Judge Sattler is Coughlin's father's patient (Timothy D.

Coughlin, MD is a family
physician). Judge Sattler serves on the oard of !ashoe "egal Services, #hich Coughlin is
suing, including in C$%%&'%()) (Judge Sattler inherited that case from Judge *lliott #hom
failed to disclose or recuse himself #here he sat on the +oard of !"S's co&defendant, C,,!).
-./.%0 stri1ing of mandamus petition inappropriate. 2uite clear that Coughlin #as see1ing the
/JDC to re3uired the 4JC 5udges to follo# the la# vis a vis 64S %78.-'), #here they failed to
on /.).%0 in rcr%%&'900-%, and rcr%/&'9)90', leading to a conviction for a SC4 %%%(9)
:serious offense; in %/&'9)90' on -./.%0.
< = " * D *lectronically '%&'0&/'%/>'0>0%>/' ?M Joey @rduna Aastings Cler1 of the Court
Transaction B /978)/9
+a1er's %.0.%/ filing reads> @??@S=T=@6 T@ ,M*6D*D *M*4C*6CD M@T=@6
<@4 T*M?@4,4D 4*ST4,=6=6C @4D*4
4espondent, M,TT M*4"=SS, y and through his counsel, 4=CA,4D C. A="", "TD.
and C,S*D D. +,E*4, *S2., opposes appellant's Famended emergency motion for
temporary restraining order.F Despite the complete lac1 of merit of the instant motion, Merliss
has refrained from disposing of any property left ehind y Mr. Coughlin pending this court's
ruling on the motion. This opposition is ased on the points and authorities elo# and all
papers and pleadings on file herein.
?@=6TS ,6D ,GTA@4=T=*S
This is an appeal from a summary eviction granted in the 4eno Justice Court. The
pertinent facts for purposes of this motion are as follo#s>
%. 4espondent, M,TT M*4"=SS (FM*4"=SSF) is the o#ner of the residential real
property located at %/% 4iver 4oc1, 4eno, 6evada (the F?4@?*4TDF).
/. ,ppellant, H,CA,4D +,4E*4 C@GCA"=6 (FC@GCA"=6F), #as a tenant
at the ?roperty eginning in March /'%'.Coughlin's rent pursuant to the lease #asI(''.'' per
month. Coughlin last paid rent in May, /'%%. ,s discussed elo#, the 5usticecourt re5ected all of
Coughlin's reasons for not paying rent.
0. @n @ctoer /7, /'%%, after t#o evidentiary hearings on the matter, JudgeSferraJJa of
the 4eno Justice Court granted a no&cause summary eviction in favor of Merlissand against
Coughlin. , true and correct copy of the 5ustice court's order of @ctoer /7,/'%% is attached
hereto as *KA=+=T %.
-. @n 6ovemer %, /'%%, Coughlin #as la#fully and properly loc1ed out of the?roperty.
). @n 6ovemer %0, /'%%, Dr. Merliss and Mr. Aill discovered Coughlin livingin the
asement of the ?roperty.Coughlin #as arrested and charged #ith criminaltrespassing at that
time. , motion for order to sho# cause #hy Coughlin should not e heldin contempt of the
5ustice court pursuant to 64S //.'/' is currently pending in that court.=t #as clear that
Coughlin had not made any attempt to remove any of his elongings fromthe ?roperty efore
he #as caught living in the asement, although he had een living thereillegally for t#o #ee1s.
=n fact, Coughlin had an entire #ee1 et#een the @ctoer /), /'%%hearing, in #hich the
eviction #as granted, and 6ovemer %, /'%%, #hen he #as loc1ed out, to remove his things,
ut apparently chose to use that time to get himself holed&up in the asement instead.
9. During the time Coughlin #as secretly living in the asement, Mr. Aill #as sending
him emails almost daily in an effort to get Coughlin to ma1e some effort to remove his personal
property from the residence. True and corr*.ct copies of Mr. Aill's emaiLs are attached hereto
as *KA=+=T /..
7. @n Decemer /%, /'%%, after a hearing on Coughlin's motion to contest Merliss'
personal property lien, Judge SferraJJa entered another order. , true and correctcopy of that
court's order resolving motion to contest personal property lien is attachedhereto as *KA=+=T
0.
8. ?ursuant to *KA=+=T 0, Coughlin #as provided access to the ?roperty on Thursday,
Decemer //, /'%%, and <riday, Decemer /0, /'%%.
(. @n Decemer //, /'%%, Coughlin sent an email to the undersigned and
JudgeSferraJJa, in #hich he essentially announced that he #as entitled to a stay, and to return
toand continue in possession of the ?roperty. Judge SferraJJa 3uic1ly responded y email,and
reminded Mr. Coughlin that the stay had een denied. , true and correct copy of thatemail
eMchange is attached hereto as *KA=+=T -. Coughlin removed very little of hisproperty that
day, and clearly intended to simply re&ta1e possession of the house, untilJudge SferraJJa
disaused him of that notion.
%'. Coughlin failed to remove all of his personal property from the premises, and a
sustantial amount of cleanup remains to e done. Coughlin also failed to comply #ith the
court's order that any person accompanying him to the property must sign the liaility #aiver
attached to the court's order.
%%. @n <riday, Decemer /0,/'%%, counsel for Merliss neglected to remove thepadloc1
to the ac1 gate of the property. @nce notified, counsel promptly #ent to theproperty to remove
the padloc1, only to discover that the gate had een ta1en off of itshinges y Coughlin.
Coughlin's access to the house itself #as never hindered.
%/. !hile at the property to remove the padloc1, Coughlin, on more than oneoccasion,
screamed profanities at Merliss' counsel, and, at one point, charged Mr. Aill andattempted to
physically intimidate him. ,t least the audio of this incident #as captured ontape.
%0. 6evertheless, at )>'' p.m. on <riday, Decemer /0,/'%%, counsel grantedCoughlin
and his agents additional, unfettered, and unlimited access to the outside of theproperty to
remove any remaining items. The only condition placed on that access #as thatCoughlin's
helpers agreed to replace the gate on its hinges as est they could. Coughlin andhis agents
failed to remove the remainder of Coughin's property from the yard that night,and failed to put
the gate ac1 on the hinges.
%-. @n Decemer /8,/'%%, Mr. Aill sent an email to Coughlin, offering himanother
opportunity to finish retrieving his elongings from the ?roperty. , true and correct copy of
that email is attached hereto as *KA=+=T S. Coughlin did not accept Mr. Aill's offer, or respond
in any #ay to that email.
%). @n Decemer /(, /'%%, the undersigned re&sent Mr. Aill's email to Coughlin. , true
and correct copy of the undersigned's email is attached hereto as *KA=+=T 9. Coughlin did not
respond in any #ay to that email.
%9. @n Decemer 0', /'%%, Mr. Aill revo1ed the offer eMtended in his Decemer /8, /'%%
email. ,t true and correct copy of that revocation is attached hereto as *KA=+=T 7.
4eference is made to the declaration of Casey D. +a1er, *s3., attached hereto as
*KA=+=T 8, for authentication of *KA=+=TS %, 0,-, 9, %' and %%.
4eference is made to the Declaration of 4ichard C. Aill, *s3., attached hereto as
*KA=+=T (, for authentication of *KA=+=TS /, ) and 7.
LAW
%. 4eference is made to 64C? 9)(), #hich provides in pertinent part as follo#s>
, temporary restraining order may e granted #ithout #ritten or oral notice to the adverse
party or that party's attorney only if (%) it clearly appears from specific facts sho#n y affidavit
or y the verified complaint that immediate and irreparale in5ury, loss, or damage #ill result to
the applicant efore the adverse party or attorney can e heard in opposition, and (/) the
applicant's attorney certifies to the court in #riting the efforts, if any, #hich have een made to
give the notice and the reasons supporting the claim that notice should not e re3uired. 64C?
9)()
/. 4eference is made to 64C? 9)(c), #hich provides in pertinent part as follo#s> eMcept
the payment y doing done, 6o restraining order or preliminary in5unction shall issue upon the
giving of security y the applicant, in such sum as court deems proper, for the of such costs and
damages as may e incurred or suffered any party #ho is found to have een #rongfully
en5oined or restrained. 64C? 9)(c)
4eference is made to 64S 00.'%', #hich provides in full as follo#s>
,n in5unction may e granted in the follo#ing cases>
%. !hen it shall appear y the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
demanded, and such relief or any part thereof consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually.
/. !hen it shall appear y the complaint or affidavit that the commission or continuance
of some act, during the litigation, #ould produce great or irreparale in5ury to the plaintiff.
0. !hen it shall appear, during the litigation, that the defendant is or threatens, or is
aout to do, or is procuring or suffering to e some act in violation of the plaint=ffs rights
respecting the su5ect of the action, and tending to render the 5udgment ineffectual. 64S
00.'%'.
ANALYSIS
+ased on the caption of Mr. Coughlin's filing #ith the court, it appears that he is as1ing
the court to temporarily restrain Merliss from disposing of the personal property Mr. Coughlin
aandoned and left at the ?roperty, Ao#ever, Mr, Coughlin's paper fails to provide any analysis
or evidentiary asis for that re3uest, and is fatally deficient for a numer of reasons.
Mr. Coughlin ma1es no citation to any authority, nor does he provide any analysis, that #ould
even remotely support the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary in5unction.
=n 09 pages of ramling, Mr. Coughlin, a licensed 6evada attorney, does not manage to
even mention, much less analyJe, 64C? 9) or 64S 00.'%', #hich are the controlling
provisions of la#. The court is left to speculate as to the asis for Mr. Coughlin's re3uest. =n
fact, there is no asis.
A. Coughlin's Request for a Temporary Restraining Orer is !ro"eurally an
Su#stanti$ely %efi"ient
<irst, it is important for the court to note that Coughlin's paper #as never properly
served on Merliss or his counsel. The only copies counsel received #ere y email and faM. Cf.,
64C? ). See the Declaration of Casey D. +a1er, *s3., attached hereto as *KA=+=T 8. <urther,
Coughlin's F?roof of ServiceF identifies the incorrect document, and falsely states that
document #as mailed. Mr. Coughlin has never mailed any document to the office of the
undersigned, and this #as een a constant issue in the underlying eviction action.l ,s is the
case here, Merliss has een forced to respond to one of Mr. Coughlin's rants #ithout proper
service, in an aundance of caution that the court may choose to rule on it efore Merliss is
given proper notice and an opportunity to e heard. Gnfortunately, Mr. Coughlin appears intent
on continuing his ausive tactics in this court.
+ecause Coughlin has failed to properly serve his motion, and, ased on his faulty proof
of service, does not appear to intend to, he is, in effect, as1ing the court to issue an in5unction
#ithout notice, as contemplated y 64C? 9)().
,s set forth elo#, Coughlin's motion fails to satisfy even one re3uirement of that rule. 64C?
9)() provides that a temporary restraining order is only availale #here it Fclearly appears
from specific facts sho#n y affidavit or y the verified complaint that immediate and
irreparale in5ury .. . F #ill result efore the opposing party can e heard. (*mphasis added.)
Aere, there is no verified complaint. Coughlin's motion is not verified, and does not contain any
s#orn affidavit as re3uired y the 4ule.
Thus, there is no evidence to support any eMercise of discretion y this court.
<urther,Coughlin does not eMplain ho# he #ill suffer irreparale in5ury in the event Merliss is
allo#ed to comply #ith Judge SferraJJa's order and dispose of the property Coughlin chose %
Throughout counsel's dealings #ith Coughlin, he consistently files papers he does not serve and
serves papers he does not file. +y these auses, he has muddied the record and driven the fees
and costs eyond all reason.
9
to aandon at the house. =n fact, Coughlin #ill not suffer irreparale in5ury, ecause money
damages are un3uestionaly an ade3uate remedy for any loss of personal property he may
suffer. Coughlin is not entitled to any relief under 64C? 9) ecause he has an ade3uate legal
remedy. ,nd even if he did not, his unclean hands and ine3uitale conduct should preclude him
from any relief from this court at this time.
*ven if the court #ere inclined to overloo1 the ovious and fatal deficiencies of
Coughlin's motion, Coughlin does not address the mandatory ond he must post pursuant to
64C? 9)(c). ,s set forth in Judge SferraJJa's order (*KA=+=T 0), the reasonale costs of
storage at the ?roperty is I0'.'' per day. That amount should accrue from 6ovemer %7, /'%%,
and continue until this appeal is concluded or any restraining order or in5unction is ultimately
dissolved. The ond should also include fees incurred y Merliss in opposing this Femergency
amended motion,F #hich fees total I%,-8).''. See Declaration of Casey D. +a1er, *s3.,
*KA=+=T 8.
&. Coughlin 'as Not Sho(n Any &asis for An In)un"tion to Issue
The issuance of an in5unction is controlled y 64S 00.'%'. That statute re3uires that
there e a complaint or an affidavit on file, and some sho#ing of great or irreparale harm, or a
violation of the moving party's rights. Setting aside for the moment the complete lac1 of
analysis y Coughlin, it is clear that this situation does not #arrant eMtraordinary e3uitale
relief.
,s discussed aove, there is no complaint on file. Coughlin has neither verified his
motion, nor sumitted an affidavit. <urther, there can e no irreparale harm #here money
damages are an ade3uate remedy. Thus, it #ould e an ause of discretion for the court to grant
Coughlin any relief under 64S 00.'%'(%) or (/).
"i1e#ise, no relief is availale to Coughlin under 64S 00.'%'(0). +ecause the order
Coughlin appealed from is the @ctoer /7, /'%% order granting an eviction (*KA=+=T %), the
Fsu5ect of this actionF as contemplated y that statute is Coughlin's rights in the real property &
not the personal property he chose to aandon there. ,t the moment, Coughlin has no rights in
the real property, so Merliss cannot e said to e violating any rights of Coughlin's.
"i1e#ise, even if the court #ere to someho# eMpand its application of that statute to the
Decemer /%, /'%% order resolving the landlord's personal property lien (*KA=+=T 0),
Coughlin's FrightsF in the personal property on the premises #ere terminated at )>'' p.m. on
<riday, Decemer /0, /'%% y a la#ful court order. ,s such, Coughlin no longer has any rights
in that property, either, and there is nothing for Merliss to violate or for the court to en5oin.
Gntil it has een reversed, Merliss is entitled, and, indeed, oligated, to comply #ith the 5ustice
court's order. 64S //.'%'.
C. Coughlin is Not *ntitle to A Stay
Coughlin claims to have deposited I/)' #ith the 5ustice's court pursuant to 64S -'.08),
although he has not provided any proof in support of his claim. ,ttached hereto as *KA=+=T %'
is a true and correct copy of the 5ustice's court's doc1et as of Decemer %(, /'%%. That doc1et
sho#s that Coughlin paid a filing fee for his appeal on Decemer %/, /'%%, in the amount of
I/%9.''. =t is entirely unclear from the follo#ing entries of that doc1et #hether or #hen
Coughlin ever paid an additional I/)'.'' under 64S -'.08). =f he ever did so, it #as not until
on or around Decemer %-, /'%%, #ell after he had een loc1ed out and appealed, and #ell
after his motion(s) for a stay had already een denied #ee1s earlier. See also *KA=+=T -.
This information should e part of the appeal record #ith this court as #ell, and can e verified
y the court in that manner. *ven if Coughlin eventually paid some amount to#ard an appeal
ond, it #as not in time to stay the eviction during this appeal. To do that, a proper motion must
e made and granted, and the ond posted, prior to the loc1out. The loc1out here occurred on
6ovemer %, /'%%. +y the time Coughlin managed to find that statute and pay any money to
the court, he had een loc1ed out of the property for siM #ee1s. ,s such, any re3uest for a stay
#as, and is, moot. ,t this point, Coughlin does not have any rights in either the real or personal
property, and there is nothing to stay. Coughlin is not entitled to that relief under any analysis.
<n/ (fn/ Coughlin has since filed a motion #ith the 5ustice court see1ing a return of his
ond, #hich he claims to have paid on Decemer //, /'%%, ut fails to mention that here.
, true and correct copy of Coughlin's motion is attached hereto as *KA=+=T %%.)
%. Coughlin As+s for *,traorinary *quita#le Relief- &ut 'as .aile to /itigate 'is
%amages or Other(ise &eha$e *quita#ly
Coughlin had three #ee1s to remove his property efore finally eing arrested for
trespassing on 6ovemer %0, /'%% (@ctoer /), /'%% through 6ovemer %0, /'%%). =nstead of
moving his things, ho#ever, he chose to arricade himself in the asement, apparently
elieving that he could live there indefinitely #ithout eing discovered. Then, later, he had t#o
full days pursuant to a court order in #hich to remove his elongings. @n Thursday, Decemer
//, /'%%, he did virtually nothing, eMcept send harassing emails to the court and counsel. See,
e.g., *KA=+=T -. More of those emails are attached to Coughlin's motion. @n <riday,
Decemer /0, /'%%, he and his cre# removed a sustantial amount of his elongings, ut also
left a sustantial amount of deris on the premises. ,t the end of the day on Decemer /0,
/'%%, counsel even allo#ed Coughlin's cre# additional, unlimited, unfettered access to the
ac1yard and other outside areas to finish removing #hat #as there. 6either they nor Coughlin
too1 advantage of that opportunity. @n Decemer /8,/'%%, Mr. Aill offered Mr. Coughlin an
additional opportunity to retrieve #hatever #as left on the premises. ,ll Mr. Coughlin had to
do #as to prepare a stipulation and order for this court's signature, and he #ould have een
allo#ed ac1 on the ?roperty. See *KA=+=T ). @n Decemer /(,/'%%, the undersigned re&sent
that email to Mr. Coughlin. See *KA=+=T 9. Coughlin failed to accept the offer to retrieve his
elongings, and it #as ultimately revo1ed. =nstead of resolving this matter y stipulation,
Coughlin filed the instant motion. ,s has een the case throughout the underlying eviction
action, Mr. Coughlin is oviously more interested in fighting aout his perceived issues than he
is in resolving them. Mr. Coughlin does not come to court #ith clean hands, and should not e
a#arded any e3uitale relief #hatsoever, especially #ithout eing re3uired to post ade3uate
security as re3uired y la#. <urther, the court should note that Coughlin does not come #ith a
plan or a proposal. Ae 5ust #ants to prevent Dr. Merliss from re&renting the house, and cause
him to incur additional fees. That is his real agenda.
CONCL0SION Coughlin's motion is procedurally and sustantively deficient in many
respects. Ae has not satisfied any of the threshold re3uirements of either 64C? 9) or 64S
00.'%'. Ae has not sho#n the court any legal or factual asis for the relief he purports to see1,
and, in fact, does not even address the merits of his motion #hatsoever, eMcept to simply
demand more time to get his things. Coughlin declined an offer from counsel to stipulate to the
relief he no# as1s the court to grant him. =nstead, he chose to #aste this court's time #ith an
unsupported, incoherent, and procedurally deficient motion that does not even address the
applicale sustantive la#. Coughlin's motion must e denied.
!A*4*<@4*, 4espondent prays that Coughlin ta1e nothing y #ay of his motion, and
that same e denied in its entiretyN and for such other, further, and additional relief as seems
5ust to the court in the premises. Dated this 0
rd
day of January, /'%/. .s. Casey D. +a1er, *s3.;
Such a typical Aill.+a1er move (eMactly #hat Thomas J. Aall, *s3., descried to
Coughlin as the types of purposeful ofuscation designed to increase their illale hours and
cost of litigation to the opposing side that +a1er and Aill perpetually engage in) resides in
attaching an 4JC Doc1et from %/.%(.%% and purporting to e una#are of the date #hen
Coughlin posted the I/)' supersedeas ond (aside from the initial posting thereof on %'.%7.%%,
#hich the 4JC retained until Coughlin received it ac1 from the 4JC on %%.%9.%%, at #hich
point Coughlin #as refused on multiple occasions y 4JC <iling @ffice staff (#ith intererence
y the 4JC +ailiffs) in his attempt to post the I/)' called for in 64S -'.08)). This idiotice
move y Aill and +a1er is thoroughly eMposed upon a revie# of *Mhiit %% to their %.0.%%
@pposition to ,mended Motion for T4@ (Coughlin's %/./7.%% Motion #hich is all of one page
long and #hich eMplictly cites %/.//.%% as the date fo the posting of the I/)' supersedeas ond
pursuant to 64S -'.08) (something even further underscored y a revie# of *Mhiit - and the
%/.//.%% announcement y Coughlin (in addition to Coughlin having that %/.//.%% 6otice of
?osting Supersedeas +ond personally delivered to Aill's office on %/.//.%%) of the %/.//.%%
psoting of the I/)' supersedeas ond). So, ovioulsy, +a1er and Aill's attaching *Mhiit %', an
4JC doc1et from %/.%(.%% is a total non&se3uitir, and completely transparent and insipid (not to
mention dishonest) is their attempts to then feign confusion or uncertainty as to #hen Coughlin
#as finally ale to get the 4JC to ta1e the I/)' supersedeas ond he posted on %/.//.%%.
Suse3uently Coughlin learned that the 4JC did, in fact, ta1e the I%.'' ills he #ould leave on
the counter upon Christine *ric1son and Cherly $ertung refusing to ta1e the I/)' 64S -'.08)
supersedeas onds he #as attempting to post. Coughlin could not afford to leave I/)' on the
4JC filing office counter #ith the uncertainty of #hether the cler1's #ould follo# through on
there stated refusal not to accept his posting such ond.
+a1er continually ma1es legal pronouncements, #ithout citing to any authority to
support such positions, such as his contention that Coughlin #as re3uired to provide some
proof of having posted the I/)' supersedeas ond (additionally, Judge SferraJJa granted
Coughlin =<? status as to the appeal on %'./).%%, and argualy, that applies to the I/)' ond
for costs on appeal pursuant to the indigency language of 6JC4C? 70...as such, the 4JC
Doc1et in *Mhiit %' fo +a1er's %.0.%/ Motion reveals a a chec1 dated %%.7.%% the 4JC notes as
posted on %/.%-.%% for I/)'.'', #hich argualy also should have satisfied the re3uirements of
64S -'.08). +a1er cites asolutely no la# in support of the follo#ing positions underlined
elo#>
:C. Coughlin is Not *ntitle to A Stay
Coughlin claims to have deposited I/)' #ith the 5ustice's court pursuant to 64S -'.08),
although he has not pro$ie any proof in support of his "laim. ,ttached hereto as
*KA=+=T %' is a true and correct copy of the 5ustice's court's doc1et as of Decemer %(, /'%%.
That docket shows that Coughlin paid a filing fee for his appeal on December 12, 2011, in
the amount of $216.00.;
,ctually, that is not true, the Doc1et actually indicates that on %/.8.%% :received a chec1
made payale to : /JDC for I/%9.'' (characteriJed as :this is for the District Court's papeal fee
#hen appeal goes over; as notated y Chief Civil Cler1 Earen Stancil)>
:%*C 1 4eceived a chec1 made payale to 'Second Judicial District Court' dated %%.8.%% for
I/%9.''. (This is for District Court's appeal fee #hen appeal goes over) 1s
D*C %/ 4eceived chec1 B%-// from Hachary Coughlin payale to District Court for appeal
fee. 5J
D*C %- 4eceipt to Hachary Coughlin from 4eno Justice Court for I/)'.'' for appeal ond and
a receipt for I%.'' for 'supersedeas ond'. *mergency Motion for T4@N =n5unction 4e3uest for
Su#mission of this /otion Attempting to !ay Appeal &on of 2345.55 an Superseeas
Whate$er it Is file.;;
<urther, +a1er #as present in court on %'./).%% #hen Judge SferraJJa ruled that he #as,
due to Coughlin's indigency and his having previously granted Coughlin =?< status.fee #aiver
in %7'8 on %'.9.%%, that he #as #aiving the filing fee in the 4JC for the appeal to District
Court (I/-.'').
Clearly the 4JC Doc1et demonstrates an attempt y Coughlin to pay I/)'.'' pursuant
to 64S -'.08) on :D*C %/;, and that is over an aove the eMtent to #hich the I/)'.'' :appeal
ond and a receipt for I%.'' for 'supersedeas ond' is notated under :D*C %-; on that same
doc1et. ,dditionally, the doc1et entry for :D*C %); reveals the :6@T=C* @< ?@ST=6C
,6D ,CC*?T,6C* <@ SG?*4S*D*,S.C@ST +@6D @6 ,??*,"; filed y Coughlin.
<urther, in a %/.//.%% :6@T* @4D*4; in the 4JC file hand#ritten and initialed y
Judge SferraJJa, he ruled :%/.//.%% The stay #as denied an no ond #as posted #ithin %'
daysO Defendant needs to have the District Court address this on appeal. .s. ?S;. The allusion
to :#ithin %' days; y Judge SferraJJa invo1es 64S -'.08' and 6JC4C? 70,(a)(-), oth of
#hich +a1er admits do not apply to this matter, given is #as a mere summary eviction, rather
than a :formal eviction;. There, Judge SferraJJa and +a1er continue in attempting to have it
oth #ays. That is, see1ing to apply all the enefits of a plenary proceeding to the enefit of
the landlord (the application of 64S -'.08' and 4ule 70,(a)(-), the aility to utiliJe discovery
li1e +a1er's %'.%8.%% Motion for a 6JC4C? 0- @rder for =nspection, supoenaing Coughlin for
the %'./).%% hearing, intially attempting to rule on more than possession #here at the
conlcusion fo the %'./).%% hearing Judge SferraJJa ruled :the I/,/7) is the property of the
M....;
<urther, it is entirely inaccurate for Judge SferraJJa to indicate that :no ond #as posted
#ithin %' days; #here Judge SferraJJa converted the I/,/7) in rent escro# deposited on
%'.%7.%% to Coughlin's :appeal ond (note chec1 transcript;) at the conclusion of the %'./).%%
:Trial; #hich #as later recharacteriJed as a :continuation of a summary eviction proceeding;..
Just li1e Coughlin #rote in his %/.//.%% email to +a1er and SferraJJa (#hich Judge
SferraJJa re3uired Coughlin to send to him, y email) the 4JC and +a1er are left #ith a
choice...either its a plenary trial or a summary eviction. There are pros and cons to each
(eMplicitly set out y Coughlin in his %'.%7.%% :*mergency Motion to Stay, Set ,side and
$acate *viction Aearing @rder; at page 9 (#herein Coughlin copied and pasted from the
6SCt's :"andlord Tenant Aandoo1; a simplied ta1e on eviction la# in 6evada, #ith statutory
citations. =t is reathta1ing ho# applicale the follo#ing protion Coughlin cited to is to the
issues that utlimately ecame and are at dispute in the matter, the appeal, and Coughlin's formal
disciplinary hearing.
The posting of I/,/7) y Coughlin on %'.%7.%% #ith the 4JC also operates to satisfy any
re3uired filing fee of onds for costs on appeal and 64S -'.08) supersedeas ond attendant to
Coughlin's %'.%(.%% filing of a 6otice of ,ppeal as to the %'.%0.%% :*viction Decision and
@rder; (#hich, asolutely #as a final appealale order, and therefore, Coughlin perfected his
appeal and the 4JC #as divested of 5ursidiction), in addition to the onds and fees associated
#ith Coughlin's %'.%7.%% :*mergency Motion to Stay, Set ,side, $acate *viction Aearing
@rder <iled;.
So, its completely lac1ing in merit for +a1er to #rite>
: =t is entirely unclear from the follo#ing entries of that o"+et #hether or #hen
Coughlin ever paid an additional I/)'.'' under 64S -'.08). =f he ever did so, it #as not until
on or around Decemer %-, /'%%, #ell after he had een loc1ed out and appealed, and #ell
after his motion(s) for a stay had already een denied #ee1s earlier. See also *KA=+=T -.
This information should e part of the appeal record #ith this court as #ell, and can e
verified y the court in that manner. *ven if Coughlin eventually paid some amount to#ard an
appeal ond, it #as not in time to stay the eviction during this appeal. To do that, a proper
motion must e made and granted, and the ond posted, prior to the loc1out. The loc1out here
occurred on 6ovemer %, /'%%. +y the time Coughlin managed to find that statute and pay any
money to the court, he had een loc1ed out of the property for siM #ee1s. ,s such, any re3uest
for a stay #as, and is, moot. ,t this point, Coughlin does not have any rights in either the real
or personal property, and there is nothing to stay. Coughlin is not entitled to that relief under
any analysis. <n/ (fn/ Coughlin has since filed a motion #ith the 5ustice court see1ing a return
of his ond, #hich he claims to have paid on Decemer //, /'%%, ut fails to mention that here.
, true and correct copy of Coughlin's motion is attached hereto as *KA=+=T %%.);
,lso> :
64SP-./0' Doc1et> *ntriesN form.
NRS67.375 *ntries in o"+et prima fa"ie e$ien"e of fa"ts.
64SP-./)' Doc1et must e 1ept y 5ustice of the peace.
64SP-./8' Jurisdiction of 5ustice of the peace #ith #hom doc1et is deposited.
64SP-.0)' Deputy cler1> ,ppointmentN compensationN po#ers and duties.
64SP-.0)0 Deputy marshal> ,ppointmentN dutiesN 3ualificationsN compensation.
64SP-.07' Jurisdiction.
64SP-.07% *ffect of transfer of original 5urisdiction from district court to 5ustice
court.
The follo#ing rings up some 3uestions as to the 4JC morphing the %/./'.%/
:,dministrative @rder /'%/&'%, =n the ,dministrative Matter of Hachary Coughlin; (to #hich,
on /./).%0, Chief Judge ?earson issued an @rder to Sho# Cause to Coughlin, aring the same
caption (ie, lac1ing a case numer of an opposing party), setting an @SC Aearing for 0.).%0,
#hich #as continued until 0.%%.%0 (#ith Coughlin preserving for the record that he #ished to
remain his o#n counsel thereafter and his o5ections to any attempts to insert the
:,dministrative @rder; into any other case (Judge ?earson indicated it #as retroactively eing
placed into 4C4/'%%&'900-%, despite the fact that there #as not ostensile connection et#een
the t#o or the su5ect matter involved (indeed, the /./).%0 @SC fails to cite any actual names
in connection #ith any of the vague allegations (in violation of 64S //.'0'(/)). Gpon
Coughlin pointing out the issues #ith such an approach, a ne# case #as created, 4C4/'%0&
'7%-07, #ith the :Complaint; therein consisting of the %/./'.%/ :,dministrative @rder /'%/&
'%; aring the same %/./'.%/ file stamp date, #ith the ne# case numer affiMed thereto, #ith
no ne# file stamping to go along #ith the ne# case numer (ie, a document #as altered y the
4JC after it #as file stamped). This presents several issue #ith respect to 64S -./0'.
:64S -./0'(c)PThe date of the summons, and the time of its returnN and if an order to arrest the
defendant e made, or a #rit of attachment e issued, a statement of the fact.; Coughlin #as
summarily arrested (after 7 pm in his o#n home, no less) y a D,S officer on /./.%0 (hours
after sending an email to the !CD,'s @ffice). D,S @fficer 4amos indicated to Coughlin at
the time of the arrest that he #as arresting Coughlin summarily for t#o specific alleged parole
violations, indicating they consisted of t#o alleged failurs to chec1 in #ith D,S, one on %./.%0
and one on %./0.%0. ,t the 0.%/.%0 @SC Aearing, Judge ?earson sought to characteriJe that
/./.%0 D,S arrest of Coughlin as stemming from the alleged issuance of a #arrant for
Coughlin's arrest pursuant to an alleged failure y Coughlin to otain a :mental health
evaluation; #ithin 0' days of the @rder of %%./%.%/ y Judge SferraJJa in 4C4%%&'900-%.
Ao#ever, the Doc1et in that matter, and the correspondence and communications et#een
Coughlin, D,S, and 4JC Chief +ailiff SeMton, and +ailiff Aeiert clearly reveal that not only
#as the issuance of a #arrant on %.(.%0 for Coughlin's arrest in that regard unsupportale in the
first place, ut such #arrant #as
<urther, Judge ?earson's revisionist history as to the asis for the summary proation
violation arrest indicated y D,S @fficer 4amos on /./.%/ (to #hich he completely lac1ed
proale cause considering the correspondence et#een D,S @fficer +ro#n et al and
Coughlin as to oth the %./.%0 and %./0.%/ chec1ins, particularly #here 4JC +ailiff ,ugustin
Medina #illfully prevented Coughlin from accessing the D,S office prior to its 0>'' pm
closing time (and D,S is not :an area under the eMclusive control of the 4JC; to #hatever
eMtent Judge SferraJJa's %/./'.%/ :,dministrative @rder /'%/&'%; is even a legal order (and
Coughlin should not e su5ect to the threat of incarceration of /) days for every alleged de
minimis infraction thereof (and the 4JC and Judge ?earson, in his /./).%/ @SC and statements
on the record on 0.).%0 and 0.%%.%0 have made contradictory assessments fo the eMtent to
#hich D,S is under the umrella or a part of the 4JC sufficient to ma1e, say, a phone call or
email to a D,S @fficer a violation of such :,dministrative @rder /'%/&'%;. The fact that
Coughlin had provided documentation and medical evidence that he is diagnosed #ith and
eing treated for ,DD.,DAD and Ma5or Depressive Disorder ma1es all the more untenale
the eMtent to #hich D,S and the 4JC have narro#ed the acceptale time frames and methods
of communicating or sumitting materials to oth the 4JC and the S+6 (eMposing Coughlin to
an arraignment on -.%7.%0 incident to the felony and gross misdemeanor protection orders
violation charges that the !CD,'s office dropped on 0.7.%/. ,nd the City of 4eno's indication
that the !CD,'s @ffice dropped such prosecutions only ased on a lac1 of 5urisdiction ma1es
no sense #here the 4JC prosecuted Coughlin for a misdemeanor arrest y the 4?D that #as
similarly alleged to have occurred #ithin 4eno City limits (as #as the case in %%&'900-% and
%/&'9)90', and proaly, %/&'97(8').
So, #here the ,rrest 4eport and ?roale Cause 4eport y D,S @fficers for the /.%.%0
summary arrest for alleged proation violations clearly fails to indicate any #arrant having
een issued. 4ather, that /.%.%0
(and 4JC +ailiff SeMton and Aeiert and the doc1et in %%&'900-% reveal no such #arrant #as
issued sufficient to ma1e that /.%.%0 arrest), ut rather, specifially mentions t#o alleged failures
to chec1 in #ith D,S (failing to allege any sort of :no call no sho#; typically re3uired for such
a summary arrest, Judge ?earson and the 4JC's attempts to retroactively recharacteriJe #hether
such arrest #as ased upon a #arrant is trouling, especially #here the #arrant #as allegedly
issued incident to an allegation that Coughlin failed to :provide proof of otaining a mental
health evaluation #ithin 0' days; of the %%./%.%/ @rder in %%&'900-%. This is particularly true
considering the communciations and correspondences et#een Coughlin and D,S in that
regard, Coughlin's sumitting an =<? as to the eMpense of any such evaluation that #as not
satisfied y virtue of the evaluation connected to the doc1et entry of :%'.//.%/ Aearing 4esult
(Judicial @fficer> SferraJJa, ?eter ) DefendiJnt has een found competent. Defendant has
indicated that he #ould li1e to represent himself. Defendant <aretlo Canvassed. Defendant's
motion to represent hirnselof is C4,6T*D. The Court also appointes ?ulic Defender Jim
"eslie as standy coul=Sel. Motion y Defendant to have trameript prepared at pulic eMpense.
Motion D*6=*D. Trial confirmed setfor; #ith "a1e's Crossing's Durante's report or proof
thereof provided to D,S, in addition to communications regarding the arrangement #ith
66,AMS.
=ndeed, the doc1et in %%&'900-% eMpressly reuts the indication y Judge ?earson as to
#hether the /./.%0 arrest #as ased upon a #arrant> :%.%%.%0 !arrant 4ecalled ?er @rder of
Steve Tuttle and Judge ?earson, #arrant is recalled D,S to inform Defendant of evaluation and
freed .' get i= comple.ed. D@ 6@T =SSG* !,44,6T !rrff@GT @E <4@M ?*,4S@6.;
<urther,
The /.%.%0 :=nmate +oo1ing =nformation <orm; indicates the D,S arrest time as 7>'/
pm (ie, in violation of 64S %7%.%09 #here the proation stemmed from a simple misdemeanor
conviction (for #hich Coughlin has already no# served %0 days, to go along #ith the
completely overreaching %8' day suspended sentence in %%&'900-% and another %8' day
suspended sentence incident to the -./.%0 conviction in %/&'9)90' (#herein Judge Clifton in
another display of transparent overreaching made that sentence run consecutive to the one in
%%&'900-%, giving Coughlin four years of probation for t#o misdemeanors that don't add up to
ten days in 5ail given the fine schedule for a petty larceny charge and a :resisting a pulic
officer charge; .
The /.-.%/ %'>// pm =nmate 4elease =nformation <orm (Coughlin #as not actually
released until %>0' am on /.).%/, yet still made it to the 8>0' am hearing that morning in %%&
'900-% (incident to his eing in court any#ays for the /.).%0 continuation fo the trial in %/&
'9)90'...
<or the 4JC to suggest is has not made such patently overreaching convictions and
sentences for any other reason that to assist !ashoe County and the !CD,'s @ffice.4JC, and
!CS@'s @ffice in dealing with Coughlin (even #here Coughlin has een chuc1ing the deuce
up for months.#aiving the #hite flag of surrender), is 5ust preposterous, and really, its very
insincere and ignorant, someho#, at the same time, for Judge SferraJJa and Clifton (not to
mention ready attac1 dog #ith Clydesdale style ethics conflicts linders on DD, Hachary
6orman Doung, *s3., courtesy of ,D, AelJer) to continue stac1ing as many SC4 %%%(9)
convictions on Coughlin records, all #hilst ignoring the patent conse3uential effects of their
eMtremely suspect rulings in 4ev/'%%&''%7'8 (including Judge Clifton's of %'.%7.%%, and
Judge Schroeders of 0.%).%/ in rev%/&07-, and in 4ev%/&%'-8 of 9./8.%/ and 7.).%/, and
Judge ?earson's in the same 4ev%/&%'-8 of 7.0%.%/ and in 4ev%/&'78-0/ of %'./.%/ (and the
4JC's failure to accord Coughlin a hearing as re3uired upon his filing a Tenant's ,ffidaivt
incident to the summary eviction he only learned of at the %'./.%/ hearing upon cross&eMaming
Een Crant of Superior Storage. Aolland Q Aart's 4ic1 *lmore may have some 'splainin to do
on that one, and might eMchange notes #ith Cayle Eern, *s3., as to the violations of 4?C 0.),,
from 4ev%/&07- on 0.%).%/.
So, the 4JC and !ashoe County enefitted in its avo#ed goal to have Coughlin
disarred y putting him in 5ail for five days right efore the /.%0.%0 deadline for Coughlin to
file his ,ppeal +rief in 9/007.
: Judge ?earson on /.).%0 at, according to the doc1et entry and @SC hearing (further Coughlin has
asolutely no recollection of the /.-.%0 video hearing efore Judge SferraJJa eing an :arraignment;
and certainly no #arrant eing mentioned is recalled y Coughlin at 8>0' am in %%&'900-% (#hich #as
improperly noti"e to Coughlin on his Jail =nmate 4elease =nformation paper#or1 as eing set for
<eruary )
th
, /'%0, #hich, incidentally, the /./).%0 @SC in ,@%/&'% includes as one of the dates
#herein Coughlin is alleged to have violated the ,@%/&'% (:@n .e#ruary 4- 3589 Coughlin contacted
two employees #ho are not ailiffs at a numer other than that provided to him as the ailiff s station.
,t ?age /. =t is possile that someone in3uired #ith the 4JC on that /.).%0 date as to #hether any such
hearing in %%&'900-% #as still on calendar and that an 4JC employee, #hom may have een a +ailiff,
indicated that such /.).%0 Aearing in %%&'900-% #as, in fact, not still on calendar, ut, rather, had een
incorrectly listed on Coughlin' !C Jail =nmate 4elease =nformation paper#or1 #here such Aearing
#as actually set for, and did, in fact ta1e place on, /./.%0 at 8>0' am. !hether no# it is the case that
the 4JC Judges intended the /./.%0 Aearing to e a Cagnon = style hearing and such Aearing
indentified in Coughlin's !C Jail =nmate 4elease =nformation paper#or1 to e a :Cagnon ==; type of
Aearing is possile. =t may e possile that an 4JC employee, #hom may have een a +ailiff, ut,
#hom may also not have een a +ailiff incorrectly indicated to someone #hom may have in3uired #ith
the 4JC #ith regard to #hether such /.7.%0 Aearing in %%&'900-% #as still on calendar that such
Aearing #as not still on calendar of set to ta1e place, ut had, in fact, een vacated.) The /./).%0 @SC
in ,@%/&'% reads>;
Doc1et in %%&'900-% reads>
:%.%%.%0 !arrant 4ecalled ?er @rder of Steve Tultle and Judge ?earson, #arralJt is recalled D,S to
inform Defendant of evaluation and freed .' get i= completed. D@ 6@T =SSG* !,44,6T !rrff@GT
@E <4@M ?*,4S@6.
%.%7.%0 C,6C*"* D !arrant ,rraignment (%'>'' ,M) (Judicial @fficer> Schroeder, Jac1) $acated
Mental Aealth *valuation and comply #ith recommendations . Case is on ,ppeal.
/.-.%0 !arrant ,rraignment (%'>'' ,M) (Judicial @fficer> SfernlHHa, ?eter) <TC&D,S $iolation.
+,=">I)oo C,SA ?arties ?resent> Defendant Coughlin, Hachary +ar1er;
/.-.%0 :+ail Sct (Judicial @fficer> SferraJJa, ?eter) +ail Set at I)''.'' C,SA @6"D. Defendant
4emanded to the Custody of the !ashoe County Sheriff.;
:/.).%0 @rder to Sho# Cause (8>0' ,M) (Judicial @fficer> ?earson, Scott) <TC&D,S $=@l,T=@6
?arties present> Defendant Coughlin, Hachary +ar1er;
D,S @fficer +ro#n has een particularly dishonest #ith Coughlin #ith respect to her
comunications #ith Coughlin vis a vis getting a mental health evaluation done, the fee #aiver
application process, #hether a #arrant #ould issue, the eMtent to #hich Coughlin had already provided
:proof of otaining; such evaluation :#ithin 0' days', etc., etc.
4egardless, the ,rrest 4eport and ?C Sheet of the /.%.%0 D,S summary proation violation
arrest clearly indicates no #arrant #as involved, that it too1 place after 7 pm (D,S @fficers ordered
Coughlin out of his residence) and #as premised upon a total lac1 of proale cause to ma1e such a
summary arrest.
So, despite Judge ?earson's attempts to undo the violation of 64S %7%.%09 y D,S @fficer in
arresting Couglin in his home after 7 pm #ithout a #arrant on /.%.%0, the ?C Sheet and doc1et in %%&
'900-% tells the real story. Some might say> do the 4eno Justice Court 5udges ever follo# the la#O
That ,4 and ?C Sheet identifies the charge as the follo#ing>
:64S /%%,.%/) ,rrest of proationer.
%. The "hief or an assistant may arrest a probationer without a warrant if there is pro#a#le "ause
to #elie$e that the pro#ationer has "ommitte an a"t that "onstitutes a $iolation of a "onition of
his or her suspene senten"e or resiential "onfinement.
/. ,ny other peace officer may arrest a proationer upon receipt of a #ritten order y a chief or an
assistant stating that there is proale cause to elieve that a proationer has committed an act that
constitutes a violation of a condition of his or her suspended sentence or residential confinement.
0. ,fter ma+ing an arrest- the "hief- assistant or other pea"e offi"er shall immeiately notify the
senten"ing "ourt of the arrest of the pro#ationer an shall su#mit a (ritten report setting forth
the a"t that "onstitute a $iolation of a "onition of the suspene senten"e or resiential
"onfinement of the pro#ationer.
-. , chief, an assistant or another peace officer may immediately release from custody #ithout any
further proceedings any proationer arrested #ithout a #arrant pursuant to this section if the chief,
assistant or other peace officer determines that there is not proale cause to elieve that the person
violated the condition of his or her suspended sentence or residential confinement.;
!ith :transporting @fficer 4amos; #ith him, D,S @fficer !ic1man made the #arrantless
arrest of /.%.%0, indicating> :on /.%.%0 at apprMoimately %8>-) hours, #e made contact #ith the aove
su5ect #ho is on proation #ith this department. Su5ect failed to chec1 in into this department as
re3uired on %.0.%0 and %./0.%0. Su5ect #as ta1en into custody for failing to chec1 in #hich is a
violation of his proation. Su5ect #as ta1en into custody, cuffed, doule loc1ed, and chec1ed for
tightness. Su5ect #as then transported to !ashoe Jail.;.
@fficer !ic1man's declaration only indicates :#e made contact; failing to mention the
:contact; consisted of anging on Coughlin's resdience door (this !ashoe County.City of 4eno Cang
+ang has reduced 6ational Merit <inalist.former 4eno Aigh ,ll&Time leading Scorer in +as1etall (/
time all state, #hatever #hatever.passed the 6$ ar eMam after second year of la# schoo. Tenth in his
la# school class, GS?T@ patent attorney, etc.) Coughlin to living in a fifth #heel trailer he rents for
I7) a month and eating at food pantries. =sn't 6evada greatO 6o #onder it leads or is near the ottom,
or topO @f all the misery categories and indeMes (unemployment, suicides, disease, foreclosures,
an1ruptcies. Maye if 6evada's Judge cease co&signing all the misconduct of la# enforcement and
prosecutors, and instead invested in its residents a it more (and the fe# s1illed, educated young
professional.students #ho don't olt the state at the first chance they get) 6evada could progress a it,
noO =nstead, its ecome a mecca for la# enforcement officers transplanted from California ta1ing out
their frustrations on locals, #hile eing comparitively #ell enefitted and compensated for the privilege
of doing so..
Ao#ever, the time of arrest as listed on teh
Sure does help to have Judge *lliot stri1e from the record on his last day on the ench all of
Coughlin's filing in C4%/&/'/) (the appeal of %%&'900-%) including Coughlin's typed %.%8.%0 Motion
to Stay ?roation (citing some ridiculous font siJe allegation applicale to perhaps % sentence at most
of a %' page filing, made all the more duious given the su5ect matter eMposed therein relative to the
per se dis3ualification asis Judge *lliott ignored due to his +oard ?residency for the same C,,!
Coughlin #as suing efore him in C$%%&'%()), and act of 5udicial misconduct sufficient to have all
rulings or ordres y Judge *lliott in any case involving Coughlin overtturned (and *lliot handled all of
Coughlin's criminal appeals and disposed of all of them on ultra suspect grounds (and #ent to Stanford
#ith *lcano and *cheverria).
<urther, the 4JC still refused to process the 6otice of ,ppeal Coughlin filed in various matters,
includign on 0.%(.%0 in %%&'900-% as to the 0.%%.%0- @rder.
%%&'900-% :/.).%0 @rder to Sho# Cause Aearing Aeld (Judicial @fficer> ?earson, ScotR)
Defendant has sumit.ed an S+8( re3uest. C4,6T*D. Court is to pay for evaluation. *valuator may
C()T.tact the Defendant at ((-() 997&7-'/ or ye&mail at JachcoughlinSholmail.com. Defendant is to
continue chec1ing in #ith D,S et#een (>'' am and />''pm on !ednesdays. Defendant is to have no
contact #ith 4JC staff . y phone, leller or e&mail. Defendant may file pleadings, ut is to chec1 in #ith
security first at the entrance of the Mills +. "ance @ffice +uilding. and a =GC +a5.if#f ill e notified
+ail is to remain infull force and effect.=n a Trial set in 4C4 /'%/&'9)90'. Deputy District ,llorney
Hoch Doung re3uested to go ac1 on the record efore Judge ?earson to e heard regarding the
previous S+8( C4,6T*D in 4C4 /'%%&'900-%. Defendant #ho is appearing #ithout caunse.,
o5ected Judge Clifton C4,6TS Slates re3uest . Aearing proceeded efore Judge Scolt ?earson. State
is represented y Hach Doung, *s3., Defendant is not represented y Counsel. ,fter further revie# of
the file, the Court has reconsidered DefendanJs S+8( filed <eruary ), /'%0, at 8>)- am and has
D*6=*D it. The Court is still ordering the Defendant get evaluated for competency at the Courts
eMpelue. Defendant re3uested that his medicatioll e paid for. The Court indicaled it #ill comider il at a
laler time. The order ta sho# cause hearing has een confirmed setfor <eruary /)./'%0, a=8>0',.M.
Defondant is ordered to maG an apt. for evaluation y <eruary %/, /'.0 and is to sho# D,Sproo f o f
lhal apt.;
:0.).%0 @rder to Sho# Cause (/>'' ?M) (Judicial @fficer> ?earson, Scott) ?arties ?resent>
Defendant Coughlin. Hachary +ar1er;T
:0.).%0 Aearing 4esult (Judicial @fficer> ?earson, Scott ) Gpon the order of Judge Scott ?earson.
+ruce "indsay of tire +o +ell Croup, is herey appointed to represent the Defendant in this matter and
the ,dministrative @rder;. <irst, Coughlin clearly retained, on the the record, his right to continue self
representing, only assenting to "indsay appearing in :%%&'900-%; in a co&counsel arrangement, #hich
Judge ?earson indicated :#as up to you and Mr. "indsay;. Coughlin never assented to "indsay
appearing in :the ,dministrative Matter; or some ne# case created thereafter to fit such into %0&
'7%-07. "indsay's role seemed to consist chiefly of collecting chec1s for three different case numer
he #as allegedly appointed on for every one :hearing; he sho#ed up to (usually late, #ith no
conferring of any sort #ith his :client; eforehand) and 5ust, generall, playing the !ashington Cenerals
role to a 't'. So, :this matter; and :the ,dministrative @rder; are different cases, #hereas up until
Coughlin pointing out the illegality thereof, Judge ?earson #as attempting to retroactively stic1 the
:,dministrative @rder; into :this matter; (%%&'900-%). ?erhaps the 4?D, !ashoe County, and the
4JC should stop handing out arrest and prosecutions li1e candy if it lac1s the resources to afford the
due process, record 1eeping, and organiJational structure necessary to support the massive
infrastructure such overcharging. adn aseless arresting re3uires.
:%/.'9%/'%/ %/%%'./'%/ %/%%(%/'%/ '%%%'%/'%0 '%.%%./'%0 '%%%7%/'%0
'/%'-%/'%0 '/%'-%/'%0 '/%')%/'%0 '/%')%/'%0 4*6@ C4=M=6," C,S* SGMM,4D
C,S* 6o. 4C4l@ll&'900-% re3uested y James "eslie, Deputy ?ulic Defender UJ ,ppeal
<iled 6otice @f ,ppealN Designation @f 4ecordN 4e3uest for Transcript Cash +ail Converted
and 4efunded +ail converted to fines and fees in the amoulJt ofI%7).''. +alance refunded in
the amount of I/('.oochec1 B'-'-7- 2l @rder <iled Ul ?roceedings Certified to the Second
Judicial District Court "etter Sent +.l ?roceedings Certified to the Second Judicial District
Court Supplemental tl= !arrant =ssued <irst +ench !arrant issued ail set at I)''.'' Cosh
@nly !arrant 4ecalled ?er @rder of Steve Tultle and Judge ?earson, #arralJt is recalled D,S
to inform Defendant of evaluation and freed .' get i= comple.ed. D@ 6@T =SSG* !,44,6T
!rrff@GT @E <4@M ?*,4S@6. C,6C*"* D !arrant ,rraignment (%'>'' ,M) (Judicial
@fficer> Schroeder, Jac1) $acated Mental Aealth *valuation and comply #ith recommendations
. Case is on ,ppeal. 25 !arrant ,rraignment (%'>'' ,M) (Judicial @fficer> SfernlHHa, ?eter)
f7C&D,S $iolation. +,=">I)oo C,SA ?arties ?resent> Defendant Coughlin, Hachary +ar1er
(J +ail Sct (Judicial @fficer> SferraJJa, ?eter) +ail Set at I)''.'' C,SA@ 6"D. Defendant
4emanded to the CGRitadyo f the !ashoe County Sheriff. U5 @rder to Sho# Cause (8>0' ,M)
(Judicial @fficer> ?earson, Scott) <TC&D,S $=@l,T=@6 ?arties Fresent> Defendant Coughlin,
lcJchary +ar1er +.l @rder to Sho# Cause Aearing Aeld (Judicial @fficer> ?earson, ScotR)
Defendant has sumit.ed an S+8( re3uest. C4,6T*D. Court is to pay for evaluation.
*valuator may C()T.tact the Defendant at ((-() 997&7-'/ or ye&mail at
JachcoughlinSholmail.com. Defendant is to continue chec1ing in #ith D,S et#een (>'' am
and />''pm on !ednesdays. Defendant is to have no contact #ith 4JC staff . y phone, leller
or e&mail. Defendant may file pleadings, ut is to chec1 in #ith security first at the entrance of
the Mills +. "ance @ffice +uilding. and a =GC +a5.if#f ill e notified +ail is to remain infull
force and effect.=n a Trial set in 4C4 /'%/&'9)90'. Deputy District ,llorney Hoch Doung
re3uested to go ac1 on the record efore Judge ?earson to e heard regarding the previous
S+8( C4,6T*D in 4C4 /'%%&'900-%. Defendant #ho is appearing #ithout caunse., o5ected
Judge Clifton C4,6TS Slates re3uest . Aearing proceeded efore Judge Scolt ?earson. State is
represented y Hach Doung, *s3., Defendant is not represented y Counsel. ,fter further
revie# of the file, the Court has reconsidered DefendanJs S+8( filed <eruary ), /'%0, at 8>)-
am and has D*6=*D it. The Court is still ordering the Defendant get evaluated for competency
at the Courts eMpelue. Defendant re3uested that his medicatioll e paid for. The Court indicaled
it #ill comider il at a laler time. The order ta sho# cause hearing has een confirmed setfor
<eruary /)./'%0, a=8>0',.M. Defondant is ordered to maG an apt. for evaluation y <eruary
%/, /'.0 and is to sho# D,Sproo f o f lhal apt. Cash +ail ?osted in the amount ofI)''. oo +.l
@rd rr to Sho# Cause (/>'' ?M) (Judicial @fficer> ?earson, Scott) ?arties ?resent> Defendant
Coughlin. Hachary +arhr Aearing 4esult (Judicial @fficer> ?earson, Scott ) Gpon the order of
Judge Scott ?earson. +ruce "indsay of tire +o +ell Croup, is herey appointed to represent
the Defendant in this malle=' and lhe ,dminislrative @rdel'. U) @rder to Sho# Cause (8>0' ,M)
(Judicial @fficer> ?earson, Scott) '/%/)%/'%0 Continued to '0.%%./'%0V ,rraignment
4eset.ContinuanceV Coughlin. Hachary +ar1er @rder to Sho# Cause Aearing Ael- (Judicial
@fficer> ?earson, SC@=R) Defendan. is nimtated into D,S supel'$ision for up to TAlETD&S=K
(09) months. Defendant is on1red to otain *valuation at Court's *Mpense. Defondant is not to
use or possess any countrolled sustance unless presCl'ied y Medical Doctor. DefondallJ is
to give his atlor%l(%D, +ruce "indsay, .lame of Defotu1mts psychiatrist. #ho shall provide
*valuation. Defendant is to e nim.aled into the CC? ?rogram to egin March /%, /'%0 at %>0'
?.M. Court Compliance ?rogram To egin 0%/%%/'%0 U) Motion <iled Motion to $acate any
@rder =ssuing from March % =. /'%0 Aearing in 4C4/'% %V'900-% filed. 2) 4e3uest for
Sumission <iled +.l M@lion <iled Motion to 4emove +ruce "indsay, *s3. as Co&Counsel
filed. tl= Motion <iled Motion.or Chec1.or Dr. Dasar ?ursuant to @rder 4endend on /.%0.%0 and
Sumission '. ?roposed @rder for Mental health *valuation SJ Motion <iled 6otice of, ppeal
Court Com lianee :
duty to file s8( competency Competency *valuation S+8( <orm
<rom> Hach Coughlin (JachcoughlinShotmail.com)
Sent> <ri /.'%.%0 %'>)( ,M
To> JyoungSda.#ashoecounty.us (JyoungSda.#ashoecounty.us)N
tgalliSda.#ashoecounty.us (tgalliSda.#ashoecounty.us)
0/ attachments
% %/ %/ ''9(9 4?D "oo1's ?roof of Service '9)90' 9'00% '09/8 '900-% Sifre.pdf ()//.- E+)
, % %0 %/ ''9(9 4?D "oo1's ?roof of Service '9)90' 9'00% '09/8 '900-% Sifre.pdf (%)-.'
E+) , %/ ) %/ '/'- email from sstettnerSda.#ashoecounty.us failure to timely provide +rady
material reveal 4?D Sifre complicity #ith 4JC Judges '9)90' '97(8' ')00-% /98''.pdf (-%.8
E+) , % %/ %/ rpd police report %/ cr ''9(9 sifre leedy loo1 nash young 1andaras radsha#
'/'- '9)90' redacted ocrd.pdf (0./ M+) , %/ 9 %/ supoenas '9)90' The# Sifre Schaur
"opeJ <oreshee *C@MM.pdf ().% M+) , SG??"*M*6T," 4*?"D T@ @??@S=T=@6 C$'8&
'%7'( % %0 %/ (Supplemental ...) %%cr''9(9 1ing sn sifre rcr/'%/&'9)90' ocrd and tagged
5ig/ lossy.pdf (/''.( E+) , 9 /9 %/ '/'- '97(8' %/-/' 9'0'/ 6CS Taitlel 4MC Machen
Aarley email to 4JC Stancil and !CS@ Stuchell Sheriff's !e and Spar1s Justice Court
Aansen.pdf (/).% E+) , 7 0 %/ %/ cr %/-/' redacted report f.pdf (/.0 M+) , 7 0 %/ '/'-
'97(8' 4MC %/-/' criminal Complaint DT? signed y 6orth#ind's Eres ut filled out in
4?D !eaver's hand#riting.pdf ()0'.) E+) , 7 0 %/ Eres T?@ /87 4MC %/-/' 4JC '97(8'
pages %- to /) faM sotelo.pdf (0//.- E+) , 7 0 %/ redacted disturing the peace arrest %/ cr
%/-/' rmc loomis sotelo mauser #eaver dye ''9(9 /98'' sn '/'- /) page discovery
north#ind ncs 1res reduced siJe.pdf (/.0 M+) , 7 /) %/ 9'0'/ '/'- '97(8' %/-/' '-0)
stamped Coughlin's motion for eMtensio nto file rief and eMhiit 9'0'/.pdf (%-8.7 E+) , 8 ( %/
"oomis second Motion to #ithdra# %/ cr %/-/' rmc see also /9-').pdf (//(./ E+) , ( 7 %/
'900-% @rder <or Competency *valuation '/'- '9)90' %/-/'.pdf (%)70.) E+) , %' %% %/
4MC %/ C4 %/-/' ,mended Criminal Complaint nrs -8-D.8)'(/) rmc %.'-.'%).pdf (%9'.-
E+) , %' %( %/ '/'- SG+?@*6, @6 E*=TA "@@M=S <@4 %% %- %/ <@4M,"
D=SC=?"=6,4D A*,4=6C /9-') %/-/'.pdf (%%09.9 E+) , /(/7W'''% Sotelo Motion to
!ithdra# and @4der granting it %/ C4 %/-/'.pdf (%%8.- E+) , 7 0 %/ '/'- %'-8 '97(8'
%/-/' 4MC Case Summary sheet ail info, Sooudi trespass, three criminal complaints and
4?D arrest report and pc sheet.pdf (%(7%.9 E+) , % %/ %/ Aill T?@ application 4JC Schroeder
''''%8 ''9(9 /98'' '/'- '9)90'.pdf (908.- E+) , <$%/&''%87&/9)%-%) (,pplication for
T?@).pdf (89(.8 E+) , %' - %/ 4JC ,lright '/'- Doc1et Eres /87 @rder Denying *?@
ruling on lien '97(8'.pdf (7(.0 E+) , ?ages from 7 0 %/ 6orth#inds ,partments Milan Eres
4JC T?@ ,pplication rcp/'%/&'''/87 and Judge Schroeders 7 ) %/ @rder granting %'-8
'97(8' %/-/' and doc1et and 8 7 %/ eMtension hearing notice.pdf (//8.9 E+) , 7 0 %/ '/'-
'97(8' '%-8 4MC %/-/' hand#ritten !itness Statement y 6orth#ind's Milan Ere's
compare to hand#riting in T?@ application in /87 and criminal complaint for DT?.pdf (0'8.'
E+) , 7 0 %/ '/'- '97(8' %'-8 4MC %/-/' proale cause sheet and Declaration Supplment
y 4?D , !eaver compare hand#riting to Eres dtp complaint of same day.pdf (8-8.0 E+) , 7
) %/ '/'- '97(8' unsecured load Complaint signed y 4?D !eaver %/-/' Eres 6orth#inds
4MC 4?D %'-8.pdf (9'8.) E+) , 4JC Judge ,lright letter for Taitel ,lright slo#s Eres
T?@ hearing do#n to retain 5urisidction rcp/'%/&'''/87 hearing on 8 ) %/ '97(8' /9-').pdf
(80/.' E+) , 8 /- %/ C@M?",=6TSS6$+,4.@4C C4=*$,6C* ,C,=6ST 4MC
D*<*6D*4S ,6D !C?D "*S"=* 4C?/'%/&'''/87 %/C4%/-/' 4C4/'%/&'97(8'
6@4TA!=6D E4*+S !*,$*4 M=""*4 ocrd and tagged 5ig/ lossy.pdf (09.) E+) , 8 ( %/
4MC defender "oomis motion to #ithdra# %/-/' north#ind 1res rmc rpd.pdf (0/7./ E+) ,
loomis motion to #ithdra# %/ cr %/-/' north#ind 1res rmc rpd.pdf (%9-.7 E+) , 1res
rcp/'%/&'''/87 rmc %/cr%/-/' rcr/'%/&'97(8' %/ page mausert sotelo faM.pdf (//'.( E+) ,
4e3uest for ,udio Copy of ?roceedings r5c form 1res v coughlin rcp/'%/&'''/87.pdf ()8.'
E+) , 8 /- %/ C@M?",=6TSS6$+,4.@4C C4=*$,6C* ,C,=6ST 4MC D*<*6D*4S
,6D !C?D "*S"=* 4C?/'%/&'''/87 %/C4%/-/' 4C4/'%/&'97(8' 6@4TA!=6D
E4*+S !*,$*4 M=""*4.pdf (/'.% E+)
Hachary +ar1er Coughlin %-7% *. (th St. 4eno, 6$ 8()%/ Tel and <aM> (-( 997 7-'/
HachCoughlinShotmail.com
<rom> JachcoughlinShotmail.com
To> rrucelindsayla#Syahoo.com
Su5ect> <!> Competency *valuation S+8( <orm
Date> <ri, %8 Jan /'%0 %%>'->07 &'8''
Hachary +ar1er Coughlin %-7% *. (th St. 4eno, 6$ 8()%/ Tel and <aM> (-( 997 7-'/
HachCoughlinShotmail.com
<rom> JachcoughlinShotmail.com
To> rlSroertrucelindsay.com
Su5ect> Competency *valuation S+8( <orm
Date> Thu, %7 Jan /'%0 %)>-7>/8 &'8''
Dear Mr. "indsay,
= ,C4** !=TA D@G4 *K?4*SS =6D=C,T=@6 M,D* DG4=6C @GT =6 ?*4S@6
M**T=6C TA,T D@G A,$* , DGTD T@ M@$* <@4 ,6 @4D*4 <@4 C@M?*T*6CD
*$,"G,T=@6 @< MDS*"< +D =MM*D=,T*"D <="=6C TA* S+8( <@4M T@D,D.
= apologiJe for not having returned the scanned materials to you yet. = #ill email them and
provide you the hard copies as #ell immediatly..
Sincerely,
Hach Coughlin
?S. =f you #ant to discuss anything please 5ust email me a good time to call you or you might
e ale to reach me at 77) 9// ((09..
https>..s1ydrive.live.com.redirOresidX-0'8-908<0/<)</8R%%8
?lease find very relevant materials to the defense of this case attached and at the aove lin1. =
have scanned everything therein for viruses and it is %''Y safe and virus free.
Sorry for the delay, = am not fla1ing on you, its 5ust een hectic, i'll get to getting it scanned
and returned, very usy addressing a recent @rder of the 66D+ see1ing to disar me, ut = #ill
get to it.
= don't #ant much, o1ay. Just a fe# simple things.=f you get me this stuff, as far as = am
concerned, #e are straight (assuming you don't pull a Jim "eslie and insist on remaing on my
case as long as possile to purposefully torpedo it....) There #as tal1 of Cape <ear #ith "eslie
#ell efore he moved to #ithdra# and got a T?@, and no# an *?@ (though courthouse
sanctuary doctrine ma1es the FserviceF thereof rather suspect. "eslie #as not all FterrifiedF
ac1 then...!hat changedO @h, that's right, he #as finished puttin' in #or1 for the County (ie,
ma1ign sure = got convicted on oth counts in '900-%, than1s to his ma1ing the 64S %7%.%09
(or trying to, at least, ...he failed) citiJen's arrest arguments that #ent completely over DD,
Doung head (or, more li1ely DD, Doung 5ust couldn't stomach anymore of the farce and chose
not to ma1e such arguments to the tirunal). Can you serve the !CD, #ith re3uest for
discovery and supoena the 4JC and !CS@ for the follo#ing (assuming the #on't 5ust copy
the stuff an provide it all nice'n'easy li1e)>
certified audio transcripts of the follo#ing hearings in the 4JC>
%. 7.).%/ in 4JC 4ev/'%/&''%'-8 hearing granting a default victory incident to a 9./8.%/
motion to set aside the fraudulently procurred 9./7.%/ "oc1otu @rder at the rental #here the
'97(8' arrest occurred.
/. 7.0%.%/ hearing in r5c rev/'%/&''%'-8 efore Judge ?earson (this #as a hearing noticed on
7./0.%/ to address my Motion to Set ,side the 9./7.%/ eviction @rder signed y Judge
Schroeder despite my 9./9.%/ email and faM to the 4JC, SJC, !CS@, and City of 4eno
regarding my filign the Tenant's ,ns#er in the SJC, and the deficiencies in the ) day notice.
(please see the attached police report y the 4?D incident to the preteMtual (and Soldal v. Coo1
Co violating, not that it matters, this is nevada after all) arrest shortly upon my ailing out on
the '97(8' charge in 4MC %/ C4 %/-/'(#herein the FapproachF y the 4?D (to #hich 4?D
Sargent Sifre incidates some level of complicity et#een the 4?D and 4JC in a recording only
recently propound y the !CD, 5ust / 5udicial days efore the %/.%%.%/ Trial stemming from
the %.%-.%/ misuse of (%% arrest in rcr/'%/&'9)90' (a #itness 5ust sadly passed a#ay
uneMpectedly / days after the D, complete his direct eMamination of her, *Comm's Eariann
+eechler).
/.% the audio transcript of the one hearing in 4*$ /'%/&'7)9)8 Hach Coughlin vs Jeff
6ichols. This is relevant to '97(8' ecause its another eviction scenario and estalishes a
pattern and practice y the 4?D, !CS@ and 4JC to refuse to uphold my rights #hile
aggressively applying an overly rigid and formulaic application of rules to me as a pro se
tenant, and even going eyond that, some might say, at times. ?lease, this one is important, =
need it. , former !CS@ Deputy pu
0. = #ould li1e you to serve on the !CD, a re3uest for discovery and also a supoena.<@=, (=
1no#, 64S @pen 4ecords 4*3uest) on *C@MM for any (%% calls, 4?D Dispatch calls from
civilians, or recordings et#een the 4?D or #cso or 4eno spar1s =ndian colony ?olice or
dispatch.*C@MM in any #ay connected to me, Hach Coughlin, or suspected to e connected to
me. = am not going to as1 for much more, if you get me all that, ='ll e good, if not...='ll e
tedious.
-. any and all recordings made y anyone (4?D, !CS@, 6orth#inds Staff, ystanders, and
especially Jeff Chandler or 4yan !4ay or anyone else associate #ith 6evada Court Services)
of ,6D interactions #ith me in any #ay connected to 6orth#inds ,partments and my
tenancies there (i had three rentals, units /(, -), and 7%). ?lease have served a supoena duces
tecum on 6evada Court Services directed to anythign (documentation, recordings, etc) related
to Hach Coughlin and serve a #itness supoena on 6CS's 4yan !ray (might have stopped
#or1ing there, ut still supoena him please) as #ell as Jeff Chandler.
). The 4MC audio transcript of the (it #oudl cost my I0) i don't have, and they proaly have
to #aive the fee for you, the 4JC does #hen "eslie and the !C?D re3uest recordings) 7.).%/
unnoticed ail hearing in 4MC %/ C4 %/-/' #herein my ail #as impermissily raise from a
ondale I%,-%) to a cash only I0,''' for charges that #ere plainly manufacture any#ays.
9. the %/.0.%/ Trial audio transcript in 4MC %/ C4 %/-/'.
7. the %/.%8.%/ audio transcript of the hearing in '97(8' (the case you are on) #herein Jim
"eslie (#ithout DD, Doung there) #as ale to get some things done...you li1ely are re3uired
to, or at least, might #ant to, have this any#ays.... = dont' necessarily need the hard copies (you
can sign up for a free hotmail account at ###.outloo1.com and s1ydrive them to me, its totally
easy, or = can pic1 them up, copy them, and deliver them to you...i 5ust dont' have the money
and the court's nic1el and dime me li1e craJy).
8. The %/.9.%/ filing in the appeal of an associated 4JC prosecution in rcr/'%/&'900-% (it is
the 4ecord on ,ppeal, asically, ut = thin1 they titled it F6otice of ,ppealF on the doc1et...and
the 4JC has failed to provide me a copy of it...not even the rand ne# filings listing the indeM
of documents included in that %/.9.%/ filing (#hich is asically a 6otice of ,ppeal). D*S, =T
is relevant to this case...it goes to conflicts analysis to oth the 4JC (even across departments,
especially given some admission y Clifton as to loo1ing over Fsumission on supoenasF from
that '900-% case efore SferraJJa, on the record in '9)90'...DD, Doung is an efiler and could
easily email you that /' m or so %/.9.%/ 6otice of ,ppeal (8'- page) filign in C4%/&/'/)
(the appeal of rcr/'%%&'900-%, the first of %' arrest.incarcerations of me since 8./'.%%).
?lease supoena 6evada Court Services 4yan !ray (he may not #or1 there anymore, ut he
#as present at the scene of the arrest and, oviously, along #ith 6orth#inds Manager Duane
Ja1os (#ho testified on that 7.0%.%/ audio transcript = am re3uesting you otain and copy me
on in rev/'%/&''%'-8 aout the events in 3uestion in '97(8') participated in attempted rea1
in an fraudulent Declaration of Service of the 9.%-.%/ ) Day GD 6otice.
(. "astly, please serve the 4JC Custodian of 4ecords a Supoena duces tecum for all
records.faM logs.information.documentation related to any faMing of @rders y 4JC Judges to
the !CS@ et#een @ctoer /-th, /'%% and 6ovemer /nd /'%% (each faM has a 5o numer,
etc. = #ant a se3uential printout or log of those faMes as it goes to #hether the 4JC, in accord
#ith its admitted policy, faMed to the !CS@ the t#o different @4ders y Judge S<erraJJa
related to the *viction (a %'./).%% F*viction @4der and DecisionF and a %'./7.%% F<indings of
<act, Conclusions of "a#, and @4der for Summary *victionF. = need to 1no# if and #hen
such items #ere faMed or transmitted to the !CS@...it is very relevant given the same !CS@
Deputy Machen conducted the loc1out on %%.%.%% from my former home la# office, according
to the loc1smith, 4*no Carson Messenger receipts, the transcript of th 9.%8.%/ criminal
trespass trial in 4MC %% Cr /9-') (s#orn testimony of Casey +a1er, eS3. and 4ichard C. A=ll,
eS3.) demonstrates that the !CS@'s @ffice is eing ostructive, as is the 4JC (#hom failed to
comply #ith my SC4 %')(-).SC4 %%( properly issued and served supoena and supoena
decus tecums of %'.0'.%/ in the formal disciplinary matter (espeically consiering the -.%%.%/
volunteering of information and documents y 4JC 5udges secretary "ori To#nsend), and
further specify the supoena duces tecum is for the Ffile stamped cover pageF of any filign y
Couglin in 4JC rev/'%/&'''07-.
%'. the audio transcript of the 8.7.%/ T?@ Aearing in 4JC 4C?/'%/&'''/87) for Milan
Eres v. Hach Coughlin (Eres #as 6@rth#inds ,pts maintenance man (the one doing the
sa#Jalling to the metal door of unit /( incident to the arrest in '97(8'...Ae testified under oath
the matters of material direct relevane to the defense of this case. This is a no rainer, and the
fact that "eslie continuously refused to otain a copy of this hearing (again, the 4JC #aives the
I0) fee for th #C?D...so #hat #as "eslie's eMcuseO That 6orth#ind's ,partments sent him
some photgraphs of a micro#aveO ?lease. Jim "eslie is a 5o1e. That might e relevant to an
evictio hearing, ut not to a 64S %((./8' defense. !hat Eres testified to at that T?@
eMtension hearing on cross eMamination is oviously eMtremely relevant, particularly #here
there #as eMtensive 3uestioning directed to the circumstances of the arrest in '97(8'.
%%. "astly, a supoena duces tecum on the Custodian of 4ecords for the 4eno muni Court and
the Custodian of 4ecords for the City of 4*no Marshals for any an all documentation,
marshal's reports, or recordings (Thompsons admitted to ma1ign at least on on or aout
0.//.%/) in any #ay related to Coguhlin (oviously, there shoudl e an arrest report from the
/./7.%/ direct contempt arrest #herein Marshal Aarley, as testified to y Judge 6ash Aolmes at
my disciplinary hearing on %%.%-.%/ via her hearsay of #hat Aarley told her, has apparently
alleged some Fdisassemlign of a recording device and hiding a component of it in the
restroom during arestroom rea1 that #as egrudingly granted immediately after Aolmes
egan interrogating Coughlin aout h#ether he #as Frecording the proceedingsF and or
#hether he Fhad a recording deviceF, upon #hich, alleged Aolmes, Coughlin immediately got
Fall s3uirmy and egged to use the restroomF....@1ay, lets see the documentation, marshal's
report etc. for anything, ut especially including that. =< they move to 2Gash = #ant e copied
on it (please copy me on anything anyone sends you ever in any #ay related to me) as = have
some authority and opposition #or1 = #oudl li1e for you to at least consider incident to any
reply you may #ish to file....this is relevant. 4JC Clifton signed an @4der for Competency
eval on /./7.%/ at %>0% pm...JGDge 6ash holmes could nto e found y her staff at that time,
despite the traffic citaiton trial connected to 4ichard C. Aill, *s3.'s office and the trespass arrest
eing schedule to occur then...oth A@lmes and Clifton #ere mysteriously transferred criminal
cases involving Coughlin on /./7.%/...oth are lifelong prosecutors, formerly Aolmes #as
Clifton's oss from aout (% to (- ish (not to mention "inda Cardner #as a co#or1er (see
)-8-- and 9'0'/), and 6ash Aolmes 0.%-.%/ grievance against Coughli nto the S+6 admits to
communications #ith the !C?D aout Coughlin.
%/. please supoena duces tecum the !C?D as to anything in any #ay related to A@lmes
admission regarding the !C?D in her 0.%-.%/ grievance...
%0. "astly, please serve a supoena duces tecum on the custodian of 4*cords for 4ichard C.
A=ll, *S3. and his former associates ne# firm in Eentuc1y, Casey D. +a1er, *s3's +a1er and
+a1er or #hatever tey call themsleves narro#ly tailored to any documentation, recordings, or
information aring on #hen and if their office provided the t#o different eviction @4ders to
the #cso office (+a1er's testimony at the 9.%8.%/ crimnal trespass trial (there is an oficial
transcript at te lin1) sheds some light on this vis a vis @ctoer /8th, /'%%...and familiarJie
yourslef #ith the void.stale order concept incident to 64S -'./)0's re3uirement that the
loc1out e done F#ithin /- hoursF of Freceipt of the orderF....y the !CS@...the same deputy
ma1ign the arrest in '97(8' conducted that loc1out and filed a fraudulent affidavit of service
on %%.7.%% alleging to have Fpersonally servedF me...#hich his supervisor #as ofrced to admit,
in #riting, he did not, ut rather merely posted the order on the door (hill lied at the 9.%8.%/
trespass trial in testying Fthey posted it to the door ecause you ran a#ayF despite that eing
completely false, and #here A=ll admits he #as not even present that day, and his associate
completely failes to ac1 up hill's aseless, defamatory accusation (one of many y Aill).
,nd that's it. Dou do all that and provide a reasonale return and attempt to counter all the s
M@tions to 2uash sure to ensue, and #e are straight. Dou can move to #ithdra# and = #ill
give you glo#ing revie#, = promise. Aell, = #ill even draft all these supoenas for your
approval and the oppositions to the motions to 3uash if you li1e, and provide the authority in
support of them. +ut = need you to issue the supoenas and have them served, and get the
recordings, etc....even if they ma1e you pay for them, none of this adds up to more than I/''
(perhaps you can file a notice of appearance, if an efiler on the cr%/&/'/) under some
5ustification that is is necessary to the defense herein or = #ould allo# you to appear as co&
counsel provided you dont' insist on hi5ac1ing things..., ut oviously paying I% page for all
8'- pages hard copy from aint goign to #or1....
= really appreciate any help you can provide.
Sifre's admissions as to said complicity may provide a asis for your filing a Motion to
conflict out the r5c and the #cda's office (in addition to DD, Eandaras' involvement in the
turning over of my smartphone and data card to the City of 4eno Marshals and the 4MC in %%
T4 /98'', as admitted to y !CS@ Aodge to me, in front of local attorney ?am !illmore (=
#as arrested incidnet to a contempt finding at the /./7.%/ trial efore 5udge 6ash Aolmes, and
it #as not until after my property #as oo1ed into my personal secured property and #ell after
any time for a Fsearch incident to arrestF that the !C Jail released to the 4MC and its Marshals
on /./8.%/ my property, #hich #as returned 07 days later #iped of all data incident to an @rder
of 0.0'.%/ that seems to have clearly e responsive to a filing y me in 6$+ %'&')%'- efore
Judge 6ash Aolmes and !ashoe "egal Services *Mec. Director *lcano %(77 McCeorge S@"
classmate, 6$+ Judge +. +eesley....all three of #hom testified at my %%.%-.%/ formal
disciplinary hearing at the S+6, despite SC4 %')(/)(c) eing desecrated in every #ay
imaginale, another Mirching to esmirch the 5udicial system in 6evada. DD, Eandaras is on
the 66D+ and refuses to deny that she or David Aamilton, *s3. (4ichard C. Aill, *s3.'s est
friend) #ere on my screening ?anel. This =S revelvant to #hat you are getting seven ones for,
under a conflict or dis3ualification analysis (= #ould li1e a reason #hy this case #as transferred
on /./7.%/ from Judge "ynch, same day another case in the 4MC #as transferred to 5Gdge
Aolmes (the %.%/.%/ custodial arrest for 5ay#al1ign cuJ richard g. hill said to cas in rmc %/ C4
%/-/'.
7.).%/ in 4JC 4ev/'%/&''%'-8 (this is the summary eviction from the very unit B/( rental at
6orth#inds ,partment, %98' S1y Mountain Drive that = #as arrested at on 9./8.%/ in the
matter you #ere assigned and contracted to handle for I7''.''). = did not attend the hearing
ecause = #as rearrested on 7.0.%/ y the 4eno ?olice Department 5ust loc1s from 6orth#inds
,partments in 4MC %/ C4 %/-/' (a custodial arrest involving three charges, one, a simple
traffic citation for failure to secure a load on one's vehicle (they allege an empty plastic storage
tu fell off my vehicle), t#o, no proof of vehicle insurance (despite 4?D @fficer ,lan !eaver
admitting that = sho#ed him a high resolution pdf of my then current GS,, auto insurance on
a -.7 inch smart phone screen...he said it had to e a paper printout), and three, Fdisturing the
peaceF ased upon the criminal complaint signed y 6orth#ind's ,partments maintenance
man, /0 year old Milan Eres (#hom otained a T?@ against me from the 4JC in 4C?/'%/&
'''/87 on 7.).%/ after the 4?D fraudulently urged Eres to apply for one incident to the
7.0.%/ arrest, as further confirmed y the commentary y the same 4?D Sargent Sifre (only
finally propounded to me follo#ing a %/.).%/ email from the !CD, informing me of the
availaility of such discovery
please let me 1no#, in #riting, and #ith specifics, #hether or not you #ill move, in #riting, to
otain the aove indicated materials, and provide an indication of ho# soon you #ill do so,
#ith proof thereof. Sorry to have to as1 for that, ut time is of the essence and = need to 1no#
if this is going to #or1 out #ith you or not. =f it does, = #ill asolutely credit you for eing a
faithful defender of the SiMth ,mendment, and maye more.
Sincerely,
Hach Coughlin;
:Covington's threats vis a vis State +ar of 6evada 9/007
<rom> Hach Coughlin (JachcoughlinShotmail.com)
Sent> <ri /.'%.%0 %>'% ?M
To> 5helJerSda.#ashoecounty.us (5helJerSda.#ashoecounty.us)N
triandaSda.#ashoecounty.us (triandaSda.#ashoecounty.us)N M+aysSda.#ashoecounty.us
(maysSda.#ashoecounty.us)N s5ste#artSda.#ashoecounty.us
(s5ste#artSda.#ashoecounty.us)N tgalliSda.#ashoecounty.us (tgalliSda.#ashoecounty.us)N
plipparelliSda.#ashoecounty.us (plipparelliSda.#ashoecounty.us)N
plipparSda.#ashoecounty.us (plipparSda.#ashoecounty.us)N JyoungSda.#ashoecounty.us
(JyoungSda.#ashoecounty.us)N phalsteadSda.#ashoecounty.us
(phalsteadSda.#ashoecounty.us)N complaintsSnvar.org (complaintsSnvar.org)N
lcastilloSnvcourts.nv.gov (lcastilloSnvcourts.nv.gov)N tlindemanSnvcourts.nv.gov
(tlindemanSnvcourts.nv.gov)
Dear ,D, AelJer,
=n her %/.%0.%/ email to !C?D "eslie, DD, Eandaras admits that there is an incapacity issue
#ith Coughlin, yet the !CD,'s @fficer persists #ith the %.//.%0 Trial in '9)90'. =nstead of
moving for a competency evaluation, "eslie and Eandaras (and !atts&$ial, the DD,, not the
Judicial ,ssistant la#yer for Judge !al1er) ause process, dodge and ostruct Coughlin's
supoenas on /JDC Judges and ,dminstrators, and the 4JC Custodian of 4ecords, !ashoe
County Sheriff's @ffice, etc., etc.
This is a#fully similar to the esM=4CA=6C of the legal profession's dignity here in 6orthern
6evada a#hile ac1 in =n 4e Mirch...some S+6 !CD,'s @ffice synergy there too.
The thing aout !C?D "eslie's protection order that is the most stri1ing lie, is that the lin1ed
clip is not a FvideoF at all. =t is audio only. <urther, nothing in the audio could possily e said
to amount to a Fvo# to continue harassing his former pulic defenderF. Jim "eslie is a liar and
a fraud. ,nd one of the est prosecutor's the !CD,'s @ffice has.
,lso, ?aula Campell of the State +ar of 6evada completely disputes +ar Counsel ?at Eing's
attriutions to her in his o#n T?@ ,pplication, #hich, as usual, contains Eing's rand of lying
every other #ord out of his moutn. , <@<C@" is not an @rder. Eing, you demand Coughlin
call ahead prior to coming to the S+6 to file anything, then, #hen he does, you characteriJe it
as re3uiring you call the policeO *ver heard of a post hearing motionO !hy doesn't Eing and
Cler1 of Court ?eters try to lie a little less aout the representations they ma1e to 4espondent's
vis a vis SC4 %')(-), SC4 %%', and SC4 %%((0), and all the eM parte communications #ith the
?anel that Eing admits to intending to ma1e during a %'.%).%/ conversation #ith Coughlin in
6C%/&'/'-O ,nd coached up that ?anel #as...ruling on voluminous motions on %'.0.%/
efore the @rder appointing ?anel Chair *cheverria could have even arrived in the mail given
66D+ 6$D*T4 Chairman Susich's @rder appointing the ?anel is signed and dated %'.0'.%/.
@h, that's right, no time for Fa regular motion cycleF to 3uash all of Coughlin's supoenas.
,nd loo1, its a prosecutor's #orld here in 6orthern 6evada. ,nd there #ill al#ays e the
prosecutor's at the S+6 there to catch them if they fall, li1e #ith =n 4e +ec1ett (+are couldnt'
ring himself to characteriJe a crime #ith the eMacting #ording in its elements as that found in
SC4 %%%(9) as a serious offenseO 6o matter, even upon the Supreme Court doing it for him,
+ec1ett got the ol' SC4 %%%(%') pass, after an arduous #ee1 of reha FcuredF him...). ,nd no
iggie #ith !illardson having an affair #ith the Judge #hile appearing in case efore
him...http>..###.lvr5.com.ne#s.la#yer&#ho&had&relationship&#ith&5udge&#on&t&face&
discipline&from&ar&%8(%9'-/%.htmlOrefX-/%
!hat am = eing disarred again forO @h, that's right, former !CD, DD, domestic violence
attorney no# Judge "inda Cardner sanctioned me under 64S 7.'8) for as1ing for alimony for
the domestic violence victim = #as representing as a legal aid attorney...finding it veMatious
(though not re3uiring, under any canon, her to report anything related to Coughlin's advocacy
there to the S+6...) despite her 9.%(.'( <@<C@" and Decree of Divorce ultimately including a
I%.'' per year 5urisdictional reservation alimony a#ard...and %8.'%'(/)() address only
frivolous and veMtious claims or defense, not Ffailing to conduct discoveryF or FsarcasticF
presentation. So either Judge Cardner violated a Canon y failing to report Coughlin to the +ar
for some alleged violation of an 4?C, or +ar Counsel Eing is violating 4?C 0.8, -.%, 0.0, and
0.- y ta1ing Judge ". Carnder's -.%0.'( @rder ,fter Trial that he got from 4MC Judge 6ash
Aolmes after Judge ". Cardner passed it to her rother, 4MC Judge !. Cardner, #hom passed
it to all the other 4MC Judges. 4MC Judge 6ash Aolmes also admits to the !C?D
potentially violating the attorney&client privilege in communicating #ith her, for god 1no#s
#hat reason, in her 0.%-.%/ grievance against Coughlin to the S+6, #here she alleges Coughlin
is FdecompensatingF, though, Judge !. Cardner admitted on the record on -.%'.%/ that Judge
6ash Aolmes violated 6evada la# y failing to notify the other departments of the 4MC in
#irting of her suspension of the trial of /./7.%/ in %% T4 /98'' upon her finding Coughlin's
competency in 3uestion and Freferring this matter to the State +arF, ut not efore she
estalished the ma5ority vie#point in the la# y failing to grant even a rief stay to an attorney
representing clients prior to summarily incarcerating him for summary contempt (she
characteriJed it as criminal, ut cited to civil statutes, though, conveniently avoided 64S
//.'0'(/), #hich #ould re3uired ol' shifty Marshal Aarley to put it in an ,ffidavit, #hich he
definitely does not #ant to do. ,nd 66D+.!CD, DD, Eandaras had to sign off on Judge
6ash Aolmes 0.0'.'( @rder resleasing Coughlin property to him (#hich oddly, contrary to the
oo1ing inta1e form listing Coughlin's personal property as including a stand alone micro sd
card, only mentioned t#o phones and a shaver...though the smartphone had the micro sd card
inserted into it...though all the date #as #iped form everything....hhmmmmn. ,nd Coughlin
did not lie to Judge 6ash Aolmes during the /./7.%/ Trial, period. She #as reduced to alleging
he lied aout having recording devices (ecause neither she nor anyone else invovled #ants to
address the #arrantless confiscation of Coughlin's property not incident to a search incident to
arrest #here the !CS@ released Coughlin's property to the City of 4eno Marshals a day after
he #as oo1ed and #here Coughlin's property #as already oo1ed into his o#n personal
property at the 5ail, its not a DiaJ search incident to arrest, its 5ust a <ourth ,mendment
violation at that point...
+ut the thing is, the audio transcript of the /./7.%/ Trial clearly sho#s that Coughlin made an
Fopen refusalF to indicate #hether or not he had any Frecording devicesF, telling Judge 6ash
Aolmes F#hat is in my poc1ets is private, and that's a <ourth ,mendment issue...F#hereupon
she changed her 3uestion, as1ing Coughlin is he #as presently recording the proceedings.
Coughlin responded truthfully that he #as not. <eeling the reasonaleness of her sua sponte
interrogation evaporating, Judge 6ash Aolmes moved on....and sho#ed up at Coughlin's
%%.%-.%/ formal disciplinary hearing #ith an a#fully slippery version of the events that day,
easily disproven y a simple revie# of the audio transcript, not that ?anel Chair *cheverria #as
going to let that happen. @ne restroom rea1. 6o interrogation aout recording or Frecording
devicesF until ,<T*4 that one restroom rea1. Judge 6ash Aolmes tried to cole together a
finding of reasonale suspicion y alleging she 3ueried Coughlin aout recording and
recording devices, #hereupon he 3uic1ly Fgot all s3uirmy and egged to use the restroomF.
Deah, no. Didn't 3uite happen. 6ice try, though. @h, #ell, Judge 6ash Aolmes #ill 5ust allude
to some uns#orn unattriuted hearsay to stand in place for the failed proffer of facts supporting
reasonale suspicion...
=ts odd that !ashoe "egal Services fired Coughlin, asserting it #as solely due to former
!CD,'s @ffice domestic violence attorney no# /JDC Judge "inda Cardner's -.%0.'( @rder
,fter Trial in D$'8&'%%98 #hen considering the doc1et in <$'(&''889 sho#s then !"S
+oard ?resident +rec1enridge pic1ed up the cd of the hearing #herein Coughlin represented a
male domestic violence victim, and in doing so so upset 4oManne of the C,,! run T?@
,dvocates office. Then there is C,,! complaining aout Coughlin incident to the Carnine
case. So...is C,,! an independent contractorO =s /JDC Judge Cardner Fa partyF for an 4?C
-./ analysisO !ould that ma1e the !CD,'s @ffice an inappropriate choice for an entity to
prosecute Coughlin hereO
That Joshi '%%98 Trial started on 0.%/.'(...The Grie T?@ #as on 0.%/.'(. Carnine #as on
0.%0.'(, and the Joshi '%%98 Trial concluded on 0.%7.'(, #ith another Aearing in Grie on
0./'.'(...and the +oard of *3ualiJation appeal !"S's (!CD,'s @ffice *C4 partner, another
conflict) dropped off on Coughlin a #ee1 efore the 0.%'.'( filing dealinde came due and #as
filed y Coughlin on 0.%'.'(. ,nd #hile Coughlin's competence to practice la# has een put
in 3uestion y DD, Eandaras' fello# 66D+ memers...the Davenport case
The S+6 and DD, Eandaras's fello# 66D+ memers are attempting to disar me. , ig part
of that is the I-/,'9' attorneys fee a#ard y my and ?atridcia Aalstead's former co#or1er, no#
/JDC Judge <lanagan, incident to the Motion for ,ttorney's <ees filed y 4ichard C. Aill, *s3.
on the same day /JDC Judge *lliott incarcerated me for as1ing a 3uestion aout my A=?,,
rights incident to DD, Doung (and Ms. Aalstead ares some responsiility there as she #as
listed as attorney of record as #ell) violating the stay in 64S %78.-') y ma1ing one of his
myriad demands upon local 5udges to ta1e me into custody for mentioning some constitutional
right or other (it really is mar1ed ho# DD, Doung orders Judges around, very impressive the
command of the 5udiciary your office has, some might say).
+esides that, on May 7th, /'%/, the day an @pposition #as due to Aill's attorney's fee motion,
DD, Doung attempted to hold a Trial against me in 4C4/'%%&'900-% (the i?hone case), and
!C?D Joe Coodnight admitted minutes efore the trial started that he had not vie#ed the
eMcuplatory video #herein = otained a confession from material #itness 6icole !atson that
the man #ho pic1ed up the iphone off the ground in the middle of the do#nto#n s1ate place in
front of City Aall, threatened to thro# it in the river if someone did not claim it immediately.
The !C?D couldn't even e othered to mail out a certified mail supoena for a misdemeanor
trial to attempt to served that Mc2ueen Aigh School student, 6icole !atson. ,lso, during the
8 days = spent in 5ail starting on -.%(.%/, = #as deprived my regular psychoactive medication.
Det, your office persists in a prosecution in '9)90' ased upon an allegation that = lied in
asserting that an officer #as shining a flash light in my face, #hen really, the officer asserts, he
#as merely shining the flashlight at my shoulder....
My +oyd School of "a# /''' classmate Chris Aic1s sa# me at the cross #al1 et#een the
Mills "ane Justice Center and the District Courthouse and amled do#n the side#al1 in an
effort to avoid cross paths #ith me, 5ust last #ee1, 5ay#al1ing in the process. = #as arrested, a
custodial arrest, for such 5ay#al1ing on %.%/.%/ in %/ 4MC ''9(9. ,t some point, is playing
1ic1 the can #ith the struggling civil rights attorney #ith mental health issues incident to a %8
month slide follo#ing a divorce eneath the !CD,'s @fficeO
= elieve it is impermissile to have =nvestigator Covington essentially practicing la# #ithout a
license #here DD, Doung has een #alled off from any of my attempts to communicate #ith
him regarding C4%/&/'/). This has made it impossile to discuss settings, and other matter.
,dditionally, = thin1 (comined #ith #hat = feel is misconduct y DD, !atts&$ial and DD,
Eandaras incident to the failure of /JDC Judges and ,dministrators and 4JC Custodian of
4ecords to respond to my supoenas and supoena Duces Tecums for the %%.%-.%/ formal
disciplinary hearing, and Eandaras egging !C?D Jim "eslie on to file a aseless ause of
process T?@ in 4JC 4C?/'%/&''')(( (DD, Eandaras is on the 66D+, and refused to deny
that she #as on the Screening ?anel for my case). 6o#, 5ust t#o days ago =nspector Covington
made veiled threats relative to phone conversations = had #ith the State +ar of 6evada, and =
elieve it is impermissile to have 66D+ memer Eandaras, a party, also prosecuting me #ith
your office, particularly #herer DD, Doung is not eMcused from his 4?C oligations, despite
the attempts to #all him off from any of my communications. The failure to propound the
+rady material that finally #as provided on after = received an email notice of its availaility
on %/.).%/ is particularly trouling considering ho# close in time that is to the %/.%%.%/ trial in
4C4/'%/&'9)90', and the eMtent to #hich Sargent Sifre's commentary, some might say,
indicate some level of complicity et#een the 4JC ,nd the 4?D incident to the 9 or so
#rongful evictions and arrests = have een su5ected to this year. = am 5ust trying to stailiJe
and get ac1 on my fee. = have lived here all my life and have strong ties to the community and
#ould gladly #elcome and opportunity to dispose of all three of these criminal matters in
eMchange for a #aiver of any civil causes of action = might have in connection #ith these three
prosecutions and the arrests underpinning them and the #rongful evictions and anything related
to the 4JC. = only #ant to do something li1e that if it is legally permissile to, ut = have seen
some authority (ie a ,m Trials articler F4epresenting "a#yers in Disciplinary MattersF that
suggests doing so is permissile if the District ,ttorney's @ffice signs off on it...).
= appreciate the opportunity to address some of my concerns here.
4espectfully Sumitted,
Hachary +ar1er Coughlin %-7% *. (th St. 4eno, 6$ 8()%/ Tel and <aM> (-( 997 7-'/
HachCoughlinShotmail.com
Hach has %'- files to share #ith you on S1yDrive. To vie# them, clic1 the lin1s elo#.
%% %0 %/ #cda #cso #atts vial supoena correspondence --%pm.pdf
%% %- %/ '/'- Calli !CD, and 66D+ Eandaras's Mtn to 2uash Supoenas on !CS@
Machen DD, Doung '09/8 /'/) %/9/ '079 /'9-.pdf
%% %- %/ '/'- 4JC Schroeder 07- @rderny Denying Coughlin.pdf
%% %- %/ '900-% Eandaras *mergency eM parte '/'- 3uash Coughlin Motion to 2uash
Supoenas (%).pdf
%% %- %/ vol 0 '/'- ates % T@ )7-.pdf
%% %- %/ !CD, DD, Eandaras '/'- Motion to 2uash Supoenas.pdf
%% %- %/ #cso 1ir1ham 5udge linda gardner '/'- )-8-- '-0) /'/) '%%98.pdf
%% %) %/ '900-% Sumission of Materials 4elated to Supoenas etc '/'- %7'8 cover
page stamped.pdf
<$'(&''889 & J@S* G4=+* $S. E,4=6, C,M,CA@ $,"D*H (DM) !"S
?resident +rec1enridge has CD of *?@ hearing urned pic1ed up - %' '(.pdf
0 %' '( '%%98 #ls )-8-- '/'- Coughlin taM appeal for *lcano days efore ". Cardner
Trial - %0 '( sanction order '(&-'0 !ashoe "gl&<inal.pdf
0 %/ '( '/'- Grie *?@ Aearing *Mhiit photographs of ause D$'(&''889 '/'-
C,,! ,dvocate ,ghast !"S ?resident +rec1enridge @rders hearing cd pic1ed up - %' '(
'%%98 '%()).pdf
0 %0 %/ %)8 pm /98'' 6ash rmc SG, S?@6T* @4D*4 D*6D=6C 4*"=*<
S@GCAT =6 =M?4@?*4 D@CGM*6T.pdf
0 %0 %/ /%9 pm #ith eM% ifp /98'' @4D*4 ST4=E=6C <GC=T=$* document nash
rmc.pdf
0 %0 %/ %/08pm %% T4 /98'' SG, S?@6T* @4D*4 D*6D=6C 4*"l*< S@GCAT
=6 =M?4@?*4 D@CGM*6T 4?D !CS@ 4MC 4JC 6,SA E=6C C",4E S+6.pdf
0 %0 %/ email from #cso dei campell dcampellS#ashoecounty.us /98'' '/'-.pdf
0 %- %/ grievance y Judge 6ash Aolmes 4MC /98'' '-0-.pdf
0 %) %/ '''07- "oc1out @rder ?TTA@, #cso '/'- #ith faM headers schroeder.pdf
0 /' %/ *lliot '/'- C,,! Crisis '%()) @rder ,#arding <ees '0./'.%/.pdf
0 /% %/ per 5udges @rders Marshal Deighton rmc %% tr /98''.pdf
0 // %/ '/'- email from 4MC ,dministrator Cassandra Jac1son to S+6 and 4MC
Judges and Judicial ,ssistants '/'-.pdf
Do#nload all

