancy, fantasy and most centrally imagination and its cognates (that is, terms drawing on both the Greek and Latin ones); and in German alone there are at least three central terms, Einbildung skraft (eg in Kant), Fantasie (eg in Schleiermacher) and Vorstellung (eg in Brentano, Wittgenstein); in Swedish too we have the etymologically related inbillning, fantasi and frestllning . In other words, there is linguistic as well as synchronic and diachronic disagreement as to the very notion and its meaning. Below I shall review some of these historical and disciplinary discrepancies. But let me first note that perhaps the most notable division in the usage of imagination is between an

individual versus a communal focus, largely conforming to Norbert Eliass (1998: 269-290) juxtaposition of two fundamentally different views of humankind, homo clausus and homines aperti. The individual or singular usage, often viewed in the abstract as a faculty, (the) imagination, is most prevalent in disciplines with a focus on the mind (or the way of thinking) of the individual, especially in philosophy, psychology and pedagogy - however much the notion in these disciplines might differ in other respects. The communal usage often occurs as the uncountable noun, imagination, with a specification that it shares a certain aspect of, for instance, philosophical, national, chronological or social character. Examples are moral imagination, American imagination, medieval imagination, and, of course, popular imagination. This denotation of imagination as a shared frame of mind has been neglected by most academic disciplines, though rather recently it has become prevalent in anthropology, literary studies and popular culture studies. But it is symptomatic that even major dictionaries, like Websters Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (1989: 711 s.v. imagination), despite offering eight meanings of the word, omits this shared, communal, plural usage. It is perhaps as symptomatic that one of the best brief surveys of the notion, Kieran Egans (1992: 9-43) dense thirty-five-page review A Very Short History of Imagination spends less than one full paragraph on the topic we are focusing on in this edition. This neglect is all the more evident in six other recent surveys: Mary Warnock (1976), Mark Johnson (1987: 141-166), Richard Kearney (1988; 1998 - the most thorough and encompassing studies), Alan R. White (1990: 1-79) and David L. Norton (1996: 5-19) - all philosophers - have next to nothing to say about it. Yet, as we shall see in section 4., Johnson, Kearney and Norton go on to present views of imagination that consider the individual in a sociocultural setting, thus building a bridge between the two senses of imagination. However, the shared or communal view has traditionally in many ways gone against received academic and other elitist views of imagination, and is thus particularly important to establish more firmly on the academic agenda. So let me take this opportunity to congratulate the editor Sven-Erik Klinkmann on establishing the Network on Popular Imagination and to thank him for inviting me to become a member of it. Let us start with a brief look at the various ways in which imagination has traditionally been viewed in academia (that is, in philosophy, psychology and, to some extent, pedagogy), so that we may better understand the divergence in usage in general and the communal and plural meaning that underlies the notion of popular imagination in particular. After surveying the study of imagination and popular imagination I claim that neither notion can be studied properly if the other is neglected. This implies a serious critique of academic disciplinary rigidity. Hence, I conclude by considering some recent interdisciplinary research and future possible avenues, which can effect a convergence in the studies of cognition and culture, imagination and popular imagination. I want to apologize at this point for the rather outrageous exercise in namedropping that a survey of this kind entails. In this case, however, I hope the end justifies the means - and the end is to show that we must have a thorough historical and cross-disciplinary awareness of the discussions of imagination in order better to understand and study actual and potential uses of imagination and popular imagination.

2. Imagination in the Subjunctive Mood: From Mediation to Creation The notion that imagination is a way of thinking of the possible, as suggested by most literature on the subject, is eloquently epitomized by Ralph D. Elliss (1995a: 2-3, 79-82 et passim) view that imagination as a central element in consciousness is subjunctive in mood. Entertaining the idea of the possible may capture most of the varied and amorphous ways imagination has been discussed in philosophical, psychological and pedagogical discussion ever since Plato. Plato and Aristotle left us with a view of imagination (or,

more precisely, eikasia and phantasia or phantasma) whose impact is still seen in contemporary discussions of it. The two most salient facets of it are its mediating role between sense perception and the intellect and its reproductive role as a mirror of phenomena in the world (which, in turn, reflect original ideas). Understandably, for Plato, and later for St. Augustine and Descartes, among others, imagination entailed a derivative activity which obscured reason. But Aristotle (1986: 186-201 427a-429a), in De Anima, was the first to employ it with positive connotations in a brief chapter conveniently placed between those on sense perception and the intellect. In fact he gives it two rather separate meanings: first that of an interpretive act and then a faculty to produce something approaching (though not explicitly described as) mental imagery (the shift occurs in 428a; see Aristotle 1986: 198). Thus it is safest to concur with one of De Animas translators, Hugh Lawson-Tancred (1986: 84), that we are, even at this early date, dealing with a family-concept. In fact Aristotle (1986: 200 429a, 245n99) makes the meaning of phantasia even more intricate by suggesting what apparently is a specious etymology of it as deriving from light, phos, which, together with the suggestion in the latter passage on imagination (as well as a later one on thinking in images; see Aristotle 1986: 208-209 431a-431b, 248n121) and the etymology of the Latin term imaginatio, may have led later commentators on imagination to what was to become one of its most prevalent denotations (and one that still figures prominently in dictionaries), the act or faculty of forming of mental images. In the Middle Ages the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition was the central one: St. Augustine, St. Bonaventura and St. Thomas Aquinas still view imagination, with much Platonic suspicion, as a mediating faculty between body and mind (see Egan 1992: 16-17). Among the Italian Renaissance humanists this tradition is as strong, as is evident in On the Imagination by Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (c. 1470-1533), the major work by the nephew of the famous Giovanni Pico della Mirandola:

inasmuch as cognition originates from sense, as in many cases was contended by Aristotle (in De Anima(, (...( an d as has been accepted by a continuous succession of philosophers; and inasmuch as sense itself, when informed with the likeness of a sensible object, immediately has recourse to phantasy, and, so to speak, consigns to it what it has drawn in from without; and inasmuch as these images remain therein for a very long time, and are very like to perpetual sensations; therefore we must infer that the behavior of all animate beings arises from the nature of the phantasy - the imagination. (Pico della Mirandola 1930: 39)

Further on Pico della Mirandola (1930: 43) warns that imagination is irrational and devoid of correct judgement, unless aided by the guidance of a superior power - a caution echoed throughout Western history and of late by Alan White (1990: 185). More particularly, it is the covert impetus of employing creative imagination in teaching and learning by careful tutoring, from Thomas Hobbes (in Leviathan) and John Locke (in Thoughts concerning Education) to John Deweys (1916/1980: 245) admonition not to foster mind-wandering and wayward fancy and Mary Warnocks (1994: 189) recent plea to teachers to educate a childs imagination, indeed to make this a central pedagogical aim. Another important dimension of the quote from Pico della Mirandola is the stress he lays on imagination founded on entertaining images - something, as I noted above, only hinted at by Aristotle in De Anima. In fact Whites (1990: 3-45) survey of the history of imagination from Aristotle to Immanuel Kant (which omits all medieval and Renaissance philosophers) focuses on the centrality of the image in philosophical

