MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

Foreign Ballistic Missile Capabilities

APRIL 2009

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited. Approved for Public Release 09-MDA-4495 (10 APR 09)

This

Missile

Defense

Agency

publication

was

developed to provide an unclassified picture of the ballistic missile capabilities of foreign countries. This publication was developed from a series of U.S. government Intelligence Community documents, testimony from senior Intelligence Community leaders, and Department of Defense documents. Please see the attached endnotes for complete sourcing.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page Introduction Ballistic Missile Basics Overview of Select Ballistic Missile Programs Select Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs) Select Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) and Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) Select Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) Select Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Summary Endnotes 1 1 3 6 10 16 20 22 26 27

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INTRODUCTION
Ballistic missiles are attractive to many nations because they can be used effectively against an adversary with a formidable air defense system where an attack with manned aircraft would be too impractical or costly. Additionally, missiles can be used as a deterrent or as an instrument of terror. Missiles also offer the advantage of fewer maintenance, training, and logistical requirements than manned aircraft. Even limited use of these weapons can be devastating because ballistic missiles can be armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads.1 Ballistic missile capabilities continue to increase with the proliferation of missile technology. Over 20 countries have ballistic missile systems and it is likely that missiles will be a threat in future conflicts involving U.S. forces. Ballistic missiles have been used in several conflicts over the last 20 years, including the Iran-Iraq war, the Afghan civil war, the war in Yemen, the 1991 and 2003 Persian Gulf conflicts, and the Russian military action in Chechnya. 2 In order to better understand ballistic missile capabilities, this document addresses ballistic missile basics, characteristics, proliferation, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from select ballistic missile capable countries.

BALLISTIC MISSILE BASICS
WHAT IS A BALLISTIC MISSILE? Ballistic missiles are a means to rapidly and accurately deliver a lethal payload to a target.3 Once its fuel has been consumed, the ballistic missile (or, more commonly, a weaponcarrying payload that separates from the booster section) follows an elliptical orbit around the center of the Earth, defined strictly by the combination of velocity/flight angle at burnout and the Earth’s gravity. By careful control of the missile during its powered flight, the payload can be very accurately placed at the desired target point. 4 Operational ballistic missiles are deployed in silos, on submarines, and on land-mobile launchers. Mobile missiles are favored by many nations because they can be hidden, which greatly increases their survivability.5 In many short-range ballistic missiles, the entire missile remains intact until the warhead detonates. In longer-range ballistic missiles, warheads are contained in separating reentry vehicles (RVs). Some long-range ballistic missiles carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), which hold up to 10 RVs per missile. RVs reenter the Earth’s atmosphere at very high velocities, on the order of 4-5 miles per second. 6

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Ballistic missiles are composed of one or more stages. Multiple-stage missiles, which are configured so that each stage has its own independent propulsion system, are more efficient for longer range missions.7 Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) typically have two or three stages with powerful liquid-propellant engines or solid propellant motors that propel the payload toward the target, as well as a post-boost vehicle (PBV) with a much smaller propulsion system. Some RVs, defined as maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs), have independent maneuvering capability.8 MISSILE COMPONENTS All ballistic missiles are made up of three essential elements: a propulsion system, which provides the energy necessary to reach the target; a guidance system, which controls steering of the missile during powered flight and ensures the correct initial conditions for the ballistic trajectory; and the payload, which destroys the target.9 Propulsion Rocket propulsion involves combining fuel and an oxidizer in a combustion chamber, in which chemical reactions produce a high-pressure, high temperature gas. Exhausting that gas produces a thrust that propels the missile.10 Ballistic missiles can use solid or liquid propellant rocket propulsion systems. In general, liquid systems are somewhat more energetic than solid systems because liquid fuels and oxidizers that yield more energy can be chosen. The advantage of solid propellant systems is that they are rugged, easily stored, transportable, and have no moving parts. Ballistic Missile Components The trend in modern missile systems has been toward the use of solid propellants because of their simplicity of operation and reduced logistical requirements; however, some countries have greater access to liquid propellant technology and, therefore, continue to develop new liquid propellant missiles.11 Guidance System The accuracy of a ballistic missile depends on its ability to achieve an exact velocity and location in space at the end of its powered flight. Ensuring that this velocity and location are precisely attained is the job of the guidance and control system. Throughout the powered phase of flight, the instruments in the inertial navigation system (INS) must continually sense all the components of the missile’s acceleration. The guidance computer uses these sensed
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accelerations to determine the missile’s “state” (velocity, location, and orientation) and sends corrective messages to the missile’s steering system to eliminate deviations from the required flight profile.12 Payload The function of the ballistic missile payload subsystem is to ensure that the weapon reaches the target and detonates at the correct time and place.13 Ballistic missile payloads can be nuclear, conventional, or chemical/biological. Chemical and biological weapons have also been incorporated into payload systems for short-range ballistic missiles. The effectiveness of these designs, and their ability to be scaled to longer ranges, is speculative.14 BALLISTIC MISSILES CLASSES AND RANGE 15 Ballistic Missiles are classified into the following categories. Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM): < 1,000 km Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM): 1,000-3,000 km Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM): 3,000-5,500 km Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM): > 5,500 km Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM): Any ballistic missile launched from a submarine, regardless of maximum range Space Launch Vehicle (SLV): Used to deliver a payload to orbit

