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Dan Marcus
From: Sent: To: Christine Healey Thursday, April 29, 2004 10:26 AM Dan Marcus

Subject: FW: Pre-Meeting for Ridge meeting Dan - Here are Warren's questions - they cover lots of bases. Also Bill Johnstone suggested we ask Ridge about changes in the one-size-fits-all threat alert system and other general questions about making the public appropriately aware of risks. Today's story about bioterrorism was interesting. DHS was criticized for keeping too much information secret and not educating and preparing the public. Chris Original Message From: Warren Bass Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 9:56 AM To: Christine Healey Cc: Mike Hurley Subject: FW: Pre-Meeting for Ridge meeting

Here you go, Chris—sorry to be late on this. (Was stuck in writing hell yesterday, and it just slipped my addled mind.) Ridge isn't a huge deal for us, but we've got a few things. Our basic question is: how does DHS lash up with the rest of the post-9/ii CT structure? Beyond that: • • • • • • • • • • • How does Ridge interact with other principals? Who has the lead during an alert? Who does what? What stovepipes still persist? How far are we from having a functioning, truly integrated DHS? Our impression is that it's still a mess. How does DHS interact with the NSC, including OCX and what's become of the CSG? How does Ridge interact with Fran Townsend at NSC? How does the White House Homeland Security Council interact with DHS? What's right/wrong with this system? How does DHS receive, consume, analyze, and use intel? What's Ridge's daily intel take? How does the DHS budget process work? How does the DHS oversight process work? How much of Ridge's time is spent before congressional committees? • Does DHS have an ability to do "red team" planning? How does it try to anticipate attacks and identify vulnerabilities?

4/29/2004

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Lorry Fenner
From: Sent: To: Cc: Lloyd Salvetti Thursday, April 29, 2004 1:16 PM Lorry Fenner; Christine Healey Team 2

Subject: RE: Pre-Meeting for Ridge meeting Chris: In addition to the points Lorry raises in her note I have two Q's for possible use with Ridge: 1.) In our interview of Hughes he said that DHS/IA has no automated data handling system, no data base for common use and no data mining tools although DHS/IA has full connectivity with the intelligence and defense communities. What is his plan and priority for acquiring the IT systems that will enable DHS to integrate and analyze intelligence information from all sources? (I think the bigger question is: what are his IT priorities for DHS, what is his timetable and does he have the resources (both people and $$$) to accomplish his objectives?) 2.) Hughes said that the flow of information from the intelligence and law enforcement community is "not as good as it could be" requiring DHS/IA to "pull" information from those communities rather than having it "pushed" to DHS. What are the biggest obstacles to carrying out his mission has he encountered in his department's relationships with the intelligence and law enforcement communities, especially the CIA, TTIC and then FBI? Who has the responsibility for communication of threat information to state/local officials - DHS or the FBI? Who has the responsibility for communication of threat information to the private sector - DHS or the FBI? Good luck, Lloyd —Original Message— From: Lorry Fenner Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 11:01 AM To: Christine Healey Cc: Team 2 Subject: FW: Pre-Meeting for Ridge meeting At the April hearing, the relationship between DHS/IA, TTIC, CTC and FBI's CTD is still unclear, can you clarify what is the value added of DHS/IA for you/the department and to the national security in general? Does DHS/IA get all the information it needs from TTIC, CIA, FBI, state and local LE? Again at the hearing, this was unclear, who has responsibility for operational and strategic level warning (as opposed to tactical) to the President and senior leaders, and to ensure action is taken. Today would the FAA, INS, HHS, CDC, Port Authority, etc, take more appropriate measures in the months and years (as opposed to the days) before a 9/11 based on IAIP and DHS work/activities? If the Intelligence Community was reorganized or new DNI installed what would be the impact on DHS and specifically on IAIP? Thank you