discussion on imagination. However, to claim that imagination prior to the Enlightenment was not considered either particularly interesting or energetic in our mental lives owing to the conclusion that it was almost entirely a mimetic faculty , as Egan (1992: 17) explicitly does, and Johnson (1987) and White (1990) seem to suggest by excluding all discussion between Aristotle and Hobbes, is an exaggeration, to say the least. In histories of imagination it is seldom noted that by about 1600, if not before, two major thinkers, apparently unaware of each others work, widen the concept in ways that point to future Romantic views. In his Essays on Magic, completed in 1588, Giordano Bruno (1998: 138, 139) mentions that the role of the imagination is to receive images derived from the senses and to preserve, combine and divide them and that this activity can be determined by ulterior agents, such as a spirit, rational soul or demon. But Bruno (1998:138) also presents another way imagination occurs: by the free creative choice of the person who imagines, for example, poets, painters, story writers and all who combine images in some organized way. In The Advancement of Learning Francis Bacon (1605/1996: 217, 218) speaks of imagination as a mediating faculty, the Janus of Imagination facing both Reason and Action, yet for him too it is not simply and only a messenger; but is invested with or at leastwise usurpeth no small authority in itself. In matters of Faith and Religion as well as in all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence and other impression of like nature, Bacon asserts, we raise our Imagination above our Reason, whereas he cannot find any science that doth properly or fitly pertain to the Imagination. This emphasis on the creative use of imagination points in two directions: to the mythical Hebraic tradition of yetser, usually translated as imagination, but as Kearney (1988: 41; see also 37-78) shows, originally meaning to form or create, as it does in Genesis; and to the Romantic concept of poetic creation (see below). The Enlightenment view of imagination is often equated with Ren Descartess (1637/1968: 59) view in his famous fourth Discourse on Method, according to which we should never let ourselves be persuaded except on the evidence of our reason. And it is to be observed that I say: of our reason, and not: of our imagination or our senses. However, not all enlightened philosophers were Platonists in this sense. In his Ethics Benedictus de Spinoza (1677/1989: 56, II Prop. XVII), although alluding to Descartes and his notion of perceiving images in his Optics, emphatically states that the imaginations of the mind, regarded in themselves, contain no error and goes on to assert that if the mind while it imagined things not existing as present to itself knew at the same time that these things did not in truth exist, it would attribute this power of imagination to a virtue of its nature, not to a defect (loc.cit.). As we enter the Romantic period the most important philosopher on imagination is Immanuel Kant, who by emphasis on its cognitive centrality and by broadening of the concept to include four functions simply placed imagination at the centre of all philosophical discussion ever since. The functions, as summarized in Johnson (1987: 165), are paraphrased below:

1. the reproductive (the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition)

2. the productive (unifying consciousness through time; pointing to the phenomenological tradition discussed below and eg to Warnock 1994)

3. the schematizing (the impetus of much of Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Johnson 1987 and to some extent of Lakoff and Johnson 1999)

4. the creative (a central element in most definitions of imagination in the last two centuries).

However, the most influential Romantic work on imagination in the English-speaking world at least is most likely Samuel Taylor Coleridges Biographia Literaria from 1817. It is interesting to see how Coleridge (1975/1987: 162, 152 n1) formulates his position as a development of that of the venerable sage of Koenigsberg (Kant) and as a contrast to Descartes, replacing the cogito with the sum, I AM. However, the more active, or, more precisely, creative role of imagination in synthesizing sense perception Coleridge champions had already been suggested in the eighteenth century by David Hume (1758/1999: 124, 5.10), who was a central source of inspiration for Kant. Coleridge (1975/1987: 167) famously prioritized the creative function, which he termed primary imagination and consigned the unifying productive and schematizing functions to the secondary imagination, and the reproductive function to fancy. In other words, the emphasis in the Romantic tradition is on ontology, on a subject who primarily is and in his or her imagination repeats, in Coleridges words (loc. cit.), in its finite mind the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. Thus, this stress on the creativity of imagination is quite far removed from the Talmudic notion of creative imagination, yetser, which centres on ethics rather than ontology (see Kearney 1988: 49). In the words of Martin Buber (1952: 38; see also 35-42), one of the most famous commentators on imagination in the Hebraic tradition in this century, imagining the possible can lead to temptation, yet imagination is not entirely evil, it is evil and good, for in the midst of it and from out of it decision can arouse the hearts willing direction toward (God(. The mid and late nineteenth century is not much discussed in the philosophical literature on imagination with the possible exception of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as forerunners of twentieth-century existentialist views (see Kearney 1988: 201-217). For them imagination is much more circumscribed than the transcendental, Romantic tradition would have. Despite Kearneys (1988: 196-197) view of existentialism as the most influential philosophy of imagination between the mid nineteenth and mid twentieth centuries, in the latter part of the nineteenth-century the Romantic tradition was still be reckoned with, especially since merging with the hermeneutic tradition in Germany and the aesthetic tradition in Italy. Much influenced by Friedrich Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey, one of the towering German philosophers of his day, though regrettably overlooked today, developed the psychological-historical side of the philological tradition and thus gave new dimensions to the study of imagination. The neglect of Dilthey is only in part due to the fact that the philological-historical tradition in hermeneutics has been ousted by the more interpretivist

Gadamerian-Ricoeurian tradition in postwar philosophy, but also to the fact that latter-day critics including Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975/1989) - have disregarded, slighted or misunderstood Diltheys contextualist project. In fact Diltheys point in most writings on hermeneutic understanding, including creative imagination, must be understood as the combination of an inner, psychological view and an outer, contextualizing historical one. In brief, he emphasizes that The Poets imagination is historically conditioned, not only in its material, but also in its technique (Dilthey 1887/1985: 54). Thus, in early as well as late studies Dilthey (1883/1988: 129; 1910/1985: 235) fuses psychology and history, as when he asserts that a true poetics (...( must take its concepts and principles from a combination of historical research and (a( general study of human nature or when he considers the poets imagination - in this case Goethes - in its relations to the material of lived reality, tradition, and what earlier poets have created. In his Aesthetic Benedetto Croce (1922: 155-474) discusses imagination in passing throughout his historical survey of aesthetics, but in fact it also forms an integral part of his aesthetics of intuitive knowledge, since such knowledge is obtained through the imagination (1922: 1). For Croce (1922: 11), intuitive knowledge must be expressed; in brief, intuitive knowledge is expressive knowledge. Later in this century this expression theory was developed and by R. G. Collingwood (1938/1970) and related, more interdisciplinary frameworks on symbolical meaning-making were devised by Ernst Cassirer (1944/1974), Kenneth Burke (1941), Susanne K. Langer (1942/1956, 1953/1963, 1962, 1988), Victor W. Turner (1982), Norbert Elias (1991/1995) and Ellen Dissanayake (1988, 1992). However, this tradition has had a comparatively small influence on the mainstream of philosophy - let alone literary studies and art history - in the twentieth century, partly because it has wrongly been equated with a naive ideal theory (in Collingwoods case), partly because it is too encompassing for narrowly disciplinarian views and partly because it wars against some central tenets of analytical philosophy and - later - (post)structuralistically informed literary theory. In sociology and anthropology, on the other hand, it has exerted a considerable influence. (As for its importance for popular imagination see section 3.) Yet in the late nineteenth century philosophy and psychology had a particularly fruitful period of rapprochem ent, also in the sense of developing new views on imagination. Some of this goes back to Diltheys work, yet surpassing him in influence is the philosopher-psychologist Franz Brentano in Vienna. Randall Collins (1998:693) epitomizes Brentanos importance by hailing him as the most influential lecturer at the end of the century, since he tutored many subsequently famous students, among them, Sigmund Freud and Edmund Husserl. It was Brentanos (1924/1995: 88) notion of consciousness as informed by intentional inexistence (ie reference to a content, direction toward an object) that is at the basis of Husserls phenomenology, and, via Husserl, of Sartres psychology of imagination. Before considering such twentieth-century philosophers who put much faith in imagination, we should note that for Freud (1929/1961: 28-30; 29, 30 quotes) the life of the imagination, as in artistic appreciation (as well as creation), is a sublimation that induces a mild narcosis in order to bring about a transient withdrawal from the pressure of vital needs. Three philosophers as different as Jean-Paul Sartre, Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig Wittgenstein are sometimes grouped together as representing the most important advances on imagination in this century. For instance, as noted above, Alan White views the imagining images tradition the central one in philosophy before the twentieth century and claims that Sartre, Ryle and Wittgenstein share the project of discarding this tradition in a section somewhat drastically termed The Death of the Image (see White 1990: 47-74). However, this should be taken with a pinch of salt, since, for instance, when in Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein (1953/1991: 101 301) famously claims that An image is not a picture (Eine Vorstellung ist kein Bild(, he does not leave it at that but goes on to state but a picture can correspond to it. Still, neither