4*> notice to set in cr%/&/'/)
<rom> Hach Coughlin (JachcoughlinShotmail.com)
Sent> Tue %./(.%0 ->)) ?M
To> Covington, Mar1 A. (mcovingtonSda.#ashoecounty.us)N
phalsteadSda.#ashoecounty.us (phalsteadSda.#ashoecounty.us)N chic1sSda.#ashoecounty.us
(chic1sSda.#ashoecounty.us)N plipparelliSda.#ashoecounty.us
(plipparelliSda.#ashoecounty.us)N complaintsSnvar.org (complaintsSnvar.org)
this is not right. that's the unauthoriJed practice of la# an attempt y DD, Doung and the
!CD, to s1irt the 4?C y having a non&attorney deal #ith the opposing side. the attorney's in
the !CD,'s @ffice have a supervisory capacity here, one that #as not all that #ell 1ept during
C4%/&'079 and incident to the numerous violation of the mandatory stays associated #ith the
multiple competency evaluations. 6o#, =nspector Covington is continuing further #ith the
original aseless threats aout dissuading #itnesses from @ctoer /'%% in ma1ing allegations
on the telephone to Coughlin accusing Coughlin of some further misconduct. Fhe advised me
that, if this is regarding...is nonsense cods#allop and is not a asis for eMcusing Doung
professional oligations. <urther, SC4 %'( and SC4 %%(, SC4 %')(-) control, not 64C? -),
and !CD, DD, Eandaras (a 66D+ memer) has no place filing motions to 3uash
considering her role in the confiscation of Coughlin's smartphone and #iping of data therein
after 07 days incidnet to %% T4 /98''
Hachary +ar1er Coughlin %-7% *. (th St. 4eno, 6$ 8()%/ Tel and <aM> (-( 997 7-'/
HachCoughlinShotmail.com
<rom> MCovingtonSda.#ashoecounty.us
To> JachcoughlinShotmail.com
CC> 5helJerSda.#ashoecounty.usN D,&=nvestSupervisorsS#ashoecounty.us
Su5ect> 4*> notice to set in cr%/&/'/)
Date> Tue, /( Jan /'%0 %(>)'>%% Z''''
Mr. Coughlin, after our phone conversation, = spo1e to Mr. Doung aout this issue. Ae advised
me that, if this is regarding your appeal case, please set a date #ith the court and he #ill ans#er
in due course.

=f you have any 3uestions aout this, please in3uire via e&mail.

Mar1 Covington
Supervising =nvestigator

<rom> Hach Coughlin [mailto>JachcoughlinShotmail.com\
Sent> Monday, January /8, /'%0 )>'' ?M
To> Ao#den, AeidiN Doung, Hach
Su5ect> notice to set in cr%/&/'/)

Can #e stipulate to a date for the notice to set tomorro#O ,lso, = have not een provided the
%/.9.%/ 4@, or F6otice of ,ppealF from the 4JC that is 8'- pages long, ut DD, Doung
has...#hich is entirely unfair.
Hachary +ar1er Coughlin %-7% *. (th St. 4eno, 6$ 8()%/ Tel and <aM> (-( 997 7-'/
HachCoughlinShotmail.com;
<urther, Judge Clifton indicated on the record to Couglhin on /.%/.%0 that a +ench
!arrant for <ailure To ,ppear issued for Coughlin's arrest on that date at (>09 am, ho#ever, the
doc1et in that matter indicates that such #arrant issued at %>'' pm on /.%/.%0. Couglhin #as
allegedly late to court that morning for a (>'' trial, allegedly calling the Court at approMimately
(>0) am (#here the continuation fo the trial #as set to start at (>'' am) to report that he had
slept through t#o different alarm cloc1s after eing up most of the night preparing for the trial,
having difficulty ad5usting his daily routine due to the arrests of /./.%0 (confined and ta1en off
his medication until his release on /.).%/ at %>0' am
Doc1et in %/&'9)90' :0.%(.%0 Misdemeanor Judgment <iled (Judicial @fficerN Clifton, David )
on <eruary %0, /'%0, ,M*MD*D y Judge Clifton to read Misdemeanor commitment @rder;
:64S -./0'(d)PThe time #hen the parties, or either of them, appear, or their nonappearance, if
default e madeN a minute of the pleadings and motionsN if in #riting, referring to themN if not
in #riting, a concise statement of the material parts of the pleading.;
:64S -./0'(f)PThe demand for a trial y 5ury, #hen the same is made, and y #hom made, the
order for the 5ury, and the time appointed for the return of the 5ury and for the trial.;
:64S -./0'(1)PThe receipt of a notice of appeal, if any e given, and of the appeal ond, if
any e filed.;
:64SP-./0'PPDoc1et> *ntriesN form.
%.PP*very 5ustice must 1eep a doc1et, in #hich the 5ustice must enter>
(a)PThe title of every action or proceeding.
()PThe o5ect of the action or proceedingN and if a sum of money e claimed, the amount
thereof.
(c)PThe date of the summons, and the time of its returnN and if an order to arrest the
defendant e made, or a #rit of attachment e issued, a statement of the fact.
(d)PThe time #hen the parties, or either of them, appear, or their nonappearance, if default
e madeN a minute of the pleadings and motionsN if in #riting, referring to themN if not in
#riting, a concise statement of the material parts of the pleading.
(e)P*very ad5ournment, stating on #hose application and to #hat time.
(f)PThe demand for a trial y 5ury, #hen the same is made, and y #hom made, the order
for the 5ury, and the time appointed for the return of the 5ury and for the trial.
(g)PThe names of the 5urors #ho appear and are s#orn, and the names of all #itnesses
s#orn, and at #hose re3uest.
(h)PThe verdict of the 5ury, and #hen receivedN if the 5ury disagree and are discharged, the
fact of such disagreement and discharge.
(i)PThe 5udgment of the court, specifying the costs included, and the time #hen rendered.
(5)PThe issuing of the eMecution, #hen issued and to #homN the rene#als thereof, if any,
and #hen made, and a statement of any money paid to the 5ustice, #hen and y #hom.
(1)PThe receipt of a notice of appeal, if any e given, and of the appeal ond, if any e
filed.
/.PPThe Court ,dministrator shall prescrie the form of the doc1et and of any other
appropriate records to e 1ept y the 5ustice, #hich form may vary from court to court
according to the numer and 1ind of cases customarily heard.;
:64SP-./-'PPEntries in docket prima facie eidence of facts.PPThe several particulars of
64S -./0' specified must e entered under the title of the action to #hich they relate, and
(unless other#ise in this chapter provided) at the time when they occur. Such entries in a
5ustice]s doc1et, or a transcript thereof, certified y the 5ustice, or the 5ustice]s successor in
office, are prima facie evidence of the facts so stated.;
Doc1et in %/&'9)90' indicates> :'%.%7./'%/ ?ulic Defender ,ppointed;
%./0.%/ Case <iled
%./0.%/ <ormal Charges GS* @< TA* (%% *M*4C*6CD SDST*M !A*6 6@ ,CTG,"
@4 ?*4C*=$*D *M*4C*6CD *K=STS, a violation of 64S /'7.%-)
:/.%-.%/ C,6C*"*D ,rraignment (%'>'' ,M) (Judicial @ffiter> ?earson, Scott) $acated
,rraignment (%'>'' ,M) (Judicial @fficer> ?earson, Scott); Dogan #as appointed to defend
Couglin on %.%7.%/, and the !C?D's @ffice sent Coughlin a letter notifying him of Dogan's
appearance as attorney of record on on January /9
th
, /'%/, and Dogan's supervisor, Chris
<ortier emailed Coughlin on /.9.%/ to discuss Dogan's representation, and Dogan an Coughlin
met and discussed the case on /.8.%/, at #hich time, to Coughlin's understanding, Dogan
agreed to appear on Coughlin's ehalf at the /.%-.%/ arraingment and enter a not guilty plea.
Civen the charge #as a gross misdemeanor, under 6evada la#, Coughlin #as entitled to
:representation at all stages of the proceedings;, including the arraignment. Dogan failed to
appear, though he #as re3uired to. The 4JC 's Judicial Secretary "ori To#nsend voluntarily
sent the S+6 @+C;s Eing the /./%.%/ filing y Coughlin represented y the follo#ing doc1et
entry>
:/./%.%/ 6otice !otice of "ppearance. *ntry of ?lea of 6ot Cuilty, !aiver of 4ight to
,rraignmentN Motion to Dismiss filed.; (DD, Doung failed to ever oppose this Motion to
Dismiss, to #hich, on 0.%(.%0 Judge Clifton re5ected Coughlin's DC4 %0(0), ?ol1 v. State
argument that such failure to oppose should e ta1en as an admission, ma1ign a sua sponte
argument that DD, Doung :implicilty opposed; Coughlin's Motion. <urther prolematic is the
uneMplained transferring of %/&'9)90' from D%, Judge "ynch, to D), Judge Clifton, on
/./7.%/.
:/./7.%/ Mandatory Status Conference (% >0' ?M) (5udicial @fficer> Schroeder, Jac1); The
doc1et does not indicate that MSC of /./7.%/ #as :C,6C*""*D; (as it does for the 0./(.%/
date), yet the 4JC has continued to maintain that no audio transcript is availale for that
hearing due to the fact that it #as not held. The doc1et entry immediately thereafter, for the
same /./7.%/ date, indicates :/./7.%/ @rder for Competency *valuation <iled;.
:/./8.%/ Case Transferred to ,nother Court to D.C. /%/7%/'./ ?SDCA;
)./0.%/ 4emand from Second Judicial District Court <iled;
The doc1et indicates Coughlin, then a an attorney license in 6evada, filed a ::/./%.%/
6otice 6otice of ,ppearance;. Despite that, Judge Clifton steadfastly refused to allo#
Coughlin to file documents thereafter or issue his o#n supoenas, su5ecting Coughlin to the
threat of contempt charges and #orse.
:8./%.%/ Aearing 4esult (Judicial @fficer> SferraJJa, ?eler )
Defendant failed to appear, Defense re3uested that this cose e continued and set #ith his
misdemeanor 4eno Justice Court Case set for ,ugust /(, /'%/ '% 8>0',.M. State opposes as
this is Mr. Caughlin's second time foiling to appear. Defense's motion is C4,6T*D. MSC is
setfor ,ugust /(,/'%/ at (>'',.M.; Coughlin dispute the allegation that he failed to appear on
either /.%-.%/ or 8./(.%/, rather, the !C?D failed to appear despite agreeing to at the /.%-.%/
arraignment, and the !C?D admits to failing to notify Coughlin in #riting for the 8.9.%/
hearing, and the doc1et fails to contain any entry on 8.9.%/ to indicate that some Motion
Aearing #as to e held on that date, or that such #as continued. 4ather, the first appearance in
the 4JC's doc1et of any indication that there #as some 8.9.%/ hearing in %/&'9)90' is
indicated in the doc1et entry for 8./%.%/.
:8./7.%/ Motion Aearing (8>0' ,M) (Judicial @fficer> SferraJJa, ?eter) ?arties ?resenl>
?laintiff The State of 6evada Deputy Dislrict ,t.orney Daung, Hach Defendant Coughlin,
Hachary +ar1er ?ulic Defender l.eslie, James +riand :
:8./7.%/ ,mended Criminal Complaint <iled (Judicial @fficer> SferraJJa, ?eter ) Stric1en;
:8./7.%/ Aearing 4esult (Judicial @fficer> SferraJJa, ?eter) The State moved to stri1e Second
,mended Criminal Complaint.;
:8./7.%/ Motion Cranted (Judicial @fficer> SferraJJa, ?eter) to Stri1e Second ,mended
Criminal Complaint.
:8./7.%/ Aearing 4esult The Slate read offered plea negotiations into the record at #hich time
the Defendant accepted the offered plea. the State file Amene Criminal Complaints.
Aearing proceeded at conclusion of the hearing, the Court #ill not accept Defendant's plea. The
State moved to Stri1e ,mended Criminal Complaint. C4,6T*D. Mandatory Status
Conference remains set ,ugust /(, /'%/, at (>'',.M.;
=t #as overly pre5udicial to Coughlin's defense for Judge Clifton to, uneMplainedly, e
given some>
:%%.).%/ Correspondence 4ecieved via mail from 4eno City ,ttorney's @ffice 4e> !ritten
@5ection ?ursuant to 4eno Justice Court 4ule -) (4JC4 -)) 4egarding *&mailed Supeonas
to City of 4eno *mergency Communication Center from Hach Coughlin Concerning
4C4/'%%&'900-%.;
<urther, in 4JC 4C4%%&'900-%, the doc1et entry for 7.%9.%/ only serves to prove
Coughlin's contention that during that Trial date Judge SferraJJa indicated that the 8./(.%/
court date #ould not e a trial date, ut rather> :Aearing 4esult (Judicial @fficer> SferraJJa,
?eter ) Defense movesfor continuanceN ?ulic Defonder Jeremy +osler indicated that a ne#
Deputy ?ulic Defender shall e appointed to ta1e over the case. State ,grees. #rial shall be
set on "ugust 2$, 2012. "ll %otions shall be decided at that date;.
The suse3uent need to have an appearance of the doc1et entry for 8.(.%/ does little
more than prove that Coughlin's ne#ly introduced !C?D "eslie (a Chief Deputy ?ulic
Defender #ho never handles misdemeanor cases, save for ta1ing over all three of Coughlins for
the eMpress purpose of saotaging them to enefit the !ashoe County fisc), #hom replaced
!C?D D?D Coodnight minutes efore the 7.%9.'( Trial date, loied ehind the scenes to
Judge SferraJJa to enter such a 6otice.@rder to defeat Coughlin's argument that the 8./(.%/
date #as not a :Trial; date, ut rather set for disposing of :pre&trial motions;, and to then set a
Trial date should one e necessary. "eslie, as his is #ont, of course, attempted to 5am oth the
hearing of pre&trial motions and an MSC in %/&'9)90', and a hearing in %/&'97(8' all into that
8./(.%/ date (#hich occurred a couple days after "eslie successfully of the only inviolale right
of criminal defendant that "eslie had yet to rape, ie, Coughlin's right to decide #hether to
accept the State's plea argain or to go to trial).
!hile that doc1et indicates :8.(.%/ 6otice The Aonorale ?eler J. SferraJJa #ill hear
Motion to Suppress at the time set for #rial& that entry #as, of course, interpreted to mean
the trial #as set for 8./(.%/. @f course, that 8.(.%/ doc1et entry does not actually indicate that
the trial date #as set for 8./(.%/. This materially pre5udiced Coughlin's defense, as did "eslie's
lying to his client Coughlin regarding his arranging for the :#itnesses to e held to their
supoenas; (Templeton and Da#son...Da#son later admitted to Coughlin "eslie told him not to
sho# up for the 8./(.%/ date, and "eslie, only informed Coughlin that he released all #itnesses
from their supoenas #ell into the State's presentation of its case during the Aearing on the
Motion to Suppress (going eyond a failure to communicate #ith his client, "eslie actually
purposefully mislead his client, failed to revie# the eMculpatory video.audio of the
arrest.assault and attery of Coughlin 5ust prior to the arrest.and suse3uent investigatory
videos from one #ee1 after the arrest #herein the material #itness "eslie and the !C?D
refused to even attempt to serve a supoena on via 64S %7-.0-) (not to mention she is a
Mc2ueen Aigh School student, so, she's not that difficult to trac1 do#n), 6icole !atson, #hom
Coughlin caught on tape, 1no#ing she #as eing recorded, admit to hearing an unidentified
man #hom she #itnessed pic1 up a phone off the ground int he middle of the s1ate plaJa (in
constrast to Cole's assertions that he carefully set such phone in a hat on a ledge on the
perimeter thereof neMt to a group of his friends) and threat to thro# the phone :in the river; if
someone did not claim it immediately...#hich is not the case upon a revie# of the audio
transcript and the doc1et entry from 7.%9.%/. 4ather, that doc1et entry for 7.%).%/ indicated
:#rial shall be set on "ugust 2$, 2012. "ll %otions shall be decided at that date;. Setting a
trial on a date is far different than setting a trial for a date. <urther, indicating :all motions shall
e decided at that date; fails to characteriJe :that date; as a trial date, rather, is further
underscores the eMtent to #hich :that date; #as set for nothing more than hearing, and deciding
:all motions; and to then, :if necessary; set a trial date.
The entry in %%&'900-% for 8./(.%/ reads> :Aearing 4esult The Stale read offered plea
negotiations into the record at #hich time the Defendant accepted the offered plea. Tire State
filed ,mended Criminal Complaints. Aearing proceeded. ,t conclusion of the hearing. The
Court #ill not accept Defendant's plea. The State moved to Stri1e ,mended Criminal
Complaint. C4,6T*D. Trial remains set ,ugust /(, /'%/. at (>'' ,.M.;
The doc1et entry in %%&'900-% for the Suppressio Aearing demonstrates the clearly
reversile error attendant to Judge SferraJJa ruling there #as proale cause to ma1e the arrest
(despite it clearly eing violative of 64S %7%.%09, especially #here Cole testified that he told
the @fficer the phones value #as less than the amount re3uired to charge Coughlin #ith :felony
grand larceny; and the arrest occurred :et#een 7 pm and 7 am;). !ithout anything connected
to the :pat do#n search;, #hich the doc1et indicates :Defendant's motion to Suppress
C4,6T*D to the eMtent of the :pat do#n search;, there is insufficient evidence or support to
find sufficient proale cause to arrest eMisted. The State failed to argue any :inevitale
discovery; or that Duralde #ould have :heard; the :silent; :virating; incoming call alert
(#here there #as testimony and evidence that the alert #as nothign more than the phone's
screen lighting up, and no :virating; sound...and #here the video.audio fo the arrest, ta1en
#ith a high definition audio.video smartphone less than %' inches a#ay, reveals asolutely
none of the :virating; that 4?D @fficer Duralde indicated he could :hear; in connectin with
his pat down search (and at that point, it #as a second 3uasi&pat do#n search (read, really a
<ourth ,mendment violating search and seiJure, rather than a :pat do#n search; #here, at that
point, Duralde indicated he had already discerned that Coughlin possessed no #eapons and
posed no threat').
The doc1et entry for 8./(.%/ reads>;Aearing 4esult (Judicial @fficer> SferraJJa, ?eter)
Defendant addressed motion to appoint co&counSel. Defenrdant's Counsel addressed motion to
appoint co&counsel. The State opposes motion to appoint co&counsel. Motion D*6=*D. =f
Defendant so chooses the Court #ill conduct a <aretta Canvas. Defendant moved for self
representation. The Court canvassed the Defendant regarding the <aretta in3uiry. The State
o5ects to Defendant's motion to represent himself on the grounds that it is untimely and that
this is for the purpose of delay and not in good faith. Defendant's counsel addressed motion for
self representation. Motion D*6=*D. The State's motion to Stri1e all Documents that #ere
filed solely y the Defendant is herey C4,6T*D. The Defendant previously filed Motion to
Suppress. Motion Aearing proceeded. The State opposes Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
Defendant's Motion to Suppress C4,6T*D to the eMtent of the Fpat do#n searchF. Trial
proceeded. Witnesses hel to su#poenas.:
Its no #onder that Coughlin felt forced to confirm the sole self representation that he
#as unla#fully prevented from underta1ing since his filing, as prima facie evidence of is
demonstrated of y the follo#ing doc1et entries in %%&'900-%>
:/.%).%/ ,uthoriJation to 4epresent <iled; y Couglin #hile he #as an attorney licensed to
practice in 6evada. ,nother couple Coughlin filings on :/.%).%/ Motion <iled Motion to
,llo# "ate <iling ?re&Trial 6otice; and :Motion <iled ?re&Trial Motion;. ,dditionally,
Coughlin's right to represent himself #here he #as an attorney licensed in 6evada #as denied,
revealing clearly reversile error #here Coughlin filed, as the doc1et indicates on :/.%7.%/
6otice of ,ppearance <iled and Supplement to Motion to ,ccept ?re Trial Motions !here
Gntimely;.
The stressful lead up to the /./(.%/ trial date in %%&'900-% is a SC4 %'/.) mitigating
factor as to any misconduct alleged in connection #ith the /./7.%/ or 0.%/.%/ trial dates in %%
T4 /98''. <urther, there is no indication in the %%&'900-% doc1et that the re3uired :notice in
#riting to all other departments; #as issued y D) in response to the /./7.%/ @rder for
Competency *valuation. 4egardless, given 5urisdiction #as only remanded ac1 the the 4JC
on ).%8.%/ y Judge *lliott, the doc1et entry of :).0.%/ 4esponse 4eply to State's @pposition
to Motion to Supress; represents a fugitive document filed in violation of the stay under 64S
%78.-'), as #as the /./7.%/, />)) pm file stamped :@pposition to Motion to Continue <iled
Trial date and Motion to ,ppoint Co&Counsel; y DD, Doung... ,s such, it #as reversile
error to refuse Coughlin his right to appear on his o#n ehalf, especiall under DC4 %0(0) and
?ol1 #here, one #ould thin1, at some point, DD, Doung #ould e held to having his fugitive
documents and failures to oppose held against the State in any#here near the same overly rigid
and formulaic application of procedural rules that Judge Clifton and SferraJJa so consistently
applied to Coughlin.
<urther, the ).7.%/ transfer to Mental Aealth Court; itself violated the 64S %78.-')
stay, as did the State and D?D Coodnight's attempts to hold the :).7.%/ Misdemeanor Trial;, as
#as the setting of that trial itself (the 4JC constantly moves cases for#ard during such
mandatory stays, though the pulic defenders most definitely do not uild a defense case during
such time).
:).7.%/ Mcnlal Aealth Court (Judicial @fficer> SferraJJa, ?eter) Defense re3uested .' e
trans.erred .' Melltal Aealth Court. StaG did %%'% oppose m fonSR m lhe Defendalll entered a
plea to the charges. The Court finds that the Defendant does %%'% infocl have to enter a plea.
State re3uested (hat if.he Court decides to transfer this case %' Mental l=ea.lh Court. prior to
that happelling. #itness fees e paid ill the amount ofI7).oo. DefellSe opposed stating
De.eru1mR has no means ofpaying #itness.ees. %% is ordered =hlJ==Jre Defondant is topay
S7).@@ #itness.ees y May 7. /'.% Gpon.urther order a. the C@l$t. this cose is traT=Sforred
to the 5urisdiction o.District Court Mental Aealth Court #ithout a plea.;
<urther, Judge +reen's shameful summary removal of Coughlin from Mental Aealth
Court #as truly appalling. There #as asolutely no notice or opportunity to e heard as to the
fraudulent asis for the MAC removign Coughlin #here the program materials, offer,
acceptance, and contract entered into #ith Coughlin #as thereafter, apparently, unilaterally
altered y an ,, focused Judge +reen, #hom lac1s a medical degree or license to practice
medicine, yet, along #ith 4ene +iondo (and the complicity of silent !C?D Jennifer 4ains)
refused to allo# Coughlin to ta1e a medication for ,DD.,DAD.Treatment 4esistant
Depression that the MAC's Sharon Dollarhide admitted #as not eMcluded y the contract or
program materials.rules.guidelines provided to Coughlin. <ollo#ing that )./-.%/ hearing,
Coughlin #as accosted y several !CS@ Deputies in the hall#ay of the /JDC courthouse
demanding to search Coughlin for any recording devices and interrogating him as to #hether
he recorded any of the :hearing; efore Judge +reen.
=t #as reversile error to refuse to re5ect to plea argain Coughlin voluntarily and freely
accepted (and eMpressly indicated to the Court that he had so done) on :8./7.%/ Aearing 4esult
The Stale read offered plea negotiatioT=S into lhe record at #hich lime the Defondant accepted
tire offered plea. Tire S,ate filed ,mended Crimino. Complo.nls. Aearing proceeded ,=
conclusion of the heoring. lhe Cal$= #ill not accept De.elldant's plea. The State moved to
Stri1e ,mended Criminal Complaint. C4,6T*D. Trial remains sel ,ugust /(. /'%/. al (>''
,.,=.; in %%&'900-%.
<urther, the suggestion y Judge Clifton that Coughlin #as see1ing (or, rather, had
successfully attained) an @rder for Competency *valuation from Judge ?earson (#hich
Coughlin handed to Judge Clifton in court, on the record, on /./.%0 in %/&'9)90', re3uiring a
stay of proceedings in all departments, which Judge Clifton, as is his #ont, violated 6evada
la# in #illfully ignoring in his patent display of partiality to#ards the same !CD,'s @ffice in
#hich he #as a prosecutor for the /) years preceding his investiture ceremon in January of
/'%%. <urther, Judge Clifton's evident partiality and the eMtent to #hich he has yet to emrace
his role as a 5udge, ut rather constantly reverts to the more familiar, to him, role of a
prosecutor, #as evident #hen, during the 0.%(.%/ Trial date in %/&'9)90' he announced to
Coughlin, on the record> := 1no# #hat = am doing, = have een doing this for t#enty&five
years;...#hich is curious given Judge Clifton #or1ed in civil litigation for five years prior to
his t#enty&five years as a prosecutor #ith the !CD,'s @ffice (#here he #or1ed alongside
/JDC Judge ". Cardner in the domestic violence unit for some time, a reunion of sorts from
their tenure together at 4eno Aigh School (class of '77 and '78, respectively, #ith the Judge in
Coughlin's criminal trespass prosecution in 4MC /9-'), !. Carnder, ". Cardner's brother,
class of '7)).
4egardless, prosecutorial and police misconduct #as revealed incident to the failure to
propound the *C@MM recordings et#een the 4?D and *C@MM. That doc1et entry for
%/.%(.%% reads> :4e3uest <iled 4e3uest.or Discovery;, #hich represents the filing y !C?D
Coodnight #hich demanded all recordings (logs or audio files) y *comm.4?D, etc....and
despite that the *C@MM recordings et#een the 4?D and *C@MM, #hich totally vitiated the
fraudulent recounting of :#hat the officer's #ere told y dispatch (the officer's #ere out of
there cars and on scene, unale to read the logs on their in car screens, and nothing on their
radios indicated anything aout :a possile fight; or :someone 5ust soc1ed a minor;, therefore,
no eMigent safety asis for the pat do#n search, etc., etc. ((%% dispatchers, one of #hich on duty
that night #as 4?D @fficer Duralde's #ife, dispatcher Jessica Duralde...a connection that Judge
Clifton threatened to 5ail Coughlin should he mention it again, after stri1ing such mention from
the record on 0.%(.%0 and -./.%0 (#here Judge Clifton gave similar indications in response to
Coughlin unearthing the marital relationship et#een Judge Clifton and Deputy ,C 4honda
Clifton, see 9/8/%, #here the ,C's office is representing the !CD,'s @ffice...and consider that
Judge Sattler is a memer of the +oard of Directors of !ashoe "egal Services (replacing
C,,! *Mecutive +oard memer Judge *lliott in C$%%&'%()), #here Coughlin #as suing
both !"S and C,,!...oh, and '()*s E+ecutie Director ,aul Elcano*s daughter, #-ler
Elcano, Es.., was recentl- hired as a prosecutor for the 'ashoe Count- District "ttorne-*s
/ffice. !"S and the !CD,'s @ffice have partnered (#ith Coughlin's former 4MC pulic
defender, "e# Taitel, *s3....see C$%%&'0/%9 and 4MC %% C4 /9-'), and 4JC 4ev%/&%'-8,
and 4C4%/&'97(8', and 4ev%%&%7'8 for a Conflict&?alooJa...,D, AeJler #ill have none of
this (or 66D+.DD, Eandaras's %/.%0.%/ emails to Coughlin's then !C?D C?D "eslie
declaring Coughlin's :competency; an issue (implicating 64S %78.-')...#hich of course, the
!CD,'s @ffice and 4JC as a #hole ignored completely, especially at the improperly noticed
(:your're hereR; said Judge Clifton, echoing 4MC Jugde Dil#orth's statements in response to
similar due process.lac1 of notice.service arguments made y Coughlin at the %/.0.%/ Trial in
%/ C4 %/-/' (#hich is entirely connected to C$%%&'0%/9, 4JC 4ev%/&%'-8, 4C4%/&'97(8',
and, therefore, C$%%&'0%/9, and therefore, C$%%&'%()), and therefore 4C4%/&'9)90', and
therefore 6C%/&'/'-, '-0-, '-0), etc., etc., and on and one. Sure the 6evada Constituting
re3uires some to s#ear to protection :the Constitution and the government of Nevada ut its a
it much to stretch that and JC4C? % to an eMception that s#allo#s all dur process protections
and procedural rules, not to mention individual lierties and rights altogether. +ut, it sure helps
come re&election time).
=n there Memorandum of Costs in '09/8, +a1er and Aill as1 for the same I%,'9' for
:securing the property; for 6+= contractors ?hil Ste#arts claimed charged that #ere already
denied at the %/./%.%% Aearing on Coughlin's Motion to Contest ?ersonal ?roperty "ien. "a#
of the Case. 4es Judiciate. ,ctually "itigated. "ac1ing merit for +a1er to see1 such costs
again in '09/8.
64SP-'.08'PP?rovisions governing appeals.PP*ither party may, #ithin %' ays, appeal from
the )ugment rendered. +ut an appeal y the defendant shall not stay the eMecution of the
)ugment, unless, #ithin the %' ays, the defendant shall eMecute and file #ith the court or
5ustice the defendant]s underta1ing to the plaintiff, #ith t#o or more sureties, in an amount to
e fiMed y the court or 5ustice, ut #hich shall not e less than t#ice the amount of the
)ugment and "osts, to the effect that, if the )ugment appealed from e affirmed or the appeal
e dismissed, the appellant #ill pay the )ugment and the cost of appeal, the value of the use
and occupation of the property, and damages 5ustly accruing to the plaintiff during the
pendency of the appeal. Gpon ta1ing the appeal and filing the underta1ing, all further
proceedings in the case shall e stayed.
[%(%% C?, U 9)(N 4" U )9'%N 6C" U (%-8\
64SP-'.08)PPstay of eMecution upon appealN duty of tenant #ho retains possession of
premises to pay rent during stay.PPGpon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to 64S
-'./)0>
%.PP*Mcept as other#ise provided in this susection, a stay of eMecution may e otained y
filing #ith the trial court a #on in the amount of 2345 to cover the eMpected "osts on appeal. ,
surety upon the #on sumits to the 5urisdiction of the appellate court and irrevocaly appoints
the cler1 of that court as the surety]s agent upon #hom papers affecting the surety]s liaility
upon the #on may e served. "iaility of a surety may e enforced, or the #on may e
released, on motion in the appellate court #ithout independent action. , tenant of commercial
property may otain a stay of eMecution only upon the issuance of a stay pursuant to 4ule 8 of
the 6evada 4ules of ,ppellate ?rocedure and the posting of a superseeas #on in the amount
of %'' percent of the unpaid rent claim of the landlord.
/.PP, tenant #ho retains possession of the premises that are the su5ect of the appeal
during the pendency of the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount provided in the
underlying contract et#een the tenant and the landlord as it ecomes due. =f the tenant fails to
pay such rent, the landlord may initiate ne# proceedings for a summary eviction y serving the
tenant #ith a ne# notice pursuant to 64S -'./)0.
(,dded to 64S y %((7, 0)%'N , /'%%, %-(/)
4G"*P70.PPbond 0/1 costs @6 ,??*,"

2nless an appellant is e+empted b- law, or has filed a supersedeas bond or other
undertaking which includes securit- for the pa-ment of costs on appeal , in civil cases a #on
for "osts on appeal or e3uivalent security shall e filed y the appellant in the 5ustice court #ith
the notice of appealN but securit- shall not be re.uired of an appellant who is not sub3ect to
costs. The bond or e.uialent securit- shall be in the sum or alue of $240 unless the 3ustice
court fi+es a different amount. , #on for "osts on appeal shall have sufficient surety, and it or
any e3uivalent security shall #e "onitione to se"ure the payment of "osts if the appeal is
finally ismisse or the )ugment affirme- or of su"h "osts as the istri"t "ourt may ire"t
if the )ugment is moifie. If a #on or equi$alent se"urity in the sum or $alue of 2345 is
gi$en- no approal thereof is necessar-. ,fter a #on for "osts on appeal is filed, a respondent
may raise for determination y the 5ustice court o5ections to the form of the #on or to the
sufficiency of the surety. The provisions of 4ule ;9A apply to a surety #on upon a #on given
pursuant to this rule.
[,s amendedN effective July %, /'').\
Coughlin #as granted in forma pauperis (F=<?F) status y the 4eno Justice Court on @ctoer 9,
/'%%.-/ 4@,, $ol. =, pp. /7-&/7) =<?status only applies to the trial level of litigation, not to appeals.
-0 64S %/>'%). Casper v. Auer, 8) 6ev. -7-,-)9 ?./d -09 (%(9().,ccordingly, if he #ished to stay
the enforcement of the <<C"Q@ and stop the loc1out, he #as re3uired to post a supersedeas ond, and
otain an order granting a stay, efore the loc1out occurred. ,s to the ond re3uirement, since this case
#as not a FformalF eviction, 6JC4C? 70,(a)(%)(-) do not apply. =nstead, this case falls under the
FcatchallF provision at the end of susection (a) of that 4ule, #hich provides in pertinent part F=n cases
not provided forin (%), (/), (0) or (-) aove, the giving of an appeal ond, under the provisions of 4ule
70, shall stay proceedings in the court elo# upon the 5udgment or order appealed from ... eMcept
#here the appellate court may other#ise direct upon such terms as it may in its discretion impose.,,--
6JC4C? ;9A(a). 6JC4C? 70 provides that FThe ond or e3uivalent security shall e in the sum or
value of I/)' unless the 5ustice court fiMes a different amount.F (*mphasis added). 64S -'.08)(%)
provides that a stay may e otained y posting a ond in the amount of I/)'.'' #ith the trial court.
+a1er #as present in court upon Judge SferraJJa rendering a fairly detailed order (#hich
+a1er completely departed from in his proposed <@<C@"@S*, re3uiring much in attorney's
fees on oth sides to correct y Couglin's procurring an @rder on %%.7.%% setting aside portions
of the proposed @rder Judge SferraJJa signed, #hich argualy vitiates much of the rest of such
order, and such, Judge <lanagan's overly deferential treatment thereroef (particularly #here
,nvui re3uires a :de novo; revie#, #as clear error.
,dditionally, is fraudulent for +a1er to maintain that Coughlin's =<? applied only to
:trial court; matters #hen he #as present in Court #hen Judge SferraJJa #aived the filing fee
on appeal in the 4JC to Coughlin. That, comined #ith 6JC4C? 70's language respecting (and
the eMtent to #hich Judge SferraJJa's purporting it to e 5ust (and apparently, standard practice
amongst 4JC Judges) to charge :three times the monthly rent; as an :ond on appeal; for
:costs; (ie, not a stay, or supersedeas ond) ma1es everything aout Judge SferraJJa's variosu
@rders and +a1er's +rief completely #rong. : 2nless an appellant is e+empted b- law, or has
filed a supersedeas bond or other undertaking which includes securit- for the pa-ment of costs
on appeal, in civil cases a #on for "osts on appeal or e3uivalent security shall e filed y the
appellant in the 5ustice court #ith the notice of appealN but securit- shall not be re.uired of an
appellant who is not sub3ect to costs .; Coughlin eing granted his =<? in oth the trial court
and y the trial court as to the :filing fee; (#hich, argualy, ought eMtend to the anticipated
:costs; underlying the I/)' :appeal ond; re3uirement, and therefore, Coughlin is not :su5ect
to costs;. 4egardless, the transcript from the Aearing on the supersedeas ond motion in
$enetian v. T#o 4oads ma1es clear that :costs; are not :rent;, and 64S 9(.')' and the use of
and meanings of the terms :prevaling party; and :costs; therein, and such Chapter eing
limited to :5udgments;, ma1es clear that no anticipated :attorney's fees a#ard; could 5ustify
such an eMorinate :ond on appeal; unless such #as actually a :supersedeas ond; that also
encompassed any :ond on appeal; (#hich, again, as to the 6JC4C? 4ule 70 :R0L*6;9.66
&ON% .OR COSTS ON A!!*AL;, Coughlin, granted =<? status, #ould not have to pay).
Selection protions fo the $enetian v T#o 4oads transcript>
:M4 . C@G"TA,4D> = thin1 maye mar1 the errata, if that's o1ay #ith the court, as *Mhiit ,,
#ould e important. !e did file that. ,ny#ay, -'.08) provides a stay of eMecution may e
otained y filing #ith the trial court a ond in the amount of I/)'.'' to cover the eMpected
costs on appeal. T#o 4oads posted the ond #ith the court on @ctoer 9th, /'%' . ,nd #e
provided the notice of posting a ond. =t 's actually *Mhiit + to the errata . ,nd then
recogniJing that it #ould e unfair for a landlord to e saddled #ith a tenant that #asn't paying
rent during an appeal, it actually goes on and says, a tenant #ho retains possession of the
premises that are the su5ect of the appeal, during the pendency of the appeal shall pay to the
landlord rent in the amount provided in the underlying contract et#een the tenant and the
landlord as it ecomes due . That's right out of the statute . ,nd consistent #ith that
re3uirement and really follo#ing up on the discussion #e had on Septemer /(th, T#o roads
on @ctoer 9th, /'%' paid the current amount of rent due, consistent #ith the invoice for
@ctoer of /'%', presented I%-8,//).-8 to $enetian. That's *Mhiit , to the errata. !ith the
cover letter that says this is pursuant to our rights under the 7 statute, #e 're paying the @ctoer
/'%' rent . So = elieve at that point #e 've met our statutory oligation under 64S -'.08) to
otain a stay. =n the alternative, #e then also moved under 9/ &64C? 9/ . "et me address the
opposition really that #e got to the stay under -'.08) is narro#. ,nd the ul1 of the lengthy
pleading filed y $enetian really goes to the issue of e3uities and really is in response to the, =
elieve, to the 9/ &&64C? 9/ re3uest, #here you do #eigh those factors. ,nd = can address
them. *ssentially the ul1 of this comes do#n to you're a dead eat tenant. TA* C@G4T> "et's
stay confined to the Chapter -' argument for right no#. That 's my igger concern, then 4ule
9/ and supersedeas onds. Those are generally more applicale to 5Gdgments. ?osting a
supersedeas ond and 5udgment amount for appeal, as opposed to a situation #here, in my
mind, you have a specific statute governing the issue, as opposed to a general appeal rule . M4.
C@G"TA,4D> @1ay. ='d e happy to do that, ecause = thin1 that is #here &&the fight, #hether
#e 've met that statute. ,nd so really the opposition comes do#n to, they say that it is
discretionary #ith the court, numer one. =t 's a discretionary stay #ith the court. !hich
fran1ly, and #ith not. not #e the ,nd or the the stay 8 Supreme 5ustice 0 month their position.
the the this 5urisdictional of 0 all due respect, #hen you read that statute it is The discretion lies
#ith the tenant as to #hether or they pay a cost ond. ,nd if #e post that cost ond, may otain
a stay of eMecution. There is some discretion for the court to increase amount of that cost ond.
= #ould ac1no#ledge that . = thin1 that either the court can do that sua sponte at the re3uest of
the $enetian. +ut at this 5uncture statute provides for a cost ond, I/)'.''. ,nd then second
part #e have to do is pay the rent...
The other issue = thin1 is that it 's not discretionary #ith this court. ,gain, the plain language of
the statute says that the stay shall e issued &%/ eMcuse me. =t does not. =t says, #e may &&the
tenant may otain a stay if they do the follo#ing t#o steps, post the ond, pay the rent. !hich
#e did. ,gain, the only discretion the statute provides this court is in the discretion of the
amount of the cost ond. So = thin1 #e've met our oligation under the statute to otain a stay. =
thin1 the very purpose of the appeal #ill e flat out defeated. ,sent a stay #e #ill e evicted
summarily, if you don't grant the stay. ,nd it is clear #e #ill have irreparale in5ury. The
6evada Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that real property and its attriutes are considered
uni3ue. ,nd loss of real property rights generally result in irreparale harm. The very purpose
of this appeal #ill e % ' throated if #e don't have the aility to challenge that . !e #ill e
evicted and that #ill e the end of the tenant's opportunity to stay in here . ,nd #e #ill have
suffered irreparale in5ury in the form of losing our aility to operate in this uni3ue real
property premises . That is 3uintessential irreparale in5ury that #e are faced #ith asent this
stay. = can run through the other factors, your Aonor, if = need to. +ut = don't thin1 under the
statutory constraints that Aanson is controlling. +ut if you feel #e need to run through those,
this is oviously important to my client . = elieve every one of those Aanson factors ode in
favor of granting this stay, in favor of T#o 4oads eing ale to stay in this space. =f there is any
3uestions aout that in your Aonor's mind, then = #ant the opportunity to ma1e a record and
address those. TA* C@G4T> "et me let them address the statute first. Then #e'll see #here #e
go from there. M4. <*D*4> Dour Aonor, = thin1 #e laid out our position #ith respect to the
statute . Dou 1no#, pertaining to the factor #e rought aout aout the terms of the time frame
et#een the t#o . The more important part is the second part of the argument #e raised. ,nd
that is #hen you read the statute, it is a discretionary % % aspect #ith respect to ho# the
language is drafted. !hat they're trying to say, your Aonor, #hich = elieve the statute #as ever
intended for, nor if you loo1 at the may language that you see in 4ule 9/, it also tal1s aout
may e granted upon posting a supersedeas ond. There actually is a correlation et#een the
t#o . 4ule 9/ does not lay out all the Aanson factors . Aanson and everything else is in direct
relationship to 9/ , #hich tal1s aout may grant a stay. Similarly here, it tal1s aout a may
factor #ith respect to #hat needs to occur. !hat they're arguing is y simply posting I/)'.'',
they automatically get a stay. = don 't elieve that #as ever intended y the legislature. ,ny
intent you can read in the statute, it ' s discretionary. TA* C@G4T > Ao# can you read that any
other #ay. ='ve got to agree &&= mean, 5ust y reading the statute #ith Mr. Coulthard, regardless
of #hether you're John Doe living in a studio apartment do#n to#n or T#o 4oads #ith a giant
restaurant in the $enetian, the intent, as = read that statute, is you may get a stay #hen you pay
this cost ond . That 's you pay that ond and the stay is in effect . = don't thin1 there is
anything that says = have the discretion if you paid the money to not let you have a % / stay, not
let you stay in there . The only discretion = thin1 the court has to deal #ith it is if you are not
then paying rents, then you you have to file a ne# proceeding, #hich = thin1 is ridiculous . +ut
that 's #hat the statute says. +ut that's almost summarily you're out no#, ecause you didn't pay
the rents, 1ind of thing. M4 . <*D*4> = thin1 = 1no# #e 're you're coming from, your Aonor.
<rom reading the statute, the statute to me had to e read in con5unction #ith #hat is normally
done #hen a stay is needed or re3uired. !hen you read 9/, again, it 's the may language . =
mean, then #e 're focusing upon #hich rings ac1 the discretion, #hich #e elieve leads ac1
to the application of all of the Aanson factors . The Aanson factors are there in essence to
alance the harms that the parties need to deal #ith #ith respect to #hat amount &&irrespective,
you don't get to the ond portion or the ond argument, the cost ond, the discretion of #hether
it's higher than that amount, until you've satisfied the other elements that are re3uired. !hen
you read /9&', your Aonor, that says &// TA* C@G4T> "et me as1 you this then. Don' t you
thin1 that the legislature #ould have recogniJed &&and there is a difference et#een structuring
appeals and stays on a 5udgment &&or monetary % 0 5udgment versus ta1ing people out of their
home. That's the focus of #here the summary eviction statutes carne from..
...M4. <*D*4> =t also applies to 9/&C , your Aonor, that in5unctive relief is a procedure there
that also lays out argument that the Aanson factors #ould apply there as #ell . So #hen you
really lay out #hat the elements re3uired, = don't thin1 you can overloo1 the Aanson factors. =
thin1 5ust this gets do#n to if you reach and meet the elements re3uired in Aanson, then you
loo1 to this #ith respect to #hether an amount of #hat this cost ond #ould e the e3uivalent
to. =n terms of &&and again, the may language. ,nd that to us is #here it gets directly correlated
to #hat the 9/&D or 9/&C language tal1s aout. ,nd it also references #hen you read 9/&C,
#hen an appeal is ta1en y the appellant giving the supersedeas ond, may otain a stay,
su5ect to. =t's the same may language, your Aonor. =n essence #hether you read it the #ay
they're trying to say aout #hat they're creating is y simply putting up I/)'.'', putting aside
#hat Section / says aout #hat they shall e re3uired to, there is a difference in that language.
T#o has shall language versus the may language in Susection %. !hen you ta1e that into
account and you % - read that, they need to also still satisfy those Aanson elements and go
through those . @ther#ise, anyody, any time you deal #ith a tenant situation #here the argue
and raise a defense or not &&your Aonor already rule their defense is unreasonale &&#hether
you raise it or not or create one, you can 5ust come in and say, o1ay, here is I/)'.'' ond.
!e've done #hat #e need to do. !e've no# stayed it. = don't elieve that #as the intent here.
*specially #ith respect to the amount of damages #e're tal1ing aout here . +ecause effectively
#hat #e 're getting here, your Aonor &&#e laid it out in the papers &&a stay here on summary
eviction, also stays our aility to go after this in the monetary damage case. So = don't elieve
those t#o can e loo1ed at in correlation that #ay . = thin1 it 's not an automatic recourse. The
language in here does not say that. =f the legislature #as intending it to e it #ould have said
they #ill automatically get a stay upon the posting of a I/)'.'' ond. =t does not say that, your
Aonor. =t does not have the direct language. =f the legislature intended for it to get to that level,
they #ould have included that specific language. =t's not there. So = don't thin1 #e can overloo1
all of these Aanson factors and apply all of the Aanson factors. Dou only get to that level, your
% ) Aonor, if you can satisfy those Aanson elements. ,nd to our position, as #e laid out, they
don 't get any#here close to it . Ae has no# raised a ne# argument #hich = didn't raise in the
papers aout real property. =t #as never raised. =n the papers it tal1s aout losing the usiness.
!hich is a lost usiness . That 's a profit case. !e deal #ith those situations regularly. =t 's a
simple damage case. +ut = can go through all the Aanson factors, your Aonor, if your Aonor
#ants me to, ecause #e 've laid it out pretty #ell. = don 't elieve you get to that level and that
statute until you satisfy those Aanson elements. = don't elieve this #as intended, nor &&='ll say =
don't elieve that #as the intent of this statute, to supersede the re3uirements of the elements
for a stay pending any type of an appeal. 6ot even in a situation #ith a landlord tenant, your
Aonor. TA* C@G4T> !ell, = disagree #ith you. ='ll tell you that in my eMperience the #ay =
descried it is eMactly ho# the 5ustice court treats it and district court treats it. !hich is #hen
you see1 to remove someody &&='m al#ays focused on the individual, since that #as the
geneses of #hat it #as all aout. ,nd usinesses are 5ust getting the enefit of #hat the
individual gets in a home situation. % 9 +ut #henever someody is aout to e evicted from
their home, they post that I/)' .'', they automatically get a stay. Then the shall language is in
order for your stay not to dissolve on your head, you have to e paying the rent every month
from there on out . Dou may have een evicted ecause you #eren't paying any rent in the past,
ut if you're going to appeal the ruling and you filed the I/)'.'' to get it up to district court to
loo1 at #hat the J? did, then you have to e paying your rent every month thereafter, or then
they are going to come in and you have no grounds to #ard off eing actually physical ta1en
out of the property . +ut = thin1 the statute does direct itself not to &the court has discretion to
do this, that, or the other, ut the stay of eMecution may e otained. That's the party. , party
may otain a stay upon filing a ond. So = don't thin1 #e get to the factors. = thin1 the statute is
pretty eMpress in my mind in terms of #hat the intent of the legislate #as in terms of people, or
as = said, usinesses that have een ordered summarily evicted . = #ill tell you some of the
factors, = do thin1 that there is an irreparale harm argument to the defendant to e ta1en out of
this usiness, ased upon #hat 's ta1en place. =t's ovious that the o5ect of their appeal gets % 7
defeated f they're ta1en out of the usiness #hen they're trying to appeal to stay in the
usiness . The only 3uestionale thing is, li1e many in5unction hearings, is reasonale
li1elihood of success on the merits . = disagreed #ith their position in #hat the interpretation
#as . +ut = have never efore elieved that 5ust ecause = disagree that the seven people aove
me aren't going to disagree #ith me. =t happens. So = can't say that they don't have a reasonale
li1elihood of convincing, #hether it's the *n +anc Supreme Court or a panel of the Supreme
Court that their position is more meritorious then #hat = thought it #as. So in any event, #hat =
1ind of #anted us to &&='m going to grant you the stay. +ut in terms of the cost ond, = do agree
that I/)'.'', again, contemplates the situation that = 5ust tal1ed aout #ith the individual
getting evicted from the home, appealing from 5ustice court to district court . = thin1 #hat #e 're
dealing #ith here is going to have sustantially different costs then #hat #e 're dealing #ith in
a normal getting evicted from your apartment type situation . So #hat is your position on that .
M4. <*D*4> @ur position, your Aonor, #e it laid and #e dealt #ith the harms that #ere going
to occur to the $enetian, inclusive. =n essence these are % 8 the contemplations, mediation,
aritration process #ith respect to damage type a#ards. !e ' re effectively, y granting a stay,
#e getting stayed #ith respect to the aility to collect upon #hat #e elieve is past due
damages of over 0.0 million dollars, plus interest . So #e elieve ecause of the effectiveness
that that's going to have on our aility to ever collect upon this monetary 5udgment , they
should e re3uired to ond that entire amount . The entire 0.0 million, plus interest #ith respect
to the underlying damage case . = 1no# that it 's not normally part of #hat a summary eviction
is aout #ith the possessory aspects, ut given the effect of #hat this stay #ill have, = thin1 that
's a fair and r8asonale amount to e posted, your Aonor. TA* C@G4T > Mr . Coulthard . M4.
C@G"TA,4D> The statute specifically states cost ond on appeal, not supersedeas ond. !hat
#e ' re dealing #ith are the filing fees, the costs that #ill e incurred in prosecuting this appeal .
That is not legal fees. That is not &&they don't have an underlying 5udgment as to this 0 million
dollar rental amount. So, = mean, I%,)'', I/,'''.'', if you loo1 at #hat is defined in costs,
#hat can actually e incurred more than ade3uately protects them. The important thing to note,
your Aonor, is they're % ( getting the current rent . They are right no#, ased upon your order,
#e're living under your interpretation of the second amendment . The original deferred rent
hasn' t even &&that second amendment is still in force and effect . So that &&under your
interpretation, #hich #e, #ith all due respect, adamantly dispute. !e thin1 there is another
interpretation, all of #hich = argued efore and = #on't do no#. +ut they are getting the enefit
of that second amendment . Current rents are eing paid . So they 're not in any #ay harmed.
,s to their past due rents, he said it himself, interest . That 's if they do prevail, and that your
decision is held up on appeal and affirmed on appeal . ,nd they do pursue a monetary 5udgment
. ,t that 5uncture #e 're going to e ale to do some discovery and contest that. = assure you it
#ill e contested. +ut there is pre5udgment interest, and interest under these documents that
under our court rules protect them from that . There is no methodology for a supersedeas ond,
#hich ecause there is no monetary 5udgment. =t is a cost ond, I%,)''.''. I/,)''.'' is more
than #e #ill incur in costs on this appeal . So = #ould suggest that #ould e more than enough.
=f you do increase that amount, #e #ant some time to get it posted. TA* C@G4T > @1ay. / '
!ell, =' m going to &your last comments hit on my numer, #hich = #rote do#n I/, )''.''.
"arge commercial usiness leases oviously entail a lot more compleMities then normal
residential apartment leases . +ut that doesn 't mean that all those compleMities and the various
aspects of #hat #as to e paid under the lease, #hether it's the first amendment, the second
amendment, #hether it 's past due rents , current rents, the various other things that #ere in
there = can' t rememer all the language no# ut there #as a lot of things the money #as
supposed to e going to in this lease. The cost ond on appeal doesn 't really say you need to
account for all those things right no#, 5ust #hat are the costs on appeal, #hat is a reasonale
amount . ,nd again, this can e related in front of the Supreme Court , the issues relating to the
stay or the ond up to the Supreme Court as #ell. +ut = thin1 I/,)''. '' cost ond is
appropriate . M4. <*D*4>
@ne fact #e #ant to ring up. That is one...TA* C@@4T> 4egardless of #hat too1 place in the
summary eviction, #hat -08) states very eMpressly is you get the appeal upon the posting of the
ond, and thereafter the stay you have to pay the rent . =t doesn't spea1 to any other contractual
conditions and oligations you may have. That's all part of your reach of contract action,
#hatever you may ring at some point in time. +ut = ordered the stay and they have to ma1e
their monthly rental payments. They'll e oligated to pay each time thereafter, or as = said,
under -/)0, you file a ne# proceedings saying they haven't made their payments no# and #e
#ant them out out . M4. <*D*4> ?art and parcel, #e #ant to see the order after it's prepared.
So #e're clear #ith respect to #hat's in the order . =s your order going to say that #e don't get
the Aanson / / factors, #e're 5ust loo1ing at Section -'.0)8. So #e can e clear. TA* C@G4T >
The order can include #hat = said aout the factors a moment ago . +ut = don't thin1 the factors
are #hat rule . @ftentimes #hen you are ruling on something, ='ll address part of #hat you
rought up, even though = thin1 the statute eMpressly gives them the right to stay once they
have filed the ond, = still thin1 the factors #eigh in favor of the defense, as = said. @n the
irreparale harm issue, = thin1 if the appeal gets defeated, = thin1 they have a reasonale
li1elihood of success on the merits. That's a lo# standard . =t's 5ust is there a reasonale
interpretation of that that someody other than myself might disagree #ith me on, so that things
#eigh in favor of them .;
:
:). 6ot granting Coughlin a stay
Coughlin #as granted in forma pauperis (F=<?F) status y the 4eno Justice Court on @ctoer 9,
/'%%.-/ =<?status only applies to the trial level of litigation, not to appeals. -0 ,ccordingly, if he
#ished to stay the enforcement of the <<C"Q@ and stop the loc1out, he #as re3uired to post a
supersedeas ond, and otain an order granting a stay, efore the loc1out occurred.
,s to the ond re3uirement, since this case #as not a FformalF eviction, 6JC4C? 70,(a)(%)(-) do not
apply. =nstead, this case falls underthe FcatchallF provision at the end of susection (a) of that 4ule,
#hich provides in pertinent part F=n cases not provided forin (%), (/), (0) or (-) aove, the giving of an
appeal ond, under the provisions of 4ule 70, shall stay proceedings in the court elo# upon the
5udgment or order appealed from ... eMcept #here the appellate court may other#ise direct upon such
terms as it may in its discretion impose.,,-- 6JC4C? 70 provides that FThe ond or e3uivalent security
shall e in the sum or value of I/)' unless the 5ustice court fiMes a different amount.F (*mphasis
added). 64S -'.08)(%) provides that a stay may e otained y posting a ond in the amount of
I/)'.'' #ith the trial court.
Coughlin deposited I/,/7) #ith the court pursuant to 64S %%8,.0)) and the court's order of
@ctoer %0, /'%%. Ae orally moved the court for a stay of the eviction at the end of the @ctoer /),
/'%% hearing, ut did not cite any authority for his re3uest. ,ccordingly, that motion #as denied.-)
Thus, although the court ordered that Coughlin's deposit #ould serve as his appeal ond, it denied a
stay ecause Coughlin did not provide the court #ith any asis to grant one, as #as his legal
responsiility. Then, at Coughlin's specific re3uest, the court held an emergency hearing on 6ovemer
7, /'%%, #here it amended the <<C"Q@ and returned all sums on deposit to Coughlin, as he #as
clamoring. The court then set the supersedeas ond at I/,7''.'', as it #as entitled to do.-9 Coughlin
no# argues that he should have een granted a stay ofthe eviction ecause he had funds on deposit #ith
the court at the time of the loc1out. *ven if he #ould have een entitled to that relief, that position is
inconsistent #ith his prior demands that all of his deposit e returned to him, and he is 5udicially
estopped from arguing it no#.-7 =fCoughlin #anted to apply those funds to a super&sedeas ond under
JC4C? 70, or 64S -'.08), he should have either made that re3uest at the @ctoer /), /'%%
hearing #hen the eviction #as announced, or sometime et#een that hearing and the loc1out a
#ee1 later. Ae never did so. =n fact, he did 5ust the opposite. !hen Coughlin filed his Fmotion
for stay' -8 on @ctoer 0%,/'%%, in #hich he demanded his deposit ac1 -(, the loc1out had not
even occurred. That confirms that Coughlin had no intention of posting a ond. or applying
those funds in order to otain a stay. Ae cannot e heard to argue other#ise no#. Then, after he
received his deposit ac1, he did not deposit any additional funds #ith the court until on or
aout Decemer 8, /'%% #hen he finally paid the filing fee to perfect his appeal. Thereafter, on
Decemer %-,/'%%, he posted I/)'.'' for his appeal ond, and I%.'' for his Fsuperseeas
#onF (#hich sums he has suse3uently moved to have returned to him). )' +y then, his
re3uest for a stay had een moot for approMimately siM #ee1s.;
%.
/.4@,, $ol. =$, pp./, //&/0.
0.-'.
-.4@,, $ol. ===, p. ).
-%. 4eno 6e#spapers, =nc.
-/. 4@,, $ol. =, pp. /7-&/7).
-0V 64S %/>'%). Casper v. Auer, 8) 6ev. -7-,-)9 ?./d -09 (%(9().
).--V 6JC4C? ;9A(a).
9.-)V 4@,, $ol. ==, pp. 8),/.
7.-9. 4@,, $ol ===, pp. /%8&/%(N $ol. ==, pp. -,/7.
8.-9. 4@,, $ol ===, pp. /%8&/%(N $ol. ==, pp. -,/7.
-7. Marcuse.
-8. 4@,, $ol. ==, p. 0.
-(. 4@,, $ol. ==, pp. -, /7
)'. 4@,, $ol. =$, pp. /%'&/%%.
)%. Cf., Schuc1.
)/. 4@,, $ol. ==, p. 8).
)0. Cf., Schuc1
+a1er's alleges that 6JC4C? 70,(a) contains some :catch&all; provision, arguing that
%7'8 #as not a :formal eviction; (odd, considering +a1er #anted to utiliJing formal discovery
under 6JC4C? 0-, #anted to e a#arded the rent escro#....of course, he definitely argued
Coughlin should not e allo#ed to ring counterclaims, despite his ,ns#ering +rief ma1ing
li1e the issue had never even arisen.
,s to 5ust #hat is meant y the phrase :formal eviction; as found in 6JC4C? 70,(a)(-),
consider the fe# appearances of such prhase or similar in 6evada la#>
used in ClaJier case, and in JC4C" -'.
:6JC4C? 4G"*P%').PPA*,4=6CS T@ +* 5!0/1%"( Aearings regarding applications for
orders of summary eviction shall e informal. 6o formal pleading other than the affidavits and
application provided y these rules may e re3uired, since it is the intent of such hearings to
determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit, notice or service of any notice and
to dispense fair and speedy 5ustice.
+a1er's /./-.%/ ,ns#ering +riefs reads> :0.-. <or eMample, Coughlin chose to spend
the first of his t#o allotted days sending comative emails to oth Judge SferraJJa and
Merliss' counsel, instead of diligently trying to remove his elongings. ,t one point,
Coughlin even announced that he #as entitled to a stay of the proceedings, and that
#ould allo# him to return to, and reta1e possession of, the property. Judge SferraJJa
notified Coughlin that a stay had een denied. See *KA=+=T %, #hich is a true and
correct copy ofthe referenced em ails of Decemer //, /'%%. +ecause Coughlin chose to
#aste half of his allotted time trying to pic1 a fight over that #hich #as already moot, he
failed to remove all ofhis elongings from the property.f/ This, of course, led him to
file a motion for a temporary restraining order (FT4@F) in this
fn % Coughlin had one #ee1 from the time the court ruled, on @ctoer /), /'%%, that he
#ould e evicted, until he #as loc1ed out on 6ovemer %,/'%%. Then, he #as coming
and going on the property for another t#o #ee1s. Det, during this time, he failed to
remove any of this possessions. =n that regard, the court should 1no# that Mr. Coughlin
is a hoarder.
<n./ *ven though Coughlin removed at least one full G&Aaul oM truc1 of his
elongings from the property, he still left mountains ofF5un1F ehind. <or eMample, there
#ere no less than %0 automoile seats in the asement. The ac1yard #as full, up to the
top of the siM foot fence, #ith discarded televisions, car ody parts, tires, and ro1en
furniture. (page 0)
court, #hich is discussed further, elo#. !hen Coughlin's T4@ motion #as denied, that,
in turn, led him to physically attempt to interfere #ith Merliss' efforts to dispose of the
property Coughlin had chosen to aandon. ?redictaly, the end result #as sustantial
additional fees incurred y Merliss, #hich #as, of course, Coughlin's goal all along.
0.). =n addition to his continued activity in the 4JC, Coughlin has filed
hundreds of pages of ausive, and often nonsensical, materials #ith this court, in #hich
he has repeatedly sought relief to #hich he #as not even argualy entitled. =n many of
his filings, Coughlin failed to even identify, much less analyJe, the controlling la# on
the su5ect. 6evertheless, Merliss #as forced to respond to those filing, lest the court
ta1e Merliss' silence as an admission under DC4 %0(0) that Coughlin's re3uests #ere
meritorious.
0.9. <or eMample, Coughlin's Decemer 0', /'%% motion for a temporary
restraining order #as /' pages long, eMcluding eMhiits. Coughlin, a la#yer, failed to
identify or discuss the controlling la#, 64C? 9)() and 64S 00.'%', in any #ay. =n
addition to eing procedurally deficient, that motion #as sustantively #ithout any merit
#hatsoever, and this court so found. See this court's @rder dated January %%, /'%/.
6evertheless, Merliss #as forced to incur attorney's fees to respond to that frivolous
motion, and, as a safe&haror, delay his efforts to clean out and re&=et the property,
causing him further damage.
0.7. @n January %/, /'%/, after his motion for a T4@ #as denied, Coughlin
chose to resort to the self&help tactic of physically interfering #ith Merliss' efforts to
clean out the property. See Merliss' motion for order to sho# cause filed herein on
January /', /'%/ for further particulars. Those antics ultimately led to Coughlin's arrest,
and additional motions and hearings, continuing his tactic of causing Merliss more and
more fees....; <rom +a1er's -.%(.%/ Motion for ,ttorney's <ees in '09/8.
...
+a1er's /./-.%/ ,ns#ering +rief reads> :). 6ot granting Coughlin a stay Coughlin #as granted
in forma pauperis (F=<?F) status y the 4eno Justice Court on @ctoer 9, /'%%.-/ =<? status only
applies to the trial level of litigation, not to appeals. -0 64S %/>'%). Casper v. Auer, 8) 6ev. -7-,-)9
?./d -09 (%(9().,ccordingly, if he #ished to stay the enforcement of the <<C"Q@ and stop the
loc1out, he #as re3uired to post a supersedeas ond, and otain an order granting a stay, efore the
loc1out occurred.
,s to the #on requirement- sin"e this "ase (as not a <formal< e$i"tion, 6JC4C? 70,(a)
(%)&(-) do not apply. =nstead, this case falls under the FcatchallF provision at the end of susection (a) of
that 4ule, #hich provides in pertinent part F=n cases not provided for in (%), (/), (0) or (-) aove, the
giving of an appeal ond, under the provisions of 4ule 70, shall stay proceedings in the court elo#
upon the 5udgment or order appealed from ... eMcept #here the appellate court may other#ise direct
upon such terms as it may in its discretion impose. -- 6JC4C? 70,(a). 6JC4C? 70 provides that
FThe ond or e3uivalent security shall e in the sum or value of I/)' unless the 5ustice court fiMes a
different amount.F (*mphasis added). 64S -'.08)(%) provides that a stay may e otained y posting a
ond in the amount of I/)'.'' #ith the trial court.
Coughlin deposited I/,/7) #ith the court pursuant to 64S %%8,.0)) and the court's order of
@ctoer %0, /'%%. Ae orally moved the court for a stay of the eviction at the end of the @ctoer /),
/'%% hearing, ut did not cite any authority for his re3uest. ,ccordingly, that motion #as denied.-)
4@,, $ol. ==, pp. 8),/. Thus, although the court ordered that Coughlin's deposit #ould serve as his
appeal ond, it denied a stay ecause Coughlin did not provide the court #ith any asis to grant one, as
#as his legal responsiility. Then, at Coughlin's specific re3uest, the court held an emergency hearing
on 6ovemer 7, /'%%, #here it amended the <<C"Q@ and returned all sums on deposit to Coughlin, as
he #as clamoring. The court then set the supersedeas ond at I/,7''.'', as it #as entitled to do. -9
4@,, $ol ===, pp. /%8&/%(N $ol. ==, pp. -,/7. Coughlin no# argues that he should have een granted a
stay of the eviction ecause he had funds on deposit #ith the court at the time of the loc1out. *ven if he
#ould have een entitled to that relief, that position is inconsistent #ith his prior demands that all of his
deposit e returned to him, and he is 5udicially estopped from arguing it no#.-7 4@,, $ol ===, pp. /%8&
/%(N $ol. ==, pp. -,/7. =f Coughlin #anted to apply those funds to a supersedeas ond under JC4C? 70,
or 64S -'.08), he should have either made that re3uest at the @ctoer /), /'%% hearing #hen the
eviction #as announced, or sometime et#een that hearing and the loc1out a #ee1 later. Ae
never did so. =n fact, he did 5ust the opposite. !hen Coughlin filed his Fmotion for stay; (fn -8
Marcuse (cited earlier in fn 0)> Marcuse v. Del Webb Communities, 123 Nev. 278, 163 P.3d 462 2!!7"# Moreover, because t$e court
ado%ted Cou&$lin's %osition and ruled
on t$at basis, $e is (udiciall) esto%%ed *rom c$an&in& $is t$eor) no+.3, ) on @ctoer 0%, /'%%, in #hich he demanded his
deposit ac1 -( (4@,, $ol. ==, p. 0.), the loc1out had not even occurred. That confirms that Coughlin
had no intention of posting a ond or applying those funds in order to otain a stay. Ae cannot e heard
to argue other#ise no#. Then, after he received his deposit ac1, he did not deposit any additional
funds #ith the court until on or aout Decemer 8, /'%% #hen he finally paid the filing fee to perfect
his appeal. Thereafter, on Decemer %-, /'%%, he posted I/)'.'' for his appeal ond, and I%.'' for his
Fsupersedeas ondF (#hich sums he has suse3uently moved to have returned to him).)' +y then, his
re3uest for a stay had een moot for approMimately siM #ee1s. :
,t the %%.%-.%/ formal disciplinary hearing, Aill testified> :A*,4=6C & $ol. =,
(?ages )%>/% to )/>%() 2 !ith that said, did he sho# candor to youO , =n our dealings
#ith Mr. Coughlin, you could not trust him at all. 6o agreement ever made #ith Mr.
Coughlin #as honored y him. <or eMample, #hen Judge SferraJJa ordered that Mr.
Coughlin could have t#o days && he #as originally given a #ee1 to move his stuff out
efore the eviction order #as served. Thereafter there #as a hearing. The 5udge gave Mr.
Coughlin t#o days to go in and remove his possessions. Mr. Coughlin && #e #ent over
there, opened the doors aout 8>'' o'cloc1. Ae #asn't there. A#out 88=55 o'"lo"+ (e get
an e>mail from /r. Coughlin saying I ha$e appeale ?uge Sferra@@a's ruling. That
means his ruling is sta-ed. That means I "an go #a"+ into the house. I'm staying in
the house- an there's nothing you "an o a#out it. /R. CO0A'LIN= O#)e"tion-
hearsay. /R. *C'*B*RRIA= O$errule. T'* WITN*SS= Sometime later that
ay (e got an orer from ?uge Sferra@@a saying that the re.uest for a sta- had
been denied. /r. Coughlin ha #urne #asi"ally a (hole ay oing nothing trying
to get his stuff out. That #as typical.;
6JC4C? 79+ provides that> :,ppeal from formal eiction> Within 85 ays of ser$i"e of
entry of order . !1) 60.7809 1ule :7";6<. <ees> ?ayale upon filing notice of appeal. 4ule
7-+(a)(%). +ond for costs> <iled #ith notice of appeal. 4ule 70. +ond, supersedeas> ,t or after
time of filing notice of appeal. )ta- is effectie when bond filed. 4ule 70,.; +y connecting
the phrase :formal eviction; to 64S -'.08' (#hich only applies to :5udgments; stemming
from
C",H=*4 v. JGST=C* C@G4T 8(( ?./d %%') (%(()) FThis notice eMpressly threatened
an action in 5ustice's court for eviction, pursuant to 64S -'./)0,% the summary eviction
statute.fn% %. 64S -'./)0 allo#s a landlord to apply to the 5ustice's court for an eviction order
ased on default in payment of rent. =f the tenant can sho#, y affidavit, a legal defense to the
alleged unla#ful detainer, further proceedings must e conducted pursuant to the more formal
eiction procedures in !1) 60.2$0 to 60.620. =f, on the other hand, the tenant fails to sho# a
legal defense to the alleged unla#ful detainer, then the 5ustice's court may issue a summary
order for removal of the tenant.F
JC4"$ -'(i)(%)&(/) provides further support for the vie# that the phrase :formal
eviction; necessarily eMcludes summary evictions> : (i)P,s used in this section, :eviction
action; means>
(%)P, summary eviction action pursuant to 64S -'./)0 or 64S -'./)-N or
(/)P, formal civil eviction pursuant to 64S -'./(' to -'.-/', inclusive.;
: 4uleP-'.PPMotions to stay in eviction cases.
(a)P, tenant in an eviction case may only file % motion to stay or % motion to vacate per
case, on a form approved y the court.
()PGpon the filing of a motion to stay under susection (a), any pending eviction order
shall e stayed until further order of the court.
(c)P, motion to stay #ill e revie#ed y the court #ithin % 5udicial day.
(d)P=f a tenant ans#er has not een filed in an eviction case, a motion to stay must e
accompanied y the appropriate filing fee, eMcept as other#ise provided in 4ule -0.
(e)PGnless the revie#ing 5udge so orders, a motion to stay #ill not e set for hearing ut
instead #ill e approved or denied eM parte.
(f)P,ny hearing on a motion to stay must e scheduled #ithin seven (7) 5udicial days from
the date the motion is approved for hearing.
(g)P=f a motion to stay is set for hearing, the landlord may file a #ritten opposition to the
motion.
(h)P=f a tenant has already appeared efore a 5udge for a hearing on the eviction, no motion
to stay y that tenant #ill e accepted for filing, unless the tenant alleges that he has fully
complied #ith an applicale order of the court.
(i)P,s used in this section, :eviction action; means>
(%)P, summary eviction action pursuant to 64S -'./)0 or 64S -'./)-N or
(/)P, formal civil eviction pursuant to 64S -'./(' to -'.-/', inclusive.;
+a1er's o#n ,ns#ering +rief admits that %7'8 #as not a :formal eviction;, and
therefore, 6JC4? 70,(a)(-) does not apply. :,s to the #on requirement- sin"e this "ase (as
not a <formal< e$i"tion, 6JC4C? 70,(a)(%)&(-) do not apply. =nstead, this case falls under the
FcatchallF provision at the end of susection (a) of that 4ule, #hich provides in pertinent part F=n cases
not provided for in (%), (/), (0) or (-) aove, the giving of an appeal ond, under the provisions of 4ule
70, shall stay proceedings in the court elo# upon the 5udgment or order appealed from ... eMcept
#here the appellate court may other#ise direct upon such terms as it may in its discretion impose.; --
6JC4C? 70,(a). 6JC4C? 70 provides that FThe ond or e3uivalent security shall e in the sum or
value of $240 unless the 3ustice court fi+es a different amount.F (*mphasis added). 64S -'.08)(%)
provides that a stay may e otained y posting a ond in the amount of I/)'.'' #ith the trial court.;
+a1er's /.%-.%/ ,ns#ering +rief.
:64SP-'.08)PPStay of eMecution upon appealN duty of tenant #ho retains possession of premises to
pay rent during stay.PP2pon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to !1) 60.247=
%.PP*Mcept as other#ise provided in this susection, a stay of eMecution may e otained y filing
#ith the trial court a ond in the amount of 2345 to "o$er the e,pe"te costs on appeal... , tenant of
commercial property may otain a stay of eMecution only upon the issuance of a stay pursuant to 4ule 8
of the 6evada 4ules of ,ppellate ?rocedure and the posting of a supersedeas ond in the amount of
%'' percent of the unpaid rent claim of the landlord.;
The 4JC failed to comply #ith JC4C? 70,()> : ()PSupersedeas +ond> <orm and *ffect.P...
When a proper #on to stay proceedings is filed, it shall stay further pro"eeings e,"ept as
other(ise a#o$e pro$ie- an if an e,e"ution or other orer shall ha$e #een issue to the sheriff-
"oroner- or elisor- the person shall return the same- (ith the "ause therefor- an his or her
pro"eeings thereuner- upon re"ei$ing from the "ler+ or )usti"e a noti"e of the stay of
pro"eeings .;
So, +a1er admits that JC4C? 70,(a)(-) does not apply, the suggests that the :catch&all;
provision in 4ule 70,(a) cover appeals of summary evictions and therein invo1es some authority
#ithin JC4C? 70 to have allo#ed Judge SferraJJa to not only deny Coughlin a stay, ut to do so #here
he characteriJed the court continuing to hold onto Coughlin I/,/7) :rent escro#; deposit as :satisfying
his ond on appeal;. Ao#ever, 4ule 70 (especially in light of JC4C? 8% and 64S -'.08) (#hich oth
Judge Aerndon in the $enetian v T#o 4oads Transcript and Judge SferraJJa on %'.%0.%% invo1ed,
SferraJJa, though, incorrectly preventing Coughlin from asserting coutnerclaims (#hich +a1er lied
aout hin his /./-.%/ +rief in stating that 64S %%8,.-(' #as :of no moment;) y indicating 4ule 8%
made any JC4C? relative to counterclaims inapplicale given that :special statuory; provision
applicale to summary eviction proceedings did not allo# for such, even #here such a matter #as set
'over for trial;. , particularly #here -'.08)(%) specifically identifies the supersedeas ond effected
therein as :to cover the eMpected costs on appeal; considering 4ule 70's dictate that :Gnless an
appellant is eMempted y la# (#hich Coughlin argualy #as given the 4JC #aived the filing fee of his
appeal due to his indigency and its granting Couglin =<? status in %7'8), or has filed a supersedeas
bond or other undertaking which includes securit- for the pa-ment of costs on appeal, in civil cases
a ond for costs on appeal or e3uivalent security shall e filed y the appellant in the 5ustice court #ith
the notice of appealN but securit- shall not be re.uired of an appellant who is not sub3ect to costs. The
ond or e3uivalent security shall e in the sum or value of I/)' unless the 3ustice court fi+es a
different amount
So, it is completely dishonest for +a1er, in his /./-.%/ +rief to #rite> :,s to the #on
requirement- sin"e this "ase (as not a <formal< e$i"tion, 6JC4C? 70,(a)(%)&(-) do not apply.
=nstead, this case falls under the FcatchallF provision at the end of susection (a) of that 4ule, #hich
provides in pertinent part F=n cases not provided for in (%), (/), (0) or (-) aove, the giing of an
appeal bond, under the proisions of 1ule :7, shall sta- proceedings in the court below upon the
3udgment or order appealed from ... eMcept #here the appellate court may other#ise direct upon such
terms as it may in its discretion impose. 6JC4C? 70,(a). 6JC4C? 70 provides that FThe ond or
e3uivalent security shall e in the sum or value of I/)' unless the 5ustice court fiMes a different
amount.F (*mphasis added). 64S -'.08)(%) provides that a stay may e otained y posting a ond in
the amount of I/)'.'' #ith the trial court.
Coughlin deposited I/,/7) #ith the court pursuant to 64S %%8,.0)) and the court's order of
@ctoer %0, /'%%. Ae orally moved the court for a stay of the eviction at the end of the @ctoer /),
/'%% hearing, ut did not cite any authority for his re3uest. ,ccordingly, that motion #as denied.-)
4@,, $ol. ==, pp. 8),/. #hus, although the court ordered that Coughlin*s deposit would sere as his
appeal bond, it denied a stay ecause Coughlin did not provide the court #ith any asis to grant one, as
#as his legal responsiility.:
4egardless of the fact that +a1er cites not authority to support his contention that the allege
failure of Coughlin to :provide the court #ith any asis to grant; a stay, Judge SferraJJa's order
indicated : that Coughlin*s deposit would sere as his appeal bond .. That eing the case, 4ule
70,(a)'s catchall provision provides :e, #hich provides in pertinent part F=n cases not provided for in
(%), (/), (0) or (-) aove, that the giing of an appeal bond, under the proisions of 1ule :7, shall
sta- proceedings in the court below upon the 3udgment or order appealed from&. ,nd, under 4ule
70, at the conclusion of the %'./).%% hearing, Judge SferraJJa ruled as to 5ust #hat that appeal ond
#ould e #here 4ule 70 provides that the :ond or e3uivalent security shall e in the sum or value of
I/)' unless the 3ustice court fi+es a different amount.; That eing the case, that Judge SferraJJa did
so fiM a different amount (curiously ma1ing Coughlin's ond ten times the amount set as the default
under 4ule 70...), 4ule 70, then mandates that :the giving of an appeal ond, under the provisions of
4ule 70, shall sta- proceedings in the court below upon the 3udgment or order appealed from;.
4egardles of the duiousness of +a1er's argument relative to #hether Coughlin cited to sufficient legal
authority on %'./).%%...Judge SferraJJa's order as rendered #as legally operative sufficient to re3uire
the proceedings e stayed (Couglin certainly did not as1 Judge SferraJJa to 5ust forget aout any appeal
and give him his I/,/7) ac1 at that point....and any suse3uent Motion for the 4eturn of that I/,/7)
y Coughlin can in no #ay e characteriJed as retracting his Motion for such a Stay, ut rather, a mere
common sense complaint (#hich Coughlin set out in specific detail) relative to the ine3uity of the 4JC
holding on to ten time the amount re3uired to get a stay, and then failing to grant Coughlin just such a
stay. Some might say this is a common complaint aout the 4JC and its +ailiffs as #ell...that of the
general sense that its follo#ing the la# and recognizing the rights of defendants and litigants is an
optional type of thing, that they only need do if they feel li1e it, li1e the person involved or their
:attitude; enough to, or find it convenient and eMpedient to do so.
The headings for the forms on the 6. S. Ct's #esite appear to contain some significant
mista1es. ,s for :<orm 0/;, such form is identified as applicale to an appeal of a summary eviction,
yet the form cites to 64S -'.08', #hich relates to the appeal of a plenary unla#ful detainer civil
action. =ndeed, 64S -'.08) is no#here mentioned.
http>..la#lirary.nevada5udiciary.us.forms.standardiJed"andlordTenantforms.php
Ao# to ,ppeal a Summary *viction <rom Justice Court to District Court
Landlord or Tenant Instructions for Forms 31 through 36
Form #31 Notice of Appeal
Form #32 Motion to Set ond and to Sta! "#iction $ending Appeal
Form #33 Notice of $osting and Acceptance of Supersedes%&ost ond on Appeal
Form #3' (esignation of )ecord and Statement of $oints on Appeal and Notice of Intent to File rief
Form #3* &ertificate of No Transcript
Form #36 Statement of $roceedings
$ac+et "le#en Instructions and forms 31 through 36
?ac1et %%, at page 0 of 9, indicates Coughlin's argument aout the !CS@ violating the la# y
failign to provide /- hours notice efore conducting a loc1out, in addition to revealing that the !CS@,
y virtue of eing given the %'./7.%% <@<C@"@S* (considering the language contained on page 9
therein aout the :ond on appeal;) #as given notice of the stay sufficient to forid it from conducting
the loc1out (though the various legal impossiilities and contradictory legal positiosn contained therein
may have confused the !CS@ a it)>
:!hile the la# may allo# you %' 5udicial days to file your appeal, if you have
een ordered to vacate the rental unit, you must ta1e eMtra steps efore the end
of the /-&hour eviction notice the constale.sheriff #ill give you in order to stay
or stop the eviction.
To Stop the *viction (Tenant), you must>
%. <ile the Civil Cover Sheet and 6otice of the ,ppeal, <orm B0%N
/. ?ay the filing fee or have the @rder 4egarding !aiver of <ees and
Costs, <orm B0(,/
from the Justice CourtN
0. <ile a Motion to Set +ond and to Stay *viction ?ending ,ppeal,
<orm B0/, if the 5udge has not already set the amountN
-. ?ay for the ond and file a 6otice of ?osting and ,cceptance of
Supersedeas.Cost +ond on ,ppeal, <orm B00. The cost is set y
the court at I/)' or moreN
). Deliver a copy of the Supersedeas +ond and the 6otice of
,ppeal to the constale.sheriff to stop the eviction. =f you do
not do this, you #ill e evictedN and
9. Cive or mail copies of the Supersedeas +ond and 6otice of ,ppeal
to your landlord. :
Judge SferraJJa rendered an order sufficient to accomplish everything in paragraph -> :-. ?ay
for the ond and file a 6otice of ?osting and ,cceptance of
Supersedeas.Cost +ond on ,ppeal, <orm B00. The cost is set y
the court at I/)' or moreN;
4G"*P70.PP+@6D <@4 C@STS @6 ,??*,"