OVERVIEW OF SELECT BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS
Many countries view ballistic missile systems as cost-effective weapons and symbols of national power. In addition, they present an asymmetric threat to U.S. airpower. Many ballistic missiles are armed with weapons of mass destruction. North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile development program and has exported missile technology to other countries, including Iran and Pakistan. On 4 and 5 July 2006, North Korea flight-tested the Taepo Dong-2 SLV/ICBM for the first time, which failed shortly after launch. At the same time it successfully flight tested six theater ballistic missiles. These successes demonstrated the capability to target U.S. forces and allies in South Korea and Japan.16 In April 2009 North Korea launched the TD-2 for the second time in a failed attempt to orbit a satellite.17
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Iran has an extensive missile development program and has received support from entities in Russia, China, and North Korea.18 Beyond the steady growth in its missile and rocket inventories, Iran has boosted the lethality and effectiveness of existing systems with accuracy improvements and new submunition payloads. Iran has publicized exercises featuring missile launches.19 China’s deployed missile inventory includes nuclear-armed ICBMs, IRBMs and MRBMs, and conventional MRBMs and SRBMs. China’s nuclear force is becoming more survivable with the deployment of DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile ICBMs and the eventual deployment of the JL-2 SLBM. China currently has fewer than 50 ICBMs capable of targeting the United States; however, the number of ICBM warheads capable of reaching the United States could more than double in the next 15 years, DF-31 especially if MIRVs are employed. China has fielded over 1,000 CSS-6 and CSS-7 conventional SRBMs opposite Taiwan. It also is developing more capable conventional missiles able to range U.S. and allied military installations in the region. Chinese conventional missile upgrades may include MaRVs with multiple constellation, satellite-aided navigation and terminal guidance.20 Russia still has several thousand nuclear warheads deployed on ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States, and is expected to retain the largest force of strategic ballistic missiles outside the United States.21 India views the development and possession of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles as symbols of world power and an important component of self-reliance. New Delhi believes that a nuclear-capable missile is necessary to deter Pakistani first use of nuclear weapons and preserve the option to wage a limited conventional war. 22 It has development and production infrastructures for both solid- and liquid-propellant missiles. India’s ballistic Noble Prophet 2 missile programs have benefited from the acquisition of foreign equipment and technology, especially from Russia. 23 Since the 1980s, Pakistan has pursued an indigenous ballistic missile development capability in order to avoid reliance on any foreign entity.24 Pakistan’s goal is to produce increasingly longer-range missiles.25 Pakistan has development and production facilities for both solid- and liquid-propellant missiles;26 however, Pakistan likely will continue to require significant foreign assistance in key technologies for several years. 27
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PROLIFERATION TRENDS Transfers of technologies, components and raw materials support WMD and missile programs development, especially across the Middle East and South Asia. Such technology transfers have lasting consequences. China’s provision of solid-propellant missile technology more than 15 years ago helped Pakistan develop the Shaheen II medium-range and Abdali short-range ballistic missiles. Other examples include an agreement between China and Turkey regarding an SRBM, Beijing’s active marketing of their latest developmental SRBM, the P12; and Egyptian Scud production from North Korea. 28 While some of these transferred items are proscribed under various WMDrelated control regimes, many others are dual-use with legitimate industrial applications. Examples include: multiaxis computer numerically controlled machine tools that have applications in nuclear and missile programs, but Shaheen II are also commonly used throughout legitimate industry. Specialty metals such as 7000-series aluminum used in nuclear and missile programs are also commonly used in aircraft and other industries. 29 Most state programs now emphasize selfsufficiency to reduce reliance upon external suppliers, and limit their vulnerability to detection and interdiction. Iranian weapon makers advertise their ability to manufacture guidance and control components, such as dynamically tuned gyros. Instead of importing ballistic missile systems, Tehran now produces the Scud B and C, Shahab 3 and Fateh-110 even though it still depends on outside sources for many of the related dual-use raw materials and components. 30 Consequently, as some countries forego imports in favor of indigenous WMD-related production, they position themselves anew as potential “secondary proliferators.” One example is North Korea’s proliferation of ballistic missile systems based on Soviet-designed Scud missiles acquired Shahab 3 in the 1980s.31 North Korea has exported missile technology to Iran and Pakistan. 32 For example, Iran’s Shahab 3 MRBM is based on the North Korean No Dong.33
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Even though most advanced nations cooperate against WMD proliferation, a number of trends beyond direct government control still fuel proliferation. They include commercial scientific advances, the availability of relevant dualuse studies and information, scientists’ enthusiasm for sharing their research and the availability of dual-use training and education.34 LAUNCH TRENDS
Pakistani Ghauri MRBM

Key countries with ballistic missile development programs, including North Korea, Iran, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and Syria have conducted several hundred launches of ballistic missiles over the past decade. This includes short-range, medium-range, intermediate-range, intercontinental, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 35 The two countries launching the majority of these ballistic missiles in the past decade are China and Russia, accounting for eighty to ninety percent of all ballistic missile launches. Although both China and Russia have conducted a large number of flight tests, a large percentage of the Russian launches include several hundred combat launches against Chechnya between 1999 and 2003. In the past five years, China has steadily increased its average number of ballistic missile launches per year, showing an increased emphasis on the development and testing of ballistic missiles. 36 North Korea, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Syria have averaged much smaller numbers of ballistic missile launches per year over the past decade. Two notable exceptions to this have been North Korea’s launch of seven ballistic missiles in July 2006, and Iran’s launch of nine missiles and rockets of various types during an exercise in July 2008. 37

SS-27 Launch

SELECT INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBMs) AND SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES (SLVs)
Very few countries have developed and deployed ICBMs. For several countries ICBM development has coincided with SLV development because of the commonality of

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required technology. As an example, when North Korea launched a three-stage Taepo Dong-1 (TD-1) MRBM in 1998, it publicly characterized it as an SLV. 38 Although the small third stage failed to place a satellite in orbit, the two-stage missile booster apparently performed successfully.39 The launch demonstrated several key technologies required to develop an ICBM, including stage separation. The existence of a third stage itself was an unanticipated development in the North Korean ballistic missile program.40 NORTH KOREA North Korea continues to develop the Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2), a two- or three-stage liquid-propellant missile 41 capable of carrying a nuclear payload.42 The two-stage TD-2 option could deliver a several-hundred-kg payload up to 10,000 km, which is sufficient to strike Alaska, Hawaii, and parts of the continental United States.43 A three-stage option could deliver a several-hundred-kg payload up to 15,000 km, which is sufficient to strike all of North America if the third stage is similar to the one used on the TD-1 in 1998. 44 The TD-2 may be exported to other countries in the future. 45 North Korea conducted the first test launch of the TD-2 on 4 July 2006 from the Taepo Dong test site. This launch, which failed in flight less than one minute after launch, could have been a test of a long-range missile or an attempted satellite launch. 46

TD-2 Launch 2009

North Korea launched a TD-2 missile on 5 April 2009 as a space launch vehicle. The launch failed: stage one of the missile fell into the Sea of Japan and the remaining stages along with the payload itself landed in the Pacific Ocean.47 IRAN Iran does not yet have the technical capability to produce an ICBM, but it is believed they may develop one by 2015.48 Iran has continued research and development on its longer range ballistic missile programs and has publicly reiterated its commitment to developing SLVs, which contain most of the key building blocks for an ICBM. 49 Iran launched its Safir SLV on 17 August 2008 in a failed attempt to orbit its indigenously produced Omid satellite.50 On 2 February 2009 Iran again launched a Safir SLV, successfully inserting the Omid satellite into orbit.51 This success shows progress in some technologies relevant to ICBMs.52