Wittgenstein nor Ryle (1949/1995: 232-263) has much new to offer except insightful analyses of how parochial and sight-centred previous discussions of imagination have been. But in The Psychology of Imagination Sartre (1940/1978), firmly grounded in Husserls phenomenology, takes the notion of imagination as thinking of the possible to one of its logical endpoints. Imagining an image, he asserts, is a negation of the world from a particular point of view, and thus although as a result of producing the unreal, consciousness can appear momentarily delivered from being-in-the-world, it is just this being-in-the-world which is the necessary condition of the imagination (Sartre 1940/1978: 215). By arguing that this negation helps man comprehend reality, Sartre (1940/1978: 216) renders imagination perhaps the most grandiose role in the entire history of philosophy, very much in the line of the German Idealist Fichte (see Fichte 1797-1800/1994: 28, 95): imagination is not a contingent and superadded power of consciousness, it is the whole of consciousness as it realizes its freedom. Still, what Kearney (1988:185) has said about the Romantic imagination is as true of Sartres: neither can possibly deliver on its promises and, furthermore, history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has made it patently clear that neither can transform r eality. As we go on briefly to consider late twentieth-century views of imagination in sciences such as linguistics, cognitive science, psychology, and neurology - as well as the recent interdisciplinary field of study termed imagology -, we notice the prominence of the study of image, imagery and imaging (rather than imagination, or the imaginary as in Sartre and, later, Lacan and Kristeva). This suggests that, if the philosophical warnings of equating visualization with imagination (a central point in White 1990) has been heeded at all, it has led to studies of human image-making - something closer to visualization than imagination in any of its traditional senses. However, some of the most interesting work conducted in cognitive science, notably by Ralph D. Ellis (1995a, 1995b) and Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. (1994), is directed to bridging the work on imaging and imagery on the one hand and imagination and understanding (even phenomenology in Ellis 1995a) on the other. Finally, there is the postmodern view of imagination. In an attempt to summarize the implications of a host of French thinkers of structuralist or poststructuralist inclination (Lacan, Althusser, Foucault, Barthes, Derrida), Kearney (1988: 252) suggests that they all reflect the crisis of the imaginary in which the imaginations of technological reproductions tend to supplant the real. They are sceptical of any original meaning (which is considered a humanist illusion), and so meaning is deconstructed into an endless play of linguistic signs, each one of which relates to the other in a parodic circle (loc.cit.). Hence, explicitly or implicitly, they discard the Romantic concept of creative imagination, yet, at least in Kearneys (1988: 253) view, without the notion of origination (whether exterior or interior to man), the concept of imagination itself collapses. Still, we may suppose, according to such postmodern views, it survives in various parodic uses and guises, in the arts at least. Although exceedingly brief, the above sprint through history suggests that imagination has been a central concept most philosophically minded thinkers have felt they cannot neglect. From a notion characterized by entertaining thoughts of the possible, it has finally come to the dead-end of its own impossibility by implosion or perhaps rather, an explosion into vestiges of language. Still, as a notion extended into many other fields than philosophy, imagination throws light on the entire Western frame of mind, especially in the way it has, even prior to the Enlightenment, so clearly focused on the individual. It is about time, it seems, that communal and (multi)cultural ways of thinking should more prominently be included in discussions of imagination.

3. Imagination as a Shared Frame of Mind

It may seem curious that I should spend a good third of my paper on views on imagination as an activity or function of the individual mind, since the emphasis of this edition is on the shared frame of mind in popular imagination. I have two reasons: first, as the above survey suggests, it is this view of imagination that is central in Western scientific discourse rather than that of a shared frame of mind. Second, as we shall see, to some extent this discourse informs contemporary discussions on popular imagination. Let us first consider the origins of popular imagination, the phenomenon rather than the notion, which, as we shall see, is not particularly widespread either in diachronic or synchronic perspective. However, sharing a frame of mind, of course, is as old as human communication. This is true even if Michael C. Corballis (1999: 139 quote) were right in his reformulation of the old hypothesis that the origins of language are gestural, since even iconic gesturing presupposes one of the prerequisites of language, the ability to adopt the mental perspective of another individual. What is more, as so many researchers in primatology, psychology and sociology have found, intersubjective attunement in infancy is fundamental to development in humans (see Brten 1998; Elias 1998: 60-63; Hutcheon 1999). In many senses, this is how we become human. In cultural terms it is of utmost importance, especially in an oral culture, that communication, its crucial features and insights can be coded in some way. This is where myths come in, and myths, it could be justifiably argued, is a fundamental way of sharing a frame of mind. In the literature on myth this connection is often made, but in the literature on imagination I reviewed above only Egan (1992: 10-12) discusses the importance of myth. Central mythical features, he argues, are captivating images and an emotionally engaging quality, together ensuring that the myth will be passed on. He goes on to claim that it was the need to memorize things that early stimulated and developed the capacity for imagination. Patterning of sound, vivid images, and story-structuring were, we might sensibly observe, the most important early social inventions (Egan 1992: 11). It is precisely social convention that is the basis of classic views of myth in mile Durkheim and Lucien Lvy-Bruhl, even though the latter erred in making a strict division between primitive and developed thought. In short, in Richard Chases (1960/1961: 134) summary of the anthropological view of his day, primitive man, like civilized man, lives in two worlds, the matter-of-fact workaday world and the magico-religious world and (...( he employs various psychic and social devices for keeping them separate. In his definition of myth Chase (1960/1961: 129) also makes explicit the connection between myth (meaning story) and imagination: myth is literature and must be considered as an aesthetic creation of the human imagination. I have spent a paragraph delineating myth, since I think myth or, perhaps rather, mythical imagination based on belief, as Ernst Cassirer (1944/1974: 75) terms it, flows into what we today term popular imagination. I use the vague verb flow into intentionally, since in contemporary usage popular imagination may be less reliant on belief, more informed by modern - or postmodern, if you like - self-consciousness. But we should note the interaction between myth and imagination: (popular) imagination creates myth, which, in turn, may spawn other creations by (popular) imagination, and so on. It is this realization of myths and rituals - reciprocity with human imagination that Cassirer, Langer, Elias, Turner and Dissanayake have analyzed in this century, and their considerable - in part still potential - significance for a host of sciences has not yet been fully understood or explored. However, their focus on (the role of imagination in) symbolic representation has now been taken up by, for instance, social and political theoreticians on the one hand and neurologists and evolutionary anthropologists on the other. It is symptomatic that neither of these traditions seem aware of the symbol studies conducted in the humanities. This is evident in Robinson and Rundells (1994) anthology on imagination in social theory, which includes major names, such as Cornelius Castoriadis, Martin Jay, Niklas Luhmann and Paul Ricoeur, as well as in Terrence Deacons (1997/1998) magisterial treatise on how the co-evolution of language