Gnless an appellant is eMempted y la#, or has filed a supersedeas ond or other underta1ing #hich
includes security for the payment of costs on appeal, in civil cases a ond for costs on appeal or
e3uivalent security shall e filed y the appellant in the 5ustice court #ith the notice of appealN ut
security shall not e re3uired of an appellant #ho is not su5ect to costs. The ond or e3uivalent
security shall e in the sum or value of I/)' unless the 5ustice court fiMes a different amount. , ond
for costs on appeal shall have sufficient surety, and it or any e3uivalent security shall e conditioned to
secure the payment of costs if the appeal is finally dismissed or the 5udgment affirmed, or of such costs
as the district court may direct if the 5udgment is modified. =f a ond or e3uivalent security in the sum
or value of I/)' is given, no approval thereof is necessary. ,fter a ond for costs on appeal is filed, a
respondent may raise for determination y the 5ustice court o5ections to the form of the ond or to the
sufficiency of the surety. The provisions of 4ule 70, apply to a surety ond upon a ond given
pursuant to this rule.
*,hi#it 8 is the 83C33C88 email=
<rom> SferraJJa, ?ete [psferraJJaS#ashoecounty.usJ
Sent> Thursday, Decemer //, /'%% />00 ?M
To> JachcoughlinShotmail.comN cda1erSrichardhilla#.com
Cc> Stancil, Earen
Su5ect> 4*> inventory continued
Dear Mr Coughlin>
The stay #as denied. Dou #ill need to as1 the District Court for a stay.
?ete SferraJJa
<rom> Hach Coughlin [mailto>JachcoughlinShotmail.com\
Sent> Thursday, Decemer //,/'%%%/>'( ?M
To> SferraJJa, ?eteN cda1erSrichardhilla#.com
Su5ect> inventory continued
Dear Judge SferraJJa and Mr. +a1er,
,dditionally some rare oo1 are missing, family
photographs.1eepsa1es.heirlooms.media, = elieve the .^
.... hammer #eighted a"tion casio 88 1ey ?K 00' is the model numer, = elieve, = #ill
have to chec1 ....... <urther, this is all moot at this point as = have filed a Supersedeas
+ond of I/)', and according to 64S -'.08), = automatically get a stay of eviction and
am entitled to return to the property and continue in possession. The Statute sets the
Superseeas &on D(hi"h yiels a stayE at 2345 if rent is uner 28555- unless the
Court (ishes to rule that I am a "ommer"ial tenant. 'o(e$er- if the "ourt oes rule
that I am a "ommer"ial tenant- the No Cause *$i"tion Noti"e in this "ase- uner
NRS 75.349 ma+es a Summary *$i"tion !ro"eeing impermissi#le, as Summary
*viction ?roceedings are not allo#ed against "ommer"ial tenants #here only a 6o
cause *viction 6otice is filed. =ts one or the other, ut Mr. Aill and +a1er cannot have it
oth #ays. <urther, the Courts @rder of Decemer /%, /'%% is 5ust that, and @rder, its
not an agreement, its not a settlement, etc, etc. and the audio record clearly reflects that.
64S -'.08) Stay of eMecution upon appealN duty of tenant #ho retains possession of
premises to pay rent during stay. Gpon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to 64S
-'./)0>
%. *Mcept as other#ise provided in this susection, a stay of eMecution may e
otained y filing #ith the trial court a ond in the amount of I/)' to cover the
eMpected "osts on appeal. =n an a"tion concerning a lease of "ommer"ial property
or any other property for #hich the monthly rent eMceeds I%,''', the court may,
upon its o#n motion or that of a party, and upon a sho#ing of good cause, order an
additional ond to e posted to cover the eMpected "osts on appeal. , surety upon
the ond sumits to the 5urisdiction of the appellate court and irrevocaly appoints
the cler1 of that court as the surety's agent upon #hom papers affecting the surety's
liaility upon the ond may e served. "iaility of a surety may e enforced, or the
ond may e released, on motion in the appellate court #ithout independent
a"tion.
/. , tenant #ho retains possession of the premises that are the su5ect of the appeal
during the pendency of the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount
provided in the underlying contract et#een the tenant and the landlord as it
ecomes due. =f the tenant fails to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate ne#
proceedings for a summary eviction y serving the tenant #ith a ne# notice
pursuant to 64S -'./)0.
Sincerely, Hach Coughlin, *s3.;
Coughlin's o#n %'.%(.%% filing in %7'8 3uotes the "andlord Tenant
Aandoo1>
Fhttp>..###.clar1countycourts.us.CivilSAC.landlord&tenant&evictions.order&summary&
eviction.html
:,ppeals from @rders for Summary *viction
,ll tenants filing an appeal must post a ond of at least I/)'. =f you #ish to stop the
eviction pending your appeal and are a tenant of a resiential property (hose
monthly rent is 28555 or less- this 2345 is all you are require to pay.
=f you are a tenant of resiential property #hose monthly rent eMceeds I%''' or a tenant
of a "ommer"ial property you must post ond of I/)' ut the court can, on its o#n or
on the motion of the landlord, increase the ond. See 64S -'.08)(%);
?age 0 of the :"andlord Tenant Aandoo1; distriuted on the this Court's #esite reads>
http>..###.nevada5udiciary.us.indeM.php.vie#documentsandforms.func&startdo#n.)%)8.
:Choosing Whether to .ile A Summary or F.ormal: *$i"tion a"tion
=n most cases, the landlord can choose #hether to file a summar- or formal
eiction a"tion . Ao#ever, there are circumstances under #hich summary eviction
cannot e used. <or instance, summary eviction is not availale for>
%) *victions follo#ing the foreclosure sale of a rental property (See 64S -'./)))
/) *$i"tion of "ommer"ial tenants for other than nonpayment of rent
(See 64S -'./)-)
0) *viction of a tenant of a moile home par1 from the par1
(See 64S -'./)0(%') and 64S Chapter %%8+)
The #enefits of summary e$i"tion are=
%. =t is easy to file on your o#n #ithout the assistance of an attorneyN and
/. Dou are li1ely to get the tenant out of your property in a shorter time period than
#ith the formal eviction process.
The ra(#a"+s to summary e$i"tion are>
%. Dou cannot get a money )ugment as part of your a"tion (ut you can sue in a
separate a"tion)N
/. =f there is a genuine dispute over material facts, the court must dismiss the a"tion
(although you can re&file a formal eviction a"tion)N and
0. The tenant may #e a#le to file an appeal- an remain in the unit until the
appeal is hear #y posting a #on (ith the "ourt that may #e "heaper than that
require in the formal eviction process.;;
: 6JC4C? 70,(a)(-)> :=n cases involving an appeal y the defendant of an order of eviction in
a formal proceeding, such appeal shall not stay the eMecution of the 5udgment, unless, no later
than %' days after the filing of a notice of appeal, the person shall eMecute and file #ith the
court or 5ustice an underta1ing to the plaintiff, #ith t#o or more sureties, in an amount to e
fiMed y the court or 5ustice, ut #hich shall not e less than t#ice the amount of the 5udgment
and costs, to the effect that, if the 5udgment appealed from e affirmed or the appeal e
dismissed, the appellant #ill pay the 5udgment and the cost of appeal, the value of the use and
occupation of the property, and damages 5ustly accruing to the plaintiff during the pendency of
the appeal. Gpon ta1ing the appeal and filing the underta1ing, all further proceedings in the
case shall e stayed.
!henever an appeal is perfected, and a ond given as provided y paragraphs (%), (/), (0)
and (-) herein, it shall stay all further proceedings in the court elo#, upon the 5udgment or
order appealed from or upon matters emraced therein, eMcept as hereinafter specified.
Ao#ever, the court elo# may proceed upon any other matter included in the action or
proceeding and not affected y the 5udgment or order appealed fromN and the court elo# may
in its discretion dispense #ith or limit the security re3uired y (%), (/), (0) and (-) aove, #hen
an appellant is an eMecutor, administrator, trustee, or other person acting in another]s right.
In "ases not pro$ie for in D8E- D3E- D9E or D7E a#o$e, the giving of an appeal ond, uner
the pro$isions of Rule ;9, shall sta- proceedings in the court below upon the 3udgment or
order appealed from, e+cept that #here it directs the same of perishale property, the court
elo# may order the property to e sold and the proceeds thereof to e deposited to aide y
the 5udgment of the appellate court, and e+cept where the appellate court ma- otherwise
direct upon such terms as it ma- in its discretion impose.; =ts not clear #hether the passage
:and e+cept where the appellate court ma- otherwise direct upon such terms as it ma- in its
discretion impose... is meant to apply only to :perishale property; situations or in general.
*ven assuming it applies in general, as a sort of catch&all...+a1er fraudulently ignores the very
6JC4C? 8% that Judge SferraJJa pointed out on %'.%0.%% as re3uiring the application of any
specific statutory remedy (such as 64S -'.08)) #here the 6JC4C? do not directly spea1 to
such areas. ,s such, to the eMtent +a1er argues that this #as not an appeal of a :formal
eiction;, his then citing to 6JC4C? 70,(a)'s :catch&all provision; completely lac1s merit
#here a specific statutory section spea1s to supersedeas onds in appeals of summary
evictions, 64S -'.08). ,dditionally, +a1er fraudulently then ma1es argument as to the trial
court denying the stay #hen the :catch all; provision he cites to specifically re3uires
%'./7.%% <@<C@"@S* reads> :OR%*R .OR S0//ARY *BICTION
"andlord, M,TT M*4"=SS, ha$ing applie #y Affia$it for an @rder see1ing
summary e$i"tion of the aove&named Tenant and it appearing from the record on file
herein that the statutory re3uirements have een met and that the Tenant, after notice,
unla#fully detains and #ithholds the rental unit, and the Court eing fully advised and
finding good cause, therefore,
=T =S A*4*+D @4D*4*D, ,DJGDC*D ,6D D*C4**D ,S <@""@!S>
That the sheriff.constale of 4eno To#nship, or one of their duly authoriJed
agents e, and herey is, directed to remove each and every person found upon the
rental unit at %/% 4iver 4oc1, 4eno, !ashoe County, 6evada, y no earlier than
@ctoer 0%, /'%% at ) pm. "andlord is herey a#arded the right of possession of the
premises.
=T =S A*4*+D <G4TA*4 @4D*4*D, ,DJGDC*D ,6D D*C4**D ,S
<@""@!S>
The sums "urrently on eposit (ith the Court- in the amount of 23-3;4.55-
are the property of the lanlor- /att /erliss- #ut shall not #e immeiately
release to him. Instea- those sums shall ser$e as Coughlin's se"urity for "osts on
appeal, pursuant to N?CRC! ;9, in the event Coughlin timely and properly appeals
this order. =n the event Coughlin fails to timely and properly appeal this order, those
sums shall e immediately released to Merliss or his counsel of record. These sums
shall not- in any e$ent- operate to stay enfor"ement of this orer an the surrener
of the right of Coughlin to possess the !roperty. 6othing in this order shall prevent
this "ourt or an appellate "ourt from releasing the deposited funds to Merliss or his
counsel prior to or after any appeal is perfected, or from in"reasing the amount of
any se"urity to #e poste #y Coughlin for any reason, or oth, either upon its o#n
motion or upon motion y Merliss.
=T =S S@ @4D*4*D.F;
4G"*P;9A.PPstay @6 ,??*,"_superseeas #on

(a)Psuperseeas #onN !hen 4e3uired.PP!henever an appellant entitled thereto desires a
stay on appeal, the person may file a #on for superseeas, as provided in this rule.

(%)P=f the appeal e from a )ugment or order directing the pa-ment of mone-, the
#on shall e conditioned for the satisfaction of the )ugment in full together #ith "osts and
interest if for any reason the appeal is dismissed or if the )ugment is affirmed, and to satisfy in
full such modification of the )ugment and such "osts and interests as the appellate court may
ad5udge and a#ard, and that if the appellant does not ma1e such payment #ithin 0' ays after
the filing of affirmance of the )ugment in #hole or part, in the court in #hich the appeal is
ta1en, )ugment may e entered, on motion of the respondent, in the respondent]s favor against
the surety or sureties for such amount, together #ith the interest that may e due thereon, and
the "osts #hich may e a#arded against the appellant upon the appeal. !hen the )ugment is
for the recovery of money not other#ise secured, the amount of the #on shall e fiMed at such
sum as #ill cover the #hole amount of the )ugment remaining unsatisfied, "osts on the appeal
and interest, unless the 5ustice after notice and hearing and for good cause sho#n fiMes a
different amount or orders security other than the #on.
=f the appeal e from an order dissolving or refusing to dissolve an attachment, the #on
shall e in the sum of the value of the property attached and conditioned that if the order
appealed from, or any part thereof, e affirmed, the appellant shall pay to the opposing party, on
such appeal, all damages and "osts caused y the appellant y reason of such appeal and the
stay of eMecution thereon.

(/)P=f the )ugment or order appealed from direct the assignment or delier- of
documents, or personal propert-, the things re3uired to e assigned or delivered shall e
assigned and placed in the custody of such officer or receiver as the court may appoint, and the
#on shall e in such amount as the court or 5ustice may direct, to the effect that the appellant
#ill, if the )ugment or order appealed from, or any part thereof, e affirmed, pay to the
opposing party on such appeal all damages and "osts caused y the appellant y reason of such
appeal and the stay of eMecution thereon. =n lieu of the assignment and delivery, and of the
#on herein provided for, the appellant may enter into a #on, in such amount as the court or
5ustice thereof may direct, to the effect that if the )ugment or order, or any part thereof, e
affirmed, the appellant #ill oey the order and pay to the opposing party on such appeal all
damages and "osts caused y reason of said appeal and the stay of eMecution thereon.

(0)P=f the )ugment or order appealed from direct the e+ecution of a cone-ance or
other instrument, the instrument shall e eMecuted and deposited #ith the cler1 or 5ustice of the
court #ith #hom the )ugment or order is entered to aide y the )ugment of the appellate
court, and the #on shall e in such amount as the court or 5ustice thereof may direct, to the
effect that the appellant #ill, if the )ugment or order appealed from, or any party thereof, e
affirmed, pay to the opposing party on such appeal all damages and "osts caused y the
appellant y reason of such appeal and the stay of eMecution thereon.

(-)Pn cases inoling an appeal b- the defendant of an order of eiction in a formal
proceeding- su"h appeal shall not stay the e,e"ution of the 3udgment - unless- no later than 10
da-s after the filing of a notice of appeal - the person shall e,e"ute an file with the court or
3ustice an unerta+ing to the plaintiff- (ith t(o or more sureties- in an amount to be fi+ed
b- the court or 3ustice, but which shall not be less than twice the amount of the 3udgment and
costs- to the effe"t that- if the 3udgment appeale from #e affirme or the appeal #e
ismisse- the appellant (ill pay the 3udgment an the "ost of appeal- the $alue of the use
an o""upation of the property- an amages )ustly a""ruing to the plaintiff uring the
penen"y of the appeal. 0pon ta+ing the appeal an filing the unerta+ing- all further
pro"eeings in the "ase shall #e staye.
!henever an appeal is perfected, an a #on gi$en as pro$ie #y paragraphs D8E- D3E-
D9E an D7E herein- it shall sta- all further proceedings in the court below, upon the 3udgment
or order appealed from or upon matters embraced therein- e,"ept as hereinafter spe"ifie.
'o(e$er- the "ourt #elo( may pro"ee upon any other matter in"lue in the a"tion or
pro"eeing an not affe"te #y the )ugment or orer appeale fromN and the court elo#
may in its discretion dispense #ith or limit the security re3uired y (%), (/), (0) and (-) aove,
#hen an appellant is an eMecutor, administrator, trustee, or other person acting in another]s
right.
In "ases not pro$ie for in D8E- D3E- D9E or D7E a#o$e- the gi$ing of an appeal bond -
uner the pro$isions of Rule ;9- shall sta- proceedings in the court below upon the 3udgment
or order appealed from- eMcept that #here it directs the same of perishale property, the court
elo# may order the property to e sold and the proceeds thereof to e deposited to aide y
the )ugment of the appellate court, and eMcept #here the appellate court may other#ise direct
upon such terms as it may in its discretion impose.

()Psuperseeas #on> <orm and *ffect.PP,ny #ons re3uired y these rules may e in one
instrument or several at the option of the giver.
=n every case #here, under the provisions of these rules, a #on is re3uired, such #on may
e eMecuted on the part of the appellant y at least t#o 3ualified and sufficient sureties, stating
their place of residence and occupation, or y a #oning or surety company authoriJed and
3ualified to do usiness in the State of 6evada.
!here the #on is eMecuted y such a #oning or surety company, no affidavit as to the
sufficiency of such surety need accompany the #on. @ther#ise, the #on shall e of no effect
unless it e accompanied y the affidavit of personal sureties that they are each a resident and
householder or freeholder #ithin the State and that they are each #orth the amount specified
therein over and aove their 5ust dets and liailities, eMclusive of property eMempt from
eMecutionN they may state in their affidavit that they are severally #orth amounts less than that
eMpressed in the #on, if the #hole amount e e3uivalent to that of t#o 3ualified and sufficient
sureties. *ach such affidavit shall e accompanied y a financial statement in the form
determined y the 5ustice courts.
The adverse party may eMcept to the sufficiency of the sureties #ithin ) ays after the filing
of the #on, and, unless they or other sureties 5ustify efore the 5ustice #ithin %' ays
thereafter, upon notice to the adverse party, to the amount stated in their affidavits, the appeal
shall e regarded as if no such #on had een given.
5n all cases where a bond is re.uired b- these rules, a deposit in the court below of the
amount of the 3udgment appealed from and such additional amount as ma- be specified b-
the 3ustice of the court b- which the 3udgment was rendered, shall be e.uialent to filing the
bond, and in all cases the #on or deposit may e #aived y the #ritten consent of the appellee
filed in said action or proceeding.
'hen a proper bond to sta- proceedings is filed, it shall sta- further proceedings e+cept as
otherwise aboe proided, and if an e+ecution or other order shall hae been issued to the
sheriff, coroner, or elisor, the person shall return the same, with the cause therefor, and his
or her proceedings thereunder, upon receiing from the clerk or 3ustice a notice of the sta- of
proceedings.

4G"*P70+.PP&ON%S_M=SC*"",6*@GS ?4@$=S=@6S

(a)P<ailure to <ile or =nsufficiency of #on.PP=f a #on on appeal or a superseeas #on is
not filed #ithin the time specified, the appeal #ill e su5ect to such sanctions as provided in
4ule 79. =f the #on filed is found insufficient, and if the action is not -et docketed with the
appellate court, a bond ma- be filed at such time before the action is so docketed , as ma- be
fi+ed b- the 3ustice court. ,fter the action is so doc1eted, application for leave to file a
sufficient #on may e made only in the appellate court.

()P)ugment ,gainst Surety.PP+y entering into an appeal or superseeas #on given
pursuant to 4ule 70 or ;9A, the surety sumits to the 5urisdiction of the court and irrevocaly
appoints the cler1 of the 5ustice court or the 5ustice as the surety]s agent upon #hom any papers
affecting the surety]s liaility on the #on may e served. The surety]s liaility may e
enforced on motion #ithout the necessity of an independent action. The motion and such notice
of the motion as the court prescries may e served on the cler1 of the court, or 5ustice, #ho
shall forth#ith mail copies to the surety if the surety]s address is 1no#n.
[,s amendedN effective July %, /'').\
:Amene Case Appeal Statement- Statement of Re"or on Appeal- /otion to Set Asie *$i"tion
Orer- *mergen"y *, !arte /otion for Orer Shortening TimeG %*SIANATION O. R*COR%
AN% STAT*/*NT O. !OINTS ON A!!*AlN% NOTIC* O. INT*NT TO .IL* &RI*.G
Statement of !ro"eeingsG C*RTI.ICAT* O. NO TRANSCRI!TGNOTIC* O. !OSTINA AN%
ACC*!TANC* O. S0!*RS*%*ASCCOST &ON% ON A!!*AL

,ppellant "a# @ffice of Hach Coughlin, *s3. and Coughlin Memory <oam, pursuant to JC4C? 7-,
designates as the record on appeal all documents provided for in JC4C? 7-(f) and all documents
other#ise contained in the Justice Court file.
NOTIC* O. INT*NT TO .IL* &RI*.
,ppellant intends to file an opening rief pursuant to the re3uirements and time frames
contained in JC4C? 7). ,ppellant Hach Coughlin, *s3. and Hachary Coughlin's Memory <oam,
pursuant to JC4C? 7-(), herey certifies that no transcript eMists in the aove&referenced matter.
,ppellant has prepared a Statement of ?roceedings, pursuant to JC4C? 7-(c). <urther, ,ppellant is
a#aiting a ruling on his Motion to ?repare Transcript at ?ulic *Mpense and elieves the =<? @rder
granted in oth the underlying case and the 4JC appeal fee should apply to any transcript eMpense.
<urther, ,ppellant has arranged for and attaches to this filing an audio recording of the entire Summary
*viction ?roceeding and argues that is it more sensile and economical to dispense #ith a #ritten
transcript re3uirement, and that mon1 scriveners copying The +ile eventually gave #ay to the printing
press, the aacus gave #ay to the electronic calculator, and the #hite Styrofoam cups attached y a
string gave #ay to the cellular phone. ?lease note, = verify that a complete, true and accurate copy of
the entire audio recording provided to me of all proceedings in court in 4*$/'%%&''%7'8 is found at>
https>..s1ydrive.live.com.redir.aspMcidX-0'8-908f0/f)f/8QresidX-0'8-908<0/<)</8R
7%)QparidXroot
nd that copy of the audio recordings eMactly as provided to me y the 4eno Justice Court #ill
remain availale at that lin1 for at least the neMt siM months, starting from Decemer %-, /'%%. ,n
audio CD containing those eMact files is attached to this Motion as *Mhiit /.
NOTIC* O. !OSTINA AN% ACC*!TANC* O. S0!*RS*%*ASCCOST &ON%
ON A!!*AL
!A*4*,S, the aove&entitled Court issued a Judgment dated @ctoer /7, /'%% ordering the
eviction of Tenant from a noncommercial premises (the court's say s this, tenant says it #as his home
la# office, therefore commercial, regardless, rent #as I('') #ith rent less than I%,'''.'', an appeal
#as filed on 6ovemer /, /'%%, #ith appropriate fees or #aivers, 6@! TA*4*<@4*, ,ppellant Hach
Coughlin, *s3., and Coughlin Memory <oam posts his Supersedeas.Cost +ond in the amount of I/)',
pursuant to 64S -'.08)(%). ?ursuant to 64S -'.08)(%), JC4C? 70,(a) referencing JC4C? 70,
,ppellant may proceed and this Supersedeas.Cost +ond stays eMecution of the appealed order of
eviction unless other#ise ordered y the Court.
/OTION TO S*T &ON% AN% TO STAY *BICTION !*N%INA A!!*ALG /OTION TO S*T
&ON% AN% TO STAY *BICTION !*N%INA A!!*AL
Hach Coughlin, Es.., and respectfull- re.uests that the Court set the Cost and )upersedeas
>onds and sta- e+ecution of the order of eiction entered on the 10?2:?2011 in the aboe@entitled
Court pending the appeal of this matter. !1) 60.780 proides that= Either part- ma-, within 10
;3udicial< da-s, appeal from the 3udgment rendered. >ut an appeal b- the defendant shall not sta-
the e+ecution of the 3udgment, unless, within the 10 ;3udicial< da-s, he shall e+ecute and file with the
court or 3ustice his undertaking to the plaintiff, with two or more sureties, in an amount to be fi+ed
b- the court or 3ustice, but which shall not be less than twice the amount of the 3udgment and costs,
to the effect that, if the 3udgment appealed from be affirmed or the appeal be dismissed, the
appellant will pa- the 3udgment and the cost of appeal, the alue of the use and occupation of the
propert-, and damages 3ustl- accruing to the plaintiff during the pendenc- of the appeal. 2pon
taking the appeal and filing the undertaking, all further proceedings in the case shall e stayed.
<,CTS ,6D ,4CGM*6T @n the %'./7./'%% a 5udgment #as entered against ,ppellant #hich
re3uires ,ppellant to pay 4espondent I'.'' and #hich evicts ,ppellant from the la# office and
mattress usiness ,ppellant 1ept as a commercial place of usiness at %/% 4iver 4oc1 St., 4eno, 6$.
@n the %%././'%%, ,ppellant filed its 6otice of ,ppeal. !A*4*<@4*, ,ppellant re3uests that the
Court set the Cost and Supersedeas +onds and stay eMecution of the order of eviction entered on
%'./7./'%%, in the aove&entitled court upon posting of said +onds pending the appeal of this matter.
STAT*/*NT O. !OINTS AN% A0T'ORITI*S
,ppellant provides the follo#ing Statement of ?oints, pursuant to JC4C? 7-(d). (?rovide a
rief statement of facts and legal argument on #hy you should not have een evicted, referring to
statutes and case la# #herever possile. ,lso include #hat happened at your eviction hearing). The
la# in our State does not seem eMceptionally clear #ith regard to the service and process re3uirements
and timeliness, and manner of calculating time #ith respect to the FreceiptF of "oc1out @rders. The
,ffidavit of Service y Machen states that he Fpersonally served the descried documents uponF my,
Hach Coughlin...Ao#ever, = can attest y ,ffidavit that = #as not Fpersonally servedF to the eMtent that
Fpersonally servedF means or implies that = #as there, that Machen sa# me or identified me, or any of
the other indicators of something, such as a Complaint, eing Fpersonally servedF such as = understand
the phrase to me. 64C? )()(/)(,)(i&iii).
<urther, as +a1er and Aill have so often pointed out, = cannot, according to them, receive any
attorney's fee a#ard for appearing as pro se attorney, as such, 64C? )()(/)(,)(i&iii), should apply to
me only as a party, and not as a party's attorney, and, therefore, according to 64C? ), Service> F(/)
Service under this rule is made y> (,) Delivering a copy to the attorney or the party y> (i) handing it
to the attorney or to the partyN (ii) leaving it at the attorney]s or party]s office #ith a cler1 or other
person in charge, or if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place in the officeN or (iii) if
the office is closed or the person to e served has no office, leaving it at the personIs (elling house
or usual pla"e of a#oe (ith some person of suita#le age an is"retion resiing there...F So,
either it #as my office, in #hich case a 6o Cause *viction 6otice ma1es impermissile a Summary
*viction ?roceeding under 64S -'./)0, and therefore, the @rder of Summary *viction is void for lac1
of 5urisdiction, or, the ,ffidavit of Service #as on my home, and #as not FhandedF to me, or
Fpersonally servedF (despite the ,ffidavit attesting to having Fpersonally servedF me), nor #as the
@rder of Summary *viction served in accordance #ith 64C? )()(/)(,)(iii), #hich re3uires> Fif the
office is closed or the person to e served has no office, leaving it at the personIs (elling house or
usual pla"e of a#oe (ith some person of suita#le age an is"retion resiing there..F
<urther, = elieve posting an @rder on one's residence door, particularly in the conteMt of serving
a 6o Cause 6otice of *viction or Gnla#ful Detainer, is only valid if the document eing served is also
placed in the mail and 0 non 5udicial days are accorded for service to e complete. See 64C? 9(e). =
do not elieve they can prove that at all, not even close. 64C? applies to Summary *viction ,ctions,
according to the follo#ing>
F64S -'.08' ?rovisions governing appeals. *ither party may, #ithin %'
days, appeal from the 5udgment rendered. +ut an appeal y the defendant
shall not stay the eMecution of the 5udgment, unless, #ithin the %' days, the
defendant shall eMecute and file #ith the court or 5ustice the defendant]s
underta1ing to the plaintiff, #ith t#o or more sureties, in an amount to e
fiMed y the court or 5ustice, ut #hich shall not e less than t#ice the
amount of the 5udgment and costs, to the effect that, if the 5udgment
appealed from e affirmed or the appeal e dismissed, the appellant #ill pay
the 5udgment and the cost of appeal, the value of the use and occupation of
the property, and damages 5ustly accruing to the plaintiff during the
pendency of the appeal. Gpon ta1ing the appeal and filing the underta1ing,
all further proceedings in the case shall e stayed.;

NRS 75.914 Stay of e,e"ution upon appealG uty of tenant (ho retains possession of premises
to pay rent uring stay. 0pon an appeal from an orer entere pursuant to NRS 75.349 =
8. *,"ept as other(ise pro$ie in this su#se"tion- a stay of e,e"ution may #e o#taine #y
filing (ith the trial "ourt a #on in the amount of 2345 to "o$er the e,pe"te "osts on appeal. In
an a"tion "on"erning a lease of "ommer"ial property or any other property for (hi"h the monthly
rent e,"ees 28-555- the "ourt may- upon its o(n motion or that of a party- an upon a sho(ing of
goo "ause- orer an aitional #on to #e poste to "o$er the e,pe"te "osts on appeal. A surety
upon the #on su#mits to the )urisi"tion of the appellate "ourt an irre$o"a#ly appoints the
"ler+ of that "ourt as the suretyIs agent upon (hom papers affe"ting the suretyIs lia#ility upon
the #on may #e ser$e. Lia#ility of a surety may #e enfor"e- or the #on may #e release- on
motion in the appellate "ourt (ithout inepenent a"tion.
/. , tenant #ho retains possession of the premises that are the su5ect of the appeal during the
pendency of the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount provided in the underlying contract
et#een the tenant and the landlord as it ecomes due. =f the tenant fails to pay such rent, the landlord
may initiate ne# proceedings for a summary eviction y serving the tenant #ith a ne# notice pursuant
to 64S -'./)0.
64S -'.0(' ,ppellate court not to dismiss or 3uash proceedings for #ant of form. =n all cases of
appeal under 64S -'.//' to -'.-/', inclusive, the appellate court shall not dismiss or 3uash the
proceedings for #ant of form, provided the proceedings have een conducted sustantially according to
the provisions of 64S -'.//' to -'.-/', inclusiveN and amendments to the complaint, ans#er or
summons, in matters of form only, may e allo#ed y the court at any time efore final 5udgment upon
such terms as may e 5ustN and all matters of eMcuse, 5ustification or avoidance of the allegations in the
complaint may e given in evidence under the ans#er.
NRS 75.755 Rules of pra"ti"e. The pro$isions of NRS- Ne$aa Rules of Ci$il !ro"eure an
Ne$aa Rules of Appellate !ro"eure relati$e to "i$il a"tions- appeals an ne( trials- so far as
they are not in"onsistent (ith the pro$isions of NRS 75.335 to 75.735 - in"lusi$e- apply to the
pro"eeings mentione in those se"tions.:
So, considering that 64S -'.-'' re3uires that 64C? apply to Summary *viction ?roceedings under
64S -'./)0, then service, process, and time calculations of such must comport #ith the dictates of
64C? )&9> F 4G"* ). S*4$=C* ,6D <="=6C @< ?"*,D=6CS ,6D @TA*4 ?,?*4S
DaE Ser$i"e= When Require. *Mcept as other#ise provided in these rules, every order re3uired y
its terms to e served, every pleading suse3uent to the original complaint unless the court other#ise
orders ecause of numerous defendants, every paper relating to discovery re3uired to e served upon a
party unless the court other#ise orders, every #ritten motion other than one #hich may e heard eM
parte, and every #ritten notice, appearance, demand, offer of 5udgment, designation of record on
appeal, and similar paper shall e served upon each of the parties. 6o service need e made on parties
in default for failure to appear eMcept that pleadings asserting ne# or additional claims for relief against
them shall e served upon them in the manner provided for service of summons in 4ule -.
D#E Same= 'o( /ae.
(%) !henever under these rules service is re3uired or permitted to e made upon a party
represented y an attorney, the service shall e made upon the attorney unless the court orders that
service e made upon the party.
(/) Service under this rule is made y>
(,) Delivering a copy to the attorney or the party y>
(i) handing it to the attorney or to the partyN
(ii) leaving it at the attorney]s or party]s office #ith a cler1 or other person in
charge, or if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place in the officeN or
(iii) if the office is closed or the person to e served has no office, leaving it at the
person]s d#elling house or usual place of aode #ith some person of suitale age and discretion
residing there.
D&E /ailing a "opy to the attorney or the party at his or her last +no(n aress.
Ser$i"e #y mail is "omplete on mailingG pro$ie- ho(e$er- a motion- ans(er or other o"ument
"onstituting the initial appearan"e of a party must also- if ser$e #y mail- #e file (ithin the time
allo(e for ser$i"eG an pro$ie further- that after su"h initial appearan"e- ser$i"e #y mail #e
mae only #y mailing from a point (ithin the State of Ne$aa.
(C) =f the attorney or the party has no 1no#n address, leaving a copy #ith the cler1 of the
court.
D%E %eli$ering a "opy #y ele"troni" means if the attorney or the party ser$e has
"onsente to ser$i"e #y ele"troni" means. Ser$i"e #y ele"troni" means is "omplete on transmission
pro$ie- ho(e$er- a motion- ans(er or other o"ument "onstituting the initial appearan"e of a
party must also- if ser$e #y ele"troni" means- #e file (ithin the time allo(e for ser$i"e. The
ser$e attorneyIs or partyIs "onsent to ser$i"e #y ele"troni" means shall #e e,pressly state an
file in (riting (ith the "ler+ of the "ourt an ser$e on the other parties to the a"tion. The
(ritten "onsent shall ientify=
DiE the persons upon (hom ser$i"e must #e maeG
DiiE the appropriate aress or lo"ation for su"h ser$i"e- su"h as the ele"troni">
mail aress or fa"simile num#erG
DiiiE the format to #e use for atta"hmentsG an
Di$E any other limits on the s"ope or uration of the "onsent.
An attorneyIs or partyIs "onsent shall remain effe"ti$e until e,pressly re$o+e or until the
representation of a party "hanges through entry- (ithra(al- or su#stitution of "ounsel. ,n
attorney or party #ho has consented to service y electronic means shall, #ithin %' days after any
change of electronic&mail address or facsimile numer, serve and file notice of the ne# electronic&mail
address or facsimile numer.
D9E Ser$i"e #y ele"troni" means uner Rule 4D#ED3ED%E is not effe"ti$e if the party ma+ing
ser$i"e learns that the attempte ser$i"e i not rea"h the person to #e ser$e.
(-) ?roof of service may e made y certificate of an attorney or of the attorney]s employee, or
y #ritten admission, or y affidavit, or other proof satisfactory to the court. <ailure to ma1e proof of
service shall not affect the validity of service...
R0L* J. FTI/*
DaE Computation. =n computing any period of time prescried or allo#ed y these rules, y the
local rules of any district court, y order of court, or y any applicale statute, the day of the act, event,
or default from #hich the designated period of time egins to run shall not e included. The last day of
the period so computed shall e included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a non5udicial day, in
#hich event the period runs until the end of the neMt day #hich is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
non5udicial day, or, #hen the act to e done is the filing of a paper in court, a day on #hich #eather or
other conditions have made the office of the cler1 of the district court inaccessile, in #hich event the
period runs until the end of the neMt day #hich is not one of the aforementioned days. !hen the period
of time prescried or allo#ed is less than %% days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and non5udicial
days shall e eMcluded in the computation eMcept for those proceedings filed under Titles %/ or %0 of
the 6evada 4evised Statutes...
DeE Aitional Time After Ser$i"e #y /ail or *le"troni" /eans. Whene$er a party has the
right or is require to o some a"t or ta+e some pro"eeings (ithin a pres"ri#e perio after the
ser$i"e of a noti"e or other paper- other than pro"ess- upon the party an the noti"e or paper is
ser$e upon the party #y mail or #y ele"troni" means- 9 ays shall #e ae to the pres"ri#e
perio.
Sudivision (a) is revised to eMtend the eMclusion of intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and
non5udicial days to the computation of time periods less than %% days consistent #ith the %(8)
amendments to the federal rule. ,dditionally, the ``inaccessiility of the court]] provision found in
sudivision (a) of the federal rule is added to 4ule 9(a). Sudivision (a) is further amended, y adding
language referring to ``proceedings filed under Titles %/ or %0 of the 6evada 4evised Statutes,]] to
avoid any changes to current procedures in proate, guardianship and trust proceedings....
Sudivision (e) is amended to provide an additional 0 days to act in response to a paper that is
served y electronic means under ne# paragraph (/)(D) added to 4ule )().F
64S -'./)0 Gnla#ful detainer> Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and eMclusion of tenant
for default in payment of rent.
%. *Mcept as other#ise provided in susection %', in addition to the remedy provided in 64S
-'./)%/ and -'./(' to -'.-/', inclusive, #hen the tenant of any (elling- apartment- mo#ile home-
re"reational $ehi"le or "ommer"ial premises (ith perioi" rent reser$e #y the month or any
shorter perio is in efault in payment of the rent, the landlord or the landlord]s agent, unless
other#ise agreed in #riting, may serve or have served a notice in #riting, re3uiring in the alternative
the payment of the rent or the surrender of the premises...
-. =f the tenant files such an affidavit at or efore the time stated in the notice, the landlord or
the landlord]s agent, after receipt of a file&stamped copy of the affidavit #hich #as filed, shall not
provide for the non admittance of the tenant to the premises y loc1ing or other#ise.
). Gpon noncompliance #ith the notice>
(a) The landlord or the landlord]s agent may apply y affidavit of complaint for eviction to the
5ustice court of the to#nship in #hich the d#elling, apartment, moile home or commercial premises
are located or to the district court of the county in #hich the d#elling, apartment, moile home or
commercial premises are located, #hichever has 5urisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon
issue an order directing the sheriff or constale of the county to remove the tenant #ithin /- hours after
receipt of the order..
9. Gpon the filing y the tenant of the affidavit permitted in susection 0, regardless of the
information contained in the affidavit, and the filing y the landlord of the affidavit permitted y
susection ), the 5ustice court or the district court shall hold a hearing, after service of notice of the
hearing upon the parties, to determine the truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit or notice
provided for in this section. If the "ourt etermines that there is no legal efense as to the allege
unla(ful etainer an the tenant is guilty of an unla(ful etainer- the "ourt may issue a summary
orer for remo$al of the tenant or an orer pro$iing for the non amittan"e of the tenant. If the
"ourt etermines that there is a legal efense as to the allege unla(ful etainer- the "ourt shall
refuse to grant either party any relief- an- e,"ept as other(ise pro$ie in this su#se"tion- shall
require that any further pro"eeings #e "onu"te pursuant to NRS 75.3K5 to 75.735 - in"lusi$e.
The issuan"e of a summary orer for remo$al of the tenant oes not pre"lue an a"tion #y the
tenant for any amages or other relief to (hi"h the tenant may #e entitle....
7. The tenant may, upon payment of the appropriate fees relating to the filing and service of a
motion, file a motion #ith the court, on a form provided y the cler1 of the court, to dispute the amount
of the costs, if any, claimed y the landlord pursuant to 64S %%8./'7 or %%8,.-9' for the inventory,
moving and storage of personal property left on the premises. The motion must e filed #ithin /' days
after the summary order for removal of the tenant or the aandonment of the premises y the tenant, or
#ithin /' days after>
(a) The tenant has vacated or een removed from the premisesN and
() , copy of those charges has een re3uested y or provided to the tenant,
a #hichever is later.
8. Gpon the filing of a motion pursuant to su#se"tion ;- the "ourt shall s"heule a hearing on
the motion. The hearing must #e hel (ithin 85 ays after the filing of the motion. The "ourt
shall affi, the ate of the hearing to the motion an orer a "opy ser$e upon the lanlor #y the
sheriff- "onsta#le or other pro"ess ser$er. At the hearing- the "ourt may>
(a) Determine the costs, if any, claimed y the landlord pursuant to 64S %%8./'7 or %%8,.-9' and
any accumulating daily costsN and
() @rder the release of the tenant]s property upon the payment of the charges determined to e due
or if no charges are determined to e due.;
"andlord Merliss filed only a 6o Cause 6otice of *viction in 4*$/'%%&''%7'8 on Commercial
Tenant Hach Coughlin, *s3.'s la# office. ,s such, a Summary *viction ?roceeding is impermissile
given the re3uirement of 64S -'./)0 that the 6otice alleged non&payment of rent to allo# the landlord
to proceed under the Summary *viction ?roceeding section, 64S -'./)0. <urther, Judge SferraJJa
#as precluded from ruling on anything other than possession of the premises pursuant to 64S
-'./)0(9), ,nvui, and ClaJier. <urther, the tenancy did not terminate under the "ease ,greement, it
#as rene#ed.
ervice of notices to 3uitN proof re3uired efore issuance of 64S -'./)- Gnla#ful detainer>
Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and eMclusion of tenant from certain types of property.
*Mcept as other#ise provided y specific statute, in addition to the remedy provided in 64S -'./)%
and in 64S -'./(' to -'.-/', inclusive, #hen the tenant of a d#elling unit #hich is su5ect to the
provisions of chapter %%8, of 64S, part of a lo#&rent housing program operated y a pulic housing
authority, a moile home or a recreational vehicle is guilty of an unla#ful detainer, the landlord is
entitled to the summary procedures provided in 64S -'./)0 eMcept that>
%. !ritten notice to surrender the premises must>...DeE A statement that the "laim for relief (as
authori@e #y la(.
,s such, the too early loc1out rings into play the follo#ing>
:64S %%8,.0(' Gnla#ful removal or eMclusion of tenant or #illful interruption of essential servicesN
procedure for eMpedited relief.
%. =f the landlord unla(fully remo$es the tenant from the premises or e,"lues the tenant #y
#lo"+ing or attempting to #lo"+ the tenantIs entry upon the premises or (illfully interrupts or
"auses or permits the interruption of any essential ser$i"e require #y the rental agreement or
this "hapter- the tenant may re"o$er immeiate possession pursuant to su#se"tion 7- pro"ee
uner NRS 881A.915 or terminate the rental agreement an- in aition to any other remey-
re"o$er the tenantIs a"tual amages- re"ei$e an amount not greater than 28-555 to #e fi,e #y the
"ourt- or #oth.
/. =n determining the amount, if any, to e a#arded under susection %, the court shall consider>
(a) !hether the landlord acted in good faithN
() The course of conduct et#een the landlord and the tenantN and
(c) The degree of harm to the tenant caused y the landlord]s conduct.
0. =f the rental agreement is terminated pursuant to susection %, the landlord shall return all
prepaid rent and security recoverale under this chapter.
-. *Mcept as other#ise provided in susection ), the tenant may recover immediate possession of
the premises from the landlord y filing a verified complaint for eMpedited relief for the unla#ful
removal or eMclusion of the tenant from the premises or the #illful interruption of essential services.
). , verified complaint for eMpedited relief>
(a) Must e filed #ith the court #ithin ) 5udicial days after the date of the unla#ful act y the
landlord, and the verified complaint must e dismissed if it is not timely filed. =f the verified complaint
for eMpedited relief is dismissed pursuant to this paragraph, the tenant retains the right to pursue all
other availale remedies against the landlord.
() May not e filed #ith the court if an action for summary eviction or unla#ful detainer is already
pending et#een the landlord and tenant, ut the tenant may see1 similar relief efore the 5udge
presiding over the pending action.
9. The court shall conduct a hearing on the verified complaint for eMpedited relief #ithin 0 5udicial
days after the filing of the verified complaint for eMpedited relief. +efore or at the scheduled hearing,
the tenant must provide proof that the landlord has een properly served #ith a copy of the verified
complaint for eMpedited relief. Gpon the hearing, if it is determined that the landlord has violated any
of the provisions of susection %, the court may>
(a) @rder the landlord to restore to the tenant the premises or essential services, or othN
() ,#ard damages pursuant to susection %N and
(c) *n5oin the landlord from violating the provisions of susection % and, if the circumstances so
#arrant, hold the landlord in contempt of court.
7. The payment of all costs and official fees must e deferred for any tenant #ho files a verified
complaint for eMpedited relief. ,fter any hearing and not later than final disposition of the filing or
order, the court shall assess the costs and fees against the party that does not prevail, eMcept that the
court may reduce them or #aive them, as 5ustice may re3uire.;
:64S %%8,.'(' :*Mclude; defined. :*Mclude; means to evict or to prohiit entry y loc1ing doors or
y other#ise loc1ing or attempting to loc1 entry, or to ma1e a d#elling unit uninhaitale y
interrupting or causing the interruption of electric, gas, #ater or other essential services.;
,"" ?,?*4S ,6D ?"*,D=6CS ,6D C@44*S?@6D*6CS ?4*$=@GS"D SG+M=TT*D T@
TA* 4*6@ JGST=C* C@G4T ,6D @4 =TS *M?"@D**S =S A*4*+D =6C@4?@4,T*D +D
4*<*4*6C* =6T@ TA=S <="=6C.
64S %%8,.%('> : 6otice> DefinitionN service.
%. , person has notice of a fact if>
(a) The person has actual 1no#ledge of itN
() The person has received a notice or notification of itN or
(c) <rom all the facts and circumstances the person reasonaly should 1no# that it eMists.
3. Written noti"es to the tenant pres"ri#e #y this "hapter shall #e ser$e in the manner
pro$ie #y NRS 75.315.
0. !ritten notices to the landlord prescried y this chapter may e delivered or mailed to the place
of usiness of the landlord designated in the rental agreement or to any place held out y the landlord
as the place for the receipt of rental payments from the tenant and are effective from the date of
delivery or mailing.;
:NRS 75.315 Service of notices to 3uitN proof re3uired efore issuance of order to remove.
%. *Mcept as other#ise provided in 64S -'./)0, the notices re3uired y 64S -'./)% to -'./9',
inclusive, may e served>
(a) +y delivering a copy to the tenant personally, in the presence of a #itnessN
() =f the tenant is asent from the tenant]s place of residence or from the tenant]s usual place of
usiness, y leaving a copy #ith a person of suitale age and discretion at either place and mailing a
copy to the tenant at the tenant]s place of residence or place of usinessN or
(c) =f the place of residence or usiness cannot e ascertained, or a person of suitale age or
discretion cannot e found there, y posting a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased property,
delivering a copy to a person there residing, if the person can e found, and mailing a copy to the tenant
at the place #here the leased property is situated.;
= declare under penalty of per5ury and verify that all factual assertions = ma1e herein in this filing
are true and correct to the est of my 1no#ledge. = did not receive any of the emails allegedly sent to
my from 4ichard Aill's email address, rhillSrichardhilla#.com et#een ,ugust %8
th
, /'%% to
6ovemer %7
th
, /'%%, and certainly none from rhillSrichardhilla#.com during the period et#een the
illegal loc1out at ->0' pm 6ovemer %, /'%% and the trespass arrest of 6ovemer %0
th
, /'%% #hich
allegedly spo1e to my eing provided access to the property for the purpose of my removing my
elongings, despite my numerous calls and #ritten re3uests, #hich outlined the eMigencies inherent to
my eing precluded access to my client files incident to an unla#ful and improperly notice and too
early occurring loc1out y the !CS@. = and my usiness have een damaged greatly y these acts.
<urther, = had repeatedly sent oth +a1er and Aill notice, in #riting, that = did not consent to service or
notice of anything via electronic means. <urther 64S %%8,.%(' does not spea1 to :notice of; a legal
finding, ut rather to :notice of a fact;. ,s such, = #as not appropriately served notice of the @rder of
Summary *viction, and an illegal loc1out occurred, as such no criminal trespass charge can stand.
<urther, no#, Casey +a1er #rites the undersigned and reports a urglary has recently occurred. :4*>
%/% 4iver 4oc1 <rom> Hach Coughlin (JachcoughlinShotmail.com) Sent> !ed %/.%-.%% 0>-0 ?M To>
cda1erSrichardhilla#.comN 1nielsenSrichardhilla#.comN sgallagherSrichardhilla#.com Dear Mr.
+a1er, = drove y the property recently and sa# you had added oarding up the front door on very, very
recently. Gnfortunately, your client and your firm, despite illing up some I%,'9' for FsecuringF the
property on top of charging I('' for storage for #hat could fit inside a %'M/' foot storage shed, never
once providing an inventory, and contriuting to a #rongful arrest and defamation causing me and my
clients great damage, failed to ta1e even asic steps to secure the property, despite my ma1ing
numerous #ritten re3uests that you do so, including, ut not limited to, ta1ing the damn #indo# unit
air conditioner out of the #indo# facing the side#al1 on the side of the house very close to the damn
"a1emill "odge, or even putting a strong stic1 in et#een the ottom sliding #indo# pain and the top
of the sill to prevent someone from simply pushing in the #indo# unit air conditioner and pushing the
#indo# up to gain access. <urther, a lan1et that #as on the orange circular couch is clearly in the
flo#er ed in front of the house. ,dditionally, there are reports that someone #ith your office gave
someone a mattress from the inventory of Coughlin Memory <oam (a 6evada licensed usiness located
at the property) and an eMpensive mattress platform has clearly een damaged and placed in the flo#er
ed as #ell, in addition to one of the #ooden porch shades eing removed from the front porch. Dou
and your client are, of course, liale for all of this.; (email from Coughlin to +a1er, attached as *Mhiit
0 along #ith the follo#ing email from +a1er reporting the urglary to Couglin)>;<rom>
cda1erSrichardhilla#.com To> JachcoughlinShotmail.com CC> rhillSrichardhilla#.com Su5ect>
%/% 4iver 4oc1 Date> !ed, %- Dec /'%% %0>)'>'/ &'8'' Mr. Coughlin> The 4iver 4oc1 property has
een ro1en into. !e elieve the rea1&in occurred sometime on Monday, Decemer %/, /'%%. There
appear to e items missing, including the T$ in the living room, perhaps a computer monitor, and
perhaps some stereo e3uipment. = can]t tell #hat else. The contents of the residence appear to have
een rifled through. = am providing you #ith this information as a courtesy. This email does 6@T
constitute permission for you to go to the 4iver 4oc1 property. Casey D. +a1er, *s3.; See *Mhiit 0.
,lso, attached to this at *Mhiit % is a collection of documents related to some faMes, ?roposed
@rders, *M ?arte *mergency Motion for =nspection, ,ffidavit of Due Diligence y ?rocess Servers
ostensily claiming the aility to see through #alls, etc., and one interesting copy of a faM received
from Casey +a1er, *s3 y the 4eno Justice Court #ith a hand#ritten note on the faM dated %'./'./'%%
that appears to e Judge SferraJJa's signature and hand#riting #herein the follo#ing notation is made>
:
:64S %%8,./9' Disclosure of names and addresses of managers and o#nersN emergency telephone
numerN service of process.
%. The landlord, or any person authoriJed to enter into a rental agreement on his or her ehalf, shall
disclose to the tenant in #riting at or efore the commencement of the tenancy>
(a) The name and address of>
(%) The persons authoriJed to manage the premisesN
(/) , person #ithin this State authoriJed to act for and on ehalf of the landlord for the purpose
of service of process and receiving notices and demandsN and
(0) The principal or corporate o#ner.
() , telephone numer at #hich a responsile person #ho resides in the county or #ithin 9' miles
of #here the premises are located may e called in case of emergency.
/. The information re3uired to e furnished y this section must e 1ept current, and this section is
enforceale against any successor landlord or manager of the premises.
0. , party #ho enters into a rental agreement on ehalf of the landlord and fails to comply #ith this
section is an agent of the landlord for purposes of>
(a) Service of process and receiving notices and demandsN and
() ?erforming the oligations of the landlord under la# and under the rental agreement.
-. =n any action against a landlord #hich involves his or her rental property, service of process
upon the manager of the property or a person descried in paragraph (a) of susection % shall e
deemed to e service upon the landlord. The oligations of the landlord devolve upon the persons
authoriJed to enter into a rental agreement on his or her ehalf.
). This section does not limit or remove the liaility of an undisclosed landlord.;
64S -'.0%' =ssue of fact to e tried y 5ury if proper demand made. !henever an issue of fact is
presented y the pleadings, it shall e tried y a 5ury, if proper demand is made pursuant to the 6evada
4ules of Civil ?rocedure or the Justice Court 4ules of Civil ?rocedure
,ctually, a lot of people seemed confused regarding the :/- hours; loc1out thing. The only
appearance in either 64S %%8, or 64S -', in the provisions applicale to Summary *viction
?roceedings of anything related to :/- hours; is in 64S -'./)0()), #hich only spea1s to a situation
#here the Tenant does not file a Tenant's ,ns#er or Tenant's ,ffidavit, #hich is clearly inapplicale
here, as the Tenant did file such a @pposition to the 6o Cause *viction 6otice>
:). Gpon noncompliance #ith the notice> (a) The landlord or the landlord]s agent may apply y
affidavit of complaint for eviction to the 5ustice court of the to#nship in #hich the d#elling, apartment,
moile home or commercial premises are located or to the district court of the county in #hich the
d#elling, apartment, moile home or commercial premises are located, #hichever has 5urisdiction over
the matter. The "ourt may thereupon issue an orer ire"ting the sheriff or "onsta#le of the "ounty
to remo$e the tenant (ithin 37 hours after re"eipt of the orer. The affidavit must state or
contain...;
So, asent some statutory provision allo#ing the @rder of Summary *viction to result in a
loc1out y the !ashoe County Sheriff's @ffice prior to the 0 days for mailing #here personal service of
the @rder of Summary *viction #as not effectuated, despite #hat !CS@ employee may have
incorrectly (or falsely) asserted in the !CS@'s John Machem's ,ffidavit of Service from, file stamped
6ovemer 7, /'%% (especially #here it is timestamped ->0' pm, 6ovemer %, /'%%, especially #here
the @rder of Summary *viction eMplicitly reads that no such loc1out shall occur prior to )>'' pm on
6ovemer %, /'%%). See, 64C? )()(/)(,)(i&iii), 64C? 9(e).
Interestingly- Ri"har 'ill +no(s his "ase is toast uner NRC! 4D#ED3EDAEDi>iiiE- NRC! JDeE- in
aition to NRC! 88. That is #hy in 4ichard Aill's 6ovemer /%, /'%% Motion for @rder To Sho#
Cause, on page /, Aills resorts to literally grasping at stra#s, imagining that #hat the !ashoe County
Sheriff's @ffice customarily does is someho# automatically codified into mandatory precedent lac1
letter la#. To #it, 4ichard Aill #rote in his Motion <or @rder To Sho# Cause that> :.ACTS
S'OWINA CONT*/!T O. CO0RT 9. *KA=+=T % #as served on Coughlin on 6ovemer F /'%%
y the !ashoe County Sheriffs Department, y posting same on the front door of the property in the
manner customary for evictions in !ashoe County. The loc1s to the premises #ere changed at that
time, therey e5ecting and dispossessing Coughlin of possession of the ?roperty.; <urther, therein
4ichard Aill admits that the loc1out occurred at ->0' pm, as indicated in #riting in the !CS@'s
Machem's ,ffidavit of Service, contra to the mandate of Judge SferraJJa's @rder of Summary *viction
re3uiring any loc1out to occur after )>'' pm, 6ovemer %, /'%%.
=ndeed, in a Decemer 8
th
, /'%% letter to "andlord, from Tenant (attached as an *Mhiit to
Coughlin's %/.%-.%% filing in %7'8), further issues for the appeal an auguring for a Temporary
4estraining @rder or =n5unction>
:the Court has decided to set another hearing in that 4egard for Decemer /'th, /'%% at
(>-) am. Ao#ever, and very, very curiously (againR) the 4JC could only set the hearing
(despite the statutory requirement in 64S -'./)0(7)&(8) that is occur #ithin %' days of the
filing of my Motion To Contest ?ersonal ?roperty "ien) for %e"em#er 35
th
- 3588 at K=74
am. ,s such = am left in the untenale situation of allo#ing your artificial deadline to pass,
at #hich point you #ill, according to your o#n #ritten #ords, firesale mine and my client's
property, do the same #ith property at %/% 4iver 4oc1 #hich elongs to others, and 5ust
generally destroy heirlooms, 1eepsa1es, office e3uipment, mattress usiness e3uipment and
other materials. I A/ '*R*&Y R*L0*STINA IN WRITINA A WRITT*N
STI!0LATION .RO/ YO0 AAR**INA TO *MT*N% T'* !*RIO% YO0 LAI%
O0T IN YO0R %*C*/&*R 3- 3588 L*TT*R TO /* &Y W'IC' YO0 ASS*RT-
AT !AA* 3 !ARAARA!' 8- T'AT T'* F.INAL %AY ON W'IC' YO0 WILL &*
ALLOW*% TO *NT*R ONTO T'* RIB*R ROCN !RO!*RTY !0RS0ANT TO
T'IS O..*R IS /ON%AY- %*C*/&*R 8K- 3588...: ?lease agree to retract your
artificial Decemer %(, /'%% deadline and place any ne# deadline out at least ) days after
any ruling on the Motion to Contest ?ersonal ?roperty "ien y the 4eno Justice Court,
pursuant to the hearing on that Motion currently set for %e"em#er 35
th
- 3588 at K=74 a.m.
= <G4TA*4 4*S*4$* ,"" MD 4=CATS T@ C@6T*ST @4 ?G4SG* MD 4=CATS
G6D*4 TA* D*<,G"T TA,T SA@G"D A,$* +**6 @4D*4*D ,C,=6ST D@G
?G4SG,6T T@ D@G4 <,="G4 T@ ,??*,4 ,T TA* 6@$*M+*4 //6D, /'%%
A*,4=6C ?4*$=@GS"D S*T =6 TA=S M,TT*4 ,6D <G4TA*4 4*S*4$* M*
4=CAT T@ S**E 4*D4*SS <@4 TA* <,CT TA,T (,S=D* <4@M !A,T*$*4 TA*
6@$*M+*4 //6D, /'%% A*,4=6C !="" +* D**M*D) TA* 4*6@ JGST=C*
C@G4T <,="*D T@ A@"D , A*,4=6C =6 4*S?@6S* T@ MD M@T=@6 =6
C@M?"=,6C* !=TA TA* S?*C=<=C D=CT,T*S <@G6D =6 64S -'./)0(7)&(8),
=6C"GD=6C, +GT 6@T "=M=T*D T@, A,$=6C TA* SA*4=<< ,<<*CT S*4$=C* @<
6@T=C* @< SGCA A*,4=6C.
= received your shameless Decemer /, /'%% letter in the mail F4e> Disposal of personal
property left at %/% 4iver 4oc1, 4eno, 6evadaF. = dispute all contentions or allegations it
contains. ,s = have previously indicated, though, = am under no duty to do so, given your
propensity to attempt to ury the truth in lies and all the time sapping that #ould have on me
should = agree to register my contentions or disagreements #ith your attempts to practice
la#. Dou have failed to provide any proof of any FinventoryingF done on your part or any
itemiJation of charges incurred in relation to such inventorying. <urther, you have een
served a filing ready 64C? %% motion incident to your pernicious attempts to include the
contractor's ill of I%'9' (#hich includes an entry for FfiMing lea1 in the asementF,
something for #hich, there is no reasonale neMus to 64S -'.-9''s dictate calling for
reasonale costs for Finventorying, moving, and storage). Civen that you have already sent
me #ritten ills and demands for rent, starting 6ovemer %, /'%% (something for #hich
4ichard Aill lied to the 4?D @fficers aout at the time of the arrest for alleged trespass on
6ovemer %0th, /'%%, @fficer Carter, 4?D, etc.).

