Maternity Children’s Hospital vs. Secretary of Labor G.R. No.

78909 June 30 1984 Labor Law Defined Facts: Petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by the Board of Directors of the Cagayan de Oro Women's Club and Puericulture Center, headed by Mrs. Antera Dorado, as holdover President. The hospital derives its finances from the club itself as well as from paying patients, averaging 130 per month. It is also partly subsidized by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Cagayan De Oro City government. Petitioner has forty-one (41) employees. Aside from salary and living allowances, the employees are given food, but the amount spent therefor is deducted from their respective salaries (pp. 77-78, Rollo). On May 23, 1986, ten (10) employees of the petitioner employed in different capacities/positions filed a complaint with the Office of the Regional Director of Labor and Employment, Region X, for underpayment of their salaries and ECOLAS, which was docketed as ROX Case No. CW-71-86. The Regional Director issued and order based on the reports of the Labor Standard and Welfare Officers, directing payment of P723, 888.58 representing underpayment of wages and ECOLAs to all the petitioner’s employees. Petitioner appealed to the Minister of Labor and Employment which modified the decision as to the period for the payment ECOLAs only. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner and was denied by the Secretary of Labor. Held: Labor standards refer to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules, and regulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary and welfare benefits, including occupational, safety, and health standards (Section 7, Rule I, Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Office, dated September 16, 1987).

Calalang vs. Williams Case Digest Calalang vs. Williams [GR 47800, 2 December 1940]

Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila Issues: Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power? Ruling: There is no undue deleagation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines” and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic “whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest.” The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