and the human brain has been spurred by the use of symbolic reference: excepting philosophy, no references are made across disciplines and, more specifically, the Cassirer-Langer tradition is disregarded. I think it is important to be reminded of the fact that there is still a spectrum between unquestioned belief and utter scepticism in our understanding of various phenomena relating to popular imagination. What has happened, it seems, in the latter part of this century is that the growth of popular culture and postmodernism in the arts have eroded the strict division between what is real and what is imaginary or virtually real. Interestingly, as Elias (1983/1987: 49 quote, 56-65) has shown, this was the crucial distinction earlier-stage societies made in order to go beyond their magical-mythical forms of thinking. Similar erosion has, of course, occured in science, beginning with Einstein, Heisenberg and Kuhn primarily in the natural sciences and, later, continued by poststructuralism primarily in the human and social sciences. This does not, for the most part, signal a regression into magical-mythical world views, but playful border crossings in the arts and sometimes an equally playful but often very serious probing into the limits and rhetoric of science and its discourses. But how did we reach this stage in Western culture where, at times, (supposedly) high and low culture, science and fiction merge? At the start of this paper I mentioned that Kieran Egan is the only historian of imagination who touches on the shared meaning. With reference to Jacques Le Goffs Limagination medivale from 1986, Egan (1992: 17) speaks of the profane imagination in popular culture, as against the official church concept, in the Middle Ages: this intellectual underworld, as he terms it, celebrated and enjoyed witchcraft, folklore, occultism, and other realms where the body, dreams and magic enjoyed an energetic currency denied them by the church. The fact that the church still kept policing the borders of imagination in 1600 is evident in Giordano Brunos death at the hands of the Inquisition for his writings. However, in post-Renaissance Europe, Peter Stallybrass and Allon White (1986: 193) claim, drawing on Bakhtin, Freud and Kristeva, the formation of the cultural Imaginary of the middle class (...( involved an internal distancing from the popular which was complex and often contradictory to its effects. Mikhail Bakhtin (1984) has rightly made much of the importance of the carnival in cultural history, as has Sven-Erik Klinkmann (1998) in twentieth-century culture of the masks of Elvis Presley. Still, although it is true that much folk, later popular, today largely mass culture has provided alternatives to high or mainstream culture, not all such culture is dissident, revolutionary or esoteric. One way of schematizing the relation between the terms is to view popular as a superior node joining folk and mass. Even if mass art has a modern ring to it, Nol Carroll (1998: 172) reminds us that it has been with us, to a certain extent, since the invention of the printing press. Conversely, we should remember that although mass art statistically is the most dominant art of our times (Carroll 1998: 173 - which also proves it is far from dissident -, folk art in various forms (handicrafts, folk music, folklore) may have been curtailed by mass art and created a variety of world and tourist hybrids with it, but is nonetheless still in existence. What about popular imagination per se? First we should concede that it is not a received notion - hopefully this edition might bring about some small change in this state of affairs. A search in the MLA Bibliography, which lists titles of scholarly articles and books between 1963-05/1999, renders 9 047 hits on popular, 4 412 on imagination, but only 21 on popular imagination. Of these twelve are papers in Clive Blooms edition Jacobean Poetry and Prose: Rhetoric, Representation and the Popular Imagination (1988). The rest is thematically a motley crew: Emily Dickinson, cinema, Sophies Choice , Stephen King, Africa, the lesbian, and paranoia, to mention a few. In other words, almost any widespread artefact, topic or notion can enter the popular imagination - as we can see from the topics in this edition. Still, judging from the titles, none of the twenty-one articles and books highlights the notion of popular imagination

as such. Of course, this does not mean that popular imagination has not been or is not studied under other names in a variety of disciplines. In fact, one might argue that popular imagination is what studies in folklore focus on (as suggested by the fact that the conference this edition is based on took place under the auspices of a department of folkloristics). In anthropology, Clifford Geertz (1983/1993: 53), perhaps most famously, has traced the role of Bali in the history of our (Western( imagination. In fact, as far as I can understand, Geertz (1983/ 1993: 36-54) attempts something much grander by this essay entitled Found in Translation: On the Social History of Moral Imagination, by the collection in which it is included, and indeed by all of his oeuvre: to devise the best possible hermeneutic circle for anthropological study. In doing so, Geertz (1983/1993: 48) points to contemporary pitfalls in the human and social sciences, but more importantly implicitly stresses the importance of contextualization:

The notions of the self-interpreting text on the literary side or of the material determination of consciousness on the social science side may have their uses, or they may not; but so far as understanding how the constructions of other peoples imaginations connect to those of our own, they head us off precisely in the wrong direction toward an isolation of the meaning-form aspects of the matter from the practical contexts that give them life.

Taking our cue from Geertz - and phenomenology -, we could say that since popular imagination must be abo ut something, it can be studied in two ways: starting with a particular topic (say, stand-up comedy) to the people aware of it (say, Americans), or the other way around, starting with a particular population and their awareness of a topic. This indicates that popular imagination could be studied theoretically as well as empirically, and perhaps most felicitously by combining the two approaches. Popular imagination could thus make use of the broad circles of hermeneutics Dilthey, drawing on Schleiermacher and his exemplary praxis, suggested for textual interpetation (see Dilthey 1900/1972: 243). Even closer to Geertzs aim is Diltheys late emphasis on lived experience (Erlebnis) as the basis of the study of man (see Dilthey 1907-08/1985: 223), which in fact has been taken up by another central figure in anthropology, Victor Turner, in his late works (1982: 12-19, 75, 86; 1986). It is interesting to note that Turner (1986: 429) defines the liminal phase in ritual - one of his central anthropological interests - as being dominantly in the subjunctive mood of culture, the mood of maybe might be, as if, hypothesis, fantasy, conjecture, desire, thus implying that popular imagination, like imagination, can make use of the metaphor of the subjunctive mood. But perhaps the most major name Geertz and Turner, like all the above-mentioned historians of imagination, largely neglect is that of Giambattista Vico. There are many reasons for this neglect: one is simply that Vico is often relegated to discussions in historiography or the philosophy of history; another is that his key term is not imagination but primarily fantasia. Frank Nuessel (1998: 282) has usefully summarized Vicos view on imagination, from perception to verbalization (with reference to Verene 1981):

the process of transforming the perceived world into the received or conceptual world (percept ( concept) involves the Vichian imagination which consists of the fantasia (the imagination proper), the ingegno ( ingenuity or invention), and the memoria (or memory). (---( The interaction of these three components, f

antasia, ingegno, and memoria, converge to create conceptualization, and, ultimately, verbalization of our experienced reality.

In a nutshell, even though Vicos view is simply that, in the words of Marcel Danesi and Frank Nuessel (1994a: iv), the imagination is the essence of mind, it is not as romantically grandiose as those of German Idealism and Sartres phenomenology. Vico spent most of his intellectual life attempting to provide a firm basis for this major notion (with some debt to Bacon 1605/1996, among others), and was able to do it so convincingly in his New Science (Vico 1744/1984) that it remains seminal and topical for much of the recent research on cognition and culture and their interrelation. Vico is important in terms of the present discussion, not only by his effort to go beyond the mediating function of imagination and to subcategorize the concept by including creativity and memory as its components - something that cognitive linguists and scientists, often ignorant of Vico, are attempting today-, but in that he first grasped that it is by imaginative insight that we understand our fellow men. If such Vichian ideas had more often been included in the discussion of imagination in the last two and a half centuries, the notion would most likely be much broader and naturally include the shared, communal aspect. In Isaiah Berlins (1979/1998: 353) words, drawing on Vicos insight, in order to comprehend ways of life (...( remote from us and unlike our own (in space as well as time, I presume), one must understand that all humans have minds and purposes and inner lives comparable to ours, and, thus that by virtue of possessing imaginative power of a high degree, such as artists and, in particular, novelists require we can approximate an understanding of them. We should, for instance, remember that one dimension in Karl Poppers (1945/1983: 44 emphasis added) project of defending rationalism includes this Vichian dimension: reason, supported by imagination, he writes, enables us to understand that men who are far away, whom we shall never see, are like ourselves. What is also noteworthy in Vico (1744/1984: 116 375) is his realization that imagination developed in peoples as well as individuals:

poetic (ie creative( wisdom, the first wisdom of the gentile world, must have begun with a metaphysics not rational and abstract like that of learned men now, but felt and imagined as that of these first men must have been, who, without power of ratiocination, were all robust sense and vigorous imagination.