<urther, = sho#ed up to the hearing pursuant to 64S -'./)0(7)&(8). Dou failed to. There is
not issue as to staleness, ut rather #hy a default 5udgment should not have issued in my
favor pursuant to your failure to appear for the hearing. <urther, the %' days called for in
64S -'./)0(7)&(8) (= #ould cite it here for you, ut prefer to see if you can e othered to
actually loo1 up and read that section for the first time all y yourself) certainly are
calculated in a different #ay than ho#ever it is you came to the determination that My
Motion to Contest of 6ovemer %9, /'%% #as FstaleF.
<urther, as found on page / of your Decemer /, /'%% letter, Fthe terms and conditions for
you to enter...are the same as those terms contained in Mr. Aill's email to you dated
6ovemer /), /'%%....F So, under 64S -'./)0(7)&(8) even should your FstaleF argument
hold #ater, = still have /' days from the date you provided #ritten itemiJation of your
charges to move for another hearing to contest your unla#ful rent distraint attempt on a
commercial usiness #here you filed only a 6o Cause 6otice of *viction (oopsR), using a
damn form, no less, #hile illing I/',''' to your client, er, = mean to contest your duious
personal property lien.
TA* /% D,D S,<* A,4+@4 ?*4=@D =S DG* T@ *K?=4* S@@6 !=TA 4*C,4D T@
D@G4 M,=6T,=6=6C TA=S *$=CT=@6 G6D*4 64S -'./)0 D*S?=T* D@G4
*K?4*SS !4=TT*6 ,DM=SS=@6 TA,T =T =6$@"$*S , C@MM*4C=," "*,S*
,6D M*4*"D , 6@ C,GS* 6@T=C* @< *$=CT=@6.G6",!<G" D*T,=6*4. TA*
",! =S C"*,4 =6 TA=S 4*C,4D, A@"D=6C TA,T 6@ C,GS* *$=CT=@6S ,4*
6@T ?*4M=SS=+"* ,C,=6ST C@MM*4C=," T*6,6TS !A*4* <,="G4* T@ ?,D
4*6T =S 6@T ,""*C*D. ,"*4T TA* C@G4T T@ D@G4 T4,6SC4*SS=@6
=MM*D=,T*"D @4 ?4*?,4* T@ D*<*6D ,C,=6ST D@G4 $*K,T=@GS T,CT=S.
<G4TA*4, ?"*,S* ?4@$=D* ?4@@< TA,T D@G 4*C*=$*D D@G4 MD C"=*6T'S
F=6<@4M*D C@6S*6TF !=TA 4*S?*CT T@ TA* $,4=@GS 4=SES D@G !*4*
D4,CC=6C A=M TA4@GCA =6C=D*6T T@ D@G4 F!4@6C S=T* SG4C*4DF @< ,
"*C," 6,TG4*, ie, see1ing a 6o Cause *viction against a commercial tenant, as1ing for
attorney's fees and running up a I/',''' attorney's fees ill #ithin a type of proceeding, a
Summary *viction ?roceeding a la 64S -'./)0, that is eMpressly included amongst those
matters in 6evada's Justice Court (JC4C? 0) that do not allo# for a prevailing party a#ard
of attorney's fees.
<urther, you have apparently een giving a#ay commercial property of mine, including
materials related to the mattress usiness located as %/% 4iver 4oc1 St. Do you #ant to
guess #hether or not = have a video tape of anyone attesting that you did, in fact, give them a
mattress, or do anything elseO Dou 1no#, under Schiff, you, and your client, can e held
valuale for the entire value of either usiness in damages under the #rongful eviction and
other tort.contract ased theories of recovery that #ill e included in the la#suit against you,
as resulte in the (rongful e$i"tion of a seafoo istri#utor in S"hiff- to the tune of
some I0'',''', if memory serves. That may eMtend to personal liaility #ith respect to
your various employees. <G4TA*4, D@G ,4* ,""*C*D"D +@TA !=TAA@"D=6C
,6D D*6D=6C MD ,CC*SS T@ =T*MS M,="*D T@ M*, MD ",! ?4,CT=C*, @4
MD M,TT4*SS +GS=6*SS =6 TA* G6=T*D ST,T*S ?@ST," S*4$=C*, ,
$=@",T=@6 @< <*D*4," ",!. = D*M,6D D@G M,E* TA*S* =T*MS
,$,=",+"* T@ M* ,T @6C*.

Dou are allegedly #ithholding items addressed to me that #ere sent in the Gnited States
Mail. Some of these pieces of mail involve important and eMigent client matters.
,dditionally, your office refused to return my state issued driver's license for the entire
period et#een 6ovemer %)th, through 6ovemer //nd, #hich is another criminal la#
violation, = elieve. = do not elieve you have any asis for a lien on these items. <urther,
you are #ithholding items of mine that #ere not at the property at the time of your illegal
loc1out. Dou have een informed as to #hat these items are, and = elieve you are guilty of
a criminal la# violation for #ithholding them. ?lease ma1e them availale to me at once.
?lease do not attempt to ma1e phone calls or voice mails to me. ?lease communicate to me
only in #riting.;
Judge SferraJJa apparently made an @rder on %'./7./'%% #hich, essentially, converted to the
Court all the money = had availale to me, then, shortly thereafter, he made an another @rder denying a
re3uest for ?ulication of Transcript at ?ulic *Mpense, claiming that the %%.7./'%% @rder returning the
money reclassified at that point as a Supersedeas +ond (if the court is holding a Supersedeas +ond,
doesn't that mean Stay must e in place, as such, #ouldn't a trespass charge e a legal fictionO). 64S
-'./)0(9) eMplicitly prevents this (and the 4JC #ill need to enact and get approved its o#n version of
"as $egas's Justice Court 4ule -- if it #ants to order tenants in a Summary *Mecution, er, Summary
*viction proceeding to pay monies into the court or other#ise reclassify previous order for rent escro#
and deem monies previously sumitted as :,ppeal +ond;s or other types of +onds. Simply put, the
4JC must return the I//7) = #as improperly forced to deposit into the court as rent escro#. <urther,
the =<? granted in this case should apply to the ,ppeal +ond or any other fees or onds re3uired y this
or any other court. This is also a #histle lo#er and or 2ui Tam action, as the Justice Court should not
e leveraged as a clu to ash tenants senseless 5ust ecause attorney's li1e 4ichard Aill, *s3. and
Casey +a1er, *s3. find it profitale. 2uit having filing office employees ully tenants into coming
do#n and eing served notices y the filing office that they la# in 6evada re3uires landlord or
landlord's attorney to service and file proof of. Don't act li1e JC44T allo# it, see 4ule / of JC44T,
asically, JC44T doesn't apply to landlord tenant action and 3uit acting li1e the 4JC gets to apply
:house rules;, #ithout getting them printed for the pulic and approved y the Supreme Court of
6evada. See 4ule 8% and 80 of the State of 6evada's Justice Court 4ules of Civil ?rocedure.F .rom
Coughlin's 83C87C88 < Amene Case Appeal Statement- Statement of Re"or on Appeal- /otion
to Set Asie *$i"tion Orer- *mergen"y *, !arte /otion for Orer Shortening TimeG
%*SIANATION O. R*COR% AN% STAT*/*NT O. !OINTS ON AppealGAN% NOTIC* O.
INT*NT TO .IL* &RI*.G Statement of !ro"eeingsG C*RTI.ICAT* O. NO
TRANSCRI!TGNOTIC* O. !OSTINA AN% ACC*!TANC* O. S0!*RS*%*ASCCOST
&ON% ON A!!*AL:- (hi"h (as timely- espe"ially "onsiering there (as no F)ugment' in$ol$e
suffi"inet to in$o+e NRS 75.915 or N?CRC! ;9 or ;9ADaED7E- not to mention that Couglin (as
grante I!. status #y ?uge Sferra@@a- e$en as to the 237 appeal fee in the R?C- therefore- no
Fappeal #on: (as e$en require of Couglin Dsee ?uge Steinheimmer's 88C1C88 enial of
Coughlin's /otion to !ro"ee In .orma !auperis in CB88>59548 (herein she ma+es "lear she
la"+s )urisi"tion to (ai$e su"h Fappeal #on: for "osts Dsu"h is pro$in"e of the R?C- an #y
granting Coughlin's I!.- ?uge Sferra@@a there#y rule that Coughlin (oul not #e require to
file su"h a 2345 appeal #on as set out in N?CRC! ;9- as Couglin (as Fe,empte #y la(: from
su"h requirement- an regarless- e$en (here Coughlin su#)e"t to su"h #on require in
N?CRC! ;9- parti"ularly (here Fsecurit- shall not be re.uired of an appellant who is not sub3ect
to costs&. ?uge Sferra@@a's ruling on 85C34C88 ne"essarily mae it so that Coughlin ha D#y the
R?C retaining his 23-3;4 e$en after the 85C34C88 Trial- Ffiled a supersedeas bond or other
undertaking which includes securit- for the pa-ment of costs on appeal- in ciil cases a #on for
"osts on appeal or equi$alent se"urity shall #e file #y the appellant in the )usti"e "ourt (ith the
noti"e of appeal:- an therefore- either su"h F#on on appeal' (as in"orporate into the
superseeas #on that the R?C retaining Coughlin's 23-3;4 must ha$e ne"essarily #een Dnothing
(oul )ustify ?uge Sferra@@a ma+ing Coughlin's Fappeal #on' D(hi"h is meant only to "o$er
the F"osts: Die- filing fee- et"....rent is not a "ost...E a staggering nearly ten times (as it is set at in
N?CRC! ;9- an there e,ists no authority for any "ontention that ?uge Sferra@@a ha the
)urisi"tion ne"essary to support any su"h ruling. Its a trou#ling ruling too- +in of a Fthe Court
is going to ta+e ten times the amount ne"essary- an still refuse you your stay- espite you #eing
statutorily entitle to the automati"e stay set out in NRS 75.917- parti"ularly (here there is no
F)ugment:- gi$en this (as only a summary e$i"tion...or FTrial: Duner N?CRC! 85KE- e,"ept for
the fa"t that you in't get your 35 ays to respon to a Summons an Complaint- an- really- the
lanlor (asn't e$en require to file a lanlor's affia$it "ontainign all that require #y NRS
75.347D3E e$en to this ay...sorry this lea to a terri#le run in your life of 84 arrests an 1
e$i"tions Dmany of (hi"h the R?C has prolonge or e,a"er#ate uner e,"eptionally questiona#le
"ir"umstan"es DClifton- !earson- S"hroeer- an Sferra@@a openly $iolating Ne$aa la( per NRS
8.395- 8.394- NRS 75.349D4E- an NRS 8;1.754- in aition to %%A Young malfeasan"e prati"ally
#eing "heere #y R?C ?uges- as (as the WC!% an &ru"e Linsay's e,tremely efi"ient
Frepresentation:- mu"h suspe"t "onut #y R?C &ailiffs an Cler+s- et".E. Also- neither &a+er nor
'ill e$er "hallenge Coughlin's #on per N?CRC! ;9's= FAfter a #on for "osts on appeal is
file- a responent may raise for etermination #y the )usti"e "ourt o#)e"tions to the form of the
#on or to the suffi"ien"y of the surety.:
N?CRC! ;9= F&ON% 0/1 C/)#) ON A!!*AL

2nless an appellant is e+empted b- law- or has filed a supersedeas bond or other undertaking
which includes securit- for the pa-ment of costs on appeal- in ciil cases a #on for "osts on appeal
or equi$alent se"urity shall #e file #y the appellant in the )usti"e "ourt (ith the noti"e of appealG
but securit- shall not be re.uired of an appellant who is not sub3ect to costs. The bond or e.uialent
securit- shall be in the sum or alue of $240 unless the 3ustice court fi+es a different amount. A
#on for "osts on appeal shall ha$e suffi"ient surety- an it or any equi$alent se"urity shall #e
"onitione to se"ure the payment of "osts if the appeal is finally ismisse or the )ugment
affirme- or of su"h "osts as the istri"t "ourt may ire"t if the )ugment is moifie. If a #on or
equi$alent se"urity in the sum or $alue of 2345 is gi$en- no approal thereof is necessar-. After a
#on for "osts on appeal is file- a responent may raise for etermination #y the )usti"e "ourt
o#)e"tions to the form of the #on or to the suffi"ien"y of the surety. The pro$isions of Rule ;9A
apply to a surety #on upon a #on gi$en pursuant to this rule.:
<urther, +a1er himself admits in his ,nsering +rief that %7'8 #as not a :formal proceeding;
(#hich #ould mean Juge SferraJJa's 6ote @rder' of %/.//.%% indicating that Coughlin #ould not
recieve a stay due to not having made a deposit :#itihin %' days; (#hich is not true given the 4JC
retain Coughlin's escro#, and SferraJJa himself ruled on %'./).%% (see 6JC4C? 4ule 70+()> : ()P
superseeas #on> <orm and *ffect.PP... 5n all cases where a bond is re.uired b- these rules, a
deposit in the court below of the amount of the 3udgment appealed from and such additional amount
as ma- be specified b- the 3ustice of the court b- which the 3udgment was rendered, shall be
e.uialent to filing the bond,;) that such #as Couglhin's :ond;...and upon such escro# eing
returned to Coughlin, 4JC Cler1s (including Cherl and Christine *ric1son, refused to accept from
Coughlin, on several attempts the I/)' Coughlin attempted to deposit as a supersedeas ond (see
Coughlin's %%./%.%% email to Chief Civil Cler1 Stancil). (a)P<ailure to <ile or =nsufficiency of
#on.PP=f a #on on appeal or a superseeas #on is not filed #ithin the time specified, the appeal
#ill e su5ect to such sanctions as provided in 4ule 79. =f the #on filed is found insufficient, and if
the action is not -et docketed with the appellate court, a bond ma- be filed at such time before the
action is so docketed, as ma- be fi+ed b- the 3ustice court. "fter the action is so docketed, application
for leae to file a sufficient bond ma- be made onl- in the appellate court.; <urther
6JC4C? 70,(a)(-)>P :n cases inoling an appeal b- the defendant of an order of eiction
in a formal proceeding- su"h appeal shall not stay the e,e"ution of the 3udgment - unless- no
later than 10 da-s after the filing of a notice of appeal - the person shall e,e"ute an file with
the court or 3ustice an unerta+ing to the plaintiff- (ith t(o or more sureties- in an
amount to be fi+ed b- the court or 3ustice, but which shall not be less than twice the amount
of the 3udgment and costs - to the effe"t that- if the 3udgment appeale from #e affirme or
the appeal #e ismisse- the appellant (ill pay the 3udgment an the "ost of appeal- the
value of the use and occupation of the property, an amages )ustly a""ruing to the plaintiff
uring the penen"y of the appeal. 0pon ta+ing the appeal an filing the unerta+ing- all
further pro"eeings in the "ase shall #e staye.
!henever an appeal is perfected, an a #on gi$en as pro$ie #y paragraphs D8E- D3E-
D9E an D7E herein- it shall sta- all further proceedings in the court below, upon the 3udgment
or order appealed from or upon matters embraced therein- e,"ept as hereinafter spe"ifie.
'o(e$er- the court below ma- proceed upon an- other matter included in the action or
proceeding and not affected b- the 3udgment or order appealed from N ...
In "ases not pro$ie for in D8E- D3E- D9E or D7E a#o$e- the gi$ing of an appeal bond -
uner the pro$isions of Rule ;9- shall sta- proceedings in the court below upon the 3udgment
or order appealed from- eMcept that #here it directs the same of perishale property, the court
elo# may order the property to e sold and the proceeds thereof to e deposited to aide y
the )ugment of the appellate court, and eMcept #here the appellate court may other#ise direct
upon such terms as it may in its discretion impose.

()Psuperseeas #on> <orm and *ffect.PP... 5n all cases where a bond is re.uired b- these
rules, a deposit in the court below of the amount of the 3udgment appealed from and such
additional amount as ma- be specified b- the 3ustice of the court b- which the 3udgment was
rendered, shall be e.uialent to filing the bond , and in all cases the #on or deposit may e
#aived y the #ritten consent of the appellee filed in said action or proceeding.
'hen a proper bond to sta- proceedings is filed, it shall sta- further proceedings ...and if
an e+ecution or other order shall hae been issued to the sheriff, coroner, or elisor, the
person shall return the same, with the cause therefor, and his or her proceedings thereunder,
upon receiving from the cler! or justice a notice of the sta- of proceedings.

:supersedeas ond
<rom> Hach Coughlin (JachcoughlinShotmail.com)
Sent> Mon %%./%.%% 8>-9 ?M
To> 1stancilS#ashoecounty.us
Ms. Stancil,
= may e unale to post the supersedeas ond in time if = am not provided my #allet, state
issued, identifcation, etc. y mr. Aill. <urther la# of the case applies to Judge SferraJJa's
earlier determinatino of the amount, and under JC4C? 70 and nrs -'.08' its not clear #hat the
ond should e, if any, as #ell as #hether the eMecution should have een stayed during the
period Judge SferraJJa continued to hold the I/,/7). = see1 clarification from you and the
4JC.
Than1 Dou,
Hach Coughlin, *s3.
%/% 4iver 4oc1 St.
4eno, 6$ 8()'%
77) 008 8%%8
"icensed in 6evada
a stay
<rom> Hach Coughlin (JachcoughlinShotmail.com)
Sent> Thu %%./-.%% 0>%( ,M
To> 1stancilS#ashoecounty.us
http>..la#lirary.nevada5udiciary.us.documents.landlordTenant<orms'9%/."andlordWTenant<or
msW0%to09.,ppealSummary*victionJusticeToDistrictCourt.pdf
my I//7) #as ruled the supersedeas ond, and retained y the court, yet the eviction #as not
stayed...rent #as less than I%''', = am confused.
64S -'.08' ?rovisions governing appeals. *ither party may, #ithin %' days, appeal from the
5udgment rendered. +ut an appeal y the defendant shall not stay the eMecution of the
5udgment, unless, #ithin the %' days, the defendant shall eMecute and file #ith the court or
5ustice the defendant]s underta1ing to the plaintiff, #ith t#o or more sureties, in an amount to
e fiMed y the court or 5ustice, ut #hich shall not e less than t#ice the amount of the
5udgment and costs, to the effect that, if the 5udgment appealed from e affirmed or the appeal
e dismissed, the appellant #ill pay the 5udgment and the cost of appeal, the value of the use
and occupation of the property, and damages 5ustly accruing to the plaintiff during the
pendency of the appeal. Gpon ta1ing the appeal and filing the underta1ing, all further
proceedings in the case shall e stayed.
[%(%% C?, U 9)(N 4" U )9'%N 6C" U (%-8\
64S -'.08) Stay of eMecution upon appealN duty of tenant #ho retains possession of
premises to pay rent during stay. Gpon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to 64S
-'./)0>
%. *Mcept as other#ise provided in this susection, a stay of eMecution may e otained y
filing #ith the trial court a ond in the amount of I/)' to cover the eMpected costs on appeal. =n
an action concerning a lease of commercial property or any other property for #hich the
monthly rent eMceeds I%,''', the court may, upon its o#n motion or that of a party, and upon a
sho#ing of good cause, order an additional ond to e posted to cover the eMpected costs on
appeal. , surety upon the ond sumits to the 5urisdiction of the appellate court and irrevocaly
appoints the cler1 of that court as the surety]s agent upon #hom papers affecting the surety]s
liaility upon the ond may e served. "iaility of a surety may e enforced, or the ond may
e released, on motion in the appellate court #ithout independent action.
/. , tenant #ho retains possession of the premises that are the su5ect of the appeal during the
pendency of the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount provided in the underlying
contract et#een the tenant and the landlord as it ecomes due. =f the tenant fails to pay such
rent, the landlord may initiate ne# proceedings for a summary eviction y serving the tenant
#ith a ne# notice pursuant to 64S -'./)0.
appeal rief date re3uest pursuant to 6. S. Ct. instrucMtion
<rom> Hach Coughlin (JachcoughlinShotmail.com)
Sent> Thu %%./-.%% 0>0- ,M
To> cfrandenSmail.co.#ashoe.nv.usN 1stancilS#ashoecounty.us
% attachment
,ppealSummary*victionJusticeToDistrictCourt.pdf (%((.% E+)
Ai Mr. <randen,
= am follo#ing the directions of the 6evada Supreme Court in contacting you and ecause =
1eep trying to file these things in the
4eno Justice Court ut 1eep getting them handed ac1 to me and escorted out the uilding y a
+ro#n Shirt. There #as an Summary *viction @rder that 1ept my I//7) rent escro# deposit,
reclassifying it as a supersedeas.appeal ond...ut no stay #as granted.....64S -'.08) #ould
seem to go against that....6o# my client file are eing held under an unla#ful rent distraint and
my emergency motion to Judge +erry has not een ruled on and Judge Steinheimmer denied
my =<?....
http>..la#lirary.nevada5udiciary.us.documents.landlordTenant<orms'9%/."andlordWTenant<or
msW0%to09.,ppealSummary*victionJusticeToDistrictCourt.pdf
There are t#o #ays to do this>
%. =f there #as a court reporter recording your trial in Justice Court,
order a copy of the transcript (there may e a cost to getting it) and
file it #ith the Justice CourtN
/. =f there #as no court reporter at your trial, file the Certificate of 6o
Transcript, <orm B0)N and a Statement of ?roceedings, <orm B09,
#ith the Justice Court. 6ote that you must serve your version to
the "andlord for his.her o5ections, and then you must sumit oth
to the Justice Court. See JC4C? 7-.
ST*? TA4**> <="=6C TA* ,??*"",T* +4=*<
The Justice Court Cler1 should notify all parties #hen the record has een
transmitted to the District Court.
0
Call the court cler1 periodically to see if your case has
een given to the District Court. !hen the case has een given to the District Court,
contact the cler1 of the District Court that has your case and as1 #hen your appellate
rief must e filed #ith the District Court. =f you are unale for any reason to find out a
specific date to file your appellate rief, you must file it in the District Court #ithin 0'
days after your case has een given to the District Court. Chec1 your local rules for
your District Court regarding limitations on the length of your rief.
6ote> The District Court can refuse to accept riefs and simply decide your appeal on
the record sumitted.
=n #riting your appellate rief>
%. Do not argue disputed factsN and
/. ,rgue only mista1es of la# that ma1e a difference.
The 5udge in your summary eviction hearing has the authority to decide factual
issues. To argue any factual issue, the 5udge]s decision must e :aritrary and
capricious; or #ithout any support. This standard is very difficult to meet, and the
District Court 5udge gives great #eight to the factual decisions of the Justice Court
5udge.

<rom> JachcoughlinShotmail.com
To> 1stancilS#ashoecounty.us
Su5ect> a stay
Date> Thu, /- 6ov /'%% '0>%(>)9 &'8''
http>..la#lirary.nevada5udiciary.us.documents.landlordTenant<orms'9%/."andlordWTenant<or
msW0%to09.,ppealSummary*victionJusticeToDistrictCourt.pdf
my I//7) #as ruled the supersedeas ond, and retained y the court, yet the eviction #as not
stayed...rent #as less than I%''', = am confused.
64S -'.08' ?rovisions governing appeals. *ither party may, #ithin %' days, appeal from the
5udgment rendered. +ut an appeal y the defendant shall not stay the eMecution of the
5udgment, unless, #ithin the %' days, the defendant shall eMecute and file #ith the court or
5ustice the defendant]s underta1ing to the plaintiff, #ith t#o or more sureties, in an amount to
e fiMed y the court or 5ustice, ut #hich shall not e less than t#ice the amount of the
5udgment and costs, to the effect that, if the 5udgment appealed from e affirmed or the appeal
e dismissed, the appellant #ill pay the 5udgment and the cost of appeal, the value of the use
and occupation of the property, and damages 5ustly accruing to the plaintiff during the
pendency of the appeal. Gpon ta1ing the appeal and filing the underta1ing, all further
proceedings in the case shall e stayed.
[%(%% C?, U 9)(N 4" U )9'%N 6C" U (%-8\
64S -'.08) Stay of eMecution upon appealN duty of tenant #ho retains possession of
premises to pay rent during stay. Gpon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to 64S
-'./)0>
%. *Mcept as other#ise provided in this susection, a stay of eMecution may e otained y
filing #ith the trial court a ond in the amount of I/)' to cover the eMpected costs on appeal. =n
an action concerning a lease of commercial property or any other property for #hich the
monthly rent eMceeds I%,''', the court may, upon its o#n motion or that of a party, and upon a
sho#ing of good cause, order an additional ond to e posted to cover the eMpected costs on
appeal. , surety upon the ond sumits to the 5urisdiction of the appellate court and irrevocaly
appoints the cler1 of that court as the surety]s agent upon #hom papers affecting the surety]s
liaility upon the ond may e served. "iaility of a surety may e enforced, or the ond may
e released, on motion in the appellate court #ithout independent action.
/. , tenant #ho retains possession of the premises that are the su5ect of the appeal during the
pendency of the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount provided in the underlying
contract et#een the tenant and the landlord as it ecomes due. =f the tenant fails to pay such
rent, the landlord may initiate ne# proceedings for a summary eviction y serving the tenant
#ith a ne# notice pursuant to 64S -'./)0.
:<!> appeal rief date re3uest pursuant to 6. S. Ct. instrucMtion
<rom> Hach Coughlin (JachcoughlinShotmail.com)
Sent> Thu %%./-.%% 0>-7 ,M
To> stuttleS#ashoecounty.us
% attachment
,ppealSummary*victionJusticeToDistrictCourt.pdf (%((.% E+)
Mr. Tuttle,
the n s ct directions say to contact you and as1
ST*? TA4**> <="=6C TA* ,??*"",T* +4=*< The Justice Court Cler1 should notify all
parties #hen the record has een transmitted to the District Court. 0 Call the court cler1
periodically to see if your case has een given to the District Court. !hen the case has een
given to the District Court, contact the cler1 of the District Court that has your case and as1
#hen your appellate rief must e filed #ith the District Court. =f you are unale for any reason
to find out a specific date to file your appellate rief, you must file it in the District Court
#ithin 0' days after your case has een given to the District Court. Chec1 your local rules for
your District Court regarding limitations on the length of your rief. 6ote> The District Court
can refuse to accept riefs and simply decide your appeal on the record sumitted.
So = am #riting to in3uire aout that.
Sincerely,
Hach Coughlin
?S
ST*? T!@> TA* 4*C@4D <4@M TA* T4=," The first pleading, #hich must e filed in all
appeals, is the Designation of 4ecord and Statement of ?oints on ,ppeal and 6otice of =ntent to
<ile +rief, <orm B0-. The portion designating the record simply s#eeps all documents from the
Justice Court proceedings into the appeal. The second section, stating points on appeal, re3uires
you to list the reasons for the appeal. The third part notifies the court of your intention to file an
appellate rief. Dou must get a copy of the trial record and file it #ith the Justice Court #ithin
%' days of the date you file the 6otice of ,ppeal. There are t#o #ays to do this> %. =f there #as
a court reporter recording your trial in Justice Court, order a copy of the transcript (there may
e a cost to getting it) and file it #ith the Justice CourtN /. =f there #as no court reporter at your
trial, file the Certificate of 6o Transcript, <orm B0)N and a Statement of ?roceedings, <orm
B09, #ith the Justice Court. 6ote that you must serve your version to the "andlord for his.her
o5ections, and then you must sumit oth to the Justice Court. See JC4C? 7-.

Ao#ever, the second time = tried to sumit the Certificate of 6o Transcript (the first time a
+ro#n Shirt named SeMton #ent all clu ouncer on me) 6ot only did +ro#n Shirt SeMton
stamp out my access to 5ustice #ith his cold cruel Jac1oot, ut Drema told me that = couldn't
file it ecause the 4JC audio records the proceeding and = could pay the I%,''' to the
FrecommendedF transcriptionist to transcrie ) hours of proceedings, #hich, given the industry
standard of et#een / to 0 hours of transcription #or1 for every hour of hearing, #ould put the
transcriptionist into a higher taM rac1et per hour than me, that's for sure. ,ny#ays, the 6. S.
Ct instructions do not 5ie #ith #hat Drema said, so....<urther, Judge SferraJJa entered an
@rder in response to a Motino to ?roduce Transcript at ?ulic *Mpense that asically said =
#ould need to have t#o loan shar1s rea1 oth my legs and say they #ould #ac1 me neMt
#ee1 if = didn't get the rest to them, and #here = has asolutely no money to my name, efore
Judge SferraJJa #ould even egin ot thin1 aout approving the @rder ased on need or
indigency.
<rom> JachcoughlinShotmail.com
To> cfrandenSmail.co.#ashoe.nv.usN 1stancilS#ashoecounty.us
Su5ect> appeal rief date re3uest pursuant to 6. S. Ct. instrucMtion
Date> Thu, /- 6ov /'%% '0>0->0/ &'8''
Ai Mr. <randen,
= am follo#ing the directions of the 6evada Supreme Court in contacting you and ecause =
1eep trying to file these things in the
4eno Justice Court ut 1eep getting them handed ac1 to me and escorted out the uilding y a
+ro#n Shirt. There #as an Summary *viction @rder that 1ept my I//7) rent escro# deposit,
reclassifying it as a supersedeas.appeal ond...ut no stay #as granted.....64S -'.08) #ould
seem to go against that....6o# my client file are eing held under an unla#ful rent distraint and
my emergency motion to Judge +erry has not een ruled on and Judge Steinheimmer denied
my =<?....
http>..la#lirary.nevada5udiciary.us.documents.landlordTenant<orms'9%/."andlordWTenant<or
msW0%to09.,ppealSummary*victionJusticeToDistrictCourt.pdf
There are t#o #ays to do this>
%. =f there #as a court reporter recording your trial in Justice Court,
order a copy of the transcript (there may e a cost to getting it) and
file it #ith the Justice CourtN
/. =f there #as no court reporter at your trial, file the Certificate of 6o
Transcript, <orm B0)N and a Statement of ?roceedings, <orm B09,
#ith the Justice Court. 6ote that you must serve your version to
the "andlord for his.her o5ections, and then you must sumit oth
to the Justice Court. See JC4C? 7-.
ST*? TA4**> <="=6C TA* ,??*"",T* +4=*<
The Justice Court Cler1 should notify all parties #hen the record has een
transmitted to the District Court.
0
Call the court cler1 periodically to see if your case has
een given to the District Court. !hen the case has een given to the District Court,
contact the cler1 of the District Court that has your case and as1 #hen your appellate
rief must e filed #ith the District Court. =f you are unale for any reason to find out a
specific date to file your appellate rief, you must file it in the District Court #ithin 0'
days after your case has een given to the District Court. Chec1 your local rules for
your District Court regarding limitations on the length of your rief.
6ote> The District Court can refuse to accept riefs and simply decide your appeal on
the record sumitted.
=n #riting your appellate rief>
%. Do not argue disputed factsN and
/. ,rgue only mista1es of la# that ma1e a difference.
The 5udge in your summary eviction hearing has the authority to decide factual
issues. To argue any factual issue, the 5udge]s decision must e :aritrary and
capricious; or #ithout any support. This standard is very difficult to meet, and the
District Court 5udge gives great #eight to the factual decisions of the Justice Court
5udge.

<rom> JachcoughlinShotmail.com
To> 1stancilS#ashoecounty.us
Su5ect> a stay
Date> Thu, /- 6ov /'%% '0>%(>)9 &'8''
http>..la#lirary.nevada5udiciary.us.documents.landlordTenant<orms'9%/."andlordWTenant<or
msW0%to09.,ppealSummary*victionJusticeToDistrictCourt.pdf
my I//7) #as ruled the supersedeas ond, and retained y the court, yet the eviction #as not
stayed...rent #as less than I%''', = am confused.
64S -'.08' ?rovisions governing appeals. *ither party may, #ithin %' days, appeal from the
5udgment rendered. +ut an appeal y the defendant shall not stay the eMecution of the
5udgment, unless, #ithin the %' days, the defendant shall eMecute and file #ith the court or
5ustice the defendant]s underta1ing to the plaintiff, #ith t#o or more sureties, in an amount to
e fiMed y the court or 5ustice, ut #hich shall not e less than t#ice the amount of the
5udgment and costs, to the effect that, if the 5udgment appealed from e affirmed or the appeal
e dismissed, the appellant #ill pay the 5udgment and the cost of appeal, the value of the use
and occupation of the property, and damages 5ustly accruing to the plaintiff during the
pendency of the appeal. Gpon ta1ing the appeal and filing the underta1ing, all further
proceedings in the case shall e stayed.
64S -'.08) Stay of eMecution upon appealN duty of tenant #ho retains possession of
premises to pay rent during stay. Gpon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to 64S
-'./)0>
%. *Mcept as other#ise provided in this susection, a stay of eMecution may e otained y
filing #ith the trial court a ond in the amount of I/)' to cover the eMpected costs on appeal. =n
an action concerning a lease of commercial property or any other property for #hich the
monthly rent eMceeds I%,''', the court may, upon its o#n motion or that of a party, and upon a
sho#ing of good cause, order an additional ond to e posted to cover the eMpected costs on
appeal. , surety upon the ond sumits to the 5urisdiction of the appellate court and irrevocaly
appoints the cler1 of that court as the surety]s agent upon #hom papers affecting the surety]s
liaility upon the ond may e served. "iaility of a surety may e enforced, or the ond may
e released, on motion in the appellate court #ithout independent action.
/. , tenant #ho retains possession of the premises that are the su5ect of the appeal during
the pendency of the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount provided in the
underlying contract et#een the tenant and the landlord as it ecomes due. =f the tenant fails to
pay such rent, the landlord may initiate ne# proceedings for a summary eviction y serving the
tenant #ith a ne# notice pursuant to 64S -'./)0.;
6JC4C? 4G"*P70+.PP&ON%S_M=SC*"",6*@GS ?4@$=S=@6S

(a)P<ailure to <ile or =nsufficiency of #on.PP=f a #on on appeal or a superseeas #on is
not filed #ithin the time specified, the appeal #ill e su5ect to such sanctions as provided in
4ule 79. =f the #on filed is found insufficient, and if the action is not -et docketed with the
appellate court, a bond ma- be filed at such time before the action is so docketed , as ma- be
fi+ed b- the 3ustice court. "fter the action is so docketed, application for leae to file a
sufficient bond ma- be made onl- in the appellate court .
,s to +a1er's argument that the alleged failure y Coughlin to spea1 over Judge
SferraJJa's cursory denial of even the thought of a stay on %'./).%%> :6JC4C? 4G"* -9.
*KC*?T=@6S G66*C*SS,4D <ormal eMceptions to rulings or orders of the court are
unnecessaryN ut for all purposes for #hich an eMception has heretofore een necessary it is
sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, ma1es
1no#n to the court the action #hich the party desires the court to ta1e or the party]s o5ection
to the action of the court and the party]s grounds thereforN and, if a party has no opportunity to
o5ect to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the asence of an o5ection does not thereafter
pre5udice the party.;
Judge <lanagan's 0.0'.%/ @rder clearly #rong #here is reads, on page )'s footnote )> :
Merliss sought a personal property lien for storage of Coughlin's personal elongings in
the ?roperty...Coughlin filed a motion to contest the lien. @n Decemer /%, /'%%, Judge
SferraJJa ordered Coughlin to pay to Merliss I-8'.'' as Ffair and reasonale
compensationF for Merliss's storage of his personal elongings....also granted Coughlin
access to the ?roperty to remove his personal elongings y Decemer /0, /'%% )>''
p.m. Coughlin failed to do so. ,s a result, Merliss hired a contractor to dispose of
Coughlin's personal elongings. Coughlin appealed.... As a preliminary matter-
ho(e$er this Court notes it is the issue of summary e$i"tion an the ?uge
Sferra@@a's O"to#er 3;- 3588 Orer that presently "on"erns this Court....=n addition,
b ecause Coughlin failed to timel- file his notice of appeal regarding the personal
propert- lien, see 64S -'./)0(8), and because Coughlin*s notice of appeal fails to
identif- an error regarding the court*s procedure in setting a hearing on this issue,
this Court will no consider this issue.);.
Strangely, Judge <lanagan's @rder fails to include a date for the :6otice of
,ppeal; Coughlin filed as to the %/./%.%% @rder in %7'8 (:b ecause Coughlin failed to
timel- file his notice of appeal regarding the personal propert- lien,;), so its a it hard
to tell 5ust ho# it #as :late; or :not timely;). Clearly, Coughlin did file a timely 6otice
of ,ppeal on %/./9.%% (as to the %/./%.%% @rder in %7'8). The 4JC, curiously, failed to
actually transmit the documents listed in the :,ppeal 4eceipt; on page / of the 0 page
%.-.%/ Supplemental to Justice Court ?roceedings it transmitted to the /JDC, despite the
:Certificate of Cler1; (Tuttle's seal, +onnie Cooper's signature) attesting that :true and
correct; copies of the documents listed on the :,ppeal 4eceipt; #ere eing enclosed
there#ith. ,dditionally, #hether or not Coughlin. =ts really not clear at all 5ust #hat
:6otice of ,ppeal; Judge <lanagan is referring to #hen he #rites> :because Coughlin*s
notice of appeal fails to identif- an error regarding the court*s procedure in setting a
hearing on this issue, this Court will no consider this issue.& Coughlin did file
another 6otice of ,ppeal as to the %/./%.%% @rder on /.%.%/...ho#ever, that #as never
transmitted y the 4JC to the /JDC in any Supplemental...so...is that #hat Judge
<lanagan is referring toO =f so, ho# does he 1no# aout it (its not mentioned any#here
in any filingings in C$%%&'09/8)O *Mtra&5udicial or eM parte communciationsO <urther,
Coughlin's %/./9.%% 6otice of ,ppeals of the %/./%.%% @rder certiainly does :identify
and error regarding the court's procedure in setting a hearing on this issue;...ut,
regardless...#hether or not Coughlin had done so, that is not the stanar for (hether
or not an issue or Orer shall #e "onsiere in the appellate "ourt's ruling on an
appeal. There #ere a multitude of asis and issues Coughlin identified in his %/./9.%%
6otice of ,ppeal that presented asis for overturning that order (insufficient evidence,
clearly erroneous, etc., etc.).
6JC4C? 79+ provides that> :,ppeal from formal eiction> Within 85 ays of ser$i"e of
entry of order . !1) 60.7809 1ule :7";6<. <ees> ?ayale upon filing notice of appeal. 4ule
7-+(a)(%). +ond for costs> <iled #ith notice of appeal. 4ule 70. +ond, supersedeas> ,t or after
time of filing notice of appeal. )ta- is effectie when bond filed. 4ule 70,.;
+a1er's o#n ,ns#ering +rief admits that %7'8 #as not a :formal eviction;, and
therefore, 6JC4? 70,(a)(-) does not apply.
+a1er's /./-.%/ ,ns#ering +rief reads> :===. STAN%AR% O. R*BI*W= <OAPn orer
granting summary e$i"tion uner NRS 75.349DJE shoul #e re$ie(e on appeal #ase
upon the stanar for re$ie( of an orer granting summary )ugment uner NRC! 4J
#e"ause these pro"eeings are analogous.,,8. ,nvui, ""C vW C.". Dragon, ""C, %/0 6ev.
/%/,/%),%90 ?.0d -') (/''7). FTo successfully defend against a summary 5udgment motion,
the nonmoving party must transcend the pleadings and, #y affia$it or other amissi#le
e$ien"e- introu"e spe"ifi" fa"ts that sho( a genuine issue of material fa"t.'F Torreala v.
Eesmitis, %/- 6ev. (), %78 ?.0d 7%9 (/''8). , case appealed must not #e trie a n ew.A 10.
!BC1C, :6". <urther, Fa [lo#er court's\ findings #ill not e distured on appeal unless the-
are clearl- erroneous and are not based on substantial eidence.F %%. Ciellini v. Elindt, %%'
6ev. %/'%, %/'-,88) ?./d )-' (%((-) (emphasis added). FThe notice of appeal shall specify
the party or parties ta1ing the appealN shall designate the 5udgment, order or part thereof
appealed from ...,,%/ 6JC4C? 7/( c). F@nly those parts of the 3udgment #hich are included in
the notice of appeal #ill e considered y the appellate Court. %0 4eno 6e#spapers, =nc. v.
+i, 79 6ev. 00/, 00), 0)0 ?./d -)8 (%(9').;
So (and Coughlin #as 5ailed #rongfully for ) days y Judge 6ash Aolmes during the
time period to file a 4eply +rief to +a1er's /./-.%/ ,ns#ering +rief, shortly after Judge 6ash
Aolmes told Coughlin :=f you say the name 4ichard C. Aill one more time you are going out of
here in cuffs, do you understand meO;. Judge Aolmes ruled in her 0.%/.%/ @rder that Coughlin
continually sought to inter5ect Aill's name into the record during the proceedings despite Aill
having no connection thereto. Ao#ever, Aill clearly did have a connection in that the traffic
citations #ere issued to Coughlin outside Aill's la# office, shortly after Aill and Coughlin oth
called the police, upon Aill refusing to give Coughlin ac1 his #allet, driver's license (some
rea1 y 4?D Sargent Tarter not citing Coughlin for failing to have his driver's license on him,
huh...,lso Tarter testified that Coughlin :didn't get the message..; and that he had only #ritten
one other traffic citation in the previous year and :normally; :give people a #arning, ut in the
case of someone li1e you #ho didn't get the message; Tarter gave Coughlin outside Aill's
office. Tarter accused Coughlin of failing to come to a complete stop at the intersection of St.
"aurence and <orrest Street during the trial, yet on the scene Tarter accused Coughlin of eing
aout to turn up <orrest St. to head ac1 to Aill's la# office after Tarter told him to leave the
area.
Coughlin protested that he had no such intention of returning to Aill's office, and that, in
fact, Coughlin #ould een heading up the #rong #ay of the one #ay street, <orrest, bac! to
Aill's la# office at 9)/ <orrest St., #here he to so proceed #here Coughlin #as travelling east
on St. "aurence prior to coming to a complete stop at the intersection of St. "aurence and
<orrest St., shortly after passing a par1ed Sargent Tarter on the south side of St. "aurence.
Tarter indicated he started follo#ing Coughlin upon vie#ing, from his par1ed vanteage point,
Coughlin failing to come to a complete stop at the intersection, ut that's not true. @ne, Tarter's
vehicle #as par1ed to far a#ay from that intersection to have any such vie#point, and t#o,
Tarter proceeded to egin follo#ing Coughlin immediately after Coughlin passed him, Tarter
pulling out and eginning to follo# Coughlin prior to Coughlin even getting to said
intersection. Coughlin clearly rememers coming to a complete stop at said intersection and
noting Sargent Tarter follo#ing directly ehind him, #orried that some police retaliation #as
afoot and ta1ing care to e eMtremely cautious to follo# all rules of the road. 4egardless,
Coughlin #as #ell familar #ith that intersection, having live for a couple years at (0% <orrest
St., and al#ays came to a complete stop there, and loo1ed both #ays, regardless of the fact that
it #as a one way street. Sargent Tarter #as actually duplicitous enough at the trial to attempt to
utiliJe an argument suggesting Coughlin as not telling the truth aout coming to a complete
stop and loo1ing oth #ays in light of <orrest eing a one #ay street. This, despite, on the day
of the citation, Coughlin clearly indicating to Tarter on at least t#o occassions that <orrest is a
one way street, and therefore, it #ould e highly unli1ely Coughlin #as aout to turn left onto
<orrest, against oncoming traffic, 5ust to get ac1 to Aill's office, especially #here Coughlin
#as #ell a#are Tarter #as follo#ing him at that point, and #here Tarter had 5ust told Coughlin
to leave Aill's @ffice.
<urther connection et#een Aill and the /./7.%/ Trial resides in the fact that Aill had the
!CS@ and 4MC Marshals violate courthouse sanctuary rule on /./7.%/ in attempting to have
Coughlin personally served, #hile in the courtroom #ith Judge <lanagan's @rder to Sho#
Cause of /.8.%/, in the same appeal of the same summary eviction from Coughlin's la# office
that resulted in Coughlin's venturing to Aill's office in the first place on the day of Tarter's
citation (#here Coughlin called ahead and told Aill that he #as coming to pic1 up his 1eys,
#allet, client's files, and driver's license, immediately after eing released from three days in
5ail incident to the criminal trespass arrest at Coughlin's former home la# office #here Aill
signed the criminal complaint and lied to the 4?D in order to effect a #rongful arrest. So, it is
clearly incorrect for Judge 6ash Aolmes to find any mention of Aill during that /./7.%/ traffic
citation trial to e irrelevant enough to 5ustify disarring Coughlin and her entering an order,
finding, y the :clear and convicing evidence; standard of proof language from Schaeffer that
ar counsel had fed her earlier that day on the phone, that Coughlin violated a multitude of
4ules of ?rofessional Conduct. =ts eyond shameful #hat has gone on here. =ts een a good
old fashioned !ashoe County Cang +ang. The 1ind 4eno is so #ell 1no#n for. 4eno (%%.
Judges co&signing anything and everything memers of local la# enforcement feel li1e doing.
,nd those memers of la# enforcement 1no# it, and an1 on it, and it results in a lo#er and
lo#er standard of conduct eing perpetuated year after year.
+a1er's /./-.%/ ,ns#ering +rief reads> :===. STAN%AR% O. R*BI*W= <OAPn orer
granting summary e$i"tion uner NRS 75.349DJE shoul #e re$ie(e on appeal #ase
upon the stanar for re$ie( of an orer granting summary )ugment uner NRC! 4J
#e"ause these pro"eeings are analogous.; 8. ,nvui, ""C vW C.". Dragon, ""C, %/0 6ev.
/%/, /%), %90 ?.0d -') (/''7). FTo successfully defend against a summary 5udgment motion,
the nonmoving party must transcend the pleadings and, #y affia$it or other amissi#le
e$ien"e- introu"e spe"ifi" fa"ts that sho( a genuine issue of material fa"t.'F Torreala v.
Eesmitis, %/- 6ev. (), %78 ?.0d 7%9 (/''8). , case appealed must not #e trie a n ew.A 10.
!BC1C, :6". <urther, Fa [lo#er court's\ findings #ill not e distured on appeal unless the-
are clearl- erroneous and are not based on substantial eidence.F %%. Ciellini v. Elindt, %%'
6ev. %/'%, %/'-,88) ?./d )-' (%((-) (emphasis added). FThe notice of appeal shall specify
the party or parties ta1ing the appealN shall designate the 5udgment, order or part thereof
appealed from ...,,%/ 6JC4C? 7/( c). F@nly those parts of the 3udgment #hich are included in
the notice of appeal #ill e considered y the appellate Court. %0 4eno 6e#spapers, =nc. v.
+i, 79 6ev. 00/, 00), 0)0 ?./d -)8 (%(9').;
+a1er purposefully miscited to Ciellini even #here he cited to ,nvui.
/001/87. A"tions for unla(ful etainer.... /001/(%(%8) 4evie# /0013K9. Summary
pro"eeings. 399N953 )urisi"tion in summary pro"eeings- 399N988. >> Warrant to
ispossess- an e,e"ution thereof.
)/+ C.J.S. "andlord Q Tenant U %)79> :K==. 4eentry and 4ecovery of ?ossession y
"andlord C. )tatutor- Dispossession ,roceedings9 )ummar- ,roceedings :. "ppellate
1eiew U %)79. )tandard of reiew !est's Eey 6umer Digest, "andlord and Tenant
/001/(%(%8), 0%)(%), 0%)(0). , decision of the trial court in a summary dispossession
proceeding may e revie#ed for ause of discretion, but under some statutes, a de noo
reiew is conducted. The revie#ing court #ill give #eight to the opinion of the trial court(<6
=\ and #ill not distur an eMercise of discretion y the trial court in the asence of an ause of
the court's discretion.[ <6/\ The appellate court #ill indulge in reasonale presumptions in
support of the findings of the trial court on conflicting evidence[<60\ and in support of the
5udgment appealed from.[<6-\ Gnder some statutes, ho#ever, dispossession proceedings are
triale de novo on appea%.[ <6)) !here there is a trial de novo, the appellate court should
consider the facts of the case (<69\ and render a proper 5udgment.[<67\ !hether the unla#ful
detainer notice re3uirement is calculated in accordance #ith the timing provisions of the civil
rules is a matter of statutory interpretation to e revie#ed de novo.[<68\ ,n order granting a
summary eviction under a lease providing for periodic rent reserved y the month, or any
shorter period, should e revie#ed on appeal ased upon the standard of revie# for an order
granting summary 5udgment, #hich is de novo revie#, ecause such proceedings are
analogous.(<6()
[<6l \ 6.D.&Metropolitan "ife =ns. Co. v. Carroll, -0 Misc. /d 90(, /)% 6.D.S./d 9(0
(,pp. Term %(9-). [<6/\ Ca"&!hipple v. Aaerle, //0 Cal. ,pp. /d -77, 09 Cal. 4ptr. ( ()th
DisR. %(90). 4evie#ing decision regarding issuance of a protective order D.C.&Craham v.
"anier ,ssociates, %( ,.0d 09% (D.C. /'%%). ?lenary revie# of sufficiency of notice to 3uit
Conn.&+ayer v. Sho#motion, =nc., /(/ Conn. 08%,(70 ,./d %//( (/''(). [<60\ ,la.&Ayde v.
=sell, /)- ,la. 070,-8 So. /d -9) (%()'). =l"&!oodson v. +enson, 00' =i=. ,pp. /-8, 7'
6.*./d 7-/ (%st DisR. %(-7). [<6-\=l=.&Mitchell v. Tyler, 00/ ===. ,pp. )77, 79 6.*./d /07 (%st
DisR. %(-7). Mass.&Staples v. Collins, 0/% Mass. --(, 70 6.*./d 7/( (%(-7). [<6)\ ,la.&Ayde
v. =sell, /)- ,la. 070,-8 So. /d -9) (%()'). Mo.&Conley v. Dee, /-9 S.!./d 08) (Mo. Ct.
,pp. %()/). [<69) ,riJ.&@lds +ros. "umer Co. v. 4ushing, 9- ,riJ. %((,%97 ?./d 0(- (%(-9).
[<67\ ,riJ.&@lds +ros. "umer Co. v. 4ushing, 9- ,riJ. %((, %97 ?./d 0(- (%(-9). Mo.&Conley
v. Dee, /-9 S.!./d 08) (Mo. CR. ,pp. %()/). [<68\ !ash.&Christensen v. *lls#orth, %9/ !ash.
/d 09), %70 ?.0d //8 (/''7). [<6(\ 6ev.&,nvui, ""C v. C.". Dragon, ""C, %/0 6ev. /%/,%90
?.0d -') (/''7).;
)/+ C.J.S. "andlord Q Tenant U %)79> :K==. 4eentry and 4ecovery of ?ossession y
"andlord C. )tatutor- Dispossession ,roceedings9 )ummar- ,roceedings :. "ppellate
1eiew U %)79. )tandard of reiew !est's Eey 6umer Digest, "andlord and Tenant
/001/(%(%8), 0%)(%), 0%)(0). Gnder some statutes, ho#ever, dispossession proceedings are
triale de novo on appea%. ,la.&Ayde v. =sell, /)- ,la. 070,-8 So. /d -9) (%()'). Mo.&Conley
v. Dee, /-9 S.!./d 08) (Mo. Ct. ,pp. %()/). !here there is a trial de novo, the appellate court
should consider the facts of the case . ,riJ.&@lds +ros. "umer Co. v. 4ushing, 9- ,riJ.
%((,%97 ?./d 0(- (%(-9).\ and render a proper 5udgment. ,riJ.&@lds +ros. "umer Co. v.
4ushing, 9- ,riJ. %((, %97 ?./d 0(- (%(-9). Mo.&Conley v. Dee, /-9 S.!./d 08) (Mo. CR.
,pp. %()/). !hether the unla#ful detainer notice re3uirement is calculated in accordance #ith
the timing provisions of the civil rules is a matter of statutory interpretation to e revie#ed de
novo. !ash.&Christensen v. *lls#orth, %9/ !ash. /d 09), %70 ?.0d //8 (/''7). ,n order
granting a summary eviction under a lease providing for periodic rent reserved y the month, or
any shorter period, should e revie#ed on appeal ased upon the standard of revie# for an
order granting summary 5udgment, #hich is de novo revie#, ecause such proceedings are
analogous. ,nvui, ""C v. C.". Dragon, ""C, %/0 6ev. /%/, %90 ?.0d -') (/''7).
[<6l \ 6.D.&Metropolitan "ife =ns. Co. v. Carroll, -0 Misc. /d 90(, /)% 6.D.S./d 9(0
(,pp. Term %(9-). [<6/\ Ca"&!hipple v. Aaerle, //0 Cal. ,pp. /d -77, 09 Cal. 4ptr. ( ()th
DisR. %(90). 4evie#ing decision regarding issuance of a protective order D.C.&Craham v.
"anier ,ssociates, %( ,.0d 09% (D.C. /'%%). ?lenary revie# of sufficiency of notice to 3uit
Conn.&+ayer v. Sho#motion, =nc., /(/ Conn. 08%,(70 ,./d %//( (/''(). [<60\ ,la.&Ayde v.
=sell, /)- ,la. 070,-8 So. /d -9) (%()'). =l"&!oodson v. +enson, 00' =i=. ,pp. /-8, 7'
6.*./d 7-/ (%st DisR. %(-7). [<6-\=l=.&Mitchell v. Tyler, 00/ ===. ,pp. )77, 79 6.*./d /07 (%st
DisR. %(-7). Mass.&Staples v. Collins, 0/% Mass. --(, 70 6.*./d 7/( (%(-7). [<6)\ [<69)
[<67\ . [<68\ . [<6(\ 6ev.&;
, revie# of Judge <lanagan's 0.0'.%/ @rder and +a1ers /./-.%/ ,ns#ering +rief reveal
the eMtent to #hich Judge <lanagan, #illing or not, #as led do#n a clearly erroneous path y
+a1er and his purposefully misstatements of the la#, especially as to the :)tandard of 1eiew;
applicale to an appeal of a :summary eviction;. <lanagan #rites>
FStanar of Re$ie(
@n civil appeals from 5ustice courts to district courts, a case
Fmust not be tried anew.' 6JC4C? 7/(c). !hether on appeal at the
6evada Supreme Court from a district court, or appeal at a district
court from a 5ustice court, a lo#er court's findings F#ill not e
distured on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous and are not
ased on sustantial evidence.F Ciellini v Elindt, %%' 6ev. %/'%,
%/'-,88) ?./d )-', )-/ (%((-).
F[,\n order granting summary eviction under 64S -'./)0(9)
should e revie#ed on appeal ased upon the standard for revie# of
an order granting summary )ugment under 64C )9 ecause these
proceedings are analogous.F ,nvui, ""C v. C.". Dragon, ""C, %/0
6ev. /%/ /%), %90 ?.0d -'), -'7 (/''7). Summary )ugment is
proper only if no genuine issue of material fact eMists and the
moving party is entitled to )ugment as a matter of la#. 6*$. 4.
C=$ ?. )9(c)N see !ood v. Safe#ay, =nc., %/% 6ev. 7/-, 7/(, %/%
?.0d %'/9, %'/( (/'')). The moving party ears the initial urden of
proving there is no genuine issue of material fact. Main v. Ste#art,
%'( 6ev. 7/%, 7/9&/7, 8)7 ?./d 7)), 7)8 (%((0).
@nce the moving party satisfies this urden, ho#ever, the
urden shifts to the nonmoving party to sho# the eMistence of a
genuine issue of material fact. =d. at 7/7. !hile the pleading and the
record must e construed in the light most favorale to the
nonmoving party, the party must do more than simply sho# there is
some metaphysical dout as to the operative facts !ood, %/% 6ev. at
7/(. To avoid having summary )ugment entered against it, the
party must (page )) y affidavit or other#ise, set forth specific facts
demonstrating the eMistence of a genuine issue for trial. =d.
Legal Analysis
This Court has revie#ed all of the parties' pleadings and the
eMhiits attached thereto This Court also has considered all of the
parties' relevant arguments. ,fter this revie# and consideration, this
Court #ill not distur Judge SferraJJa's @ctoer /7, /'%% @rder
granting summary eviction. This Court finds that @rder #as based
on substantial eidence and it was no clearl- erroneous. Thus, this
Court concludes "erliss has met his initial burden of proving there
is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Coughlin was
summarily evicted properly. Conse3uently, the urden shifts to
Coughlin to sho# the eMistence of a genuine issue of material fact.
,lthough Coughlin raises several claims and ma1es numerous
allegations in his +rief Coughlin fails to present additional facts
related to his defenses raised in 1BC that undermine or
legitimatel- call into .uestion the substantial eidence upon (hi"h
?uge Sferra@@a relie (hen he grante summary e$i"tion. This
Court gi$es substantial deference to the lo(er "ourt's fa"tual
finings in this regard, particularly in light of the numerous
hearings held before #udge $ferrazza and Coughlin%s related
opportunities to present evidence supporting his various defenses.
Therefore, this Court fins no genuine issue of material fa"t e,ists
regaring (hether Coughlin (as summarily e$i"te properly in
the lo(er "ourt. ,s a result, Coughlin's appeal is %*NI*%.
;
=t is entirely unclear #hy Judge <lanagan's @rder indicates>
:FStanar of Re$ie(
@n civil appeals from 5ustice courts to district courts, a case Fmust not #e
trie ane(.' 6JC4C? 7/(c)...; #hen a revie# of J6C4C? 7/(c) reveals no
such authority. 4ather 6JC4C? 7/(c) reads> :(c)PContent of the 6otice of
,ppeal.PThe notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties ta1ing the
appealN shall designate the 5udgment, order or part thereof appealed fromN
and shall name the court to #hich the appeal is ta1en.;
?erhaps Judge <lanagan intended to cite to 6JC4C? 4G"*P
79,.PP;?@!*4S @< D=ST4=CT C@G4T @6 ,??*,". , case appealed
must not e tried ane#. Gpon an appeal heard upon the record or a
statement of the case, the district court may revie# all orders affecting the
3udgment appealed from and may set aside, or confirm, or modify, any or
all of the proceedings suse3uent to and dependent upon such 5udgment,
and may, if necessary or proper, order a ne# trial.; Ao#ever, it #as not a
:5udgment; that Coughlin appeal (particulary #here Judge SferraJJa ruled
that the %'./).%% date #as not a :Trial; ut, rather, a :continuation of a
summary eviction proceeding; (he made numerous contradictory rulings in
that regard, ut the the %'./).%% :*viction Decision and @rder; has one
title, and the %'./7.%% <@<C@" and @rder of Summary *viction; certainly
indicates 6JC4C? %'( did not actually come into play. 4egardless, +a1er,
Coughlin, and Judge <lanagan all cite to ,nvui in the @rder and their
+riefs...and ,nvui ma1es eMtremely clear that appeals of summary eviction are
revie#ed :de novo;, #hich means :tried ane#;, so Judge <lanagan's invocation
of some rule holding that civil appeals from 5ustice courts to district courts, a case
Fmust not #e trie ane(; is clearly erroneous.
=n his /./-.%/ ,ns#ering +rief, +a1er #rites> :4*S?@6D*6T'S ,6S!*4=6C +4=*<
4espondent, M,TT M*4"=SS (FM*4"=SSF), y and through his counsel, 4=CA,4D C.
A="", "TD. and C,S*D D. +,E*4, *S2., sumits his ,ns#ering +rief. =. ST,T*M*6T @<
TA* =SSG*S> The only issue in this appeal is #hether the 4eno Justice Court erred in granting
a summary eviction of appellant, H,CA,4D C@GCA"=6 (FC@GCA"=6F) y its <indings of
<act, Conclusions of "a#, and @rder for Summary *viction (F<<C"Q@F) dated Decemer
/7,/'%./. See 4ecord on ,ppeal (F4@,F) at $ol. ==, pp. 7)&8'. *KA=+=T % hereto. ==.
ST,T*M*6T @< TA* C,S*> ,lthough Coughlin has muddied the record to a spectacular
degree #ith his ausive filings, at its core, this is a simple no&cause residential summary
eviction case. The pertinent facts are as follo#s> The underlying facts of the eviction are set
forth in the <<C"Q@. The statutory notices and other documentary evidence the court relied on
in ma1ing its findings of fact can e found at 4@,, $ol. $, pp. 8)&8(N ('&(-N ()&%'(N %%0&%/8.
*KA=+=TS /,0,- and ) hereto. The Standard 4ental ,greement (F"*,S*F) for the home at %/%
4iver 4oc1, 4eno, 6evada (the F?4@?*4TDF) can e found at 4@,, $ol. $, pp %/(&%0/.
*KA=+=T 9 hereto. Those facts #ere estalished during t#o evidentiary hearings, in #hich
Coughlin fully participated. The first hearing #as on @ctoer %0, /'%%, and lasted (' minutes.
, continuation ofthat hearing occurred on @ctoer /), /'%%, and lasted several hours. l The
purpose ofthose hearings #as to Fdetermine the truthfulness and sufficiency ofthe tenant's and
the landlord's affidavits,F to determine #hether there is any Flegal defense as to the alleged
unla#ful detainer,F and #hether Fthe tenant is guilty ofan unla#ful detainerF./ Those hearings
#ere Coughlin's opportunity to sustantiate, y competent evidence, any legal defense he may
have had to the eviction.
The only defenses raised y Coughlin elo# #ere ased on #hat he claimed #as FretaliatoryF
conduct y Merliss, and FhaitailityF issues at the property. +oth defenses #ere ased on
provisions of64S Chapter l=S,.0 ,t the first hearing, Coughlin alleged his defenses, ut did
not offer any evidence to support them. Judge SferraJJa could have granted an eviction after
that hearing, ut .chose instead to allo# Coughlin another opportunity to sustantiate his
allegations.- Since Coughlin's defenses #ere ased on alleged FhaitailityF issues, the court
re3uired him to deposit, pursuant to 64S -'.0))()), the amount ofrent Coughlin claimed he
had #ithheld for those reasons, efore he #ould e allo#ed to sustantiate them #ith
evidence.s Coughlin ultimately failed to raise any material factual dispute, and the court
properly granted the eviction. The loc1out #as performed on 6ovemer =, /'%%. Coughlin filed
his first notice ofappeal on 6ovemer 0, /'%%.9 @n 6ovemer %0,/'%%, Coughlin #as found
living in the asement of the property, and #as arrested.7 Coughlin continues to file additional
papers in oth courts, #herein he attempts to raise ne# arguments he never raised elo#.
===. ST,6D,4D @< 4*$=*!> F[,\n order granting summary eviction under 64S -'./)0(9)
should e revie#ed on appeal ased upon the standard for revie# of an order granting summary
5udgment under 64C? )9 ecause these proceedings are analogous.,,8 FTo successfully defend
against a summary 5udgment motion, the nonmoving party must transcend the pleadings and,
y affidavit or other admissile evidence, introduce specific facts that sho# a genuine issue
ofmaterial fact.'F, case appealed must not e tried a ne#.F=@ <urther, Fa [lo#er court's\
findings #ill not e distured on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous and are not ased on
sustantial evidence.FJ % FThe notice ofappeal shall specify the party or parties ta1ing the
appealN shall designate the 5udgment, order or part thereof appealed from ...,,%/ F@nly those
parts of the 5udgment #hich are included in the notice of appeal #ill e considered y the
appellate Cuurt.,,R0
=$. ,4CGM*6T> Despite having filed more than )' pages in t#o riefs, Coughlin fails to
articulate or coherently analyJe #hat he claims to e errors y the 5ustice court. %- Ae does not
ma1e so much as a single citation to the 4@,, and his failure in this regard is sanctionale.%)
The Court and Merliss are unfairly left to speculate as to the ases for his appeal. %9 The
incoherency of Coughlin's riefs ma1es that tas1 nearly impossile. This difficulty is
compounded y Coughlin's refusal to pay for a transcript ofthe proceedings elo#. %7 @n or
aout <eruary 8, /'%/, Coughlin attempted to supplement his opening rief #ith a CD that
supposedly contained the audio recordings ofthe hearings elo#. 6ot only #as this an improper
attempt y Coughlin to circumvent the record on appeal, the CD delivered to the undersigned's
office #as so adly damaged, that it #ould not e opened, even y counsel's =T professional.
+ecause ofCoughlin's transgressions, Merliss has een deprived ofthe aility to accurately cite
to the hearing elo#. ,s est Merliss can tell, Coughlin alleges the follo#ing errors>
%. Judge SferraJJa mista1enly called the @ctoer /), /'%/ hearing a FtrialF and re3uired
Coughlin to deposit the #ithheld rent #ith the court
Summary eviction hearings are conducted pursuant to 64S -'./)0(9). F<ormalF eviction
proceedings are conducted pursuant to 64S -'./(' through 64S -'.-/'. F<ormalF eviction
proceedings contemplate the filing of a complaint, an ans#er, conducting discovery, and a
formal Ftrial.,,%8 They can include claims for damages y oth sides. F<ormalF evictions can
either e initiated y the landlord in the first instance, or, #here a summary eviction has een
commenced, and the tenant estalishes a legal defense at the hearing, the court must then order
the parties to proceed under those statutes.%(
!hen Judge SferraJJa continued the @ctoer %0,/'%% hearing, he misspo1e and called the
second hearing a Ftrial.F That same #ord, Ftrial,F #as entered into the court's order./' Coughlin
has seiJed J.lpon the #ord FtrialF to argue that he should have een afforded some further
procedural protections of the FformalF eviction proceedings (mainly, delay). This argument is
nonsense./% The only #ay the court could have ordered the parties to proceed #ith a FformalF
eviction is int found that Coughlin had raised a legal defense to the summary eviction.// Aere,
it found the opposite.
=n ruling from the ench, the court eMplained more than once that the purpose ofthe @ctoer /),
/'%% proceeding #as to allo# Coughlin another opportunity to sustantiate the defenses he had
alleged at the first hearing, ecause he had not yet done S@./0 The court's order reflects this, in
that it re3uired Coughlin to deposit the #ithheld rent ifhe (Coughlin) #ished to have another
opportunity to prove up his haitaility defenses. =f he failed to post the rent, the eviction
#ould e granted, ecause he had not estalished a legal defense as re3uired y 64S
-'./)0(9). The court's inadvertent use ofthe #ord FtrialF did not someho# ta1e the case out of
the summary proceedings, nor could it have, and any argument that it did eMalts form over
sustance and ignores the clear purpose ofthe order./- Coughlin 1ne# the @ctoer /),/'%%
hearing #as merely a continuation ofthe first hearing. Ae 1ne# that there had not een any
formal complaint filed. There is not one in the record. Ae recogniJed, and argued repeatedly,
that all he had to do to defeat the summary eviction #as estalish a material factual dispute for
trial. =n fact, he argues as much in the Fstatement offacts and la#F he purports to incorporate in
his first notice of appea%./) Coughlin did not eMplain ho# he could have possily een
pre5udiced y the court's misstatement, so it is of no conse3uence.
,s to the rent deposit, 64S %%8,.0)) specifically provides that F[a\ tenant does not have a
defense to an eviction under paragraph (d) ofsusection % unless the tenant has deposited the
#ithheld rentinto an escro# account pursuant to this susection.F Coughlin #as attempting to
set up a defense ased on FhaitailityF./9 Ae had #ithheld rent in the process, #hile
purporting to invo1e that statute./7 *ven though the eviction proceeding #as for Fno&cause,F
and not eMpressly ased on Coughlin's failure to pay rent, the court #as correct to re3uire him
to deposit #hat he claimed he had #ithheld, in order to proceed #ith his defense. The statute is
plain on its face, and ma1es logical sense, as #ell. =f Coughlin did not have the rent, and failed
to prove his case, the court has, in effect, improperly en5oined the landlord's use of his property.
=n any event, the @ctoer %0,/'%% order #as not an appealale order under 6JC4C? 7/,. <or
that reason, it is not properly at issue here. =tis also moot, since the court eventually returned
Coughlin's deposit to him, as discussed further, elo#.
/. 6ot finding any amiguity in the lease regarding F#eedsF
@ne FhaitailityF item alleged y Coughlin #as that #eeds #ere gro#ing in the yard. The
court found that maintenance of the surrounding grounds, including any #eeds, #ere
Coughlin's responsiility under paragraph // of the "ease./8 That paragraph provides in part
that FTenant #ill irrigate and maintain any surrounding grounds, including la#ns and
shruery, if they are for the Tenant's eMclusive use.F/( =tis undisputed that the yard at the
property #as for Coughlin's eMclusive use. The "ease is unamiguous, and the court's finding
#as correct. Moreover, F#eedsF do not constitute a FhaitailityF issue under 64S %%8,./(',
in any event, and Coughlin never presented any evidence that they did, or that he complied
#ith the statutory protocol for #ithholding, or had any right to #ithhold, any rent for that, or
any other alleged FhaitailityF issue.0o
0. Cranting a no&cause summary eviction against a FcommercialF tenant
Coughlin no# argues that he #as a FcommercialF tenant, and therefore not su5ect to summary
eviction. Ae first raised this argument in his Fopposition to motion for order to sho# cause,F
#hich he filed on Decemer ), /'%%, siM #ee1s after the eviction #as grantedO% Merliss
addressed it in his reply filed the follo#ing day.0/ <irst, Coughlin has the la# #rong. Summary
evictions are availale against a tenant of any property that is su5ect to 64S Chapter %%S,,
#hich Merliss' property un3uestionaly #as.00 Second, Coughlin affirmatively #aived any
argument that 64S Chapter l=8, does not apply y asing his entire defense
(retaliation.haitaility) on #hat he alleged #ere violations of that chapter.0- Moreover,
ecause the court adopted Coughlin's position and ruled on that asis, he is 5udicially estopped
from changing his theory no#.0) ,dditionally, since Coughlin never timely raised the argument
elo#, it cannot form the asis for any relief on appeal.09 =n any event, Coughlin has not cited
to any#here in the 4@, that #ould support this ne# argument, and neither this Court nor the
court elo# are or #ere oligated to sift through the record in search ofsome fact #hich might
support his claim.07 <inally, even if Coughlin #ere running one or more unlicensed usinesses
out oft he property, he does not eMplain ho# that #ould ta1e this matter out of64S Chapter
l%8,.
-. 6ot holding a hearing on Coughlin's motion to contest personal property lien #ithin %'
The <<C"Q@ #as entered on @ctoer /7, /'%%. Coughlin's first notice ofappeal #as filed on
6ovemer 0,/'%%. Coughlin filed his first motion to contest persona\ property lien on
6ovemer %9,/'%%.08 64S -'./)0(8) provides that a hearing on that motion must e set #ithin
%' days after the motion is filed. Ao#ever, Coughlin refused to cooperate #ith court staff to set
the hearing he re3uested, so it did not ta1e place #ithin %' days.0( Then, on 6ovemer /0,
/'%%, Coughlin ineMplicaly filed another notice ofappea%.-o !hat is important for this court's
purposes is that neither notice ofappeal identifies any perceived error regarding the court's
procedure in setting a hearing on that collateral matter. 6or is such an FissueF appealale under
6JC4C? 7/,. ,s such, this FissueF is inappropriate for the court's consideration here.-%
). 6ot granting Coughlin a stay
Coughlin #as granted in forma pauperis (F=<?F) status y the 4eno Justice Court on @ctoer 9,
/'%%.-/ =<?status only applies to the trial level of litigation, not to appeals. -0 ,ccordingly, if
he #ished to stay the enforcement of the <<C"Q@ and stop the loc1out, he #as re3uired to
post a supersedeas ond, and otain an order granting a stay, efore the loc1out occurred.
,s to the ond re3uirement, since this case #as not a FformalF eviction, 6JC4C? 70,(a)(%)
(-) do not apply. =nstead, this case falls underthe FcatchallF provision at the end of susection
(a) of that 4ule, #hich provides in pertinent part F=n cases not provided forin (%), (/), (0) or (-)
aove, the giving ofan appeal ond, under the provisions of 4ule 70, shall stay proceedings in
the court elo# upon the 5udgment or order appealed from ... eMcept #here the appellate court
may other#ise direct upon such terms as it may in its discretion impose.,,-- 6JC4C? 70
provides that FThe ond or e3uivalent security shall e in the sum or value of I/)' unless the
5ustice court fiMes a different amount.F (*mphasis added). 64S -'.08)(%) provides that a stay
may e otained y posting a ond in the amount of I/)'.'' #ith the trial court.
Coughlin deposited I/,/7) #ith the court pursuant to 64S % %8,.0)) and the court's order
of@ctoer %0,/'%%. Ae orally moved the court for a stay ofthe eviction at the end ofthe @ctoer
/), /'%% hearing, ut did not cite any authority for his re3uest. ,ccordingly, that motion #as
denied.-) Thus, although the court ordered that Coughlin's deposit #ould serve as his appeal
ond, it denied a stay ecause Coughlin did not provide the court #ith any asis to grant one,
as #as his legal responsiility. Then, at Coughlin's specific re3uest, the court held an
emergency hearing on 6ovemer 7,/'%%, #here it amended the <<C"Q@ and returned all sums
on deposit to Coughlin, as he #as clamoring. The court then set the supersedeas ond at
I/,7''.'', as it #as entitled to do.-9 Coughlin no# argues that he should have een granted a
stay ofthe eviction ecause he had funds on deposit #ith the court at the time of the loc1out.
*ven if he #ould have een entitled to that relief, that position is inconsistent #ith his prior
demands that all of his deposit e returned to him, and he is 5udicially estopped from arguing it
no#.-7 =fCoughlin #anted to apply those funds to a super&sedeas ond under
JC4C? 70, or 64S -'.08), he should have either made that re3uest at the @ctoer /), /'%%
hearing #hen the eviction #as announced, or sometime et#een that hearing and the loc1out a
#ee1 later. Ae never did so. =n fact, he did 5ust the opposite. !hen Coughlin filed his Fmotion
for stay'b-8 on @ctoer 0%,/'%%, in #hich he demanded his deposit ac1-(, the loc1out had
not even occurred. That confirms that Coughlin had no intention ofposting a ond. or applying
those funds in order to otain a stay. Ae cannot e heard to argue other#ise no#. Then, after he
received his deposit ac1, he did not deposit any additional funds #ith the court until on or
aout Decemer 8, /'%% #hen he finally paid the filing feeto perfect his appeal. Thereafter, on
Decemer %-,/'%%, he posted I/)'.'' for his appeal ond, and I%.'' for his Fsupersedeas
ondF (#hich sums he has suse3uently moved to have returned to him).)' +y then, his re3uest
for a stay had een moot for approMimately siM #ee1s.
9. Sheriff's removal oftenant F#ithin /- hours ofreceipt ofthe @rder.F
Coughlin tries to imply some sort of #rongdoing in relation to the loc1out in this case on page
% ofhis second opening rief. +ut he does not inform the court to #hich ForderF he is referring
that provided for a loc1out F#ithin /- hours,F or #hat, eMactly, his argument is. )% =n this case,
the court announced the eviction at the hearing on @ctoer /), /'%%.)/ That eviction #as not
effective until after
) >'' p.m. on @ctoer 0%, /'%%, siM days later. This #as confirmed in the <<C"Q@ signed y
the court on @ctoer /7,/'%%. Coughlin #as loc1ed out on 6ovemer %,/'%%. This FargumentF
is frivolous, unsupporte , nonsenslca ,an cannot %'rm t e aSls l@r any re =e ere.
7. The trial Court's ,pplication of64S %%8,.-('
Coughlin complains that it #as reversile error for the Ftrial courtF to apply 64S %%8,.-('. Ae
does not cite to any#here in the 4@, to support his allegation that that statute #as ever applied
y the court.)0 =n fact, it never #as. The 5ustice court applied 64S %%8,.0))()). This
FargumentF is of no moment.
8. The Security Deposit.
Coughlin alleges that Merliss has not returned or accounted for the security deposit under the
"ease. Ae has not cited to any#here in the 4@, to sustantiate that allegation. )- Ae does not
eMplain ho# the security deposit has anything to do #ith the underlying no&cause eviction, or
ho# the lo#er court erred in relation to it.)) Coughlin #ants to discuss #hat he thin1s is a
claim for damages, ut neither this Court nor the court elo# have or had 5urisdiction to even
consider the matter. )9
$. C@6C"GS=@6> Despite t#o opportunities to do so, Coughlin failed to meet his urden
elo# to introduce, y affidavit or other admissile evidence, specific facts that sho# a genuine
issue of material fact. ,s such, the 5ustice court properly granted the summary eviction ased
on the evidence efore itN namely, the "ease, the statutory notices served y Merliss, and the
testimony adduced at the hearings. Coughlin has not met his urden here to sho# that any ofthe
court's findings #ere clearly erroneous and not ased on sustantial evidence. The FargumentsF
he presents in his riefs are nonsensical, and,. for the most part, untimely, not properly
preserved or efore this court, and derived from unappealale activity elo#. 6one of
Coughlin's arguments are supported y any citation to the record. ,s such, he has not given this
court any evidentiary or legal asis to overturn any ruling y the lo#er court. !hat Coughlin
really #ants to do is relitigate the case here, #hich is not permitted. Coughlin is not entitled to
any relief, and his appeal must e dismissed.
!A*4*<@4*, Merliss prays that Coughlin ta1e nothing y #ay of his appealN that same e
dismissed in its entiretyN and that the 5udgment of the lo#er court, including its order of
Decemer /7, /'%%, e affirmedN that Merliss e a#arded his fees and costs of this appeal in
accordance #ith 64S 9(.')'N that Coughlin e held in contempt of court as prayed for in
Merliss' motion for order to sho# cause, filed herein on January /', /'%/N and for such other,
further and additional reliefas seems 5ust to the court in the premises. .s. Casey D. +a1er
/./-.%/;
*6D6@T*S
%.See <<C"Q@ at %
/.64S -'./)0(9). <<C"Q@ at -, ,0.
0.See <<C"Q@ at 0,,( et se3. See, also, 4@,, $ol. =, pp. /08&/99N 4@,, $ol. $, pp. %(-&%(8.
-.64S -'./)0(9).
).4@,, $ol.l, p. %)0.
9.. 4@, $ol. ===, pp. //(&/00. 7V 4@,, $ol. ===, pp. %8&00.
7.,nvui, ""C vW C.". Dragon, ""C, %/0 6ev. /%/,/%),%90 ?.0d -') (/''7).
8.Torreala v. Eesmitis, %/- 6ev. (), %78 ?.0d 7%9 (/''8).
(.6JC4C? 79,.
%'.Ciellini v. Elindt, %%' 6ev. %/'%, %/'-,88) ?./d )-' (%((-) (emphasis added).
%%.6JC4C? 7/( c).
%/.4eno 6e#spapers, =nc. v. +i, 79 6ev. 00/, 00), 0)0 ?./d -)8 (%(9').
%-.?lease see Merliss' counter&motion to stri1e eMcess pages, filed herein on <eruary (,/'%/.
=f the court is going to consider anything eyond the first five pages filed y Coughlin, Merliss
specifically re3uests leave to file a supplemental riefto meet those arguments.
%). See 64,? /8(a)(8) and (e). See also, !eddell v. Ste#art, %/7 6ev. ,dv. @p. )8,/9% ?.0d
%'8', %'8- (Sept. /(,/'%%) (F ...it is imperative that the parties follo# the applicale procedural
rules and that they comply in a timely fashion #ith [the court's\ directives.F)N and Smith v.
*mery, %'( 6ev. 707, 7-0, 8)9 ?./d %089 (%((0).
%0.Cf., Schuc1 v. Signature <light Support of6evada, =nc., %/9 6ev. W (,dv.@p. -/),/-) ?.0d
)-/,)--&)-) (6ov. -, /'%') (the court is Fnot oligated to #ade through and search the entire
record for some specific facts #hich might support the nonmoving party's claim.F) Cf.,
6JC4C? 7-().
%8.=d
%(V See 64S -'./)0(9).
%.4@,, $ol. =, p. %)0.
/./%.
0.See, 6JC4C? %'- (F?rior to the holding of a hearing for summary eviction, the 5ustice shall
determine the method of service ofnotice of the hearing on oth parties.F)
-.//.
).64S -'./)0(9).
9./0.
7.Coughlin's uneMplained and uneMcused refusal to pay for a transcript ma1es it impossile to
cite Judge SferraJJa's statements #ith precision.
8./-.
(.,ccord, "ee v. C6"$ Corp., %%9 6ev. -/-,-/7,((9 ?./d -%9 (/''') (the important in3uiry is
on F#hat the order or 5udgment actually does, not on #hat it is called.F)(emphasis in original).
%'./).
%%.4@,, $ol. ===, pp. /0'&/00.
%/./9.
%0.64S %%8,.0))(l)(d). 4@,, $ol. =, pp. /08&/99.
%-./7. =d.
%)./8.
%9.See <<"CQ@ at ^'%%&%%.%.
%7./(.
%8.*KA=+=T 9 at /, ,//.
%(.0'. <<C"Q@ at '^%/&%/.l.
/'.0%.
/%.4@,, $ol. =$, pp. /)0&/9%.
//.0/.
/0.See, FSupplemental Justice Court ,ppeal ?roceedings,F at /, filed herein on January -,
/'%/. Merliss' reply is identified as item numer -. <or reasons un1no#n, copies ofthose
documents #ere not made availale to Merliss through the court's electronic filing system.
/-.00.
/).64S -'./)-.
/9.0-.
/7.See <<C"Q@ eginning at ,(. See, also, 4@,, $ol. =, pp. /08&/99.
/8.0).
/(.Marcuse v. Del !e Communities, %/06ev. /78, %90 ?.0d -9/ (/''7).
0'.09.
0%.Schuc1. The lo#er court recogniJed as much at the Decemer /',/'%% hearing on
Coughlin's motion to contest personal property lien. <or that hearing, Merliss had supoenaed
Darlene Sharpe, the real estate agent #ho had facilitated the rental ofthe property to Coughlin,
to testify in the event the court #as going to allo# Coughlin to elatedly argue this issue. 4@,,
$ol. $=, p.%80. ,t that hearing, Judge SferraJJa appropriately recogniJed that Coughlin #as
improperly attempting to relitigate the eviction ased on previously unraised arguments, and
did not let the parties address or present any evidence on the matter. Ms. Sharpe #as prepared
to testify that (%) Coughlin never mentioned that he #as an attorney, or that he had either a Fla#
practiceF or a Fmattress usiness,F
0/.(/) that Coughlin had represented himself on his rental application as a Fself&employed
researcher,F and (0) that Coughlin had surreptitiously altered the lease to allo# for
FcommercialF use of the property. See, 4eply in Support of Motion for @rder to Sho# Cause,
identified as item numer - in the Supplemental Justice Court ,ppeal ?roceedings, filed herein
on January -, /'%/.
00.07. Schuc1.
0-.08.
0).4@,, $ol. ===, pp. %)0&%9'.
09.0(.
07.4@,, $ol. =$, pp./, //&/0.
08.-'.
0(.4@,, $ol. ===, p. ).
-'.-%. 4eno 6e#spapers, =nc.
-%.-/. 4@,, $ol. =, pp. /7-&/7).
-/.-0V 64S %/>'%). Casper v. Auer, 8) 6ev. -7-,-)9 ?./d -09 (%(9().
-0.--V 6JC4C? 70,(a).
--.-)V 4@,, $ol. ==, pp. 8),/.
-).-9. 4@,, $ol ===, pp. /%8&/%(N $ol. ==, pp. -,/7.
-9.-9. 4@,, $ol ===, pp. /%8&/%(N $ol. ==, pp. -,/7.
-7. Marcuse.
-8. 4@,, $ol. ==, p. 0.
-(. 4@,, $ol. ==, pp. -, /7
)'. 4@,, $ol. =$, pp. /%'&/%%.
)%. Cf., Schuc1.
)/. 4@,, $ol. ==, p. 8).
)0. Cf., Schuc1
)-. Cf., Schuc1.
)). Cf., Ciellini.
)9. 6JC4C? 79,, 4eno 6e#spaper, =nc.N 64S -'./)0(9).;
:6JC4C? 4G"*P79+.PPT=M*T,+"* C@$*46=6C ,??*,"S <4@M JGST=C* C@G4TS
,ppeal, civil>
!ithin /' days of service of #ritten notice of entry of 3udgment or order appealed from. 4ule
7/+(a).