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CHINA China is qualitatively and quantitatively improving its strategic forces. Currently, China has less than 50 ICBMs capable of targeting the United States; however, the number of ICBM warheads capable of reaching the United States could more than double in the next 15 years, especially if MIRVs are employed. This includes approximately 20 silo-based, nuclear-armed, liquid-propellant CSS-4 ICBMs.53 China has been developing advanced new mobile, solid-propellant ICBMs, including the solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-31 and DF-31A ICBMs, which were deployed respectively in 2006 and 2007. The DF31 is a three-stage missile carried inside a canister. CSS-4 Launch The deployment of roadmobile ICBMs will enhance the survivability of the Chinese strategic missile force. The DF-31 will be capable of reaching targets throughout Europe and Asia as well as parts of Canada and the northwestern United States. 54 The DF-31A, with a range of 11,200 km, can target any location in DF-31 ICBM in Transit the continental United States (CONUS). 55 RUSSIA Russia views its strategic missile forces, especially its nuclear-armed missiles, as a symbol of great power status and a key deterrent.56 Although the size of the Russian ICBM force will continue to decrease because of arms control agreements, aging missiles, and resource constraints, Russia probably will retain the largest ICBM force outside the United States. 57 Efforts to maintain and modernize the force are underway. The Russian SS-27 ICBM, a missile designed with countermeasures to ballistic missile defense systems, is now deployed in silos in five regiments. Prime Minister Putin and other Russian officials claim that a new class of hypersonic vehicle is being developed to allow Russian strategic missiles to penetrate missile defense systems. 58 Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) SS-27 is extending the service life of its older ICBMs – silo-based SS-18s and SS-19s, and road-mobile SS-25s – in part to compensate for the slow deployment of the SS-27. 59

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Representative ICBMs

ICBM Characteristics60
Missile Taepo Dong-2 CSS-3 CSS-4 Mod 1 CSS-4 Mod 2 DF-31 DF-31A SS-18 Mod 4 SS-18 Mod 5 SS-19 Mod 3 SS-25 SS-27 New ICBM Producer and / or User North Korea China China China China China Russia Russia Russia Russia Russia Russia Number of Stages 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 + PBV 2 + PBV 2 + PBV 3 + PBV 3 + PBV Unknown Warheads per Missile 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 10 6 1 1 Unknown –9– Propellant Liquid Liquid Liquid Liquid Solid Solid Liquid Liquid Liquid Solid Solid Solid Deployment Mode Unknown Silo / transportable Silo Silo Road-mobile Mobile Silo Silo Silo Road-mobile Silo / Road-mobile Silo / mobile Maximum Range (km) 5,440+ 5,440+ 12,800+ 12,800+ 7,200+ 11,200+ 8,800+ 9,600+ 8,800+ 11,200+ 11,200+ 8,800+

SELECT MEDIUM-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES (MRBMs) AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES (IRBMs)
New MRBM and/or IRBM systems are in development in North Korea, Iran, China, India, and Pakistan. These are strategic systems, and most will be armed with nonconventional warheads. Russia no longer produces or retains any MRBM or IRBM systems because they are banned by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which entered into force in 1988. China has been very active in its development of MRBMs. 61 NORTH KOREA

Chinese MRBM / IRBM Range Rings

North Korean MRBM / IRBM Range Rings

North Korea has fewer than 50 launchers62 for its indigenously-developed No Dong MRBM, which uses a scaled-up Scud engine. It can threaten Japan, South Korea, and U.S. bases in the vicinity of North Korea. It was first flight-tested in 1993.63 Pakistan’s Ghauri and Iran’s Shahab-3 MRBMs are based on the No Dong.64 North Korea is also developing a new IRBM65 that has not been flight-tested to date, but could be exported to other countries. 66 IRAN The Iranian Shahab 3 MRBM is based on the North Korean No Dong missile. Iran modified the Shahab 3 to extend its range and effectiveness and has claimed to have tested an improved version of the Shahab 3 in 2004. Subsequent statements by Iranian officials suggest the range is up to 2,000 km for the improved Shahab 3, with the capability to mass produce Shahab 3 missiles.67 Iran is focusing its main developmental efforts on the improved version of its Shahab 3 MRBM, including a new type of RV. 68
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Shahab 3

Tehran is developing the new 2,000 km range Ashura MRBM.69 Iran has also indicated it has a solid-propellant MRBM in development,70 and it may seek to develop additional longer-range MRBMs and IRBMs. This includes a variant of the North Korean new IRBM which reportedly has been sold to Iran.71

Iranian Theater Ballistic Missile Range Rings

CHINA An area of clear investment for China has involved the pursuit of MRBMs, including the CSS-5, a two-stage, solid-propellant MRBM capable of reaching targets in the Pacific Theater and most of Asia. 72 China is acquiring conventional MRBMs to increase the range to which it can conduct precision strikes, to include targeting naval ships, including aircraft carriers, operating far from China’s shores. 73 China is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) based on a variant of the CSS-5 MRBM as a component of its antiaccess strategy. As described in an Schematic Diagram of the Anti-Ship Ballistic authoritative 2004 article for the Missile’s use of midcourse and terminal guidance to strike an aircraft carrier used in a 2006 article Second Artillery Corps, the ASBM could
from the Second Artillery Engineering College. – 11 –

employ “terminal-sensitive penetrating submunitions” to “destroy the enemy’s carrierborne planes, the control tower and other easily damaged and vital positions.” 74 The ASBM has a range in excess of 1,500 km, is armed with a maneuverable warhead, and when incorporated into a sophisticated command and control system, is intended to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships at sea, including aircraft carriers in the western Pacific Ocean. 75

CSS-5

The PLA has replaced older liquid-fueled nuclear-capable CSS-3 IRBMs with more advanced solid-fueled CSS-5 MRBMs in Western China. 76 China also has fewer than 50 of the CSS-2 IRBM, which is a single-stage, liquid-propellant, limited mobility system with a range of 3,000+ km. China also supplied the CSS-2 to Saudi Arabia. 77