In literary studies too the study of imagination has been extended from that of the creative genius of the Romantic-hermeneutic tradition to what sense of life, often viewed in a moral framework, literary works may impart to their readers, thus pointing to a study of their role in popular imagination. Martha C. Nussbaum (1995: 2), for instance, finds that literature and literary imagination are subversive by their very presentations of other points of view. Hence, for her, the novel - or, more precisely, a particular kind of novel (see Nussbaum 1995: 124n2) - is

a morally controversial form, expressing in its very shape and style, in its modes of interaction with its readers, a normative sense of life. (...( It tells its readers to notice this and not this, to be active in these and not

those ways. It leads them to certain postures of the mind and heart and not others. (Nussbaum 1995: 2)

Of course, Bakhtin (1981), on the contrary, focuses on the dialogic juxtaposition - heteroglossia - in novels of another sort. Still, this move from considering what literature is to what it does, how it lives on in the imagination of its readers, is symptomatic of Nussbaums work, from her study of imagination in Aristotle (summarized in Nussbaum 1990: 77-79) to her recent extension of her insights on imagination to pedagogical training (Nussbaum 1997: 10-11 et passim). A similar, if more noticeable and famous, move in literary studies from narrative theory to ethical interpretation is to be found in Wayne C. Booths (1961/1970, 1988) career. These are only two instances in literary studies of what might be termed a moral turn, which, together with the acceptance of popular culture studies, suggests that literature and a host of other disciplines - such as, art, music and film - are now more open to studies of imagination and popular imagination, even though the notions as such may not always be applied. Similar turns, it seems, have taken or are taking place in other disciplines in the human and social sciences as well, but neither space nor competence permits me to dwell on them. However, let me add a few notes in order to suggest how widely spread the notion of a shared imagination is. In historiography, for instance, Hayden Whites (1973) central use of the notion historical imagination, often synonymous with historical consciousness, has spawned a wealth of similar approaches - often without Whites anchoring in Vico and R. G. Collingwood (1946/1993), which is only evident in a later work (see White 1978/1987). In geography postmodern practitioners, such as Derek Gregory (1994) and Edward W. Soja (1996), study imaginary spaces, to some extent drawing on untenable poststructuralist and postcolonial frameworks. Even the natural sciences, it seems, must take imagination and imagery into account, not just as one of the central means by which scientific creativity works, but, for instance, as Harriet Ritvo (1997: 175-187) has shown, zoological history must be able to account for nineteenth-century research on imaginary animals and, as Stephen Hawking (1988/1989: 151-152 et passim; 1993/1994: 74-76) has suggested, future physics must be able to explain what he terms imaginary time. But - turning to the obvious point of comparison - what, if any, might be the difference between studies in popular culture and studies of popular imagination? Perhaps a simple - and, to some extent, simplifying answer would be that popular culture studies focuses largely on all kinds of artefacts (including those electronically mediated or performed), their creation, mediation and reception. In Charles F. Altmans (1986: 8) view, for instance, Popular culture may be said to exist when a given text achieves wide dissemination through the efforts of a publishing institution (taken in a broad sense) with a vested interest in survival. One of the most notable names in popular culture studies, John Fiske (1989/1990: 23), argues that popular culture in industrial societies is contradictory to its core and thus stresses on the one hand that it is commodified, industrialized, but on the other that in order to be included in popular culture a commodity must also bear the interests of the people. In Michael J. Bells (1982: 443) words, it is, at its simplest at least, the culture of mass appeal and can be studied along the lines of Jakobsons model of communication. However, at times popular culture studies is defined more broadly as aiming at an interpretation of culture (Rosenberg 1986: 154), and then, of course, it would more firmly include the other pole in popular imagination studies, the study of any phenomena that (specified or unspecified) groups of people are aware of. So, to rephrase what I mentioned above, popular imagination can be studied at least in two ways: by primarily focusing on culture and its artefacts or on shared (awareness of) concepts and phenomena in particular

populations. In many cases either pursuit would be illuminated by the other; in all cases popular imagination studies should make discriminating use of any array of disciplines and their methodologies that might throw light on their objects of study. In fact the motivation underlying my forays into a host of disciplines in this paper is a firm conviction that much disciplinary myopia can be dispelled by going beyond ones primary field. But whether the study of popular imagination should be afforded a discipline of its own is questionable. However, by popularizing the notion and pursuing such studies, we could, at the very least, see to it that it becomes a household term in our various disciplines and that it might receive a niche in each. This is as good a starting-point as any for the interdiscipline popular imagination studies could become. Since the study of imagination per se patently has become an accepted field of study in a number of academic disciplines, one way of proving the use of popular imagination studies is to show how the study of imagination can benefit from the study of popular imagination (and vice versa). But, in fact, I think we must build a bridge between the two if either is to do its job properly: in any culture individual imaginations are always to some extent built on shared experiences, and the other way around - popular imagination consists of a host of individual interpretations.

4. A Look Ahead: Bridging the Study of Imagination and Popular Imagination I have not been able to refrain from pointing to some useful material for building such bridges within and between the studies of imagination and popular imagination in my discussion of both imagination and popular imagination. Whatever we may think of the methodological differences between the two cultures (Snow 1959/ 1964) - largely what Dilthey (1883/1988) calls Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften - , we cannot afford to neglect either the inner or the outer view of imagination. To put it another way, whatever we say about imagination should not stand in blatant contradiction to corroborated findings in, say, neurology or sociology - or, if it does, then at least one of the disciplines (including our own) should seriously reconsider its premises or conclusions. I have implied above that this is what Ellis (1995a) tries to effect by neurological study of image-making, linguistic study of imagery and phenomenological study of the mind. A related approach is Daniel C. Dennetts (1991/1993: 66-98 et passim) combination of inside and outside perspectives on consciousness by what he terms heterophenomenology. Certainly, the central relation in human imagination between perception, memory and imagination should be studied from different points of view so that, for instance, Husserls (1999: 198-9) distinction between mere phantasy and recollection (according to which only the latter has a relation to the then and the now) could today be put to neurological, neuropsychological and empirical tests. Perhaps Raymond Gibbs (1994: 5) best summarizes the central insight of what seems to be in the air:

Recent advances in cognitive linguistics, philosophy, anthropology, and psychology show that not only is much of our language metaphorically structured, but so is much of our cognition. People conceptualize their experiences in figurative terms via metaphor, metonomy, irony, oxymoron, and so on, and these principles underlie the way we think, reason, and imagine.

This is why Vico is of such seminal importance to much of the crucial rethinking that is taking place in the human and social sciences today. How we view man in general and human cognition in particular - including imagination and emotions - should, as he implied, have repercussions on all human studies. Now at last we must concede that Protagoras was right in asserting that Man is the measure of all things (quoted in Abel 1976/ 1997: xxi), not in a narrow - potentially narcissistic - humanist sense, but in the sense that this is how human meaning-making has always been effected: as an embodied, contextualized understanding of the surrounding world. It is related rethinking that has led prominent figures in anthropology (Geertz), sociology (Elias), psychology (Sigmund Koch 1999) and translation studies (Andrew Chesterman 1998) to eschew theory-ridden top-down approaches and insist on bottom-up studies and/or on sociohistorically situated studies. Also, Vicos (1744/1984: 3 2) initial emphasis on mens nature as having a principal property: that of being social shows that he is a precursor of Eliass homines aperti view of the necessary interdependence of individuals, towards which the human studies as a whole finally seem to be moving. However, this does not necessarily entail that the phenomenologico-hermeneutical tradition (as, for instance, portrayed in Kearney 1998) must be ousted, since it - like the Vichian heritage - relies centrally on what Brentano (1924/1995) calls Vorstellungen (ideas, presentations). Such ideas may be firmly lodged in homo clausus in this tradition, but they can, as, for instance, Gaston Bachelards material ima gining implies (see Kearney 1998: 103-106), be prompted by archetypal symbols and go beyond the self. Whatever one thinks of such approaches to symbolical representation - or domain-specific or connectionist models of cognition, for that matter -, it should be evident by now, on the basis of both archeological and cognitive evidence, that (1) studies of imagination cannot bypass symbolic representation and (2) the brain evinces cognitive fluidity (Mithen 1996) and other dynamical, interactive properties (Horgan and Tienson 1996) to such a degree that the way mental representation works cannot be adequately described by structural or computational analogies. What is needed, then, are both hedgehogs and foxes conducting micro- and macrostudies of cognition and culture, respectively, and, in particular, of their processual nature and interrelation. To view, in a narrower perspective, ways in which imagination and popular imagination might be jointly studied, let us consider Kearneys (1988: 359-397) call for developing imagination in various directions after the postmodern cul-de-sac. Kearney (1988: 361-371, 370-371 quote) pleads for both an ethical imagination and a poetical imagination, which should include a social project that would nourish the conviction that things can be changed. The first and most effective step in this direction is to begin to imagine that the world as it is could be otherwise. This is where, as Mary Warnock (1972/1978: xvii) points out, Sartres study on the imagination was to take him, and it comes close to David Nortons (1996: 2) thesis according to which our access to (the( perspectival worlds (of other people( is afforded by imagination. Still, even more topical in the context of popular imagination, Kearneys social project is related to the fundamental insight of Mark Johnson (1987: 190) as he outlines a theory of meaning on the basis of an embodied understanding of cognition:

In short, a theory of meaning is a theory of how we understand things (of whatever sort). (...( (T(his is not merely a matter of how some individual might happen to understand something but rather how an indiv idual as embedded in a (linguistic) community, a culture, and a historical context understands. In other words, we are concerned here with public, shared meaning.