*nlargement of time for appeals>
Time for ta1ing appeal may e enlarged y timely motion for>
(%)PJudgment under 4ule )'().
D3E6Aitional or amene finings of fa"t uner Rule 43D#E.
D9E6Altering or amening )ugment uner Rule 4K.
D7E6Ne( trial uner Rule 4K.
The time for ta1ing appeal commences ane# upon entry of an order granting or denying any of
the aove motions. 4ule 7/+().

,ppeal from
formal eviction>
!ithin %' days of service of entry of order. 64S -'.08'N 4ule 70,(-).

<ees>
?ayale upon filing notice of appeal. 4ule 7-+(a)(%).

+ond for costs>
<iled #ith notice of appeal. 4ule 70.

+ond, supersedeas>
,t or after time of filing notice of appeal. Stay is effective #hen ond filed. 4ule 70,.

Transcript of proceedings>
,ppellant must order #ithin %' days of notice of appeal. Transcript must e prepared y
reporter #ithin 0' days after receipt of form letter from cler1, eMcept 0'&day eMtension may e
granted. 4ule 7-()(%).

Transmission and doc1eting of record on appeal>
!ithin 0' days after perfection of appeal, unless shortened or eMtended. !here multiple
appeals are ta1en, #ithin 0' days after perfection of the final appeal. 4ule 7-,(a).

*nlargement or shortening of time for transmission and doc1eting record on appeal>
Time may e eMtended y the 5ustice court not more than 9' days from filing of first notice of
appeal, or y the district court for additional time, provided orders of eMtension are made efore
eMpiration of last previous time. The 5ustice court or the district court may order the time for
transmission and doc1eting to e shortened. 4ule 7-,(d).

4ecord for preliminary determination>
@n any of the follo#ing motions, a party may doc1et in the district court such parts of the
original record as the person re3uests, prior to doc1eting the complete record on appeal>

(%)PMotion to dismiss appeal.

(/)PMotion for stay pending appeal.

(0)PMotion for additional security for ond on appeal or supersedeas ond.

(-)PMotion for any intermediate order. 4ule 7-,(e).

+riefs>
=f ordered, appellant]s opening riefN #ithin 0' days after the record is filed. 4espondent]s
ans#ering riefN #ithin 0' days after service of the opening rief. ,ppellant]s reply rief, if
anyN #ithin %) days of service of respondent]s ans#ering rief. 4ule 7)(a), 7)()(/).

@ral argument>
=n all cases, unless other#ise ordered y the district court. 4ule 7),.;
:4G"*P79.PPD=SM=SS," <@4 <,="G4* @< ,??*"",6T T@ C@M?"D !=TA 4G"*S

(a)P=f the appellant shall fail to cause timely transmission of the record as provided in 4ule
7-,, or, if re3uired, to timely file an opening rief, or to post the undertaking as re.uired b-
1ule :7 or :7", or to arrange for a transcript as re3uired y 4ule 7-, and 7-,, or the payment
of filing fees as require #y Rule ;7&- unless e+empt- or upon a sho#ing that any other
necessary steps have not een ta1en, the appeal may e dismissed y the district court upon a
motion of any respondent or upon its o#n motion at the cost of the appellant. ?rior to the
granting of the dismissal, the appellant shall e given #ritten notice of the motion to dismiss.
The motion shall e supported y a certificate of the cler1 or 5ustice of the 5ustice court,
sho#ing the date and sustance of the 5udgment or order from #hich the appeal #as ta1en, the
date on #hich the notice of appeal #as filed, the eMpiration date of any order eMtending the
time for transmitting the record, and proof of service. The notice of the motion to dismiss may
e mailed or delivered to the appellant or the appellant]s attorney. The appellant may respond in
#riting #ithin 7 days of such service, sho#ing good cause, if any, #hy the motion should not
e granted. The district court cler1 shall doc1et the appeal for the limited purpose of permitting
the district court to entertain the motion #ithout re3uiring payment of the filing fee, ut the
appellant shall not e permitted to respond #ithout payment of the fee unless the person is
other#ise eMempt therefrom. The district court, #ith or #ithout allo#ing a response from the
respondent, shall grant the motion to dismiss if good cause is not sho#n. =f satisfied as to good
cause for the delay, the district court shall allo# the appeal to continue upon such terms as it
may order.

()P=f any respondent shall fail to timely file an ans#ering rief, such failure may e treated
y the district court as a confession of error and sufficient grounds for reversal of the 5udgment
or order appealed from.;

K=.PPC*6*4," ?4@$=S=@6S
6JC4C? 4G"*P8%.PP,??"=C,+="=TD =6 C*6*4," (a)PTo !hat ?roceedings
,pplicale.PPThese rules o not go$ern pro"eure an pra"ti"e in any spe"ial statutory
pro"eeing insofar as they are in"onsistent or in "onfli"t (ith the pro"eure an pra"ti"e
pro$ie #y the appli"a#le statute.

6JC4C? 8%()P;Chief Justices of the ?eace.PP4ule 8-, relating to "hief )usti"es of the
pea"e- shall apply to all pro"eeings in the )usti"e "ourts- (hether "riminal- "i$il or
other(ise.:
64S -'.08) presents 5ust such a :special statutory proceeding (in comination #ith
64S -'./)0, ./)-. ,s such 6JC4C? 70, 70,(a)(-), 70+, etc. do not even apply as to the stay
issue, to the eMtent 64S -'.08) covers the situation, #hich it does.
Judge <lanagan's 0.0'.%/ @rder :orro#s; heavily from +a1er's ,ns#ering +rief
(similar to ho# Judge SferraJJa's %'./7.%% <@<C@"@S* #as actually created y +a1er
himself...and signed y Judge SferraJJa less than four hours afte +a1er sumitted it, late (such
#as due on %'./9.%% at noon, and +a1er did not provide his propose <@<C@"@S* until noon
on %'./7.%% to either the 4JC or Coughlin). 4egardless, Coughlin
6JC4C? 4G"*P80.PP4G"*S +D JGST=C* C@G4TS> :*ach 5ustice or 5ustice court in a
to#nship #ith more than one 5ustice, y action of a ma5ority of the 5ustices thereof, may from
time to time ma1e and amend the rules governing its practice not inconsistent #ith these rules.
Copies of rules and amendments so made y any 5ustice court shall upon their promulgation e
furnished to the Supreme Court, #ut shall not #e"ome effe"ti$e until after appro$al #y the
Supreme Court an pu#li"ation. In all "ases not pro$ie for #y these rules the )usti"e
"ourts may regulate their pra"ti"e in any manner not in"onsistent (ith these rules.;
6JC4C? 4G"*P8-.PPCA=*< JGST=C*S @< TA* ?*,C*>
:(a)P*lection.PP=n any to#nship having three or more 5ustices of the peace, the 5ustices
shall annually elect one of their numer to serve as chief 5ustice of the peace for that to#nship.
The election shall ta1e place et#een 6ovemer %) and Decemer % of each year, and the chief
5ustice of the peace so elected shall egin to serve on the first Monday in January of the neMt
year. ,ny incument 5ustice of the peace #ho #ill not e returning to office the neMt year
(ecause of retirement, resignation, failure to e reelected, or other reason) shall not e eligile
to vote in the election for chief 5ustice of the peace. ,ny person #ho has een elected to ta1e
office as 5ustice of the peace shall e eligile to vote in the election for chief 5ustice of the
peace. *Mcept #ith the unanimous consent of the 5ustices of the peace in a to#nship, no chief
5ustice of the peace shall serve more than / successive one&year terms.
()P4esponsiilities.PPThe chief 5ustice of the peace in a to#nship shall>
(%)P+e responsile for the administration of court rules and regulations.
(/)PConsider and rule on any eM parte applications for orders in cases #hich have not
een assigned.
(0)PAear or reassign emergency matters #hen the assigned 5ustice is asent or
other#ise unavailale.
(-)PDesignate another 5ustice to perform the duties of chief 5ustice of the peace #hen
the chief 5ustice of the peace is asent.
())P@versee all administrative and clerical #or1 and functions of the court as set forth
in 64S Chapter -.
(9)PCall and preside over meetings #ith the other 5ustices of that to#nship, as often as
may e deemed necessary y the chief 5ustice of the peace, to discuss and set policy on
procedures, planning, caseload distriution, 5udicial training, vacations, court improvements,
personnel and any other matters of enefit or concern to the court.;
=K.PPC=$=" ,??*,"S <4@M JGST=C* C@G4TS 4G"*P7/.PP,??*,"_A@! T,E*6> :
(c)PContent of the 6otice of ,ppeal.PThe notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties
ta1ing the appealN shall designate the 5udgment, order or part thereof appealed fromN and shall
name the court to #hich the appeal is ta1en.;
Judge <lanagan appears to ma1e the same :mista1e; that Judge SferraJJa did in %7'8.
That consists of relying upon the t#isted, fraudulent mistatements of the la# that +a1er and
Aill call la#yering, then overreacting to the human displays of emotions y the opposing
attorney.litigant, and engaging in #hat some might say appears to e a transparent display of
:inadvertent; errors of la# orne of a retaliatory animus. ,t the end of the day, ho#ever, these
5udges are usy and have heavy case loads. They are some#hat entitled to rely upon the
representations as to la# and facts made to them y the attorneys appearing efore them.
Ao#ever, Judge SferraJJa could nto rely upon +a1er and Merliss's declaration that the lease
had :eMpired; or :terminated; given the :term; in the agreement #as for :%/ months;. (@f
course, the :term; in the lease #as for :no less than %/ months;, and there #as no :defined
termination date; to e found in paragraph / of the lease #here paragraph /' indicated such a
defined date #ould affect the holdover.termination status of the lease. <urther, Judge SferraJJa
may have relied upon +a1er's indicating that he elicited testimony from Merliss that spo1e to
all that contained in +a1er's %'.%(.%% Declaration (#hich +a1er purported to contain everything
re3uired y 64S -'./)-(/)). Ao#ever, reliance upon +a1er's purposefully misleading
approach there (in violation of 4?C 0.0, 0.-, etc.) caused Judge SferraJJa to miss the part
#here Merliss failed to file any landlord's affidavit.declaration (or even testify) to the
re3uirement that he s#ear that his claim for relief #as authoriJed y la#, per 64S -'./)-(/).
,s it turns out, Merliss's claim #as not authoriJed y la# in that the lease #as never
terminated, as any attempt to notice Coughlin on the termination of the lease #as deficient,
o#ing largely to a fraudulent attempt y +a1er to avoid having the language of the lease
agreement that #as so clearly negative to his client's positions respective of #hether any
retaliation occurred (especially #ith respect to his client's liaility for the actions of Creen
,ction "a#n Service and Darlene Sharpe), his client's liaility for the utility ill (given the
standing orders and 6$ *nergy's policies), the set&off re3uired y 64S %%8,.0(' incident to
the unla#ful interuption of essential services, etc.). <urther +a1er #ished to avoid prolonging
further the summary eviction approach he initially too1 in %-(/ (from #hich +a1er
fraudulently sumitted a Memorandum of Costs for in another case, %7'8), ut dropped, largely
due to his mista1es and ineMperience causing delays and eMcessive fees.
=n his Jeal to avoid havign the lease agreement :rene# on its terms; or continue
indefinitely (the lease is amiguous in that regard, and +a1er's invo1ing 64S -'./)% rather
than 64S -'./)' (as Judge SferraJJa indicated #as re3uired or at issue) is telling. So, +a1er
and Merliss lied to Judge SferraJJa aout #hether the lease #as eMpired and as to the actual
term of the lease. Judge SferraJJa pre5udiced Coughlin y essentially ootstrapping the
notice Coughlin #as provided in the nonpayment summary eviction in %-(/ to the no cause
summary evictino in %7'8. Ao#ever, those are rather different theories of la# involved. ,s
such, there #as no real notice to e ootstrapped, and the underlying rationale ehind such
notice re3uirements (li1e those in 6JC4C? %'(, and %'8) is to afford parties and their attorneys
an opportunity to uild their cases from a legal and factual perspective (and maye to move
their elongings out #hile also so preparing for a hearing). Civen Judge SferraJJa's refusal to
accord Coughlin the re3uired t#enty days to respond to a properly filed and served Summons
and Complaint under 6JC4C? %'( (an per 64S -'./)0(9)), Coughlin #as unale to
sufficiently prepare for the %'./).%% :Trial;. ,dditionally, there eMists no authority for Judge
SferraJJa's position that he could convert a summary eviction proceeding to a :Trial; (as he did
in his %'.%0.%% @rder), and continue to retain the 64S %%8,.0))()) escro# deposit he re3uired
of Coughlin, plus add on another ne# re3uirement that Coughlin deposit, on 6ovemer %
st
,
/'%%, the rent for 6ovemer, as a condition of Coughlin eing afforded the procedural
protections of 6JC4C? %'( and 64S -'./)0(9). Ao# aout, first, having Merliss signed on
the dotted line of a Complaint, and get a Summons issued, then served on Coughlin, the afford
Coughlin an opportunity to file an ,ns#er, rather than demanding Coughlin sumit to some sua
sponte interrogation y Judge SferraJJa as to #hether and ho# much rent he o#es Merliss,
even in the face of +a1er insisting all that #as up for the court's inspection #as possessio of the
premises. ,s Coughlin indicated on %'./).%%, reserving his o5ections to Judge SferraJJa's
essentially re3uiring Coughlin to pled non&payment, and placing the urden on Coughlin to
then sho# the he did actually fail to so pay his rent... :those are fatual issues, Dour Aonor;.
=ndeed, that is very true considering the eMtent to #hich Merliss admitted to a novation of any
laiility Coughlin had as to Coughlin's former co&tenant, Melissa Glloa, ta1ing Coughlin's
rental contriutions for May and June /'%% and surreptiously failing to for#ard them to Merliss
along #ith her part of her o#n for May and all of her share for June /'%%.
Judge Sattler is Coughlin's Iather's patient (Timothy D. Coughlin, MD is a Iamily
physician). Judge Sattler serves on the board oI Washoe Legal Services, which Coughlin is
suing, including in CV11-01955 (Judge Sattler inherited that case Irom Judge Elliott whom
Iailed to disclose or recuse himselI where he sat on the Board oI WLS's co-deIendant, CAAW).
4/2/13 striking oI mandamus petition inappropriate. Quite clear that Coughlin was seeking the
2JDC to required the RJC judges to Iollow the law vis a vis NRS 178.405, where they Iailed to
on 2/5/13 in rcr11-063341, and rcr12-065630, leading to a conviction Ior a SCR 111(6)
'serious oIIense in 12-065630 on 4/2/13.
F I L E D Electronically 01-03-2012:03:31:20 PM Joey Orduna Hastings Clerk oI the Court
Transaction # 2678526
Baker's 1/3/12 Iiling reads: OPPOSITION TO AMENDED EMERGENCY MOTION
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Respondent, MATT MERLISS, by and through his counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, LTD.
and CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ., opposes appellant's "amended emergency motion Ior
temporary restraining order." Despite the complete lack oI merit oI the instant motion, Merliss
has reIrained Irom disposing oI any property leIt behind by Mr. Coughlin pending this court's
ruling on the motion. This opposition is based on the points and authorities below and all
papers and pleadings on Iile herein.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
This is an appeal Irom a summary eviction granted in the Reno Justice Court. The
pertinent Iacts Ior purposes oI this motion are as Iollows:
1. Respondent, MATT MERLISS ("MERLISS") is the owner oI the residential real
property located at 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada (the "PROPERTY").
2. Appellant, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN ("COUGHLIN"), was a tenant
at the Property beginning in March 2010.Coughlin's rent pursuant to the lease was$900.00 per
month. Coughlin last paid rent in May, 2011. As discussed below, the justicecourt rejected all oI
Coughlin's reasons Ior not paying rent.
3. On October 27, 2011, aIter two evidentiary hearings on the matter, JudgeSIerrazza oI
the Reno Justice Court granted a no-cause summary eviction in Iavor oI Merlissand against
Coughlin. A true and correct copy oI the justice court's order oI October 27,2011 is attached
hereto as EXHIBIT 1.
4. On November 1, 2011, Coughlin was lawIully and properly locked out oI theProperty.
5. On November 13, 2011, Dr. Merliss and Mr. Hill discovered Coughlin livingin the
basement oI the Property.Coughlin was arrested and charged with criminaltrespassing at that
time. A motion Ior order to show cause why Coughlin should not be heldin contempt oI the
justice court pursuant to NRS 22.020 is currently pending in that court.It was clear that
Coughlin had not made any attempt to remove any oI his belongings Iromthe Property beIore
he was caught living in the basement, although he had been living thereillegally Ior two weeks.
In Iact, Coughlin had an entire week between the October 25, 2011hearing, in which the
eviction was granted, and November 1, 2011, when he was locked out, to remove his things,
but apparently chose to use that time to get himselI holed-up in the basement instead.
6. During the time Coughlin was secretly living in the basement, Mr. Hill was sending
him emails almost daily in an eIIort to get Coughlin to make some eIIort to remove his personal
property Irom the residence. True and corrE.ct copies oI Mr. Hill's emai}s are attached hereto
as EXHIBIT 2..
7. On December 21, 2011, aIter a hearing on Coughlin's motion to contest Merliss'
personal property lien, Judge SIerrazza entered another order. A true and correctcopy oI that
court's order resolving motion to contest personal property lien is attachedhereto as EXHIBIT
3.
8. Pursuant to EXHIBIT 3, Coughlin was provided access to the Property on Thursday,
December 22, 2011, and Friday, December 23, 2011.
9. On December 22, 2011, Coughlin sent an email to the undersigned and
JudgeSIerrazza, in which he essentially announced that he was entitled to a stay, and to return
toand continue in possession oI the Property. Judge SIerrazza quickly responded by email,and
reminded Mr. Coughlin that the stay had been denied. A true and correct copy oI thatemail
exchange is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 4. Coughlin removed very little oI hisproperty that
day, and clearly intended to simply re-take possession oI the house, untilJudge SIerrazza
disabused him oI that notion.
10. Coughlin Iailed to remove all oI his personal property Irom the premises, and a
substantial amount oI cleanup remains to be done. Coughlin also Iailed to comply with the
court's order that any person accompanying him to the property must sign the liability waiver
attached to the court's order.
11. On Friday, December 23,2011, counsel Ior Merliss neglected to remove thepadlock
to the back gate oI the property. Once notiIied, counsel promptly went to theproperty to remove
the padlock, only to discover that the gate had been taken oII oI itshinges by Coughlin.
Coughlin's access to the house itselI was never hindered.
12. While at the property to remove the padlock, Coughlin, on more than oneoccasion,
screamed proIanities at Merliss' counsel, and, at one point, charged Mr. Hill andattempted to
physically intimidate him. At least the audio oI this incident was captured ontape.
13. Nevertheless, at 5:00 p.m. on Friday, December 23,2011, counsel grantedCoughlin
and his agents additional, unIettered, and unlimited access to the outside oI theproperty to
remove any remaining items. The only condition placed on that access was thatCoughlin's
helpers agreed to replace the gate on its hinges as best they could. Coughlin andhis agents
Iailed to remove the remainder oI Coughin's property Irom the yard that night,and Iailed to put
the gate back on the hinges.
14. On December 28,2011, Mr. Hill sent an email to Coughlin, oIIering himanother
opportunity to Iinish retrieving his belongings Irom the Property. A true and correct copy oI
that email is attached hereto as EXHIBIT S. Coughlin did not accept Mr. Hill's oIIer, or respond
in any way to that email.
15. On December 29, 2011, the undersigned re-sent Mr. Hill's email to Coughlin. A true
and correct copy oI the undersigned's email is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 6. Coughlin did not
respond in any way to that email.
16. On December 30, 2011, Mr. Hill revoked the oIIer extended in his December 28, 2011
email. At true and correct copy oI that revocation is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 7.
ReIerence is made to the declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq., attached hereto as
EXHIBIT 8, Ior authentication oI EXHIBITS 1, 3,4, 6, 10 and 11.
ReIerence is made to the Declaration oI Richard G. Hill, Esq., attached hereto as
EXHIBIT 9, Ior authentication oI EXHIBITS 2, 5 and 7.
LAW
1. ReIerence is made to NRCP 65(b), which provides in pertinent part as Iollows:
A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to the adverse
party or that party's attorney only iI (1) it clearly appears Irom speciIic Iacts shown by aIIidavit
or by the veriIied complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to
the applicant beIore the adverse party or attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the
applicant's attorney certiIies to the court in writing the eIIorts, iI any, which have been made to
give the notice and the reasons supporting the claim that notice should not be required. NRCP
65(b)
2. ReIerence is made to NRCP 65(c), which provides in pertinent part as Iollows: except
the payment by doing done, No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue upon the
giving oI security by the applicant, in such sum as court deems proper, Ior the oI such costs and
damages as may be incurred or suIIered any party who is Iound to have been wrongIully
enjoined or restrained. NRCP 65(c)
ReIerence is made to NRS 33.010, which provides in Iull as Iollows:
An injunction may be granted in the Iollowing cases:
1. When it shall appear by the complaint that the plaintiII is entitled to the relieI
demanded, and such relieI or any part thereoI consists in restraining the commission or
continuance oI the act complained oI, either Ior a limited period or perpetually.
2. When it shall appear by the complaint or aIIidavit that the commission or continuance
oI some act, during the litigation, would produce great or irreparable injury to the plaintiII.
3. When it shall appear, during the litigation, that the deIendant is or threatens, or is
about to do, or is procuring or suIIering to be some act in violation oI the plaintIIIs rights
respecting the subject oI the action, and tending to render the judgment ineIIectual. NRS
33.010.
ANALYSIS
Based on the caption oI Mr. Coughlin's Iiling with the court, it appears that he is asking
the court to temporarily restrain Merliss Irom disposing oI the personal property Mr. Coughlin
abandoned and leIt at the Property, However, Mr, Coughlin's paper Iails to provide any analysis
or evidentiary basis Ior that request, and is Iatally deIicient Ior a number oI reasons.
Mr. Coughlin makes no citation to any authority, nor does he provide any analysis, that would
even remotely support the issuance oI a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.
In 36 pages oI rambling, Mr. Coughlin, a licensed Nevada attorney, does not manage to
even mention, much less analyze, NRCP 65 or NRS 33.010, which are the controlling
provisions oI law. The court is leIt to speculate as to the basis Ior Mr. Coughlin's request. In
Iact, there is no basis.
A. Coughlin's Request for a Temporary Restraining Order is Procedurally and
Substantively Deficient
First, it is important Ior the court to note that Coughlin's paper was never properly
served on Merliss or his counsel. The only copies counsel received were by email and Iax. CI.,
NRCP 5. See the Declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq., attached hereto as EXHIBIT 8. Further,
Coughlin's "ProoI oI Service" identiIies the incorrect document, and Ialsely states that
document was mailed. Mr. Coughlin has never mailed any document to the oIIice oI the
undersigned, and this was been a constant issue in the underlying eviction action.l As is the
case here, Merliss has been Iorced to respond to one oI Mr. Coughlin's rants without proper
service, in an abundance oI caution that the court may choose to rule on it beIore Merliss is
given proper notice and an opportunity to be heard. UnIortunately, Mr. Coughlin appears intent
on continuing his abusive tactics in this court.
Because Coughlin has Iailed to properly serve his motion, and, based on his Iaulty prooI
oI service, does not appear to intend to, he is, in eIIect, asking the court to issue an injunction
without notice, as contemplated by NRCP 65(b).
As set Iorth below, Coughlin's motion Iails to satisIy even one requirement oI that rule. NRCP
65(b) provides that a temporary restraining order is only available where it "clearly appears
Irom speciIic Iacts shown by aIIidavit or by the veriIied complaint that immediate and
irreparable injury .. . " will result beIore the opposing party can be heard. (Emphasis added.)
Here, there is no veriIied complaint. Coughlin's motion is not veriIied, and does not contain any
sworn aIIidavit as required by the Rule.
Thus, there is no evidence to support any exercise oI discretion by this court.
Further,Coughlin does not explain how he will suIIer irreparable injury in the event Merliss is
allowed to comply with Judge SIerrazza's order and dispose oI the property Coughlin chose 1
Throughout counsel's dealings with Coughlin, he consistently Iiles papers he does not serve and
serves papers he does not Iile. By these abuses, he has muddied the record and driven the Iees
and costs beyond all reason.
6
to abandon at the house. In Iact, Coughlin will not suIIer irreparable injury, because money
damages are unquestionably an adequate remedy Ior any loss oI personal property he may
suIIer. Coughlin is not entitled to any relieI under NRCP 65 because he has an adequate legal
remedy. And even iI he did not, his unclean hands and inequitable conduct should preclude him
Irom any relieI Irom this court at this time.
Even iI the court were inclined to overlook the obvious and Iatal deIiciencies oI
Coughlin's motion, Coughlin does not address the mandatory bond he must post pursuant to
NRCP 65(c). As set Iorth in Judge SIerrazza's order (EXHIBIT 3), the reasonable costs oI
storage at the Property is $30.00 per day. That amount should accrue Irom November 17, 2011,
and continue until this appeal is concluded or any restraining order or injunction is ultimately
dissolved. The bond should also include Iees incurred by Merliss in opposing this "emergency
amended motion," which Iees total $1,485.00. See Declaration oI Casey D. Baker, Esq.,
EXHIBIT 8.
B. Coughlin Has Not Shown Any Basis for An Injunction to Issue
The issuance oI an injunction is controlled by NRS 33.010. That statute requires that
there be a complaint or an aIIidavit on Iile, and some showing oI great or irreparable harm, or a
violation oI the moving party's rights. Setting aside Ior the moment the complete lack oI
analysis by Coughlin, it is clear that this situation does not warrant extraordinary equitable
relieI.
As discussed above, there is no complaint on Iile. Coughlin has neither veriIied his
motion, nor submitted an aIIidavit. Further, there can be no irreparable harm where money
damages are an adequate remedy. Thus, it would be an abuse oI discretion Ior the court to grant
Coughlin any relieI under NRS 33.010(1) or (2).
Likewise, no relieI is available to Coughlin under NRS 33.010(3). Because the order
Coughlin appealed Irom is the October 27, 2011 order granting an eviction (EXHIBIT 1), the
"subject oI this action" as contemplated by that statute is Coughlin's rights in the real property -
not the personal property he chose to abandon there. At the moment, Coughlin has no rights in
the real property, so Merliss cannot be said to be violating any rights oI Coughlin's.
Likewise, even iI the court were to somehow expand its application oI that statute to the
December 21, 2011 order resolving the landlord's personal property lien (EXHIBIT 3),
Coughlin's "rights" in the personal property on the premises were terminated at 5:00 p.m. on
Friday, December 23, 2011 by a lawIul court order. As such, Coughlin no longer has any rights
in that property, either, and there is nothing Ior Merliss to violate or Ior the court to enjoin.
Until it has been reversed, Merliss is entitled, and, indeed, obligated, to comply with the justice
court's order. NRS 22.010.
C. Coughlin is Not Entitled to A Stay
Coughlin claims to have deposited $250 with the justice's court pursuant to NRS 40.385,
although he has not provided any prooI in support oI his claim. Attached hereto as EXHIBIT 10
is a true and correct copy oI the justice's court's docket as oI December 19, 2011. That docket
shows that Coughlin paid a Iiling Iee Ior his appeal on December 12, 2011, in the amount oI
$216.00. It is entirely unclear Irom the Iollowing entries oI that docket whether or when
Coughlin ever paid an additional $250.00 under NRS 40.385. II he ever did so, it was not until
on or around December 14, 2011, well aIter he had been locked out and appealed, and well
aIter his motion(s) Ior a stay had already been denied weeks earlier. See also EXHIBIT 4.
This inIormation should be part oI the appeal record with this court as well, and can be veriIied
by the court in that manner. Even iI Coughlin eventually paid some amount toward an appeal
bond, it was not in time to stay the eviction during this appeal. To do that, a proper motion must
be made and granted, and the bond posted, prior to the lockout. The lockout here occurred on
November 1, 2011. By the time Coughlin managed to Iind that statute and pay any money to
the court, he had been locked out oI the property Ior six weeks. As such, any request Ior a stay
was, and is, moot. At this point, Coughlin does not have any rights in either the real or personal
property, and there is nothing to stay. Coughlin is not entitled to that relieI under any analysis.
Fn2 (In2 Coughlin has since Iiled a motion with the justice court seeking a return oI his
bond, which he claims to have paid on December 22, 2011, but Iails to mention that here.
A true and correct copy oI Coughlin's motion is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 11.)
D. Coughlin Asks for Extraordinary Equitable Relief, But Has Failed to Mitigate His
Damages or Otherwise Behave Equitably
Coughlin had three weeks to remove his property beIore Iinally being arrested Ior
trespassing on November 13, 2011 (October 25, 2011 through November 13, 2011). Instead oI
moving his things, however, he chose to barricade himselI in the basement, apparently
believing that he could live there indeIinitely without being discovered. Then, later, he had two
Iull days pursuant to a court order in which to remove his belongings. On Thursday, December
22, 2011, he did virtually nothing, except send harassing emails to the court and counsel. See,
e.g., EXHIBIT 4. More oI those emails are attached to Coughlin's motion. On Friday,
December 23, 2011, he and his crew removed a substantial amount oI his belongings, but also
leIt a substantial amount oI debris on the premises. At the end oI the day on December 23,
2011, counsel even allowed Coughlin's crew additional, unlimited, unIettered access to the
backyard and other outside areas to Iinish removing what was there. Neither they nor Coughlin
took advantage oI that opportunity. On December 28,2011, Mr. Hill oIIered Mr. Coughlin an
additional opportunity to retrieve whatever was leIt on the premises. All Mr. Coughlin had to
do was to prepare a stipulation and order Ior this court's signature, and he would have been
allowed back on the Property. See EXHIBIT 5. On December 29,2011, the undersigned re-sent
that email to Mr. Coughlin. See EXHIBIT 6. Coughlin Iailed to accept the oIIer to retrieve his
belongings, and it was ultimately revoked. Instead oI resolving this matter by stipulation,
Coughlin Iiled the instant motion. As has been the case throughout the underlying eviction
action, Mr. Coughlin is obviously more interested in Iighting about his perceived issues than he
is in resolving them. Mr. Coughlin does not come to court with clean hands, and should not be
awarded any equitable relieI whatsoever, especially without being required to post adequate
security as required by law. Further, the court should note that Coughlin does not come with a
plan or a proposal. He just wants to prevent Dr. Merliss Irom re-renting the house, and cause
him to incur additional Iees. That is his real agenda.
CONCLUSION Coughlin's motion is procedurally and substantively deIicient in many
respects. He has not satisIied any oI the threshold requirements oI either NRCP 65 or NRS
33.010. He has not shown the court any legal or Iactual basis Ior the relieI he purports to seek,
and, in Iact, does not even address the merits oI his motion whatsoever, except to simply
demand more time to get his things. Coughlin declined an oIIer Irom counsel to stipulate to the
relieI he now asks the court to grant him. Instead, he chose to waste this court's time with an
unsupported, incoherent, and procedurally deIicient motion that does not even address the
applicable substantive law. Coughlin's motion must be denied.
WHEREFORE, Respondent prays that Coughlin take nothing by way oI his motion, and
that same be denied in its entirety; and Ior such other, Iurther, and additional relieI as seems
just to the court in the premises. Dated this 3
rd
day oI January, 2012. /s/ Casey D. Baker, Esq.
Such a typical Hill/Baker move (exactly what Thomas J. Hall, Esq., described to
Coughlin as the types oI purposeIul obIuscation designed to increase their billable hours and
cost oI litigation to the opposing side that Baker and Hill perpetually engage in) resides in
attaching an RJC Docket Irom 12/19/11 and purporting to be unaware oI the date when
Coughlin posted the $250 supersedeas bond (aside Irom the initial posting thereoI on 10/17/11,
which the RJC retained until Coughlin received it back Irom the RJC on 11/16/11, at which
point Coughlin was reIused on multiple occasions by RJC Filing OIIice staII (with intererence
by the RJC BailiIIs) in his attempt to post the $250 called Ior in NRS 40.385). This idiotice
move by Hill and Baker is thoroughly exposed upon a review oI Exhibit 11 to their 1/3/11
Opposition to Amended Motion Ior TRO (Coughlin's 12/27/11 Motion which is all oI one page
long and which explictly cites 12/22/11 as the date Io the posting oI the $250 supersedeas bond
pursuant to NRS 40.385 (something even Iurther underscored by a review oI Exhibit 4 and the
12/22/11 announcement by Coughlin (in addition to Coughlin having that 12/22/11 Notice oI
Posting Supersedeas Bond personally delivered to Hill's oIIice on 12/22/11) oI the 12/22/11
psoting oI the $250 supersedeas bond). So, obvioulsy, Baker and Hill's attaching Exhibit 10, an
RJC docket Irom 12/19/11 is a total non-sequitir, and completely transparent and insipid (not to
mention dishonest) is their attempts to then Ieign conIusion or uncertainty as to when Coughlin
was Iinally able to get the RJC to take the $250 supersedeas bond he posted on 12/22/11.
Subsequently Coughlin learned that the RJC did, in Iact, take the $1.00 bills he would leave on
the counter upon Christine Erickson and Cherly Vertung reIusing to take the $250 NRS 40.385
supersedeas bonds he was attempting to post. Coughlin could not aIIord to leave $250 on the
RJC Iiling oIIice counter with the uncertainty oI whether the clerk's would Iollow through on
there stated reIusal not to accept his posting such bond.
Baker continually makes legal pronouncements, without citing to any authority to
support such positions, such as his contention that Coughlin was required to provide some
prooI oI having posted the $250 supersedeas bond (additionally, Judge SIerrazza granted
Coughlin IFP status as to the appeal on 10/25/11, and arguably, that applies to the $250 bond
Ior costs on appeal pursuant to the indigency language oI NJCRCP 73...as such, the RJC
Docket in Exhibit 10 Io Baker's 1/3/12 Motion reveals a a check dated 11/7/11 the RJC notes as
posted on 12/14/11 Ior $250.00, which arguably also should have satisIied the requirements oI
NRS 40.385. Baker cites absolutely no law in support oI the Iollowing positions underlined
below:
'C. Coughlin is Not Entitled to A Stay
Coughlin claims to have deposited $250 with the justice's court pursuant to NRS 40.385,
although he has not provided any proof in support of his claim. Attached hereto as
EXHIBIT 10 is a true and correct copy oI the justice's court's docket as oI December 19, 2011.
That docket shows that Coughlin paid a filing fee for his appeal on December 12, 211, in
the amount of $21..
Actually, that is not true, the Docket actually indicates that on 12/8/11 'received a check
made payable to ' 2JDC Ior $216.00 (characterized as 'this is Ior the District Court's papeal Iee
when appeal goes over as notated by ChieI Civil Clerk Karen Stancil):
'DEC 8 Received a check made payable to 'Second Judicial District Court' dated 11/8/11 Ior
$216.00. (This is Ior District Court's appeal Iee when appeal goes over) ks
DEC 12 Received check #1422 Irom Zachary Coughlin payable to District Court Ior appeal
Iee. jJ
DEC 14 Receipt to Zachary Coughlin Irom Reno Justice Court Ior $250.00 Ior appeal bond and
a receipt Ior $1.00 Ior 'supersedeas bond'. Emergency Motion Ior TRO; Injunction Request Ior
Submission of this Motion Attempting to Pay Appeal Bond of $250.00 and Supersedeas
Whatever it Is filed.
Further, Baker was present in court on 10/25/11 when Judge SIerrazza ruled that he was,
due to Coughlin's indigency and his having previously granted Coughlin IPF status/Iee waiver
in 1708 on 10/6/11, that he was waiving the Iiling Iee in the RJC Ior the appeal to District
Court ($24.00).
Clearly the RJC Docket demonstrates an attempt by Coughlin to pay $250.00 pursuant
to NRS 40.385 on 'DEC 12, and that is over an above the extent to which the $250.00 'appeal
bond and a receipt Ior $1.00 Ior 'supersedeas bond' is notated under 'DEC 14 on that same
docket. Additionally, the docket entry Ior 'DEC 15 reveals the 'NOTICE OF POSTING
AND ACCEPTANCE FO SUPERSEDEAS/COST BOND ON APPEAL Iiled by Coughlin.
Further, in a 12/22/11 'NOTE ORDER in the RJC Iile handwritten and initialed by
Judge SIerrazza, he ruled '12/22/11 The stay was denied an no bond was posted within 10
days? DeIendant needs to have the District Court address this on appeal. /s/ PS. The allusion
to 'within 10 days by Judge SIerrazza invokes NRS 40.380 and NJCRCP 73A(a)(4), both oI
which Baker admits do not apply to this matter, given is was a mere summary eviction, rather
than a 'Iormal eviction. There, Judge SIerrazza and Baker continue in attempting to have it
both ways. That is, seeking to apply all the beneIits oI a plenary proceeding to the beneIit oI
the landlord (the application oI NRS 40.380 and Rule 73A(a)(4), the ability to utilize discovery
like Baker's 10/18/11 Motion Ior a NJCRCP 34 Order Ior Inspection, supboenaing Coughlin Ior
the 10/25/11 hearing, intially attempting to rule on more than possession where at the
conlcusion Io the 10/25/11 hearing Judge SIerrazza ruled 'the $2,275 is the property oI the
x....
Further, it is entirely inaccurate Ior Judge SIerrazza to indicate that 'no bond was posted
within 10 days where Judge SIerrazza converted the $2,275 in rent escrow deposited on
10/17/11 to Coughlin's 'appeal bond (note check transcript) at the conclusion oI the 10/25/11
'Trial which was later recharacterized as a 'continuation oI a summary eviction proceeding..
Just like Coughlin wrote in his 12/22/11 email to Baker and SIerrazza (which Judge
SIerrazza required Coughlin to send to him, by email) the RJC and Baker are leIt with a
choice...either its a plenary trial or a summary eviction. There are pros and cons to each
(explicitly set out by Coughlin in his 10/17/11 'Emergency Motion to Stay, Set Aside and
Vacate Eviction Hearing Order at page 6 (wherein Coughlin copied and pasted Irom the
NSCt's 'Landlord Tenant Handbook a simplied take on eviction law in Nevada, with statutory
citations. It is breathtaking how applicable the Iollowing protion Coughlin cited to is to the
issues that utlimately became and are at dispute in the matter, the appeal, and Coughlin's Iormal
disciplinary hearing.
The posting oI $2,275 by Coughlin on 10/17/11 with the RJC also operates to satisIy any
required Iiling Iee oI bonds Ior costs on appeal and NRS 40.385 supersedeas bond attendant to
Coughlin's 10/19/11 Iiling oI a Notice oI Appeal as to the 10/13/11 'Eviction Decision and
Order (which, absolutely was a Iinal appealable order, and thereIore, Coughlin perIected his
appeal and the RJC was divested oI jursidiction), in addition to the bonds and Iees associated
with Coughlin's 10/17/11 'Emergency Motion to Stay, Set Aside, Vacate Eviction Hearing
Order Filed.
So, its completely lacking in merit Ior Baker to write:
' It is entirely unclear Irom the Iollowing entries oI that docket whether or when
Coughlin ever paid an additional $250.00 under NRS 40.385. II he ever did so, it was not until
on or around December 14, 2011, well aIter he had been locked out and appealed, and well
aIter his motion(s) Ior a stay had already been denied weeks earlier. See also EXHIBIT 4.
This inIormation should be part oI the appeal record with this court as well, and can be
veriIied by the court in that manner. Even iI Coughlin eventually paid some amount toward an
appeal bond, it was not in time to stay the eviction during this appeal. To do that, a proper
motion must be made and granted, and the bond posted, prior to the lockout. The lockout here
occurred on November 1, 2011. By the time Coughlin managed to Iind that statute and pay any
money to the court, he had been locked out oI the property Ior six weeks. As such, any request
Ior a stay was, and is, moot. At this point, Coughlin does not have any rights in either the real
or personal property, and there is nothing to stay. Coughlin is not entitled to that relieI under
any analysis. Fn2 (In2 Coughlin has since Iiled a motion with the justice court seeking a return
oI his bond, which he claims to have paid on December 22, 2011, but Iails to mention that here.
A true and correct copy oI Coughlin's motion is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 11.)
Also: '
NRS4.230 Docket: Entries; Iorm.
NRS4.240 Entries in docket prima facie evidence of facts.
NRS4.250 Docket must be kept by justice oI the peace.
NRS4.280 Jurisdiction oI justice oI the peace with whom docket is deposited.
NRS4.350 Deputy clerk: Appointment; compensation; powers and duties.
NRS4.353 Deputy marshal: Appointment; duties; qualiIications; compensation.
NRS4.370 Jurisdiction.
NRS4.371 EIIect oI transIer oI original jurisdiction Irom district court to justice
court.
The Iollowing brings up some questions as to the RJC morphing the 12/20/12
'Administrative Order 2012-01, In the Administrative Matter oI Zachary Coughlin (to which,
on 2/25/13, ChieI Judge Pearson issued an Order to Show Cause to Coughlin, baring the same
caption (ie, lacking a case number oI an opposing party), setting an OSC Hearing Ior 3/5/13,
which was continued until 3/11/13 (with Coughlin preserving Ior the record that he wished to
remain his own counsel thereaIter and his objections to any attempts to insert the
'Administrative Order into any other case (Judge Pearson indicated it was retroactively being
placed into RCR2011-063341, despite the Iact that there was not ostensible connection between
the two or the subject matter involved (indeed, the 2/25/13 OSC Iails to cite any actual names
in connection with any oI the vague allegations (in violation oI NRS 22.030(2)). Upon
Coughlin pointing out the issues with such an approach, a new case was created, RCR2013-
071437, with the 'Complaint therein consisting oI the 12/20/12 'Administrative Order 2012-
01 baring the same 12/20/12 Iile stamp date, with the new case number aIIixed thereto, with
no new Iile stamping to go along with the new case number (ie, a document was altered by the
RJC aIter it was Iile stamped). This presents several issue with respect to NRS 4.230.
'NRS 4.230(c)The date oI the summons, and the time oI its return; and iI an order to arrest the
deIendant be made, or a writ oI attachment be issued, a statement oI the Iact. Coughlin was
summarily arrested (aIter 7 pm in his own home, no less) by a DAS oIIicer on 2/2/13 (hours
aIter sending an email to the WCDA's OIIice). DAS OIIicer Ramos indicated to Coughlin at
the time oI the arrest that he was arresting Coughlin summarily Ior two speciIic alleged parole
violations, indicating they consisted oI two alleged Iailurs to check in with DAS, one on 1/2/13
and one on 1/23/13. At the 3/12/13 OSC Hearing, Judge Pearson sought to characterize that
2/2/13 DAS arrest oI Coughlin as stemming Irom the alleged issuance oI a warrant Ior
Coughlin's arrest pursuant to an alleged Iailure by Coughlin to obtain a 'mental health
evaluation within 30 days oI the Order oI 11/21/12 by Judge SIerrazza in RCR11-063341.
However, the Docket in that matter, and the correspondence and communications between
Coughlin, DAS, and RJC ChieI BailiII Sexton, and BailiII Heibert clearly reveal that not only
was the issuance oI a warrant on 1/9/13 Ior Coughlin's arrest in that regard unsupportable in the
Iirst place, but such warrant was
Further, Judge Pearson's revisionist history as to the basis Ior the summary probation
violation arrest indicated by DAS OIIicer Ramos on 2/2/12 (to which he completely lacked
probable cause considering the correspondence between DAS OIIicer Brown et al and
Coughlin as to both the 1/2/13 and 1/23/12 checkins, particularly where RJC BailiII Augustin
Medina willIully prevented Coughlin Irom accessing the DAS oIIice prior to its 3:00 pm
closing time (and DAS is not 'an area under the exclusive control oI the RJC to whatever
extent Judge SIerrazza's 12/20/12 'Administrative Order 2012-01 is even a legal order (and
Coughlin should not be subject to the threat oI incarceration oI 25 days Ior every alleged de
minimis inIraction thereoI (and the RJC and Judge Pearson, in his 2/25/12 OSC and statements
on the record on 3/5/13 and 3/11/13 have made contradictory assessments Io the extent to
which DAS is under the umbrella or a part oI the RJC suIIicient to make, say, a phone call or
email to a DAS OIIicer a violation oI such 'Administrative Order 2012-01. The Iact that
Coughlin had provided documentation and medical evidence that he is diagnosed with and
being treated Ior ADD/ADHD and Major Depressive Disorder makes all the more untenable
the extent to which DAS and the RJC have narrowed the acceptable time Irames and methods
oI communicating or submitting materials to both the RJC and the SBN (exposing Coughlin to
an arraignment on 4/17/13 incident to the Ielony and gross misdemeanor protection orders
violation charges that the WCDA's oIIice dropped on 3/7/12. And the City oI Reno's indication
that the WCDA's OIIice dropped such prosecutions only based on a lack oI jurisdiction makes
no sense where the RJC prosecuted Coughlin Ior a misdemeanor arrest by the RPD that was
similarly alleged to have occurred within Reno City limits (as was the case in 11-063341 and
12-065630, and probably, 12-067980).
So, where the Arrest Report and Probable Cause Report by DAS OIIicers Ior the 2/1/13
summary arrest Ior alleged probation violations clearly Iails to indicate any warrant having
been issued. Rather, that 2/1/13
(and RJC BailiII Sexton and Heibert and the docket in 11-063341 reveal no such warrant was
issued suIIicient to make that 2/1/13 arrest), but rather, speciIially mentions two alleged Iailures
to check in with DAS (Iailing to allege any sort oI 'no call no show typically required Ior such
a summary arrest, Judge Pearson and the RJC's attempts to retroactively recharacterize whether
such arrest was based upon a warrant is troubling, especially where the warrant was allegedly
issued incident to an allegation that Coughlin Iailed to 'provide prooI oI obtaining a mental
health evaluation within 30 days oI the 11/21/12 Order in 11-063341. This is particularly true
considering the communciations and correspondences between Coughlin and DAS in that
regard, Coughlin's submitting an IFP as to the expense oI any such evaluation that was not
satisIied by virtue oI the evaluation connected to the docket entry oI '10/22/12 Hearing Result
(Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peter ) DeIendiJnt has been Iound competent. DeIendant has
indicated that he would like to represent himselI. DeIendant Faretlo Canvassed. DeIendant's
motion to represent hirnseloI is GRANTED. The Court also appointes Public DeIender Jim
Leslie as standby coulISel. Motion by DeIendant to have trameript prepared at public expense.
Motion DENIED. Trial conIirmed setIor with Lake's Crossing's Durante's report or prooI
thereoI provided to DAS, in addition to communications regarding the arrangement with
NNAHMS.
Indeed, the docket in 11-063341 expressly rebuts the indication by Judge Pearson as to
whether the 2/2/13 arrest was based upon a warrant: '1/11/13 Warrant Recalled Per Order oI
Steve Tuttle and Judge Pearson, warrant is recalled DAS to inIorm DeIendant oI evaluation and
Ireed /0 get iI comple/ed. DO NOT ISSUE WARRANT WrrIIOUT OK FROM PEARSON.
Further,
The 2/1/13 'Inmate Booking InIormation Form indicates the DAS arrest time as 7:02
pm (ie, in violation oI NRS 171.136 where the probation stemmed Irom a simple misdemeanor
conviction (Ior which Coughlin has already now served 13 days, to go along with the
completely overreaching 180 day suspended sentence in 11-063341 and another 180 day
suspended sentence incident to the 4/2/13 conviction in 12-065630 (wherein Judge CliIton in
another display oI transparent overreaching made that sentence run consecutive to the one in
11-063341, giving Coughlin four years of probation Ior two misdemeanors that don't add up to
ten days in jail given the Iine schedule Ior a petty larceny charge and a 'resisting a public
oIIicer charge .
The 2/4/12 10:22 pm Inmate Release InIormation Form (Coughlin was not actually
released until 1:30 am on 2/5/12, yet still made it to the 8:30 am hearing that morning in 11-
063341 (incident to his being in court anyways Ior the 2/5/13 continuation Io the trial in 12-
065630...
For the RJC to suggest is has not made such patently overreaching convictions and
sentences Ior any other reason that to assist Washoe County and the WCDA's OIIice/RJC, and
WCSO's OIIice in aealing with Coughlin (even where Coughlin has been chucking the deuce
up Ior months/waiving the white Ilag oI surrender), is just preposterous, and really, its very
insincere and ignorant, somehow, at the same time, Ior Judge SIerrazza and CliIton (not to
mention ready attack dog with Clydesdale style ethics conIlicts blinders on DDA Zachary
Norman Young, Esq., courtesy oI ADA Helzer) to continue stacking as many SCR 111(6)
convictions on Coughlin records, all whilst ignoring the patent consequential eIIects oI their
extremely suspect rulings in Rev2011-001708 (including Judge CliIton's oI 10/17/11, and
Judge Schroeders oI 3/15/12 in rev12-374, and in Rev12-1048 oI 6/28/12 and 7/5/12, and
Judge Pearson's in the same Rev12-1048 oI 7/31/12 and in Rev12-078432 oI 10/2/12 (and the
RJC's Iailure to accord Coughlin a hearing as required upon his Iiling a Tenant's AIIidaivt
incident to the summary eviction he only learned oI at the 10/2/12 hearing upon cross-examing
Ken Grant oI Superior Storage. Holland & Hart's Rick Elmore may have some 'splainin to do
on that one, and might exchange notes with Gayle Kern, Esq., as to the violations oI RPC 3.5A,
Irom Rev12-374 on 3/15/12.
So, the RJC and Washoe County beneIitted in its avowed goal to have Coughlin
disbarred by putting him in jail Ior Iive days right beIore the 2/13/13 deadline Ior Coughlin to
Iile his Appeal BrieI in 62337.
' Judge Pearson on 2/5/13 at, according to the docket entry and OSC hearing (Iurther Coughlin has
absolutely no recollection oI the 2/4/13 video hearing beIore Judge SIerrazza being an 'arraignment
and certainly no warrant being mentioned is recalled by Coughlin at 8:30 am in 11-063341 (which was
improperly noticed to Coughlin on his Jail Inmate Release InIormation paperwork as being set Ior
February 5
th
, 2013, which, incidentally, the 2/25/13 OSC in AO12-01 includes as one oI the dates
wherein Coughlin is alleged to have violated the AO12-01 ('On February 5, 2013 Coughlin contacted
two employees who are not bailiIIs at a number other than that provided to him as the bailiII s station.
At Page 2. It is possible that someone inquired with the RJC on that 2/5/13 date as to whether any such
hearing in 11-063341 was still on calendar and that an RJC employee, whom may have been a BailiII,
indicated that such 2/5/13 Hearing in 11-063341 was, in Iact, not still on calendar, but, rather, had been
incorrectly listed on Coughlin' WC Jail Inmate Release InIormation paperwork where such Hearing
was actually set Ior, and did, in Iact take place on, 2/2/13 at 8:30 am. Whether now it is the case that
the RJC Judges intended the 2/2/13 Hearing to be a Gagnon I style hearing and such Hearing
indentiIied in Coughlin's WC Jail Inmate Release InIormation paperwork to be a 'Gagnon II type oI
Hearing is possible. It may be possible that an RJC employee, whom may have been a BailiII, but,
whom may also not have been a BailiII incorrectly indicated to someone whom may have inquired with
the RJC with regard to whether such 2/7/13 Hearing in 11-063341 was still on calendar that such
Hearing was not still on calendar oI set to take place, but had, in Iact, been vacated.) The 2/25/13 OSC
in AO12-01 reads:
Docket in 11-063341 reads:
'1/11/13 Warrant Recalled Per Order oI Steve Tultle and Judge Pearson, warralJt is recalled DAS to
inIorm DeIendant oI evaluation and Ireed /0 get iI completed. DO NOT ISSUE WARRANT WrrIIOUT
OK FROM PEARSON.
1/17/13 CANCELE D Warrant Arraignment (10:00 AM) (Judicial OIIicer: Schroeder, Jack) Vacated
Mental Health Evaluation and comply with recommendations . Case is on Appeal.
2/4/13 Warrant Arraignment (10:00 AM) (Judicial OIIicer: SIernlZZa, Peter) FTC-DAS Violation.
BAIL:$5oo CASH Parties Present: DeIendant Coughlin, Zachary Barker
2/4/13 'Bail Sct (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peter) Bail Set at $500.00 CASH ONLY. DeIendant
Remanded to the Custody oI the Washoe County SheriII.
'2/5/13 Order to Show Cause (8:30 AM) (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott) FTC-DAS VIOlATION
Parties present: DeIendant Coughlin, Zachary Barker
DAS OIIicer Brown has been particularly dishonest with Coughlin with respect to her
comunications with Coughlin vis a vis getting a mental health evaluation done, the Iee waiver
application process, whether a warrant would issue, the extent to which Coughlin had already provided
'prooI oI obtaining such evaluation 'within 30 days', etc., etc.
Regardless, the Arrest Report and PC Sheet oI the 2/1/13 DAS summary probation violation
arrest clearly indicates no warrant was involved, that it took place aIter 7 pm (DAS OIIicers ordered
Coughlin out oI his residence) and was premised upon a total lack oI probable cause to make such a
summary arrest.
So, despite Judge Pearson's attempts to undo the violation oI NRS 171.136 by DAS OIIicer in
arresting Couglin in his home aIter 7 pm without a warrant on 2/1/13, the PC Sheet and docket in 11-
063341 tells the real story. Some might say: do the Reno Justice Court judges ever Iollow the law?
That AR and PC Sheet identiIies the charge as the Iollowing:
'NRS 211A.125 Arrest oI probationer.
1. The chief or an assistant may arrest a probationer without a warrant if there is probable cause
to believe that the probationer has committed an act that constitutes a violation of a condition of
his or her suspended sentence or residential confinement.
2. Any other peace oIIicer may arrest a probationer upon receipt oI a written order by a chieI or an
assistant stating that there is probable cause to believe that a probationer has committed an act that
constitutes a violation oI a condition oI his or her suspended sentence or residential conIinement.
3. After making an arrest, the chief, assistant or other peace officer shall immediately notify the
sentencing court of the arrest of the probationer and shall submit a written report setting forth
the act that constituted a violation of a condition of the suspended sentence or residential
confinement of the probationer.
4. A chieI, an assistant or another peace oIIicer may immediately release Irom custody without any
Iurther proceedings any probationer arrested without a warrant pursuant to this section iI the chieI,
assistant or other peace oIIicer determines that there is not probable cause to believe that the person
violated the condition oI his or her suspended sentence or residential conIinement.
With 'transporting OIIicer Ramos with him, DAS OIIicer Wickman made the warrantless
arrest oI 2/1/13, indicating: 'on 2/1/13 at apprxoimately 18:45 hours, we made contact with the above
subject who is on probation with this department. Subject Iailed to check in into this department as
required on 1/3/13 and 1/23/13. Subject was taken into custody Ior Iailing to check in which is a
violation oI his probation. Subject was taken into custody, cuIIed, double locked, and checked Ior
tightness. Subject was then transported to Washoe Jail..
OIIicer Wickman's declaration only indicates 'we made contact Iailing to mention the
'contact consisted oI banging on Coughlin's resdience door (this Washoe County/City oI Reno Gang
Bang has reduced National Merit Finalist/Iormer Reno High All-Time leading Scorer in Basketball (2
time all state, whatever whatever/passed the NV bar exam aIter second year oI law schoo. Tenth in his
law school class, USPTO patent attorney, etc.) Coughlin to living in a IiIth wheel trailer he rents Ior
$75 a month and eating at Iood pantries. Isn't Nevada great? No wonder it leads or is near the bottom,
or top? OI all the misery categories and indexes (unemployment, suicides, disease, Ioreclosures,
bankruptcies. Maybe iI Nevada's Judge cease co-signing all the misconduct oI law enIorcement and
prosecutors, and instead invested in its residents a bit more (and the Iew skilled, educated young
proIessional/students who don't bolt the state at the Iirst chance they get) Nevada could progress a bit,
no? Instead, its become a mecca Ior law enIorcement oIIicers transplanted Irom CaliIornia taking out
their Irustrations on locals, while being comparitively well beneIitted and compensated Ior the privilege
oI doing so..
However, the time oI arrest as listed on teh
Sure does help to have Judge Elliot strike Irom the record on his last day on the bench all oI
Coughlin's Iiling in CR12-2025 (the appeal oI 11-063341) including Coughlin's typed 1/18/13 Motion
to Stay Probation (citing some ridiculous Iont size allegation applicable to perhaps 1 sentence at most
oI a 10 page Iiling, made all the more dubious given the subject matter exposed therein relative to the
per se disqualiIication basis Judge Elliott ignored due to his Board Presidency Ior the same CAAW
Coughlin was suing beIore him in CV11-01955, and act oI judicial misconduct suIIicient to have all
rulings or ordres by Judge Elliott in any case involving Coughlin overtturned (and Elliot handled all oI
Coughlin's criminal appeals and disposed oI all oI them on ultra suspect grounds (and went to StanIord
with Elcano and Echeverria).
Further, the RJC still reIused to process the Notice oI Appeal Coughlin Iiled in various matters,
includign on 3/19/13 in 11-063341 as to the 3/11/134 Order.
11-063341 '2/5/13 Order to Show Cause Hearing Held (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scot!)
DeIendant has submit/ed an SB89 request. GRANTED. Court is to pay Ior evaluation. Evaluator may
C()T/tact the DeIendant at (949) 667-7402 or bye-mail at zachcoughlinholmail.com. DeIendant is to
continue checking in with DAS between 9:00 am and 2:00pm on Wednesdays. DeIendant is to have no
contact with RJC staII . by phone, leller or e-mail. DeIendant may Iile pleadings, but is to check in with
security Iirst at the entrance oI the Mills B. Lance OIIice Building. and a IUC Baj/iIwI illb e notiIied
Bail is to remain inIull Iorce and eIIect.In a Trial set in RCR 2012-065630. Deputy District Allorney
Zoch Young requested to go back on the record beIore Judge Pearson to be heard regarding the
previous SB89 GRANTED in RCR 2011-063341. DeIendant who is appearing without caunse/,
objected Judge CliIton GRANTS Slates request . Hearing proceeded beIore Judge Scolt Pearson. State
is represented by Zach Young, Esq., DeIendant is not represented by Counsel. AIter Iurther review oI
the Iile, the Court has reconsidered DeIendanJs SB89 Iiled February 5, 2013, at 8:54 am and has
DENIED it. The Court is still ordering the DeIendant get evaluated Ior competency at the Courts
expelue. DeIendant requested that his medicatioll be paid Ior. The Court indicaled it will comider il at a
laler time. The order ta show cause hearing has been conIirmed setIor February 25.2013, aI8:30A.M.
DeIondant is ordered to maU an apt. Ior evaluation by February 12, 20/3 and is to show DASproo I o I
lhal apt.
'3/5/13 Order to Show Cause (2:00 PM) (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott) Parties Present:
DeIendant Coughlin. Zachary Barker\
'3/5/13 Hearing Result (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott ) Upon the order oI Judge Scott Pearson.
Bruce Lindsay oI tire Bob Bell Group, is hereby appointed to represent the DeIendant in this matter and
the Administrative Order. First, Coughlin clearly retained, on the the record, his right to continue selI
representing, only assenting to Lindsay appearing in '11-063341 in a co-counsel arrangement, which
Judge Pearson indicated 'was up to you and Mr. Lindsay. Coughlin never assented to Lindsay
appearing in 'the Administrative Matter or some new case created thereaIter to Iit such into 13-
071437. Lindsay's role seemed to consist chieIly oI collecting checks Ior three diIIerent case number
he was allegedly appointed on Ior every one 'hearing he showed up to (usually late, with no
conIerring oI any sort with his 'client beIorehand) and just, generall, playing the Washington Generals
role to a 't'. So, 'this matter and 'the Administrative Order are diIIerent cases, whereas up until
Coughlin pointing out the illegality thereoI, Judge Pearson was attempting to retroactively stick the
'Administrative Order into 'this matter (11-063341). Perhaps the RPD, Washoe County, and the
RJC should stop handing out arrest and prosecutions like candy iI it lacks the resources to aIIord the
due process, record keeping, and organizational structure necessary to support the massive
inIrastructure such overcharging/ adn baseless arresting requires.
'12/0612012 12110/2012 1211912012 0111012013 01/11/2013 0111712013
0210412013 0210412013 0210512013 0210512013 RENO CRIMINAL CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. RCRlOll-063341 requested by James Leslie, Deputy Public DeIender J Appeal
Filed Notice OI Appeal; Designation OI Record; Request Ior Transcript Cash Bail Converted
and ReIunded Bail converted to Iines and Iees in the amoulJt oI$175.00. Balance reIunded in
the amount oI $290.oocheck #040474 Ql Order Filed l Proceedings CertiIied to the Second
Judicial District Court Letter Sent B.l Proceedings CertiIied to the Second Judicial District
Court Supplemental tlI Warrant Issued First Bench Warrant issued bail set at $500.00 Cosh
Only Warrant Recalled Per Order oI Steve Tultle and Judge Pearson, warralJt is recalled DAS
to inIorm DeIendant oI evaluation and Ireed /0 get iI comple/ed. DO NOT ISSUE WARRANT
WrrIIOUT OK FROM PEARSON. CANCELE D Warrant Arraignment (10:00 AM) (Judicial
OIIicer: Schroeder, Jack) Vacated Mental Health Evaluation and comply with recommendations
. Case is on Appeal. Qj Warrant Arraignment (10:00 AM) (Judicial OIIicer: SIernlZZa, Peter)
I7C-DAS Violation. BAIL:$5oo CASH Parties Present: DeIendant Coughlin, Zachary Barker
9J Bail Sct (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peter) Bail Set at $500.00 CASHO NLY. DeIendant
Remanded to the CU!itadyo I the Washoe County SheriII. j Order to Show Cause (8:30 AM)
(Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott) FTC-DAS VIOlATION Parties "resent: DeIendant Coughlin,
lcJchary Barker B.l Order to Show Cause Hearing Held (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scot!)
DeIendant has submit/ed an SB89 request. GRANTED. Court is to pay Ior evaluation.
Evaluator may C()T/tact the DeIendant at (949) 667-7402 or bye-mail at
zachcoughlinholmail.com. DeIendant is to continue checking in with DAS between 9:00 am
and 2:00pm on Wednesdays. DeIendant is to have no contact with RJC staII . by phone, leller
or e-mail. DeIendant may Iile pleadings, but is to check in with security Iirst at the entrance oI
the Mills B. Lance OIIice Building. and a IUC Baj/iIwI illb e notiIied Bail is to remain inIull
Iorce and eIIect.In a Trial set in RCR 2012-065630. Deputy District Allorney Zoch Young
requested to go back on the record beIore Judge Pearson to be heard regarding the previous
SB89 GRANTED in RCR 2011-063341. DeIendant who is appearing without caunse/, objected
Judge CliIton GRANTS Slates request . Hearing proceeded beIore Judge Scolt Pearson. State is
represented by Zach Young, Esq., DeIendant is not represented by Counsel. AIter Iurther
review oI the Iile, the Court has reconsidered DeIendanJs SB89 Iiled February 5, 2013, at 8:54
am and has DENIED it. The Court is still ordering the DeIendant get evaluated Ior competency
at the Courts expelue. DeIendant requested that his medicatioll be paid Ior. The Court indicaled
it will comider il at a laler time. The order ta show cause hearing has been conIirmed setIor
February 25.2013, aI8:30A.M. DeIondant is ordered to maU an apt. Ior evaluation by February
12, 20/3 and is to show DASproo I o I lhal apt. Cash Bail Posted in the amount oI$500. oo B.l
Ord rr to Show Cause (2:00 PM) (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott) Parties Present: DeIendant
Coughlin. Zachary Barhr Hearing Result (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott ) Upon the order oI
Judge Scott Pearson. Bruce Lindsay oI tire Bob Bell Group, is hereby appointed to represent
the DeIendant in this malleI' and lhe Adminislrative Ordel'. ) Order to Show Cause (8:30 AM)
(Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott) 0212512013 Continued to 03/11/2013 Arraignment
Reset/Continuance Coughlin. Zachary Barker Order to Show Cause Hearing Hel4 (Judicial
OIIicer: Pearson, SCOI!) DeIendan/ is nimtated into DAS supel'Vision Ior up to THlKTY-SIX
(36) months. DeIendant is onkred to obtain Evaluation at Court's Expense. DeIondant is not to
use or possess any countrolled substance unless presCl'ibed by Medical Doctor. DeIondallJ is
to give his atlor1l(1Y, Bruce Lindsay, /lame oI DeIotukmts psychiatrist. who shall provide
Evaluation. DeIendant is to be nim/aled into the CCP Program to begin March 21, 2013 at 1:30
P.M. Court Compliance Program To begin 312112013 ) Motion Filed Motion to Vacate any
Order Issuing Irom March 1 I. 2013 Hearing in RCR201 1063341 Iiled. Q) Request Ior
Submission Filed B.l MOlion Filed Motion to Remove Bruce Lindsay, Esq. as Co-Counsel
Iiled. tlI Motion Filed Motion/or Check/or Dr. Yasar Pursuant to Order Rendend on 2/13/13 and
Submission 0/ Proposed Order Ior Mental health Evaluation SJ Motion Filed Notice oIA ppeal
Court Com lianee '
duty to Iile sb89 competency Competency Evaluation SB89 Form
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 2/01/13 10:59 AM
To: zyoungda.washoecounty.us (zyoungda.washoecounty.us);
tgallida.washoecounty.us (tgallida.washoecounty.us)
32 attachments
1 12 12 00696 RPD Look's ProoI oI Service 065630 60331 03628 063341 SiIre.pdI (522.4 KB)
, 1 13 12 00696 RPD Look's ProoI oI Service 065630 60331 03628 063341 SiIre.pdI (154.0
KB) , 12 5 12 0204 email Irom sstettnerda.washoecounty.us Iailure to timely provide Brady
material reveal RPD SiIre complicity with RJC Judges 065630 067980 053341 26800.pdI (41.8
KB) , 1 12 12 rpd police report 12 cr 00696 siIre leedy look nash young kandaras bradshaw
0204 065630 redacted ocrd.pdI (3.2 MB) , 12 6 12 subpoenas 065630 Thew SiIre Schaur
Lopez Foreshee ECOMM.pdI (5.1 MB) , SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY TO OPPOSITION CV08-
01709 1 13 12 (Supplemental ...) 11cr00696 king sbn siIre rcr2012-065630 ocrd and tagged
jbig2 lossy.pdI (200.9 KB) , 6 26 12 0204 067980 12420 60302 NCS Taitlel RMC Machen
Harley email to RJC Stancil and WCSO Stuchell SheriII's Web and Sparks Justice Court
Hansen.pdI (25.1 KB) , 7 3 12 12 cr 12420 redacted report bI.pdI (2.3 MB) , 7 3 12 0204
067980 RMC 12420 criminal Complaint DTP signed by Northwind's Krebs but Iilled out in
RPD Weaver's handwriting.pdI (530.5 KB) , 7 3 12 Krebs TPO 287 RMC 12420 RJC 067980
pages 14 to 25 Iax sotelo.pdI (322.4 KB) , 7 3 12 redacted disturbing the peace arrest 12 cr
12420 rmc loomis sotelo mauser weaver dye 00696 26800 sbn 0204 25 page discovery
northwind ncs krebs reduced size.pdI (2.3 MB) , 7 25 12 60302 0204 067980 12420 0435
stamped Coughlin's motion Ior extensio nto Iile brieI and exhibit 60302.pdI (148.7 KB) , 8 9 12
Loomis second Motion to withdraw 12 cr 12420 rmc see also 26405.pdI (229.2 KB) , 9 7 12
063341 Order For Competency Evaluation 0204 065630 12420.pdI (1573.5 KB) , 10 11 12
RMC 12 CR 12420 Amended Criminal Complaint nrs 484D.850(2) rmc 1.04.015.pdI (160.4
KB) , 10 19 12 0204 SUBPOENA ON KEITH LOOMIS FOR 11 14 12 FORMAL
DISCIPLINARY HEARING 26405 12420.pdI (1136.6 KB) , 29270001 Sotelo Motion to
Withdraw and ORder granting it 12 CR 12420.pdI (118.4 KB) , 7 3 12 0204 1048 067980
12420 RMC Case Summary sheet bail inIo, Sooudi trespass, three criminal complaints and
RPD arrest report and pc sheet.pdI (1971.6 KB) , 1 12 12 Hill TPO application RJC Schroeder
000018 00696 26800 0204 065630.pdI (638.4 KB) , FV12-00187-2651415 (Application Ior
TPO).pdI (869.8 KB) , 10 4 12 RJC Albright 0204 Docket Krebs 287 Order Denying EPO
ruling on lien 067980.pdI (79.3 KB) , Pages Irom 7 3 12 Northwinds Apartments Milan Krebs
RJC TPO Application rcp2012-000287 and Judge Schroeders 7 5 12 Order granting 1048
067980 12420 and docket and 8 7 12 extension hearing notice.pdI (228.6 KB) , 7 3 12 0204
067980 0148 RMC 12420 handwritten Witness Statement by Northwind's Milan Kreb's
compare to handwriting in TPO application in 287 and criminal complaint Ior DTP.pdI (308.0
KB) , 7 3 12 0204 067980 1048 RMC 12420 probable cause sheet and Declaration Supplment
by RPD A Weaver compare handwriting to Krebs dtp complaint oI same day.pdI (848.3 KB) , 7
5 12 0204 067980 unsecured load Complaint signed by RPD Weaver 12420 Krebs Northwinds
RMC RPD 1048.pdI (608.5 KB) , RJC Judge Albright letter Ior Taitel Albright slows Krebs
TPO hearing down to retain jurisidction rcp2012-000287 hearing on 8 5 12 067980 26405.pdI
(832.0 KB) , 8 24 12 COMPLAINTSNVBAR.ORG GRIEVANCE AGAINST RMC
DEFENDERS AND WCPD LESLIE RCP2012-000287 12CR12420 RCR2012-067980
NORTHWIND KREBS WEAVER MILLER ocrd and tagged jbig2 lossy.pdI (36.5 KB) , 8 9 12
RMC deIender Loomis motion to withdraw 12420 northwind krebs rmc rpd.pdI (327.2 KB) ,
loomis motion to withdraw 12 cr 12420 northwind krebs rmc rpd.pdI (164.7 KB) , krebs
rcp2012-000287 rmc 12cr12420 rcr2012-067980 12 page mausert sotelo Iax.pdI (220.9 KB) ,
Request Ior Audio Copy oI Proceedings rjc Iorm krebs v coughlin rcp2012-000287.pdI (58.0
KB) , 8 24 12 COMPLAINTSNVBAR.ORG GRIEVANCE AGAINST RMC DEFENDERS
AND WCPD LESLIE RCP2012-000287 12CR12420 RCR2012-067980 NORTHWIND
KREBS WEAVER MILLER.pdI (20.1 KB)
Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlinhotmail.com
From: zachcoughlinhotmail.com
To: rbrucelindsaylawyahoo.com
Subject: FW: Competency Evaluation SB89 Form
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2013 11:04:37 -0800
Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlinhotmail.com
From: zachcoughlinhotmail.com
To: rblrobertbrucelindsay.com
Subject: Competency Evaluation SB89 Form
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2013 15:47:28 -0800
Dear Mr. Lindsay,
I AGREE WITH YOUR EXPRESS INDICATION MADE DURING OUT IN PERSON
MEETING THAT YOU HAVE A DUTY TO MOVE FOR AN ORDER FOR COMPETENCY
EVALUATION OF MYSELF BY IMMEDIATELY FILING THE SB89 FORM TODAY.
I apologize Ior not having returned the scanned materials to you yet. I will email them and
provide you the hard copies as well immediatly..
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PS. II you want to discuss anything please just email me a good time to call you or you might
be able to reach me at 775 622 9936..
https://skydrive.live.com/redir?resid43084638F32F5F28!118
Please Iind very relevant materials to the deIense oI this case attached and at the above link. I
have scanned everything therein Ior viruses and it is 100 saIe and virus Iree.
Sorry Ior the delay, I am not Ilaking on you, its just been hectic, i'll get to getting it scanned
and returned, very busy addressing a recent Order oI the NNDB seeking to disbar me, but I will
get to it.
I don't want much, okay. Just a Iew simple things.II you get me this stuII, as Iar as I am
concerned, we are straight (assuming you don't pull a Jim Leslie and insist on remaing on my
case as long as possible to purposeIully torpedo it....) There was talk oI Cape Fear with Leslie
well beIore he moved to withdraw and got a TPO, and now an EPO (though courthouse
sanctuary doctrine makes the "service" thereoI rather suspect. Leslie was not all "terriIied"
back then...What changed? Oh, that's right, he was Iinished puttin' in work Ior the County (ie,
makign sure I got convicted on both counts in 063341, thanks to his making the NRS 171.136
(or trying to, at least, ...he Iailed) citizen's arrest arguments that went completely over DDA
Young head (or, more likely DDA Young just couldn't stomach anymore oI the Iarce and chose
not to make such arguments to the tirbunal). Can you serve the WCDA with request Ior
discovery and subpoena the RJC and WCSO Ior the Iollowing (assuming the won't just copy
the stuII an provide it all nice'n'easy like):
certiIied audio transcripts oI the Iollowing hearings in the RJC:
1. 7/5/12 in RJC Rev2012-001048 hearing granting a deIault victory incident to a 6/28/12
motion to set aside the Iraudulently procurred 6/27/12 Lockotu Order at the rental where the
067980 arrest occurred.
2. 7/31/12 hearing in rjc rev2012-001048 beIore Judge Pearson (this was a hearing noticed on
7/23/12 to address my Motion to Set Aside the 6/27/12 eviction Order signed by Judge
Schroeder despite my 6/26/12 email and Iax to the RJC, SJC, WCSO, and City oI Reno
regarding my Iilign the Tenant's Answer in the SJC, and the deIiciencies in the 5 day notice.
(please see the attached police report by the RPD incident to the pretextual (and Soldal v. Cook
Co violating, not that it matters, this is nevada aIter all) arrest shortly upon my bailing out on
the 067980 charge in RMC 12 CR 12420(wherein the "approach" by the RPD (to which RPD
Sargent SiIre incidates some level oI complicity between the RPD and RJC in a recording only
recently propound by the WCDA just 2 judicial days beIore the 12/11/12 Trial stemming Irom
the 1/14/12 misuse oI 911 arrest in rcr2012-065630 (a witness just sadly passed away
unexpectedly 2 days aIter the DA complete his direct examination oI her, EComm's Kariann
Beechler).
2.1 the audio transcript oI the one hearing in REV 2012-075658 Zach Coughlin vs JeII
Nichols. This is relevant to 067980 because its another eviction scenario and establishes a
pattern and practice by the RPD, WCSO and RJC to reIuse to uphold my rights while
aggressively applying an overly rigid and Iormulaic application oI rules to me as a pro se
tenant, and even going beyond that, some might say, at times. Please, this one is important, I
need it. A Iormer WCSO Deputy pu
3. I would like you to serve on the WCDA a request Ior discovery and also a subpoena/FOIA (I
know, NRS Open Records REquest) on ECOMM Ior any 911 calls, RPD Dispatch calls Irom
civilians, or recordings between the RPD or wcso or Reno sparks Indian colony Police or
dispatch/ECOMM in any way connected to me, Zach Coughlin, or suspected to be connected to
me. I am not going to ask Ior much more, iI you get me all that, I'll be good, iI not...I'll be
tedious.
4. any and all recordings made by anyone (RPD, WCSO, Northwinds StaII, bystanders, and
especially JeII Chandler or Ryan WRay or anyone else associate with Nevada Court Services)
oI ANY interactions with me in any way connected to Northwinds Apartments and my
tenancies there (i had three rentals, units 29, 45, and 71). Please have served a subpoena duces
tecum on Nevada Court Services directed to anythign (documentation, recordings, etc) related
to Zach Coughlin and serve a witness subpoena on NCS's Ryan Wray (might have stopped
working there, but still subpoena him please) as well as JeII Chandler.
5. The RMC audio transcript oI the (it woudl cost my $35 i don't have, and they probably have
to waive the Iee Ior you, the RJC does when Leslie and the WCPD request recordings) 7/5/12
unnoticed bail hearing in RMC 12 CR 12420 wherein my bail was impermissibly raise Irom a
bondable $1,415 to a cash only $3,000 Ior charges that were plainly manuIacture anyways.
6. the 12/3/12 Trial audio transcript in RMC 12 CR 12420.
7. the 12/18/12 audio transcript oI the hearing in 067980 (the case you are on) wherein Jim
Leslie (without DDA Young there) was able to get some things done...you likely are required
to, or at least, might want to, have this anyways.... I dont' necessarily need the hard copies (you
can sign up Ior a Iree hotmail account at www.outlook.com and skydrive them to me, its totally
easy, or I can pick them up, copy them, and deliver them to you...i just dont' have the money
and the court's nickel and dime me like crazy).
8. The 12/6/12 Iiling in the appeal oI an associated RJC prosecution in rcr2012-063341 (it is
the Record on Appeal, basically, but I think they titled it "Notice oI Appeal" on the docket...and
the RJC has Iailed to provide me a copy oI it...not even the brand new Iilings listing the index
oI documents included in that 12/6/12 Iiling (which is basically a Notice oI Appeal). YES, IT
is relevant to this case...it goes to conIlicts analysis to both the RJC (even across departments,
especially given some admission by CliIton as to looking over "submission on subpoenas" Irom
that 063341 case beIore SIerrazza, on the record in 065630...DDA Young is an eIiler and could
easily email you that 20 mb or so 12/6/12 Notice oI Appeal (804 page) Iilign in CR12-2025
(the appeal oI rcr2011-063341, the Iirst oI 10 arrest/incarcerations oI me since 8/20/11).
Please subpoena Nevada Court Services Ryan Wray (he may not work there anymore, but he
was present at the scene oI the arrest and, obviously, along with Northwinds Manager Duane
Jakobs (who testiIied on that 7/31/12 audio transcript I am requesting you obtain and copy me
on in rev2012-001048 about the events in question in 067980) participated in attempted break
in an Iraudulent Declaration oI Service oI the 6/14/12 5 Day UD Notice.
9. Lastly, please serve the RJC Custodian oI Records a Subpoena duces tecum Ior all
records/Iax logs/inIormation/documentation related to any Iaxing oI Orders by RJC Judges to
the WCSO between October 24th, 2011 and November 2nd 2011 (each Iax has a job number,
etc. I want a sequential printout or log oI those Iaxes as it goes to whether the RJC, in accord
with its admitted policy, Iaxed to the WCSO the two diIIerent ORders by Judge SFerrazza
related to the Eviction (a 10/25/11 "Eviction ORder and Decision" and a 10/27/11 "Findings oI
Fact, Conclusions oI Law, and ORder Ior Summary Eviction". I need to know iI and when
such items were Iaxed or transmitted to the WCSO...it is very relevant given the same WCSO
Deputy Machen conducted the lockout on 11/1/11 Irom my Iormer home law oIIice, according
to the locksmith, REno Carson Messenger receipts, the transcript oI th 6/18/12 criminal
trespass trial in RMC 11 Cr 26405 (sworn testimony oI Casey Baker, eSq. and Richard G. HIll,
eSq.) demonstrates that the WCSO's OIIice is being obstructive, as is the RJC (whom Iailed to
comply with my SCR 105(4)/SCR 119 properly issued and served supboena and subpoena
decus tecums oI 10/30/12 in the Iormal disciplinary matter (espeically consiering the 4/11/12
volunteering oI inIormation and documents by RJC judges secretary Lori Townsend), and
Iurther speciIy the subpoena duces tecum is Ior the "Iile stamped cover page" oI any Iilign by
Couglin in RJC rev2012-000374.
10. the audio transcript oI the 8/7/12 TPO Hearing in RJC RCP2012-000287) Ior Milan
Krebs v. Zach Coughlin (Krebs was NOrthwinds Apts maintenance man (the one doing the
sawzalling to the metal door oI unit 29 incident to the arrest in 067980...He testiIied under oath
the matters oI material direct relevane to the deIense oI this case. This is a no brainer, and the
Iact that Leslie continuously reIused to obtain a copy oI this hearing (again, the RJC waives the
$35 Iee Ior th wCPD...so what was Leslie's excuse? That Northwind's Apartments sent him
some photgraphs oI a microwave? Please. Jim Leslie is a joke. That might be relevant to an
evictio hearing, but not to a NRS 199.280 deIense. What Krebs testiIied to at that TPO
extension hearing on cross examination is obviously extremely relevant, particularly where
there was extensive questioning directed to the circumstances oI the arrest in 067980.
11. Lastly, a subpoena duces tecum on the Custodian oI Records Ior the Reno muni Court and
the Custodian oI Records Ior the City oI REno Marshals Ior any an all documentation,
marshal's reports, or recordings (Thompsons admitted to makign at least on on or about
3/22/12) in any way related to Coguhlin (obviously, there shoudl be an arrest report Irom the
2/27/12 direct contempt arrest wherein Marshal Harley, as testiIied to by Judge Nash Holmes at
my disciplinary hearing on 11/14/12 via her hearsay oI what Harley told her, has apparently
alleged some "disassemblign oI a recording device and hiding a component oI it in the
restroom during arestroom break that was begrudingly granted immediately aIter Holmes
began interrogating Coughlin about hwether he was "recording the proceedings" and or
whether he "had a recording device", upon which, alleged Holmes, Coughlin immediately got
"all squirmy and begged to use the restroom"....Okay, lets see the documentation, marshal's
report etc. Ior anything, but especially including that. IF they move to QUash I want be copied
on it (please copy me on anything anyone sends you ever in any way related to me) as I have
some authority and opposition work I woudl like Ior you to at least consider incident to any
reply you may wish to Iile....this is relevant. RJC CliIton signed an ORder Ior Competency
eval on 2/27/12 at 1:31 pm...JUDge Nash holmes could nto be Iound by her staII at that time,
despite the traIIic citaiton trial connected to Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s oIIice and the trespass arrest
being schedule to occur then...both HOlmes and CliIton were mysteriously transIerred criminal
cases involving Coughlin on 2/27/12...both are liIelong prosecutors, Iormerly Holmes was
CliIton's boss Irom about 91 to 94 ish (not to mention Linda Gardner was a coworker (see
54844 and 60302), and Nash Holmes 3/14/12 grievance against Coughli nto the SBN admits to
communications with the WCPD about Coughlin.
12. please subpoena duces tecum the WCPD as to anything in any way related to HOlmes
admission regarding the WCPD in her 3/14/12 grievance...
13. Lastly, please serve a subpoena duces tecum on the custodian oI REcords Ior Richard G.
HIll, ESq. and his Iormer associates new Iirm in Kentucky, Casey D. Baker, Esq's Baker and
Baker or whatever tey call themsleves narrowly tailored to any documentation, recordings, or
inIormation baring on when and iI their oIIice provided the two diIIerent eviction ORders to
the wcso oIIice (Baker's testimony at the 6/18/12 crimnal trespass trial (there is an oIicial
transcript at te link) sheds some light on this vis a vis October 28th, 2011...and Iamiliarzie
yoursleI with the void/stale order concept incident to NRS 40.253's requirement that the
lockout be done "within 24 hours" oI "receipt oI the order"....by the WCSO...the same deputy
makign the arrest in 067980 conducted that lockout and Iiled a Iraudulent aIIidavit oI service
on 11/7/11 alleging to have "personally served" me...which his supervisor was oIrced to admit,
in writing, he did not, but rather merely posted the order on the door (hill lied at the 6/18/12
trespass trial in testying "they posted it to the door because you ran away" despite that being
completely Ialse, and where HIll admits he was not even present that day, and his associate
completely Iailes to back up hill's baseless, deIamatory accusation (one oI many by Hill).
And that's it. You do all that and provide a reasonable return and attempt to counter all the bs
MOtions to Quash sure to ensue, and we are straight. You can move to withdraw and I will
give you glowing review, I promise. Hell, I will even draIt all these subpoenas Ior your
approval and the oppositions to the motions to quash iI you like, and provide the authority in
support oI them. But I need you to issue the subpoenas and have them served, and get the
recordings, etc....even iI they make you pay Ior them, none oI this adds up to more than $200
(perhaps you can Iile a notice oI appearance, iI an eIiler on the cr12-2025 under some
justiIication that is is necessary to the deIense herein or I would allow you to appear as co-
counsel provided you dont' insist on hijacking things..., but obviously paying $1 page Ior all
804 pages hard copy Irom aint goign to work....
I really appreciate any help you can provide.
SiIre's admissions as to said complicity may provide a basis Ior your Iiling a Motion to
conIlict out the rjc and the wcda's oIIice (in addition to DDA Kandaras' involvement in the
turning over oI my smartphone and data card to the City oI Reno Marshals and the RMC in 11
TR 26800, as admitted to by WCSO Hodge to me, in Iront oI local attorney Pam Willmore (I
was arrested incidnet to a contempt Iinding at the 2/27/12 trial beIore judge Nash Holmes, and
it was not until aIter my property was booked into my personal secured property and well aIter
any time Ior a "search incident to arrest" that the WC Jail released to the RMC and its Marshals
on 2/28/12 my property, which was returned 37 days later wiped oI all data incident to an Order
oI 3/30/12 that seems to have clearly be responsive to a Iiling by me in NVB 10-05104 beIore
Judge Nash Holmes and Washoe Legal Services Exec. Director Elcano 1977 McGeorge SOL
classmate, NVB Judge B. Beesley....all three oI whom testiIied at my 11/14/12 Iormal
disciplinary hearing at the SBN, despite SCR 105(2)(c) being desecrated in every way
imaginable, another Mirching to besmirch the judicial system in Nevada. DDA Kandaras is on
the NNDB and reIuses to deny that she or David Hamilton, Esq. (Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s best
Iriend) were on my screening Panel. This IS revelvant to what you are getting seven bones Ior,
under a conIlict or disqualiIication analysis (I would like a reason why this case was transIerred
on 2/27/12 Irom Judge Lynch, same day another case in the RMC was transIerred to jUdge
Holmes (the 1/12/12 custodial arrest Ior jaywalkign cuz richard g. hill said to cas in rmc 12 CR
12420.
7/5/12 in RJC Rev2012-001048 (this is the summary eviction Irom the very unit #29 rental at
Northwinds Apartment, 1680 Sky Mountain Drive that I was arrested at on 6/28/12 in the
matter you were assigned and contracted to handle Ior $700.00). I did not attend the hearing
because I was rearrested on 7/3/12 by the Reno Police Department just blocks Irom Northwinds
Apartments in RMC 12 CR 12420 (a custodial arrest involving three charges, one, a simple
traIIic citation Ior Iailure to secure a load on one's vehicle (they allege an empty plastic storage
tub Iell oII my vehicle), two, no prooI oI vehicle insurance (despite RPD OIIicer Alan Weaver
admitting that I showed him a high resolution pdI oI my then current USAA auto insurance on
a 4.7 inch smart phone screen...he said it had to be a paper printout), and three, "disturbing the
peace" based upon the criminal complaint signed by Northwind's Apartments maintenance
man, 23 year old Milan Krebs (whom obtained a TPO against me Irom the RJC in RCP2012-
000287 on 7/5/12 aIter the RPD Iraudulently urged Krebs to apply Ior one incident to the
7/3/12 arrest, as Iurther conIirmed by the commentary by the same RPD Sargent SiIre (only
Iinally propounded to me Iollowing a 12/5/12 email Irom the WCDA inIorming me oI the
availability oI such discovery
please let me know, in writing, and with speciIics, whether or not you will move, in writing, to
obtain the above indicated materials, and provide an indication oI how soon you will do so,
with prooI thereoI. Sorry to have to ask Ior that, but time is oI the essence and I need to know
iI this is going to work out with you or not. II it does, I will absolutely credit you Ior being a
IaithIul deIender oI the Sixth Amendment, and maybe more.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
'Covington's threats vis a vis State Bar oI Nevada 62337
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 2/01/13 1:01 PM
To: jhelzerda.washoecounty.us (jhelzerda.washoecounty.us);
triandada.washoecounty.us (triandada.washoecounty.us); MBaysda.washoecounty.us
(mbaysda.washoecounty.us); sjstewartda.washoecounty.us
(sjstewartda.washoecounty.us); tgallida.washoecounty.us (tgallida.washoecounty.us);
plipparellida.washoecounty.us (plipparellida.washoecounty.us);
plipparda.washoecounty.us (plipparda.washoecounty.us); zyoungda.washoecounty.us
(zyoungda.washoecounty.us); phalsteadda.washoecounty.us
(phalsteadda.washoecounty.us); complaintsnvbar.org (complaintsnvbar.org);
lcastillonvcourts.nv.gov (lcastillonvcourts.nv.gov); tlindemannvcourts.nv.gov
(tlindemannvcourts.nv.gov)
Dear ADA Helzer,
In her 12/13/12 email to WCPD Leslie, DDA Kandaras admits that there is an incapacity issue
with Coughlin, yet the WCDA's OIIicer persists with the 1/22/13 Trial in 065630. Instead oI
moving Ior a competency evaluation, Leslie and Kandaras (and Watts-Vial, the DDA, not the
Judicial Assistant lawyer Ior Judge Walker) abuse process, dodge and obstruct Coughlin's
subpoenas on 2JDC Judges and Adminstrators, and the RJC Custodian oI Records, Washoe
County SheriII's OIIice, etc., etc.
This is awIully similar to the besMIRCHING oI the legal proIession's dignity here in Northern
Nevada awhile back in In Re Mirch...some SBN WCDA's OIIice synergy there too.
The thing about WCPD Leslie's protection order that is the most striking lie, is that the linked
clip is not a "video" at all. It is audio only. Further, nothing in the audio could possibly be said
to amount to a "vow to continue harassing his Iormer public deIender". Jim Leslie is a liar and
a Iraud. And one oI the best prosecutor's the WCDA's OIIice has.
Also, Paula Cambpell oI the State Bar oI Nevada completely disputes Bar Counsel Pat King's
attributions to her in his own TPO Application, which, as usual, contains King's brand oI lying
every other word out oI his moutn. A FOFCOL is not an Order. King, you demand Coughlin
call ahead prior to coming to the SBN to Iile anything, then, when he does, you characterize it
as requiring you call the police? Ever heard oI a post hearing motion? Why doesn't King and
Clerk oI Court Peters try to lie a little less about the representations they make to Respondent's
vis a vis SCR 105(4), SCR 110, and SCR 119(3), and all the ex parte communications with the
Panel that King admits to intending to make during a 10/15/12 conversation with Coughlin in
NG12-0204? And coached up that Panel was...ruling on voluminous motions on 10/3/12
beIore the Order appointing Panel Chair Echeverria could have even arrived in the mail given
NNDB NVDETR Chairman Susich's Order appointing the Panel is signed and dated 10/30/12.
Oh, that's right, no time Ior "a regular motion cycle" to quash all oI Coughlin's subpoenas.
And look, its a prosecutor's world here in Northern Nevada. And there will always be the
prosecutor's at the SBN there to catch them iI they Iall, like with In Re Beckett (Bare couldnt'
bring himselI to characterize a crime with the exacting wording in its elements as that Iound in
SCR 111(6) as a serious oIIense? No matter, even upon the Supreme Court doing it Ior him,
Beckett got the ol' SCR 111(10) pass, aIter an arduous week oI rehab "cured" him...). And no
biggie with Willardson having an aIIair with the Judge while appearing in case beIore
him...http://www.lvrj.com/news/lawyer-who-had-relationship-with-judge-won-t-Iace-
discipline-Irom-bar-189160421.html?reI421
What am I being disbarred again Ior? Oh, that's right, Iormer WCDA DDA domestic violence
attorney now Judge Linda Gardner sanctioned me under NRS 7.085 Ior asking Ior alimony Ior
the domestic violence victim I was representing as a legal aid attorney...Iinding it vexatious
(though not requiring, under any canon, her to report anything related to Coughlin's advocacy
there to the SBN...) despite her 6/19/09 FOFCOL and Decree oI Divorce ultimately including a
$1.00 per year jurisdictional reservation alimony award...and 18.010(2)(b) address only
Irivolous and vextious claims or deIense, not "Iailing to conduct discovery" or "sarcastic"
presentation. So either Judge Gardner violated a Canon by Iailing to report Coughlin to the Bar
Ior some alleged violation oI an RPC, or Bar Counsel King is violating RPC 3.8, 4.1, 3.3, and
3.4 by taking Judge L. Garnder's 4/13/09 Order AIter Trial that he got Irom RMC Judge Nash
Holmes aIter Judge L. Gardner passed it to her brother, RMC Judge W. Gardner, whom passed
it to all the other RMC Judges. RMC Judge Nash Holmes also admits to the WCPD
potentially violating the attorney-client privilege in communicating with her, Ior god knows
what reason, in her 3/14/12 grievance against Coughlin to the SBN, where she alleges Coughlin
is "decompensating", though, Judge W. Gardner admitted on the record on 4/10/12 that Judge
Nash Holmes violated Nevada law by Iailing to notiIy the other departments oI the RMC in
wirting oI her suspension oI the trial oI 2/27/12 in 11 TR 26800 upon her Iinding Coughlin's
competency in question and "reIerring this matter to the State Bar", but not beIore she
established the majority viewpoint in the law by Iailing to grant even a brieI stay to an attorney
representing clients prior to summarily incarcerating him Ior summary contempt (she
characterized it as criminal, but cited to civil statutes, though, conveniently avoided NRS
22.030(2), which would required ol' shiIty Marshal Harley to put it in an AIIidavit, which he
deIinitely does not want to do. And NNDB/WCDA DDA Kandaras had to sign oII on Judge
Nash Holmes 3/30/09 Order resleasing Coughlin property to him (which oddly, contrary to the
booking intake Iorm listing Coughlin's personal property as including a stand alone micro sd
card, only mentioned two phones and a shaver...though the smartphone had the micro sd card
inserted into it...though all the date was wiped Iorm everything....hhmmmmn. And Coughlin
did not lie to Judge Nash Holmes during the 2/27/12 Trial, period. She was reduced to alleging
he lied about having recording devices (because neither she nor anyone else invovled wants to
address the warrantless conIiscation oI Coughlin's property not incident to a search incident to
arrest where the WCSO released Coughlin's property to the City oI Reno Marshals a day aIter
he was booked and where Coughlin's property was already booked into his own personal
property at the jail, its not a Diaz search incident to arrest, its just a Fourth Amendment
violation at that point...
But the thing is, the audio transcript oI the 2/27/12 Trial clearly shows that Coughlin made an
"open reIusal" to indicate whether or not he had any "recording devices", telling Judge Nash
Holmes "what is in my pockets is private, and that's a Fourth Amendment issue..."whereupon
she changed her question, asking Coughlin is he was presently recording the proceedings.
Coughlin responded truthIully that he was not. Feeling the reasonableness oI her sua sponte
interrogation evaporating, Judge Nash Holmes moved on....and showed up at Coughlin's
11/14/12 Iormal disciplinary hearing with an awIully slippery version oI the events that day,
easily disproven by a simple review oI the audio transcript, not that Panel Chair Echeverria was
going to let that happen. One restroom break. No interrogation about recording or "recording
devices" until AFTER that one restroom break. Judge Nash Holmes tried to cobble together a
Iinding oI reasonable suspicion by alleging she queried Coughlin about recording and
recording devices, whereupon he quickly "got all squirmy and begged to use the restroom".
Yeah, no. Didn't quite happen. Nice try, though. Oh, well, Judge Nash Holmes will just allude
to some unsworn unattributed hearsay to stand in place Ior the Iailed proIIer oI Iacts supporting
reasonable suspicion...
Its odd that Washoe Legal Services Iired Coughlin, asserting it was solely due to Iormer
WCDA's OIIice domestic violence attorney now 2JDC Judge Linda Gardner's 4/13/09 Order
AIter Trial in DV08-01168 when considering the docket in FV09-00886 shows then WLS
Board President Breckenridge picked up the cd oI the hearing wherein Coughlin represented a
male domestic violence victim, and in doing so so upset Roxanne oI the CAAW run TPO
Advocates oIIice. Then there is CAAW complaining about Coughlin incident to the Carnine
case. So...is CAAW an independent contractor? Is 2JDC Judge Gardner "a party" Ior an RPC
4.2 analysis? Would that make the WCDA's OIIice an inappropriate choice Ior an entity to
prosecute Coughlin here?
That Joshi 01168 Trial started on 3/12/09...The Uribe TPO was on 3/12/09. Carnine was on
3/13/09, and the Joshi 01168 Trial concluded on 3/17/09, with another Hearing in Uribe on
3/20/09...and the Board oI Equalization appeal WLS's (WCDA's OIIice ECR partner, another
conIlict) dropped oII on Coughlin a week beIore the 3/10/09 Iiling dealinde came due and was
Iiled by Coughlin on 3/10/09. And while Coughlin's competence to practice law has been put
in question by DDA Kandaras' Iellow NNDB members...the Davenport case
The SBN and DDA Kandaras's Iellow NNDB members are attempting to disbar me. A big part
oI that is the $42,060 attorneys Iee award by my and Patridcia Halstead's Iormer coworker, now
2JDC Judge Flanagan, incident to the Motion Ior Attorney's Fees Iiled by Richard G. Hill, Esq.
on the same day 2JDC Judge Elliott incarcerated me Ior asking a question about my HIPAA
rights incident to DDA Young (and Ms. Halstead bares some responsibility there as she was
listed as attorney oI record as well) violating the stay in NRS 178.405 by making one oI his
myriad demands upon local judges to take me into custody Ior mentioning some constitutional
right or other (it really is marked how DDA Young orders Judges around, very impressive the
command oI the judiciary your oIIice has, some might say).
Besides that, on May 7th, 2012, the day an Opposition was due to Hill's attorney's Iee motion,
DDA Young attempted to hold a Trial against me in RCR2011-063341 (the iPhone case), and
WCPD Joe Goodnight admitted minutes beIore the trial started that he had not viewed the
excuplatory video wherein I obtained a conIession Irom material witness Nicole Watson that
the man who picked up the iphone oII the ground in the middle oI the downtown skate place in
Iront oI City Hall, threatened to throw it in the river iI someone did not claim it immediately.
The WCPD couldn't even be bothered to mail out a certiIied mail subpoena Ior a misdemeanor
trial to attempt to served that McQueen High School student, Nicole Watson. Also, during the
8 days I spent in jail starting on 4/19/12, I was deprived my regular psychoactive medication.
Yet, your oIIice persists in a prosecution in 065630 based upon an allegation that I lied in
asserting that an oIIicer was shining a Ilash light in my Iace, when really, the oIIicer asserts, he
was merely shining the Ilashlight at my shoulder....
My Boyd School oI Law 2000 classmate Chris Hicks saw me at the cross walk between the
Mills Lane Justice Center and the District Courthouse and ambled down the sidewalk in an
eIIort to avoid cross paths with me, just last week, jaywalking in the process. I was arrested, a
custodial arrest, Ior such jaywalking on 1/12/12 in 12 RMC 00696. At some point, is playing
kick the can with the struggling civil rights attorney with mental health issues incident to a 18
month slide Iollowing a divorce beneath the WCDA's OIIice?
I believe it is impermissible to have Investigator Covington essentially practicing law without a
license where DDA Young has been walled oII Irom any oI my attempts to communicate with
him regarding CR12-2025. This has made it impossible to discuss settings, and other matter.
Additionally, I think (combined with what I Ieel is misconduct by DDA Watts-Vial and DDA
Kandaras incident to the Iailure oI 2JDC Judges and Administrators and RJC Custodian oI
Records to respond to my subpoenas and subpoena Duces Tecums Ior the 11/14/12 Iormal
disciplinary hearing, and Kandaras egging WCPD Jim Leslie on to Iile a baseless abuse oI
process TPO in RJC RCP2012-000599 (DDA Kandaras is on the NNDB, and reIused to deny
that she was on the Screening Panel Ior my case). Now, just two days ago Inspector Covington
made veiled threats relative to phone conversations I had with the State Bar oI Nevada, and I
believe it is impermissible to have NNDB member Kandaras, a party, also prosecuting me with
your oIIice, particularly wherer DDA Young is not excused Irom his RPC obligations, despite
the attempts to wall him oII Irom any oI my communications. The Iailure to propound the
Brady material that Iinally was provided on aIter I received an email notice oI its availability
on 12/5/12 is particularly troubling considering how close in time that is to the 12/11/12 trial in
RCR2012-065630, and the extent to which Sargent SiIre's commentary, some might say,
indicate some level oI complicity between the RJC And the RPD incident to the 6 or so
wrongIul evictions and arrests I have been subjected to this year. I am just trying to stabilize
and get back on my Iee. I have lived here all my liIe and have strong ties to the community and
would gladly welcome and opportunity to dispose oI all three oI these criminal matters in
exchange Ior a waiver oI any civil causes oI action I might have in connection with these three
prosecutions and the arrests underpinning them and the wrongIul evictions and anything related
to the RJC. I only want to do something like that iI it is legally permissible to, but I have seen
some authority (ie a Am Trials articler "Representing Lawyers in Disciplinary Matters" that
suggests doing so is permissible iI the District Attorney's OIIice signs oII on it...).
I appreciate the opportunity to address some oI my concerns here.
RespectIully Submitted,
Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlinhotmail.com
Zach has 104 Iiles to share with you on SkyDrive. To view them, click the links below.
11 13 12 wcda wcso watts vial supboena correspondence 441pm.pdI
11 14 12 0204 Galli WCDA and NNDB Kandaras's Mtn to Quash Subpoenas on WCSO
Machen DDA Young 03628 2025 1262 0376 2064.pdI
11 14 12 0204 RJC Schroeder 374 Orderny Denying Coughlin.pdI
11 14 12 063341 Kandaras Emergency ex parte 0204 quash Coughlin Motion to Quash
Subpoenas (1).pdI
11 14 12 vol 3 0204 bates 1 TO 574.pdI
11 14 12 WCDA DDA Kandaras 0204 Motion to Quash Subpoenas.pdI
11 14 12 wcso kirkham judge linda gardner 0204 54844 0435 2025 01168.pdI
11 15 12 063341 Submission oI Materials Related to Subpoenas etc 0204 1708 cover
page stamped.pdI
FV09-00886 - JOSE URIBE VS. KARINA CAMACHO VALDEZ (DM) WLS
President Breckenridge has CD oI EPO hearing burned picked up 4 10 09.pdI
3 10 09 01168 wls 54844 0204 Coughlin tax appeal Ior Elcano days beIore L. Gardner
Trial 4 13 09 sanction order 09-403 Washoe Lgl-Final.pdI
3 12 09 0204 Uribe EPO Hearing Exhibit photographs oI abuse DV09-00886 0204
CAAW Advocate Aghast WLS President Breckenridge Orders hearing cd picked up 4 10 09
01168 01955.pdI
3 13 12 158 pm 26800 Nash rmc SUA SPONTE ORDER DENYING RELIEF
SOUGHT IN IMPROPER DOCUMENT.pdI
3 13 12 216 pm with ex1 iIp 26800 ORDER STRIKING FUGITIVE document nash
rmc.pdI
3 13 12 1238pm 11 TR 26800 SUA SPONTE ORDER DENYING RELlEF SOUGHT
IN IMPROPER DOCUMENT RPD WCSO RMC RJC NASH KING CLARK SBN.pdI
3 13 12 email Irom wcso debi campbell dcampbellwashoecounty.us 26800 0204.pdI
3 14 12 grievance by Judge Nash Holmes RMC 26800 0434.pdI
3 15 12 000374 Lockout Order PTTHOA wcso 0204 with Iax headers schroeder.pdI
3 20 12 Elliot 0204 CAAW Crisis 01955 Order Awarding Fees 03.20.12.pdI
3 21 12 per judges Orders Marshal Deighton rmc 11 tr 26800.pdI
3 22 12 0204 email Irom RMC Administrator Cassandra Jackson to SBN and RMC
Judges and Judicial Assistants 0204.pdI
Download all