RUSSIA Russia has not fielded any Medium- or IntermediateRange Ballistic Missiles; however, Russian entities have provided substantial missile-related technology, training, and expertise to Iran, which has helped to accelerate Iranian efforts to build new, indigenous ballistic missile systems. Materials and technology obtained from Russia helped hasten Iranian development of the Shahab 3 MRBM. 78 INDIA/PAKISTAN India and Pakistan are continuing development of MRBM systems capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. India has indicated it plans to deploy the new solid-propellant Agni II MRBM. A longer-range Agni III IRBM is also under development.79 The Agni II will allow India to strike all of Pakistan and most of China. 80 The Agni III will allow India to strike targets as far away as Shaheen II Beijing.81 Pakistan conducted the first flight test of its new two-stage, solid-propellant Shaheen II MRBM in 2004. The Shaheen II could have a range of 2,000 km or more, in the same class as the Indian Agni II.82 Pakistan also has the Ghauri single-stage, liquid fueled, road-mobile MRBM which is based on the North Korean No Dong.83 Additionally, Chinese assistance has helped Pakistan move toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant MRBMs.84
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Representative MRBMs and IRBMs

MRBM and IRBM Characteristics85
Missile Producer and / or User Number of Stages Propellant Deployment Mode Maximum Range (km)

No Dong New IRBM Shahab 3 Shahab 3 Variant Ashura New MRBM CSS-2 CSS-5 Mod 1 CSS-5 Mod 2 CSS-5 ASBM Agni II Agni III Ghauri Shaheen II

North Korea North Korea Iran Iran Iran Iran China China China China India India Pakistan Pakistan

1 1 1 1 Unknown Unknown 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 – 13 –

Liquid Liquid Liquid Liquid Unknown Solid Liquid Solid Solid Solid Solid Solid Liquid Solid

Road-mobile Mobile Road-mobile Road-mobile Unknown Unknown Transportable Road-mobile Road-mobile Road-mobile Mobile Mobile Road-mobile Road-mobile

1,300 3,200+ 1,300+ 2,000 2,000 1,920 3,000+ 1,770+ 1,770+ 1,500 2,000+ 3,200+ 1,300 2,000+

FOREIGN BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS
UNITED KINGDOM
Trident D-5

BELARUS
Scud B SS-21

UKRAINE
Scud B SS-21

SYRIA
Scud B/C/D SS-21

TURKMENISTAN
Scud B

KAZAKHSTAN
Scud B SS-21

RUSSIA
SS-21 Mod 2/3 SS-26 Iskander-E Scud B SS-1c Mod 2 SS-18 SS-19 SS-25 SS-27 New ICBM SS-N-18 SS-N-20 CHINA SS-N-23 CSS-6 Sineva CSS-7 Bulava-30 CSS-5 CSS-2 CSS-3 CSS-4 DF-31 DF-31A CSS-NX-3 JL-2

FRANCE
M45 M51

ISRAEL
Jericho 1 Jericho 2

LIBYA
Scud B Al Fatah

NORTH KOREA
Scud B/C No Dong Taepo Dong-1 New IRBM Taepo Dong-2

EGYPT
Scud B

SOUTH KOREA
NHK-1 NHK-A

IRAN
Fateh-110 Scud B/C CSS-8 Shahab 3 Shahab 3 Variant Ashura

VIETNAM SAUDI ARABIA
CSS-2

YEMEN
Scud B SS-21

UAE
Scud B

PAKISTAN
Hatf 1 Ghaznavi Shaheen I Ghauri Shaheen II

INDIA
Prithvi 1/2 Dhanush Agni 1 Agni 2/3 Sagarika
Sources:

Scud B

SRBM MRBM/IRBM ICBM SLBM

National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2006 Congressional Research Service, Ballistic & Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries, 2004 Federal Aviation Administration, Quarterly Launch Report 1997

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SELECT SHORT-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES (SRBMs)
Several countries are now producing and/or developing SRBM systems, while many other countries have purchased missiles or missile technologies from one or more of the missile producers. New SRBM systems are in development in several countries. 86 The Russian SS-1c Mod 1, also called the Scud B, has been exported to more countries than any other type of guided ballistic missile. It has proven to be an adaptable and versatile weapon. For example, the Iraqi Scud missiles used during the 1991 Persian Gulf War had been modified to double their range. North Korea has produced its own version of the Scud B, as well as the Scud C, an extended-range version of the Scud B.87

Scud B

Although the Scud was originally designed as a tactical battlefield support weapon, many countries view it and other SRBM systems as strategic weapons to be used against urban areas. Iraq used extended-range Scud missiles as strategic weapons during both the IranIraq war and the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In the future, other countries could modify Scud missiles to significantly improve their accuracy and use them against high-value military targets and cities. 88 NORTH KOREA North Korea has over 500 Scud missiles available for use against targets on the Korean peninsula,89 including 300 km Scud B and 500 km Scud C SRBMs. 90 North Korea produces both its own version of the Russian Scud B and the Scud C, an indigenous, extended-range version of the Scud B.91 In 2005, North Korea tested a new solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile.92 IRAN Iran has a force of several hundred Scud Bs, Scud Cs, Fateh-110s, and Chinese-made CSS-8 SRBMs.93 Iran also produces Scud missiles with assistance from North Korea.94 Iran has a solidfuel rocket infrastructure and has produced short-range rockets. 95 Iranian engineers are also likely working to improve the accuracy of the country’s SRBMs.96
Fateh-110

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North Korean SRBM Range Rings

Iranian SRBM Range Rings

CHINA China has deployed a very large force of modern solid propellant SRBMs in the vicinity of Taiwan. 97 These include the CSS-7 and CSS-6 single-stage, solid-propellant missiles with ranges of 300 km and 600 km respectively.98 All Chinese SRBMs are mobile and can deploy throughout the country.99 As of September 2008, China had 1,050-1,150 SRBMs and is increasing its inventory at a rate of over 100 missiles per year. While China’s first-generation SRBMs do not possess true precision strike capability, later generations have greater ranges, improved accuracy, and a wider variety of conventional payloads, including unitary and submunition warheads.100 RUSSIA Russian SS-21 and SS-26 SRBMs provide Russian ground forces with a rapid, precision-guided, theater deep-strike capability.101 Russia continues to maintain a significant number of SRBMs, particularly SS-21s and Scuds that were retained from deactivated units. Russia fired SS-21s and Scuds against Chechen forces in the fall of 1999.102 Russia is also offering the advanced new Iskander-E SRBM for export.103 INDIA Indian SRBMs include the Prithvi I and Prithvi II, as well as the ship-launched Dhanush. The Prithvi I is deployed with the Indian Army. 104 The Prithvi II is a modified Prithvi I for use by India’s Air Force. 105 The Dhanush is a naval version of the Prithvi and is undergoing seabased flight tests from an Indian naval surface ship.106 The Indian military is preparing to field several new or updated SRBMs.107