Thus, here we have three eminent philosophers (Kearney, Norton and Johnson), all of whom consider the history of imagination in some detail and all of whom either call for or simply view imagination as a concept of shared meaning - the very basis of the rather neglected project of popular imagination studies. In other words, in this sense, imagination relies on popular imagination and, in the final analysis, on a culture (or cultures). This brings us to another view touched on above: individuals and their imaginations become attuned to their culture by acting intersubjectively in it. This is the often implicit premise of all pleas for educating childrens imagination, whether the admonition is to let it grow unhindered, as in Schleiermachers (1799/1988: 141-161) notion of religious intuition, or, to tutor it carefully, as is more often the case in pedagogical instruction from Pico della Mirandola to contemporary humanists and sociologists, like Nussbaum (1997) and Pat Duffy Hutcheon (1999: 196). In fact, as Donald Verene (1994: 135) reminds us, this is true of Vico as well: his philosophy is a circle that begins and ends in pedagogy.Thus, as we take a stand - pedagogically, aesthetically, ethically, socially, politically - as individuals, groups or nations, we do so to a great extent on the basis of how our imaginations are attuned to the surrounding culture or cultures. We make crucial decisions in our lives on the basis of what we accept and cannot accept of the popular imagination in which we are immersed by way of our culture. The points I am trying to make here is that, first, imagination and popular imagination should in the future to a considerable extent be conflated as objects of study and, second, that studies of them should ideally be conducted along a spectrum of disciplines from neurology, neuropsychology, cognitive psychology and cultural psychology all the way to art history, musicology, comparative literature, comparative religion, history, folkloristics, sociology, ethnography and anthropology. Imagination resides at the very centre of the age-old nature and nurture debate, which perhaps is solved by the interactional view mentioned above: like human cognition in general, imagination is both innate and learned. Of course, except for putting an end to a futile debate, this realization in fact solves very little. What it does suggest, however, is that the road to take now is one in which the intricacies of mans interaction with his or her environment must be studied in detail and with a recognition of its staggering complexity. Let me briefly make explicit what may be implicit in the above: despite the cultural attunement stressed above, there are major differences in how individual imaginations are constituted. This has always been common knowledge, but perhaps at times so common that philosophers and other scholars have overlooked it. However, in his essay On the Power of Imagination Montaigne (1958/1993: 36-48) focuses on idiosyncratic differences between individual imaginations. Similarly, a standard jazz ballad like Imagination (by Johnny Burke and Jimmy Van Heusen) harps on such differences:

Imagination is funny It makes a cloudy day sunny It makes a bee think of honey Just as I think of you

Imagination is crazy

Your whole perspective gets hazy Starts you asking a daisy What to do, what to do

In a few words - and the ballad goes on to consider other ways of imagining - this item of popular culture touches on what it took philosophy more than two millennia to reach: a charting of different modes and kinds of imagination, not just as cognitive categories but as ways of thinking of the possible and the impossible. In the early twentieth century we find such preliminary charts in I. A. Richards (1926: 239-253) six senses of imagination and Gilbert Ryles (1949/1990: 232-263) chapter on different kinds of imagining. But it has taken another half a century of various life and human sciences and popular culture studies until we finally grasped the interrelation between imagination and popular imagination. In a late letter William Blake, perhaps the most passionate spokesman for imagination in the history of literature and art, speaks of how he has been ailing, but brushes it aside, but not in Spirit & Life not in the Real Man The Imagination which Liveth for Ever (quoted in Blake 1997: 14). To make more and more precise maps of that vast territory of individual and shared human imagination Blake sought to personify is one of the most fascinating tasks that awaits us in this century.


Abel, Reuben. 1976/1997. Man Is the Measure. A Cordial Invitation to the Central Problems of Philosophy. New York et al.: The Free Press. Altman, Charles F. 1986. The Medieval Marquee: Church Portal Sculpture as Publicity. In Campbell 1986: 6-15. Aristotle. 1986. De Anima (On the Soul). Trans. H. Lawson-Tancred. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Bacon, Francis. 1605/1996. The Advancement of Learning. In Brian Vickers (ed.), Francis Bacon. The Oxford Authors. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 120-299. Bakhtin, M. M. 1965/1984. Rabelais and His World. Trans. H. Iswolsky. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Bakhtin, M. M. 1981. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Ed. Michael Holquist. Trans. M. Holquist and C. Emerson. Austin and London: University of Texas Press. Bell, Michael J. 1982. The Study of Popular Culture. In M. Thomas Inge (ed.), Concise Histories of American Popular Culture. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 443-465. Berlin, Isaiah. 1979/1998. The Divorce between the Sciences and the Humanities. InThe Proper Study of Mankind. An Anthology of Essays. Eds. Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer. London: Pimlico. 326-358. Blake, William. 1977. The Complete Poems. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Booth, Wayne C. 1961/1970. The Rhetoric of Fiction. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. Booth, Wayne C. 1988. The Company We Keep. An Ethics of Fiction. Berkeley et al.: University of California Press. Brten, Stein (ed.). 1998. Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny. Cambridge and Paris: Cambridge University Press and Editions de la Maison des Sciences de lHomme. Brentano, Franz. 1924/1995. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Eds. Oskar Kraus; Linda L. McAlister; trans. A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell and L.L. McAlister. London and New York: Routledge. (Original work published 1874) Brown, Richard Harvey. 1977/1989. A Poetic for Sociology. Toward a Logic of Discovery for the Human Sciences. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. Bruno, Giordano. 1998. Cause, Principle and Unity. Essays on Magic. Eds. and trans. R. de Lucca; R. J. Blackwell. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press. Buber, Martin. 1952. Images of Good and Evil. Trans. M. Bullock. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Burke, Kenneth. 1941. The Philosophy of Literary Form. Studies in Symbolic Action. n.p.: Louisiana State University Press. Burke, Kenneth. 1950. A Rhetoric of Motives. New York: Prentice-Hall. Campbell, Josie P. (ed.). 1986. Popular Culture in the Middle Ages. Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Popular Press. Carroll, Joseph. 1995. Evolution and Literary Theory. Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press. Carroll, Nol. 1998. A Philosophy of Mass Art. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Cassirer, Ernst. 1944/1974. An Essay on Man. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Castoriadis, Cornelius. 1975/1987. The Imaginary Institution of Society. Trans. K. Blamey. Cambridge: Polity Press. Chase, Richard. 1960/1961. Myth as Literature. In James E. Miller, Jr. (ed.),Myth and Method. Modern Theories of Fiction. n.p.: University of Nebraska Press / Bison. 127-143. (Original work published 1949) Chesterman, Andrew. 1998. Causes, Translations, Effects.Target 10:2. 201-230. Cole, Michael. 1996. Cultural Psychology. A Once and Future Discipline. Cambridge, MA, and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. 1975/1987. Biographia Literaria or Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and Opinions. London and Melbourne: Dent. (Original work published 1817) Collingwood, R. G. 1938/1970. The Principles of Art. London et al.: Oxford University Press. Collingwood, R.G. 1946/1993. The Idea of History, rev. ed. Oxford et al.: Clarendon Press. Collins, Randall. 1998. The Sociology of Philosophies. A Global Theory of Intellectual Change. Cambridge, MA, and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Corballis, Michael. 1999. The Gestural Origins of Language. American Scientist 87:2, March-April. 138-145. Cornoldi, Cesare, Robert H. Logie, Maria A. Brandimonte, Geir Kaufmann and Daniel Reisberg. 1996. Stretching the Imagination. Representation and Transformation in Mental Imagery. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Croce, Benedetto. 1922. Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic, 2nd ed. Trans. D. Ainsle. London: Macmillan. (Original work published 1902) Currie, Gregory. 1995. Image and Mind. Film, Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press. DAndrade, Roy. 1995. The Development of Cognitive Anthropology. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press. Danesi, Marcel (ed.). 1995. Giambattista Vico and Anglo-American Science. Philosophy and Writing. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Danesi, Marcel and Frank Nuessel. 1994a. Preface. In Danesi and Nuessel 1994b: iii-v. Danesi, Marcel and Frank Nuessel (eds.). 1994b. The Imaginative Basis of Thought and Culture: Contemporary Perspectives on Giambattista Vico. Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press. Deacon, Terrence. 1997/1998. The Symbolic Species. The Co-Evolution of Language and the Human Brain. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Dennett, Daniel C. 1991/1993. Consciousness Explained. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Descartes, Ren. 1637/1968. Discourse on the Method of Properly Conducting Ones Reason and of Seeking the Truth in the Sciences . In Discourse on Method and The Meditations. Trans. F.E. Sutcliffe. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 25-91. Dewey, John. 1916/1980. The Middle Works, 1899-1924. Vol. 9: 1916. Democracy and Education. Ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press. Dewey, John. 1934/1987. The Later Works, 1925-1953. Vol. 10: 1934. Art as Experience. Ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press. Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1860/1996. Schleiermachers Hermeneutical System in Relation to Earlier Protestant Hermeneutics. Trans. T. Nordenhaug. In Dilthey 1996: 33-227. Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1883/1988. Introduction to the Human Sciences. An Attempt to Lay a Foundation for the Study of Society and History. Trans. R.J. Betanzos. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1887/1985. The Imagination of the Poet: Elements for a Poetics. Trans. L. Agosta and R. A. Makkreel. In Dilthey 1985: 29-173. Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1900/1972. The Rise of Hermeneutics. Trans. F. Jameson.New Literary History III:2, Winter. 229-244. Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1907-08/1985. Fragments for a Poetics. Trans. R. A. Makkreel. In Dilthey 1985: 223-231. Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1910/1985. Goethe and the Poetic Imagination. Trans. C. Rodie. In Dilthey 1985: 235-302. Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1985. Poetry and Experience. Selected Works Vol. V. Eds. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1996. Hermeneutics and the Study of History. Selected Works Vol. IV. Eds. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Dissanayake, Ellen. 1988. What Is Art For? Seattle and London: University of Washington Press. Dissanayake, Ellen.1992. Homo Aestheticus. Where Art Comes From and Why. New York: The Free Press. Donald, Merlin. 1991. Origins of the Modern Mind. Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press. Easterlin, Nancy. 1999. Making Knowledge: Bioepistemology and the Foundations of Literary Theory.Mosaic 32:1, March. 131-147. Egan, Kieran. 1992. Imagination in Teaching and Learning. Ages 8 to 15. London: Routledge. Elias, Norbert. 1983/1987. Involvement and Detachment. Trans. E. Jephcott. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Elias, Norbert. 1991/1995. The Symbol Theory. London: Sage. Elias, Norbert. 1998. On Civilization, Power and Knowledge. Selected Writings. Eds. Stephen Mennell and Johan Goudsblom. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. Ellis, Ralph D. 1995a. Questioning Consciousness. The Interplay of Imagery, Cognition, and Emotion in the Human Brain. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Ellis, Ralph D. 1995b. The imagist approach to inferential thought patterns: The crucial role of rhythm pattern recognition.Pragmatics & Cognition 3:1. 75-109. Esrock, Ellen J. 1994. The Readers Eye. Visual Imaging as Reader Response . Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University

