MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO vs. MENDEZ Facts : President C. Garcia, issued E.O.

353 creating the municipal district of San Andres,Quezon. By virtue of E.O. 174, issued by President D. Macapagal, the municipal district of SanAndres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality byoperation of Sec. 2 of RA 1515. It was then attacked of its validity. The Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto against the officials of theMunicipality of San Andres. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No.353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres bepermanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respectiveoffices. While petitioners would grant that the enactment of RA 7160 may have converted theMunicipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they contend that since the petition forquo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner had acquired a vestedright to seek the nullification of E.O. 353, and any attempt to apply Sec. 442 of RA 7160 to thepetition would perforce be violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Issue : Whether or not the Municpality of San Andres legally exists. YES Held : The de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must beconceded. Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of anunconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in thiscase hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have atleast attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of ade facto municipal corporation. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, theMunicipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years. On the contrary,certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of theMunicipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, ExecutiveOrder No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after havingsurpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515.Sec. 442(d) of the LGC of 1991, which provides that municipal districts organized pursuant topresidential issuances or executives orders and which have their respective sets of electivemunicipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth beconsidered as regular municipalities, is also curative statute, as it validates the creation of municipalities by executive orders which had been held to be an invalid usurpation of legislativepower. MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ vs. BAZ Facts : The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO 258 of then Pres. Quirino pursuant toSec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Sinacaban laid claim to several barrios based on thetechnical description in EO 258. The Municipality of Jimenez asserted jurisdiction based on anagreement with Sinacaban which was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidentalwhich fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. The Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the earlierresolution approving the agreement between the municipalities was void since the Board had nopower to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258. Jimenez argued that the power

The municipality of Balabaganwas created by EO 386 of President Garcia out of barrios and sitios of Malabang. and the municipality itself having discharged its corporatefunctions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action. It cannot be applied to municipal corporations createdbefore. Sinacaban is constituted as part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of MTCs in the country. It is notsubject to the plebiscite requirement.Moreover. XI. The State and even Jimenez recognized Sinacaban’s corporate existence by entering into anagreement with it regarding the boundary. The fact that no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the EO creating themunicipality. its creation can no longer be questioned. although it may be inquiredinto directly in an action for quo warranto at the . apportioning legislative districts throughout the country. Sec.Section 3 of the previous Constitution. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was decided in 1965 and yet thevalidity of EO 258 creating it had never been questioned. The petitionersseek to nullify the EO. the SC laid the factors to consider in validating the creation of amunicipal corporation:1.4.: AO 33. YES Held : Where a municipality created as such by EO is later impliedly recognized and its acts areaccorded legal validity. Ex. Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. thenSinacaban. which was created thru and EO.2. had no legal personality and no right to assert aterritorial claim. In the case of Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez. The fact that for 30 years. Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. the validity of the corporation has not been challenged. The fact that the municipality was later classified as a 5th class municipality.which considered Sinacaban as part of the 2nd District of Misamis Occidental. and the rest of the respondents are thecouncilors. 68 of the Administrative Code is unconstitutional. Rule 66. It was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned. Lanao del Sur. having beenorganized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional. etc.In this case. 16 of the Rules of COurt provides that a quo warranto suit against a corporationfor forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within 5 years from the time the act complanedof was done or committed. and3. It is contended that as ade facto corporation.II. its officers havingbeen either elected or appointed. whilethe respondent Pangandapun Bonito is the mayor. Issue : Whether or not Sinacaban has juridical personality. Sec.5. BENITO Facts: The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang. the LGC of 1991. Petitioners relied on the Pelaez ruling that the President’s power to createmunicipalities under Sec.” Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinanceappended to the 1987 Constitution. The requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art. organized aspart of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitutionapportioning the seats in the House. its existence cannot be collaterally attacked.tocreate municipalities is essentially legislative (as held in Pelaez v Auditor General). the following factors are present:1. such as Sinacaban MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG vs. Respondents arguedthat the Pelaez ruling is inapplicable because Balabagan is a de facto corporation.2. 442(d) provides that “municipal districts organized pursuant topresidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of electiveofficials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered asregular municipalities. of the municipality of Balabagan of the same province.3. It applies only to new municipalities created for the firsttime under the Constitution.