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PAKISTAN Pakistan has several active SRBM programs, including the Ghaznavi.108 Pakistan is attempting to market the Hatf I as an inexpensive and easy to operate system.109 Pakistani officials claim the Shaheen I is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.110

SYRIA

Ghaznavi

Prithvi

Syria has a combined total of several hundred SS-21, Scud B, C, and D SRBMs.111 Syria’s liquid-propellant ballistic missile program continues to depend on foreign equipment and assistance, primarily from North Korean entities. 112 Syria also continues to acquire Scudrelated equipment and materials from North Korea and Iran and produces the Scud C with North Korean assistance. 113 Syria is fielding updated SRBMs to replace older and shorterrange variants.114 LIBYA Libya has pledged to eliminate ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 300 km and payloads greater than 500 kg and to allow immediate inspections and monitoring to verify these actions.115 Libya has disclosed several dozen facilities, including their deployed Scud B sites and their secret North Korean-assisted Scud C production line. 116 The Scud C program has been disbanded, including five completed systems, two partial systems, and all related equipment.117 The Al Fatah is an indigenously-developed, 200 km range SRBM which is currently undergoing testing.118

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Representative SRBMs

SRBM Characteristics119
Missile Producer and / or User Number of Stages Propellant Deployment Mode Maximum Range (km)

Scud B (SS-1C Mod 1) Scud C Fateh-110 CSS-8 CSS-6 CSS-7 SS-21 Mod 2 SS-21 Mod 3 SS-26 Iskander-E Prithvi Prithvi II Agni I Dhanush Hatf I Ghaznavi Shaheen I SS-21 Scud D Al Fatah

North Korea, Iran, Syria, Russia, Libya North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya Iran Iran, China China China Russia Russia Russia Russia India India India India Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Syria Syria Libya

1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Unknown

Liquid Liquid Solid 1st Stage – Solid 2nd Stage – Liquid Solid Solid Liquid Solid Solid Solid Liquid Liquid Solid Liquid Solid Solid Solid Liquid Liquid Liquid

Road-mobile Road-mobile Road-mobile Road-mobile Road-mobile Road-mobile Road-mobile Road-mobile Road-mobile Road-mobile Road-mobile Road-mobile Road-mobile Ship-based Road-mobile Road-mobile Road-mobile Road-mobile Road-mobile Road-mobile

300 500 193 150 600 300 70 120 300+ 272+ 150 250 700 400 80 400 450+ 70 700 200

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SELECT SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES (SLBMs)
CHINA China has no deployed SLBMs. China has designed a new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) called the Type 094, which will carry the new JL-2 SLBM. 120 The JL-2 SLBM is a three-stage, solid-propellant missile. This missile is not yet deployed, but it is capable of a 7,200 km range. The JL-2 is expected to be capable of targeting the entire United States.121 The introduction of a new generation SLBM on China’s new ballistic missile submarine will provide an additional survivable nuclear option.122

CSS-NX-3 SLBM Launch Sequence

The CSS-NX-3 SLBM is a two-stage, solid-propellant missile that is launched from a Xia class SSBN. China has 12 launch tubes, but this missile is not yet deployed. The CSS-NX-3 is capable of a 1,600+ km range. 123 RUSSIA Russia still maintains a substantial force of SSBNs with intercontinental-range missiles. They are developing new and improved SLBM weapon systems to replace its current inventory of Cold War vintage systems. 124 The SS-N-18 SLBM is a two stage, liquidpropellant missile that is launched from a Delta III class SSBN. 125 The SS-N-20 SLBM is a three stage, solid-propellant missile that is launched from a Typhoon class SSBN. 126 The SS-N-23 SLBM is a three stage, liquid-propellant missile that is launched from a Delta IV class SSBN. 127 The Sineva is an upgrade to the SSN-23 and is intended to replace it on Delta IVs. 128 The Bulava-30 SLBM is a new three-stage, solid-propellant missile that is launched from both the Typhoon and Dolgorukiy class SSBNs, but the missile is not yet deployed. 129

Bulava-30 SLBM Launch from a Typhoon

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INDIA India, with Russian assistance, is currently developing an SLBM known as the Sagarika.130 The Sagarika could be operational after 2010.131 UNITED KINGDOM The United Kingdom (U.K.) is committed to retaining an independent nuclear deterrent. As a result of decisions taken by the Government in late 2006, the U.K. will develop a new generation SSBN to replace the current Vanguard-class submarine from the mid 2020s. The U.K. is also participating in the life extension program for the U.S. Navy’s Trident II D-5 SLBM, and is undertaking a review of the optimum life of its current warhead stockpile and analysis of the range of replacement options that might be available. These measures will enable the U.K. to sustain a nuclear deterrent force well into the future.132 FRANCE France has also committed to maintaining a modern nuclear force. In support of this policy, France is committed to the modernization of its sea-based ballistic missile force. Currently, France is developing a new Triomphant-class SSBN to be deployed in 2010; a new SLBM (M-51) to be deployed in 2010; and new warheads for both their SLBMs and air-to-ground missiles. 133

M-51 SLBM

Representative SLBMs – 21 –

SLBM Characteristics130
Missile CSS-NX-3 JL-2 SS-N-18 SS-N-20 SS-N-23 Sineva Bulava-30 Sagarika Producer and / or User China China Russia Russia Russia Russia Russia India Number of Stages 2 3 2 + PBV 3 + PBV 3 + PBV Unknown 3 + PBV Unknown Warheads per Missile 1 1 3 10 4 10 Unknown Unknown Propellant Solid Solid Liquid Solid Liquid Liquid Solid Unknown Submarine Xia Type 094 Delta III Typhoon Delta IV Delta IV Typhoon / Dolgorukiy Unknown Maximum Range (km) 1,600+ 7,200+ 5,600+ 8,800+ 8,000+ 8,000+ 8,000+ 288+