3958. A close perusal of the last part of section 1 of Act No. 1924 Facts: The accused being the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela. The constitution of the Philippine Islands guarantees to every citizen his liberty and one of his liberties is the liberty to contract. which was long due and payable. The lower court. did then and there willfully. Article III. upon which the complaint was based were illegal. as last amended by section 1 of Act No. deprived of their liberty to contract. No. 2549. and to pay the costs. the said Macaria Fajardo. In both cases the deceit or fraud is the essential element constituting the offense. The fiscal appealed from said order. which considers as an offense the facts alleged in the information. Clearly. It ignores the necessities of the employer by compelling him to pay not less than a certain sum. will show that its language refers only to the employer who. To said complaint. a tobacco factory pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas. declaring unconstitutional the last part of section 1 of Act No. as amended by Acts Nos. and in not declaring section 13 of Act No. We do not believe that this constitutional provision has been correctly applied in this case. reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery. From that sentence the defendant appealed. and the nonpayment of the salary within the periods specified is considered as a violation of the law. The first case is a violation of Act No. Such persons are. 3958. The Court of Appeal held that the last part of section 1 of Act No. shop or place of labor of any description. 3071. 3071. to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. In the appeal. and. the salaries of his employees or laborers on the fifteenth or last day of every month or on Saturday of every week. the right to contract to labor or for labor. in his capacity as president and general manager of the Consolidated Mines. 2549. 3958. having failed to pay the salary. but to refuse to labor. No. should prove satisfactorily that it was impossible to make such payment. and to refuse to make such contracts. in accordance with the provisions of section 15 of said Act. and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50. and reversed the appealed order with instructions to the lower court to proceed with the trial of the criminal case until it is terminated. firm. at an agreed salary of P35 a month willfully and illegally refused to pay the salary of said stenographer corresponding to the above-mentioned period of time.y of July. 1936. having engaged the services of Severa Velasco de Vera as stenographer. Hence. and in dismissing the cause.People vs Vera Reyes G. by reason of her pregnancy. and dismissed the case. The information alleged that from September 9 to October 28. Philippine currency. 2549. in spite of her repeated demands. every person. So ordered. 3958 is constitutional and valid? Held: The court held that this provision is null because it violates the provision of section 1 (12). the Solicitor-General contends that the court erred in declaring Act No. and now makes the following assignments of error: That the court erred in overruling the demurrer. and to terminate such contracts. as last amended by section 1 of Act No. The law creates a term in every such contract. without the consent of the parties. as amended by section 1 of Act No. 3958 unconstitutional. for the reason that it violates the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. is valid. the law has deprived. G. The statute now under consideration is attacked upon the ground that it authorizes an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract including within the guarantees of the due process clause of the 5th Amendment. in convicting him of the crime charged in the information. liberty or property without due process of law. 2549 as last amended by Act No. 3071 are a reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state Held: Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of its supposed police power. the privilege of abandoning his business as an alternative for going on at a loss. and is no longer open to question. 1939 Facts: The defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila by the assistant city fiscal with a violation of Act No.R. An employer so circumstanced is not unlike a person who defrauds another. when he can do so. That the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual protected by this clause is settled by the decision of this court. unlawfully. defendant-appellant. to a certain extent. the court sustained the demurrer.. unconstitutional. not only whether the employee is capable of earning it. with only two days extension. 1923. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS." and of insuring to them. without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance. shop or place of labor of any description within the Philippine Islands. without justification and to the prejudice of the laborer or employee. found the defendant guilty of the alleged offense described in the complaint. or corporation owning or managing a factory. which provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. vs. L-45748 April 5. the defendant contended that the provisions of said Act No. with the praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory. 3085 and 3958. It has been decided in a long line of decisions of . consequently. of the Constitution. 1923. being able to make payment. After the hearing. Issue: Whether or not the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of Act No. unconstitutional and void. therefore. to which she was entitled as her regular wages corresponding to thirty days before and thirty days after her delivery and confinement which took place on the 12th day of August. JULIO POMAR. plaintiffappellee. L-22008 November 3. 2549. In either case the offender cannot certainly invoke the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. Liberty includes not only the right to labor. and feloniously fail and refuse to pay to said woman the sum of eighty pesos (P80). 3958 considers as illegal the refusal of an employer to pay. of his right to enter into contracts of employment upon such terms as he and the employee may agree upon. upon said accused. which guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life. but irrespective of the ability of his business to sustain the burden. a corporation duly authorized to transact business and the petitioner Macaria Fajardo. to do so.. whom he granted vacation leave which began on the 16th d. of course. despite and over the demands made by her. The same Act exempts from criminal responsibility the employer who. and the second is estafa punished by the Revised Penal Code. Issue: (a) W/N the last part of section 1 of Act No. therefore. The last part of section 1 of Act No. The law takes account of the necessities of only one party to the contract. the accused. with costs de oficio. we are of the opinion that this Act contravenes those provisions of the state and Federal constitutions. 3958. shall abstain or refuse to do so. generously leaving him. by refusing to pay his just debt.R. 2549 as last amended by Act No.