" The Act of Congress.Hence. valid on its face. Th e CA f o u n d t h a t t h e p l a n s s u b mi t t e d b y t h e t wo municipalities are inadequate insofar as identifying the monuments of the boundary lineb e t we e n t h e p e t i t i o n e r a n d t h e M u n c i p a l i t y o f Ma b i n i .Executive Order 386 "created no office.and that respondent municipality does not have a juridical personality since it was created undera void executive order. ExecutiveOrder 386 is declared void. conferring no rights and imposing no duties. which has either: (a)Been upheld for a time by the courts.independently of the Administrative Code provision in question. as it was organized before the promulgation of the SC's decision in Pelaez. (2) there can be no de facto municipalcorporation unless either directly or potentially. CA Facts : The Municipality of Candijay claimed that the barrio of Pagahat is within its territorial jurisdiction and that it is not a part of the Municipality of Alicia. that it wasinoperative. the petition is granted. inasmuch as Section 68 of . prior to sucha determination. Th e C A r u l e d t h a t i n c a s e s o f equiponderance of evidence. NOHeld: The following principles may be deduced. Order No. provided that a warrantfor its creation can be found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its potentialexistence in the general constitution of the state. in the case at bar.Issue: Whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation. The trial court ruled for Candijayb u t t h i s wa s r e ve r s e d b y t h e C A ." This is not to say. 265 issued by PresidentQuirino creating respondent municipality is null and void ab initio. as inoperative as though it had never been passed. The petitioner argues that the CA improperly applied the rule on equiponderance of evidence. Petitioner contended that Exec. however. that the actual existence of a statute. or (b) Not yet been declared void. such a de jure corporation is authorized by somelegislative fiat. as. the decisions could fairly be made to rest on theconsideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. the courts must find for the defendant. having been found to be unconstitutional. It is quite clear. ACCORDINGLY. (3) there can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone. there is no other valid statute togive color of authority to its creation. theinvalidity of which is apparent on its face. that the acts done by themunicipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the executive order "is. the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when thestatute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation. (1) The color of authority requisite to a de factomunicipal corporation may be an unconstitutional law.In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact thatthe statute creating it was later invalidated. in legal contemplation. however. (4) there can be no de facto corporation created totake the place of an existing de jure corporation. There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the executiveorder creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an act done in reliance uponthe validity of the creation of that municipality. as such organization would clearly be ausurper. and the respondents are hereby permanently restrained fromperforming the duties and functions of their respective offices MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY vs. was not a law.instance of the State and not of an individuallike the petitioner. is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. and hence affording no basis for thechallenged decree.

the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. 353 but it was not to be the case. and aimed at giving validity to acts done that would have been invalid underexisting laws. Alicia must benefit from the effects of Sec. Variousgovernmental acts through the years all indicate the State’s recognition and acknowledgementof its existence. This decision have noted the earlier decision of Pelaez where the Executive orders of . 1515. In that case. Auditor General was promulgated. with costs against petitioner. began and continuedto exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. Candijay asked the trial court to bar the respondent frompresenting evidence on the ground that it had no juridical personality. certain governmental acts allpointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. On the contrary. Quirino is null and void ab initio since Sec. According to Sec. or ten years ahead of the Municipality of SanAndres. and had been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was promulgated. 174 classified theMunicipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the incomerequirement laid out in Republic Act No. and later the Municipality of San Andres. 422 (d) of the LGC and should beconsidered a regular. and was therefore declaredunconstitutional. are validly accepted in this jurisdiction. constituted an unduedelegation of legislative powers to the President of the Philippines. which in essenceare retrospective. WHEREFORE. 442 (d) of the LGC. the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for morethan six years when. In themeantime. Pelaez vs. after more than five years as a municipal district. Issue : Whether or not a municipality. de jure municipality. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT Facts : This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the existence of Municipalityof Andong in LanaoDel Sur. Executive Order No. the Municipal district.” “Curative laws.Respondent municipality's situation in the instant case is strikingly similar to that of themunicipality of San Andres. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of ExecutiveOrder No. on 24 December 1965. NO Held : The petitioner commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of therespondent on 19 January 1984 (35 yrs after its creation in 1949) during the proceedings in thiscase. After presentation of evidence. can be consideredas not having a juridical personality in light of the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991. as if existing laws have been complied with. municipal districts “organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have theirrespective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of theCode shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. created under a void executive order. CAMID vs. 353 creating the municipal districtof San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost 30 years that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. Thus. 353. 68 of the RAC constituted anundue delegation of legislative power to the President. Executive Order No. Created in 1959 byvirtue of Executive Order No. on which said Executive Order was based. Candijay argued that EO265 issued by Pres. subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. The Municipality of Alicia was created by EO 265.theRevised Administrative Code.