5/12/2004

Questions for Secretary Ridge

1. What is the value of the Homeland Security Council in the day to day activities of the Department, especially the border security issues? Help or hindrance? 2. Are you confident that Congress will stick by US VISIT and mandate and fund the program that you think is needed? , ^,^-01^^- <v/^^ ~ £h£a -rV. M!^ f 3. Do you envision that the eventual US VISIT-based border screening system ~ which would encompass the border process from visa through naturalization — would also incorporate TSA information on passenger travel? 4. Deputy Secretary Loy told us that he thought a bjorder policy group at the Deputy Secretary level would be useful to coordinateCCjS1 and(^TS interests, and technology issues that transcend the individual agenciesT^Vhat is the status of building a policy unit? \

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5. What do you see as the overall mission of ICE at DHS?

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6. As you know we learned that a legacy INS inspector was the only inspector to turn away a potential hijacker. He did so based on an intimate knowledge of immigration law, backed up by supervisors versed in immigration law. Are you concerned that virtually all senior field positions have been assigned to legacy Customs officials who are not trained in immigration law and yet are responsible decisions on removals such as Kahtani's? 7. What do you see as the biggest obstacles to further collaboration with Canada, Mexico and the Europeans on border security issues?

Commission's eleventh public hearing on "Emergency Response " May 18-19, 2004 New School University in New York City Questions for Tom Ridge, Secretary of Homeland Security 1. Has DHS developed a methodology for identifying emergency preparedness requirements! Have threats been identified, capabilities for addressing threats determined and requirements generated for establishing or gaining access to necessary capabilities? What do emergency responders need to be prepared for - beyond local fires, hazmat incidents or natural disasters? 2. What is DHS doing to promote what is called a regional approach to emergency preparedness and response? a. Has a strategy for regionalization been developed to encourage states to organize intra-regionally as a sustainable way to manage emergency response resources? b. Is DHS requiring all states to submit statewide mutual assistance plans as a requirement for receiving homeland security grants? c. DHS has allocated or awarded over $8 billion to assist and equip our nation's first responders, how is this money tracked to ensure it furthers a regional approach and enhances regional capabilities rather than limited parochial interests? Are grants being structured to reward the pooling of assets across jurisdictional lines? d. How might DHS foster a regionalization strategy that would allow for maximum coverage and adequate redundancy within a state? 3. Integrating the federal government with state governments in a coordinated way in order to bring resources to bear against any given disaster has always been our single biggest challenge. In addition to a National Response Plan (NRP) and a National Incident Management System (NIMS), what is being done to address this integration concern? a. Who is in charge at the federal level during the next terrorist attack - DHS, DoJ acting through the FBI, or DoD acting through NORTHCOM? Have the appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination been established between you and the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense? 4. Some states have combined their emergency management agency and homeland security department into one department (such as Iowa). Other states have two separate departments (such as Alabama). Are you concerned that a bifurcation of emergency management and homeland security is taking place, which may create an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy and impede effective command, control and coordination during an actual disaster, particularly a terrorist incident? a. Who is in charge at the state and local level - emergency management directors, homeland security directors, or public health directors? And do they know who to communicate with at the federal level?