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)
OVERVIEW Ballistic missiles can be armed with conventional or nonconventional warheads. Conventional warheads are filled with a chemical explosive, such as TNT, and rely on the detonation of the explosive and the resulting metal casing fragmentation as kill

Warhead – 22 –

mechanisms. Nonconventional warheads include weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons), as well as nonlethal warheads, a relatively new class of warhead designed to disable equipment rather than harm personnel. Conventional, biological, and chemical weapons can be packaged in unitary (single) warheads and in submunitions (multiple small bomblets that are released at altitude to disperse over a wide area). 135 Almost all of the longer-range ballistic missiles carry nuclear warheads. Most of these warheads have an explosive force that is tens to hundreds of times more powerful than the atomic bombs used in World War II. Chemical and biological weapons are attractive to many Third World countr-ies because they are much easier to produce than nuclear weapons. Many countries with chemical and biological warfare programs Nuclear Explosion also are equipped with ballistic missiles. Accuracy is not very important for these weapons when used against urban areas or large concentrations of military forces. Chemical and biological weapons are capable of producing massive casualties, inducing panic and chaos in civilian populations, and severely degrading military operations. 136 PROLIFERATION The total number of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons in the world is shrinking as the major powers scale back their inventories through unilateral reductions and arms control, but other countries and groups still try to acquire these weapons. About a dozen countries have offensive biological weapons (BW) programs, and the same number have chemical weapons (CW) programs. That number could grow as new technologies are developed and the international flow of information, goods, expertise, and technology continues. Nearly all countries that reportedly have or are seeking nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons also have ballistic missiles.137 Elements in North Korea, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and other countries continue to export weapons technology. The potential for secondary proliferation markets has grown, and concern about the ability of individual actors like the Pakistani nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, to peddle nuclear technology has grown considerably. 138

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COUNTRY INFORMATION North Korea On 10 February 2005, North Korea announced for the first time publicly that it has nuclear arms; they claimed the nuclear weapons development was for self-defense purposes. In October 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test.139 North Korea has pursued biological warfare capabilities since the 1960s. It has acquired dual-use biotechnical equipment, supplies, and reagents that could be used to support biological weapons efforts. 140 North Korea is enhancing its biological weapons potential as it builds a legitimate biotechnology infrastructure and is believed to possess a munitions production infrastructure that would allow agent weaponization. It may have biological weapons available for use. 141 North Korea has a long-standing chemical weapons program.142 It is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and continues to acquire dual-use chemicals that could be weaponized. 143 North Korea’s chemical warfare capabilities include the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking, and blood agent using a sizeable, though aging, chemical industry. It possesses a stockpile of agents and weapons of unknown size, which it could employ by a variety of delivery means. 144 Iran In November 2007, the Intelligence Community judged with high confidence that in Fall 2003 Iran halted its nuclear weapons program, to include weapon design, weaponization work, and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work.145 As of mid-2007 Iran had not restarted the program.146 Although the Intelligence Community judges that Iran does not yet have a nuclear weapon, 147 it is currently developing its nuclear infrastructure, which could produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for a nuclear weapons program.148 The Intelligence Community judges with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.149 Iran’s biological weapons program began during the Iran/Iraq War, employing limited amounts of agent against Iraqi troops.150 Iran has a growing biotechnology industry, significant pharmaceutical experience, and the overall infrastructure that could be used to support a biological warfare program.151 It is believed that Iran maintains offensive chemical and biological weapons capabilities in various stages of development,152 is technically capable of producing at least rudimentary bulk-fill biological warheads for a variety of delivery systems, including missiles,153 and continues to aggressively seek foreign technology, training, and expertise to advance its biotechnology industry.154 Iran has
– 24 –

produced blister, blood, and choking agents, and is believed to be conducting research on nerve agents. 155 Iran also possesses weaponized stockpiles of agents, is capable of agent delivery, and trains military forces to operate in contaminated environments. 156 China China’s 2006 Defense White Paper states that: 1) the purpose of China’s nuclear force is to “deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China;” 2) China “upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons;” and, 3) China “has never entered into and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.” The document reiterated China’s commitment to a declaratory policy of “no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances,” and states China “unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear weapon-free zones.” Doctrinal materials suggest additional missions for China’s nuclear forces include deterring conventional attacks against China nuclear assets or conventional attacks with WMD-like effects, reinforcing China’s great power status, and increasing freedom of action by limiting the extent to which others can coerce China with nuclear threats.157 China continues to maintain some elements of an offensive biological weapons program and possesses a sufficiently advanced biotechnology infrastructure to allow it to develop and produce biological agents.158 While China has affirmed its commitment not to develop BW, it likely has retained elements of its offensive program.159 China is believed to have an advanced chemical warfare program including research and development, production, and weaponization.160 International sales of CW have been a source of foreign exchange.161 Russia Russia maintains a full compliment of nuclear weapons, including a relatively large stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear warheads. Russia also continues research and development that could support its chemical and biological warfare programs.162 India India is building larger stockpiles of fission weapons and is likely working on advanced warhead and delivery system designs to increase the effectiveness of these weapons.163 Additionally, India has the infrastructure to support biological and some aspects of their chemical warfare programs.164 India had five underground nuclear tests in May 1998165 and is capable of manufacturing complete sets of components for plutonium-based nuclear weapons. In the biological arena, India has substantial biotechnical infrastructure and expertise166 and is conducting biological warfare defense research. 167 India acknowledged a chemical warfare program in 1997 and opened its facilities to inspection.168 A sizeable chemical industry could be a source for proliferation and weaponization of dual-use chemicals.169
– 25 –

Syria Syria possesses a biotechnical infrastructure that is adequate to support limited biological warfare programs,170 and it is believed that Syria maintains an offensive biological weapons research and development program.171 Syria is also believed to be pursuing select biological agent development.172 Additionally, Syria has an active chemical weapons program 173 and is currently making improvements to its chemical infrastructure. Syria has developed CW warheads for its Scud missiles, 174 and it continues to seek CW related expertise from foreign sources, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. 175 In September 2007, Israel bombed a covert nuclear reactor in eastern Syria. North Korea assisted Syria’s covert nuclear activities, and the reactor, which was damaged beyond repair, was capable of producing plutonium. In defiance of its international obligations, Syria did not inform the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the construction of the reactor, and, after it was destroyed, the regime moved quickly to bury evidence of its existence. The construction of the reactor was a dangerous and potentially destabilizing development for the region and the world.176