Camid insists the continuing of EO 107.Former President Macapagal creating 33 Municipalities of Lanao Del Sur was considered null andvoid due to undue delegation of legislative powers. Among the annulled executive orders is EO107 creating Andong. it has its own high school. Camid does not have shown factual demonstration of the continuous exercise bythe municipal corporation of its corporation of its corporate powers as well as acquiescence bythe other instrumentalities of the state like charters or the legislature’s action. NO Held : Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the communityhas claimed and exercised corporate functions.( 2 ) A n d o n g d i d not meet the requisites set by LGC of 1991 Sec. The DILG Certification and the Ordinance in the1987 Constitution validatesthem. (2) Themunicipality existed for 30 years before it was questioned and (3) The municipality wasclassified as a fifth class municipality and was included in the legislative district in the Houseof Representatives apportionment. (3) he noted agencies and private groups recognizing Andong and also the CENROand DENR Certification of land area and population of Andong. this petition. The fact that there existing organic statutes . Hon.(4) The Ordinance appended in the 1987 Constitution (which apportioned seats for the Houseof Reps to the different legislative districts in the Philippines. The petitioner herein represents himself as resident of Andong (as aprivate citizen andtaxpayer). DECS office. Mendez. San Andres was created through an executive order.442 (d) r e g a r d i n g municipalities created by executive orders. and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title byprescription. there is an enumeration of existing municipalities including 18 0f the33 Municipalities invalidated in Pelaez Case. It says: Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Camid finds this as an abuse of discretion andunequal treatment for Andong.May any action on the Certification be an appropriate solution to Camid’s prayer? NO. for the followingreasons:(1) There are facts found in the San Andres case that are not present in the case at bar: (1) The Executive Order creating San Andres was not invalidated in Pelaez Case. Bureau of Post.(3) The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in themunicipality are eloquent indicia (indicators) that the State does not recognize the existenceof the municipality. with the knowledge and acquiescence of thelegislature. TheC e r t i f i c a t i o n h a s n o p o we r o r i t d o e s n o t b e a r a n y a u t h o r i t y t o c r e a t e o r r e va l i d a t e a municipality. Likewise. Camid contends/argues the following: (1) Municipality of Andong evolved into a fullblown municipality (since there is a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential tasksand services. Existing municipaldistricts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which havetheir respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivityof this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. etc. arguing that inMunicipality of San Narciso v. Issue : Whether or not the Municipality of Andong be recognized as a de facto municipalcorporation.Should the case of Andong be treated same as the case of San Andres? No. enumerates the variousmunicipalities encompassed in the various districts) did not include Andong. Thus.In the Certification of DILG.Is there an unequal treatment since 18 of the 33 invalidated municipalities are now consideredexisting? NONE. the Court affirmed in making San Andres a de factomunicipal corporation. (2) 17 baranggays withchairman.

those considered as juridical person includes the State and its political subdivisions andOther corporations.attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence. supplemented by the provisions of this Code. Issue: Whether or not a municipal government can directly maintain and operate an electricplant without obtaining a specific franchise for the purpose and without a . which while exempting public services owned or operatedby any instrumentality of the government or any GOCCs from its supervision. a municipalgovernment actually functions as an extension of the national government and. Section 4. jurisdiction andcontrol stops short of including "the fixing of rates."Petitioner Surigao Electric.passed by the legislation recreating thesemunicipalities is enough to accord a different treatment as that of the municipality of Andong. aninstrumentality of the national government is exempted from the jurisdiction of the PSC exceptwith respect to the fixing of rates. Congress further amended the Public Service Act. A corporation is anartificial being created by operation of law." the other respondent herein. theirpersonality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law. it isan instrumentality of the latter. 1960. and by express provisions of Section 14(e) of RA 2677.Corporations created by special laws or charters. Since Andong has no law recreating it and that it is not arecognized olitical subdivision. Corporation defined. vs. challengethe validity of the order of respondent Public Service Commission wherein it held that it had "noother alternative but to approve as [it did approve] the tentative schedule of rates submitted bythe applicant. Tubig and Tubaran) which are recognized andstill existing. therefore. MUNICIPALITY OF SURIGAO Facts : On June 18. Moreover. 45 of the New CivilCode. These two aregoverned by the law creating them. created by law. supported and utilized by theNational Government as a part of its government machinery and functions." but at the same time affirming its power of regulation. a legislative franchise holder.Respondent Commission contends that a municipal government or a municipal corporation suchas the Municipality of Surigao is a government entity recognized. Corporations created by special laws orcharters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the special law or charter creating themor applicable to them.SC DISMISSED petition for lack of Merit. and Arturo Lumanlan to whom therights and privileges of the former as well as its plant and facilities were transferred. insofar as they areapplicable. more specifically asset forth in the next section of the law. under Art. Note the following Sections with regards to juridicalpersonality of corporations in relation to the reasons why San Andres have a different treatmentwith Andong: Batas Pambansa Blg. This exemption is even clearer in Section 13(a). The solution to have Andong recognized is through legislation and not judicialconfirmation of void title SURIGAO ELECTRIC. one of the changesintroduced doing away with the requirement of a certificate of public convenience and necessityfrom the Public Service Commission for "public services owned or operated by governmententities or GOCCs. institutions and entities for public interest or purpose. it is not also considered a juridical person.What happened with the people from Andong?-The constituent barrios of the voided townreturns to its original municipalities (Lumbatan. 8: Section 2. Municipality of Surigao.44 of the New Civil Code with relation to Art. CO. having the right of succession and the powers.