Press. Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. 1797-1800/1994. Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre and Other Writings (1797-1800). Ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett. Fisch, Max Harold. 1984. Introduction. In Vico 1744/1984: xix-xlv. Fiske, John. 1989/1990. Understanding Popular Culture. Boston et al.: Unwin Hyman. Freud, Sigmund. 1929/1961. Civilization and Its Discontents. Trans. J. Strachey. New York and London: W. W. Norton. Fussell, Paul. 1975. The Great War and Modern Memory. New York: Oxford University Press. Fussell, Paul. 1989. Wartime. Understanding Behavior in the Second World War. New York and London: Oxford University Press. Fussell, Susan R. and Roger J. Kreuz (eds.). 1998. Social and Cognitive Approaches to Interpersonal Communication. Mahwah, NJ, and London: Lawrence Erlbaum. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1975/1989. Truth and Method. 2nd, rev. ed. Trans. W. Glen-Doepel; rev. trans. J. Weinsheimer and D.G. Marshall. London: Sheed & Ward. (Original work published 1960) Geertz, Clifford. 1973/1993. The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays. London: Fontana. Geertz, Clifford. 1983/1993. Local Knowledge. Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. London: Fontana. Gibbs, Raymond W., Jr. 1994. The Poetics of Mind: Figurative Thought, Language, and Understanding. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press. Goldman, L. R. 1998. Childs Play. Myth, Mimesis and Make-Believe . Oxford and New York: Berg. Gregory, Derek. 1994. Geographical Imaginations. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Haugeland, John. 1995. Mind Embodied and Embedded. In Leila Haaparanta and Sara Heinmaa (eds.), Mind and Cognition. Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence. Acta Philosophica Fennica 58. Helsinki: The Philosophical Society of Finland. 233-267. Hawking, Stephen. 1988/1989. A Brief History of Time. From the Big Bang to Black Holes. Toronto et al.: Bantam. Hawking, Stephen. 1993/1994. Black Holes and Baby Universes and Other Essays. Toronto et al.: Bantam. Hertzberg, Lars. 1991. Imagination and the Sense of Identity. In David Cockburn (ed.),Human Beings. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 29. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press. 143-155. Horgan, Terence and John Tienson. 1996. Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge, MA, and London: The MIT Press. Hume, David. 1758/1999. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. Tom L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hundert, Edward M. 1995. Lessons from an Optical Illusion. On Nature and Nurture, Knowledge and Values. Cambridge, MA; and London: Harvard University Press. Husserl, Edmund. 1999. The Essential Husserl. Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Hutcheon, Pat Duffy. 1999. Building Character and Culture. Westport, CT, and London: Praeger. Johnson, Mark. 1987. The Body in the Mind. The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. Johnson, Mark. 1993. Moral Imagination. Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. Katz, Alfred N., Christina Cacciari, Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. and Mark Turner. 1998. Figurative Language and Thought. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kearney, Richard. 1988. The Wake of Imagination. Toward a Postmodern Culture. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Kearney, Richard. 1998. Poetics of Imagining. Modern to Post-modern. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Kenny, Anthony. 1989/1992. The Metaphysics of Mind. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Klinkmann, Sven-Erik. 1998. Elvis Presley - den karnevalistiske kungen (Elvis Presley - The Carnivalesque King(. bo/Turku, Finland: bo Akademi University Press. Koch, Sigmund. 1999. Psychology in Human Context. Essays in Dissidence and Reconstruction. Eds. David Finkelman and Frank Kessel. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, George. 1987. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. What Categories Reveal about the Mind. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. 1999. Philosophy in the Flesh. The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought. New York: Basic Books. Langer, Susanne K. 1942/1956. Philosophy in a New Key. A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art. New York: Mentor. Langer, Susanne K. 1953/1963. Feeling and Form. A Theory of Art Developed from Philosophy in a New Key. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Langer, Susanne K. 1962. Philosophical Sketches. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. Langer, Susanne K. 1988. Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling. Abridged edition by Gary Van Den Heuvel. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Lawson-Tancred, Hugh. 1986. Introduction. In Aristotle 1986: 11-116. Le Goff, Jacques. 1977/1980. Time, Work, & Culture in the Middle Ages. Trans. A. Goldhammer. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. Le Goff, Jacques. 1981/1986. The Birth of Purgatory. Trans. A. Goldhammer. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. Lieberman, Philip. 1998. Eve Spoke. Human Language and Human Evolution. New York and London: W. W. Norton. Makkreel, Rudolf A. 1975/1992. Dilthey. Philosopher of the Human Studies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Matthiessen, C.M.I.M. 1998. Construing processes of consciousness: From the commonsense model to the uncommonsense model of cognitive science. In J. R. Martin and Robert Veel (eds.), Reading Science. Critical and Functional Perspectives on Discourses of Science. London and New York: Routledge. 327-356. Mennell, Stephen and Johan Goudsblom. 1998. Introduction. In Elias 1998: 1-45. Miller, Arthur I. 1984/1986. Imagery in Scientific Thought. Creating 20th-Century Physics. Cambridge, MA, and London: The MIT Press. Miller, Arthur I. 1996. Insights of Genius. Imagery and Creativity in Science and Art. New York: Copernicus / Springer-Verlag. Mithen, Steven. 1996. The Prehistory of the Mind. A Search for the Origins of Art, Religion and Science. London: Phoenix. Montaigne, Michel de. 1958/1993. Essays. Trans. J.M. Cohen. Harmondsworth: Penguin. (Original work published 1580) Norton, David L. 1996. Imagination, Understanding, and the Virtue of Liberality. Lanham, MD, and London: Rowman & Littlefield. Nuessel, Frank. 1995. Vico and Current Work in Cognitive Linguistics. In Danesi 1995: 127-145. Nuessel, Frank. 1998. Vicos Views on Language and Linguistics. Romance Languages Annual IX. 280-287. Nussbaum, Martha C. 1990. Loves Knowledge. Essays on Philosophy and Literature . New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nussbaum, Martha C. 1995. Poetic Justice. The Literary Imagination and Public Life. Boston: Beacon Press.