SUMMARY
Overall, the threat posed by ballistic missile delivery systems is likely to continue increasing while growing more complex over the next decade. Current trends indicate that adversary ballistic missile systems, with advanced liquid- or solid-propellant propulsion systems, are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable and accurate while also presenting longer ranges. Prelaunch survivability is also likely to increase as potential adversaries strengthen their denial and deception measures and increasingly base their missiles on mobile sea- and land-based platforms. Adversary nations are increasingly adopting technical and operational countermeasures to defeat missile defenses. For example, China, Iran and North Korea exercise near simultaneous salvo firings from multiple locations to defeat these defenses. The availability of weapons of mass destruction for use on ballistic missiles vastly increases the significance of this threat.177 Viewed from a global perspective, Russia probably will retain the largest force of strategic ballistic missiles outside the United States. China is capable of producing technologically advanced ballistic missiles and has sold ballistic missile technology to other countries. China has an extensive theater missile program and has deployed a large force of ballistic missiles in the vicinity of Taiwan. North Korea is continuing the development of the Taepo Dong-2 ICBM and has a new IRBM in development. Any North Korean ballistic missiles may be exported to other countries in the future. With continued foreign assistance, Iran also could have an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015. 178 Ballistic missiles, with their relatively low operating costs, their high probability of penetrating existing defense systems, and their value as a symbol of national power, will continue to be the offensive weapons of choice for many nations. As such, they are threats that must be carefully considered in future military planning and operations.179
– 26 –

ENDNOTES
All sources used for this document are unclassified and have been released to the public by the originating agencies.
1 “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), NASIC-10310985-06, March 2006, p. 1 (B&CM Threat 2006) 2 3

B&CM Threat 2006, p. 1

“Ballistic Missiles: Delivery Systems For Weapons of Mass Destruction,” DCI Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control (WINPAC), May 1995, p. 3 (WINPAC 1995)
4 5 6 7 8 9

WINPAC 1995, p. 3 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 3 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 3 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 3 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 3 WINPAC 1995, p. 3 WINPAC 1995, p. 5 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 3; WINPAC 1995, p. 5 WINPAC 1995, p. 16-18 WINPAC 1995, p. 21 WINPAC 1995, p. 23 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 3

10 11 12 13 14 15 16

“Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples Statement for the Record to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 18 January 2007, p. 10-11 (Maples 18 Jan 2007) NORAD News Release, “NORAD and USNORTHCOM monitor North Korean Launch,” North American Aerospace Defense Command, 5 April 2009 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9 “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Statement for the Record, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, 27 February 2008, p. 11, 29 (Maples 27 Feb 2008); DoD, Armed Forces Press Article, 9 July 2008 Maples, 27 Feb 2008, p. 15 B&CM Threat 2006, inside front cover

17

18 19

20 21 22

Unclassified National Intelligence Estimate, “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015,” National Intelligence Council, December 2001, p. 13 (Unclassified NIE 2001) “Proliferation: Threat and Response,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 2001 p. 25 (PTR) Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 13 PTR, p. 30 PTR, p. 28 PTR, p. 30 Maples, 27 Feb 2008 pp. 28-30 Maples, 27 Feb 2008 pp. 28-30 Maples, 27 Feb 2008 pp. 28-30 Maples, 27 Feb 2008 pp. 28-30 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9 Maples, 27 Feb 2008 pp. 28-30 MSIC, Response to MDA PR A128-08-0082/2, September 2008 (MISC Sep 2008) MISC Sep 2008 MISC Sep 2008

23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37

– 27 –

38 39 40 41

PTR p. 11 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9 PTR, p. 11

“Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Testimony of Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 24 February 2004, p. 9 (Jacoby 24 Feb 2004) Maples 18 Jan 2007, p. 11; “Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long-Term Challenges with a Long-Term Strategy” Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence, Porter J. Goss before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 16 February 2005, p. 5 (Goss 16 Feb 2005); and B&CM 2006 Threat, inside cover Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 9 Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 9 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 17; Jacoby 24 Feb 2004, p. 9

42

43 44 45 46

“Press briefing on the North Korean Missile Launch,” White House Press Secretary, Tony Snow and National Security Advisor, Steven Hadley, 4 July 2006, p. 1; “Recent Developments in U.S.-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) Relations,” Statement of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Christopher R. Hill before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 20 July 2006, p. 1
47

NORAD News Release, “NORAD and USNORTHCOM monitor North Korean Launch,” North American Aerospace Defense Command, 5 April 2009 “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Testimony of Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 16 February 2005, p. 11 (Jacoby 16 Feb 2005) “The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context,” Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 24 February 2004, p. 10 (Tenet 24 Feb 2004) National Aeronautics and Space Administration 2008 Worldwide Space Launches, 1 October 2008. Spacewarn Bulletin No. 664, 01 March 2009, National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

48

49

50 51 52

Annual Threat Assessment, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, U.S. Army, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 10 March 2009 B&CM Threat 2008, p. 17; Maples 27 Feb 2008, p. 15; “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009,” Department of Defense Report to Congress, p. 24 (China Annual Report 2009) B&CM Threat 2006, p. 17, China Annual Report 2009, p. 24 China Annual Report 2009, p. 48

53

54 55 56

“Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Statement for the Record, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, 17 March 2005, p. 11 (Jacoby 17 Mar 2005) B&CM Threat 2006, p. 17 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 17 Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 7

57 58 59 60

China Annual Report 2008, p. 56; Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee: Annual Threat Assessment, 27 Feb 2008 (Senate 27 Feb 2008); Jacoby 17 Mar 2005; Maples 27 Feb 2008; B&CM Threat 2006; Senate Armed Services Holds Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget for U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces-Korea, 11 March 2008 (Senate 11 Mar 2008) B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9 B&CM Threat 2006, p.10 Rumsfeld Report Exsum, p. 7 PTR, pp. 30 and 38 Maples 18 Jan 2007, p. 11 B&CM Threat 2006, pp.9, 10; Maples 18 Jan 2007, p. 11

61 62 63 64 65 66 67

“Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Statement for the Record, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, 28 February 2006, p. 12 (Maples 28 Feb 2006); B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9

– 28 –

68

PTR, pp. 36-38; B&CM Threat 2006, p. 15 and “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,” Testimony of Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 16 February 2005 p. 11 (Jacoby 16 Feb 2005) Maples 27 Feb 2008, p. 11 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9