Reference by petitioners to the statute providing the procedure for the taking over and operationby the government of public utilities. needs further discussion. which is entitled "An ActCreating theMunicipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur. de Leon. to put it at its mildest. the Municipality of Surigao is not a GOCC. In the language of their own brief: "This Act provides for the procedure to be followedwhenever the Government or any political subdivision thereof decides to acquire and operate apublic utility owned and operated by any individual or private corporation. which is a taking of private property for public use upon the payment of just compensation. in their view "to further strengthen their contention". COMELEC Facts : Lidasan is a resident of Parang. 2677. however. There is here no appropriation. of course. suffers from a fate less auspicious. What was owned before by petitioners continue to remain theirs. and the other as quasi-private and corporate.Rather. undefined scope of the police power.Petitioners seek refuge in the legislative franchise granted them. one as governmental. WHEREFORE. however. such as the one nowunder consideration. it may be implied from a latter act of general applicability. What theamendatory act in effect accomplishes is to lend encouragement and support for the municipalcorporation itself undertaking an activity as a result of which. there has been recognition by the Court of the dualcharacter of a municipal corporation. YES Held: Here." That is to beregulated. Later. such powers beingin their nature public. In Mendoza v." was passed. Whatever privilege may beclaimed by petitioners cannot override the specific constitutional restriction that no franchise orright shall be granted to any individual or corporation except under a condition that it shall besubject to amendment. t h e r e l e va n c y o f t h e s t a t u t e p r o vi d i n g f o r t h e t a k i n g o r o p e r a t i o n o f t h e government of public utilities. by the imposition of a regulation. t h e n . theordinary case of restraint on property or liberty. If at all then.C l e a r l y.An alleged error imputed to respondent Commission. Such amendment or alteration need notbe express. the exercise of this governmental prerogativecomes within the broad. the orders of respondentPublic Service Commission denying the motion for reconsideration are affirmed LINDASAN vs. being a branch of the generaladministration of the state. Cotabato. that it is not agovernment entity. as tothe commission of this alleged error is unavailing. without the need of acertificate of public convenience. There is to be no transfer of ownership. which itis not. by this enactment is the exercise of eminent domain. Lidasanc a m e t o k n o w l a t e r o n t h a t b a r r i o s To g a i g a n d M a d a l u m j u s t me n t i o n e d a r e . therefore. It is no t here. even if such statute were applicable. appears. a municipal corporation. the better to enable it to aid a state inproperly governing that portion of its people residing within its municipality. may further promotecommunity welfare by itself engaging in supplying public services. Legislative and governmental powers are "conferred upon a municipality. therefore. far from being strengthened bysuch a reference. by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. RA 4790. far from clear. Petitioners'contention as to this alleged error being committed. profits of a competing private firmwould be adversely affected. There is here no taking. alteration or repeal by Congress.certificate of publicconvenience and necessity duly issued by the Public Service Commission. It cannot be said.