RE: notice to set in cr12-2025
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Sent: Tue 1/29/13 4:55 PM
To: Covington, Mark H. (mcovingtonda.washoecounty.us);
phalsteadda.washoecounty.us (phalsteadda.washoecounty.us); chicksda.washoecounty.us
(chicksda.washoecounty.us); plipparellida.washoecounty.us
(plipparellida.washoecounty.us); complaintsnvbar.org (complaintsnvbar.org)
this is not right. that's the unauthorized practice oI law an attempt by DDA Young and the
WCDA to skirt the RPC by having a non-attorney deal with the opposing side. the attorney's in
the WCDA's OIIice have a supervisory capacity here, one that was not all that well kept during
CR12-0376 and incident to the numerous violation oI the mandatory stays associated with the
multiple competency evaluations. Now, Inspector Covington is continuing Iurther with the
original baseless threats about dissuading witnesses Irom October 2011 in making allegations
on the telephone to Coughlin accusing Coughlin oI some Iurther misconduct. "he advised me
that, iI this is regarding...is nonsense codswallop and is not a basis Ior excusing Young
proIessional obligations. Further, SCR 109 and SCR 119, SCR 105(4) control, not NRCP 45,
and WCDA DDA Kandaras (a NNDB member) has no place Iiling motions to quash
considering her role in the conIiscation oI Coughlin's smartphone and wiping oI data therein
aIter 37 days incidnet to 11 TR 26800
Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlinhotmail.com
From: MCovingtonda.washoecounty.us
To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com
CC: jhelzerda.washoecounty.us; DA-InvestSupervisorswashoecounty.us
Subject: RE: notice to set in cr12-2025
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2013 19:50:11 0000
Mr. Coughlin, aIter our phone conversation, I spoke to Mr. Young about this issue. He advised
me that, iI this is regarding your appeal case, please set a date with the court and he will answer
in due course.

II you have any questions about this, please inquire via e-mail.

Mark Covington
Supervising Investigator

From: Zach Coughlin |mailto:zachcoughlinhotmail.com|
Sent: Monday, January 28, 2013 5:00 PM
To: Howden, Heidi; Young, Zach
Subject: notice to set in cr12-2025

Can we stipulate to a date Ior the notice to set tomorrow? Also, I have not been provided the
12/6/12 ROA or "Notice oI Appeal" Irom the RJC that is 804 pages long, but DDA Young
has...which is entirely unIair.
Zachary Barker Coughlin 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlinhotmail.com
Further, Judge CliIton indicated on the record to Couglhin on 2/12/13 that a Bench
Warrant Ior Failure To Appear issued Ior Coughlin's arrest on that date at 9:36 am, however, the
docket in that matter indicates that such warrant issued at 1:00 pm on 2/12/13. Couglhin was
allegedly late to court that morning Ior a 9:00 trial, allegedly calling the Court at approximately
9:35 am (where the continuation Io the trial was set to start at 9:00 am) to report that he had
slept through two diIIerent alarm clocks aIter being up most oI the night preparing Ior the trial,
having diIIiculty adjusting his daily routine due to the arrests oI 2/2/13 (conIined and taken oII
his medication until his release on 2/5/12 at 1:30 am
Docket in 12-065630 '3/19/13 Misdemeanor Judgment Filed (Judicial OIIicer; CliIton, David )
on February 13, 2013, AMEMDED by Judge CliIton to read Misdemeanor commitment Order
'NRS 4.230(d)The time when the parties, or either oI them, appear, or their nonappearance, iI
deIault be made; a minute oI the pleadings and motions; iI in writing, reIerring to them; iI not
in writing, a concise statement oI the material parts oI the pleading.
'NRS 4.230(I)The demand Ior a trial by jury, when the same is made, and by whom made, the
order Ior the jury, and the time appointed Ior the return oI the jury and Ior the trial.
'NRS 4.230(k)The receipt oI a notice oI appeal, iI any be given, and oI the appeal bond, iI
any be Iiled.
'NRS4.230Docket: Entries; Iorm.
1.Every justice must keep a docket, in which the justice must enter:
(a)The title oI every action or proceeding.
(b)The object oI the action or proceeding; and iI a sum oI money be claimed, the amount
thereoI.
(c)The date oI the summons, and the time oI its return; and iI an order to arrest the
deIendant be made, or a writ oI attachment be issued, a statement oI the Iact.
(d)The time when the parties, or either oI them, appear, or their nonappearance, iI deIault
be made; a minute oI the pleadings and motions; iI in writing, reIerring to them; iI not in
writing, a concise statement oI the material parts oI the pleading.
(e)Every adjournment, stating on whose application and to what time.
(I)The demand Ior a trial by jury, when the same is made, and by whom made, the order
Ior the jury, and the time appointed Ior the return oI the jury and Ior the trial.
(g)The names oI the jurors who appear and are sworn, and the names oI all witnesses
sworn, and at whose request.
(h)The verdict oI the jury, and when received; iI the jury disagree and are discharged, the
Iact oI such disagreement and discharge.
(i)The judgment oI the court, speciIying the costs included, and the time when rendered.
(j)The issuing oI the execution, when issued and to whom; the renewals thereoI, iI any,
and when made, and a statement oI any money paid to the justice, when and by whom.
(k)The receipt oI a notice oI appeal, iI any be given, and oI the appeal bond, iI any be
Iiled.
2.The Court Administrator shall prescribe the Iorm oI the docket and oI any other
appropriate records to be kept by the justice, which Iorm may vary Irom court to court
according to the number and kind oI cases customarily heard.
'NRS4.240Entries in docket prima facie evidence of facts.The several particulars oI
NRS 4.230 speciIied must be entered under the title oI the action to which they relate, and
(unless otherwise in this chapter provided) at the time when they occur. Such entries in a
justice`s docket, or a transcript thereoI, certiIied by the justice, or the justice`s successor in
oIIice, are prima Iacie evidence oI the Iacts so stated.
Docket in 12-065630 indicates: '01/17/2012 Public DeIender Appointed
1/23/12 Case Filed
1/23/12 Formal Charges USE OF THE 911 EMERGENCY SYSTEM WHEN NO ACTUAL
OR PERCEIVED EMERGENCY EXISTS, a violation oI NRS 207.145
'2/14/12 CANCELED Arraignment (10:00 AM) (Judicial OIIiter: Pearson, Scott) Vacated
Arraignment (10:00 AM) (Judicial OIIicer: Pearson, Scott) Dogan was appointed to deIend
Couglin on 1/17/12, and the WCPD's OIIice sent Coughlin a letter notiIying him oI Dogan's
appearance as attorney oI record on on January 26
th
, 2012, and Dogan's supervisor, Chris
Fortier emailed Coughlin on 2/6/12 to discuss Dogan's representation, and Dogan an Coughlin
met and discussed the case on 2/8/12, at which time, to Coughlin's understanding, Dogan
agreed to appear on Coughlin's behalI at the 2/14/12 arraingment and enter a not guilty plea.
Given the charge was a gross misdemeanor, under Nevada law, Coughlin was entitled to
'representation at all stages oI the proceedings, including the arraignment. Dogan Iailed to
appear, though he was required to. The RJC 's Judicial Secretary Lori Townsend voluntarily
sent the SBN OBCs King the 2/21/12 Iiling by Coughlin represented by the Iollowing docket
entry:
'2/21/12 Notice Aotice of Appearance. Entry oI Plea oI Not Guilty, Waiver oI Right to
Arraignment; Motion to Dismiss Iiled. (DDA Young Iailed to ever oppose this Motion to
Dismiss, to which, on 3/19/13 Judge CliIton rejected Coughlin's DCR 13(3), Polk v. State
argument that such Iailure to oppose should be taken as an admission, makign a sua sponte
argument that DDA Young 'implicilty opposed Coughlin's Motion. Further problematic is the
unexplained transIerring oI 12-065630 Irom D1, Judge Lynch, to D5, Judge CliIton, on
2/27/12.
'2/27/12 Mandatory Status ConIerence (1 :30 PM) (judicial OIIicer: Schroeder, Jack) The
docket does not indicate that MSC oI 2/27/12 was 'CANCELLED (as it does Ior the 3/29/12
date), yet the RJC has continued to maintain that no audio transcript is available Ior that
hearing due to the Iact that it was not held. The docket entry immediately thereaIter, Ior the
same 2/27/12 date, indicates '2/27/12 Order Ior Competency Evaluation Filed.
'2/28/12 Case TransIerred to Another Court to D.C. 2127120/2 PSYCH
5/23/12 Remand Irom Second Judicial District Court Filed
The docket indicates Coughlin, then a an attorney license in Nevada, Iiled a ''2/21/12
Notice Notice oI Appearance. Despite that, Judge CliIton steadIastly reIused to allow
Coughlin to Iile documents thereaIter or issue his own subpoenas, subjecting Coughlin to the
threat oI contempt charges and worse.
'8/21/12 Hearing Result (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peler )
DeIendant Iailed to appear, DeIense requested that this cose be continued and set with his
misdemeanor Reno Justice Court Case set Ior August 29, 2012 01 8:30A.M. State opposes as
this is Mr. Caughlin's second time Ioiling to appear. DeIense's motion is GRANTED. MSC is
setIor August 29,2012 at 9:00A.M. Coughlin dispute the allegation that he Iailed to appear on
either 2/14/12 or 8/29/12, rather, the WCPD Iailed to appear despite agreeing to at the 2/14/12
arraignment, and the WCPD admits to Iailing to notiIy Coughlin in writing Ior the 8/6/12
hearing, and the docket Iails to contain any entry on 8/6/12 to indicate that some Motion
Hearing was to be held on that date, or that such was continued. Rather, the Iirst appearance in
the RJC's docket oI any indication that there was some 8/6/12 hearing in 12-065630 is
indicated in the docket entry Ior 8/21/12.
'8/27/12 Motion Hearing (8:30 AM) (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peter) Parties Presenl:
PlaintiII The State oI Nevada Deputy Dislrict At/orney Yaung, Zach DeIendant Coughlin,
Zachary Barker Public DeIender l.eslie, James Briand '
'8/27/12 Amended Criminal Complaint Filed (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peter ) Stricken
'8/27/12 Hearing Result (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peter) The State moved to strike Second
Amended Criminal Complaint.
'8/27/12 Motion Granted (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peter) to Strike Second Amended
Criminal Complaint.
'8/27/12 Hearing Result The Slate read oIIered plea negotiations into the record at which time
the DeIendant accepted the oIIered plea. the State filed Amended Criminal Complaints.
Hearing proceeded at conclusion oI the hearing, the Court will not accept DeIendant's plea. The
State moved to Strike Amended Criminal Complaint. GRANTED. Mandatory Status
ConIerence remains set August 29, 2012, at 9:00A.M.
It was overly prejudicial to Coughlin's deIense Ior Judge CliIton to, unexplainedly, be
given some:
'11/5/12 Correspondence Recieved via mail Irom Reno City Attorney's OIIice Re: Written
Objection Pursuant to Reno Justice Court Rule 45 (RJCR 45) Regarding E-mailed Subpeonas
to City oI Reno Emergency Communication Center Irom Zach Coughlin Concerning
RCR2011-063341.
Further, in RJC RCR11-063341, the docket entry Ior 7/16/12 only serves to prove
Coughlin's contention that during that Trial date Judge SIerrazza indicated that the 8/29/12
court date would not be a trial date, but rather: 'Hearing Result (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza,
Peter ) DeIense movesIor continuance; Public DeIonder Jeremy Bosler indicated that a new
Deputy Public DeIender shall be appointed to take over the case. State Agrees. 1rial shall be
set on August 29, 212. All Motions shall be decided at that date.
The subsequent need to have an appearance oI the docket entry Ior 8/9/12 does little
more than prove that Coughlin's newly introduced WCPD Leslie (a ChieI Deputy Public
DeIender who never handles misdemeanor cases, save Ior taking over all three oI Coughlins Ior
the express purpose oI sabotaging them to beneIit the Washoe County Iisc), whom replaced
WCPD DPD Goodnight minutes beIore the 7/16/09 Trial date, lobbied behind the scenes to
Judge SIerrazza to enter such a Notice/Order to deIeat Coughlin's argument that the 8/29/12
date was not a 'Trial date, but rather set Ior disposing oI 'pre-trial motions, and to then set a
Trial date should one be necessary. Leslie, as his is wont, oI course, attempted to jam both the
hearing oI pre-trial motions and an MSC in 12-065630, and a hearing in 12-067980 all into that
8/29/12 date (which occurred a couple days aIter Leslie successIully oI the only inviolable right
oI criminal deIendant that Leslie had yet to rape, ie, Coughlin's right to decide whether to
accept the State's plea bargain or to go to trial).
While that docket indicates '8/9/12 Notice The Honorable Peler J. SIerrazza will hear
Motion to Suppress at the time set for 1rial" that entry was, oI course, interpreted to mean
the trial was set Ior 8/29/12. OI course, that 8/9/12 docket entry does not actually indicate that
the trial date was set for 8/29/12. This materially prejudiced Coughlin's deIense, as did Leslie's
lying to his client Coughlin regarding his arranging Ior the 'witnesses to be held to their
subpoenas (Templeton and Dawson...Dawson later admitted to Coughlin Leslie told him not to
show up Ior the 8/29/12 date, and Leslie, only inIormed Coughlin that he released all witnesses
Irom their subpoenas well into the State's presentation oI its case during the Hearing on the
Motion to Suppress (going beyond a Iailure to communicate with his client, Leslie actually
purposeIully mislead his client, Iailed to review the exculpatory video/audio oI the
arrest/assault and battery oI Coughlin just prior to the arrest/and subsequent investigatory
videos Irom one week aIter the arrest wherein the material witness Leslie and the WCPD
reIused to even attempt to serve a subpoena on via NRS 174.345 (not to mention she is a
McQueen High School student, so, she's not that diIIicult to track down), Nicole Watson, whom
Coughlin caught on tape, knowing she was being recorded, admit to hearing an unidentiIied
man whom she witnessed pick up a phone oII the ground int he middle oI the skate plaza (in
constrast to Goble's assertions that he careIully set such phone in a hat on a ledge on the
perimeter thereoI next to a group oI his Iriends) and threat to throw the phone 'in the river iI
someone did not claim it immediately...which is not the case upon a review oI the audio
transcript and the docket entry Irom 7/16/12. Rather, that docket entry Ior 7/15/12 indicated
'1rial shall be set on August 29, 212. All Motions shall be decided at that date. Setting a
trial on a date is Iar diIIerent than setting a trial for a date. Further, indicating 'all motions shall
be decided at that date Iails to characterize 'that date as a trial date, rather, is Iurther
underscores the extent to which 'that date was set Ior nothing more than hearing, and deciding
'all motions and to then, 'iI necessary set a trial date.
The entry in 11-063341 Ior 8/29/12 reads: 'Hearing Result The Stale read oIIered plea
negotiations into the record at which time the Defendant accepted the offered plea. Tire State
Iiled Amended Criminal Complaints. Hearing proceeded. At conclusion oI the hearing. The
Court will not accept DeIendant's plea. The State moved to Strike Amended Criminal
Complaint. GRANTED. Trial remains set August 29, 2012. at 9:00 A.M.
The docket entry in 11-063341 Ior the Suppressio Hearing demonstrates the clearly
reversible error attendant to Judge SIerrazza ruling there was probable cause to make the arrest
(despite it clearly being violative oI NRS 171.136, especially where Goble testiIied that he told
the OIIicer the phones value was less than the amount required to charge Coughlin with 'Ielony
grand larceny and the arrest occurred 'between 7 pm and 7 am). Without anything connected
to the 'pat down search, which the docket indicates 'DeIendant's motion to Suppress
GRANTED to the extent oI the 'pat down search, there is insuIIicient evidence or support to
Iind suIIicient probable cause to arrest existed. The State Iailed to argue any 'inevitable
discovery or that Duralde would have 'heard the 'silent 'vibrating incoming call alert
(where there was testimony and evidence that the alert was nothign more than the phone's
screen lighting up, and no 'vibrating sound...and where the video/audio Io the arrest, taken
with a high deIinition audio/video smartphone less than 10 inches away, reveals absolutely
none oI the 'vibrating that RPD OIIicer Duralde indicated he could 'hear in connectin with
his pat aown search (and at that point, it was a second quasi-pat down search (read, really a
Fourth Amendment violating search and seizure, rather than a 'pat down search where, at that
point, Duralde indicated he had already discerned that Coughlin possessed no weapons and
posed no threat').
The docket entry Ior 8/29/12 reads:Hearing Result (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peter)
DeIendant addressed motion to appoint co-counSel. DeIenrdant's Counsel addressed motion to
appoint co-counsel. The State opposes motion to appoint co-counsel. Motion DENIED. II
DeIendant so chooses the Court will conduct a Faretta Canvas. DeIendant moved Ior selI
representation. The Court canvassed the DeIendant regarding the Faretta inquiry. The State
objects to DeIendant's motion to represent himselI on the grounds that it is untimely and that
this is Ior the purpose oI delay and not in good Iaith. DeIendant's counsel addressed motion Ior
selI representation. Motion DENIED. The State's motion to Strike all Documents that were
Iiled solely by the DeIendant is hereby GRANTED. The DeIendant previously Iiled Motion to
Suppress. Motion Hearing proceeded. The State opposes DeIendant's Motion to Suppress.
DeIendant's Motion to Suppress GRANTED to the extent oI the "pat down search". Trial
proceeded. Witnesses held to subpoenas.
Its no wonder that Coughlin Ielt Iorced to conIirm the sole selI representation that he
was unlawIully prevented Irom undertaking since his Iiling, as prima Iacie evidence oI is
demonstrated oI by the Iollowing docket entries in 11-063341:
'2/15/12 Authorization to Represent Filed by Couglin while he was an attorney licensed to
practice in Nevada. Another couple Coughlin Iilings on '2/15/12 Motion Filed Motion to
Allow Late Filing Pre-Trial Notice and 'Motion Filed Pre-Trial Motion. Additionally,
Coughlin's right to represent himselI where he was an attorney licensed in Nevada was denied,
revealing clearly reversible error where Coughlin Iiled, as the docket indicates on '2/17/12
Notice oI Appearance Filed and Supplement to Motion to Accept Pre Trial Motions Where
Untimely.
The stressIul lead up to the 2/29/12 trial date in 11-063341 is a SCR 102.5 mitigating
Iactor as to any misconduct alleged in connection with the 2/27/12 or 3/12/12 trial dates in 11
TR 26800. Further, there is no indication in the 11-063341 docket that the required 'notice in
writing to all other departments was issued by D5 in response to the 2/27/12 Order Ior
Competency Evaluation. Regardless, given jurisdiction was only remanded back the the RJC
on 5/18/12 by Judge Elliott, the docket entry oI '5/3/12 Response Reply to State's Opposition
to Motion to Supress represents a Iugitive document Iiled in violation oI the stay under NRS
178.405, as was the 2/27/12, 2:55 pm Iile stamped 'Opposition to Motion to Continue Filed
Trial date and Motion to Appoint Co-Counsel by DDA Young... As such, it was reversible
error to reIuse Coughlin his right to appear on his own behalI, especiall under DCR 13(3) and
Polk where, one would think, at some point, DDA Young would be held to having his Iugitive
documents and Iailures to oppose held against the State in anywhere near the same overly rigid
and Iormulaic application oI procedural rules that Judge CliIton and SIerrazza so consistently
applied to Coughlin.
Further, the 5/7/12 transIer to Mental Health Court itselI violated the NRS 178.405
stay, as did the State and DPD Goodnight's attempts to hold the '5/7/12 Misdemeanor Trial, as
was the setting oI that trial itselI (the RJC constantly moves cases Iorward during such
mandatory stays, though the public deIenders most deIinitely do not build a deIense case during
such time).
'5/7/12 Mcnlal Health Court (Judicial OIIicer: SIerrazza, Peter) DeIense requested /0 be
trans/erred /0 Melltal Health Court. StaU did 1101 oppose m IonS! m lhe DeIendalll entered a
plea to the charges. The Court Iinds that the DeIendant does 1101 inIocl have to enter a plea.
State requested (hat iI/he Court decides to transIer this case 10 Mental lIea/lh Court. prior to
that happelling. witness Iees be paid ill the amount oI$75.oo. DeIellSe opposed stating
De/erukm! has no means oIpaying witness/ees. 11 is ordered IhlJIIJre DeIondant is topay
S75.OO witness/ees by May 7. 20/1 Upon/urther order a/ the COlVt. this cose is traTISIorred
to the jurisdiction o/District Court Mental Health Court without a plea.
Further, Judge Breen's shameIul summary removal oI Coughlin Irom Mental Health
Court was truly appalling. There was absolutely no notice or opportunity to be heard as to the
Iraudulent basis Ior the MHC removign Coughlin where the program materials, oIIer,
acceptance, and contract entered into with Coughlin was thereaIter, apparently, unilaterally
altered by an AA Iocused Judge Breen, whom lacks a medical degree or license to practice
medicine, yet, along with Rene Biondo (and the complicity oI silent WCPD JenniIer Rains)
reIused to allow Coughlin to take a medication Ior ADD/ADHD/Treatment Resistant
Depression that the MHC's Sharon Dollarhide admitted was not excluded by the contract or
program materials/rules/guidelines provided to Coughlin. Following that 5/24/12 hearing,
Coughlin was accosted by several WCSO Deputies in the hallway oI the 2JDC courthouse
demanding to search Coughlin Ior any recording devices and interrogating him as to whether
he recorded any oI the 'hearing beIore Judge Breen.
It was reversible error to reIuse to reject to plea bargain Coughlin voluntarily and Ireely
accepted (and expressly indicated to the Court that he had so done) on '8/27/12 Hearing Result
The Stale read oIIered plea negotiatioTIS into lhe record at which lime the DeIondant accepted
tire oIIered plea. Tire S,ate Iiled Amended Crimino/ Complo/nls. Hearing proceeded AI
conclusion oI the heoring. lhe CalVI will not accept De/elldant's plea. The State moved to
Strike Amended Criminal Complaint. GRANTED. Trial remains sel August 29. 2012. al 9:00
A.AI. in 11-063341.
Further, the suggestion by Judge CliIton that Coughlin was seeking (or, rather, had
successIully attained) an Order Ior Competency Evaluation Irom Judge Pearson (which
Coughlin handed to Judge CliIton in court, on the record, on 2/2/13 in 12-065630, requiring a
stay oI proceedings in 'all aepartments`, which Judge CliIton, as is his wont, violated Nevada
law in willIully ignoring in his patent display oI partiality towards the same WCDA's OIIice in
which he was a prosecutor Ior the 25 years preceding his investiture ceremon in January oI
2011. Further, Judge CliIton's evident partiality and the extent to which he has yet to embrace
his role as a judge, but rather constantly reverts to the more Iamiliar, to him, role oI a
prosecutor, was evident when, during the 3/19/12 Trial date in 12-065630 he announced to
Coughlin, on the record: 'I know what I am doing, I have been doing this Ior twenty-Iive
years...which is curious given Judge CliIton worked in civil litigation Ior Iive years prior to
his twenty-Iive years as a prosecutor with the WCDA's OIIice (where he worked alongside
2JDC Judge L. Gardner in the domestic violence unit Ior some time, a reunion oI sorts Irom
their tenure together at Reno High School (class oI '77 and '78, respectively, with the Judge in
Coughlin's criminal trespass prosecution in RMC 26405, W. Garnder, L. Gardner's brother,
class oI '75).
Regardless, prosecutorial and police misconduct was revealed incident to the Iailure to
propound the ECOMM recordings between the RPD and ECOMM. That docket entry Ior
12/19/11 reads: 'Request Filed Request/or Discovery, which represents the Iiling by WCPD
Goodnight which demanded all recordings (logs or audio Iiles) by Ecomm/RPD, etc....and
despite that the ECOMM recordings between the RPD and ECOMM, which totally vitiated the
Iraudulent recounting oI 'what the oIIicer's were told by dispatch (the oIIicer's were out oI
there cars and on scene, unable to read the logs on their in car screens, and nothing on their
radios indicated anything about 'a possible Iight or 'someone just socked a minor, thereIore,
no exigent saIety basis Ior the pat down search, etc., etc. (911 dispatchers, one oI which on duty
that night was RPD OIIicer Duralde's wiIe, dispatcher Jessica Duralde...a connection that Judge
CliIton threatened to jail Coughlin should he mention it again, aIter striking such mention Irom
the record on 3/19/13 and 4/2/13 (where Judge CliIton gave similar indications in response to
Coughlin unearthing the marital relationship between Judge CliIton and Deputy AG Rhonda
CliIton, see 62821, where the AG's oIIice is representing the WCDA's OIIice...and consider that
Judge Sattler is a member oI the Board oI Directors oI Washoe Legal Services (replacing
CAAW Executive Board member Judge Elliott in CV11-01955, where Coughlin was suing
both WLS and CAAW...oh, and WLS's Executive Director Paul Elcano's daughter, 1yler
Elcano, Esq., was recently hired as a prosecutor for the Washoe County District Attorney's
Office. WLS and the WCDA's OIIice have partnered (with Coughlin's Iormer RMC public
deIender, Lew Taitel, Esq....see CV11-03216 and RMC 11 CR 26405, and RJC Rev12-1048,
and RCR12-067980, and Rev11-1708 Ior a ConIlict-Palooza...ADA Hezler will have none oI
this (or NNDB/DDA Kandaras's 12/13/12 emails to Coughlin's then WCPD CPD Leslie
declaring Coughlin's 'competency an issue (implicating NRS 178.405...which oI course, the
WCDA's OIIice and RJC as a whole ignored completely, especially at the improperly noticed
('your're here! said Judge CliIton, echoing RMC Jugde Dilworth's statements in response to
similar due process/lack oI notice/service arguments made by Coughlin at the 12/3/12 Trial in
12 CR 12420 (which is entirely connected to CV11-03126, RJC Rev12-1048, RCR12-067980,
and, thereIore, CV11-03126, and thereIore, CV11-01955, and thereIore RCR12-065630, and
thereIore NG12-0204, 0434, 0435, etc., etc., and on and one. Sure the Nevada Constituting
requires some to swear to protection 'the Constitution ana the government of Nevaaa` but its a
bit much to stretch that and JCRCP 1 to an exception that swallows all dur process protections
and procedural rules, not to mention individual liberties and rights altogether. But, it sure helps
come re-election time).
In there Memorandum oI Costs in 03628, Baker and Hill ask Ior the same $1,060 Ior
'securing the property Ior NBI contractors Phil Stewarts claimed charged that were already
denied at the 12/21/11 Hearing on Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien. Law
oI the Case. Res Judiciate. Actually Litigated. Lacking merit Ior Baker to seek such costs
again in 03628.
NRS40.380Provisions governing appeals.Either party may, within 10 days, appeal Irom
the judgment rendered. But an appeal by the deIendant shall not stay the execution oI the
judgment, unless, within the 10 days, the deIendant shall execute and Iile with the court or
justice the deIendant`s undertaking to the plaintiII, with two or more sureties, in an amount to
be Iixed by the court or justice, but which shall not be less than twice the amount oI the
judgment and costs, to the eIIect that, iI the judgment appealed Irom be aIIirmed or the appeal
be dismissed, the appellant will pay the judgment and the cost oI appeal, the value oI the use
and occupation oI the property, and damages justly accruing to the plaintiII during the
pendency oI the appeal. Upon taking the appeal and Iiling the undertaking, all Iurther
proceedings in the case shall be stayed.
|1911 CPA 659; RL 5601; NCL 9148|
NRS40.385stay oI execution upon appeal; duty oI tenant who retains possession oI
premises to pay rent during stay.Upon an appeal Irom an order entered pursuant to NRS
40.253:
1.Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay oI execution may be obtained by
Iiling with the trial court a bond in the amount oI $250 to cover the expected costs on appeal. A
surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction oI the appellate court and irrevocably appoints
the clerk oI that court as the surety`s agent upon whom papers aIIecting the surety`s liability
upon the bond may be served. Liability oI a surety may be enIorced, or the bond may be
released, on motion in the appellate court without independent action. A tenant oI commercial
property may obtain a stay oI execution only upon the issuance oI a stay pursuant to Rule 8 oI
the Nevada Rules oI Appellate Procedure and the posting oI a supersedeas bond in the amount
oI 100 percent oI the unpaid rent claim oI the landlord.
2.A tenant who retains possession oI the premises that are the subject oI the appeal
during the pendency oI the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount provided in the
underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes due. II the tenant Iails to
pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new proceedings Ior a summary eviction by serving the
tenant with a new notice pursuant to NRS 40.253.
(Added to NRS by 1997, 3510; A 2011, 1492)
RULE73.bond FOR costs ON APPEAL

Unless an appellant is exempted by law, or has filed a supersedeas bond or other
undertaking which includes security for the payment of costs on appeal , in civil cases a bond
Ior costs on appeal or equivalent security shall be Iiled by the appellant in the justice court with
the notice oI appeal; but security shall not be required of an appellant who is not subject to
costs. The bond or equivalent security shall be in the sum or value of $25 unless the justice
court fixes a different amount. A bond Ior costs on appeal shall have suIIicient surety, and it or
any equivalent security shall be conditioned to secure the payment of costs if the appeal is
finally dismissed or the judgment affirmed, or of such costs as the district court may direct
if the judgment is modified. If a bond or equivalent security in the sum or value of $250 is
given, no approval thereof is necessary. AIter a bond Ior costs on appeal is Iiled, a respondent
may raise Ior determination by the justice court objections to the Iorm oI the bond or to the
suIIiciency oI the surety. The provisions oI Rule 73A apply to a surety bond upon a bond given
pursuant to this rule.
|As amended; eIIective July 1, 2005.|
Coughlin was granted in Iorma pauperis ("IFP") status by the Reno Justice Court on October 6,
2011.42 ROA, Vol. I, pp. 274-275 IFPstatus only applies to the trial level oI litigation, not to appeals.
43 NRS 12:015. Casper v. Huber, 85 Nev. 474,456 P.2d 436 (1969).Accordingly, iI he wished to stay
the enIorcement oI the FFCL&O and stop the lockout, he was required to post a supersedeas bond, and
obtain an order granting a stay, beIore the lockout occurred. As to the bond requirement, since this case
was not a "Iormal" eviction, NJCRCP 73A(a)(1)(4) do not apply. Instead, this case Ialls under the
"catchall" provision at the end oI subsection (a) oI that Rule, which provides in pertinent part "In cases
not provided Iorin (1), (2), (3) or (4) above, the giving oI an appeal bond, under the provisions oI Rule
73, shall stay proceedings in the court below upon the judgment or order appealed Irom ... except
where the appellate court may otherwise direct upon such terms as it may in its discretion impose.,,44
NJCRCP 73A(a). NJCRCP 73 provides that "The bond or equivalent security shall be in the sum or
value oI $250 unless the justice court Iixes a diIIerent amount." (Emphasis added). NRS 40.385(1)
provides that a stay may be obtained by posting a bond in the amount oI $250.00 with the trial court.
Baker was present in court upon Judge SIerrazza rendering a Iairly detailed order (which
Baker completely departed Irom in his proposed FOFCOLOSE, requiring much in attorney's
Iees on both sides to correct by Couglin's procurring an Order on 11/7/11 setting aside portions
oI the proposed Order Judge SIerrazza signed, which arguably vitiates much oI the rest oI such
order, and such, Judge Flanagan's overly deIerential treatment thereroeI (particularly where
Anvui requires a 'de novo review, was clear error.
Additionally, is Iraudulent Ior Baker to maintain that Coughlin's IFP applied only to
'trial court matters when he was present in Court when Judge SIerrazza waived the Iiling Iee
on appeal in the RJC to Coughlin. That, combined with NJCRCP 73's language respecting (and
the extent to which Judge SIerrazza's purporting it to be just (and apparently, standard practice
amongst RJC Judges) to charge 'three times the monthly rent as an 'bond on appeal Ior
'costs (ie, not a stay, or supersedeas bond) makes everything about Judge SIerrazza's variosu
Orders and Baker's BrieI completely wrong. ' Unless an appellant is exempted by law, or has
filed a supersedeas bond or other undertaking which includes security for the payment of costs
on appeal, in civil cases a bond Ior costs on appeal or equivalent security shall be Iiled by the
appellant in the justice court with the notice oI appeal; but security shall not be required of an
appellant who is not subject to costs . Coughlin being granted his IFP in both the trial court
and by the trial court as to the 'Iiling Iee (which, arguably, ought extend to the anticipated
'costs underlying the $250 'appeal bond requirement, and thereIore, Coughlin is not 'subject
to costs. Regardless, the transcript Irom the Hearing on the supersedeas bond motion in
Venetian v. Two Roads makes clear that 'costs are not 'rent, and NRS 69.050 and the use oI
and meanings oI the terms 'prevaling party and 'costs therein, and such Chapter being
limited to 'judgments, makes clear that no anticipated 'attorney's Iees award could justiIy
such an exorbinate 'bond on appeal unless such was actually a 'supersedeas bond that also
encompassed any 'bond on appeal (which, again, as to the NJCRCP Rule 73 'RULE73.
BOND FOR COSTS ON APPEAL, Coughlin, granted IFP status, would not have to pay).
Selection protions Io the Venetian v Two Roads transcript:
'MR . COULTHARD: I think maybe mark the errata, iI that's okay with the court, as Exhibit A,
would be important. We did Iile that. Anyway, 40.385 provides a stay oI execution may be
obtained by Iiling with the trial court a bond in the amount oI $250.00 to cover the expected
costs on appeal. Two Roads posted the bond with the court on October 6th, 2010 . And we
provided the notice oI posting a bond. It 's actually Exhibit B to the errata . And then
recognizing that it would be unIair Ior a landlord to be saddled with a tenant that wasn't paying
rent during an appeal, it actually goes on and says, a tenant who retains possession oI the
premises that are the subject oI the appeal, during the pendency oI the appeal shall pay to the
landlord rent in the amount provided in the underlying contract between the tenant and the
landlord as it becomes due . That's right out oI the statute . And consistent with that
requirement and really Iollowing up on the discussion we had on September 29th, Two roads
on October 6th, 2010 paid the current amount oI rent due, consistent with the invoice Ior
October oI 2010, presented $148,225.48 to Venetian. That's Exhibit A to the errata. With the
cover letter that says this is pursuant to our rights under the 7 statute, we 're paying the October
2010 rent . So I believe at that point we 've met our statutory obligation under NRS 40.385 to
obtain a stay. In the alternative, we then also moved under 62 -NRCP 62 . Let me address the
opposition really that we got to the stay under 40.385 is narrow. And the bulk oI the lengthy
pleading Iiled by Venetian really goes to the issue oI equities and really is in response to the, I
believe, to the 62 --NRCP 62 request, where you do weigh those Iactors. And I can address
them. Essentially the bulk oI this comes down to you're a dead beat tenant. THE COURT: Let's
stay conIined to the Chapter 40 argument Ior right now. That 's my bigger concern, then Rule
62 and supersedeas bonds. Those are generally more applicable to jUdgments. Posting a
supersedeas bond and judgment amount Ior appeal, as opposed to a situation where, in my
mind, you have a speciIic statute governing the issue, as opposed to a general appeal rule . MR.
COULTHARD: Okay. I'd be happy to do that, because I think that is where --the Iight, whether
we 've met that statute. And so really the opposition comes down to, they say that it is
discretionary with the court, number one. It 's a discretionary stay with the court. Which
Irankly, and with not. not we the And or the the stay 8 Supreme justice 3 month their position.
the the this jurisdictional oI 3 all due respect, when you read that statute it is The discretion lies
with the tenant as to whether or they pay a cost bond. And iI we post that cost bond, may obtain
a stay oI execution. There is some discretion Ior the court to increase amount oI that cost bond.
I would acknowledge that . I think that either the court can do that sua sponte at the request oI
the Venetian. But at this juncture statute provides Ior a cost bond, $250.00. And then second
part we have to do is pay the rent...
The other issue I think is that it 's not discretionary with this court. Again, the plain language oI
the statute says that the stay shall be issued -12 excuse me. It does not. It says, we may --the
tenant may obtain a stay iI they do the Iollowing two steps, post the bond, pay the rent. Which
we did. Again, the only discretion the statute provides this court is in the discretion oI the
amount oI the cost bond. So I think we've met our obligation under the statute to obtain a stay. I
think the very purpose oI the appeal will be Ilat out deIeated. Absent a stay we will be evicted
summarily, iI you don't grant the stay. And it is clear we will have irreparable injury. The
Nevada Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that real property and its attributes are considered
unique. And loss oI real property rights generally result in irreparable harm. The very purpose
oI this appeal will be 1 0 throated iI we don't have the ability to challenge that . We will be
evicted and that will be the end oI the tenant's opportunity to stay in here . And we will have
suIIered irreparable injury in the Iorm oI losing our ability to operate in this unique real
property premises . That is quintessential irreparable injury that we are Iaced with absent this
stay. I can run through the other Iactors, your Honor, iI I need to. But I don't think under the
statutory constraints that Hanson is controlling. But iI you Ieel we need to run through those,
this is obviously important to my client . I believe every one oI those Hanson Iactors bode in
Iavor oI granting this stay, in Iavor oI Two Roads being able to stay in this space. II there is any
questions about that in your Honor's mind, then I want the opportunity to make a record and
address those. THE COURT: Let me let them address the statute Iirst. Then we'll see where we
go Irom there. MR. FEDER: Your Honor, I think we laid out our position with respect to the
statute . You know, pertaining to the Iactor we brought about about the terms oI the time Irame
between the two . The more important part is the second part oI the argument we raised. And
that is when you read the statute, it is a discretionary 1 1 aspect with respect to how the
language is draIted. What they're trying to say, your Honor, which I believe the statute was ever
intended Ior, nor iI you look at the may language that you see in Rule 62, it also talks about
may be granted upon posting a supersedeas bond. There actually is a correlation between the
two . Rule 62 does not lay out all the Hanson Iactors . Hanson and everything else is in direct
relationship to 62 , which talks about may grant a stay. Similarly here, it talks about a may
Iactor with respect to what needs to occur. What they're arguing is by simply posting $250.00,
they automatically get a stay. I don 't believe that was ever intended by the legislature. Any
intent you can read in the statute, it ' s discretionary. THE COURT : How can you read that any
other way. I've got to agree --I mean, just by reading the statute with Mr. Coulthard, regardless
oI whether you're John Doe living in a studio apartment down town or Two Roads with a giant
restaurant in the Venetian, the intent, as I read that statute, is you may get a stay when you pay
this cost bond . That 's you pay that bond and the stay is in eIIect . I don't think there is
anything that says I have the discretion iI you paid the money to not let you have a 1 2 stay, not
let you stay in there . The only discretion I think the court has to deal with it is iI you are not
then paying rents, then you you have to Iile a new proceeding, which I think is ridiculous . But
that 's what the statute says. But that's almost summarily you're out now, because you didn't pay
the rents, kind oI thing. MR . FEDER: I think I know we 're you're coming Irom, your Honor.
From reading the statute, the statute to me had to be read in conjunction with what is normally
done when a stay is needed or required. When you read 62, again, it 's the may language . I
mean, then we 're Iocusing upon which brings back the discretion, which we believe leads back
to the application oI all oI the Hanson Iactors . The Hanson Iactors are there in essence to
balance the harms that the parties need to deal with with respect to what amount --irrespective,
you don't get to the bond portion or the bond argument, the cost bond, the discretion oI whether
it's higher than that amount, until you've satisIied the other elements that are required. When
you read 26-0, your Honor, that says -22 THE COURT: Let me ask you this then. Don' t you
think that the legislature would have recognized --and there is a diIIerence between structuring
appeals and stays on a judgment --or monetary 1 3 judgment versus taking people out oI their
home. That's the Iocus oI where the summary eviction statutes carne Irom..
...MR. FEDER: It also applies to 62-C , your Honor, that injunctive relieI is a procedure there
that also lays out argument that the Hanson Iactors would apply there as well . So when you
really lay out what the elements required, I don't think you can overlook the Hanson Iactors. I
think just this gets down to iI you reach and meet the elements required in Hanson, then you
look to this with respect to whether an amount oI what this cost bond would be the equivalent
to. In terms oI --and again, the may language. And that to us is where it gets directly correlated
to what the 62-D or 62-C language talks about. And it also reIerences when you read 62-C,
when an appeal is taken by the appellant giving the supersedeas bond, may obtain a stay,
subject to. It's the same may language, your Honor. In essence whether you read it the way
they're trying to say about what they're creating is by simply putting up $250.00, putting aside
what Section 2 says about what they shall be required to, there is a diIIerence in that language.
Two has shall language versus the may language in Subsection 1. When you take that into
account and you 1 4 read that, they need to also still satisIy those Hanson elements and go
through those . Otherwise, anybody, any time you deal with a tenant situation where the argue
and raise a deIense or not --your Honor already rule their deIense is unreasonable --whether
you raise it or not or create one, you can just come in and say, okay, here is $250.00 bond.
We've done what we need to do. We've now stayed it. I don't believe that was the intent here.
Especially with respect to the amount oI damages we're talking about here . Because eIIectively
what we 're getting here, your Honor --we laid it out in the papers --a stay here on summary
eviction, also stays our ability to go aIter this in the monetary damage case. So I don't believe
those two can be looked at in correlation that way . I think it 's not an automatic recourse. The
language in here does not say that. II the legislature was intending it to be it would have said
they will automatically get a stay upon the posting oI a $250.00 bond. It does not say that, your
Honor. It does not have the direct language. II the legislature intended Ior it to get to that level,
they would have included that speciIic language. It's not there. So I don't think we can overlook
all oI these Hanson Iactors and apply all oI the Hanson Iactors. You only get to that level, your
1 5 Honor, iI you can satisIy those Hanson elements. And to our position, as we laid out, they
don 't get anywhere close to it . He has now raised a new argument which I didn't raise in the
papers about real property. It was never raised. In the papers it talks about losing the business.
Which is a lost business . That 's a proIit case. We deal with those situations regularly. It 's a
simple damage case. But I can go through all the Hanson Iactors, your Honor, iI your Honor
wants me to, because we 've laid it out pretty well. I don 't believe you get to that level and that
statute until you satisIy those Hanson elements. I don't believe this was intended, nor --I'll say I
don't believe that was the intent oI this statute, to supersede the requirements oI the elements
Ior a stay pending any type oI an appeal. Not even in a situation with a landlord tenant, your
Honor. THE COURT: Well, I disagree with you. I'll tell you that in my experience the way I
described it is exactly how the justice court treats it and district court treats it. Which is when
you seek to remove somebody --I'm always Iocused on the individual, since that was the
geneses oI what it was all about. And businesses are just getting the beneIit oI what the
individual gets in a home situation. 1 6 But whenever somebody is about to be evicted Irom
their home, they post that $250 .00, they automatically get a stay. Then the shall language is in
order Ior your stay not to dissolve on your head, you have to be paying the rent every month
Irom there on out . You may have been evicted because you weren't paying any rent in the past,
but iI you're going to appeal the ruling and you Iiled the $250.00 to get it up to district court to
look at what the JP did, then you have to be paying your rent every month thereaIter, or then
they are going to come in and you have no grounds to ward oII being actually physical taken
out oI the property . But I think the statute does direct itselI not to -the court has discretion to
do this, that, or the other, but the stay oI execution may be obtained. That's the party. A party
may obtain a stay upon Iiling a bond. So I don't think we get to the Iactors. I think the statute is
pretty express in my mind in terms oI what the intent oI the legislate was in terms oI people, or
as I said, businesses that have been ordered summarily evicted . I will tell you some oI the
Iactors, I do think that there is an irreparable harm argument to the deIendant to be taken out oI
this business, based upon what 's taken place. It's obvious that the object oI their appeal gets 1 7
deIeated I they're taken out oI the business when they're trying to appeal to stay in the
business . The only questionable thing is, like many injunction hearings, is reasonable
likelihood oI success on the merits . I disagreed with their position in what the interpretation
was . But I have never beIore believed that just because I disagree that the seven people above
me aren't going to disagree with me. It happens. So I can't say that they don't have a reasonable
likelihood oI convincing, whether it's the En Banc Supreme Court or a panel oI the Supreme
Court that their position is more meritorious then what I thought it was. So in any event, what I
kind oI wanted us to --I'm going to grant you the stay. But in terms oI the cost bond, I do agree
that $250.00, again, contemplates the situation that I just talked about with the individual
getting evicted Irom the home, appealing Irom justice court to district court . I think what we 're
dealing with here is going to have substantially diIIerent costs then what we 're dealing with in
a normal getting evicted Irom your apartment type situation . So what is your position on that .
MR. FEDER: Our position, your Honor, we it laid and we dealt with the harms that were going
to occur to the Venetian, inclusive. In essence these are 1 8 the contemplations, mediation,
arbitration process with respect to damage type awards. We ' re eIIectively, by granting a stay,
we getting stayed with respect to the ability to collect upon what we believe is past due
damages oI over 3.3 million dollars, plus interest . So we believe because oI the eIIectiveness
that that's going to have on our ability to ever collect upon this monetary judgment , they
should be required to bond that entire amount . The entire 3.3 million, plus interest with respect
to the underlying damage case . I know that it 's not normally part oI what a summary eviction
is about with the possessory aspects, but given the eIIect oI what this stay will have, I think that
's a Iair and r8asonable amount to be posted, your Honor. THE COURT : Mr . Coulthard . MR.
COULTHARD: The statute speciIically states cost bond on appeal, not supersedeas bond. What
we ' re dealing with are the Iiling Iees, the costs that will be incurred in prosecuting this appeal .
That is not legal Iees. That is not --they don't have an underlying judgment as to this 3 million
dollar rental amount. So, I mean, $1,500, $2,000.00, iI you look at what is deIined in costs,
what can actually be incurred more than adequately protects them. The important thing to note,
your Honor, is they're 1 9 getting the current rent . They are right now, based upon your order,
we're living under your interpretation oI the second amendment . The original deIerred rent
hasn' t even --that second amendment is still in Iorce and eIIect . So that --under your
interpretation, which we, with all due respect, adamantly dispute. We think there is another
interpretation, all oI which I argued beIore and I won't do now. But they are getting the beneIit
oI that second amendment . Current rents are being paid . So they 're not in any way harmed.
As to their past due rents, he said it himselI, interest . That 's iI they do prevail, and that your
decision is held up on appeal and aIIirmed on appeal . And they do pursue a monetary judgment
. At that juncture we 're going to be able to do some discovery and contest that. I assure you it
will be contested. But there is prejudgment interest, and interest under these documents that
under our court rules protect them Irom that . There is no methodology Ior a supersedeas bond,
which because there is no monetary judgment. It is a cost bond, $1,500.00. $2,500.00 is more
than we will incur in costs on this appeal . So I would suggest that would be more than enough.
II you do increase that amount, we want some time to get it posted. THE COURT : Okay. 2 0
Well, I' m going to -your last comments hit on my number, which I wrote down $2, 500.00.
Large commercial business leases obviously entail a lot more complexities then normal
residential apartment leases . But that doesn 't mean that all those complexities and the various
aspects oI what was to be paid under the lease, whether it's the Iirst amendment, the second
amendment, whether it 's past due rents , current rents, the various other things that were in
there I can' t remember all the language now but there was a lot oI things the money was
supposed to be going to in this lease. The cost bond on appeal doesn 't really say you need to
account Ior all those things right now, just what are the costs on appeal, what is a reasonable
amount . And again, this can be related in Iront oI the Supreme Court , the issues relating to the
stay or the bond up to the Supreme Court as well. But I think $2,500. 00 cost bond is
appropriate . MR. FEDER:
One Iact we want to bring up. That is one...THE COORT: Regardless oI what took place in the
summary eviction, what 4385 states very expressly is you get the appeal upon the posting oI the
bond, and thereaIter the stay you have to pay the rent . It doesn't speak to any other contractual
conditions and obligations you may have. That's all part oI your breach oI contract action,
whatever you may bring at some point in time. But I ordered the stay and they have to make
their monthly rental payments. They'll be obligated to pay each time thereaIter, or as I said,
under 4253, you Iile a new proceedings saying they haven't made their payments now and we
want them out out . MR. FEDER: Part and parcel, we want to see the order aIter it's prepared.
So we're clear with respect to what's in the order . Is your order going to say that we don't get
the Hanson 2 2 Iactors, we're just looking at Section 40.358. So we can be clear. THE COURT :
The order can include what I said about the Iactors a moment ago . But I don't think the Iactors
are what rule . OItentimes when you are ruling on something, I'll address part oI what you
brought up, even though I think the statute expressly gives them the right to stay once they
have Iiled the bond, I still think the Iactors weigh in Iavor oI the deIense, as I said. On the
irreparable harm issue, I think iI the appeal gets deIeated, I think they have a reasonable
likelihood oI success on the merits. That's a low standard . It's just is there a reasonable
interpretation oI that that somebody other than myselI might disagree with me on, so that things
weigh in Iavor oI them .
'
'5. Not granting Coughlin a stay
Coughlin was granted in Iorma pauperis ("IFP") status by the Reno Justice Court on October 6,
2011.42 IFPstatus only applies to the trial level oI litigation, not to appeals. 43 Accordingly, iI he
wished to stay the enIorcement oI the FFCL&O and stop the lockout, he was required to post a
supersedeas bond, and obtain an order granting a stay, beIore the lockout occurred.
As to the bond requirement, since this case was not a "Iormal" eviction, NJCRCP 73A(a)(1)(4) do not
apply. Instead, this case Ialls underthe "catchall" provision at the end oI subsection (a) oI that Rule,
which provides in pertinent part "In cases not provided Iorin (1), (2), (3) or (4) above, the giving oI an
appeal bond, under the provisions oI Rule 73, shall stay proceedings in the court below upon the
judgment or order appealed Irom ... except where the appellate court may otherwise direct upon such
terms as it may in its discretion impose.,,44 NJCRCP 73 provides that "The bond or equivalent security
shall be in the sum or value oI $250 unless the justice court Iixes a diIIerent amount." (Emphasis
added). NRS 40.385(1) provides that a stay may be obtained by posting a bond in the amount oI
$250.00 with the trial court.
Coughlin deposited $2,275 with the court pursuant to NRS 118A.355 and the court's order oI
October 13, 2011. He orally moved the court Ior a stay oI the eviction at the end oI the October 25,
2011 hearing, but did not cite any authority Ior his request. Accordingly, that motion was denied.45
Thus, although the court ordered that Coughlin's deposit would serve as his appeal bond, it denied a
stay because Coughlin did not provide the court with any basis to grant one, as was his legal
responsibility. Then, at Coughlin's speciIic request, the court held an emergency hearing on November
7, 2011, where it amended the FFCL&O and returned all sums on deposit to Coughlin, as he was
clamoring. The court then set the supersedeas bond at $2,700.00, as it was entitled to do.46 Coughlin
now argues that he should have been granted a stay oIthe eviction because he had Iunds on deposit with
the court at the time oI the lockout. Even iI he would have been entitled to that relieI, that position is
inconsistent with his prior demands that all oI his deposit be returned to him, and he is judicially
estopped Irom arguing it now.47 IICoughlin wanted to apply those Iunds to a super-sedeas bond under
JCRCP 73A or NRS 40.385, he should have either made that request at the October 25, 2011
hearing when the eviction was announced, or sometime between that hearing and the lockout a
week later. He never did so. In Iact, he did just the opposite. When Coughlin Iiled his "motion
Ior stay' 48 on October 31,2011, in which he demanded his deposit back 49, the lockout had not
even occurred. That conIirms that Coughlin had no intention oI posting a bond. or applying
those Iunds in order to obtain a stay. He cannot be heard to argue otherwise now. Then, aIter he
received his deposit back, he did not deposit any additional Iunds with the court until on or
about December 8, 2011 when he Iinally paid the Iiling Iee to perIect his appeal. ThereaIter, on
December 14,2011, he posted $250.00 Ior his appeal bond, and $1.00 Ior his "supersedeas
bond" (which sums he has subsequently moved to have returned to him). 50 By then, his
request Ior a stay had been moot Ior approximately six weeks.
1.
2.ROA, Vol. IV, pp.2, 22-23.
3.40.
4.ROA, Vol. III, p. 5.
41. Reno Newspapers, Inc.
42. ROA, Vol. I, pp. 274-275.
43 NRS 12:015. Casper v. Huber, 85 Nev. 474,456 P.2d 436 (1969).
5.44 NJCRCP 73A(a).
6.45 ROA, Vol. II, pp. 85,2.
7.46. ROA, Vol III, pp. 218-219; Vol. II, pp. 4,27.
8.46. ROA, Vol III, pp. 218-219; Vol. II, pp. 4,27.
47. Marcuse.
48. ROA, Vol. II, p. 3.
49. ROA, Vol. II, pp. 4, 27
50. ROA, Vol. IV, pp. 210-211.
51. CI., Schuck.
52. ROA, Vol. II, p. 85.
53. CI., Schuck
Baker's alleges that NJCRCP 73A(a) contains some 'catch-all provision, arguing that
1708 was not a 'Iormal eviction (odd, considering Baker wanted to utilizing Iormal discovery
under NJCRCP 34, wanted to be awarded the rent escrow....oI course, he deIinitely argued
Coughlin should not be allowed to bring counterclaims, despite his Answering BrieI making
like the issue had never even arisen.
As to just what is meant by the phrase 'Iormal eviction as Iound in NJCRCP 73A(a)(4),
consider the Iew appearances oI such prhase or similar in Nevada law:
used in Glazier case, and in JCRCL 40.
'NJCRCP RULE105.HEARINGS TO BE IAFORMAL Hearings regarding applications Ior
orders oI summary eviction shall be informal. No Iormal pleading other than the aIIidavits and
application provided by these rules may be required, since it is the intent oI such hearings to
determine the truthIulness and suIIiciency oI any aIIidavit, notice or service oI any notice and
to dispense Iair and speedy justice.
Baker's 2/24/12 Answering BrieIs reads: '3.4. For example, Coughlin chose to spend
the Iirst oI his two allotted days sending combative emails to both Judge SIerrazza and
Merliss' counsel, instead oI diligently trying to remove his belongings. At one point,
Coughlin even announced that he was entitled to a stay oI the proceedings, and that
would allow him to return to, and retake possession oI, the property. Judge SIerrazza
notiIied Coughlin that a stay had been denied. See EXHIBIT 1, which is a true and
correct copy oIthe reIerenced em ails oI December 22, 2011. Because Coughlin chose to
waste halI oI his allotted time trying to pick a Iight over that which was already moot, he
Iailed to remove all oIhis belongings Irom the property.Ib2 This, oI course, led him to
Iile a motion Ior a temporary restraining order ("TRO") in this
In 1 Coughlin had one week Irom the time the court ruled, on October 25, 2011, that he
would be evicted, until he was locked out on November 1,2011. Then, he was coming
and going on the property Ior another two weeks. Yet, during this time, he Iailed to
remove any oI this possessions. In that regard, the court should know that Mr. Coughlin
is a hoarder.
Fn.2 Even though Coughlin removed at least one Iull U-Haul box truck oI his
belongings Irom the property, he still leIt mountains oI"junk" behind. For example, there
were no less than 13 automobile seats in the basement. The backyard was Iull, up to the
top oI the six Ioot Ience, with discarded televisions, car body parts, tires, and broken
Iurniture. (page 3)
court, which is discussed Iurther, below. When Coughlin's TRO motion was denied, that,
in turn, led him to physically attempt to interIere with Merliss' eIIorts to dispose oI the
property Coughlin had chosen to abandon. Predictably, the end result was substantial
additional Iees incurred by Merliss, which was, oI course, Coughlin's goal all along.
3.5. In addition to his continued activity in the RJC, Coughlin has Iiled
hundreds oI pages oI abusive, and oIten nonsensical, materials with this court, in which
he has repeatedly sought relieI to which he was not even arguably entitled. In many oI
his Iilings, Coughlin Iailed to even identiIy, much less analyze, the controlling law on
the subject. Nevertheless, Merliss was Iorced to respond to those Iiling, lest the court
take Merliss' silence as an admission under DCR 13(3) that Coughlin's requests were
meritorious.
3.6. For example, Coughlin's December 30, 2011 motion Ior a temporary
restraining order was 20 pages long, excluding exhibits. Coughlin, a lawyer, Iailed to
identiIy or discuss the controlling law, NRCP 65(b) and NRS 33.010, in any way. In
addition to being procedurally deIicient, that motion was substantively without any merit
whatsoever, and this court so Iound. See this court's Order dated January 11, 2012.
Nevertheless, Merliss was Iorced to incur attorney's Iees to respond to that Irivolous
motion, and, as a saIe-harbor, delay his eIIorts to clean out and re-Iet the property,
causing him Iurther damage.
3.7. On January 12, 2012, aIter his motion Ior a TRO was denied, Coughlin
chose to resort to the selI-help tactic oI physically interIering with Merliss' eIIorts to
clean out the property. See Merliss' motion Ior order to show cause Iiled herein on
January 20, 2012 Ior Iurther particulars. Those antics ultimately led to Coughlin's arrest,
and additional motions and hearings, continuing his tactic oI causing Merliss more and
more Iees.... From Baker's 4/19/12 Motion Ior Attorney's Fees in 03628.
...
Baker's 2/24/12 Answering BrieI reads: '5. Not granting Coughlin a stay Coughlin was granted
in Iorma pauperis ("IFP") status by the Reno Justice Court on October 6, 2011.42 IFP status only
applies to the trial level oI litigation, not to appeals. 43 NRS 12:015. Casper v. Huber, 85 Nev. 474,456
P.2d 436 (1969).Accordingly, iI he wished to stay the enIorcement oI the FFCL&O and stop the
lockout, he was required to post a supersedeas bond, and obtain an order granting a stay, beIore the
lockout occurred.
As to the bond requirement, since this case was not a "formal" eviction, NJCRCP 73A(a)
(1)-(4) do not apply. Instead, this case Ialls under the "catchall" provision at the end oI subsection (a) oI
that Rule, which provides in pertinent part "In cases not provided Ior in (1), (2), (3) or (4) above, the
giving oI an appeal bond, under the provisions oI Rule 73, shall stay proceedings in the court below
upon the judgment or order appealed Irom ... except where the appellate court may otherwise direct
upon such terms as it may in its discretion impose. 44 NJCRCP 73A(a). NJCRCP 73 provides that
"The bond or equivalent security shall be in the sum or value oI $250 unless the justice court Iixes a
diIIerent amount." (Emphasis added). NRS 40.385(1) provides that a stay may be obtained by posting a
bond in the amount oI $250.00 with the trial court.
Coughlin deposited $2,275 with the court pursuant to NRS 118A.355 and the court's order oI
October 13, 2011. He orally moved the court Ior a stay oI the eviction at the end oI the October 25,
2011 hearing, but did not cite any authority Ior his request. Accordingly, that motion was denied.45
ROA, Vol. II, pp. 85,2. Thus, although the court ordered that Coughlin's deposit would serve as his
appeal bond, it denied a stay because Coughlin did not provide the court with any basis to grant one, as
was his legal responsibility. Then, at Coughlin's speciIic request, the court held an emergency hearing
on November 7, 2011, where it amended the FFCL&O and returned all sums on deposit to Coughlin, as
he was clamoring. The court then set the supersedeas bond at $2,700.00, as it was entitled to do. 46
ROA, Vol III, pp. 218-219; Vol. II, pp. 4,27. Coughlin now argues that he should have been granted a
stay oI the eviction because he had Iunds on deposit with the court at the time oI the lockout. Even iI he
would have been entitled to that relieI, that position is inconsistent with his prior demands that all oI his
deposit be returned to him, and he is judicially estopped Irom arguing it now.47 ROA, Vol III, pp. 218-
219; Vol. II, pp. 4,27. II Coughlin wanted to apply those Iunds to a supersedeas bond under JCRCP 73A
or NRS 40.385, he should have either made that request at the October 25, 2011 hearing when the
eviction was announced, or sometime between that hearing and the lockout a week later. He
never did so. In Iact, he did just the opposite. When Coughlin Iiled his "motion Ior stay (In 48
Marcuse (cited earlier in In 35: ,-..- .. 1-t J-oo 1-..c.-.. ., ;-.. .,s. ., J.,e ,.. ;...,/. ,----.--. o-..- ct- -.-c
e-,c-e 1-.tt.'. ,-..c.- e -.t-e
- ctc o.... t- .. ,.e..tt -.c-,,-e j-- t. t.. ct--- -.,, ) on October 31, 2011, in which he demanded his
deposit back 49 (ROA, Vol. II, p. 3.), the lockout had not even occurred. That conIirms that Coughlin
had no intention oI posting a bond or applying those Iunds in order to obtain a stay. He cannot be heard
to argue otherwise now. Then, aIter he received his deposit back, he did not deposit any additional
Iunds with the court until on or about December 8, 2011 when he Iinally paid the Iiling Iee to perIect
his appeal. ThereaIter, on December 14, 2011, he posted $250.00 Ior his appeal bond, and $1.00 Ior his
"supersedeas bond" (which sums he has subsequently moved to have returned to him).50 By then, his
request Ior a stay had been moot Ior approximately six weeks. '
At the 11/14/12 Iormal disciplinary hearing, Hill testiIied: 'HEARING - Vol. I,
(Pages 51:21 to 52:19) Q With that said, did he show candor to you? A In our dealings
with Mr. Coughlin, you could not trust him at all. No agreement ever made with Mr.
Coughlin was honored by him. For example, when Judge SIerrazza ordered that Mr.
Coughlin could have two days -- he was originally given a week to move his stuII out
beIore the eviction order was served. ThereaIter there was a hearing. The judge gave Mr.
Coughlin two days to go in and remove his possessions. Mr. Coughlin -- we went over
there, opened the doors about 8:00 o'clock. He wasn't there. About 11:00 o'clock we get
an e-mail from Mr. Coughlin saying I have appealed 1udge Sferrazza's ruling. That
means his ruling is stayed. That means I can go back into the house. I'm staying in
the house, and there's nothing you can do about it. MR. COUGHLIN: Objection,
hearsay. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. THE WITNESS: Sometime later that
day we got an order from 1udge Sferrazza saying that the request for a stay had
been denied. Mr. Coughlin had burned basically a whole day doing nothing trying
to get his stuff out. That was typical.
NJCRCP 76B provides that: 'Appeal Irom formal eviction: Within 10 days of service of
entry of order . ARS 4.38; Rule 73A(4). Fees: Payable upon Iiling notice oI appeal. Rule
74B(a)(1). Bond Ior costs: Filed with notice oI appeal. Rule 73. Bond, supersedeas: At or aIter
time oI Iiling notice oI appeal. Stay is effective when bond filed. Rule 73A. By connecting
the phrase 'Iormal eviction to NRS 40.380 (which only applies to 'judgments stemming
Irom
GLAZIER v. JUSTICE COURT 899 P.2d 1105 (1995) "This notice expressly threatened
an action in justice's court Ior eviction, pursuant to NRS 40.253,1 the summary eviction
statute.In1 1. NRS 40.253 allows a landlord to apply to the justice's court Ior an eviction order
based on deIault in payment oI rent. II the tenant can show, by aIIidavit, a legal deIense to the
alleged unlawIul detainer, Iurther proceedings must be conducted pursuant to the more formal
eviction procedures in ARS 4.29 to 4.42. II, on the other hand, the tenant Iails to show a
legal deIense to the alleged unlawIul detainer, then the justice's court may issue a summary
order Ior removal oI the tenant."
JCRLV 40(i)(1)-(2) provides Iurther support Ior the view that the phrase 'Iormal
eviction necessarily excludes summary evictions: ' (i)As used in this section, 'eviction
action means:
(1)A summary eviction action pursuant to NRS 40.253 or NRS 40.254; or
(2)A Iormal civil eviction pursuant to NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive.
' Rule40.Motions to stay in eviction cases.
(a)A tenant in an eviction case may only Iile 1 motion to stay or 1 motion to vacate per
case, on a Iorm approved by the court.
(b)Upon the Iiling oI a motion to stay under subsection (a), any pending eviction order
shall be stayed until Iurther order oI the court.
(c)A motion to stay will be reviewed by the court within 1 judicial day.
(d)II a tenant answer has not been Iiled in an eviction case, a motion to stay must be
accompanied by the appropriate Iiling Iee, except as otherwise provided in Rule 43.
(e)Unless the reviewing judge so orders, a motion to stay will not be set Ior hearing but
instead will be approved or denied ex parte.
(I)Any hearing on a motion to stay must be scheduled within seven (7) judicial days Irom
the date the motion is approved Ior hearing.
(g)II a motion to stay is set Ior hearing, the landlord may Iile a written opposition to the
motion.
(h)II a tenant has already appeared beIore a judge Ior a hearing on the eviction, no motion
to stay by that tenant will be accepted Ior Iiling, unless the tenant alleges that he has Iully
complied with an applicable order oI the court.
(i)As used in this section, 'eviction action means:
(1)A summary eviction action pursuant to NRS 40.253 or NRS 40.254; or
(2)A Iormal civil eviction pursuant to NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive.
Baker's own Answering BrieI admits that 1708 was not a 'Iormal eviction, and
thereIore, NJCRP 73A(a)(4) does not apply. 'As to the bond requirement, since this case was
not a "formal" eviction, NJCRCP 73A(a)(1)-(4) do not apply. Instead, this case Ialls under the
"catchall" provision at the end oI subsection (a) oI that Rule, which provides in pertinent part "In cases
not provided Ior in (1), (2), (3) or (4) above, the giving oI an appeal bond, under the provisions oI Rule
73, shall stay proceedings in the court below upon the judgment or order appealed Irom ... except
where the appellate court may otherwise direct upon such terms as it may in its discretion impose. 44
NJCRCP 73A(a). NJCRCP 73 provides that "The bond or equivalent security shall be in the sum or
value oI $25 unless the justice court fixes a different amount." (Emphasis added). NRS 40.385(1)
provides that a stay may be obtained by posting a bond in the amount oI $250.00 with the trial court.
Baker's 2/14/12 Answering BrieI.
'NRS40.385Stay oI execution upon appeal; duty oI tenant who retains possession oI premises to
pay rent during stay.Upon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to ARS 4.253:
1.Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay oI execution may be obtained by Iiling
with the trial court a bond in the amount of $250 to cover the expected costs on appeal... A tenant oI
commercial property may obtain a stay oI execution only upon the issuance oI a stay pursuant to Rule 8
oI the Nevada Rules oI Appellate Procedure and the posting oI a supersedeas bond in the amount oI
100 percent oI the unpaid rent claim oI the landlord.
The RJC Iailed to comply with JCRCP 73A(b): ' (b)Supersedeas Bond: Form and EIIect....
When a proper bond to stay proceeaings is filea, it shall stay further proceedings except as
otherwise above provided, and if an execution or other order shall have been issued to the sheriff,
coroner, or elisor, the person shall return the same, with the cause therefor, and his or her
proceedings thereunder, upon receiving from the clerk or justice a notice of the stay of
proceedings .
So, Baker admits that JCRCP 73A(a)(4) does not apply, the suggests that the 'catch-all
provision in Rule 73A(a) cover appeals oI summary evictions and therein invokes some authority
within JCRCP 73 to have allowed Judge SIerrazza to not only deny Coughlin a stay, but to do so where
he characterized the court continuing to hold onto Coughlin $2,275 'rent escrow deposit as 'satisIying
his bond on appeal. However, Rule 73 (especially in light oI JCRCP 81 and NRS 40.385 (which both
Judge Herndon in the Venetian v Two Roads Transcript and Judge SIerrazza on 10/13/11 invoked,
SIerrazza, though, incorrectly preventing Coughlin Irom asserting coutnerclaims (which Baker lied
about hin his 2/24/12 BrieI in stating that NRS 118A.490 was 'oI no moment) by indicating Rule 81
made any JCRCP relative to counterclaims inapplicable given that 'special statuory provision
applicable to summary eviction proceedings did not allow Ior such, even where such a matter was set
'over Ior trial. , particularly where 40.385(1) speciIically identiIies the supersedeas bond eIIected
therein as 'to cover the expected costs on appeal considering Rule 73's dictate that 'Unless an
appellant is exempted by law (which Coughlin arguably was given the RJC waived the Iiling Iee oI his
appeal due to his indigency and its granting Couglin IFP status in 1708), or has filed a supersedeas
bond or other undertaking which includes security for the payment of costs on appeal, in civil cases
a bond Ior costs on appeal or equivalent security shall be Iiled by the appellant in the justice court with
the notice oI appeal; but security shall not be required of an appellant who is not subject to costs. The
bond or equivalent security shall be in the sum or value oI $250 unless the justice court fixes a
different amount
So, it is completely dishonest Ior Baker, in his 2/24/12 BrieI to write: 'As to the bond
requirement, since this case was not a "formal" eviction, NJCRCP 73A(a)(1)-(4) do not apply.
Instead, this case Ialls under the "catchall" provision at the end oI subsection (a) oI that Rule, which
provides in pertinent part "In cases not provided Ior in (1), (2), (3) or (4) above, the giving of an
appeal bond, under the provisions of Rule 73, shall stay proceedings in the court below upon the
judgment or order appealed from ... except where the appellate court may otherwise direct upon such
terms as it may in its discretion impose. NJCRCP 73A(a). NJCRCP 73 provides that "The bond or
equivalent security shall be in the sum or value oI $250 unless the justice court Iixes a diIIerent
amount." (Emphasis added). NRS 40.385(1) provides that a stay may be obtained by posting a bond in
the amount oI $250.00 with the trial court.
Coughlin deposited $2,275 with the court pursuant to NRS 118A.355 and the court's order oI
October 13, 2011. He orally moved the court Ior a stay oI the eviction at the end oI the October 25,
2011 hearing, but did not cite any authority Ior his request. Accordingly, that motion was denied.45
ROA, Vol. II, pp. 85,2. 1hus, although the court ordered that Coughlin's deposit would serve as his
appeal bond, it denied a stay because Coughlin did not provide the court with any basis to grant one, as
was his legal responsibility.'
Regardless oI the Iact that Baker cites not authority to support his contention that the allege
Iailure oI Coughlin to 'provide the court with any basis to grant a stay, Judge SIerrazza's order
indicated ' that Coughlin's deposit would serve as his appeal bond .`. That being the case, Rule
73A(a)'s catchall provision provides 'e, which provides in pertinent part "In cases not provided Ior in
(1), (2), (3) or (4) above, that the giving of an appeal bond, under the provisions of Rule 73, shall
stay proceedings in the court below upon the judgment or order appealed from". And, under Rule
73, at the conclusion oI the 10/25/11 hearing, Judge SIerrazza ruled as to just what that appeal bond
would be where Rule 73 provides that the 'bond or equivalent security shall be in the sum or value oI
$250 unless the justice court fixes a different amount. That being the case, that Judge SIerrazza did
so Iix a diIIerent amount (curiously making Coughlin's bond ten times the amount set as the deIault
under Rule 73...), Rule 73A then mandates that 'the giving oI an appeal bond, under the provisions oI
Rule 73, shall stay proceedings in the court below upon the judgment or order appealed from.
Regardles oI the dubiousness oI Baker's argument relative to whether Coughlin cited to suIIicient legal
authority on 10/25/11...Judge SIerrazza's order as rendered was legally operative suIIicient to require
the proceedings be stayed (Couglin certainly did not ask Judge SIerrazza to just Iorget about any appeal
and give him his $2,275 back at that point....and any subsequent Motion Ior the Return oI that $2,275
by Coughlin can in no way be characterized as retracting his Motion Ior such a Stay, but rather, a mere
common sense complaint (which Coughlin set out in speciIic detail) relative to the inequity oI the RJC
holding on to ten time the amount required to get a stay, ana then failing to grant Coughlin fust such a
stay. Some might say this is a common complaint about the RJC and its BailiIIs as well...that oI the
general sense that its Iollowing the law and recogni:ing the rights oI deIendants and litigants is an
optional type oI thing, that they only need do iI they Ieel like it, like the person involved or their
'attitude enough to, or Iind it convenient and expedient to do so.
The headings Ior the Iorms on the N. S. Ct's website appear to contain some signiIicant
mistakes. As Ior 'Form 32, such Iorm is identiIied as applicable to an appeal oI a summary eviction,
yet the Iorm cites to NRS 40.380, which relates to the appeal oI a plenary unlawIul detainer civil
action. Indeed, NRS 40.385 is nowhere mentioned.
http://lawlibrary.nevadajudiciary.us/Iorms/standardizedLandlordTenantIorms.php
How to Appeal a Summary Eviction From Justice Court to District Court
Landlord or Tenant nstructions for Forms 31 through 36
Form #31 Notice of Appeal
Form #32 Motion to Set Bond and to Stay Eviction Pending Appeal
Form #33 Notice of Posting and Acceptance of Supersedes/Cost Bond on Appeal
Form #34 Designation of Record and Statement of Points on Appeal and Notice of ntent to File Brief
Form #35 Certificate of No Transcript
Form #36 Statement of Proceedings
Packet Eleven nstructions and forms 31 through 36
Packet 11, at page 3 oI 6, indicates Coughlin's argument about the WCSO violating the law by
Iailign to provide 24 hours notice beIore conducting a lockout, in addition to revealing that the WCSO,
by virtue oI being given the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE (considering the language contained on page 6
therein about the 'bond on appeal) was given notice oI the stay suIIicient to Iorbid it Irom conducting
the lockout (though the various legal impossibilities and contradictory legal positiosn contained therein
may have conIused the WCSO a bit):
'While the law may allow you 10 judicial days to Iile your appeal, iI you have
been ordered to vacate the rental unit, you must take extra steps beIore the end
oI the 24-hour eviction notice the constable/sheriII will give you in order to stay
or stop the eviction.
To Stop the Eviction (Tenant), you must:
1. File the Civil Cover Sheet and Notice oI the Appeal, Form #31;
2. Pay the Iiling Iee or have the Order Regarding Waiver oI Fees and
Costs, Form #39,2
Irom the Justice Court;
3. File a Motion to Set Bond and to Stay Eviction Pending Appeal,
Form #32, iI the judge has not already set the amount;
4. Pay Ior the bond and Iile a Notice oI Posting and Acceptance oI
Supersedeas/Cost Bond on Appeal, Form #33. The cost is set by
the court at $250 or more;
5. Deliver a copy oI the Supersedeas Bond and the Notice oI
Appeal to the constable/sheriII to stop the eviction. II you do
not do this, you will be evicted; and
6. Give or mail copies oI the Supersedeas Bond and Notice oI Appeal
to your landlord. '
Judge SIerrazza rendered an order suIIicient to accomplish everything in paragraph 4: '4. Pay
Ior the bond and Iile a Notice oI Posting and Acceptance oI
Supersedeas/Cost Bond on Appeal, Form #33. The cost is set by
the court at $250 or more;
RULE73.BOND FOR COSTS ON APPEAL