69 70 71

PTR, p. 35; “Oral Statement by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,” Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment Hearing, 5 February 2008 (Maples 5 Feb 2008) B&CM Threat 2006, p. 8 China Annual Report 2008, p. 24 China Annual Report 2009, p. 21 China Annual Report 2009, p. 48 China Annual Report 2009, p. 29 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 10, and China Annual Report 2008, p. 2 PTR p. 58; B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9 PTR, p. 25 PTR, p. 25 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 9 PTR, p. 30

72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84

“Attachment A, Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions,” CIA Report to Congress, 1 January through 30 June 2003, p. 10 (Unclassified Report to Congress, Jan – June 2003) China Annual Report 2008; Senate 27 Feb 2008; Jacoby 17 Mar 2005; Maples 27 Feb 2008; B&CM Threat 2006; Senate 11 Mar 2008 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 5 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 5 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 5 PTR, p. 11

85

86 87 88 89 90

“An Analysis of the North Korean Missile Program,” Unclassified Appendix to Rumsfeld Commission Report, 15 July 1998, David Wright, p. 1 (Wright Unclass Appendix to Rumsfeld Report) B&CM Threat 2006, p. 5 Maples 28 Feb 2006, p. 5 PTR, p. 36; B&CM Threat 2006, p. 4 PTR, p. 36 Rumsfeld Report Exsum, p. 8 Jacoby 17 Mar 2005, p. 11 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 5 B&CM Threat 2006, pp. 4 and 6, and China Annual Report 2008, p. 56 MSIC Response to A128-06-00171, March 2006 and China Annual Report 2006, p. 11 China Annual Report 2009, p. 22 Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 8 PTR, p. 54 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 28 PTR, p. 24 Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 13; PTR, p. 24 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 20 Jacoby 16 Feb 2005, p. 12 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 4

91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108

– 29 –

109 110 111 112 113 114 115

Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 13 PTR, p. 30 PTR, p. 45; B&CM Threat 2006, p. 6 Tenet 24 Feb 2004, p. 11 PTR, p. 45 Jacoby 17 Mar 2005, p. 12

“The President’s National Security Strategy to Combat WMD: Libya’s Announcement”, Fact Sheet, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 19 December 2003, p. 1 (Libya Announcement)
116 117

Tenet 24 Feb 2004, p. 9

“The Bush Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy: Successes and Future Challenges,” Testimony of Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John R. Bolton, before the House International Relations Committee, 30 March 2004, p. 4 (Bolton 30 Mar 2004)
118 119

PTR, pp. 47-48

China Annual Report 2008, p. 3; Senate 27 Feb 2008; Jacoby 17 Mar 2005; Maples 27 Feb 2008; B&CM Threat 2006, p. 6; Senate 11 Mar 2008
120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132

B&CM Threat 2006, p. 20 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 20 China Annual Report 2005, p. 29 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 23 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 20 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 23 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 23 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 23 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 20 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 23 PTR, p. 25 Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 13

“National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century,” Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, September 2008, p. 9 (Bodman and Gates Sep 2008)
133 134

Bodman and Gates Sep 2008, p. 9

China Annual Report 2008, p. 56; Senate 27 Feb 2008; Jacoby 17 Mar 2005; Maples 27 Feb 2008; B&CM Threat 2006; Senate 11 Mar 2008
135 136 137

B&CM Threat 2006, p. 2 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 2

“Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends,” Congressional Research Service, 20 February 2008 (CRS 2008)
138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145

CRS 2008 Maples 18 Jan 2007, p. 9 Unclassified Report to Congress, Jan – June 2003, p. 5 Tenet 24 Feb 2004, p. 9 Unclassified Report to Congress, Jan – June 2003, p. 5 Maples 18 Jan 2007, p. 9 Unclassified Report to Congress, Jan – June 2003, p. 5

Unclassified National Intelligence Estimate, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities”, National Intelligence Council, November 2007, p. 6 (Unclassified NIE 2007)
146 147 148 149

Unclassified NIE 2007, p. 6 Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 10 Maples 28 Feb 2006, p. 5 Unclassified NIE 2007, p. 8

– 30 –

150 151 152 153

PTR, p. 36 Maples 18 Jan 2007, p. 10 Maples 28 Feb 2006, p. 5

“Adherence to and Compliance with Arms, Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” U. S. Department of State, August 2005, p. 21 (Disarmament Agreements)
154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164

Disarmament Agreements, p. 21 PTR, p. 36 PTR, p. 35 China Annual Report 2008, p. 26. Maples, 18 Jan 2007 PTR, p. 14 PTR, p. 15 PTR, p. 15 Maples 28 Feb 2006, p. 10 Maples, 18 Jan 2007, p. 10

Attachment A: Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, “CIA Report to Congress, 1 January – 30 June 1999”, p. 6.
165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179

PTR, p. 24 PTR, p. 24 PTR, p. 24 PTR, p. 25 PTR, p. 24 Maples, 18 Jan 2007, p. 10 Maples, 28 Feb 2006, p. 10 Maples, 18 Jan 2007, p. 10 PTR, p. 43 Unclassified Report to Congress, Jan – June 2003, p. 6 Unclassified NIE 2001, p. 12 Statement by the White House Press Secretary, 24 April 2008 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 28; Maples 27 Feb 2008, p. 29 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 28 B&CM Threat 2006, p. 28

All range rings are sourced from the included tables. All photos are from “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” National Air and Space Intelligence Center, NASIC-1031-0985-06, March 2006, with the following exceptions: Ballistic Missile Components: Steeljaw Scribe, http://steeljawscribe.blogspot.com/2007/05/missile-defense101-icbm-fundamentals.html, accessed 16 October 2008. Noble Prophet 2: National Air and Space Intelligence Center classified website. Shahab 3: British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “Iran’s arsenal of missiles,” 10 July 2008, http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7499601.stm, accessed 03 November 2008. Fateh-110: Washington Times, AP article, “Iran Moves Closer to Nukes Capability,” 25 September 2008, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/sep/25/tehrans-threat/, accessed 17 October 2008. M-51 SLBM: British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “France to reduce nuclear warheads,” 21 March 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7308563.stm, accessed 10 November 2008. This report contains material copyrighted by others. No claim of copyright is made for any included works of the United States Government.

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MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited. Approved for Public Release 09-MDA-4495 (10 APR 09)

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