Commission's eleventh public hearing on "Emergency Response " May 18-19, 2004 New School University in New York City 5. How does DHS balance concern for terrorism versus other types of threats and hazards? Are we becoming fixated on terrorism so much at we "Can't see the forest through the trees" when it comes to a future natural disaster? Is the "all hazards " approach to emergency management still valid in a post-9/11 world or is a "terrorism-centric " approach now necessary? a. Is the recent move by DHS of the Firefighters Grant Program from FEMA to the Office for Domestic Preparedness indicative of a more "terrorism-centric " approach to emergency management? FEMA does oversee the U.S. Fire Administration. 6. What national guidelines exist for determining the burden-sharing between the federal government and state and local jurisdictions? Of course primary responsibility for funding normal levels of emergency preparedness and public health rest with state and local jurisdictions, but what federal funds are available to cover the costs of meeting a national standard in response to the national security threat posed by terrorism? Does Congress currently, or is there any chance that Congress will accompany authorizations for emergency responder assistance grants with budget authority for sustaining those grants through at least two fiscal years in order to provide sustained multiyear funding for state and local governments? 8. What is being done to allow states greater flexibility in using past homeland security funding? Are you currently able to grant a state a waiver of federal guidelines in order for states to better allocate resources according to their most urgent needs? 9. Do DHS's new technical specifications for a baseline interoperable communications system eliminate the need for first responders to have CPAS (Cellular Priority Access Service)? 10. Have you given consideration to moving the Office of Domestic Preparedness (OOP) from the Bureau of Border and Transportation to the Office of State and Local Government Coordination? Would not such a move help consolidate oversight of grants to emergency responders with your office - the Office of the Secretary? 11. Have you given consideration to establishing within DHS a National Institute for Best Practices in Emergency Preparedness to promote a universal best practices/ lessons learned knowledge base? Where can first responders currently go for such information? 12. What's the status of TOPOFF, DHS's comprehensive national program for exercise? What's next after TOPOFF 2, which was completed last May? a. What are the most important lessons you've learned from these exercises? 13. Is DHS looking at expanding the capacity of existing training facilities involved in the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium or identifying any new training facilities for emergency responders that may be required?

Commission's eleventh public hearing on "Emergency Response " May 18-19, 2004 New School University in New York City 14. Why did it take 5 months to fill the vacancy for Director, Office of National Capital Region Coordination? What constraints did DHS face in filling this position? 15. Has Congress effectively streamlined the number of committees overseeing DHS? Or do 88 committees and subcommittees continue to have jurisdiction over pieces of your department?

Questions for Ridge on Visa Policy and Relations with State 1. Background: Section 428 of the HSA vests in the Secretary the authority to control visa policy administered by State Department consular officers, and to post DHS personnel at "each diplomatic and consular post at which visas are issued." We have been told that DHS/ICE personnel in Saudi Arabia overseeing consular work are doing little more than checking records in DHS databases. Does the Secretary see this work as important for homeland security, how does the Secretary envision the use of such overseas DHS personnel over the long term, and what kind of expansion of this overseas function would you like to see? 2. Does the Secretary believe there would be value in having more cross-training between consular officers and, for example, CBP border inspectors? 3. Would the Secretary support creation of a new entity that fused more than the HAS does the consular function at State with the border screening function within DHS at CBP?

QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEW OF SECRETARY RIDGE

WHITE HOUSE SERVICE/HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL 1. Please discuss the lessons that you learned about homeland security during your

2.

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tenure as the President's homeland security advisor before you became secretary of the department. What did you determine was the appropriate role for the White House in coordinating efforts to protect against threats to the homeland when you were in the White House? How have your views changed over the past year while you have served as secretary? A March 2004 RAND paper, "Coordinating the War on Terrorism," argues that the existence of the NSC, HSC and their supporting interagency committees leads to "complex interactions and a blurring of lines of responsibility." Do you agree? Does it make sense to have both a Homeland Security Council and a National Security Council? What is right and wrong with this two-council structure? How do you interact with other principals - for instance with Secretary Thompson on bio-terrorism, with Attorney General Ashcroft or Director Mueller on integrating watch lists and communicating with state and local government officials - inside and outside the White House process? How do you (and the Department) interact with the National Director for Combating Terrorism (Townsend), the HSC (Gordon), the NSC (Rice) and the interagency working groups? Are any structural changes anticipated with Gordon's departure? Who has the lead during an alert? Please explain the interagency process leading up to a decision to elevate the threat level or alert the public to a threat. Who does what? How has the process evolved from 9/11? Over the New Year the federal government appeared to be on a heightened threat level but not the cpuntry as a whole, will this become the norm? Where are interagency connections and coordination processes working well? Where do stovepipes and problems persist? Do you agree with the recent National Journal article that reported the Administration sees terrorism as a problem to be fought "over there" and is giving insufficient attention to readiness and defense against terrorism at home? Why or why not?