Unless an appellant is exempted by law, or has Iiled a supersedeas bond or other undertaking which
includes security Ior the payment oI costs on appeal, in civil cases a bond Ior costs on appeal or
equivalent security shall be Iiled by the appellant in the justice court with the notice oI appeal; but
security shall not be required oI an appellant who is not subject to costs. The bond or equivalent
security shall be in the sum or value oI $250 unless the justice court Iixes a diIIerent amount. A bond
Ior costs on appeal shall have suIIicient surety, and it or any equivalent security shall be conditioned to
secure the payment oI costs iI the appeal is Iinally dismissed or the judgment aIIirmed, or oI such costs
as the district court may direct iI the judgment is modiIied. II a bond or equivalent security in the sum
or value oI $250 is given, no approval thereoI is necessary. AIter a bond Ior costs on appeal is Iiled, a
respondent may raise Ior determination by the justice court objections to the Iorm oI the bond or to the
suIIiciency oI the surety. The provisions oI Rule 73A apply to a surety bond upon a bond given
pursuant to this rule.
Exhibit 1 is the 12/22/11 email:
From: SIerrazza, Pete |psIerrazzawashoecounty.usJ
Sent: Thursday, December 22, 2011 2:33 PM
To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com; cdbakerrichardhillaw.com
Cc: Stancil, Karen
Subject: RE: inventory continued
Dear Mr Coughlin:
The stay was denied. You will need to ask the District Court Ior a stay.
Pete SIerrazza
From: Zach Coughlin |mailto:zachcoughlinhotmail.com|
Sent: Thursday, December 22,201112:09 PM
To: SIerrazza, Pete; cdbakerrichardhillaw.com
Subject: inventory continued
Dear Judge SIerrazza and Mr. Baker,
Additionally some rare book are missing, Iamily
photographs/keepsakes/heirlooms/media, I believe the .~
.... hammer weighted action casio 88 key PX 330 is the model number, I believe, I will
have to check ....... Further, this is all moot at this point as I have Iiled a Supersedeas
Bond oI $250, and according to NRS 40.385, I automatically get a stay oI eviction and
am entitled to return to the property and continue in possession. The Statute sets the
Supersedeas Bond (which yields a stay) at $250 if rent is under $1000, unless the
Court wishes to rule that I am a commercial tenant. However, if the court does rule
that I am a commercial tenant, the No Cause Eviction Notice in this case, under
NRS 40.253 makes a Summary Eviction Proceeding impermissible, as Summary
Eviction Proceedings are not allowed against commercial tenants where only a No
cause Eviction Notice is Iiled. Its one or the other, but Mr. Hill and Baker cannot have it
both ways. Further, the Courts Order oI December 21, 2011 is just that, and Order, its
not an agreement, its not a settlement, etc, etc. and the audio record clearly reIlects that.
NRS 40.385 Stay oI execution upon appeal; duty oI tenant who retains possession oI
premises to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal Irom an order entered pursuant to NRS
40.253:
1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay oI execution may be
obtained by Iiling with the trial court a bond in the amount oI $250 to cover the
expected costs on appeal. In an action concerning a lease oI commercial property
or any other property Ior which the monthly rent exceeds $1,000, the court may,
upon its own motion or that oI a party, and upon a showing oI good cause, order an
additional bond to be posted to cover the expected costs on appeal. A surety upon
the bond submits to the jurisdiction oI the appellate court and irrevocably appoints
the clerk oI that court as the surety's agent upon whom papers aIIecting the surety's
liability upon the bond may be served. Liability oI a surety may be enIorced, or the
bond may be released, on motion in the appellate court without independent
action.
2. A tenant who retains possession oI the premises that are the subject oI the appeal
during the pendency oI the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount
provided in the underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as it
becomes due. II the tenant Iails to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new
proceedings Ior a summary eviction by serving the tenant with a new notice
pursuant to NRS 40.253.
Sincerely, Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Coughlin's own 10/19/11 Iiling in 1708 quotes the Landlord Tenant
Handbook:
"http://www.clarkcountycourts.us/CivilSHC/landlord-tenant-evictions/order-summary-
eviction.html
'Appeals Irom Orders Ior Summary Eviction
All tenants Iiling an appeal must post a bond oI at least $250. II you wish to stop the
eviction pending your appeal and are a tenant of a residential property whose
monthly rent is $1000 or less, this $250 is all you are required to pay.
II you are a tenant oI residential property whose monthly rent exceeds $1000 or a tenant
oI a commercial property you must post bond oI $250 but the court can, on its own or
on the motion oI the landlord, increase the bond. See NRS 40.385(1)
Page 3 oI the 'Landlord Tenant Handbook distributed on the this Court's website reads:
http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/viewdocumentsandIorms/Iunc-startdown/5158/
'Choosing Whether to File A Summary or ~Formal Eviction action
In most cases, the landlord can choose whether to Iile a summary or formal
eviction action . However, there are circumstances under which summary eviction
cannot be used. For instance, summary eviction is not available Ior:
1) Evictions Iollowing the Ioreclosure sale oI a rental property (See NRS 40.255)
2) Eviction of commercial tenants for other than nonpayment of rent
(See NRS 40.254)
3) Eviction oI a tenant oI a mobile home park Irom the park
(See NRS 40.253(10) and NRS Chapter 118B)
The benefits of summary eviction are:
1. It is easy to Iile on your own without the assistance oI an attorney; and
2. You are likely to get the tenant out oI your property in a shorter time period than
with the Iormal eviction process.
The drawbacks to summary eviction are:
1. You cannot get a money judgment as part oI your action (but you can sue in a
separate action);
2. II there is a genuine dispute over material Iacts, the court must dismiss the action
(although you can re-Iile a Iormal eviction action); and
3. The tenant may be able to file an appeal, and remain in the unit until the
appeal is heard by posting a bond with the court that may be cheaper than that
required in the formal eviction process.
' NJCRCP 73A(a)(4): 'In cases involving an appeal by the deIendant oI an order oI eviction in
a Iormal proceeding, such appeal shall not stay the execution oI the judgment, unless, no later
than 10 days aIter the Iiling oI a notice oI appeal, the person shall execute and Iile with the
court or justice an undertaking to the plaintiII, with two or more sureties, in an amount to be
Iixed by the court or justice, but which shall not be less than twice the amount oI the judgment
and costs, to the eIIect that, iI the judgment appealed Irom be aIIirmed or the appeal be
dismissed, the appellant will pay the judgment and the cost oI appeal, the value oI the use and
occupation oI the property, and damages justly accruing to the plaintiII during the pendency oI
the appeal. Upon taking the appeal and Iiling the undertaking, all Iurther proceedings in the
case shall be stayed.
Whenever an appeal is perIected, and a bond given as provided by paragraphs (1), (2), (3)
and (4) herein, it shall stay all Iurther proceedings in the court below, upon the judgment or
order appealed Irom or upon matters embraced therein, except as hereinaIter speciIied.
However, the court below may proceed upon any other matter included in the action or
proceeding and not aIIected by the judgment or order appealed Irom; and the court below may
in its discretion dispense with or limit the security required by (1), (2), (3) and (4) above, when
an appellant is an executor, administrator, trustee, or other person acting in another`s right.
In cases not provided for in (1), (2), (3) or (4) above, the giving oI an appeal bond, under
the provisions of Rule 73, shall stay proceedings in the court below upon the judgment or
order appealed from, except that where it directs the same oI perishable property, the court
below may order the property to be sold and the proceeds thereoI to be deposited to abide by
the judgment oI the appellate court, and except where the appellate court may otherwise
direct upon such terms as it may in its discretion impose. Its not clear whether the passage
'and except where the appellate court may otherwise direct upon such terms as it may in its
discretion impose...` is meant to apply only to 'perishable property situations or in general.
Even assuming it applies in general, as a sort oI catch-all...Baker Iraudulently ignores the very
NJCRCP 81 that Judge SIerrazza pointed out on 10/13/11 as requiring the application oI any
speciIic statutory remedy (such as NRS 40.385) where the NJCRCP do not directly speak to
such areas. As such, to the extent Baker argues that this was not an appeal oI a 'formal
eviction, his then citing to NJCRCP 73A(a)'s 'catch-all provision completely lacks merit
where a speciIic statutory section speaks to supersedeas bonds in appeals oI summary
evictions, NRS 40.385. Additionally, Baker Iraudulently then makes argument as to the trial
court denying the stay when the 'catch all provision he cites to speciIically requires
10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE reads: 'ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICTION
Landlord, MATT MERLISS, having applied by Affidavit Ior an Order seeking
summary eviction oI the above-named Tenant and it appearing Irom the record on Iile
herein that the statutory requirements have been met and that the Tenant, aIter notice,
unlawIully detains and withholds the rental unit, and the Court being Iully advised and
Iinding good cause, thereIore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
That the sheriII/constable oI Reno Township, or one oI their duly authorized
agents be, and hereby is, directed to remove each and every person Iound upon the
rental unit at 121 River Rock, Reno, Washoe County, Nevada, by no earlier than
October 31, 2011 at 5 pm. Landlord is hereby awarded the right oI possession oI the
premises.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS
FOLLOWS:
The sums currently on deposit with the Court, in the amount of $2,275.00,
are the property of the landlord, Matt Merliss, but shall not be immediately
released to him. Instead, those sums shall serve as Coughlin's security for costs on
appeal, pursuant to N1CRCP 73, in the event Coughlin timely and properly appeals
this order. In the event Coughlin Iails to timely and properly appeal this order, those
sums shall be immediately released to Merliss or his counsel oI record. These sums
shall not, in any event, operate to stay enforcement of this order and the surrender
of the right of Coughlin to possess the Property. Nothing in this order shall prevent
this court or an appellate court Irom releasing the deposited Iunds to Merliss or his
counsel prior to or aIter any appeal is perIected, or from increasing the amount of
any security to be posted by Coughlin for any reason, or both, either upon its own
motion or upon motion by Merliss.
IT IS SO ORDERED."
RULE73A.stay ON APPEALsupersedeas bond

(a)supersedeas bond; When Required.Whenever an appellant entitled thereto desires a
stay on appeal, the person may Iile a bond Ior supersedeas, as provided in this rule.

(1)II the appeal be Irom a judgment or order directing the payment of money, the
bond shall be conditioned Ior the satisIaction oI the judgment in Iull together with costs and
interest iI Ior any reason the appeal is dismissed or iI the judgment is aIIirmed, and to satisIy in
Iull such modiIication oI the judgment and such costs and interests as the appellate court may
adjudge and award, and that iI the appellant does not make such payment within 30 days aIter
the Iiling oI aIIirmance oI the judgment in whole or part, in the court in which the appeal is
taken, judgment may be entered, on motion oI the respondent, in the respondent`s Iavor against
the surety or sureties Ior such amount, together with the interest that may be due thereon, and
the costs which may be awarded against the appellant upon the appeal. When the judgment is
Ior the recovery oI money not otherwise secured, the amount oI the bond shall be Iixed at such
sum as will cover the whole amount oI the judgment remaining unsatisIied, costs on the appeal
and interest, unless the justice aIter notice and hearing and Ior good cause shown Iixes a
diIIerent amount or orders security other than the bond.
II the appeal be Irom an order dissolving or reIusing to dissolve an attachment, the bond
shall be in the sum oI the value oI the property attached and conditioned that iI the order
appealed Irom, or any part thereoI, be aIIirmed, the appellant shall pay to the opposing party, on
such appeal, all damages and costs caused by the appellant by reason oI such appeal and the
stay oI execution thereon.

(2)II the judgment or order appealed Irom direct the assignment or delivery of
documents, or personal property, the things required to be assigned or delivered shall be
assigned and placed in the custody oI such oIIicer or receiver as the court may appoint, and the
bond shall be in such amount as the court or justice may direct, to the eIIect that the appellant
will, iI the judgment or order appealed Irom, or any part thereoI, be aIIirmed, pay to the
opposing party on such appeal all damages and costs caused by the appellant by reason oI such
appeal and the stay oI execution thereon. In lieu oI the assignment and delivery, and oI the
bond herein provided Ior, the appellant may enter into a bond, in such amount as the court or
justice thereoI may direct, to the eIIect that iI the judgment or order, or any part thereoI, be
aIIirmed, the appellant will obey the order and pay to the opposing party on such appeal all
damages and costs caused by reason oI said appeal and the stay oI execution thereon.

(3)II the judgment or order appealed from direct the execution of a conveyance or
other instrument, the instrument shall be executed and deposited with the clerk or justice oI the
court with whom the judgment or order is entered to abide by the judgment oI the appellate
court, and the bond shall be in such amount as the court or justice thereoI may direct, to the
eIIect that the appellant will, iI the judgment or order appealed Irom, or any party thereoI, be
aIIirmed, pay to the opposing party on such appeal all damages and costs caused by the
appellant by reason oI such appeal and the stay oI execution thereon.

(4)In cases involving an appeal by the defendant of an order of eviction in a formal
proceeding, such appeal shall not stay the execution of the judgment , unless, no later than 1
days after the filing of a notice of appeal , the person shall execute and file with the court or
justice an undertaking to the plaintiff, with two or more sureties, in an amount to be fixed
by the court or justice, but which shall not be less than twice the amount of the judgment and
costs, to the effect that, if the judgment appealed from be affirmed or the appeal be
dismissed, the appellant will pay the judgment and the cost of appeal, the value of the use
and occupation of the property, and damages justly accruing to the plaintiff during the
pendency of the appeal. Upon taking the appeal and filing the undertaking, all further
proceedings in the case shall be stayed.
Whenever an appeal is perIected, and a bond given as provided by paragraphs (1), (2),
(3) and (4) herein, it shall stay all further proceedings in the court below, upon the judgment
or order appealed from or upon matters embraced therein, except as hereinafter specified.
However, the court below may proceed upon any other matter included in the action or
proceeding and not affected by the judgment or order appealed from; and the court below
may in its discretion dispense with or limit the security required by (1), (2), (3) and (4) above,
when an appellant is an executor, administrator, trustee, or other person acting in another`s
right.
In cases not provided for in (1), (2), (3) or (4) above, the giving of an appeal bond ,
under the provisions of Rule 73, shall stay proceedings in the court below upon the judgment
or order appealed from, except that where it directs the same oI perishable property, the court
below may order the property to be sold and the proceeds thereoI to be deposited to abide by
the judgment oI the appellate court, and except where the appellate court may otherwise direct
upon such terms as it may in its discretion impose.

(b)supersedeas bond: Form and EIIect.Any bonds required by these rules may be in one
instrument or several at the option oI the giver.
In every case where, under the provisions oI these rules, a bond is required, such bond may
be executed on the part oI the appellant by at least two qualiIied and suIIicient sureties, stating
their place oI residence and occupation, or by a bonding or surety company authorized and
qualiIied to do business in the State oI Nevada.
Where the bond is executed by such a bonding or surety company, no aIIidavit as to the
suIIiciency oI such surety need accompany the bond. Otherwise, the bond shall be oI no eIIect
unless it be accompanied by the aIIidavit oI personal sureties that they are each a resident and
householder or Ireeholder within the State and that they are each worth the amount speciIied
therein over and above their just debts and liabilities, exclusive oI property exempt Irom
execution; they may state in their aIIidavit that they are severally worth amounts less than that
expressed in the bond, iI the whole amount be equivalent to that oI two qualiIied and suIIicient
sureties. Each such aIIidavit shall be accompanied by a Iinancial statement in the Iorm
determined by the justice courts.
The adverse party may except to the suIIiciency oI the sureties within 5 days aIter the Iiling
oI the bond, and, unless they or other sureties justiIy beIore the justice within 10 days
thereaIter, upon notice to the adverse party, to the amount stated in their aIIidavits, the appeal
shall be regarded as iI no such bond had been given.
In all cases where a bond is required by these rules, a deposit in the court below of the
amount of the judgment appealed from and such additional amount as may be specified by
the justice of the court by which the judgment was rendered, shall be equivalent to filing the
bond, and in all cases the bond or deposit may be waived by the written consent oI the appellee
Iiled in said action or proceeding.
When a proper bond to stay proceedings is filed, it shall stay further proceedings except as
otherwise above provided, and if an execution or other order shall have been issued to the
sheriff, coroner, or elisor, the person shall return the same, with the cause therefor, and his
or her proceedings thereunder, upon receiving from the clerk or justice a notice of the stay of
proceedings.

RULE73B.BONDSMISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

(a)Failure to File or InsuIIiciency oI bond.II a bond on appeal or a supersedeas bond is
not Iiled within the time speciIied, the appeal will be subject to such sanctions as provided in
Rule 76. II the bond Iiled is Iound insuIIicient, and if the action is not yet docketed with the
appellate court, a bond may be filed at such time before the action is so docketed , as may be
fixed by the justice court. AIter the action is so docketed, application Ior leave to Iile a
suIIicient bond may be made only in the appellate court.

(b)judgment Against Surety.By entering into an appeal or supersedeas bond given
pursuant to Rule 73 or 73A, the surety submits to the jurisdiction oI the court and irrevocably
appoints the clerk oI the justice court or the justice as the surety`s agent upon whom any papers
aIIecting the surety`s liability on the bond may be served. The surety`s liability may be
enIorced on motion without the necessity oI an independent action. The motion and such notice
oI the motion as the court prescribes may be served on the clerk oI the court, or justice, who
shall Iorthwith mail copies to the surety iI the surety`s address is known.
|As amended; eIIective July 1, 2005.|
'Amended Case Appeal Statement, Statement of Record on Appeal, Motion to Set Aside Eviction
Order, Emergency Ex Parte Motion for Order Shortening Time; DESIGNATION OF RECORD
AND STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAlND NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE BRIEF;
Statement of Proceedings; CERTIFICATE OF NO TRANSCRIPT;NOTICE OF POSTING AND
ACCEPTANCE OF SUPERSEDEAS/COST BOND ON APPEAL

Appellant Law OIIice oI Zach Coughlin, Esq. and Coughlin Memory Foam, pursuant to JCRCP 74,
designates as the record on appeal all documents provided Ior in JCRCP 74(I) and all documents
otherwise contained in the Justice Court Iile.
NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE BRIEF
Appellant intends to Iile an opening brieI pursuant to the requirements and time Irames
contained in JCRCP 75. Appellant Zach Coughlin, Esq. and Zachary Coughlin's Memory Foam,
pursuant to JCRCP 74(b), hereby certiIies that no transcript exists in the above-reIerenced matter.
Appellant has prepared a Statement oI Proceedings, pursuant to JCRCP 74(c). Further, Appellant is
awaiting a ruling on his Motion to Prepare Transcript at Public Expense and believes the IFP Order
granted in both the underlying case and the RJC appeal Iee should apply to any transcript expense.
Further, Appellant has arranged Ior and attaches to this Iiling an audio recording oI the entire Summary
Eviction Proceeding and argues that is it more sensible and economical to dispense with a written
transcript requirement, and that monk scriveners copying The Bible eventually gave way to the printing
press, the abacus gave way to the electronic calculator, and the white StyroIoam cups attached by a
string gave way to the cellular phone. Please note, I veriIy that a complete, true and accurate copy oI
the entire audio recording provided to me oI all proceedings in court in REV2011-001708 is Iound at:
https://skydrive.live.com/redir.aspxcid43084638I32I5I28&resid43084638F32F5F28!
715&paridroot
nd that copy oI the audio recordings exactly as provided to me by the Reno Justice Court will
remain available at that link Ior at least the next six months, starting Irom December 14, 2011. An
audio CD containing those exact Iiles is attached to this Motion as Exhibit 2.
NOTICE OF POSTING AND ACCEPTANCE OF SUPERSEDEAS/COST BOND
ON APPEAL
WHEREAS, the above-entitled Court issued a Judgment dated October 27, 2011 ordering the
eviction oI Tenant Irom a noncommercial premises (the court's say s this, tenant says it was his home
law oIIice, thereIore commercial, regardless, rent was $900) with rent less than $1,000.00, an appeal
was Iiled on November 2, 2011, with appropriate Iees or waivers, NOW THEREFORE, Appellant Zach
Coughlin, Esq., and Coughlin Memory Foam posts his Supersedeas/Cost Bond in the amount oI $250,
pursuant to NRS 40.385(1). Pursuant to NRS 40.385(1), JCRCP 73A(a) reIerencing JCRCP 73,
Appellant may proceed and this Supersedeas/Cost Bond stays execution oI the appealed order oI
eviction unless otherwise ordered by the Court.
MOTION TO SET BOND AND TO STAY EVICTION PENDING APPEAL; MOTION TO SET
BOND AND TO STAY EVICTION PENDING APPEAL
Zach Coughlin, Esq., and respectfully requests that the Court set the Cost and Supersedeas
Bonds and stay execution of the order of eviction entered on the 1/27/211 in the above-entitled
Court pending the appeal of this matter. ARS 4.38 provides that: Either party may, within 1
(judicial) days, appeal from the judgment rendered. But an appeal by the defendant shall not stay
the execution of the judgment, unless, within the 1 (judicial) days, he shall execute and file with the
court or justice his undertaking to the plaintiff, with two or more sureties, in an amount to be fixed
by the court or justice, but which shall not be less than twice the amount of the judgment and costs,
to the effect that, if the judgment appealed from be affirmed or the appeal be dismissed, the
appellant will pay the judgment and the cost of appeal, the value of the use and occupation of the
property, and damages justly accruing to the plaintiff during the pendency of the appeal. Upon
taking the appeal and filing the undertaking, all further proceedings in the case shall be stayed.
FACTS AND ARGUMENT On the 10/27/2011 a judgment was entered against Appellant which
requires Appellant to pay Respondent $0.00 and which evicts Appellant Irom the law oIIice and
mattress business Appellant kept as a commercial place oI business at 121 River Rock St., Reno, NV.
On the 11/2/2011, Appellant Iiled its Notice oI Appeal. WHEREFORE, Appellant requests that the
Court set the Cost and Supersedeas Bonds and stay execution oI the order oI eviction entered on
10/27/2011, in the above-entitled court upon posting oI said Bonds pending the appeal oI this matter.
STATEMENT OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Appellant provides the Iollowing Statement oI Points, pursuant to JCRCP 74(d). (Provide a
brieI statement oI Iacts and legal argument on why you should not have been evicted, reIerring to
statutes and case law wherever possible. Also include what happened at your eviction hearing). The
law in our State does not seem exceptionally clear with regard to the service and process requirements
and timeliness, and manner oI calculating time with respect to the "receipt" oI Lockout Orders. The
AIIidavit oI Service by Machen states that he "personally served the described documents upon" my,
Zach Coughlin...However, I can attest by AIIidavit that I was not "personally served" to the extent that
"personally served" means or implies that I was there, that Machen saw me or identiIied me, or any oI
the other indicators oI something, such as a Complaint, being "personally served" such as I understand
the phrase to me. NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(i-iii).
Further, as Baker and Hill have so oIten pointed out, I cannot, according to them, receive any
attorney's Iee award Ior appearing as pro se attorney, as such, NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(i-iii), should apply to
me only as a party, and not as a party's attorney, and, thereIore, according to NRCP 5, Service: "(2)
Service under this rule is made by: (A) Delivering a copy to the attorney or the party by: (i) handing it
to the attorney or to the party; (ii) leaving it at the attorney`s or party`s oIIice with a clerk or other
person in charge, or iI there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place in the oIIice; or (iii) iI
the oIIice is closed or the person to be served has no oIIice, leaving it at the person`s dwelling house
or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion residing there..." So,
either it was my oIIice, in which case a No Cause Eviction Notice makes impermissible a Summary
Eviction Proceeding under NRS 40.253, and thereIore, the Order oI Summary Eviction is void Ior lack
oI jurisdiction, or, the AIIidavit oI Service was on my home, and was not "handed" to me, or
"personally served" (despite the AIIidavit attesting to having "personally served" me), nor was the
Order oI Summary Eviction served in accordance with NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(iii), which requires: "iI the
oIIice is closed or the person to be served has no oIIice, leaving it at the person`s dwelling house or
usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion residing there.."
Further, I believe posting an Order on one's residence door, particularly in the context oI serving
a No Cause Notice oI Eviction or UnlawIul Detainer, is only valid iI the document being served is also
placed in the mail and 3 non judicial days are accorded Ior service to be complete. See NRCP 6(e). I
do not believe they can prove that at all, not even close. NRCP applies to Summary Eviction Actions,
according to the Iollowing:
"NRS 40.380 Provisions governing appeals. Either party may, within 10
days, appeal Irom the judgment rendered. But an appeal by the deIendant
shall not stay the execution oI the judgment, unless, within the 10 days, the
deIendant shall execute and Iile with the court or justice the deIendant`s
undertaking to the plaintiII, with two or more sureties, in an amount to be
Iixed by the court or justice, but which shall not be less than twice the
amount oI the judgment and costs, to the eIIect that, iI the judgment
appealed Irom be aIIirmed or the appeal be dismissed, the appellant will pay
the judgment and the cost oI appeal, the value oI the use and occupation oI
the property, and damages justly accruing to the plaintiII during the
pendency oI the appeal. Upon taking the appeal and Iiling the undertaking,
all Iurther proceedings in the case shall be stayed.

NRS 40.385 Stay of execution upon appeal; duty of tenant who retains possession of premises
to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to NRS 40.253 :
1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay of execution may be obtained by
filing with the trial court a bond in the amount of $250 to cover the expected costs on appeal. In
an action concerning a lease of commercial property or any other property for which the monthly
rent exceeds $1,000, the court may, upon its own motion or that of a party, and upon a showing of
good cause, order an additional bond to be posted to cover the expected costs on appeal. A surety
upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction of the appellate court and irrevocably appoints the
clerk of that court as the surety`s agent upon whom papers affecting the surety`s liability upon
the bond may be served. Liability of a surety may be enforced, or the bond may be released, on
motion in the appellate court without independent action.
2. A tenant who retains possession oI the premises that are the subject oI the appeal during the
pendency oI the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount provided in the underlying contract
between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes due. II the tenant Iails to pay such rent, the landlord
may initiate new proceedings Ior a summary eviction by serving the tenant with a new notice pursuant
to NRS 40.253.
NRS 40.390 Appellate court not to dismiss or quash proceedings Ior want oI Iorm. In all cases oI
appeal under NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, the appellate court shall not dismiss or quash the
proceedings Ior want oI Iorm, provided the proceedings have been conducted substantially according to
the provisions oI NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive; and amendments to the complaint, answer or
summons, in matters oI Iorm only, may be allowed by the court at any time beIore Iinal judgment upon
such terms as may be just; and all matters oI excuse, justiIication or avoidance oI the allegations in the
complaint may be given in evidence under the answer.
NRS 40.400 Rules of practice. The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure and
Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials, so far as
they are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220 to 40.420 , inclusive, apply to the
proceedings mentioned in those sections.
So, considering that NRS 40.400 requires that NRCP apply to Summary Eviction Proceedings under
NRS 40.253, then service, process, and time calculations oI such must comport with the dictates oI
NRCP 5-6: " RULE 5. SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS
(a) Service: When Required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, every order required by
its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the original complaint unless the court otherwise
orders because oI numerous deIendants, every paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a
party unless the court otherwise orders, every written motion other than one which may be heard ex
parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, oIIer oI judgment, designation oI record on
appeal, and similar paper shall be served upon each oI the parties. No service need be made on parties
in deIault Ior Iailure to appear except that pleadings asserting new or additional claims Ior relieI against
them shall be served upon them in the manner provided Ior service oI summons in Rule 4.
(b) Same: How Made.
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a party
represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless the court orders that
service be made upon the party.
(2) Service under this rule is made by:
(A) Delivering a copy to the attorney or the party by:
(i) handing it to the attorney or to the party;
(ii) leaving it at the attorney`s or party`s oIIice with a clerk or other person in
charge, or iI there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place in the oIIice; or
(iii) iI the oIIice is closed or the person to be served has no oIIice, leaving it at the
person`s dwelling house or usual place oI abode with some person oI suitable age and discretion
residing there.
(B) Mailing a copy to the attorney or the party at his or her last known address.
Service by mail is complete on mailing; provided, however, a motion, answer or other document
constituting the initial appearance of a party must also, if served by mail, be filed within the time
allowed for service; and provided further, that after such initial appearance, service by mail be
made only by mailing from a point within the State of Nevada.
(C) II the attorney or the party has no known address, leaving a copy with the clerk oI the
court.
(D) Delivering a copy by electronic means if the attorney or the party served has
consented to service by electronic means. Service by electronic means is complete on transmission
provided, however, a motion, answer or other document constituting the initial appearance of a
party must also, if served by electronic means, be filed within the time allowed for service. The
served attorney`s or party`s consent to service by electronic means shall be expressly stated and
filed in writing with the clerk of the court and served on the other parties to the action. The
written consent shall identify:
(i) the persons upon whom service must be made;
(ii) the appropriate address or location for such service, such as the electronic-
mail address or facsimile number;
(iii) the format to be used for attachments; and
(iv) any other limits on the scope or duration of the consent.
An attorney`s or party`s consent shall remain effective until expressly revoked or until the
representation of a party changes through entry, withdrawal, or substitution of counsel. An
attorney or party who has consented to service by electronic means shall, within 10 days aIter any
change oI electronic-mail address or Iacsimile number, serve and Iile notice oI the new electronic-mail
address or Iacsimile number.
(3) Service by electronic means under Rule 5(b)(2)(D) is not effective if the party making
service learns that the attempted service did not reach the person to be served.
(4) ProoI oI service may be made by certiIicate oI an attorney or oI the attorney`s employee, or
by written admission, or by aIIidavit, or other prooI satisIactory to the court. Failure to make prooI oI
service shall not aIIect the validity oI service...
RULE 6. ~TIME
(a) Computation. In computing any period oI time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the
local rules oI any district court, by order oI court, or by any applicable statute, the day oI the act, event,
or deIault Irom which the designated period oI time begins to run shall not be included. The last day oI
the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a nonjudicial day, in
which event the period runs until the end oI the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
nonjudicial day, or, when the act to be done is the Iiling oI a paper in court, a day on which weather or
other conditions have made the oIIice oI the clerk oI the district court inaccessible, in which event the
period runs until the end oI the next day which is not one oI the aIorementioned days. When the period
oI time prescribed or allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and nonjudicial
days shall be excluded in the computation except Ior those proceedings Iiled under Titles 12 or 13 oI
the Nevada Revised Statutes...
(e) Additional Time After Service by Mail or Electronic Means. Whenever a party has the
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the
service of a notice or other paper, other than process, upon the party and the notice or paper is
served upon the party by mail or by electronic means, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed
period.
Subdivision (a) is revised to extend the exclusion oI intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and
nonjudicial days to the computation oI time periods less than 11 days consistent with the 1985
amendments to the Iederal rule. Additionally, the inaccessibility oI the court`` provision Iound in
subdivision (a) oI the Iederal rule is added to Rule 6(a). Subdivision (a) is Iurther amended, by adding
language reIerring to proceedings Iiled under Titles 12 or 13 oI the Nevada Revised Statutes,`` to
avoid any changes to current procedures in probate, guardianship and trust proceedings....
Subdivision (e) is amended to provide an additional 3 days to act in response to a paper that is
served by electronic means under new paragraph (2)(D) added to Rule 5(b)."
NRS 40.253 UnlawIul detainer: Supplemental remedy oI summary eviction and exclusion oI tenant
Ior deIault in payment oI rent.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 10, in addition to the remedy provided in NRS
40.2512 and 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, when the tenant of any dwelling, apartment, mobile home,
recreational vehicle or commercial premises with periodic rent reserved by the month or any
shorter period is in default in payment of the rent, the landlord or the landlord`s agent, unless
otherwise agreed in writing, may serve or have served a notice in writing, requiring in the alternative
the payment oI the rent or the surrender oI the premises...
4. II the tenant Iiles such an aIIidavit at or beIore the time stated in the notice, the landlord or
the landlord`s agent, aIter receipt oI a Iile-stamped copy oI the aIIidavit which was Iiled, shall not
provide Ior the non admittance oI the tenant to the premises by locking or otherwise.
5. Upon noncompliance with the notice:
(a) The landlord or the landlord`s agent may apply by aIIidavit oI complaint Ior eviction to the
justice court oI the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises
are located or to the district court oI the county in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or
commercial premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon
issue an order directing the sheriII or constable oI the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter
receipt oI the order..
6. Upon the Iiling by the tenant oI the aIIidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless oI the
inIormation contained in the aIIidavit, and the Iiling by the landlord oI the aIIidavit permitted by
subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall hold a hearing, aIter service oI notice oI the
hearing upon the parties, to determine the truthIulness and suIIiciency oI any aIIidavit or notice
provided Ior in this section. If the court determines that there is no legal defense as to the alleged
unlawful detainer and the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary
order for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the non admittance of the tenant. If the
court determines that there is a legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer, the court shall
refuse to grant either party any relief, and, except as otherwise provided in this subsection, shall
require that any further proceedings be conducted pursuant to NRS 40.290 to 40.420 , inclusive.
The issuance of a summary order for removal of the tenant does not preclude an action by the
tenant for any damages or other relief to which the tenant may be entitled....
7. The tenant may, upon payment oI the appropriate Iees relating to the Iiling and service oI a
motion, Iile a motion with the court, on a Iorm provided by the clerk oI the court, to dispute the amount
oI the costs, iI any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118.207 or 118A.460 Ior the inventory,
moving and storage oI personal property leIt on the premises. The motion must be Iiled within 20 days
aIter the summary order Ior removal oI the tenant or the abandonment oI the premises by the tenant, or
within 20 days aIter:
(a) The tenant has vacated or been removed Irom the premises; and
(b) A copy oI those charges has been requested by or provided to the tenant,
whichever is later.
8. Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall schedule a hearing on
the motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days after the filing of the motion. The court
shall affix the date of the hearing to the motion and order a copy served upon the landlord by the
sheriff, constable or other process server. At the hearing, the court may:
(a) Determine the costs, iI any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118.207 or 118A.460 and
any accumulating daily costs; and
(b) Order the release oI the tenant`s property upon the payment oI the charges determined to be due
or iI no charges are determined to be due.
Landlord Merliss Iiled only a No Cause Notice oI Eviction in REV2011-001708 on Commercial
Tenant Zach Coughlin, Esq.'s law oIIice. As such, a Summary Eviction Proceeding is impermissible
given the requirement oI NRS 40.253 that the Notice alleged non-payment oI rent to allow the landlord
to proceed under the Summary Eviction Proceeding section, NRS 40.253. Further, Judge SIerrazza
was precluded Irom ruling on anything other than possession oI the premises pursuant to NRS
40.253(6), Anvui, and Glazier. Further, the tenancy did not terminate under the Lease Agreement, it
was renewed.
ervice oI notices to quit; prooI required beIore issuance oI NRS 40.254 UnlawIul detainer:
Supplemental remedy oI summary eviction and exclusion oI tenant Irom certain types oI property.
Except as otherwise provided by speciIic statute, in addition to the remedy provided in NRS 40.251
and in NRS 40.290 to 40.420, inclusive, when the tenant oI a dwelling unit which is subject to the
provisions oI chapter 118A oI NRS, part oI a low-rent housing program operated by a public housing
authority, a mobile home or a recreational vehicle is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer, the landlord is
entitled to the summary procedures provided in NRS 40.253 except that:
1. Written notice to surrender the premises must:...(e) A statement that the claim for relief was
authorized by law.
As such, the too early lockout brings into play the Iollowing:
'NRS 118A.390 UnlawIul removal or exclusion oI tenant or willIul interruption oI essential services;
procedure Ior expedited relieI.
1. II the landlord unlawfully removes the tenant from the premises or excludes the tenant by
blocking or attempting to block the tenant`s entry upon the premises or willfully interrupts or
causes or permits the interruption of any essential service required by the rental agreement or
this chapter, the tenant may recover immediate possession pursuant to subsection 4, proceed
under NRS 118A.380 or terminate the rental agreement and, in addition to any other remedy,
recover the tenant`s actual damages, receive an amount not greater than $1,000 to be fixed by the
court, or both.
2. In determining the amount, iI any, to be awarded under subsection 1, the court shall consider:
(a) Whether the landlord acted in good Iaith;
(b) The course oI conduct between the landlord and the tenant; and
(c) The degree oI harm to the tenant caused by the landlord`s conduct.
3. II the rental agreement is terminated pursuant to subsection 1, the landlord shall return all
prepaid rent and security recoverable under this chapter.
4. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 5, the tenant may recover immediate possession oI
the premises Irom the landlord by Iiling a veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI Ior the unlawIul
removal or exclusion oI the tenant Irom the premises or the willIul interruption oI essential services.
5. A veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI:
(a) Must be Iiled with the court within 5 judicial days aIter the date oI the unlawIul act by the
landlord, and the veriIied complaint must be dismissed iI it is not timely Iiled. II the veriIied complaint
Ior expedited relieI is dismissed pursuant to this paragraph, the tenant retains the right to pursue all
other available remedies against the landlord.
(b) May not be Iiled with the court iI an action Ior summary eviction or unlawIul detainer is already
pending between the landlord and tenant, but the tenant may seek similar relieI beIore the judge
presiding over the pending action.
6. The court shall conduct a hearing on the veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI within 3 judicial
days aIter the Iiling oI the veriIied complaint Ior expedited relieI. BeIore or at the scheduled hearing,
the tenant must provide prooI that the landlord has been properly served with a copy oI the veriIied
complaint Ior expedited relieI. Upon the hearing, iI it is determined that the landlord has violated any
oI the provisions oI subsection 1, the court may:
(a) Order the landlord to restore to the tenant the premises or essential services, or both;
(b) Award damages pursuant to subsection 1; and
(c) Enjoin the landlord Irom violating the provisions oI subsection 1 and, iI the circumstances so
warrant, hold the landlord in contempt oI court.
7. The payment oI all costs and oIIicial Iees must be deIerred Ior any tenant who Iiles a veriIied
complaint Ior expedited relieI. AIter any hearing and not later than Iinal disposition oI the Iiling or
order, the court shall assess the costs and Iees against the party that does not prevail, except that the
court may reduce them or waive them, as justice may require.
'NRS 118A.090 'Exclude deIined. 'Exclude means to evict or to prohibit entry by locking doors or
by otherwise blocking or attempting to block entry, or to make a dwelling unit uninhabitable by
interrupting or causing the interruption oI electric, gas, water or other essential services.
ALL PAPERS AND PLEADINGS AND CORRESPONDENCS PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED TO
THE RENO JUSTICE COURT AND OR ITS EMPLOYEES IS HEREBY INCORPORATED BY
REFERENCE INTO THIS FILING.
NRS 118A.190: ' Notice: DeIinition; service.
1. A person has notice oI a Iact iI:
(a) The person has actual knowledge oI it;
(b) The person has received a notice or notiIication oI it; or
(c) From all the Iacts and circumstances the person reasonably should know that it exists.
2. Written notices to the tenant prescribed by this chapter shall be served in the manner
provided by NRS 40.280.
3. Written notices to the landlord prescribed by this chapter may be delivered or mailed to the place
oI business oI the landlord designated in the rental agreement or to any place held out by the landlord
as the place Ior the receipt oI rental payments Irom the tenant and are eIIective Irom the date oI
delivery or mailing.
'NRS 40.280 Service oI notices to quit; prooI required beIore issuance oI order to remove.
1. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.253, the notices required by NRS 40.251 to 40.260,
inclusive, may be served:
(a) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally, in the presence oI a witness;
(b) II the tenant is absent Irom the tenant`s place oI residence or Irom the tenant`s usual place oI
business, by leaving a copy with a person oI suitable age and discretion at either place and mailing a
copy to the tenant at the tenant`s place oI residence or place oI business; or
(c) II the place oI residence or business cannot be ascertained, or a person oI suitable age or
discretion cannot be Iound there, by posting a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased property,
delivering a copy to a person there residing, iI the person can be Iound, and mailing a copy to the tenant
at the place where the leased property is situated.
I declare under penalty oI perjury and veriIy that all Iactual assertions I make herein in this Iiling
are true and correct to the best oI my knowledge. I did not receive any oI the emails allegedly sent to
my Irom Richard Hill's email address, rhillrichardhillaw.com between August 18
th
, 2011 to
November 17
th
, 2011, and certainly none Irom rhillrichardhillaw.com during the period between the
illegal lockout at 4:30 pm November 1, 2011 and the trespass arrest oI November 13
th
, 2011 which
allegedly spoke to my being provided access to the property Ior the purpose oI my removing my
belongings, despite my numerous calls and written requests, which outlined the exigencies inherent to
my being precluded access to my client Iiles incident to an unlawIul and improperly notice and too
early occurring lockout by the WCSO. I and my business have been damaged greatly by these acts.
Further, I had repeatedly sent both Baker and Hill notice, in writing, that I did not consent to service or
notice oI anything via electronic means. Further NRS 118A.190 does not speak to 'notice oI a legal
Iinding, but rather to 'notice oI a Iact. As such, I was not appropriately served notice oI the Order oI
Summary Eviction, and an illegal lockout occurred, as such no criminal trespass charge can stand.
Further, now, Casey Baker writes the undersigned and reports a burglary has recently occurred. 'RE:
121 River Rock From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com) Sent: Wed 12/14/11 3:43 PM To:
cdbakerrichardhillaw.com; knielsenrichardhillaw.com; sgallagherrichardhillaw.com Dear Mr.
Baker, I drove by the property recently and saw you had added boarding up the Iront door on very, very
recently. UnIortunately, your client and your Iirm, despite billing up some $1,060 Ior "securing" the
property on top oI charging $900 Ior storage Ior what could Iit inside a 10x20 Ioot storage shed, never
once providing an inventory, and contributing to a wrongIul arrest and deIamation causing me and my
clients great damage, Iailed to take even basic steps to secure the property, despite my making
numerous written requests that you do so, including, but not limited to, taking the damn window unit
air conditioner out oI the window Iacing the sidewalk on the side oI the house very close to the damn
Lakemill Lodge, or even putting a strong stick in between the bottom sliding window pain and the top
oI the sill to prevent someone Irom simply pushing in the window unit air conditioner and pushing the
window up to gain access. Further, a blanket that was on the orange circular couch is clearly in the
Ilower bed in Iront oI the house. Additionally, there are reports that someone with your oIIice gave
someone a mattress Irom the inventory oI Coughlin Memory Foam (a Nevada licensed business located
at the property) and an expensive mattress platIorm has clearly been damaged and placed in the Ilower
bed as well, in addition to one oI the wooden porch shades being removed Irom the Iront porch. You
and your client are, oI course, liable Ior all oI this. (email Irom Coughlin to Baker, attached as Exhibit
3 along with the Iollowing email Irom Baker reporting the burglary to Couglin):From:
cdbakerrichardhillaw.com To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com CC: rhillrichardhillaw.com Subject:
121 River Rock Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 13:50:02 -0800 Mr. Coughlin: The River Rock property has
been broken into. We believe the break-in occurred sometime on Monday, December 12, 2011. There
appear to be items missing, including the TV in the living room, perhaps a computer monitor, and
perhaps some stereo equipment. I can`t tell what else. The contents oI the residence appear to have
been riIled through. I am providing you with this inIormation as a courtesy. This email does NOT
constitute permission Ior you to go to the River Rock property. Casey D. Baker, Esq. See Exhibit 3.
Also, attached to this at Exhibit 1 is a collection oI documents related to some Iaxes, Proposed
Orders, Ex Parte Emergency Motion Ior Inspection, AIIidavit oI Due Diligence by Process Servers
ostensibly claiming the ability to see through walls, etc., and one interesting copy oI a Iax received
Irom Casey Baker, Esq by the Reno Justice Court with a handwritten note on the Iax dated 10/20/2011
that appears to be Judge SIerrazza's signature and handwriting wherein the Iollowing notation is made:
'
'NRS 118A.260 Disclosure oI names and addresses oI managers and owners; emergency telephone
number; service oI process.
1. The landlord, or any person authorized to enter into a rental agreement on his or her behalI, shall
disclose to the tenant in writing at or beIore the commencement oI the tenancy:
(a) The name and address oI:
(1) The persons authorized to manage the premises;
(2) A person within this State authorized to act Ior and on behalI oI the landlord Ior the purpose
oI service oI process and receiving notices and demands; and
(3) The principal or corporate owner.
(b) A telephone number at which a responsible person who resides in the county or within 60 miles
oI where the premises are located may be called in case oI emergency.
2. The inIormation required to be Iurnished by this section must be kept current, and this section is
enIorceable against any successor landlord or manager oI the premises.
3. A party who enters into a rental agreement on behalI oI the landlord and Iails to comply with this
section is an agent oI the landlord Ior purposes oI:
(a) Service oI process and receiving notices and demands; and
(b) PerIorming the obligations oI the landlord under law and under the rental agreement.
4. In any action against a landlord which involves his or her rental property, service oI process
upon the manager oI the property or a person described in paragraph (a) oI subsection 1 shall be
deemed to be service upon the landlord. The obligations oI the landlord devolve upon the persons
authorized to enter into a rental agreement on his or her behalI.
5. This section does not limit or remove the liability oI an undisclosed landlord.
NRS 40.310 Issue oI Iact to be tried by jury iI proper demand made. Whenever an issue oI Iact is
presented by the pleadings, it shall be tried by a jury, iI proper demand is made pursuant to the Nevada
Rules oI Civil Procedure or the Justice Court Rules oI Civil Procedure
Actually, a lot oI people seemed conIused regarding the '24 hours lockout thing. The only
appearance in either NRS 118A or NRS 40, in the provisions applicable to Summary Eviction
Proceedings oI anything related to '24 hours is in NRS 40.253(5), which only speaks to a situation
where the Tenant does not Iile a Tenant's Answer or Tenant's AIIidavit, which is clearly inapplicable
here, as the Tenant did Iile such a Opposition to the No Cause Eviction Notice:
'5. Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the landlord`s agent may apply by
aIIidavit oI complaint Ior eviction to the justice court oI the township in which the dwelling, apartment,
mobile home or commercial premises are located or to the district court oI the county in which the
dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction over
the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriff or constable of the county
to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order. The aIIidavit must state or
contain...
So, absent some statutory provision allowing the Order oI Summary Eviction to result in a
lockout by the Washoe County SheriII's OIIice prior to the 3 days Ior mailing where personal service oI
the Order oI Summary Eviction was not eIIectuated, despite what WCSO employee may have
incorrectly (or Ialsely) asserted in the WCSO's John Machem's AIIidavit oI Service Irom, Iile stamped
November 7, 2011 (especially where it is timestamped 4:30 pm, November 1, 2011, especially where
the Order oI Summary Eviction explicitly reads that no such lockout shall occur prior to 5:00 pm on
November 1, 2011). See, NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(i-iii), NRCP 6(e).
Interestingly, Richard Hill knows his case is toast under NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)(i-iii), NRCP 6(e), in
addition to NRCP 11. That is why in Richard Hill's November 21, 2011 Motion Ior Order To Show
Cause, on page 2, Hills resorts to literally grasping at straws, imagining that what the Washoe County
SheriII's OIIice customarily does is somehow automatically codiIied into mandatory precedent black
letter law. To wit, Richard Hill wrote in his Motion For Order To Show Cause that: 'FACTS
SHOWING CONTEMPT OF COURT 6. EXHIBIT 1 was served on Coughlin on November " 2011
by the Washoe County SheriIIs Department, by posting same on the Iront door oI the property in the
manner customary Ior evictions in Washoe County. The locks to the premises were changed at that
time, thereby ejecting and dispossessing Coughlin oI possession oI the Property. Further, therein
Richard Hill admits that the lockout occurred at 4:30 pm, as indicated in writing in the WCSO's
Machem's AIIidavit oI Service, contra to the mandate oI Judge SIerrazza's Order oI Summary Eviction
requiring any lockout to occur after 5:00 pm, November 1, 2011.
Indeed, in a December 8
th
, 2011 letter to Landlord, Irom Tenant (attached as an Exhibit to
Coughlin's 12/14/11 Iiling in 1708), Iurther issues Ior the appeal an auguring Ior a Temporary
Restraining Order or Injunction:
'the Court has decided to set another hearing in that Regard Ior December 20th, 2011 at
9:45 am. However, and very, very curiously (again!) the RJC could only set the hearing
(despite the statutory requirement in NRS 40.253(7)-(8) that is occur within 10 days oI the
Iiling oI my Motion To Contest Personal Property Lien) Ior December 20
th
, 2011 at 9:45
am. As such I am leIt in the untenable situation oI allowing your artiIicial deadline to pass,
at which point you will, according to your own written words, Iiresale mine and my client's
property, do the same with property at 121 River Rock which belongs to others, and just
generally destroy heirlooms, keepsakes, oIIice equipment, mattress business equipment and
other materials. I AM HEREBY REQUESTING IN WRITING A WRITTEN
STIPULATION FROM YOU AGREEING TO EXTEND THE PERIOD YOU LAID
OUT IN YOUR DECEMBER 2, 2011 LETTER TO ME BY WHICH YOU ASSERT,
AT PAGE 2 PARAGRAPH 1, THAT THE ~FINAL DAY ON WHICH YOU WILL BE
ALLOWED TO ENTER ONTO THE RIVER ROCK PROPERTY PURSUANT TO
THIS OFFER IS MONDAY, DECEMBER 19, 2011... Please agree to retract your
artiIicial December 19, 2011 deadline and place any new deadline out at least 5 days aIter
any ruling on the Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien by the Reno Justice Court,
pursuant to the hearing on that Motion currently set Ior December 20
th
, 2011 at 9:45 a.m.
I FURTHER RESERVE ALL MY RIGHTS TO CONTEST OR PURSUE MY RIGHTS
UNDER THE DEFAULT THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ORDERED AGAINST YOU
PURSUANT TO YOUR FAILUR TO APPEAR AT THE NOVEMBER 22ND, 2011
HEARING PREVIOUSLY SET IN THIS MATTER AND FURTHER RESERVE ME
RIGHT TO SEEK REDRESS FOR THE FACT THAT (ASIDE FROM WHATEVER THE
NOVEMBER 22ND, 2011 HEARING WILL BE DEEMED) THE RENO JUSTICE
COURT FAILED TO HOLD A HEARING IN RESPONSE TO MY MOTION IN
COMPLIANCE WITH THE SPECIFIC DICTATES FOUND IN NRS 40.253(7)-(8),
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, HAVING THE SHERIFF AFFECT SERVICE OF
NOTICE OF SUCH HEARING.
I received your shameless December 2, 2011 letter in the mail "Re: Disposal oI personal
property leIt at 121 River Rock, Reno, Nevada". I dispute all contentions or allegations it
contains. As I have previously indicated, though, I am under no duty to do so, given your
propensity to attempt to bury the truth in lies and all the time sapping that would have on me
should I agree to register my contentions or disagreements with your attempts to practice
law. You have Iailed to provide any prooI oI any "inventorying" done on your part or any
itemization oI charges incurred in relation to such inventorying. Further, you have been
served a Iiling ready NRCP 11 motion incident to your pernicious attempts to include the
contractor's bill oI $1060 (which includes an entry Ior "Iixing leak in the basement",
something Ior which, there is no reasonable nexus to NRS 40.460's dictate calling Ior
reasonable costs Ior "inventorying, moving, and storage). Given that you have already sent
me written bills and demands Ior rent, starting November 1, 2011 (something Ior which
Richard Hill lied to the RPD OIIicers about at the time oI the arrest Ior alleged trespass on
November 13th, 2011, OIIicer Carter, RPD, etc.).

Further, I showed up to the hearing pursuant to NRS 40.253(7)-(8). You Iailed to. There is
not issue as to staleness, but rather why a deIault judgment should not have issued in my
Iavor pursuant to your Iailure to appear Ior the hearing. Further, the 10 days called Ior in
NRS 40.253(7)-(8) (I would cite it here Ior you, but preIer to see iI you can be bothered to
actually look up and read that section Ior the Iirst time all by yourselI) certainly are
calculated in a diIIerent way than however it is you came to the determination that My
Motion to Contest oI November 16, 2011 was "stale".
Further, as Iound on page 2 oI your December 2, 2011 letter, "the terms and conditions Ior
you to enter...are the same as those terms contained in Mr. Hill's email to you dated
November 25, 2011...." So, under NRS 40.253(7)-(8) even should your "stale" argument
hold water, I still have 20 days Irom the date you provided written itemization oI your
charges to move Ior another hearing to contest your unlawIul rent distraint attempt on a
commercial business where you Iiled only a No Cause Notice oI Eviction (oops!), using a
damn Iorm, no less, while billing $20,000 to your client, er, I mean to contest your dubious
personal property lien.
THE 21 DAY SAFE HARBOR PERIOD IS DUE TO EXPIRE SOON WITH REGARD TO
YOUR MAINTAINING THIS EVICTION UNDER NRS 40.253 DESPITE YOUR
EXPRESS WRITTEN ADMISSION THAT IT INVOLVES A COMMERCIAL LEASE
AND MERELY A NO CAUSE NOTICE OF EVICTION/UNLAWFUL DETAINER. THE
LAW IS CLEAR IN THIS REGARD, HOLDING THAT NO CAUSE EVICTIONS ARE
NOT PERMISSIBLE AGAINST COMMERCIAL TENANTS WHERE FAILURE TO PAY
RENT IS NOT ALLEGED. ALERT THE COURT TO YOUR TRANSGRESSION
IMMEDIATELY OR PREPARE TO DEFEND AGAINST YOUR VEXATIOUS TACTIS.
FURTHER, PLEASE PROVIDE PROOF THAT YOU RECEIVED YOUR MD CLIENT'S
"INFORMED CONSENT" WITH RESPECT TO THE VARIOUS RISKS YOU WERE
DRAGGING HIM THROUGH INCIDENT TO YOUR "WRONG SITE SURGERY" OF A
LEGAL NATURE, ie, seeking a No Cause Eviction against a commercial tenant, asking Ior
attorney's Iees and running up a $20,000 attorney's Iees bill within a type oI proceeding, a
Summary Eviction Proceeding a la NRS 40.253, that is expressly included amongst those
matters in Nevada's Justice Court (JCRCP 3) that do not allow Ior a prevailing party award
oI attorney's Iees.
Further, you have apparently been giving away commercial property oI mine, including
materials related to the mattress business located as 121 River Rock St. Do you want to
guess whether or not I have a video tape oI anyone attesting that you did, in Iact, give them a
mattress, or do anything else? You know, under SchiII, you, and your client, can be held
valuable Ior the entire value oI either business in damages under the wrongIul eviction and
other tort/contract based theories oI recovery that will be included in the lawsuit against you,
as resulted in the wrongful eviction of a seafood distributor in Schiff, to the tune of
some $300,000, iI memory serves. That may extend to personal liability with respect to
your various employees. FURTHER, YOU ARE ALLEGEDLY BOTH WITHHOLDING
AND DENYING MY ACCESS TO ITEMS MAILED TO ME, MY LAW PRACTICE, OR
MY MATTRESS BUSINESS IN THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, A
VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW. I DEMAND YOU MAKE THESE ITEMS
AVAILABLE TO ME AT ONCE.