Katbo. and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality. COMELEC proceeded to establish precints forvoter registration in the saidterritories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790 be nullified forbeing unconstitutionalbecause it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in creating Dianaton. Magabo. Laguna. the respondent judge. These are the pressures whichheavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790. it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinceswere actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only tofind out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. On February 10. Mayor of SanPedro.wi t h i n t h e municipality of Buldon. LINA vs. respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the PCSO toinstall Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. and that Bayanga. 508 and the denial of a mayor's permit basedthereon is valid. [Remarkably. promulgated his decision enjoining thepetitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. Th e y a l s o ma i n t a i n t h a t r e s p o n d e n t 's l o t t o o p e r a t i o n i s i l l e g a l b e c a u s e n o p r i o r consultations and approval by the local government were sought before it was implementedcontrary to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the ProvincialGovernment of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling.1997. even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790. respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratoryrelief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Issue (1) : Whether or not Kapasiyahan Blg. 1996.Colodan.As a result of this resolution of denial. it did not apprisethe people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to theadjacent Province of Lanao del Sur.A. 1995.Held: The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. 508. Langkong.also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. PAÑO Facts : On December 29. otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1 9 9 1 . for a mayor's permit to open the lotto outlet. it would be including inthe territory thereof barrios from Cotabato. 7160. Issue : Is RA 4790. Tiongko. . Francisco Dizon Paño.Digakapan. the municipality of Parang. Sarakan. Suchtitle did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law.]Pursuant to this law. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz. Tabangao. 508 which declared its policyagainst the operation of lotto within the province.Cotabato -to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "Nobill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall beexpressed in the title of the bill. which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in anotherprovince . Provinceof Cotabato. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by theSangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial government's police power under theGeneral Welfare Clause of Republic Act 7160. This was denied by Mayor Cataquizin a letter dated February 19.

however. theseapply only to national programs and/or projects which are to be implemented in a particular localcommunity.As a policy statement expressing the local government's objection to the lotto. The game of lotto is agame of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of Congress. which is not self-executing. the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not beinterpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto. it leased aportion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc. From a careful reading of said provisions. and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. The SC held that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27 of RepublicAct 7160. but of acharitable institution. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress. Held : NO. The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue amayor's permit for the operation of a lotto outlet in favor of private respondent. the PCSO.Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. such resolution isvalid. it is farfetchedto say that lotto falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the LGC MAGTAJAS vs.from which they have derived their power in the first place. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino andOrdinance No. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council. is the law which grants a franchiseto the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. 42. The ordinance. On 7 December1992. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of thelatter. apply mandatorily in thesetting up of lotto outlets around the country.. The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayande Oro City Ordinance No. the respondentsinvoke P.Held : YES. On 4 January 1993. PRYCE Facts : PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end. This is part of the local government's autonomy to air its views which may be contrary tothat of the national government's. Given this premise. Issue (2) : Whether or not prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian areneeded before a lotto system can be operated in a given local government unit. he based his decision on an existing ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in theprovince of Laguna. Though sanctioned by the national government. Local councils exercise onlydelegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. renovated and equipped thesame. as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg.D. merely states the "objection" of the council to thesaid game. it enacted Ordinance 3353 (An Ordinance Prohibiting the issuance of business permit andcanceling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used itspremises or portion thereof for the operation of Casino). it adopted a sternerOrdinance 3375-93 (An Ordinance prohibiting the operation of Casino and providing penalty forviolation therefore). this freedom to exercise contrary views does notmean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enactedby Congress. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national government. According to themayor. . 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos.Republic Act 1169. However. and negate by mere ordinance themandate of the statute. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. On the other hand.

appropriate. there are two kinds of gambling. Held : NO. enhance the right of the people to a balancedecology. 1869.for that matter. Municipalgovernments are only agents of the national government. It is expressly vested withthe police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section16 as follows:Sec. There is a requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute. to wit. It is a heresy to suggest that the LGUs can undo the acts of Congress. promote health and safety.D. Further. This decree has the status of a statute that cannotbe amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. the preservation andenrichment of culture. there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or.Casino gambling is authorized by P. The morality of gambling is not justiciable issue. orincidental for its efficient and effective governance. among other things. like other local political subdivisions. Local councils exercise only delegatedlegislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. — General Welfare.Gambling is not illegal per se. encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific andtechnological capabilities. from which they have derivedtheir power in the first place. 3375-93 are valid. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it seesfit.including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. maintain peace and order. the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allowit without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whateverreasons it may consider sufficient. In the exercise of its own discretion. 3353 and Ordinance No. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept. and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. improve public morals. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions. is empowered to enactordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of thepeople.1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate all games of chance. 16. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expresslygranted. as well as powers necessary. even mentioning it at all. Cagayan de Oro City. enhance economic pros perity and social justice. if not indeed more so. The delegatecannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. localgovernment units shall ensure and support. those necessarily implied therefrom. Issue : Whether or not the Ordinance No. and those which are essential to thepromotion of the general welfare. The suggestion that the LGC authorize LGUs toprohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gamblingwithout a clear indication that this is the will of legislature . it is probably as oldas illegal gambling. the illegaland those authorized by law. promote full employment among their residents. and preservethe comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

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