Nussbaum, Martha C. 1997. Cultivating Humanity. A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press. Olson, David R. and Nancy Torrance (eds.). 1996. Modes of Thought. Explorations in Culture and Cognition. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press. Pettersson, Bo. 1999a. On Narrative in Recent Anglo-American Literature, Literary Theory, Historiography and Science: Referential versus Interpretive Attitudes. In Jon Buscall and Outi Pickering (eds.), Approaches to Narrative Fiction. Anglicana Turkuensia 18. bo/Turku: University of Turku. 1-19. Pettersson, Bo. 1999b. The Postcolonial Turn in Literary Translation Studies: Theoretical Frameworks Reviewed. AE: Canadian Aesthetics Journal / Revue canadienne desthtique , Summer. ( Pettersson, Bo. 1999c. Towards a Pragmatics of Literary Interpretation. In Arto Haapala and Ossi Naukkarinen (eds.), Interpretation and Its Boundaries. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press. 48-65. Pettersson, Bo. 1999d. Would I Lie to You?: Deception, Self-Deception and the Teaching of Literature in Academia. In Sanna-Kaisa Tanskanen and Brita Wrvik (eds.), Proceedings of the 7th Nordic Conference on English Studies. Anglicana Turkuensia 20. bo/Turku, Finland: University of Turku. 397-409. Pettersson, Bo. work in progress. Re-Introducing Literary Hermeneutics. Pico della Mirandola, Gianfrancesco. 1930. On the Imagination. Cornell Studies in English XVI. Trans. H. Caplan. New Haven: Yale University Press. Popper, Karl R. 1945/1983. The Defence of Rationalism. In David Miller (ed.),A Pocket Popper. n.p.: Fontana. 33-45. Posner, Michael I. and Daniel J. Levitin. 1997/1999. Imaging the Future. In Robert L. Solso (ed.),Mind and Brain Sciences in the 21st Century. Cambridge, MA, and London: The MIT Press. 91-109. Posner, Michael I. and Marcus E. Raichle. 1994/1997. Images of Mind. New York: Scientific American Library. Richards, I. A. 1926. Principles of Literary Criticism, 2nd ed. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. (Original work published 1924) Ridley, Aaron. 1997. Not Ideal: Collingwoods Expression Theory. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 55:3, Summer. 263-272. Ritvo, Harriet. 1997. The Platypus and the Mermaid and Other Figments of the Classifying Imagination. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press. Robinson, Gillian and John Rundell (eds.). 1994. Rethinking Imagination. Culture and Creativity. London and New York: Routledge. Rodi, Frithjof. 1985. Hermeneutics and the Meaning of Life: A Critique of Gadamers Interpretation of Dilthey. In Hugh J. Silverman and Don Ihde (eds.), Hermeneutics and Deconstruction. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 82-90. Rosenberg, Bruce A. 1986. Was There a Popular Culture in the Middle Ages?. In Campbell 1986: 152-157. Ryle, Gilbert. 1949/1990. The Concept of Mind. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Sandbacka, Carola. 1987. Understanding Other Cultures. Studies in the Philosophical Problems of Cross-Cultural Interpretation. Acta Philosophica Fennica 42. Helsinki: The Philosophical Society of Finland. Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1940/1978. The Psychology of Imagination. London: Methuen. Savage-Rumbaugh, Sue, Stuart G. Shanker and Talbot J. Taylor. 1998. Apes, Language, and the Human Mind. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schleiermacher, Friedrich. 1799/1988. On Religion. Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press. Scruton, Roger. 1974/1982. Art and Imagination. A Study in the Philosophy of Mind. London et al.: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Scruton, Roger. 1983. The Aesthetic Understanding. Essays in the Philosophy of Art and Culture. London and New York: Methuen. Sebeok, Thomas A. 1994. Some Reflections of Vico in Semiotics. In Danesi and Nuessel 1994b: 113-124.

Shore, Bradd. 1996. Culture in Mind. Cognition, Culture, and the Problem of Meaning. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Snow, C. P. 1959/1964. The Two Cultures: and a Second Look. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Soja, Edward W. 1996. Thirdspace. Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Spinoza, Benedictus de. 1677/1989. Ethics. Ed. and rev. transl. G.H.R. Parkinson; trans. A. Boyle. London: J. M. Dent & Sons. Stallybrass, Peter and Allon White. 1986. The Politics and Poetics of Transgression. London: Methuen. Storey, Robert. 1996. Mimesis and the Human Animal: On the Biogenetic Foundations of Literary Representation. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Tagliacozzo, Giorgio and Donald Phillip Verene (eds.). 1976. Giambattista Vicos Science of Humanity . Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Taylor, Mark C. and Esa Saarinen. 1994. Imagologies: Media Philosophy. London: Routledge. Tooby, John and Leda Cosmides. 1992. The Psychological Foundations of Culture. In Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (eds.),Th e Adapted Mind. Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 19-136. Turner, Mark. 1996. The Literary Mind. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Turner, Victor (W(. 1982. From Ritual to Theatre. The Human Seriousness of Play. New York: PAJ Publications. Turner, Victor W. 1986. Dewey, Dilthey, and Drama: An Essay in the Anthropology of Experience. In Victor W. Turner and Edward M. Bruner (eds.), The Anthropology of Experience. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 33-44. Tuttle, Howard N. 1976. The Epistemological Status of the Cultural World in Vico and Dilthey. In Tagliacozzo and Verene 1976: 241-250. Verene, Donald Phillip. 1981. Vicos Science of Imagination . Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Verene, Donald P(hillip(. 1994. Vicos Education. In Danesi and Nuessel 1994b: 135-146. Vico, Giambattista. 1708-09/1990. On the Study Methods of Our Time. Trans. E. Gianturco. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Vico, Giambattista. 1744/1984. The New Science of Giambattista Vico. Unabridged Translation of the Third Edition (1744) with the addition of Practic of the New Science. Trans. T.G. Bergin and M.H. Fisch. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Warnock, Mary. 1972/1978. Introduction. In Sartre 1940/1978: ix-xvii. Warnock, Mary. 1976. Imagination. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Warnock, Mary. 1994. Imagination and Time. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Websters Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language . 1989. New York: Portland House. White, Alan R. 1990. The Language of Imagination. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. White, Hayden, 1973. Metahistory. The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. White, Hayden. 1978/1987. Tropics of Discourse. Essays in Cultural Criticism. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953/1991. Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wollheim, Richard. 1984. The Thread of Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Zerubavel, Eviatar. 1997/1999. Social Mindscapes. An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press.