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

How does the Department (and how do you) receive, consume, analyze and use intelligence? Who is your primary intelligence advisor? What are the best sources of intelligence you receive each day? Specifically, how do you grade intelligence you receive from the FBI, the CIA, and the various elements of the Department of Homeland Security?

2. The Bureau of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Analysis was considered by many in the Congress to be the most innovative and important entity authorized within the new department - yet it is widely regarded to have been one of the weakest aspects of DHS so far: short-staffed; high turnover of leadership; unable to make a comprehensive assessment of infrastructure vulnerabilities; its function usurped in part by the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. What is your assessment of the IA/IP today? What do you see it realistically achieving in five years? ' 3. DHS has its own intelligence centers (e.g., TA/TP3^f!nast. Guard, and-Secret Service) and participates in TTIC and the I^orist Screening Center. JgBI has a Counterterrorism Division. NORTHCOM has a msion^enteTurCoIorado. Who sees to it that all these centers work together? What is your general philosophy on this? Do we need this many or more intelligence centers to increase coverage and to promote specialized analysis, such as with transportation modes; or do we need to consolidate intelligence functions and centers to avoid duplication and stovepiping? 4. How is the DHS integrating outside of Washington? Has the Department been able to put in place an integrated regional office structure? What kind of coordination mechanisms does the Department have with state, local, tribal and private_sect.nr entities?' What is working, what IS notY~~ ~~ 5. How is the Department equipped to manage its functions that must takejjlace in the international context? Who coordinates internatjnnal^affajrs at the Department? How is this coordinated with the State Department? In May 6 testimony before the Select Committee on Homeland Security, Deputy Secretary Loy mentioned his concern whether "high-consequence areas like nuclear, biological and cyber are properly organized and recognized in the department." Do you agree with Admiral Loy? Who in DHS (and elsewhere in the government) is worrying about catastrophic and "high consequence" attacks? What are they doing about them? Current law requires the Transportation Security Administration to remain intact for two years but allows the agency to be restructured after that time. What, if any, restructuring options are currently being considered for TS A, and why? 8. Do you think the Department is too big to succeed? Do you believe a case can be made for spinning off some of the entities that are part of this unprecedented merger? What would be gained or lost? 9. Given that many of the security measures of the future, including a new CAPPS II program, depend on proper identification, what is your view on whether we are doing enough to tighten the process for acquiring government-issued ID's, including breeder documents such as birth certificates, social security cards, driver's licenses? 10. A psychological study of the aftermath of September 11 performed by researchers at Carnegie Mellon University found that Americans vastly overestimated the risk of terrorism during that period. Professor Jennifer Lerner said that, "There was an overwhelming overestimation of risk." She went on to indicate that the government and media can unwittingly alter risk perception by making people

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either fearful or angry, and that, if used responsibly, information could be used to better communicate the actual degree of risk. • Given that the primary goal of terrorists is to create terror, could the government have done a better job in communicating with the public about terrorist threats before, during and after September 11,2001? • What has DHS done in trying to balance the need to promote continued vigilance, with the need to combat the "terror" of terrorism? • What more could or should be done in this respect? 11. What are your views on the Congressional oversight of the Department? Where is oversight being conducted constructively? Are there any advantages to the House's approach with its select committee over the Senate's approach where Government Affairs appears to have the main role in oversight but no new entity was created? What about in the appropriations process? 12. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) has recommended that the public sector standards produced for the National Fire ProJeetiolfAssociation should serve as the basis for similar private sector standards to use in setting up their emergency preparedness and continuity o£business standards. Would the Department consider encouraging the private'sector to-^dopt these standards? 13. There are a multitude of issues concerning border and immigration policy. [PLACEHOLDER TO BE FILLED BY TEAM 5]
OTHER TOPICS

1. What are the urgent problems in homeland security that no one is talking about or thinking about right now? 2. Are there any other issues we should discuss? 3. What recommendations should the 9-11 Commission make to have the greatest impact on homeland security?