Whether or not the plaintiff has a right to recover for damages under the Employer’s Liability Act (Act No.The men of the deceased's gang were filling the west end. It was only necessary that the danger in the work be notenhanced through his fault. to exist.) CEREZO VS THE ATLANTIC & PACIFIC COMPANYG. burying him to his neck in dirt. that the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual. in so far as the deceased was concerned. Ithas not been shown that the deceased had received orders from the defendant to enter the trench at thispoint. (Art.assisting in laying gas pipes on Calle Herran in the city of Manila.00. on the 7th of July. and the pipes were laid therein up to that point. 1916. in that they violate and are contrary to the provisions of the first paragraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of the United States of August 29. While. together with interestand costs. of Act No. The trench at the placewhere the accident occurred was between 3 and 4 feet deep. that the contracting parties may establish any agreements.250. No. and conditions they may deem advisable. 1255. . (Vol. the bank caved in. and to furnish him with a reasonably safe place to work judgment was entered in a favor of the plaintiff for the sum of ₱1. provided they are not contrary to law.) For all of the foregoing reasons. and there was no work in the progress at theeast end of the trench. It is provided further that. Jorge Ocumen. 238. that the provisions of section 13.R. Public Laws. 1874) or the Civil Code. The Plaintiff cannot recover from neither laws.nor that did the defendant acquiesce in the using of this place for these purposes. 12. terms.the Supreme Court of the United States. 1913.appellant:Clara Cerezo Defendant-appellant: The Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company FACTS: The deceased was an employee of the defendant as a day laborer on the 8th of July. p. the defendant was under no dutyto the deceased except to do him no intentional injury. we are fully persuaded. protected by the "due process of law" clause of the constitution. But the master was not an insurer and was not required to provide the safestpossible plant or to adopt the latest improvements or to warrant against latent defects which areasonable inspection did not disclose. under the facts and the law. The digging of the trench wascompleted both ways from the cross-trench in Calle Paz. Whether or not it is necessary to determine the effect of the former upon the law of industrialaccidents in this country? HELD: 1. At the time of the accident the place where the deceased's duty of refillingthe trench required him to be was at the west end. 1916 Plaintiff. and 2. There is no contention that there was any dangerwhatever in the refilling of the trench. in the absence of a showingthat the soil was of a loose character or the place itself was dangerous. Shortly after the deceased entered the trench at the east end to answer a call ofnature.An action for damages was instated against the defendant for negligently causing the death of theplaintiff's son. ISSUES: 1. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature. and (2) that although the relationof master and servant may not have ceased. for the time being. are unconstitutional and void. an overwhelming jurisprudence holds master wasbound to exercise that measure of care which reasonably prudent men take under similarcircumstances. where he died before he could be released. Defendant appealed. L-10107 Date:February 4. Nothing remained to be done there exceptto refill the trench as soon as the pipes were connected. Civil Code. on the other hand. morals or public policy. The refilling was delayed at that place until thecompletion of the connection. nor that the trench had been prepared by the defendant as a place to be used as a water-closet. the defendant urges (1) that it was under noobligation. The rule in this jurisdiction is. to brace the trench. 1913The plaintiff insists that the defendant was negligent in failing to shore or brace the trench at theplace where the accident occurred.

Experience and common sensedemonstrate that ordinarily no danger to employees is to be anticipated from such a trench asthat in question.Hence. The cause of Ocumen's death was not the weight of the earth which fell upon him. it is highly probable that he would have escaped suffocation or even serious injury. Commission Journal 1908." (Special report of the joint committee of the Philippine Legislature on the Employers'Liability Act.. We nowcome to the consideration of Act No. without indicationof their giving way. as its title indicates. and no doubt the full significance of such a doctrine was one of the impelling causes which expedited the passage of the Act. the accident was of a most unusual character.L. therefore. Rul.R. 296. Cas. Civil Code). This was just two years before the enactment of the Employers' Liability Act of 1880. The event properly comes within the class of those which could not be foreseen. defining the exact meaning of the provision of thelaw. Upon a full consideration of the evidence.) We agree with the Supreme Court ofMassachusetts that the Act should be liberally construed in favor of employees.. the defendant is not liable under the Civil Code (Article 1105. Merry (L. as we have indicated. To require the company to guard against such an accident as the one in question wouldvirtually compel it to shore up every foot of the miles of trenches dug by it in the city of Manila forthe gas mains. strongly indicates that the necessity for bracing or shoring the trench wasremote. Act No. 1874 for the purpose of determining what effect this Act hashad upon the law of damages in personal injury cases in this country. 19 Eng. was. definitely settled by the House of Lords in the case of Wilson vs.the right of the master to shift responsibility for the performance of all or at least most of these personal duties to the shoulders of a subordinate and thereby escape liability for the injuries suffered by his workmen through his non-performance of these duties. butwas due to suffocation. The fact that the walls had maintained themselves for a week. essentially a copy of the Massachusetts Employers' Liability Actwhich has "prevailed in the State of Massachusetts some years and upon which interpretationshave been made by the Massachusetts courts. was to extend the liability of employers and to renderthem liable in damages for certain classes of personal injuries for which it was thought they wereliable under the law prior to the passage of the Act. Had he been evenhalf-erect. 1874 is essentially a copy of the Massachusetts Employers' Liability Act. 2. bearing in mind that theAct is. The mainpurpose of the Act. 326. . Sc. p.1 England. and chiefly accounts for the presence in it of subsection 1 of section 1. He was sitting or squatting when the slide gave way. Appl Cas. we are clearly of the opinion thatordinary care did not require the shoring of the trench walls at the place where the deceased methis death. Yes. 132).

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