What next?

Egypt's Tamarod movement is a disparate blend of liberal, secular and Islamist groups united in their shared desire to see President Mohammed Morsi deposed. Finally they provoked the military establishment to expel Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood-led government from office on July 3. However, this undemocratic desire has two shortcomings: Tamarod relied on the army to bring the incumbent government down, and the military may never willingly leave the political scene without creating a tutelary system by which it will hold the reins. The second problem is maintaining cohesion among the opposition coalition. Previously Tamarod and the other elements of the opposition could not avoid the fracturing infighting that helped the Muslim Brotherhood to rise to power. The Tamarod movement made its debut at the beginning of May, with activities that reached the dimension of mass rallies, creating enough momentum to usher in the military coup. The military duly removed elected President Morsi from office and replaced him with Adly Mansour, head of the Supreme Court, dissolved the Islamist-dominated Shura Council and suspended the constitution. The question is whether these extra-political changes will remove or ease most of the structural problems of Egypt and bring a better government than that of the Muslim Brotherhood. Let us look at some of the basic problems that the former government was not able to overcome: The Morsi government was never able to secure the loyalty of the country's police and other domestic security forces. In fact, members of the police and other security organizations held persistent strikes and demonstrations in demand of better work conditions and benefits. They wanted better equipment and higher quality weapons. They also insisted that their inefficient and unresponsive superiors be changed. Their protests reached such dimensions that the military was called on at times to police the police and to take care of security. Relying on the military to contain the police and the domestic security apparatus severely undermined the government's ability to govern. Relying on the army for internal security made the Muslim Brotherhood government look incapable in the eyes of both the people and the army alike. The Egyptian judiciary was mainly a holdover of former President Hosni Mubarak. Many of the judges appointed by him remained loyal to entrenched interests of the ancient regime at the core of which was the military. The courts made it virtually impossible to make a new constitution and hold new elections. Mr. Morsi's attempt to adopt a younger mandatory retirement age was met as an existential threat by the judges. Morsi made his most critical move in November of last year to overcome the obstructions of the bureaucracy and the judiciary by declaring that he would rule by executive order to circumvent judicial review. This was interpreted by many segments of society and the establishment as building an unaccountable autocratic rule on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood. Tamarod made its existence known at this juncture. It attracted an assortment of opposition groups and galvanized the widespread disappointment of the people exacerbated by insurmountable economic problems that have and will haunt every government in office. Setting aside the military, let us highlight the position of two main political actors in Egyptian politics that will determine the future of the country. One is Tamarod. If this coalition of interests and organizations wants to remain politically relevant, it has to transform itself from being an amorphous body and a critical voice to a determined political organization with defined goals and principles. So far it lacks these qualities. The second is the Muslim Brotherhood, now under duress and defiant. It must never be underestimated because it is the world's oldest and largest Islamist movement. Currently it has decided to denounce the coup and engage in protests. This stance will likely result in violence. But eventually, knowing the technology to survive as a patient opposition group, it will revive itself by adapting to new conditions and building new coalitions given the fact that the new military-backed government will not survive long in the face of looming economic and political problems. The Muslim Brotherhood is a political party, hence a civic organization, and it is unlikely that its opposition will be armed. With a wide network in the society and conveyer of the wish of the underdog to have a say in the political system, the Brotherhood will always have bargaining power and a place in the power structure. Any design that excludes this group will fail to bring peace and stability to Egypt. But the Brotherhood must know its limitations and be able to reconcile with diverse groups on a common

agenda. This means working with political and ideological competitors. The first step ought to be pulling its members from the streets and letting calm return to allow settlement of the mud in politics.