You are allegedly withholding items addressed to me that were sent in the United States
Mail. Some oI these pieces oI mail involve important and exigent client matters.
Additionally, your oIIice reIused to return my state issued driver's license Ior the entire
period between November 15th, through November 22nd, which is another criminal law
violation, I believe. I do not believe you have any basis Ior a lien on these items. Further,
you are withholding items oI mine that were not at the property at the time oI your illegal
lockout. You have been inIormed as to what these items are, and I believe you are guilty oI
a criminal law violation Ior withholding them. Please make them available to me at once.
Please do not attempt to make phone calls or voice mails to me. Please communicate to me
only in writing.
Judge SIerrazza apparently made an Order on 10/27/2011 which, essentially, converted to the
Court all the money I had available to me, then, shortly thereaIter, he made an another Order denying a
request Ior Publication oI Transcript at Public Expense, claiming that the 11/7/2011 Order returning the
money reclassiIied at that point as a Supersedeas Bond (iI the court is holding a Supersedeas Bond,
doesn't that mean Stay must be in place, as such, wouldn't a trespass charge be a legal Iiction?). NRS
40.253(6) explicitly prevents this (and the RJC will need to enact and get approved its own version oI
Las Vegas's Justice Court Rule 44 iI it wants to order tenants in a Summary Execution, er, Summary
Eviction proceeding to pay monies into the court or otherwise reclassiIy previous order Ior rent escrow
and deem monies previously submitted as 'Appeal Bonds or other types oI Bonds. Simply put, the
RJC must return the $2275 I was improperly Iorced to deposit into the court as rent escrow. Further,
the IFP granted in this case should apply to the Appeal Bond or any other Iees or bonds required by this
or any other court. This is also a whistle blower and or Qui Tam action, as the Justice Court should not
be leveraged as a club to bash tenants senseless just because attorney's like Richard Hill, Esq. and
Casey Baker, Esq. Iind it proIitable. Quit having Iiling oIIice employees bully tenants into coming
down and being served notices by the Iiling oIIice that they law in Nevada requires landlord or
landlord's attorney to service and Iile prooI oI. Don't act like JCRRT allow it, see Rule 2 oI JCRRT,
basically, JCRRT doesn't apply to landlord tenant action and quit acting like the RJC gets to apply
'house rules, without getting them printed Ior the public and approved by the Supreme Court oI
Nevada. See Rule 81 and 83 oI the State oI Nevada's Justice Court Rules oI Civil Procedure.~ From
Coughlin's 12/14/11 " Amended Case Appeal Statement, Statement of Record on Appeal, Motion
to Set Aside Eviction Order, Emergency Ex Parte Motion for Order Shortening Time;
DESIGNATION OF RECORD AND STATEMENT OF POINTS ON Appeal;AND NOTICE OF
INTENT TO FILE BRIEF; Statement of Proceedings; CERTIFICATE OF NO
TRANSCRIPT;NOTICE OF POSTING AND ACCEPTANCE OF SUPERSEDEAS/COST
BOND ON APPEAL, which was timely, especially considering there was no ~judgment' involved
sufficinet to invoked NRS 40.380 or N1CRCP 73 or 73A(a)(4), not to mention that Couglin was
granted IPF status by 1udge Sferrazza, even as to the $24 appeal fee in the R1C, therefore, no
~appeal bond was even required of Couglin (see 1udge Steinheimmer's 11/8/11 denial of
Coughlin's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis in CV11-03051 wherein she makes clear she
lacks jurisdiction to waive such ~appeal bond for costs (such is province of the R1C, and by
granting Coughlin's IPF, 1udge Sferrazza thereby ruled that Coughlin would not be required to
file such a $250 appeal bond as set out in N1CRCP 73, as Couglin was ~exempted by law from
such requirement, and regardless, even where Coughlin subject to such bond required in
N1CRCP 73, particularly where ~security shall not be required of an appellant who is not subject
to costs". 1udge Sferrazza's ruling on 10/25/11 necessarily made it so that Coughlin had (by the
R1C retaining his $2,275 even after the 10/25/11 Trial, ~filed a supersedeas bond or other
undertaking which includes security for the payment of costs on appeal, in civil cases a bond for
costs on appeal or equivalent security shall be filed by the appellant in the justice court with the
notice of appeal, and therefore, either such ~bond on appeal' was incorporated into the
supersedeas bond that the R1C retaining Coughlin's $2,275 must have necessarily been (nothing
would justify 1udge Sferrazza making Coughlin's ~appeal bond' (which is meant only to cover
the ~costs (ie, filing fee, etc....rent is not a cost...) a staggering nearly ten times was it is set at in
N1CRCP 73, and there exists no authority for any contention that 1udge Sferrazza had the
jurisidction necessary to support any such ruling. Its a troubling ruling too, kind of a ~the Court
is going to take ten times the amount necessary, and still refuse you your stay, despite you being
statutorily entitled to the automatice stay set out in NRS 40.384, particularly where there is no
~judgment, given this was only a summary eviction...or ~Trial (under N1CRCP 109), except for
the fact that you didn't get your 20 days to respond to a Summons and Complaint, and, really, the
landlord wasn't even required to file a landlord's affidavit containign all that required by NRS
40.254(2) even to this day...sorry this lead to a terrible run in your life of 15 arrests and 8
evictions (many of which the R1C has prolonged or exacerbated under exceptionally questionable
circumstances (Clifton, Pearson, Schroeder, and Sferrazza openly violating Nevada law per NRS
1.230, 1.235, NRS 40.253(5), and NRS 178.405, in addition to DDA Young malfeasance pratically
being cheered by R1C 1udges, as was the WCPD and Bruce Lindsay's extremely deficient
~representation, much suspect condut by R1C Bailiffs and Clerks, etc.). Also, neither Baker nor
Hill ever challenged Coughlin's bond per N1CRCP 73's: ~After a bond for costs on appeal is
filed, a respondent may raise for determination by the justice court objections to the form of the
bond or to the sufficiency of the surety.
N1CRCP 73: ~BOND FOR COS1S ON APPEAL

Unless an appellant is exempted by law, or has filed a supersedeas bond or other undertaking
which includes security for the payment of costs on appeal, in civil cases a bond for costs on appeal
or equivalent security shall be filed by the appellant in the justice court with the notice of appeal;
but security shall not be required of an appellant who is not subject to costs. The bond or equivalent
security shall be in the sum or value of $25 unless the justice court fixes a different amount. A
bond for costs on appeal shall have sufficient surety, and it or any equivalent security shall be
conditioned to secure the payment of costs if the appeal is finally dismissed or the judgment
affirmed, or of such costs as the district court may direct if the judgment is modified. If a bond or
equivalent security in the sum or value of $250 is given, no approval thereof is necessary. After a
bond for costs on appeal is filed, a respondent may raise for determination by the justice court
objections to the form of the bond or to the sufficiency of the surety. The provisions of Rule 73A
apply to a surety bond upon a bond given pursuant to this rule.
Further, Baker himselI admits in his Ansering BrieI that 1708 was not a 'Iormal proceeding
(which would mean Juge SIerrazza's Note Order' oI 12/22/11 indicating that Coughlin would not
recieve a stay due to not having made a deposit 'witihin 10 days (which is not true given the RJC
retain Coughlin's escrow, and SIerrazza himselI ruled on 10/25/11 (see NJCRCP Rule 73B(b): ' (b)
supersedeas bond: Form and EIIect.... In all cases where a bond is required by these rules, a
deposit in the court below of the amount of the judgment appealed from and such additional amount
as may be specified by the justice of the court by which the judgment was rendered, shall be
equivalent to filing the bond,) that such was Couglhin's 'bond...and upon such escrow being
returned to Coughlin, RJC Clerks (including Cherl and Christine Erickson, reIused to accept Irom
Coughlin, on several attempts the $250 Coughlin attempted to deposit as a supersedeas bond (see
Coughlin's 11/21/11 email to ChieI Civil Clerk Stancil). (a)Failure to File or InsuIIiciency oI
bond.II a bond on appeal or a supersedeas bond is not Iiled within the time speciIied, the appeal
will be subject to such sanctions as provided in Rule 76. II the bond Iiled is Iound insuIIicient, and if
the action is not yet docketed with the appellate court, a bond may be filed at such time before the
action is so docketed, as may be fixed by the justice court. After the action is so docketed, application
for leave to file a sufficient bond may be made only in the appellate court. Further
NJCRCP 73A(a)(4): 'In cases involving an appeal by the defendant of an order of eviction
in a formal proceeding, such appeal shall not stay the execution of the judgment , unless, no
later than 1 days after the filing of a notice of appeal , the person shall execute and file with
the court or justice an undertaking to the plaintiff, with two or more sureties, in an
amount to be fixed by the court or justice, but which shall not be less than twice the amount
of the judgment and costs , to the effect that, if the judgment appealed from be affirmed or
the appeal be dismissed, the appellant will pay the judgment and the cost of appeal, the
value of the use ana occupation of the property, and damages justly accruing to the plaintiff
during the pendency of the appeal. Upon taking the appeal and filing the undertaking, all
further proceedings in the case shall be stayed.
Whenever an appeal is perfected, and a bond given as provided by paragraphs (1), (2),
(3) and (4) herein, it shall stay all further proceedings in the court below, upon the judgment
or order appealed from or upon matters embraced therein, except as hereinafter specified.
However, the court below may proceed upon any other matter included in the action or
proceeding and not affected by the judgment or order appealed from ; ...
In cases not provided for in (1), (2), (3) or (4) above, the giving of an appeal bond ,
under the provisions of Rule 73, shall stay proceedings in the court below upon the judgment
or order appealed from, except that where it directs the same oI perishable property, the court
below may order the property to be sold and the proceeds thereoI to be deposited to abide by
the judgment oI the appellate court, and except where the appellate court may otherwise direct
upon such terms as it may in its discretion impose.

(b)supersedeas bond: Form and EIIect.... In all cases where a bond is required by these
rules, a deposit in the court below of the amount of the judgment appealed from and such
additional amount as may be specified by the justice of the court by which the judgment was
rendered, shall be equivalent to filing the bond , and in all cases the bond or deposit may be
waived by the written consent oI the appellee Iiled in said action or proceeding.
When a proper bond to stay proceedings is filed, it shall stay further proceedings ...and if
an execution or other order shall have been issued to the sheriff, coroner, or elisor, the
person shall return the same, with the cause therefor, ana his or her proceeaings thereunaer,
upon receiving from the clerk or fustice a notice of the stay of proceedings.

'supersedeas bond
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Sent: Mon 11/21/11 8:46 PM
To: kstancilwashoecounty.us
Ms. Stancil,
I may be unable to post the supersedeas bond in time iI I am not provided my wallet, state
issued, identiIcation, etc. by mr. Hill. Further law oI the case applies to Judge SIerrazza's
earlier determinatino oI the amount, and under JCRCP 73 and nrs 40.380 its not clear what the
bond should be, iI any, as well as whether the execution should have been stayed during the
period Judge SIerrazza continued to hold the $2,275. I seek clariIication Irom you and the
RJC.
Thank You,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
Licensed in Nevada
a stay
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 11/24/11 3:19 AM
To: kstancilwashoecounty.us
http://lawlibrary.nevadajudiciary.us/documents/landlordTenantForms0612/LandlordTenantFor
ms31to36/AppealSummaryEvictionJusticeToDistrictCourt.pdI
my $2275 was ruled the supersedeas bond, and retained by the court, yet the eviction was not
stayed...rent was less than $1000, I am conIused.
NRS 40.380 Provisions governing appeals. Either party may, within 10 days, appeal Irom the
judgment rendered. But an appeal by the deIendant shall not stay the execution oI the
judgment, unless, within the 10 days, the deIendant shall execute and Iile with the court or
justice the deIendant`s undertaking to the plaintiII, with two or more sureties, in an amount to
be Iixed by the court or justice, but which shall not be less than twice the amount oI the
judgment and costs, to the eIIect that, iI the judgment appealed Irom be aIIirmed or the appeal
be dismissed, the appellant will pay the judgment and the cost oI appeal, the value oI the use
and occupation oI the property, and damages justly accruing to the plaintiII during the
pendency oI the appeal. Upon taking the appeal and Iiling the undertaking, all Iurther
proceedings in the case shall be stayed.
|1911 CPA 659; RL 5601; NCL 9148|
NRS 40.385 Stay oI execution upon appeal; duty oI tenant who retains possession oI
premises to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal Irom an order entered pursuant to NRS
40.253:
1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay oI execution may be obtained by
Iiling with the trial court a bond in the amount oI $250 to cover the expected costs on appeal. In
an action concerning a lease oI commercial property or any other property Ior which the
monthly rent exceeds $1,000, the court may, upon its own motion or that oI a party, and upon a
showing oI good cause, order an additional bond to be posted to cover the expected costs on
appeal. A surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction oI the appellate court and irrevocably
appoints the clerk oI that court as the surety`s agent upon whom papers aIIecting the surety`s
liability upon the bond may be served. Liability oI a surety may be enIorced, or the bond may
be released, on motion in the appellate court without independent action.
2. A tenant who retains possession oI the premises that are the subject oI the appeal during the
pendency oI the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount provided in the underlying
contract between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes due. II the tenant Iails to pay such
rent, the landlord may initiate new proceedings Ior a summary eviction by serving the tenant
with a new notice pursuant to NRS 40.253.
appeal brieI date request pursuant to N. S. Ct. instrucxtion
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 11/24/11 3:34 AM
To: cIrandenmail.co.washoe.nv.us; kstancilwashoecounty.us
1 attachment
AppealSummaryEvictionJusticeToDistrictCourt.pdI (199.1 KB)
Hi Mr. Franden,
I am Iollowing the directions oI the Nevada Supreme Court in contacting you and because I
keep trying to Iile these things in the
Reno Justice Court but keep getting them handed back to me and escorted out the building by a
Brown Shirt. There was an Summary Eviction Order that kept my $2275 rent escrow deposit,
reclassiIying it as a supersedeas/appeal bond...but no stay was granted.....NRS 40.385 would
seem to go against that....Now my client Iile are being held under an unlawIul rent distraint and
my emergency motion to Judge Berry has not been ruled on and Judge Steinheimmer denied
my IFP....
http://lawlibrary.nevadajudiciary.us/documents/landlordTenantForms0612/LandlordTenantFor
ms31to36/AppealSummaryEvictionJusticeToDistrictCourt.pdI
There are two ways to do this:
1. II there was a court reporter recording your trial in Justice Court,
order a copy oI the transcript (there may be a cost to getting it) and
Iile it with the Justice Court;
2. II there was no court reporter at your trial, Iile the CertiIicate oI No
Transcript, Form #35; and a Statement oI Proceedings, Form #36,
with the Justice Court. Note that you must serve your version to
the Landlord Ior his/her objections, and then you must submit both
to the Justice Court. See JCRCP 74.
STEP THREE: FILING THE APPELLATE BRIEF
The Justice Court Clerk should notiIy all parties when the record has been
transmitted to the District Court.
3
Call the court clerk periodically to see iI your case has
been given to the District Court. When the case has been given to the District Court,
contact the clerk oI the District Court that has your case and ask when your appellate
brieI must be Iiled with the District Court. II you are unable Ior any reason to Iind out a
speciIic date to Iile your appellate brieI, you must Iile it in the District Court within 30
days aIter your case has been given to the District Court. Check your local rules Ior
your District Court regarding limitations on the length oI your brieI.
Note: The District Court can reIuse to accept brieIs and simply decide your appeal on
the record submitted.
In writing your appellate brieI:
1. Do not argue disputed Iacts; and
2. Argue only mistakes oI law that make a diIIerence.
The judge in your summary eviction hearing has the authority to decide Iactual
issues. To argue any Iactual issue, the judge`s decision must be 'arbitrary and
capricious or without any support. This standard is very diIIicult to meet, and the
District Court judge gives great weight to the Iactual decisions oI the Justice Court
judge.

From: zachcoughlinhotmail.com
To: kstancilwashoecounty.us
Subject: a stay
Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2011 03:19:56 -0800
http://lawlibrary.nevadajudiciary.us/documents/landlordTenantForms0612/LandlordTenantFor
ms31to36/AppealSummaryEvictionJusticeToDistrictCourt.pdI
my $2275 was ruled the supersedeas bond, and retained by the court, yet the eviction was not
stayed...rent was less than $1000, I am conIused.
NRS 40.380 Provisions governing appeals. Either party may, within 10 days, appeal Irom the
judgment rendered. But an appeal by the deIendant shall not stay the execution oI the
judgment, unless, within the 10 days, the deIendant shall execute and Iile with the court or
justice the deIendant`s undertaking to the plaintiII, with two or more sureties, in an amount to
be Iixed by the court or justice, but which shall not be less than twice the amount oI the
judgment and costs, to the eIIect that, iI the judgment appealed Irom be aIIirmed or the appeal
be dismissed, the appellant will pay the judgment and the cost oI appeal, the value oI the use
and occupation oI the property, and damages justly accruing to the plaintiII during the
pendency oI the appeal. Upon taking the appeal and Iiling the undertaking, all Iurther
proceedings in the case shall be stayed.
|1911 CPA 659; RL 5601; NCL 9148|
NRS 40.385 Stay oI execution upon appeal; duty oI tenant who retains possession oI
premises to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal Irom an order entered pursuant to NRS
40.253:
1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay oI execution may be obtained by
Iiling with the trial court a bond in the amount oI $250 to cover the expected costs on appeal. In
an action concerning a lease oI commercial property or any other property Ior which the
monthly rent exceeds $1,000, the court may, upon its own motion or that oI a party, and upon a
showing oI good cause, order an additional bond to be posted to cover the expected costs on
appeal. A surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction oI the appellate court and irrevocably
appoints the clerk oI that court as the surety`s agent upon whom papers aIIecting the surety`s
liability upon the bond may be served. Liability oI a surety may be enIorced, or the bond may
be released, on motion in the appellate court without independent action.
2. A tenant who retains possession oI the premises that are the subject oI the appeal during the
pendency oI the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount provided in the underlying
contract between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes due. II the tenant Iails to pay such
rent, the landlord may initiate new proceedings Ior a summary eviction by serving the tenant
with a new notice pursuant to NRS 40.253.
'FW: appeal brieI date request pursuant to N. S. Ct. instrucxtion
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlinhotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 11/24/11 3:47 AM
To: stuttlewashoecounty.us
1 attachment
AppealSummaryEvictionJusticeToDistrictCourt.pdI (199.1 KB)
Mr. Tuttle,
the n s ct directions say to contact you and ask
STEP THREE: FILING THE APPELLATE BRIEF The Justice Court Clerk should notiIy all
parties when the record has been transmitted to the District Court. 3 Call the court clerk
periodically to see iI your case has been given to the District Court. When the case has been
given to the District Court, contact the clerk oI the District Court that has your case and ask
when your appellate brieI must be Iiled with the District Court. II you are unable Ior any reason
to Iind out a speciIic date to Iile your appellate brieI, you must Iile it in the District Court
within 30 days aIter your case has been given to the District Court. Check your local rules Ior
your District Court regarding limitations on the length oI your brieI. Note: The District Court
can reIuse to accept brieIs and simply decide your appeal on the record submitted.
So I am writing to inquire about that.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PS
STEP TWO: THE RECORD FROM THE TRIAL The Iirst pleading, which must be Iiled in all
appeals, is the Designation oI Record and Statement oI Points on Appeal and Notice oI Intent to
File BrieI, Form #34. The portion designating the record simply sweeps all documents Irom the
Justice Court proceedings into the appeal. The second section, stating points on appeal, requires
you to list the reasons Ior the appeal. The third part notiIies the court oI your intention to Iile an
appellate brieI. You must get a copy oI the trial record and Iile it with the Justice Court within
10 days oI the date you Iile the Notice oI Appeal. There are two ways to do this: 1. II there was
a court reporter recording your trial in Justice Court, order a copy oI the transcript (there may
be a cost to getting it) and Iile it with the Justice Court; 2. II there was no court reporter at your
trial, Iile the CertiIicate oI No Transcript, Form #35; and a Statement oI Proceedings, Form
#36, with the Justice Court. Note that you must serve your version to the Landlord Ior his/her
objections, and then you must submit both to the Justice Court. See JCRCP 74.

However, the second time I tried to submit the CertiIicate oI No Transcript (the Iirst time a
Brown Shirt named Sexton went all club bouncer on me) Not only did Brown Shirt Sexton
stamp out my access to justice with his cold cruel Jackboot, but Drema told me that I couldn't
Iile it because the RJC audio records the proceeding and I could pay the $1,000 to the
"recommended" transcriptionist to transcribe 5 hours oI proceedings, which, given the industry
standard oI between 2 to 3 hours oI transcription work Ior every hour oI hearing, would put the
transcriptionist into a higher tax bracket per hour than me, that's Ior sure. Anyways, the N. S.
Ct instructions do not jibe with what Drema said, so....Further, Judge SIerrazza entered an
Order in response to a Motino to Produce Transcript at Public Expense that basically said I
would need to have two loan sharks break both my legs and say they would wack me next
week iI I didn't get the rest to them, and where I has absolutely no money to my name, beIore
Judge SIerrazza would even begin ot think about approving the Order based on need or
indigency.
From: zachcoughlinhotmail.com
To: cIrandenmail.co.washoe.nv.us; kstancilwashoecounty.us
Subject: appeal brieI date request pursuant to N. S. Ct. instrucxtion
Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2011 03:34:32 -0800
Hi Mr. Franden,
I am Iollowing the directions oI the Nevada Supreme Court in contacting you and because I
keep trying to Iile these things in the
Reno Justice Court but keep getting them handed back to me and escorted out the building by a
Brown Shirt. There was an Summary Eviction Order that kept my $2275 rent escrow deposit,
reclassiIying it as a supersedeas/appeal bond...but no stay was granted.....NRS 40.385 would
seem to go against that....Now my client Iile are being held under an unlawIul rent distraint and
my emergency motion to Judge Berry has not been ruled on and Judge Steinheimmer denied
my IFP....
http://lawlibrary.nevadajudiciary.us/documents/landlordTenantForms0612/LandlordTenantFor
ms31to36/AppealSummaryEvictionJusticeToDistrictCourt.pdI
There are two ways to do this:
1. II there was a court reporter recording your trial in Justice Court,
order a copy oI the transcript (there may be a cost to getting it) and
Iile it with the Justice Court;
2. II there was no court reporter at your trial, Iile the CertiIicate oI No
Transcript, Form #35; and a Statement oI Proceedings, Form #36,
with the Justice Court. Note that you must serve your version to
the Landlord Ior his/her objections, and then you must submit both
to the Justice Court. See JCRCP 74.
STEP THREE: FILING THE APPELLATE BRIEF
The Justice Court Clerk should notiIy all parties when the record has been
transmitted to the District Court.
3
Call the court clerk periodically to see iI your case has
been given to the District Court. When the case has been given to the District Court,
contact the clerk oI the District Court that has your case and ask when your appellate
brieI must be Iiled with the District Court. II you are unable Ior any reason to Iind out a
speciIic date to Iile your appellate brieI, you must Iile it in the District Court within 30
days aIter your case has been given to the District Court. Check your local rules Ior
your District Court regarding limitations on the length oI your brieI.
Note: The District Court can reIuse to accept brieIs and simply decide your appeal on
the record submitted.
In writing your appellate brieI:
1. Do not argue disputed Iacts; and
2. Argue only mistakes oI law that make a diIIerence.
The judge in your summary eviction hearing has the authority to decide Iactual
issues. To argue any Iactual issue, the judge`s decision must be 'arbitrary and
capricious or without any support. This standard is very diIIicult to meet, and the
District Court judge gives great weight to the Iactual decisions oI the Justice Court
judge.

From: zachcoughlinhotmail.com
To: kstancilwashoecounty.us
Subject: a stay
Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2011 03:19:56 -0800
http://lawlibrary.nevadajudiciary.us/documents/landlordTenantForms0612/LandlordTenantFor
ms31to36/AppealSummaryEvictionJusticeToDistrictCourt.pdI
my $2275 was ruled the supersedeas bond, and retained by the court, yet the eviction was not
stayed...rent was less than $1000, I am conIused.
NRS 40.380 Provisions governing appeals. Either party may, within 10 days, appeal Irom the
judgment rendered. But an appeal by the deIendant shall not stay the execution oI the
judgment, unless, within the 10 days, the deIendant shall execute and Iile with the court or
justice the deIendant`s undertaking to the plaintiII, with two or more sureties, in an amount to
be Iixed by the court or justice, but which shall not be less than twice the amount oI the
judgment and costs, to the eIIect that, iI the judgment appealed Irom be aIIirmed or the appeal
be dismissed, the appellant will pay the judgment and the cost oI appeal, the value oI the use
and occupation oI the property, and damages justly accruing to the plaintiII during the
pendency oI the appeal. Upon taking the appeal and Iiling the undertaking, all Iurther
proceedings in the case shall be stayed.
NRS 40.385 Stay oI execution upon appeal; duty oI tenant who retains possession oI
premises to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal Irom an order entered pursuant to NRS
40.253:
1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay oI execution may be obtained by
Iiling with the trial court a bond in the amount oI $250 to cover the expected costs on appeal. In
an action concerning a lease oI commercial property or any other property Ior which the
monthly rent exceeds $1,000, the court may, upon its own motion or that oI a party, and upon a
showing oI good cause, order an additional bond to be posted to cover the expected costs on
appeal. A surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction oI the appellate court and irrevocably
appoints the clerk oI that court as the surety`s agent upon whom papers aIIecting the surety`s
liability upon the bond may be served. Liability oI a surety may be enIorced, or the bond may
be released, on motion in the appellate court without independent action.
2. A tenant who retains possession oI the premises that are the subject oI the appeal during
the pendency oI the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount provided in the
underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes due. II the tenant Iails to
pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new proceedings Ior a summary eviction by serving the
tenant with a new notice pursuant to NRS 40.253.
NJCRCP RULE73B.BONDSMISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

(a)Failure to File or InsuIIiciency oI bond.II a bond on appeal or a supersedeas bond is
not Iiled within the time speciIied, the appeal will be subject to such sanctions as provided in
Rule 76. II the bond Iiled is Iound insuIIicient, and if the action is not yet docketed with the
appellate court, a bond may be filed at such time before the action is so docketed , as may be
fixed by the justice court. After the action is so docketed, application for leave to file a
sufficient bond may be made only in the appellate court .
As to Baker's argument that the alleged Iailure by Coughlin to speak over Judge
SIerrazza's cursory denial oI even the thought oI a stay on 10/25/11: 'NJCRCP RULE 46.
EXCEPTIONS UNNECESSARY Formal exceptions to rulings or orders oI the court are
unnecessary; but Ior all purposes Ior which an exception has heretoIore been necessary it is
suIIicient that a party, at the time the ruling or order oI the court is made or sought, makes
known to the court the action which the party desires the court to take or the party`s objection
to the action oI the court and the party`s grounds thereIor; and, iI a party has no opportunity to
object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence oI an objection does not thereaIter
prejudice the party.
Judge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order clearly wrong where is reads, on page 5's Iootnote 5: '
Merliss sought a personal property lien Ior storage oI Coughlin's personal belongings in
the Property...Coughlin Iiled a motion to contest the lien. On December 21, 2011, Judge
SIerrazza ordered Coughlin to pay to Merliss $480.00 as "Iair and reasonable
compensation" Ior Merliss's storage oI his personal belongings....also granted Coughlin
access to the Property to remove his personal belongings by December 23, 2011 5:00
p.m. Coughlin Iailed to do so. As a result, Merliss hired a contractor to dispose oI
Coughlin's personal belongings. Coughlin appealed.... As a preliminary matter,
however this Court notes it is the issue of summary eviction and the 1udge
Sferrazza's October 27, 2011 Order that presently concerns this Court....In addition,
b ecause Coughlin failed to timely file his notice of appeal regarding the personal
property lien, see NRS 40.253(8), and because Coughlin's notice of appeal fails to
identify an error regarding the court's procedure in setting a hearing on this issue,
this Court will no consider this issue.).
Strangely, Judge Flanagan's Order Iails to include a date Ior the 'Notice oI
Appeal Coughlin Iiled as to the 12/21/11 Order in 1708 ('b ecause Coughlin failed to
timely file his notice of appeal regarding the personal property lien,), so its a bit hard
to tell just how it was 'late or 'not timely). Clearly, Coughlin did Iile a timely Notice
oI Appeal on 12/26/11 (as to the 12/21/11 Order in 1708). The RJC, curiously, Iailed to
actually transmit the documents listed in the 'Appeal Receipt on page 2 oI the 3 page
1/4/12 Supplemental to Justice Court Proceedings it transmitted to the 2JDC, despite the
'CertiIicate oI Clerk (Tuttle's seal, Bonnie Cooper's signature) attesting that 'true and
correct copies oI the documents listed on the 'Appeal Receipt were being enclosed
therewith. Additionally, whether or not Coughlin. Its really not clear at all just what
'Notice oI Appeal Judge Flanagan is reIerring to when he writes: 'because Coughlin's
notice of appeal fails to identify an error regarding the court's procedure in setting a
hearing on this issue, this Court will no consider this issue." Coughlin did Iile
another Notice oI Appeal as to the 12/21/11 Order on 2/1/12...however, that was never
transmitted by the RJC to the 2JDC in any Supplemental...so...is that what Judge
Flanagan is reIerring to? II so, how does he know about it (its not mentioned anywhere
in any Iilingings in CV11-03628)? Extra-judicial or ex parte communciations? Further,
Coughlin's 12/26/11 Notice oI Appeals oI the 12/21/11 Order certiainly does 'identiIy
and error regarding the court's procedure in setting a hearing on this issue...but,
regardless...whether or not Coughlin had done so, that is not the standard for whether
or not an issue or Order shall be considered in the appellate court's ruling on an
appeal. There were a multitude oI basis and issues Coughlin identiIied in his 12/26/11
Notice oI Appeal that presented basis Ior overturning that order (insuIIicient evidence,
clearly erroneous, etc., etc.).
NJCRCP 76B provides that: 'Appeal Irom formal eviction: Within 10 days of service of
entry of order . ARS 4.38; Rule 73A(4). Fees: Payable upon Iiling notice oI appeal. Rule
74B(a)(1). Bond Ior costs: Filed with notice oI appeal. Rule 73. Bond, supersedeas: At or aIter
time oI Iiling notice oI appeal. Stay is effective when bond filed. Rule 73A.
Baker's own Answering BrieI admits that 1708 was not a 'Iormal eviction, and
thereIore, NJCRP 73A(a)(4) does not apply.
Baker's 2/24/12 Answering BrieI reads: 'III. STANDARD OF REVIEW: "A]n order
granting summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6) should be reviewed on appeal based
upon the standard for review of an order granting summary judgment under NRCP 56
because these proceedings are analogous.,,8. Anvui, LLC v G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev.
212,215,163 P.3d 405 (2007). "To successIully deIend against a summary judgment motion,
the nonmoving party must transcend the pleadings and, by affidavit or other admissible
evidence, introduce specific facts that show a genuine issue of material fact.'" Torrealba v.
Kesmitis, 124 Nev. 95, 178 P.3d 716 (2008). A case appealed must not be tried a n ew." 1.
A1CRCP 7A. Further, "a |lower court's| Iindings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they
are clearly erroneous and are not based on substantial evidence." 11. Gibellini v. Klindt, 110
Nev. 1201, 1204,885 P.2d 540 (1994) (emphasis added). "The notice oI appeal shall speciIy
the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment, order or part thereoI
appealed Irom ...,,12 NJCRCP 72( c). "Only those parts oI the judgment which are included in
the notice oI appeal will be considered by the appellate Court. 13 Reno Newspapers, Inc. v.
Bibb, 76 Nev. 332, 335, 353 P.2d 458 (1960).
So (and Coughlin was jailed wrongIully Ior 5 days by Judge Nash Holmes during the
time period to Iile a Reply BrieI to Baker's 2/24/12 Answering BrieI, shortly aIter Judge Nash
Holmes told Coughlin 'II you say the name Richard G. Hill one more time you are going out oI
here in cuIIs, do you understand me?. Judge Holmes ruled in her 3/12/12 Order that Coughlin
continually sought to interject Hill's name into the record during the proceedings despite Hill
having no connection thereto. However, Hill clearly did have a connection in that the traIIic
citations were issued to Coughlin outside Hill's law oIIice, shortly aIter Hill and Coughlin both
called the police, upon Hill reIusing to give Coughlin back his wallet, driver's license (some
break by RPD Sargent Tarter not citing Coughlin Ior Iailing to have his driver's license on him,
huh...Also Tarter testiIied that Coughlin 'didn't get the message.. and that he had only written
one other traIIic citation in the previous year and 'normally 'give people a warning, but in the
case oI someone like you who didn't get the message Tarter gave Coughlin outside Hill's
oIIice. Tarter accused Coughlin oI Iailing to come to a complete stop at the intersection oI St.
Laurence and Forrest Street during the trial, yet on the scene Tarter accused Coughlin oI being
about to turn up Forrest St. to head back to Hill's law oIIice aIter Tarter told him to leave the
area.
Coughlin protested that he had no such intention oI returning to Hill's oIIice, and that, in
Iact, Coughlin would been heading up the wrong way oI the one way street, Forrest, back to
Hill's law oIIice at 652 Forrest St., where he to so proceed where Coughlin was travelling east
on St. Laurence prior to coming to a complete stop at the intersection oI St. Laurence and
Forrest St., shortly aIter passing a parked Sargent Tarter on the south side oI St. Laurence.
Tarter indicated he started Iollowing Coughlin upon viewing, Irom his parked vanteage point,
Coughlin Iailing to come to a complete stop at the intersection, but that's not true. One, Tarter's
vehicle was parked to Iar away Irom that intersection to have any such viewpoint, and two,
Tarter proceeded to begin Iollowing Coughlin immediately aIter Coughlin passed him, Tarter
pulling out and beginning to Iollow Coughlin prior to Coughlin even getting to said
intersection. Coughlin clearly remembers coming to a complete stop at said intersection and
noting Sargent Tarter Iollowing directly behind him, worried that some police retaliation was
aIoot and taking care to be extremely cautious to Iollow all rules oI the road. Regardless,
Coughlin was well Iamilar with that intersection, having live Ior a couple years at 931 Forrest
St., and always came to a complete stop there, and looked both ways, regardless oI the Iact that
it was a one way street. Sargent Tarter was actually duplicitous enough at the trial to attempt to
utilize an argument suggesting Coughlin as not telling the truth about coming to a complete
stop and looking both ways in light oI Forrest being a one way street. This, despite, on the day
oI the citation, Coughlin clearly indicating to Tarter on at least two occassions that Forrest is a
one way street, and thereIore, it would be highly unlikely Coughlin was about to turn leIt onto
Forrest, against oncoming traIIic, just to get back to Hill's oIIice, especially where Coughlin
was well aware Tarter was Iollowing him at that point, and where Tarter had just told Coughlin
to leave Hill's OIIice.
Further connection between Hill and the 2/27/12 Trial resides in the Iact that Hill had the
WCSO and RMC Marshals violate courthouse sanctuary rule on 2/27/12 in attempting to have
Coughlin personally served, while in the courtroom with Judge Flanagan's Order to Show
Cause oI 2/8/12, in the same appeal oI the same summary eviction Irom Coughlin's law oIIice
that resulted in Coughlin's venturing to Hill's oIIice in the Iirst place on the day oI Tarter's
citation (where Coughlin called ahead and told Hill that he was coming to pick up his keys,
wallet, client's Iiles, and driver's license, immediately aIter being released Irom three days in
jail incident to the criminal trespass arrest at Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice where Hill
signed the criminal complaint and lied to the RPD in order to eIIect a wrongIul arrest. So, it is
clearly incorrect Ior Judge Nash Holmes to Iind any mention oI Hill during that 2/27/12 traIIic
citation trial to be irrelevant enough to justiIy disbarring Coughlin and her entering an order,
Iinding, by the 'clear and convicing evidence standard oI prooI language Irom SchaeIIer that
bar counsel had Ied her earlier that day on the phone, that Coughlin violated a multitude oI
Rules oI ProIessional Conduct. Its beyond shameIul what has gone on here. Its been a good
old Iashioned Washoe County Gang Bang. The kind Reno is so well known Ior. Reno 911.
Judges co-signing anything and everything members oI local law enIorcement Ieel like doing.
And those members oI law enIorcement know it, and bank on it, and it results in a lower and
lower standard oI conduct being perpetuated year aIter year.
Baker's 2/24/12 Answering BrieI reads: 'III. STANDARD OF REVIEW: "A]n order
granting summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6) should be reviewed on appeal based
upon the standard for review of an order granting summary judgment under NRCP 56
because these proceedings are analogous. 8. Anvui, LLC v G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev.
212, 215, 163 P.3d 405 (2007). "To successIully deIend against a summary judgment motion,
the nonmoving party must transcend the pleadings and, by affidavit or other admissible
evidence, introduce specific facts that show a genuine issue of material fact.'" Torrealba v.
Kesmitis, 124 Nev. 95, 178 P.3d 716 (2008). A case appealed must not be tried a n ew." 1.
A1CRCP 7A. Further, "a |lower court's| Iindings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they
are clearly erroneous and are not based on substantial evidence." 11. Gibellini v. Klindt, 110
Nev. 1201, 1204,885 P.2d 540 (1994) (emphasis added). "The notice oI appeal shall speciIy
the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment, order or part thereoI
appealed Irom ...,,12 NJCRCP 72( c). "Only those parts oI the judgment which are included in
the notice oI appeal will be considered by the appellate Court. 13 Reno Newspapers, Inc. v.
Bibb, 76 Nev. 332, 335, 353 P.2d 458 (1960).
Baker purposeIully miscited to Gibellini even where he cited to Anvui.
233k287. Actions for unlawful detainer.... 233k291(18) Review 233k293. Summary
proceedings. 233K302 jurisdiction in summary proceedings, 233K311. -- Warrant to
dispossess, and execution thereof.
52B C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant 1576: 'XII. Reentry and Recovery oI Possession by
Landlord C. Statutory Dispossession Proceedings; Summary Proceedings 7. Appellate
Review 1576. Standard of review West's Key Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant
233k291(18), 315(1), 315(3). A decision oI the trial court in a summary dispossession
proceeding may be reviewed Ior abuse oI discretion, but under some statutes, a de novo
review is conducted. The reviewing court will give weight to the opinion oI the trial court(FN
I| and will not disturb an exercise oI discretion by the trial court in the absence oI an abuse oI
the court's discretion.| FN2| The appellate court will indulge in reasonable presumptions in
support oI the Iindings oI the trial court on conIlicting evidence|FN3| and in support oI the
judgment appealed Irom.|FN4| Under some statutes, however, dispossession proceedings are
triable de novo on appea1.| FN5) Where there is a trial de novo, the appellate court should
consider the Iacts oI the case (FN6| and render a proper judgment.|FN7| Whether the unlawIul
detainer notice requirement is calculated in accordance with the timing provisions oI the civil
rules is a matter oI statutory interpretation to be reviewed de novo.|FN8| An order granting a
summary eviction under a lease providing Ior periodic rent reserved by the month, or any
shorter period, should be reviewed on appeal based upon the standard oI review Ior an order
granting summary judgment, which is de novo review, because such proceedings are
analogous.(FN9)
|FNl | N.Y.-Metropolitan LiIe Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 43 Misc. 2d 639, 251 N.Y.S.2d 693
(App. Term 1964). |FN2| CaL-Whipple v. Haberle, 223 Cal. App. 2d 477, 36 Cal. Rptr. 9 (5th
Dis!. 1963). Reviewing decision regarding issuance oI a protective order D.C.-Graham v.
Lanier Associates, 19 A.3d 361 (D.C. 2011). Plenary review oI suIIiciency oI notice to quit
Conn.-Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381,973 A.2d 1229 (2009). |FN3| Ala.-Hyde v.
Isbell, 254 Ala. 373,48 So. 2d 465 (1950). IlL-Woodson v. Benson, 330 IiI. App. 248, 70
N.E.2d 742 (1st Dis!. 1947). |FN4|IlI.-Mitchell v. Tyler, 332 III. App. 577, 76 N.E.2d 237 (1st
Dis!. 1947). Mass.-Staples v. Collins, 321 Mass. 449, 73 N.E.2d 729 (1947). |FN5| Ala.-Hyde
v. Isbell, 254 Ala. 373,48 So. 2d 465 (1950). Mo.-Conley v. Dee, 246 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1952). |FN6) Ariz.-Olds Bros. Lumber Co. v. Rushing, 64 Ariz. 199,167 P.2d 394 (1946).
|FN7| Ariz.-Olds Bros. Lumber Co. v. Rushing, 64 Ariz. 199, 167 P.2d 394 (1946). Mo.-Conley
v. Dee, 246 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. C!. App. 1952). |FN8| Wash.-Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wash.
2d 365, 173 P.3d 228 (2007). |FN9| Nev.-Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212,163
P.3d 405 (2007).
52B C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant 1576: 'XII. Reentry and Recovery oI Possession by
Landlord C. Statutory Dispossession Proceedings; Summary Proceedings 7. Appellate
Review 1576. Standard of review West's Key Number Digest, Landlord and Tenant
233k291(18), 315(1), 315(3). Under some statutes, however, dispossession proceedings are
triable de novo on appea1. Ala.-Hyde v. Isbell, 254 Ala. 373,48 So. 2d 465 (1950). Mo.-Conley
v. Dee, 246 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952). Where there is a trial de novo, the appellate court
should consider the Iacts oI the case . Ariz.-Olds Bros. Lumber Co. v. Rushing, 64 Ariz.
199,167 P.2d 394 (1946).| and render a proper judgment. Ariz.-Olds Bros. Lumber Co. v.
Rushing, 64 Ariz. 199, 167 P.2d 394 (1946). Mo.-Conley v. Dee, 246 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. C!.
App. 1952). Whether the unlawIul detainer notice requirement is calculated in accordance with
the timing provisions oI the civil rules is a matter oI statutory interpretation to be reviewed de
novo. Wash.-Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wash. 2d 365, 173 P.3d 228 (2007). An order
granting a summary eviction under a lease providing Ior periodic rent reserved by the month, or
any shorter period, should be reviewed on appeal based upon the standard oI review Ior an
order granting summary judgment, which is de novo review, because such proceedings are
analogous. Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212, 163 P.3d 405 (2007).
|FNl | N.Y.-Metropolitan LiIe Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 43 Misc. 2d 639, 251 N.Y.S.2d 693
(App. Term 1964). |FN2| CaL-Whipple v. Haberle, 223 Cal. App. 2d 477, 36 Cal. Rptr. 9 (5th
Dis!. 1963). Reviewing decision regarding issuance oI a protective order D.C.-Graham v.
Lanier Associates, 19 A.3d 361 (D.C. 2011). Plenary review oI suIIiciency oI notice to quit
Conn.-Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381,973 A.2d 1229 (2009). |FN3| Ala.-Hyde v.
Isbell, 254 Ala. 373,48 So. 2d 465 (1950). IlL-Woodson v. Benson, 330 IiI. App. 248, 70
N.E.2d 742 (1st Dis!. 1947). |FN4|IlI.-Mitchell v. Tyler, 332 III. App. 577, 76 N.E.2d 237 (1st
Dis!. 1947). Mass.-Staples v. Collins, 321 Mass. 449, 73 N.E.2d 729 (1947). |FN5| |FN6)
|FN7| . |FN8| . |FN9| Nev.-
A review oI Judge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order and Bakers 2/24/12 Answering BrieI reveal
the extent to which Judge Flanagan, willing or not, was led down a clearly erroneous path by
Baker and his purposeIully misstatements oI the law, especially as to the 'Standard of Review
applicable to an appeal oI a 'summary eviction. Flanagan writes:
~Standard of Review
On civil appeals Irom justice courts to district courts, a case
"must not be tried anew.' NJCRCP 72(c). Whether on appeal at the
Nevada Supreme Court Irom a district court, or appeal at a district
court Irom a justice court, a lower court's Iindings "will not be
disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous and are not
based on substantial evidence." Gibellini v Klindt, 110 Nev. 1201,
1204,885 P.2d 540, 542 (1994).
"|A|n order granting summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6)
should be reviewed on appeal based upon the standard Ior review oI
an order granting summary judgment under NRC 56 because these
proceedings are analogous." Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123
Nev. 212 215, 163 P.3d 405, 407 (2007). Summary judgment is
proper only iI no genuine issue oI material Iact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oI law. NEV. R.
CIV P. 56(c); see Wood v. SaIeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121
P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). The moving party bears the initial burden oI
proving there is no genuine issue oI material Iact. Main v. Stewart,
109 Nev. 721, 726-27, 857 P.2d 755, 758 (1993).
Once the moving party satisIies this burden, however, the
burden shiIts to the nonmoving party to show the existence oI a
genuine issue oI material Iact. Id. at 727. While the pleading and the
record must be construed in the light most Iavorable to the
nonmoving party, the party must do more than simply show there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the operative Iacts Wood, 121 Nev. at
729. To avoid having summary judgment entered against it, the
party must (page 5) by aIIidavit or otherwise, set Iorth speciIic Iacts
demonstrating the existence oI a genuine issue Ior trial. Id.
Legal Analysis
This Court has reviewed all oI the parties' pleadings and the
exhibits attached thereto This Court also has considered all oI the
parties' relevant arguments. AIter this review and consideration, this
Court will not disturb Judge SIerrazza's October 27, 2011 Order
granting summary eviction. This Court Iinds that Order was based
on substantial evidence and it was no clearly erroneous. Thus, this
Court concludes Merliss has met his initial buraen of proving there
is no genuine issue of material fact regaraing whether Coughlin was
summarily evictea properly. Consequently, the burden shiIts to
Coughlin to show the existence oI a genuine issue oI material Iact.
Although Coughlin raises several claims and makes numerous
allegations in his BrieI Coughlin fails to present additional facts
related to his defenses raised in R1C that undermine or
legitimately call into question the substantial evidence upon which
1udge Sferrazza relied when he granted summary eviction. This
Court gives substantial deference to the lower court's factual
findings in this regard, particularly in light of the numerous
hearings hela before Juage Sferra::a ana Coughlins relatea
opportunities to present eviaence supporting his various aefenses.
ThereIore, this Court finds no genuine issue of material fact exists
regarding whether Coughlin was summarily evicted properly in
the lower court. As a result, Coughlin's appeal is DENIED.

It is entirely unclear why Judge Flanagan's Order indicates:

'~Standard of Review
On civil appeals Irom justice courts to district courts, a case "must not be
tried anew.' NJCRCP 72(c)... when a review oI JNCRCP 72(c) reveals no
such authority. Rather NJCRCP 72(c) reads: '(c)Content oI the Notice oI
Appeal.The notice oI appeal shall speciIy the party or parties taking the
appeal; shall designate the judgment, order or part thereoI appealed Irom;
and shall name the court to which the appeal is taken.
Perhaps Judge Flanagan intended to cite to NJCRCP RULE
76A.POWERS OF DISTRICT COURT ON APPEAL. A case appealed
must not be tried anew. Upon an appeal heard upon the record or a
statement oI the case, the district court may review all orders aIIecting the
judgment appealed from and may set aside, or conIirm, or modiIy, any or
all oI the proceedings subsequent to and dependent upon such judgment,
and may, iI necessary or proper, order a new trial. However, it was not a
'judgment that Coughlin appeal (particulary where Judge SIerrazza ruled
that the 10/25/11 date was not a 'Trial but, rather, a 'continuation oI a
summary eviction proceeding (he made numerous contradictory rulings in
that regard, but the the 10/25/11 'Eviction Decision and Order has one
title, and the 10/27/11 FOFCOL and Order oI Summary Eviction certainly
indicates NJCRCP 109 did not actually come into play. Regardless, Baker,
Coughlin, and Judge Flanagan all cite to Anvui in the Order and their
BrieIs...and Anvui makes extremely clear that appeals oI summary eviction are
reviewed 'de novo, which means 'tried anew, so Judge Flanagan's invocation
oI some rule holding that civil appeals Irom justice courts to district courts, a case
"must not be tried anew is clearly erroneous.
In his 2/24/12 Answering BrieI, Baker writes: 'RESPONDENT'S ANSWERING BRIEF
Respondent, MATT MERLISS ("MERLISS"), by and through his counsel, RICHARD G.
HILL, LTD. and CASEY D. BAKER, ESQ., submits his Answering BrieI. I. STATEMENT OF
THE ISSUES: The only issue in this appeal is whether the Reno Justice Court erred in granting
a summary eviction oI appellant, ZACHARY COUGHLIN ("COUGHLIN") by its Findings oI
Fact, Conclusions oI Law, and Order Ior Summary Eviction ("FFCL&O") dated December
27,201.2. See Record on Appeal ("ROA") at Vol. II, pp. 75-80. EXHIBIT 1 hereto. II.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: Although Coughlin has muddied the record to a spectacular
degree with his abusive Iilings, at its core, this is a simple no-cause residential summary
eviction case. The pertinent Iacts are as Iollows: The underlying Iacts oI the eviction are set
Iorth in the FFCL&O. The statutory notices and other documentary evidence the court relied on
in making its Iindings oI Iact can be Iound at ROA, Vol. V, pp. 85-89; 90-94; 95-109; 113-128.
EXHIBITS 2,3,4 and 5 hereto. The Standard Rental Agreement ("LEASE") Ior the home at 121
River Rock, Reno, Nevada (the "PROPERTY") can be Iound at ROA, Vol. V, pp 129-132.
EXHIBIT 6 hereto. Those Iacts were established during two evidentiary hearings, in which
Coughlin Iully participated. The Iirst hearing was on October 13, 2011, and lasted 90 minutes.
A continuation oIthat hearing occurred on October 25, 2011, and lasted several hours. l The
purpose oIthose hearings was to "determine the truthIulness and suIIiciency oIthe tenant's and
the landlord's aIIidavits," to determine whether there is any "legal deIense as to the alleged
unlawIul detainer," and whether "the tenant is guilty oIan unlawIul detainer".2 Those hearings
were Coughlin's opportunity to substantiate, by competent evidence, any legal deIense he may
have had to the eviction.
The only deIenses raised by Coughlin below were based on what he claimed was "retaliatory"
conduct by Merliss, and "habitability" issues at the property. Both deIenses were based on
provisions oINRS Chapter lISA.3 At the Iirst hearing, Coughlin alleged his deIenses, but did
not oIIer any evidence to support them. Judge SIerrazza could have granted an eviction aIter
that hearing, but .chose instead to allow Coughlin another opportunity to substantiate his
allegations.4 Since Coughlin's deIenses were based on alleged "habitability" issues, the court
required him to deposit, pursuant to NRS 40.355(5), the amount oIrent Coughlin claimed he
had withheld Ior those reasons, beIore he would be allowed to substantiate them with
evidence.s Coughlin ultimately Iailed to raise any material Iactual dispute, and the court
properly granted the eviction. The lockout was perIormed on November I, 2011. Coughlin Iiled
his Iirst notice oIappeal on November 3, 2011.6 On November 13,2011, Coughlin was Iound
living in the basement oI the property, and was arrested.7 Coughlin continues to Iile additional
papers in both courts, wherein he attempts to raise new arguments he never raised below.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW: "|A|n order granting summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6)
should be reviewed on appeal based upon the standard Ior review oI an order granting summary
judgment under NRCP 56 because these proceedings are analogous.,,8 "To successIully deIend
against a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party must transcend the pleadings and,
by aIIidavit or other admissible evidence, introduce speciIic Iacts that show a genuine issue
oImaterial Iact.'"A case appealed must not be tried a new."IO Further, "a |lower court's|
Iindings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous and are not based on
substantial evidence."J 1 "The notice oIappeal shall speciIy the party or parties taking the
appeal; shall designate the judgment, order or part thereoI appealed Irom ...,,12 "Only those
parts oI the judgment which are included in the notice oI appeal will be considered by the
appellate Cuurt.,,!3
IV. ARGUMENT: Despite having Iiled more than 50 pages in two brieIs, Coughlin Iails to
articulate or coherently analyze what he claims to be errors by the justice court. 14 He does not
make so much as a single citation to the ROA, and his Iailure in this regard is sanctionable.15
The Court and Merliss are unIairly leIt to speculate as to the bases Ior his appeal. 16 The
incoherency oI Coughlin's brieIs makes that task nearly impossible. This diIIiculty is
compounded by Coughlin's reIusal to pay Ior a transcript oIthe proceedings below. 17 On or
about February 8, 2012, Coughlin attempted to supplement his opening brieI with a CD that
supposedly contained the audio recordings oIthe hearings below. Not only was this an improper
attempt by Coughlin to circumvent the record on appeal, the CD delivered to the undersigned's
oIIice was so badly damaged, that it would not be opened, even by counsel's IT proIessional.
Because oICoughlin's transgressions, Merliss has been deprived oIthe ability to accurately cite
to the hearing below. As best Merliss can tell, Coughlin alleges the Iollowing errors:
1. Judge SIerrazza mistakenly called the October 25, 2012 hearing a "trial" and required
Coughlin to deposit the withheld rent with the court
Summary eviction hearings are conducted pursuant to NRS 40.253(6). "Formal" eviction
proceedings are conducted pursuant to NRS 40.290 through NRS 40.420. "Formal" eviction
proceedings contemplate the Iiling oI a complaint, an answer, conducting discovery, and a
Iormal "trial.,,18 They can include claims Ior damages by both sides. "Formal" evictions can
either be initiated by the landlord in the Iirst instance, or, where a summary eviction has been
commenced, and the tenant establishes a legal deIense at the hearing, the court must then order
the parties to proceed under those statutes.19
When Judge SIerrazza continued the October 13,2011 hearing, he misspoke and called the
second hearing a "trial." That same word, "trial," was entered into the court's order.20 Coughlin
has seized J.lpon the word "trial" to argue that he should have been aIIorded some Iurther
procedural protections oI the "Iormal" eviction proceedings (mainly, delay). This argument is
nonsense.21 The only way the court could have ordered the parties to proceed with a "Iormal"
eviction is int Iound that Coughlin had raised a legal deIense to the summary eviction.22 Here,
it Iound the opposite.
In ruling Irom the bench, the court explained more than once that the purpose oIthe October 25,
2011 proceeding was to allow Coughlin another opportunity to substantiate the deIenses he had
alleged at the Iirst hearing, because he had not yet done SO.23 The court's order reIlects this, in
that it required Coughlin to deposit the withheld rent iIhe (Coughlin) wished to have another
opportunity to prove up his habitability deIenses. II he Iailed to post the rent, the eviction
would be granted, because he had not established a legal deIense as required by NRS
40.253(6). The court's inadvertent use oIthe word "trial" did not somehow take the case out oI
the summary proceedings, nor could it have, and any argument that it did exalts Iorm over
substance and ignores the clear purpose oIthe order.24 Coughlin knew the October 25,2011
hearing was merely a continuation oIthe Iirst hearing. He knew that there had not been any
Iormal complaint Iiled. There is not one in the record. He recognized, and argued repeatedly,
that all he had to do to deIeat the summary eviction was establish a material Iactual dispute Ior
trial. In Iact, he argues as much in the "statement oIIacts and law" he purports to incorporate in
his Iirst notice oI appea1.25 Coughlin did not explain how he could have possibly been
prejudiced by the court's misstatement, so it is oI no consequence.
As to the rent deposit, NRS 118A.355 speciIically provides that "|a| tenant does not have a
deIense to an eviction under paragraph (d) oIsubsection 1 unless the tenant has deposited the
withheld rentinto an escrow account pursuant to this subsection." Coughlin was attempting to
set up a deIense based on "habitability".26 He had withheld rent in the process, while
purporting to invoke that statute.27 Even though the eviction proceeding was Ior "no-cause,"
and not expressly based on Coughlin's Iailure to pay rent, the court was correct to require him
to deposit what he claimed he had withheld, in order to proceed with his deIense. The statute is
plain on its Iace, and makes logical sense, as well. II Coughlin did not have the rent, and Iailed
to prove his case, the court has, in eIIect, improperly enjoined the landlord's use oI his property.
In any event, the October 13,2011 order was not an appealable order under NJCRCP 72A. For
that reason, it is not properly at issue here. Itis also moot, since the court eventually returned
Coughlin's deposit to him, as discussed Iurther, below.
2. Not Iinding any ambiguity in the lease regarding "weeds"
One "habitability" item alleged by Coughlin was that weeds were growing in the yard. The
court Iound that maintenance oI the surrounding grounds, including any weeds, were
Coughlin's responsibility under paragraph 22 oI the Lease.28 That paragraph provides in part
that "Tenant will irrigate and maintain any surrounding grounds, including lawns and
shrubbery, iI they are Ior the Tenant's exclusive use."29 Itis undisputed that the yard at the
property was Ior Coughlin's exclusive use. The Lease is unambiguous, and the court's Iinding
was correct. Moreover, "weeds" do not constitute a "habitability" issue under NRS 118A.290,
in any event, and Coughlin never presented any evidence that they did, or that he complied
with the statutory protocol Ior withholding, or had any right to withhold, any rent Ior that, or
any other alleged "habitability" issue.3o
3. Granting a no-cause summary eviction against a "commercial" tenant
Coughlin now argues that he was a "commercial" tenant, and thereIore not subject to summary
eviction. He Iirst raised this argument in his "opposition to motion Ior order to show cause,"
which he Iiled on December 5, 2011, six weeks aIter the eviction was granted?1 Merliss
addressed it in his reply Iiled the Iollowing day.32 First, Coughlin has the law wrong. Summary
evictions are available against a tenant oI any property that is subject to NRS Chapter 11SA,
which Merliss' property unquestionably was.33 Second, Coughlin aIIirmatively waived any
argument that NRS Chapter lI8A does not apply by basing his entire deIense
(retaliation/habitability) on what he alleged were violations oI that chapter.34 Moreover,
because the court adopted Coughlin's position and ruled on that basis, he is judicially estopped
Irom changing his theory now.35 Additionally, since Coughlin never timely raised the argument
below, it cannot Iorm the basis Ior any relieI on appeal.36 In any event, Coughlin has not cited
to anywhere in the ROA that would support this new argument, and neither this Court nor the
court below are or were obligated to siIt through the record in search oIsome Iact which might
support his claim.37 Finally, even iI Coughlin were running one or more unlicensed businesses
out oIt he property, he does not explain how that would take this matter out oINRS Chapter
l18A.
4. Not holding a hearing on Coughlin's motion to contest personal property lien within 10
The FFCL&O was entered on October 27, 2011. Coughlin's Iirst notice oIappeal was Iiled on
November 3,2011. Coughlin Iiled his Iirst motion to contest persona| property lien on
November 16,2011.38 NRS 40.253(8) provides that a hearing on that motion must be set within
10 days aIter the motion is Iiled. However, Coughlin reIused to cooperate with court staII to set
the hearing he requested, so it did not take place within 10 days.39 Then, on November 23,
2011, Coughlin inexplicably Iiled another notice oIappea1.4o What is important Ior this court's
purposes is that neither notice oIappeal identiIies any perceived error regarding the court's
procedure in setting a hearing on that collateral matter. Nor is such an "issue" appealable under
NJCRCP 72A. As such, this "issue" is inappropriate Ior the court's consideration here.41
5. Not granting Coughlin a stay
Coughlin was granted in Iorma pauperis ("IFP") status by the Reno Justice Court on October 6,
2011.42 IFPstatus only applies to the trial level oI litigation, not to appeals. 43 Accordingly, iI
he wished to stay the enIorcement oI the FFCL&O and stop the lockout, he was required to
post a supersedeas bond, and obtain an order granting a stay, beIore the lockout occurred.
As to the bond requirement, since this case was not a "Iormal" eviction, NJCRCP 73A(a)(1)
(4) do not apply. Instead, this case Ialls underthe "catchall" provision at the end oI subsection
(a) oI that Rule, which provides in pertinent part "In cases not provided Iorin (1), (2), (3) or (4)
above, the giving oIan appeal bond, under the provisions oI Rule 73, shall stay proceedings in
the court below upon the judgment or order appealed Irom ... except where the appellate court
may otherwise direct upon such terms as it may in its discretion impose.,,44 NJCRCP 73
provides that "The bond or equivalent security shall be in the sum or value oI $250 unless the
justice court Iixes a diIIerent amount." (Emphasis added). NRS 40.385(1) provides that a stay
may be obtained by posting a bond in the amount oI $250.00 with the trial court.
Coughlin deposited $2,275 with the court pursuant to NRS 1 18A.355 and the court's order
oIOctober 13,2011. He orally moved the court Ior a stay oIthe eviction at the end oIthe October
25, 2011 hearing, but did not cite any authority Ior his request. Accordingly, that motion was
denied.45 Thus, although the court ordered that Coughlin's deposit would serve as his appeal
bond, it denied a stay because Coughlin did not provide the court with any basis to grant one,
as was his legal responsibility. Then, at Coughlin's speciIic request, the court held an
emergency hearing on November 7,2011, where it amended the FFCL&O and returned all sums
on deposit to Coughlin, as he was clamoring. The court then set the supersedeas bond at
$2,700.00, as it was entitled to do.46 Coughlin now argues that he should have been granted a
stay oIthe eviction because he had Iunds on deposit with the court at the time oI the lockout.
Even iI he would have been entitled to that relieI, that position is inconsistent with his prior
demands that all oI his deposit be returned to him, and he is judicially estopped Irom arguing it
now.47 IICoughlin wanted to apply those Iunds to a super-sedeas bond under
JCRCP 73A or NRS 40.385, he should have either made that request at the October 25, 2011
hearing when the eviction was announced, or sometime between that hearing and the lockout a
week later. He never did so. In Iact, he did just the opposite. When Coughlin Iiled his "motion
Ior stay'~48 on October 31,2011, in which he demanded his deposit back49, the lockout had
not even occurred. That conIirms that Coughlin had no intention oIposting a bond. or applying
those Iunds in order to obtain a stay. He cannot be heard to argue otherwise now. Then, aIter he
received his deposit back, he did not deposit any additional Iunds with the court until on or
about December 8, 2011 when he Iinally paid the Iiling Ieeto perIect his appeal. ThereaIter, on
December 14,2011, he posted $250.00 Ior his appeal bond, and $1.00 Ior his "supersedeas
bond" (which sums he has subsequently moved to have returned to him).50 By then, his request
Ior a stay had been moot Ior approximately six weeks.
6. SheriII's removal oItenant "within 24 hours oIreceipt oIthe Order."
Coughlin tries to imply some sort oI wrongdoing in relation to the lockout in this case on page
1 oIhis second opening brieI. But he does not inIorm the court to which "order" he is reIerring
that provided Ior a lockout "within 24 hours," or what, exactly, his argument is. 51 In this case,
the court announced the eviction at the hearing on October 25, 2011.52 That eviction was not
eIIective until aIter
5 :00 p.m. on October 31, 2011, six days later. This was conIirmed in the FFCL&O signed by
the court on October 27,2011. Coughlin was locked out on November 1,2011. This "argument"
is Irivolous, unsupporte , nonsenslca ,an cannot 10rm t e aSls lOr any re Ie ere.
7. The trial Court's Application oINRS 118A.490
Coughlin complains that it was reversible error Ior the "trial court" to apply NRS 118A.490. He
does not cite to anywhere in the ROA to support his allegation that that statute was ever applied
by the court.53 In Iact, it never was. The justice court applied NRS 118A.355(5). This
"argument" is oI no moment.
8. The Security Deposit.
Coughlin alleges that Merliss has not returned or accounted Ior the security deposit under the
Lease. He has not cited to anywhere in the ROA to substantiate that allegation. 54 He does not
explain how the security deposit has anything to do with the underlying no-cause eviction, or
how the lower court erred in relation to it.55 Coughlin wants to discuss what he thinks is a
claim Ior damages, but neither this Court nor the court below have or had jurisdiction to even
consider the matter. 56
V. CONCLUSION: Despite two opportunities to do so, Coughlin Iailed to meet his burden
below to introduce, by aIIidavit or other admissible evidence, speciIic Iacts that show a genuine
issue oI material Iact. As such, the justice court properly granted the summary eviction based
on the evidence beIore it; namely, the Lease, the statutory notices served by Merliss, and the
testimony adduced at the hearings. Coughlin has not met his burden here to show that any oIthe
court's Iindings were clearly erroneous and not based on substantial evidence. The "arguments"
he presents in his brieIs are nonsensical, and,. Ior the most part, untimely, not properly
preserved or beIore this court, and derived Irom unappealable activity below. None oI
Coughlin's arguments are supported by any citation to the record. As such, he has not given this
court any evidentiary or legal basis to overturn any ruling by the lower court. What Coughlin
really wants to do is relitigate the case here, which is not permitted. Coughlin is not entitled to
any relieI, and his appeal must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, Merliss prays that Coughlin take nothing by way oI his appeal; that same be
dismissed in its entirety; and that the judgment oI the lower court, including its order oI
December 27, 2011, be aIIirmed; that Merliss be awarded his Iees and costs oI this appeal in
accordance with NRS 69.050; that Coughlin be held in contempt oI court as prayed Ior in
Merliss' motion Ior order to show cause, Iiled herein on January 20, 2012; and Ior such other,
Iurther and additional relieIas seems just to the court in the premises. /s/ Casey D. Baker
2/24/12
ENDNOTES
1.See FFCL&O at 1
2.NRS 40.253(6). FFCL&O at 4, ,3.
3.See FFCL&O at 3,,9 et seq. See, also, ROA, Vol. I, pp. 238-266; ROA, Vol. V, pp. 194-198.
4.NRS 40.253(6).
5.ROA, Vol.l, p. 153.
6.. ROA Vol. III, pp. 229-233. 7 ROA, Vol. III, pp. 18-33.
7.Anvui, LLC v G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212,215,163 P.3d 405 (2007).
8.Torrealba v. Kesmitis, 124 Nev. 95, 178 P.3d 716 (2008).
9.NJCRCP 76A.
10.Gibellini v. Klindt, 110 Nev. 1201, 1204,885 P.2d 540 (1994) (emphasis added).
11.NJCRCP 72( c).
12.Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Bibb, 76 Nev. 332, 335, 353 P.2d 458 (1960).
14.Please see Merliss' counter-motion to strike excess pages, Iiled herein on February 9,2012.
II the court is going to consider anything beyond the Iirst Iive pages Iiled by Coughlin, Merliss
speciIically requests leave to Iile a supplemental brieIto meet those arguments.
15. See NRAP 28(a)(8) and (e). See also, Weddell v. Stewart, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 58,261 P.3d
1080, 1084 (Sept. 29,2011) (" ...it is imperative that the parties Iollow the applicable procedural
rules and that they comply in a timely Iashion with |the court's| directives."); and Smith v.
Emery, 109 Nev. 737, 743, 856 P.2d 1386 (1993).
13.CI., Schuck v. Signature Flight Support oINevada, Inc., 126 Nev. (Adv.Op. 42),245 P.3d
542,544-545 (Nov. 4, 2010) (the court is "not obligated to wade through and search the entire
record Ior some speciIic Iacts which might support the nonmoving party's claim.") CI.,
NJCRCP 74(b).
18.Id
19 See NRS 40.253(6).
1.ROA, Vol. I, p. 153.
2.21.
3.See, NJCRCP 104 ("Prior to the holding oI a hearing Ior summary eviction, the justice shall
determine the method oI service oInotice oI the hearing on both parties.")
4.22.
5.NRS 40.253(6).
6.23.
7.Coughlin's unexplained and unexcused reIusal to pay Ior a transcript makes it impossible to
cite Judge SIerrazza's statements with precision.
8.24.
9.Accord, Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424,427,996 P.2d 416 (2000) (the important inquiry is
on "what the order or judgment actually does, not on what it is called.")(emphasis in original).
10.25.
11.ROA, Vol. III, pp. 230-233.
12.26.
13.NRS 118A.355(l)(d). ROA, Vol. I, pp. 238-266.
14.27. Id.
15.28.
16.See FFLC&O at ~'11-11.1.
17.29.
18.EXHIBIT 6 at 2, ,22.
19.30. FFCL&O at '~12-12.l.
20.31.
21.ROA, Vol. IV, pp. 253-261.
22.32.
23.See, "Supplemental Justice Court Appeal Proceedings," at 2, Iiled herein on January 4,
2012. Merliss' reply is identiIied as item number 4. For reasons unknown, copies oIthose
documents were not made available to Merliss through the court's electronic Iiling system.
24.33.
25.NRS 40.254.
26.34.
27.See FFCL&O beginning at ,9. See, also, ROA, Vol. I, pp. 238-266.
28.35.
29.Marcuse v. Del Webb Communities, 123Nev. 278, 163 P.3d 462 (2007).
30.36.
31.Schuck. The lower court recognized as much at the December 20,2011 hearing on
Coughlin's motion to contest personal property lien. For that hearing, Merliss had subpoenaed
Darlene Sharpe, the real estate agent who had Iacilitated the rental oIthe property to Coughlin,
to testiIy in the event the court was going to allow Coughlin to belatedly argue this issue. ROA,
Vol. VI, p.183. At that hearing, Judge SIerrazza appropriately recognized that Coughlin was
improperly attempting to relitigate the eviction based on previously unraised arguments, and
did not let the parties address or present any evidence on the matter. Ms. Sharpe was prepared
to testiIy that (1) Coughlin never mentioned that he was an attorney, or that he had either a "law
practice" or a "mattress business,"
32.(2) that Coughlin had represented himselI on his rental application as a "selI-employed
researcher," and (3) that Coughlin had surreptitiously altered the lease to allow Ior
"commercial" use oI the property. See, Reply in Support oI Motion Ior Order to Show Cause,
identiIied as item number 4 in the Supplemental Justice Court Appeal Proceedings, Iiled herein
on January 4, 2012.
33.37. Schuck.
34.38.
35.ROA, Vol. III, pp. 153-160.
36.39.
37.ROA, Vol. IV, pp.2, 22-23.
38.40.
39.ROA, Vol. III, p. 5.
40.41. Reno Newspapers, Inc.
41.42. ROA, Vol. I, pp. 274-275.
42.43 NRS 12:015. Casper v. Huber, 85 Nev. 474,456 P.2d 436 (1969).
43.44 NJCRCP 73A(a).
44.45 ROA, Vol. II, pp. 85,2.
45.46. ROA, Vol III, pp. 218-219; Vol. II, pp. 4,27.
46.46. ROA, Vol III, pp. 218-219; Vol. II, pp. 4,27.
47. Marcuse.
48. ROA, Vol. II, p. 3.
49. ROA, Vol. II, pp. 4, 27
50. ROA, Vol. IV, pp. 210-211.
51. CI., Schuck.
52. ROA, Vol. II, p. 85.
53. CI., Schuck
54. CI., Schuck.
55. CI., Gibellini.
56. NJCRCP 76A, Reno Newspaper, Inc.; NRS 40.253(6).
'NJCRCP RULE76B.TIMETABLE GOVERNING APPEALS FROM JUSTICE COURTS
Appeal, civil:
Within 20 days oI service oI written notice oI entry oI judgment or order appealed Irom. Rule
72B(a).

Enlargement oI time Ior appeals:
Time Ior taking appeal may be enlarged by timely motion Ior:
(1)Judgment under Rule 50(b).
(2)Additional or amended findings of fact under Rule 52(b).
(3)Altering or amending judgment under Rule 59.
(4)New trial under Rule 59.
The time Ior taking appeal commences anew upon entry oI an order granting or denying any oI
the above motions. Rule 72B(b).

Appeal Irom
Iormal eviction:
Within 10 days oI service oI entry oI order. NRS 40.380; Rule 73A(4).

Fees:
Payable upon Iiling notice oI appeal. Rule 74B(a)(1).

Bond Ior costs:
Filed with notice oI appeal. Rule 73.

Bond, supersedeas:
At or aIter time oI Iiling notice oI appeal. Stay is eIIective when bond Iiled. Rule 73A.

Transcript oI proceedings:
Appellant must order within 10 days oI notice oI appeal. Transcript must be prepared by
reporter within 30 days aIter receipt oI Iorm letter Irom clerk, except 30-day extension may be
granted. Rule 74(b)(1).

Transmission and docketing oI record on appeal:
Within 30 days aIter perIection oI appeal, unless shortened or extended. Where multiple
appeals are taken, within 30 days aIter perIection oI the Iinal appeal. Rule 74A(a).

Enlargement or shortening oI time Ior transmission and docketing record on appeal:
Time may be extended by the justice court not more than 60 days Irom Iiling oI Iirst notice oI
appeal, or by the district court Ior additional time, provided orders oI extension are made beIore
expiration oI last previous time. The justice court or the district court may order the time Ior
transmission and docketing to be shortened. Rule 74A(d).

Record Ior preliminary determination:
On any oI the Iollowing motions, a party may docket in the district court such parts oI the
original record as the person requests, prior to docketing the complete record on appeal:

(1)Motion to dismiss appeal.

(2)Motion Ior stay pending appeal.

(3)Motion Ior additional security Ior bond on appeal or supersedeas bond.

(4)Motion Ior any intermediate order. Rule 74A(e).

BrieIs:
II ordered, appellant`s opening brieI; within 30 days aIter the record is Iiled. Respondent`s
answering brieI; within 30 days aIter service oI the opening brieI. Appellant`s reply brieI, iI
any; within 15 days oI service oI respondent`s answering brieI. Rule 75(a), 75(b)(2).

Oral argument:
In all cases, unless otherwise ordered by the district court. Rule 75A.
'RULE76.DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE OF APPELLANT TO COMPLY WITH RULES

(a)II the appellant shall Iail to cause timely transmission oI the record as provided in Rule
74A, or, iI required, to timely Iile an opening brieI, or to post the undertaking as required by
Rule 73 or 73A, or to arrange Ior a transcript as required by Rule 74, and 74A, or the payment
of filing fees as required by Rule 74B, unless exempt, or upon a showing that any other
necessary steps have not been taken, the appeal may be dismissed by the district court upon a
motion oI any respondent or upon its own motion at the cost oI the appellant. Prior to the
granting oI the dismissal, the appellant shall be given written notice oI the motion to dismiss.
The motion shall be supported by a certiIicate oI the clerk or justice oI the justice court,
showing the date and substance oI the judgment or order Irom which the appeal was taken, the
date on which the notice oI appeal was Iiled, the expiration date oI any order extending the
time Ior transmitting the record, and prooI oI service. The notice oI the motion to dismiss may
be mailed or delivered to the appellant or the appellant`s attorney. The appellant may respond in
writing within 7 days oI such service, showing good cause, iI any, why the motion should not
be granted. The district court clerk shall docket the appeal Ior the limited purpose oI permitting
the district court to entertain the motion without requiring payment oI the Iiling Iee, but the
appellant shall not be permitted to respond without payment oI the Iee unless the person is
otherwise exempt thereIrom. The district court, with or without allowing a response Irom the
respondent, shall grant the motion to dismiss iI good cause is not shown. II satisIied as to good
cause Ior the delay, the district court shall allow the appeal to continue upon such terms as it
may order.

(b)II any respondent shall Iail to timely Iile an answering brieI, such Iailure may be treated
by the district court as a conIession oI error and suIIicient grounds Ior reversal oI the judgment
or order appealed Irom.

XI.GENERAL PROVISIONS
NJCRCP RULE81.APPLICABILITY IN GENERAL (a)To What Proceedings
Applicable.These rules do not govern procedure and practice in any special statutory
proceeding insofar as they are inconsistent or in conflict with the procedure and practice
provided by the applicable statute.

NJCRCP 81(b)ChieI Justices oI the Peace.Rule 84, relating to chief justices of the
peace, shall apply to all proceedings in the justice courts, whether criminal, civil or
otherwise.
NRS 40.385 presents just such a 'special statutory proceeding (in combination with
NRS 40.253, .254. As such NJCRCP 73, 73A(a)(4), 73B, etc. do not even apply as to the stay
issue, to the extent NRS 40.385 covers the situation, which it does.
Judge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order 'borrows heavily Irom Baker's Answering BrieI
(similar to how Judge SIerrazza's 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE was actually created by Baker
himselI...and signed by Judge SIerrazza less than Iour hours aIte Baker submitted it, late (such
was due on 10/26/11 at noon, and Baker did not provide his propose FOFCOLOSE until noon
on 10/27/11 to either the RJC or Coughlin). Regardless, Coughlin
NJCRCP RULE83.RULES BY JUSTICE COURTS: 'Each justice or justice court in a
township with more than one justice, by action oI a majority oI the justices thereoI, may Irom
time to time make and amend the rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules.
Copies oI rules and amendments so made by any justice court shall upon their promulgation be
Iurnished to the Supreme Court, but shall not become effective until after approval by the
Supreme Court and publication. In all cases not provided for by these rules the justice
courts may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules.
NJCRCP RULE84.CHIEF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE:
'(a)Election.In any township having three or more justices oI the peace, the justices
shall annually elect one oI their number to serve as chieI justice oI the peace Ior that township.
The election shall take place between November 15 and December 1 oI each year, and the chieI
justice oI the peace so elected shall begin to serve on the Iirst Monday in January oI the next
year. Any incumbent justice oI the peace who will not be returning to oIIice the next year
(because oI retirement, resignation, Iailure to be reelected, or other reason) shall not be eligible
to vote in the election Ior chieI justice oI the peace. Any person who has been elected to take
oIIice as justice oI the peace shall be eligible to vote in the election Ior chieI justice oI the
peace. Except with the unanimous consent oI the justices oI the peace in a township, no chieI
justice oI the peace shall serve more than 2 successive one-year terms.
(b)Responsibilities.The chieI justice oI the peace in a township shall:
(1)Be responsible Ior the administration oI court rules and regulations.
(2)Consider and rule on any ex parte applications Ior orders in cases which have not
been assigned.
(3)Hear or reassign emergency matters when the assigned justice is absent or
otherwise unavailable.
(4)Designate another justice to perIorm the duties oI chieI justice oI the peace when
the chieI justice oI the peace is absent.
(5)Oversee all administrative and clerical work and Iunctions oI the court as set Iorth
in NRS Chapter 4.
(6)Call and preside over meetings with the other justices oI that township, as oIten as
may be deemed necessary by the chieI justice oI the peace, to discuss and set policy on
procedures, planning, caseload distribution, judicial training, vacations, court improvements,
personnel and any other matters oI beneIit or concern to the court.
IX.CIVIL APPEALS FROM JUSTICE COURTS RULE72.APPEALHOW TAKEN: '
(c)Content oI the Notice oI Appeal.The notice oI appeal shall speciIy the party or parties
taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment, order or part thereoI appealed Irom; and shall
name the court to which the appeal is taken.
Judge Flanagan appears to make the same 'mistake that Judge SIerrazza did in 1708.
That consists oI relying upon the twisted, Iraudulent mistatements oI the law that Baker and
Hill call lawyering, then overreacting to the human displays oI emotions by the opposing
attorney/litigant, and engaging in what some might say appears to be a transparent display oI
'inadvertent errors oI law borne oI a retaliatory animus. At the end oI the day, however, these
judges are busy and have heavy case loads. They are somewhat entitled to rely upon the
representations as to law and Iacts made to them by the attorneys appearing beIore them.
However, Judge SIerrazza could nto rely upon Baker and Merliss's declaration that the lease
had 'expired or 'terminated given the 'term in the agreement was Ior '12 months. (OI
course, the 'term in the lease was Ior 'no less than 12 months, and there was no 'deIined
termination date to be Iound in paragraph 2 oI the lease where paragraph 20 indicated such a
deIined date would aIIect the holdover/termination status oI the lease. Further, Judge SIerrazza
may have relied upon Baker's indicating that he elicited testimony Irom Merliss that spoke to
all that contained in Baker's 10/19/11 Declaration (which Baker purported to contain everything
required by NRS 40.254(2)). However, reliance upon Baker's purposeIully misleading
approach there (in violation oI RPC 3.3, 3.4, etc.) caused Judge SIerrazza to miss the part
where Merliss Iailed to Iile any landlord's aIIidavit/declaration (or even testiIy) to the
requirement that he swear that his claim Ior relieI was authorized by law, per NRS 40.254(2).
As it turns out, Merliss's claim was not authorized by law in that the lease was never
terminated, as any attempt to notice Coughlin on the termination oI the lease was deIicient,
owing largely to a Iraudulent attempt by Baker to avoid having the language oI the lease
agreement that was so clearly negative to his client's positions respective oI whether any
retaliation occurred (especially with respect to his client's liability Ior the actions oI Green
Action Lawn Service and Darlene Sharpe), his client's liability Ior the utility bill (given the
standing orders and NV Energy's policies), the set-oII required by NRS 118A.390 incident to
the unlawIul interuption oI essential services, etc.). Further Baker wished to avoid prolonging
Iurther the summary eviction approach he initially took in 1492 (Irom which Baker
Iraudulently submitted a Memorandum oI Costs Ior in another case, 1708), but dropped, largely
due to his mistakes and inexperience causing delays and excessive Iees.
In his zeal to avoid havign the lease agreement 'renew on its terms or continue
indeIinitely (the lease is ambiguous in that regard, and Baker's invoking NRS 40.251 rather
than NRS 40.250 (as Judge SIerrazza indicated was required or at issue) is telling. So, Baker
and Merliss lied to Judge SIerrazza about whether the lease was expired and as to the actual
term oI the lease. Judge SIerrazza prejudiced Coughlin by essentially bootstrapping the
notice Coughlin was provided in the nonpayment summary eviction in 1492 to the no cause
summary evictino in 1708. However, those are rather diIIerent theories oI law involved. As
such, there was no real notice to be bootstrapped, and the underlying rationale behind such
notice requirements (like those in NJCRCP 109, and 108) is to aIIord parties and their attorneys
an opportunity to build their cases Irom a legal and Iactual perspective (and maybe to move
their belongings out while also so preparing Ior a hearing). Given Judge SIerrazza's reIusal to
accord Coughlin the required twenty days to respond to a properly Iiled and served Summons
and Complaint under NJCRCP 109 (an per NRS 40.253(6)), Coughlin was unable to
suIIiciently prepare Ior the 10/25/11 'Trial. Additionally, there exists no authority Ior Judge
SIerrazza's position that he could convert a summary eviction proceeding to a 'Trial (as he did
in his 10/13/11 Order), and continue to retain the NRS 118A.355(5) escrow deposit he required
oI Coughlin, plus add on another new requirement that Coughlin deposit, on November 1
st
,
2011, the rent Ior November, as a condition oI Coughlin being aIIorded the procedural
protections oI NJCRCP 109 and NRS 40.253(6). How about, Iirst, having Merliss signed on
the dotted line oI a Complaint, and get a Summons issued, then served on Coughlin, the aIIord
Coughlin an opportunity to Iile an Answer, rather than demanding Coughlin submit to some sua
sponte interrogation by Judge SIerrazza as to whether and how much rent he owes Merliss,
even in the Iace oI Baker insisting all that was up Ior the court's inspection was possessio oI the
premises. As Coughlin indicated on 10/25/11, reserving his objections to Judge SIerrazza's
essentially requiring Coughlin to pled non-payment, and placing the burden on Coughlin to
then show the he did actually Iail to so pay his rent... 'those are Iatual issues, Your Honor.
Indeed, that is very true considering the extent to which Merliss admitted to a novation oI any
laibility Coughlin had as to Coughlin's Iormer co-tenant, Melissa Ulloa, taking Coughlin's
rental contributions Ior May and June 2011 and surreptiously Iailing to Iorward them to Merliss
along with her part oI her own Ior May and all oI her share Ior June 2011.