Questions for Secretary Ridge 1. What is the value of the Homeland Security Council in the day to day activities of the Department, especially the border security issues? Help or hindrance? 2. Are you confident that Congress will stick by US VISIT and mandate and fund the program that you think is needed? 3. Do you envision that the eventual US VISIT-based border screening system ~ which would encompass the border process from visa through naturalization ~ would also incorporate TSA information on passenger travel? 4. Deputy Secretary Loy told us that he thought a border policy group at the Deputy Secretary level would be useful to coordinate CIS and BTS interests, and technology issues that transcend the individual agencies. What is the status of building a policy unit? 5. What do you see as the overall mission of ICE at DHS? 6. As you know we learned that a legacy INS inspector was the only inspector to turn away a potential hijacker. He did so based on an intimate knowledge of immigration law, backed up by supervisors versed in immigration law. Are you concerned that virtually all senior field positions have been assigned to legacy Customs officials who are not trained in immigration law and yet are responsible decisions on removals such as Kahtani's? / ' 7. What do you see as the biggest obstacles to further collaboration with Canada, Mexico and the Europeans on border security issues? What should be done to move cooperation with the Europeans forward? Mexico? 8. With your new authority over visa policy, have you and the Department of State conducted an assessment of visa policy? Do you think changes are needed?

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Dan Marcus
From: Sent: To: Cc: Chris Kojm Wednesday, May 12, 2004 8:33 AM Lee Hamilton Front Office; Emily Walker

Subject: ANSI recommendation: Talking points for the Tom Ridge meeting Lee - At some point in the Ridge meeting, or immediately afterward, we would like you to hand Ridge the draft recommendation from the American National Standards Institute. Emily will provide it to you. The talking points are pretty straightforward: Mr. Secretary, we've asked the American National Standards Institute to give the Commission some recommendations on emergency preparedness. This group, ANSI, has now provided us with a recommendation for a voluntary standard on private sector emergency preparedness. We have come to no judgment as a Commission, but we will look at this recommendation very seriously. It builds on work by DHS. DHS people participated in the process when ANSI held meetings to try to build a consensus with interested parties, including many from the private sector. Your support for this recommendation would give it some very important traction. We don't want to ask you about it today, but we will want to ask you your views on this recommendation when you testify before the Commission next week.

5/12/2004

Page 2 of2
Original Message From: Kevin Scheid Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 10:32 AM To: Team 2 Subject: FW: Pre-Meeting for Ridge meeting FYI... Attached are questions for Ridge that Warren proposed. If you have any additional questions, comments, issues please send them directly to Chris Healey. Thanks. KJS

Original Message From: Christine Healey Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 10:27 AM To: Kevin Scheid Subject: FW: Pre-Meeting for Ridge meeting

Original Message From: Warren Bass Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 9:56 AM To: Christine Healey Cc: Mike Hurley Subject: FW: Pre-Meeting for Ridge meeting

Here you go, Chris—sorry to be late on this. (Was stuck in writing hell yesterday, and it just slipped my addled mind.) Ridge isn't a huge deal for us, but we've got a few things. Our basic question is: how does DHS lash up with the rest of the post-g/ii CT structure? Beyond • • • • • • • • • • • • that: How does Ridge interact with other principals? Who has the lead during an alert? Who does what? What stovepipes still persist? How far are we from having a functioning, truly integrated DHS? Our impression is that it's still a mess. How does DHS interact with the NSC, including OCT and what's become of the CSG? How does Ridge interact with Fran Townsend at NSC? How does the White House Homeland Security Council interact with DHS? What's right/wrong with this system? How does DHS receive, consume, analyze, and use intel? What's Ridge's daily intel take? How does the DHS budget process work? How does the DHS oversight process work? How much of Ridge's time is spent before congressional committees? Does DHS have an ability to do "red team" planning? How does it try to anticipate attacks and identify vulnerabilities?

5/12/2004

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